(1) Mercado v.
De Vera
Facts:
The Petition for disbarment filed by Mercado and Sons, and the spouses
Mercado against Atty. De Vera and Atty. Bandalan, the former Regional
Trial Court Judge of Davao City, Branch 14, is an offshoot of Civil Case for
the "dissolution/liquidation of conjugal partnership, among others with
damages, and attorney’s fees" filed by Rosario P. Mercado against her
husband Jesus K. Mercado, Mercado and Sons, and Stanfilco. The case was
assigned to the sala of then Judge Bandalan, and representing R. Mercado
was Atty. De Vera.
The case was decided by Judge Bandalan in favor of R. Mercado where she
was awarded the sum of a little over P9 million.
Unfortunately, however, R. Mercado, during the pendency of the appeal by
Jesus Mercado and Mercado and Sons, terminated the services of Atty. De
Vera, offering the amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She, at
the same time, demanded an accounting and the turn-over of the money still
in the possession of Atty. De Vera. The latter refused to heed the demand,
claiming that pursuant to the decision, he should, in fact, be entitled to
P2,254,217.00 by way of attorney's fees. Failing to recover what she had felt
was lawfully due to her, R. Mercado filed disbarment proceedings against
Atty. de Vera.
Issue: Whether or not the retention of the Attys Fees in excess of P350,
000.00 by Atty. De Vera was proper
Ruling:
No, Atty. Mercado was duty bound to turn over and render a full accounting
of what he received in satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of Mrs.
Mercado.
While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer
pursuant to Canon 16, Rule 16.03, is nevertheless entitled to be duly
compensated for professional services rendered so as to pay so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements.
In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees with the
lawyer in the amount of attorney's fees. In case of a disagreement, or when
the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer for being
unconscionable, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his
possession to the payment of his fees; instead, the lawyer should file, if he
still deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion with the
proper court to fix the amount of his attorney's fees. 
Regrettably in his case, Atty. De Vera would appear to have indeed gone
over the bounds of propriety when he refused to turn-over to his client the
amount in excess of the P350,000.00 he was, in effect, allowed to retain. His
disagreement with the client, of course, entitled him to take proper legal steps
in order to recover what he might feel to be his just due but, certainly, it was
not a matter that he could take into his own hands.
Penaltry:
Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera was SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months and he was further DIRECTED to return to Rosario
K. Mercado the amount in his possession in excess of P350,000.00,
without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his
unsatisfied attorney's fees, if any.

(6) Malvar v. Kraff Food G.R. No. 183952
FACTS:
Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against
KFPI and Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal,
and ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of her full backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus attorney’s fees. NLRC and
CA affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. After the judgment in her
favor became final and executory, Malvar moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution but the execution failed due to questionable computation of the
award. Malvar requested for the 2nd issuance of the writ of execution and
was partially complied with but with protest on the part of Kraft by filing a
TRO for further execution since the computation is incorrect.
CA ruled in favor of Kraft. Thus, Malvar appealed. While her appeal was
pending in the Supreme Court, Malvar and the respondents entered into a
compromise agreement. Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw Case praying that the appeal be immediately
dismissed/withdrawn in view of the compromise agreement, and that the case
be considered closed and terminated. Before the Court could act on Malvar’s
Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the Court received a Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights from the Law Firm of Dasal, Llasos
and Associates, through its Of Counsel Retired Supreme Court Associate
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo (Intervenor), whereby the Intervenor sought,
among others, that both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly
and severally the Intervenor’s contingent fees. The Intervenor indicated that
Malvar’s precipitate action had baffled, shocked and even embarrassed the
Intervenor, because it had done everything legally possible to serve and
protect her interest. It added that it could not recall any instance of conflict or
misunderstanding with her, for, on the contrary, she had even commended it
for its dedication and devotion to her case. According to the Intervenor, it
was certain that the compromise agreement was authored by the respondents
to evade a possible loss as a result of the labor litigation and, they saw the
Intervenor as a major stumbling block to the compromise agreement that it
was then brewing with her. Obviously, the only way to remove the
Intervenor was to have her terminate its services as her legal counsel. This
prompted the Intervenor to bring the matter to the attention of the Court to
enable it to recover in full its compensation based on its written agreement
with her. Opposing the Motion for Intervention,Malvar stresses that there
was no truth to the Intervenor’s claim to defraud it of its professional fees;
that the Intervenor lacked the legal capacity to intervene because it had
ceased to exist. Malvar adds that even assuming, arguendo, that the
Intervenor still existed as a law firm, it was still not entitled to intervene for
the following reasons, namely: firstly, it failed to attend to her multiple pleas
and inquiries regarding the case: secondly, maintaining that this was a
justifiable cause to dismiss its services, the Intervenor only heeded her
repeated demands to withdraw from the case when Atty. Dasal was
confronted about his appointment to the government subsidiary; thirdly, it
was misleading and grossly erroneous for the Intervenor to claim that it had
rendered to her full and satisfactory services when the truth was that its
participation was strictly limited to the preparation, finalization and
submission of the petition for review with the Supreme Court; and finally,
while the Intervenor withdrew its services on October 5, 2009, the
compromise agreement was executed with the respondents on December 9,
2010 and notarized on December 14, 2010, after more than a year and two
months, dispelling any badge of bad faith on their end.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s
rights can prosper, and, if so, how much could it recover as attorney’s fees.
RULING: Yes. A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties
undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or put an end to one
already commenced. The client may enter into a compromise agreement with
the adverse party to terminate the litigation before a judgment is rendered
therein. If the compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary
to law, morals, good customs and public policy, its judicial approval is in
order. A compromise agreement, once approved by final order of the court,
has the force of res judicata between the parties and will not be disturbed
except for vices of consent or forgery.
A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the
intervention of the attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have
exclusive control over the subject matter of the litigation and may at any
time, if acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of court
before judgment, even without the attorney’s intervention. It is important for
the client to show, however, that the compromise agreement does not
adversely affect third persons who are not parties to the agreement.
 Firm, represented by Retired Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, its
stipulated contingent fees of 10% of ₱41,627,593.75, and the further sum
By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-
equivalent to 10% of the value of the stock option. No pronouncement on
client relationship at any time with or without cause. But this right of the
costs of suit.
client is not unlimited because good faith is required in terminating the
relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code, which
mandates that “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.” The right is also subject to the right of the
attorney to be compensated. This is clear from Section 26, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, which provides: Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An
attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the
written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time
from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the
name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be
given to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he
shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in
the contract.
However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the
case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney
shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained by the client. (Bold emphasis
supplied) In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive
a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special
instance and request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good faith
and honesty in representing and serving the interests of the client should be
reasonably compensated for his service.
WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise agreement;
GRANTS the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights; and
ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents Kraft Food Philippines Inc.
and Kraft Foods International to jointly and severally pay to Intervenor Law

(7) Lingan v. Calubagnib AC No. 5277
FACTS:  reiterated that the position of Regional Director/Attorney VI requires the
The resolution of the Supreme Court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and
Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer’s Oath when they allowed
their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections
245 and 246 of the Notarial Law. For this reason, the Supreme suspended
them from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial
commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public
for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, praying
that respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law
but was dismissed for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office, filed an undated ex parte clarificatory
pleading with leave of court. In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty.
Baliga alleged that the complainant Lingan wrote a letter to the Commission
on Human Rights requesting the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga
following the latter’s suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution suspending him
from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the Commission on Human
Rights Regional Office. According to the Commission on Human Rights En
Banc, Atty. Baliga’s suspension from the practice of law “prevented] [him]
from assuming his post as Regional Director for want of eligibility in the
meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended.”
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with
his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According
to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his
suspension from public office.
Atty. Baliga further claimed that he did not practice law while he held his
position as Regional Director and only performed generally managerial
functions. Complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to
defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the
functions of a “lawyer-manager,” which under the landmark case
of Cayetano v. Monsod constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan
officer “to be a lawyer [in] good standing.” Moreover, as admitted by Atty.
Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. That
being a “lawyer-manager,” Atty. Baliga, therefore, practiced law while he
held his position as Regional Director.
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment arguing that “the
penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and
distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public official
for the same acts.” According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga’s suspension
from the practice of law is a “bar matter” while the imposition of penalty
upon a Commission on Human Rights official “is an entirely different thing,
falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the Commission as
disciplining body.” Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would
defer to this court’s resolution of the issue and would “abide by whatever
ruling or decision this court arrives at on the matter.”
ISSUE: WON the duties of a Regional Director of CHR constitutes practice
of law.
HELD:
YES. The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created
under the Constitution with power to investigate “all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights” within the territorial
jurisdiction of its regional offices.
Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the
position of Attorney VI whose powers and functions are the characteristics of
the legal profession and which require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
For this reason, the exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the
Regional Director must be an attorney — a member of the bar in good
standing and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses
this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the
position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist
from holding the position of Regional Director.

OTHER POINTERS IN THE CASE

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April
13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as
Regional Director/Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. The Commission cannot, by mere
resolutions and other issuances, modify or defy this court’s orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human
Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees, it can only retain
those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and
Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision
of CHR Assistance, the Regional Director has the following powers and
functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to “[Commission on
Human Rights] matters;”
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices; 
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights
complaints in the absence of the legal officer or investigator; 
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and
discuss “immediate courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible
submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution”; 
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices,
letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the
regional office; and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by
the legal officer. 

(11) Letter dated February 21, 2005 AM No. 05-3-04 FC
FACTS:
In a letter to the Chief Justice, with copies thereof furnished all the Associate
Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC judges and counsels
listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as "member,
Philippine Bar", expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of
and the manner by which the Court resolved the cases filed by him. In said
letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the
dismissal of the very first case he filed with the Court, UDK-12854, entitled
Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Frustrated with the adverse
ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter addressed to the
Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the
Court.
Reacting to his letter, the Supreme Court, in an en banc Resolution required
Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly disciplined "for
degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using vile,
offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it". In
response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more
letters to the Court arguing for the propriety of his action and practically
lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics and
Constitutional Law.
In an en banc Resolution, the Court again required Atty. Sorreda to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices. By way of compliance to the
second "show cause" order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter again with copies
thereof furnished the Justices, judges and lawyers thereunder listed, states
that he "does not see the need to say any more" because the "cause" has
"already been shown as clear as day" in his earlier letter, adding that "The
need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly decisively".
While admitting "the great seriousness of the statements and imputations he
has leveled against the Court", Atty. Sorreda dared the Court whether "it is
capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the ‘Supreme Judge’".
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Atty. Sorreda constitute direct
contempt of court.
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Sorreda’s disrespectful conduct as well as his unfounded
accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring
it into disrepute constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie
curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
justice. No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the
country’s highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and
democracy.
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice, to which his client’s success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of
judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured
tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment
and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of
justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy
one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this
Court and its magistrates.
We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether
in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious
doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.
(12) Andres v. Cabrera G.R. No. 585
FACTS:
Respondent Stanley R. Cabrera was a successful Bar examinee in 1977.
Petitioner Atty. Emilia E. Andres, on the other hand, was a legal officer in the
Ministry of Labor, and the investigator who recommended the dismissal of the
case filed by Cabrera’s mother.
Upon the dismissal of his mother’s case, Cabrera to filed against the
Atty. Andres, criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents,
falsification of public documents, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Atty. Andres then filed a petition for the denial of Cabrera’s
admission as member of the Bar on the ground of lack of good moral character
as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in civil language to the
extent of being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise,
for his proclivity in filing baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases.
As such, the Court required Cabrera to file an answer to why he should
not be disqualified and ordered, at the same time, that his oath-taking be held in
abeyance. In his answer, Cabrera admits the filing of criminal cases against Atty.
Andres but denied that his language was vile, uncouth, and uncivil due to the
simple reason that the same is the truth and was made with good intentions and
justifiable motives. Cabrera’s Answer, however, repeats the use of unfit language
by calling Atty. Andres a “moron”, among others.
Because of Cabrera’s persistence of using abusive and vituperative
language, the Court resolved to defer his oath-taking pending showing that he
has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil
language. His subsequent motions, however, show that Cabrera still persists in
using unfit, highly disrespectful as well as insolent language. For this reason, the
Court resolved to require Cabrera to show cause why he should not be cited and
punished for contempt of court. Cabrera then answered the citation for contempt
against him by apologizing to the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cabrera should not be cited and punished for contempt
of court.
RULING:
Yes, Cabrera should be cited and punished for contempt of court.
Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now
stands at the threshold thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is
as much his duty as every attorney-at-law already admitted to the practice of law
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138).
According to the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and
clamor. This duty is likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer such as
the respondent for the attorney's oath solemnly enjoins him to "conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client”.
Because of all of these, Cabrera is, therefore, guilty of contempt for his
improper conduct in the use of highly disrespectful, insolent language in which
he has tended to degrade the administration of justice, and has disparaged the
dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court.
(13) Soller v. COMELEC G.R. No. 139853
FACTS:
Ferdinand Thomas Soller and Angel Saulong were both candidates for
Mayor of the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 1998
elections.
Soller was proclaimed by the municipal board of canvassers as the duly
elected mayor. Such victory prompted Saulong to file with the COMELEC a
petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return. On
May 25, 1998, Saulong also filed an election protest before the RTC. On
June 15, 1998, Soller filed his answer to the RTC with counter protest. Soller
moved to dismiss Saulong’s protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
forum- shopping and failure to state a cause of action. On July 3, 1998, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition filed by Saulong. On the other hand, the
RTC denied Soller’s motion to dismiss. Soller then filed a petition for
certiorari with the COMELEC contending that the RTC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the election
protest.
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. Hence, this suit.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has jurisdiction over Soller’s
petition
2. Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private
respondent's election protest.
HELD:
1. No. Sarmiento v. COMELEC applies. The SC held that the authority to
resolve a petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest,
like the questioned order of the trial court falls within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC by division and not en banc and any decision by the Commission
en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and
void.
2. Yes. Close scrutiny of the receipts will show that Angel Saulong failed to
pay the filing fee of P300.00 for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC
rules. A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee. Patently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
to dismiss Saulong’s election protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in
not ordering the dismissal of Saulong’s protest case. The SC also held that
the verification of the protest was defective. Since the petition lacked proper
verification, it should be treated as an unsigned pleading and must be
dismissed. The protest likewise failed to comply with the required
certification against forum shopping. Saulong successively filed a petition for
annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return and an election
protest. Yet, he did not disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a
petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
(16) Ramos v. Manalac 89 Phil 27
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari was filed seeking annulment of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan regarding a foreclosed parcel of land.
Petitioners question the validity of the CFI ruling that they will be held in
contempt for refusing to vacate the land.
The petitioners claim that those petitioners were not properly served with
summons of the case, while facts of the case show that, the summons was
served only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own
behalf and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his
appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf.
The said property, being collateral for a loan to a Mr. Rivera, was foreclosed
due to non-payment of loan amount and its interest within the prescribed
periods. Mr. Rivera later sold the property to Ms. Lopez, who later filed
petition that she be placed in possession of the land.
The petitioners question the ruling of the court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not term “appearance” would include only presence in courts.
HELD:
No, the word or term “appearance” includes not only arguing a case before
any such body but also filing a pleading in behalf of a client as “by simply
filing a formal motion, plea or answer”.
While the Supreme Court granted for the sake of argument that petitioners
were not properly served with summons, as they claim, the defect in the
service was cured when the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered
the complaint thru their attorney of record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared
in their behalf in all stages of the case.
Since Attorney Maiquez who appeared for the petitioners must be presumed
to have been authorized by them when he appeared in their behalf in all the
stages of the case. The security and finality of judicial proceedings require
that the evasions and tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be
received with undue favor to overcome such presumption (Tan
Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This is specially so when, as in the instant
case, it is only after the lapse of more than nine (9) years after the judgment
has been rendered those petitioners thought of challenging the jurisdiction of
the court.

(17) Zeta v. Malinao AM No. P-220
Fact:
A complaint against the Respondent Malinao, a court interpreter, was lodged
in the CFI by a person named Julio Zeta. The complainant alleged that the
respondent, not a member of the bar, appears in multiple occasion in various
courts, thus, constitute illegal practice of Law. Also, as a court employee, he
falsifies his time sheet as present but in reality, is absent to appear in various
cases. Subpoena was sent to the Complaint to attend the hearing of the
complaint but was found the complainant is a fictitious person.
Upon on the other hand, Mainao argued that his participation defendants'
cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by
reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality"
Issue:
Whether or not Malinao is guilty of the illegal practice of law even if the
complainant is a fictious person?
Held:
Yes, SC find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply
supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public
records and the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had
appeared.
It is clear that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various
municipal courts without prior permission of his superiors in violation of
civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by
making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions when
in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a
member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law.
We, therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator. The
defense of respondent that “his participation (sic) for defendants’ cause was
gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of
poverty and the absence of one in the locality” cannot, even if true, carry the
day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record
of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question.
Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above
circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice. In the premises,
it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by
Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the service,
with the admonition that he desists from appearing in any court or
investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
(18) Noriega v. Sison AM No. 2266
FACTS:  No.
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that
Sison, as a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission, is not
allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet Sison created another
identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in private
practice and represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his answer, admitted that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing
but the same is with the permission of the SEC Commissioner. He further
argued that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer and
he only provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family
friendship and for free.
Anent the creation of another identity in the person of “Manuel Sison”, Atty.
Sison he never represented himself deliberately and intentionally as “Atty.
Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his
appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison”,
and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court
staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”. Unfortunately, however, due to
the “inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were
sent in the name of “Atty. Manuel Sison”,
ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
HELD: 
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof.
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 
In this case, the arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed
by evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of
the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison has committed an act constituting
deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful
disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully
appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to do so. His
isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private practice of law,
more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance
because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends. Such act of Sison in
going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be
allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment against him.

(19) PCGG v. Sandiganbayan GR no. 151809
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite
the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes.
The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of
GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying
for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as
mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the
PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his
family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against
respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned
respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor
General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that
Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in
the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued
a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It
failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service.”
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when
he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of
“matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the
matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as
SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by
respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
“matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do
not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is
not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG
does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil
case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional
Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not
exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered
as innocuous such as “drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of
law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant
and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of
justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual
court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics:
“ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection
with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in
such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position
as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his
tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule
6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held
public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a
lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting
“engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the service.

(20) OCA v. Atty. Liangco AC No. 5355
Case No. 10 CANON 10 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
VS. ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO A.C. No. 5355 / December 13, 2011 Per
Curiam:
Facts: Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun was in open and adverse
possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His family's
house was erected on the land. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his
parents. However, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own
the same lot. The Sangguniang Bayan issued a Resolution stating that the
subject lot is owned by the Municipal Government of San Luis, Pampanga
and that the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise in it.
Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan,
filed with the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief
wherein respondent Atty. Daniel Liangco was the judge. On that same day of
the filing of petition, Judge Liangco issued a resolution effecting the eviction
of Gozun and all other persons in the subject lot, even without serving
summons or giving notice of the petition for declaratory relief to complainant
Gozun. Agents of the municipal government demolished Gozun’s house,
using respondent judge's resolution and the mayor's executive order as basis.
Gozun then filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator, alleging that respondent judge's issuance of the resolution
amounts to "gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence”.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Liangco be disbarred for misconduct as a
member of the bar?
Ruling: The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the
case, there was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the
disbarment of respondent.
It was observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-
established rules and procedures, that the present complaint was not the first
of its kind to be filed against him, and that before his dismissal from the
judiciary, respondent was suspended for 6 months, and that he still has
pending administrative cases for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and
direct bribery. The IBP found that respondent had acted with manifest bias
and partiality in favor of a party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of
the Rules of Procedure.
In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief
filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the
mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. As judge of
a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction
to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to
know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the
absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he in effect erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our
courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and
responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that
he as a member of the bar should know.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer
must uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.
Contrary to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic
constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property without
due process of law.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe
the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the
powers of the court to inflict injustice. Wherefore, the Court resolved to
disbar Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for gross misconduct and inexcusable
ignorance of the law.
(21) Rillaroza v. Eastern Telecom 308 SCRA 566
DOCTRINE: Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a
reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional
services.” “A lawyer has the right to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client, which compensation must be reasonable.” A lawyer
would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated,
the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.
FACTS:
Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented by the
law firm SAGA, filed with the Regional Trial court a complaint for the
recovery or revenue shares against PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, a partner of the
firm, appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount. The
latter was dissolved and the junior partners formed RADA, which took over
as counsel in the case for ETPI. ETPI signed a retainer agreement with
counsel wherein it was stated that in cases of collection or judicial action,
“our attorney’s fees shall be 15% of the amounts collected or the value of the
property acquired or liability saved.” The retainer agreement was terminated
in 1988. the next day, RADA filed a notice of attorney’s lien. In its notice,
RADA informed the court that there were negotiations toward a compromise
between ETPI and PLDT.
In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the same
was entered as a judgment. The petitioner (RADA) filed a motion for the
enforcement of attorney’s lien.
ISSUE: Is RADA entitled to the awards of attorney’s fees they are
claiming?
HELD:
RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees but the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the court of origin for the determination of the amount of
attorney’s fees to which the petitioner is entitled.
Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI
terminated the law firm’s services in 1988. Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s
fees hinges on two grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally
handled the case when he was working for SAGA, and second, the retainer
agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a
reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional
services.” “A lawyer has the right to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client, which compensation must be reasonable.” A lawyer
would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated,
the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit, meaning 'as much as he deserved' is used as a
basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a
contract but recoverable by him from his client. 19 Recovery of attorney's
fees on the basis of quantum meruit  is authorized when (1) there is no
express contract for payment of attorney's fees agreed upon between the
lawyer and the client; (2) when although there is a formal contract for
attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable
by the court; and (3) when the contract for attorney's fee's is void due to
purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the counsel, for justifiable
cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when lawyer and
client disregard the contract for attorney's fees,  
 In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by
a lawyer on the basis of  quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are
generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the
extent of services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer.
A determination of these factors would indispensably require nothing less
than a full-blown trial where private respondents can adduce evidence to
establish the right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or
refute the same. The trial court has the principal task of fixing the amount of
attorney's fees.
(22) Abella v. Banitor Jr. AM No.7332
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals
involving a Labor Case. Complainant then filed a Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch which the
respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5) months,
complainant’s motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second
Motion for Execution.
However, still, there was no action until the complainant agreed to give
respondent a portion of the monetary award thereof after the latter asked
from the former how much would be his share. Thereafter, respondent issued
a writ of execution but the employer of the complainant moved to quash the
said writ. Eventually, issued a new writ of execution wherein complainant’s
monetary awards were reduced to the effect that it modifies the DECISION
of the CA. Complainant now filed the instant disbarment complaint before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from
complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong
decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T, complainant’s employer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code.
HELD:
Yes. To note, “the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession.” This proceeds from the
lawyer’s duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard
the Bar’s integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer,
be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral, character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, it is
sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to re-compute
the monetary awards due to the complainant who sought to execute the CA
Decision which had already been final and executory. When complainant
moved for execution – twice at that – respondent slept on the same for more
than a year. It was only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit
that the latter speedily issued a writ of execution. Based on these incidents,
the Court observes that the sudden dispatch in respondent’s action soon after
the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that
he did not extort money from the complainant. Lamentably, respondent tried
to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision,
propounding that the CA’s award of separation pay denied complainant’s
entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits altogether.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of
the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads the line of
grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. On the other hand, gross misconduct
constitutes “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment.”
Thus, as respondent’s violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct
and gross misconduct, his disbarment should come as a matter of course.
However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been
disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v.
Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore precludes the Court from
duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems
it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 in order to
penalize respondent’s transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter
the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.
(24) Areola v. Mendoza
Facts:
 Areola alleged that during Prisoners’ Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the
Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the
Regional Trial Court where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture.
Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
“O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay
maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang
makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay
o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge
Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang
kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon.”
 Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all
detainees should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so
that she may know the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give
her the necessary payment for their transcript of stenographic notes.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct or the code
professional responsibility
Ruling:
 Yes, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the
judge and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This
admission corresponds to one of Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza—
that she told her clients “Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain
na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.” Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the
judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging
and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.
 As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty.
Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02
and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate
of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule
15.07 states that “a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness.”
(25) Dumagdag v. Lumaya
FACTS:
On February 26, 1990, the OSG submitted a Report finding respondent
culpable for infidelity and disloyalty to his client, negligence of duty,
unethical practices and violation of his lawyers’ oath. As penalty, the OSG
recommended that after due hearing, "respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than five (5) years.
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 21, 19916 the Court found that
respondent made a "clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility"
and suspended respondent indefinitely from the practice of law.
A "Petition For Reinvestigation and Reconsideration," filed on July 8, 1991,
was subsequently denied by the Court per its Resolution dated January 13,
1992.
The records show that thereafter, respondent sent a letter dated February 17,
1992.11 Stressing in the said letter that he was not seeking a reconsideration
of the denial of his petition for reinvestigation, respondent averred in sum
that he was a "not very healthy" sixty-two (62) year old who merely wanted
to know how long he would stay suspended and if he was disqualified to be
issued a commission as a notary public considering that his commission was
not renewed. This letter was noted by the Court in a Resolution dated March
30,1992.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed a Manifestation dated May 15, 199213
where he prayed that the Court issue a resolution or decision on his
averments that: for lack of practicing lawyers and notaries public in the
Municipality of Baganga, Davao Oriental where Branch VII of the Regional
Trial Court and the Second Municipal Court set a popular public clamor
which constrained the undersigned to file the manifestation.
Issue: Whether or not Atty Lumaya is guilty for the breach of the canons of
professional responsibility and entitled to suspension.
Ruling:
Yes. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of
the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This
authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as
well xxx That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its
members.
As has been stated earlier, the indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension puts
in his hands the key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a
lawyer. Until such time as he has purged himself of his misconduct and
acknowledged the same by exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded from every member of the bar and officer of
the court, respondents’ suspension must deservingly be fixed at ten (10)
years. Consequently, the same may only be lifted after the expiration of the
said period, counted from the time when his suspension actually commenced.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the period of respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law is hereby fixed at Ten (10) Years. The
"Petition For The Lifting Of Respondents Suspension From The Practice Of
Law" is, therefore, DENIED
(26) GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 | February 3, 2015
FACTS:
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and
his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case,
Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years
old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When
Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed a
Second Amended Complaint against him.
Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No.
CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged
that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should
not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was
commuted and the phrase “with the inherent accessory penalties provided by
law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not
deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence.
Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral
turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by
extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing
Garcia’s daughters in court.
ISSUES:
WON conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
RATIO:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve
moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in
every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation
of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. 
While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala
in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which
involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore,
that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning
of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the
cases are reached.
The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at
the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the
indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of
Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored
his full civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster
his argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an absolute and
unconditional pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a
circumstance not present in these cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did
not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the
President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive
clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and
6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio.
Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially
extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never
wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he
was released from prison.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow
men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
(27) Fernando v. Guico AC No. 10573
1. Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to
counsel Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a
favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law against
bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually
using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the
client that he soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His
acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant
breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to
delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant
conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer
as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased
to be a servant of the law. Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct
and disgraced the Legal Profession.
FACTS: Complainant Chu retained Respondent Guico as counsel to handle
the labor disputes involving his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz
Corporation (CVC). Guico’s legal services included handling a complaint for
illegal dismissal. According to Chu, during a Christmas party held at Atty.
Guico’s residence, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amount of
money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure
a favorable decision. Months later, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that
he had raised PhP 300,000.00 for the purpose and which he later delivered to
the latter’s law office. In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Guico then handed
Chua a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. Atty.
Guico told Chu to raise another PhP 300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC
Commissioner to issue the decision but Chu could only produce PhP
280,000.00, which he again brought to Atty. Guico’s office. Finally, the
NLRC issued an adverse decision against Chu’s company and there was no
other recourse but to file an appeal to the CA. In response to the
administrative complaint, Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint
as replete with lies and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only
meant for harassment. He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu,
a denial that Atty. Guico’s assistant Nardo corroborated with his own
affidavit. He further denied handing to Chu a draft decision printed on used
paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used paper must have
been among those freely lying around in his office that had been pilfered by
Chu’s witnesses in the criminal complaint he had handled for Chu. IBP
Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the CPRL and recommended his disbarment
from the practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors, however, adopted
leniency and reduced the penalty to three (3) years suspension.
ISSUE Whether or not Respondent Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the CPRL for demanding and receiving a
huge sum of money from his client to guarantee a favorable decision from
the NLRC. (YES)
RULING:
Yes, By the acts committed by Atty. Guico, he has transgressed the
parameters of conduct and ethics as embodied in the CPRL.
2. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the
complainant to establish respondent attorney’s liability by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this Court has
consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify the
imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty.
Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses, and presented the draft
decision that Atty. Guico had represented to him as having come from the
NLRC. Chu credibly insisted that the draft decision was printed on the dorsal
portion of used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office, inferring that
Atty. Guico commonly printed documents on used paper in his law office.
Despite denying being the source of the draft decision presented by Chu,
Atty. Guico’s participation in the generation of the draft decision was
undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chu’s insistence by
conceding that the used paper had originated from his office, claiming only
that used paper was just “scattered around his office.”
3. The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and
his witnesses, espe-cially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu
the supposed draft decision… sufficed to confirm that he had
committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and
receiving PhP 580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision.
Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations in his
defense, but such denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony
of Chu. [The Court] cannot but conclude that the production of the
draft decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise
money to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable result in the
labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the
complainant to establish his complaint against Atty. Guico. The
sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a
continuing condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the
Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should
not render any service or give advice to any client that would involve
defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold and obey, for
he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and
thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession.
Verily, he or she must act and comport himself or herself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the
Legal Profession. Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits
his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal
profession. Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in
appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large sums of money in order
to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the
law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by
actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum
from the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal
interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a
flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath
not to delay anruy man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His
deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual
lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he
ceased to be a servant of the law. Atty. Guico committed grave
misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave misconduct is
“improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error
of judgment.” There is no question that any gross misconduct by an
attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to
manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the
penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is
an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the
continuance of such privilege. Accordingly, the recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law
for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be
disbarred, for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his
membership in the legal profession.

(28) Arcatomy Guarin v. Limpia AC No.10576
FACTS:
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief
Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a
member of the Legacy Group of Companies. When he resigned from his
post, he then transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center as the Vice President
for Finance.
Upon on the other hand, The Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI),
another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for
LCI for "updating purposes". The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the
Board of Directors (BOD) and President. Mired with allegations of
anomalous business transactions and practices, LCI applied for voluntary
dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty.
Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him
as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she
knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he
elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never
received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as
Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as
Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a
stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that
the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have
been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary
dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and
submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the
information from the last BOD meeting.
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder because of a text
conversation between her and Guarin. Atty. Limpin asking Guarin to sign a
Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin allegedly responded
in the affirmative but never really signed the instrument.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints
against the directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-
respondents. In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the
November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. Atty. Limpin averred
that this Court held that "when the criminal prosecution based on the same
act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to
avoid contradictory findings." 
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Limpim has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01and
Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Ruling: Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin
has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Yes. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the
CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the
rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who
assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated "[t]he serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is
a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is
that the attorney is innocent of the charges proferred and has performed his
duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath."
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in
Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree
with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the
corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and
be the president of the company. It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and
certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits
that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a
stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained
therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of
Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note
that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin
was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained
false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not
conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
CPR.
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the
business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the
BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the