LEOUEL SANTOS vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA

ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
VITUG, J.

CASE FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Julia first met in Iloilo City. On September 20, 1986,
they exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court in Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter by a church wedding. They lived with Julia’s parents, and on July 18, 1987,
she gave birth to a baby boy. However, petitioner averred because of the frequent
interference by Julia’s parents. Occasionally, they would also start a “quarrel” over a
number of other things.
On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the United States of America to work as a nurse
despite petitioner’s plea to stop her. On January 1, 1989, Julia called up petitioner for
the first time and promised to return home upon expiration the expiration of her contract
in July 1989. But she never did. Petitioner visited the United States and underwent a
training program from April 1 to August 25, 1990, and desperately tried to find Julia but
was of no avail.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, a complaint for
“Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code.” Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental. On May 31, 1991,
respondent Julia opposed the complaint and denied its allegation, and on October 25,
1991, she filed a manifestation stating that she would never appear nor submit
evidence.
On November 1991, the Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeal, and later affirmed the trial court decision.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that respondent’s failure to return home or communicate with
petitioner for more than five years is considered as psychologically incapacitated to
enter into married life.

RULING:
No, the Family Code did not define the term “psychological incapacity.” It cannot
be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
percepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, “psychological incapacity” should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
 Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions
of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to
the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably,
petitioner stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem.
Hence, petition was denied.