The Art of War

Study Guide by Course Hero

What's Inside
j Book Basics ................................................................................................. 1
a Main Ideas ................................................................................................... 2
d In Context .................................................................................................... 2
a Author Biography ..................................................................................... 6
h Characters ................................................................................................... 7
k Plot Summary ............................................................................................. 8
c Chapter Summaries ............................................................................... 11
g Quotes ........................................................................................................ 23
l Symbols ..................................................................................................... 26
m Glossary ..................................................................................................... 26
b Commentaries on The Art of War ................................................. 27
b Various Translations of The Art of War ..................................... 27
e Suggested Reading .............................................................................. 28
The Art of War (Sun Tzǔ on the Art of War: The Oldest Military
Treatise in the World) is probably the world's first how-to
manual on military strategy. It was likely written, studied, and
applied over 2,000 years ago during a particularly chaotic era
of Chinese history called the Warring States period (475–221
BCE). During that time, what is now Eastern China was divided
into more than 20 territories, each ruled by its own warlord
intent on reunification, with himself being emperor. The
success of these warlords depended on the appointment of a
professional commanding general. One such commanding
general was the author, Sun Tzu (also spelled Tzǔ), who wrote
a summary of his approach to war. In the years following,
advice given in The Art of War proved its value to those who
studied and applied it with success. As it became known as a
Chinese classical work, commentaries and explanations by
other experts (only some of whom are recorded as verified
historical figures) were added. The current English translation
of The Art of War by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University
Press, London, 1963) is commonly acknowledged as definitive.
Although written in ancient times when troops fought with
swords and bows, The Art of War remains relevant in the age
of mechanized weaponry. In his preface to this translation,
Griffith states that Sun Tzu's treatise "has had a profound
influence ... on Japanese military thought; it is the source of
Mao Tse-tung's strategic theories and of the tactical doctrine
of the Chinese armies ... transmitted to Russia and became a
substantial part of her oriental heritage." Even today, the
principles and methodology of The Art of War have been

j Book Basics applied not only to military strategy but also to business and
competitive sports.

AUTHOR ABOUT THE TITLE

Sun Tzu Bing-fa—or The Art of War—emphasizes the creative abilities of
a military commander in practical strategy, organization,
YEARS WRITTEN
preparation, and conduct of battle. The work is also known
c. 475–221 BCE
descriptively as The Thirteen Chapters.
GENRE
History, War Literature

AT A GLANCE
The Art of War Study Guide Main Ideas 2

a Main Ideas Changing Tactics

Sun Tzu and his commentators state that once a general has
been appointed to lead the sovereign's forces into battle, the
Deceit as Strategy sovereign must step aside and trust in his appointment rather
than interfere. This, Tzu claims in Chapter 3, will ensure victory:
Sun Tzu and his commentators give many examples "He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the
throughout The Art of War of how to use deceit in order to gain sovereign will be victorious." Furthermore, if a general keeps
an advantage in war. A number of these may be used before his own counsel to himself, he is able to put into place the most
the first battle. For example, the deployment of reliable secret effective tactic that will answer to the needs of specific
agents (as described in Chapter 13) can plant false information conditions as they may arise: "He who knows the art of the
in the minds of the enemy general and his officers. direct and the indirect approach will be victorious." The
effective commander must be able to "read" the enemy's signs
This can be used to ascertain the strength and organization of
moment by moment, so he can determine the best way to take
the opposing forces, or to convince the enemy their opponent
advantage of weaknesses and evade opposing strengths that
is so strong and ruthless that it would be wiser to avoid battle.
would incur severe losses.
Marches can be made to look as if they are going in one
direction when, in fact, they are going in another: "When near, While some changes are cyclical and certain (as outlined in
make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you Chapter 5), others are entirely defined in the moment. Sun Tzu
are near." alludes to this by saying, "And as water has no constant form,
there are in war no constant conditions." And in Chapter 6, Sun
Tzu states, "Of the five elements, none is always predominant;
Predecided Outcomes of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are
long and some short."
The outcome of a battle often depends on conditions that have
been established long before the troops even pick up their
weapons. There are three main parts to this approach, all of Strengths and Weaknesses
which require analyzing conditions, not only within the state
and army of the general but also within those of his opponent. From the initial planning of a military campaign to its
completion, Sun Tzu urges that at every opportunity, a wise
The first is to make an accurate assessment of the resources
general will attempt to fully assess the condition, state of mind,
that will be involved, as outlined in Chapter 2. Obviously, a
and plans of the enemy. Only by thoroughly knowing these
campaign conducted over a long period of time and far from
factors can a commander decide on the best course of action
home is going to be more costly than one that is quick,
that is both direct (an offensive or defensive tactic) and
decisive, and closer to home. Morale, preparedness, and
indirect (tempting the enemy with bait, or harassing an
organization of the troops well ahead of time is also essential
arrogant opponent). Sun Tzu states in Chapter 9: "It is
to ensure the greatest chances of success once the enemy
sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to
has been engaged. The flip side of this tactic is to
concentrate your strength to capture him."
correspondingly throw the opposing general into confusion, or
into believing deceptive information, and to play upon the
general's personal weaknesses to undermine his authority in
the eyes of his officers. As Sun Tzu directly states in Chapter d In Context
3, "What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the
enemy's strategy," and "those skilled in war subdue the
enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without
assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted
operations."

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The Art of War Study Guide
China at War in the Time of
Sun Tzu
The history of China is divided into a series of consecutive
dynasties. The Zhou dynasty—the period in which Sun Tzu
lived—was one of the longest, and lasted from 1046 to 256
BCE. The Zhou dynasty includes both the Spring and Autumn
Annals period (772–476 BCE) and the Warring States period
(475–221 BCE). The two periods were marked by very different
approaches to military campaigns. Battles conducted during
the Spring and Autumn period were arranged almost like a
leisure-time sport to settle differences between aristocratic
houses. War-making took a much more serious turn during the
Warring States period, such that battles decided the survival or
ruin of each state. The integrity of the state depended on the
ability of the sovereign to appoint the best professional
strategists and commanding generals available—one of whom
was Sun Tzu.
The Spring and Autumn Annals Period
Warfare in the Spring and Autumn Annals period was based on
the idea that spring and autumn were two seasons of the year
in which war could not be conducted—activities in spring
included sowing and planting; in autumn, the harvesting was
done. Warfare was an activity conducted by the aristocracy
who followed gentlemanly rules of engagement, which included
the prohibition of aggressive attacks before an opposing army
had a chance to collect itself, or the use of deceit. During this
period, war was more of a sporting event. Forces were
commanded by the sons or ministers of the royal family.
Armies were small and generally lacked either discipline or
skill.
The Art of War reflects an entirely different attitude toward
military campaigns. War is not a game. It is serious business,
and "the province of life or death." Sun Tzu clearly states that a
wise sovereign must appoint a seasoned general well ahead of
time, then grant him sweeping authority to structure his army,
plan strategy, appoint all levels of officers to serve under his
command, and secure secret agents to conduct campaigns.
Under these conditions, war is no longer a pastime but a
matter of survival. Sun Tzu states in Chapter 1 that his advice
marks the difference between victory and defeat: "Those who
master them win; those who do not are defeated."
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In Context 3
The description of a lengthy siege in 594 BCE is given in
Griffith's account of this period. A very polite exchange takes
place between two representatives of both sides suffering
exhaustion and starvation. In the end, they mutually agree to
call the whole thing off. Under Sun Tzu's direction, however,
such a polite exchange would never have occurred. His advice
to the besieger would have been to plan and prepare well
ahead of time so the siege could be performed quickly.
Furthermore, a general acting on behalf of the state does not
have the luxury of being either humane or polite with the
enemy. Such traits in a warring general are, according to Sun
Tzu, a weakness that an acute opponent can exploit.
The Warring States Period
The Warring States period was a particularly violent period in
China's history and it presented the need for a very serious
practical approach to armed conflict. Sun Tzu's The Art of War
provided an effective blueprint to meet this need. The Zhou
Empire broke into approximately 20 minor feudal holdings,
seven of which were sufficiently strong enough to swallow
their smaller competitors. The resulting breakdown of
centralized law and order also left the countryside vulnerable
to attack by "escaped criminals, deserters from the army, and
disgraced officials." Although this didn't happen suddenly, The
Warring States period can be said to have started when three
of the strongest clans joined forces to attack and kill the ruler
of China, dividing its territories among them in 453 BCE. By
that time, the Chou family dynastic line had become so feeble
that the "Son of Heaven"—the sacred imperial title of a Chinese
ruler—was primarily allowed only ceremonial duties, while the
powerful feudal lords surrounding him fought among
themselves to seize absolute control of what is now Eastern
China.
Although war was their primary occupation, Chinese princes
enjoyed many luxuries and—perhaps more importantly—kept
commerce and trade going. These warlords employed skilled
fighters from the lower ranks of the crumbling aristocracy to
enforce civil law and order among their people, and command
troops in battle. In order to succeed and survive in this highly
competitive environment, they also employed seasoned
strategists to act as advisers during campaigns. This need
gave rise to a class of wandering scholars eager to secure
patronage who were, as Griffith describes them, "intellectual
gamblers." Success led to being elevated to an exalted
position, but failure resulted in being "unceremoniously pickled,
The Art of War Study Guide
sawn in half, boiled, minced, or torn apart by chariots."
Philosophy in The Art of War
Sun Tzu makes several references to the main Chinese
philosophies of the I-Ching (also known as Yijing) or Book of
Changes, Taoism (also Daoism), and Confucianism.
I-Ching
The I-Ching (Book of Changes) text is a Chinese system of
divination still in use today. During the Zhou dynasty, wizards
used the I-Ching to predict future events. A hexagram (or
diagram with six components) is drawn from the bottom up
using combinations of solid (masculine) and broken (feminine)
lines. These hexagrams are then read individually and in
combination, using phrases from the I-Ching, which are general
enough to apply to a wide variety of conditions to make
predictions. During the Spring and Autumn period, divinations
were conducted at various stages of a battle. But war in the
Warring States period compelled Sun Tzu to charge a general
to dispel any and all superstitions. In Chapter 11 he refers to an
effective general, claiming, "He prohibits superstitious
practices and so rids the army of doubts." This likely refers to
the practice of individual troops using charms to protect
themselves from harm.
Taoism
The Art of War directly and indirectly draws upon the
philosophic principles of Taoism to enable a commanding
general to design tactics in accord with the "play of opposites."
This philosophy—based upon observations of natural
processes and phenomena—has influenced Chinese thought
for over 2,000 years and refers to cycles of change. The
symbol of the cosmic force Tao is the yin (feminine principle in
black) and yang (male principle in white) entwined. It is
important to note, however, that a small "seed" of the feminine
is at the core of the masculine and vice versa. Sun Tzu
specifically refers to Tao in Chapter 4, saying, "Those skilled in
war cultivate the Tao and preserve the laws and are therefore
able to formulate victorious policies." An indirect reference to
Taoism involves the resources available in normal and
extraordinary forces, which, according to the wisdom of the
general in Chapter 5, can be engaged in turn because they
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In Context 4
"end and recommence; cyclical, as are the movements of the
sun and moon. They die away and are reborn; recurrent as are
the passing seasons."
Confucianism
The I-Ching is included in Confucianism, even though the
Chinese philosopher Confucius did not directly mention it in his
writings. He believed self-examination and cultivation was the
goal of every individual, and as such, he is revered as the
consummate educator. However, his efforts to bring these
ideas into government were met with indifference, a fact he
acknowledged without ceasing his efforts. Sun Tzu has a
limited response to these ideas. He urges a general to know
both himself and his enemy, but in Chapter 10 he warns that
compassionate or humane self-examination is a weakness that
can be exploited by an enemy, rather than a strength: "If he
[the general] has too delicate a sense of honor you can
calumniate him." The main function of ordinary troops in a
military structure is to obey orders without doubt.
The Art of War as a Classic
The Art of War belongs to a body of Chinese literature and
culture generated during the Zhou Dynasty. This literature
included histories mixed with philosophy and legends; how-to
manuals on crafts, arts, and etiquette; temple rituals; and
essays by scholars and sovereigns. This literature was created
from 1046 BCE—the year Confucius was believed to have been
born—to 256 BCE—the year the Zhou Dynasty was destroyed.
The Art of War was included in the category of military strategy
and studied by military officer candidates in their training for
service. Over the years, several versions of The Art of War
appeared, as later Chinese scholars added their own
interpretations of Sun Tzu's advice without distinguishing
between what Sun Tzu said and what a later commentator had
to say about it. When China was finally unified in 221 BCE, the
first emperor, Shi Huangdi (also known as Qin Shi Huang, Qin
Shih Huandi, Shi Huangti, or Shih Huan-ti), ordered a general
book-burning aimed at destroying mainly the teachings and
writings of Confucius. The purging of these texts in 213 BCE
was prompted by the emperor's adviser Li Siu, on the grounds
that the ideas expressed in them would gradually undermine
the authority of the martial state Shi Huangdi had forged.
However, as Griffith notes in his Introduction about the text of
The Art of War Study Guide
Sun Tzu's work, the edict was not strictly enforced, and
writings on "technical subjects" such as The Art of War were
not banned.
Impact of The Art of War
Strategy—or the organization and preparation for battle—is
probably Sun Tzu's most significant contribution to military
action. As a philosophy of strategy involving meticulous
attention to every detail prior to engaging the enemy, Sun
Tzu's The Art of War has been poorly understood or ignored in
the West until fairly recently. Soldier and military historian
Captain B.H. Liddell Hart points out in his Foreword to Griffith's
translation that the tactics of war-making in Europe had been
dominated by a very different approach, advocated by the
Prussian general Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz
(1780–1831) in his book, On War. Although this book influenced
Western military decision-making from the Napoleonic Wars (c.
1799–1815, where France, led by Napoleon, fought several
countries in Europe) to World War I (1914–18), Hart points out
that "Clausewitz's tendency to emphasize the logical ideal and
'the absolute' ... [led to] the practice of 'total war' beyond all
bounds of sense." This approach is in direct opposition to Sun
Tzu's overriding dictum that "to capture the enemy's army is
better than to destroy it." Despite the fact that the first
translation of The Art of War was available in Europe in 1772, it
was largely ignored except as a curiosity.
However, The Art of War has had considerable influence over
military strategy in both China and Japan. Griffith mentions,
"Over one hundred separate editions of the Sun Tzu have been
published in Japan." But Mao Zedong, or Mao Tse-tung ,
(1893–1976), a communist revolutionary and leader of the
Chinese Communist Party (also known as Chairman Mao,
founding father of the People's Republic of China), noted in
1938 that the Japanese did not follow Sun Tzu's advice during
World War II (1939–45), which meant their defeat was
inevitable. The Japanese military hierarchy proved inflexible to
changing conditions and failed to follow one of Sun Tzu's most
important points outlined in Chapter 6: "Therefore, when I have
won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to
circumstances in an infinite variety of ways."
The Art of War has had a considerable influence on Chinese
battle tactics over the centuries. Appendix I of Griffith's
translation details an account of discussions between the
"Duke" (or "Marquise") of Wen and his general, Wu Ch'i (also
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In Context 5
Wu Tzu). Wu Ch'i had made a thorough study of Sun Tzu's
treatise and recommended an expanded application of these
principles to the duke. Wu Ch'i particularly emphasized details
of sizing up the strengths and weaknesses of an opposing
force by claiming that a successful attack can be made when
the enemy "has already been encamped for a long time and is
out of grain and food." This advice reflects Sun Tzu's
statement in Chapter 2: "While we have heard of blundering
swiftness in war, we have not seen a clever operation that was
prolonged." Sun Tzu devotes Chapter 13 of The Art of War to
pre-conflict subversions of the enemy using secret agents. In a
corresponding explanation, Wu Ch'i advises the duke to be
well-informed on the character of the opposing general and, if
possible, undermine his authority by dividing and separating
him from his officers and troops.
The Chinese conflict following World War II between the
nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) and the
communists bears witness to the enduring relevancy of The
Art of War. While officers led by Chiang Kai-shek looked to
Western military tactics for guidance, and even believed the
old classics of Chinese strategy such as The Art of War were
out of date or irrelevant, revolutionary Mao Zedong was
attracted to ancient Chinese literature from an early age. While
he never directly credited Sun Tzu for any guidance, Mao
nevertheless forged an army out of impoverished peasants by
insisting they be treated with consistent moral discipline,
training, and a chance for advancement in the ranks. This
approach gained Mao their unwavering loyalty, much as Sun
Tzu had predicted in Chapter 10: "Because such a general ...
treats [his men] as his own beloved sons ... they will die for
him."
This alone would not have brought success, but Mao had the
knack of getting those he vanquished to join him: "Many of the
captured officers and men immediately joined the Red Army."
Sun Tzu approved of this attitude, as he instructed in Chapter
2: "Treat the captives well, and care for them." Mao was also
capable of following Sun Tzu's dictums of changing tactics and
the art of deception reiterated in nearly every chapter of The
Art of War. When Mao wrote slogans, he was hardly able to do
so without paraphrasing Sun Tzu. One of his slogans read,
"When the enemy halts, we harass!" Sun Tzu would agree, for
he says in Chapter 6: "When the enemy is at ease, be able to
weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make
him move."
The Art of War Study Guide
a Author Biography
What Is Known about the
Author Sun Tzu's Life
Sun Tzu (also Sun-tzu or Sunzi) was a Chinese military leader
who served the state of Wu in China. He was reputed to have
been a general for Ho Lu, king of Wu, during which time he
presumably acquired the expertise on which he based his
treatise The Art of War. As General Samuel Griffith notes in his
1963 commentaries and translation of The Art of War, several
Chinese historians doubt Sun Tzu was an actual historical
personage. The name Sun Tzu is more like a title, as Tzu
means "master," yielding the description Master Sun. Very little
is known about Sun Tzu, except that it is likely he lived
sometime around the end of the Spring and Autumn Annals
period (an era in Chinese history; 772–476 BCE) or the
beginning of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) of
China's Zhou (also known as Chou) dynasty (1046–256 BCE).
China was ruled by a series of dynasties, meaning that ruling
successors within a given period, often centuries, all came
from the same family. Each dynasty is denoted by the family
name, as in Zhou.
Appendix I of Griffith's translation includes a brief biography of
Wu Ch'i (or Wu Qi; c. 440–381 BCE) who served as a general
for the state of Wu under the title of Wu Tzu (Wu Master), and
he is credited with having written his own book of military
advice to "the Marquis of Wu." This book is a dialogue between
Wu Tzu and the Marquis, and it bears a resemblance to Sun
Tzu's The Art of War in a way that suggests it might have been
a precursor. In Chapter 2, Section 1, Wu Tzu states, "Naturally
in an army there are certain to be some officers as brave as
tigers and strong enough to lift a bronze tripod with ease." In
contrast, Sun Tzu's advice about officers relies on much more
than an estimation of their physical strength. He says in
Chapter 10, "When the officers are valiant and the troops
ineffective the army is in distress." The similarities between Wu
Tzu and Sun Tzu suggest the former may have contributed to
the latter.
The fragmentation of larger states into multiple smaller ones
that characterized the Warring States period began about 25
years after the death of the famed Chinese philosopher
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Author Biography 6
Confucius (551–479 BCE). A contemporary and likely pupil of
Confucius was Tso Ch'iu-ming, who is credited with having
written a detailed description of events in the Spring and
Autumn period, but he did not mention Sun Tzu.
Reliable accounts of Sun Tzu's life and activities are equally
confusing. Griffith states there is no mention of Sun Tzu in Tso
Ch'iu-ming's (c. 5th century BCE) detailed commentary on the
Spring and Autumn Annals period, despite the fact that some
later biographers place Sun Tzu in this era. Griffith gives
several examples of anachronisms—or statements in the text
referring to weaponry that was not in use until over a century
later—in the text that support the idea that Sun Tzu probably
lived after the Spring and Autumn Annals period.
However, Griffith suggests the strongest evidence that Sun
Tzu must have been a general for the Wu Empire in the
Warring States period is supported by the observation that
"not until the period of the Warring States were they [armies]
commanded by professional generals." This was not the case
during the Spring and Autumn Annals period, when wars were
planned and carried out by members of aristocratic families,
almost like a competitive sporting event.
The Translator's Biography of
Sun Tzu
Griffith's translation of The Art of War includes a biography of
Sun Tzu written by the Grand Historiographer Sima Qian (also
Ssu-ma Ch'ien; 145–87 BCE) entitled Sun Tzu Wu Ch'i Lieh
Chuan. This was part of a larger historical work by Ssu-ma
Ch'ien titled Shih-chi (100 BCE), and in it, two examples are
given to support the enduring force of both Sun Tzu and his
principles. The first account states that Sun Tzu first
presented The Thirteen Chapters (alternate title for The Art of
War) to the king of Wu and demonstrated its principles of troop
discipline by training over a hundred court women in a basic
drill exercise. At first, the women laughed at his instructions,
whereupon Sun Tzu blamed himself for not being clear.
However, when the women did not obey for the third time, Sun
Tzu had two of them executed despite the king's objections,
saying that "when the commander is at the head of the army
he need not accept all the sovereign's orders." This implacable
focus on principle produced the desired results, and the
terrified women went through their drills in silence and with
serious intent as if their lives depended on it. The account ends
The Art of War Study Guide Characters 7

with the king making Sun Tzu general of his armies and the
resulting supremacy of Wu over its enemies. Tu Mu
The second account in the biography of Sun Tzu deals with Tu Mu was a secretary in the Grand Council of Wan-nien. It is
Sun Pin. Sun Pin was a descendant of Sun Tzu. Sun Pin applied said he served with considerable distinction and consistency.
the principles of The Art of War to not only overcome the false
charges of a jealous rival that had left him branded a criminal
but to become chief of staff to the armies of a rival state. In Chang Yu
this role, Sun Pin wisely advised his patron to employ
deception and false information to overcome an enemy. His Samuel B. Griffith notes only that Chang Yu was a "historian
approach was very much in accord with the statement made and critic" of the late Sung (also known as Song) dynasty
by his ancestor that, in order to overcome an adversary, a wise (960–1279 CE).
general must "pretend inferiority and encourage his ignorance."
The ruse worked, and not only was the opposing force
defeated in an ambush, but Sun Pin's treacherous rival who led Mei Yao-ch'en
those forces realized imminent defeat and took his own life.
Mei Yao-ch'en was a well-known Sung dynasty poet and writer
Sun Tzu's The Art of War has remained an important guide on
from Wan-Ling. His historical accounts include The Art of War;
how to conduct oneself, not only in times of war but in the
he was also commissioned to prepare a comprehensive history
competitive fields of business and sports in the 21st century as
of the T'ang (also known as Tang) dynasty (618–907 CE). His
well.
writing was influenced by neo-Confucian precepts.

h Characters Li Ch'uan
Li Ch'uan was known as a writer of military strategy in the
Sun Tzu T'ang dynasty. His principle writings on the subject are still in
use today.
Sun Tzu was a military leader completely dedicated to serving
the state. As the ideal commander, he was detailed, organized,
and respected by his men. On the battlefield, he was ruthless,
swift, and inscrutable.

Ts'ao Ts'ao
Ts'ao Ts'ao became King of Wei in 216 BCE and is
characterized by biographers as hardworking, temperate,
frugal, and ruthless. He was a keen observer of human nature
and unperturbed by any condition of battle. He promoted many
from the lower ranks, and even from among his former
enemies. He also executed those not loyal to him, and it was
said he could not be deceived.

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The Art of War Study Guide Plot Summary 8

Full Character List k Plot Summary

Character Description
Biography of Sun Tzu
Sun Tzu ("The Master") is credited with
Sun Tzu having written the 13 chapters that
The biography of Sun Tzu as translated by Griffith was not
make up The Art of War.
originally part of The Thirteen Chapters, but added later by the
Chinese historian Sima Qian . The first part details how Sun
Ts'ao Ts'ao was a senior general whose
commentary in The Art of War takes Tzu demonstrated the effectiveness of his military strategy to
Ts'ao Ts'ao
precedence over those of other, less- Ho Lu, king of Wu. He did this by training over a hundred court
experienced commentators.
women in basic military drills. The second part of this
biography describes how a descendant of Sun Tzu overcame
Tu Mu is a major commentator in The formidable odds to bring his patron's troops to victory and
Tu Mu
Art of War.
avenge himself against his own personal enemy through the
application of his ancestor's tactics.
Chang Yu is a major commentator in
Chang Yu
The Art of War.

Mei Yao-​ch'en
Mei Yao-​ch'en is a major commentator Chapter 1: Estimates
in The Art of War.
This chapter sets the tone of the work by first presenting the
Li Ch'uan is a major commentator in The words of Sun Tzu, followed by brief explanations and examples
Li Ch'uan
Art of War. offered by several commentators. Beginning with the concept
"war is a matter of vital importance to the State," Sun Tzu
Ch'en Hao is an occasional describes appropriate methods to consistently nurture
Ch'en Hao
commentator in The Art of War.
soldiers' confidence in their commanders. At the same time,
inconsistency is a tactic used to undermine the confidence of
Chia Lin is an occasional commentator
Chia Lin an opposing general by unpredictably changing tactics and
in The Art of War.
providing misleading information. The example is given that
while horses and women are expendable to deceive an
Ho Yen-​hsi is an incidental
Ho Yen-​hsi adversary, land is not.
commentator in The Art of War.

Li Ching is an occasional commentator

Li Ching
in The Art of War. Chapter 2: Waging War
Meng is an occasional commentator in A methodical and systematic accounting of the resources
Meng
The Art of War. required to launch a campaign is discussed in this chapter. Sun
Tzu claims war is an activity best conducted when the army is
Sun Pin is a descendant of Sun Tzu. His not subjected to lengthy campaigns at distances that "require
Sun Pin
story is told in a biography of Sun Tzu.
a second levy of conscripts nor more than one provisioning."
With this in mind, Sun Tzu asserts that victory is most assured
Tu Yu is an occasional commentator in
Tu Yu when a battle is both brief and decisive: "For there has never
The Art of War.
been a protracted war from which a country has benefited."

Wang Hsi is an occasional commentator

Wang Hsi
in The Art of War.

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The Art of War Study Guide
Chapter 3: Offensive Strategy
In this chapter, Sun Tzu and his commentators explore the
dynamics of offensive strategy. This approach entails doing
the least amount of damage possible. If, as a last resort, siege
is laid against a fortified city, the goal is to take it while
inflicting a minimum of damage. Sun Tzu outlines five
conditions in which victory is most likely to be the result.
Chapter 4: Dispositions
This brief chapter discusses different dispositions—or
"shapes"—of opposing forces, and how those qualities affect
the outcome of battle. The Tao philosophy is first mentioned
here, based on practical observations of nature as a means to
guide action. The advice is to frame an army to behave like an
irresistible force of nature, similar to a great amount of water
that has been held back by a dam and then suddenly released.
Chapter 5: Energy
Sun Tzu and his commentators approach the idea of putting
energy into both "normal" (or direct) force to engage the
enemy and "extraordinary" (or indirect) force to win on the
battlefield. This is accomplished through a general's ability to
structure his forces into organized blocks, so they act like logs
or stones rolling downhill. While this constitutes the application
of a direct force, it is most effective if it is not apparent to the
enemy; what is, in truth, cohesive action, has the deceptive
appearance of being chaotic.
Chapter 6: Weaknesses and
Strengths
This chapter discusses a variety of techniques a wise general
can employ to undermine the strength of an enemy before a
confrontation takes place. The point of this stratagem is to
know as much about what an opponent has in mind as possible
without revealing anything in return. This requires a habit of
continually changing tactics in an unpredictable manner to take
maximum advantage of opportunities as they arise.
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Plot Summary 9
Chapter 7: MANŒUVRE
Sun Tzu continues his comparisons with the forces of nature
introduced in previous chapters, and returns to direct and
indirect energy discussed in Chapter 5. He acknowledges that
"nothing is more difficult than the art of manœuvre," because it
presents both advantages and dangers that can be real or
illusions. The technique of signaling troop movements using
both sound (drums) and sight (flag signals) is introduced. The
art of tempting the enemy with bait is offset by also knowing
when to allow the enemy to retreat.
Chapter 8: The Nine Variables
Sun Tzu has touched on the position of the general in previous
chapters. In this chapter, he goes into more detail about how
the skillful general balances himself autonomously between his
sovereign and the troops placed under his command to
ultimately benefit the state. Such a general must employ the
nine variables of ground to his advantage so that his opponent
is forced to take the less advantageous positions. At the same
time, five qualities of a weak general must be taken seriously.
Chapter 9: Marches
The advantage of arriving at the field of engagement first
means the general is able to control key points of engagement.
In this way, he is afforded the opportunity to deploy various
sections of his army to give each the best chance of forcing
the enemy into weakened, divided, and confused conditions.
Sun Tzu further outlines a series of conditions of encampment
and parlay by which the state of the opponent's forces can be
determined.
Chapter 10: Terrain
Opening the chapter with a description of different types of
ground, Sun Tzu goes on to use these as metaphors to explain
the "terrain" by which control of troops is—or is
not—maintained by the general and his commanding officers.
"Good commanders are both loved and feared" means a
general's troops trust him to guide them to victory because he
treats them as his own children with consistent and
The Art of War Study Guide Plot Summary 10

unemotional discipline.

Chapter 11: The Nine Varieties

of Ground
Sun Tzu lays the groundwork in this chapter for the
advantages of playing a hand "close to the chest" in letting no
one know the full extent of a plan, while at the same time
making use of whatever possible means to discover the plans
of the enemy. Sun Tzu also brings up the idea that allying
oneself with other states carries risk, while separating an
enemy from allies is an effective way to secure victory.

Chapter 12: Attack by Fire

This brief chapter describes five uses of fire in the art of war. A
general wishing to use fire must take into account the weather
and time of day, as well as how the enemy reacts to it. As in
previous chapters, Sun Tzu also uses the metaphor of fire to
comment on the way in which an enemy can be made to "catch
on fire," by playing on his emotions to induce recklessness.

Chapter 13: Employment of

Secret Agents
Although this is the last chapter, it is the one Sun Tzu
recommends the wise prince and general employ first, well
before any military engagement. It makes use of intelligent and
well-paid agents to gather information about a potential
enemy. Such agents can be recruited from within the enemy
ranks or employed to infiltrate from without. Such individuals
may also be enticed to supply the enemy with false information
and divide a sovereign from his ministers to create as much
confusion and discord as possible.

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The Art of War Study Guide
c Chapter Summaries
Biography of Sun Tzu
Summary
This translation of the historian Sima Qian's description states
that Sun Tzu was originally from Ch'i, but he presented his
book to Ho Lu, king of Wu. The king tells Sun Tzu he read it
with interest, and would like to know if its principles of troop
movement could be tested using women. When Sun Tzu tells
the king it can, he is given permission to instruct over 100 court
women. Sun Tzu divides the women into two companies
(military units of soldiers)—one on the right and one on the
left— each under the command of two of the king's favorite
concubines. He makes sure they understand his instructions
and shows them how to hold halberds (a 15th- and 16th-
century weapon where an ax and a spike are mounted on a
long handle). When the women tell him they understand, he
arranges the executioner's tools, and gives them "the orders
three times and explained them five times."
Sun Tzu then gives these women soldiers the signal to perform
the movements, but they laugh at him. He goes through the
process again, saying that if the instructions are not clear it is
the commander's fault, but the women again laugh at him. At
this, he lays blame on the two women acting as
subcommanders, whereupon they are to be executed for
disobedience. The king objects, but Sun Tzu reminds him that
because the king has made him his commander, these troops
are under his orders exclusively and that the commander
"need not accept all the sovereign's orders." The two women
are executed and new subcommanders appointed. This time,
the women go through the troop movements Sun Tzu has
taught them, and the king appoints him his general. Under this
arrangement, the king of Wu overcame several of his more
powerful neighbors and earned the respect of the remaining
feudal lords.
The second story Ssu-ma Ch'ien relates in this biography
concerns a descendant of Sun Tzu who, nearly a century later,
made a careful study of his ancestor's treatise and overcome
extraordinary odds. This descendant was Sun Pin, and he
studied military strategy with a rival named P'ang Chuan. P'ang
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Chapter Summaries 11
Chuan became commander to King Hui of the State of Wei, but
he was jealous of Sun Pin's exceptional abilities, and on false
charges had Sun Pin condemned as a criminal. Sun Pin was
branded and his feet cut off. Sun Pin escaped to the state of
Ch'i, where his military advice and successful strategic
plans—based on the instructions of his ancestor Sun
Tzu—brought success to his adoptive state. Sun Pin would not
accept the position of general to the forces of Ch'i because he
had been condemned as a criminal, but he accepted the post
of chief of staff, and gave sound guidance traveling "in a
baggage wagon, and made his plans while sitting." Using
patience, and a very careful study of enemy
encampments—including taking advantage of P'ang Chuan's
overconfidence and arrogance—the troops of Ch'i easily
defeated those of Wei. Realizing the inevitability of defeat at
the hands of his abused rival Sun Pin, P'ang Chuan took his
own life, and "because of this, Sun Pin's reputation was
worldwide and generations have transmitted his strategy."
Analysis
At first glance, these two anecdotes seem to have little in
common, but there are two threads connecting them. The first
is that Sun Tzu's advice can spell the difference between
victory or defeat under even the most adverse conditions. The
second is that his advice is as valid a century after his time as it
was when he first demonstrated it, provided the soldiers'
general really studies and understands how it works.
In the first story, Sun Tzu demonstrates the effectiveness of
his methods using a group of over 100 court women—the most
unlikely candidates for soldiers. Yet Sun Tzu shows that even
such "spoiled" women can be quickly forged into an obedient
unit. Based on this impressive demonstration, the implication is
that if Sun Tzu can get women to perform basic military drills
with precision, what could he accomplish with troops of men?
The second story makes the point that even with a physical
handicap and the stigma of having been branded a criminal,
Sun Tzu's descendant Sun Pin was able to attain a significant
command post. In this capacity, Sun Pin amply demonstrated
his keen understanding of his ancestor's principles of war-
making. Biding his time, Sun Pin not only brought his patron's
forces to victory but was able to make his enemy realize Sun
Pin's superior understanding of The Art of War. Facing
inevitable defeat at the hands of a strategist who could not
even walk, P'ang Chuan took his own life.
The Art of War Study Guide
Chapter 1
Summary
Sun Tzu begins his instruction on the topic of estimates in this
first chapter with a brief introduction. He states it is of utmost
importance that war be "thoroughly studied," because its
outcome means the difference between survival or ruin of the
state. He discusses five fundamental factors: moral influence,
weather, terrain, command, and doctrine, along with seven
elements to be elaborated on later. Sun Tzu then explains what
he means by each of these five factors. Commentators then
follow with examples and elaborations.
Chang Yu adds that these five fundamental factors combined
serve to develop a preconflict plan of action—or strategy—in
dealing with rebels. This step-by-step strategy begins with an
examination of the relationship of the people to their
governance, or what Sun Tzu calls "moral assessment." The
issue is whether or not the people are confident in their ruler,
which would determine their ability and willingness to support
the stresses of waging a war. Once this estimation has been
made, next up are the two related conditions of anticipated
weather and the characteristics of the ground over which
troops must march to meet and engage the enemy. Distances,
and the difficulty or ease of marching over the terrain, must be
estimated so that troops arrive in the best condition possible
before engaging the enemy. Commentator Mei Yao-ch'en
briefly accounts for terrain by stating that an accurate
estimate of the conditions surrounding a proposed campaign is
important in determining "the advantages of using infantry or
cavalry." (Infantry units fought on foot, while cavalry units were
on horseback.)
The last two of the five fundamental factors are command and
doctrine. Command estimates have to do with the qualities of
the commander that qualify him to order the troops and be
certain those orders will be followed. The reputation of the
commander must be supported in action, to exhibit the virtues
of command as having "wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage,
and strictness." Closely related to command, the doctrine has
to do with "organization, control, assignment of appropriate
ranks of officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision
of principle items used by the army." Sun Tzu makes it clear
that this kind of pre-engagement planning offers a greater
chance of success than having a large army. He sums up his
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Chapter Summaries 12
explanation by saying, "Those who master them win; those who
do not are defeated."
The last part of the chapter explains Sun Tzu's statement, "All
warfare is based on deception." The more prepared a
commander is, the more he should appear to his opponent to
be unprepared and disorganized. Tu Mu here offers the
example of the Chao general Li Mu who released herds of
cattle and gave the appearance of retreat, when in fact his
forces were hidden on each side. The opposing Huns fell for
the trap, went toward the cattle, and were crushed between
the two sides of Li Mu's troops. The chapter concludes with
Sun Tzu's recommendation that a commander should
frequently change tactics by accurately assessing changing
conditions.
Analysis
It is in this initial chapter that Sun Tzu lays out the principles of
preconflict preparation as the first key element of strategy.
While battles in the previous period were haphazard and more
or less casual, the disintegration of central governance into
multiple feudal territories called for a drastic change in war-
making. War became essential to the survival of the state.
Samuel B. Griffith notes that the phrase "moral influence" is
represented with the character of Tao, or "The Way." This
means if the sovereign is virtuous and just, then he is following
the "right path." And if the sovereign exerts a superior moral
influence, then his people will have the confidence and loyalty
to follow his appointed commander into battle. The character
for doctrine is, according to Griffith, fa, meaning "law or
method." The ability to accurately assess the combined
strengths and weaknesses of both moral influence and
doctrine is an important first step in estimating the likelihood of
success in battle.
The implementation of deception before, during, and after
battle is one to which Sun Tzu returns frequently throughout
his instruction. If the commander can keep his opponent in the
dark as to his true intentions, he has the advantage.
Correspondingly, the more accurately the commander
understands the motives and plans of the enemy, the more
completely he can take control of the situation and make
appropriate adjustments based on changing conditions. The
art of deception makes it impossible for the enemy to make his
own plans, because he is kept too busy trying to adjust to the
The Art of War Study Guide Chapter Summaries 13

opponent's tactics that don't seem to make any sense. more than two shipments of supplies—the first should supply
everything the troops will need at the onset and the second to
make it back home again. Over the duration of the campaign,
Chapter 2 the commanding officer must arrange for his troops to live off
of the resources of the enemy.

The ratio of the chain of command is, by Griffith's estimate,

Summary three combat troops to one administrative officer. The chain of
command must be direct and clear, with the commanding
Sun Tzu discusses the equipment, provisioning, and support of
general responsible for the entire army.
an army sent into battle. He emphasizes the use of both speed
and decisiveness to ensure victory, something that cannot be
achieved without solid preparation and organization ahead of
time. In the interests of making full use of the allocated
Chapter 3
resources, Sun Tzu strongly recommends that "those adept in
waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts nor
more than one provisioning." The commentators weigh in on Summary
this idea by providing examples of past campaigns that were
successful because the general kept track of both the physical In this chapter Sun Tzu states, "To subdue the enemy without

strengths and the state of mind of his troops. They also fighting is the acme of skill." Sun Tzu and his commentators

provide examples of generals who ignored or miscalculated return to the goal of subduing and subsuming the

factors such as hunger, thirst, attachment to accumulated loot, enemy—rather than complete destruction—and it is one

or outrage at an injustice that impaired the ability of their achieved only through careful planning. Tu Mu quotes the

troops to fight with decisive speed. The chapter concludes Grand Duke as saying, "He who excels at resolving difficulties

with some overall procedures to follow when capturing enemy does so before they arise." Sun Tzu then specifies the use of

troops and their equipment, to maximize the preservation of tactics in order of preference, beginning with attacking the

resources and sustain a well-equipped army. enemy's strategy or plans, then separating the enemy from its
allies, followed by attacking the army. The least effective tactic
is to lay siege to a city, an act that may be done "only when
Analysis there is no alternative."

Control of impatient actions in a siege situation is as critical as

This chapter reads almost as if prepared by an accountant,
it is difficult. As Tu Mu points out in a specific example of a
and rightly so. Waging war costs money, a point made
siege gone wrong, Emperor T'ai Wu at the command of
abundantly clear by Sun Tzu and his commentators in this
100,000 troops besieged Yu T'ai, which was under the
chapter. Li Ch'uan states, "Now when the army marches
command of the Sung General Tsang Chih. According to
abroad, the treasury will be emptied at home." The goal is to
custom, the emperor asked Tsang Chih for some wine, but was
organize a campaign so that a minimum of effort and
sent a pot of urine instead. This so enraged the emperor that
resources are consumed, while taking measures to see to it
he attacked the city at once. After 30 days of fighting, over half
the resources of the enemy can be used instead of wasted. If
of the emperor's army was decimated. Commentator Li Ch'uan
this can be accomplished, Sun Tzu indicates that a successful
adds to this the account of another battle during which rebel
campaign becomes sustainable with "one provisioning"—that is,
forces were entrenched at the city of Yuan Wu, but the
fresh supplies of food for the men and horses, camp supplies,
attacking army could not take it, even after months of fighting.
weapons, armor, transport, and so forth.
The attackers fell ill, whereupon their commander was advised
This planning should not require repeated levies of resources to allow the rebels a narrow escape route. That way, when the
from the people back home, a move that weakens support for defenders fled instead of "fighting to the death," the attackers
the war. Samuel B. Griffith claims that the commentators reach weakened by illness were able to take the city without a fight,
a common conclusion: a well-designed campaign requires no and the rebels disbursed such that "any village constable will

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The Art of War Study Guide
be able to capture them." In every instance, the commander
should keep control of both himself and his troops, to prevent
them from being needlessly killed.
Sun Tzu also outlines "five circumstances in which victory may
be predicted." These circumstances depend on the
commanding general's knowledge of several things: (1)
knowing as much about himself and his own troops as about
those of the opposition, so that he will know when to advance
and when to retreat; (2) knowing the correct use of both small
and large forces; (3) knowing how to forge ranks unified in
purpose; (4) knowing how to exercise patience when the
opposition does not; and (5) knowing that his sovereign does
not interfere with his decisions. The last point is particularly
important, as a sovereign's appointed general is trusted to act
with immediate and decisive action under changing conditions
on a battlefield. It is therefore up to the sovereign to choose a
general in whom he can place his complete trust, while it is the
general's corresponding duty to fulfill the trust placed in him.
Analysis
Sun Tzu and his commentators consider such things as the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the two armies before
they engage in battle. A pragmatic and unemotional
approach—as opposed to a superstitious, angry, or gracious
one—underlies this idea. Sun Tzu, along with his
commentators, makes a point of this by emphasizing how war
has changed between the Spring and Autumn Annals period
and the Warring States period.
The rules of engagement during the Spring and Autumn period
dictated that the head of each army exchanged gifts prior to
battle. But in the description of a siege given by Tu Mu, the gift
offered was so offensive that the attacking general flew into a
rage and rashly attacked, with the result that "after thirty days
of this the dead exceeded half his force."
Almost immediately, Li Ch'uan brings up the example of
another siege, and here Samuel B. Griffith notes the use of the
Chinese character Yao, or a "supernatural" belief. The
implication is that the attackers had a difficult time taking the
city, in part because those behind the city walls believed in
some sort of spell that protected them. In the end, however,
they proved vulnerable to their attackers. In the Spring and
Autumn Annals period preceding Sun Tzu's time, two armies
would sit across a field from one another, while fortune-tellers
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Chapter Summaries 14
and seers cast divinations to determine the likely outcome of
the battle. Sun Tzu seems to be acknowledging this as having
been common practice in the past but one that can't be
depended upon in the present.
In his discussion of the relationship between a sovereign and
his commanding general, Sun Tzu states there must be
complete trust. Although not explicitly stated in this chapter,
the implication is that the same must also be true of the troops
placed under the general's command, because they will only be
confused and ineffective if the general's authority is
compromised in any way.
Chapter 4
Summary
In Chapter 4 Sun Tzu draws a clear distinction between
defense and offense, relative to what the general can control
(himself and his troops) and what is beyond his control (the
opposing general and his troops). He makes several
distinctions between effective offensive and defensive tactics.
As he explains, "The experts in defense conceal themselves ...
those skilled in attack move as from above. ... Thus they are
capable of ... protecting themselves and ... gaining ... victory."
Even so, Sun Tzu goes on to suggest that predicting what
seems obvious to "the ordinary man" is sometimes nothing
more than misapprehension. Li Ch'uan gives the example of a
stunning defeat of the Chao army at the hands of General Han
Hsin, who arranged his inferior force in a defensive position
with its back to the river to face the Chao troops. Although the
Chao army was confident they would be victorious, invisible to
them their defeat had already been arranged. The ferocity of
the defenders crushed the Chao army, and General Han Hsin
beheaded their commander.
Sun Tzu also states that an easy and predictable victory over a
clearly inferior force is no mark of skill. At the same time he
also warns that what may seem obvious may not actually be
so, because victories won before the first clash of troops are
sometimes hidden realities, made visible only in the course of
battle. In other words, the wise commander prepares well
ahead of time by any means possible, ready to take advantage
of any opportunity. By way of illustrating this point,
commentator Tu Mu quotes Duke Li-Ching of Wei, who
The Art of War Study Guide
describes how the uncertainties of an opposing general can be
undermined with "unreliable reports" and lack of planning.
It is in this chapter that Sun Tzu first brings up Taoism as an
indicator of how to forge one's forces into a unit capable of
acting like an inevitable force of nature. He also presents
calculations to bring this about as "elements of war": (1)
measurement of space, (2) estimation of quantities, (3)
calculations, (4) comparisons, and (5) chances of victory. The
order in which these are considered is important, because, as
he points out, "A victorious army wins its victories before
seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of
winning."
Analysis
Similar to Chapter 3, Sun Tzu distinguishes between wars
chronicled from the Spring and Autumn Annals period and
those of his own era. He states that an easy victory is no test
of skill but recognizes that in the past, "those called skilled in
war conquered an enemy easily conquered."
Samuel B. Griffith explains the defeat of the Chao army at the
hands of General Han Hsin by offering a footnote that Han
Hsin had placed his troops on the most desperate of all
defensive grounds, with its back to the river. "He burned his
boats and smashed his cooking pots," so that his army knew it
had no option to flee—it was "conquer or drown." The
victorious troops of Han Hsin then presumably enjoyed a good
meal from the defeated enemy's supplies.
This chapter references the Tao ("The Way"). A pragmatic and
fundamental perception of the forces of nature, Taoism is
perceived as a set of "laws" or principles which, when
understood and put to use, bring success. The final passage of
this chapter lists dispositions of measurements of space,
estimation of quantities, calculations, comparisons, and
chances of victory. Griffith states that these elements are
"qualities of shape."
Chapter 5
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Chapter Summaries 15
Summary
Sun Tzu turns his attention to the forging of troops into well-
organized units that can be skillfully managed to act as a
single, irresistible force against a more loosely managed
opponent. To support this, commentator Chang Yu describes
how a pyramid of command is built from the base at the
bottom (individual soldiers) up through each level: pair, trio,
squad, section, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, group,
brigade, and finally, army. At each level, a commander is
appointed to obey his superiors and control his inferiors, with
the commanding general at the top.
Proper training and assignment of responsibility at every level
is required for consistent functioning, so that control of the
battlefield can be immediately established and maintained. This
means that, as Chang Yu points out, even though troops may
be spread out in the fighting, they and their officers never lose
track of when to advance or retreat. These orders are
delivered both by sight ("observing flags and banners") and by
sound ("signals of bells and drums") so that no single individual
is ever left alone to either advance or flee.
At this point, Sun Tzu turns to the concept of how to employ
both normal forces (requiring less energy) and extraordinary
ones (requiring more energy) in a way that will make the enemy
uncertain as to which is which. Consistent with his assertion
that a quick and decisive blow is preferable to one that
extends over a long period of time (Chapters 2 and 3), Sun Tzu
advises that the successful general is able to make the enemy
believe that the "normal" energy of his army is "extraordinary."
And, given an offensive advantage, the energy of the army
opposing them in an extraordinary fashion is really that army's
"normal" mode.
This means, according to Sun Tzu, that a victorious army
displays an energy that is "cyclical, as are the movements of
the sun and moon." Thus, the same energy will be applied to
any future confrontations as a matter of course. He claims that
handling an extraordinary force can be achieved by realizing
that its components—like the well-organized and systematic
structure of an army—are few, but the possible combinations
are limitless. In this respect, Sun Tzu gives the examples of five
notes of music and five primary colors that can be arranged in
limitless arrangements.
As he did in Chapter 4, Sun Tzu sees forces of nature—such as
the momentum of water streaming down a hill, or a hawk
The Art of War Study Guide
striking its prey—as inevitable and irresistible, because given
the same situation repeatedly, the same result occurs. The
impression that an army cannot be defeated works for the
general who can create this impression in his enemies, even
when it is not actually the case. When the enemy can be
enticed or lured into a risky attack, an advantage can be
gained. In this way, a skilled general controls the movements of
his enemy instead of being controlled by the enemy.
This chapter concludes with the commentators giving
examples of successful deception because the commanding
officers obeyed the instructions of their superiors. As Chang
Yu concludes, every type of man must be used according to
his nature and abilities, including "the avaricious and the
stupid." In this way, a general finds victory in handling both
talents and situations, rather than demanding it of his officers.
Analysis
The structure of an army is illustrated using a pyramid in this
chapter. Samuel B. Griffith notes that the numbers of each
section supporting those above and supported by those below
is described in arbitrarily English terms, but represents a
multiplication at each level, adding up to 3,200 troops. Each
level has a commanding officer who is accountable to his
superior officer. This type of organized structuring is a working
example of "modular construction," a method of combining
many basic components into an infinite variety of
configurations. Such modules are highly flexible because they
can quickly be made to act as a single unified force. They are
also capable of quickly breaking into different units as the
situation dictates.
Sun Tzu uses music and color to reiterate the notion of
creating limitless auditory (bells and drums) and visual (flags
and banners) combinations on the battlefield. In the same way
that five musical notes are the building blocks of countless
melodies, and five primary colors go into the making of images
"so infinite that one cannot visualize them all," so, too, can an
army be used in a variety of ways to ensure victory.
Mao Zedong employed Sun Tzu's strategies to become a
capable leader. In keeping with Sun Tzu's description of the
ideal general, Mao made himself accountable only to the
creation of the state, and not to any sovereign.
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Chapter Summaries 16
Chapter 6
Summary
Sun Tzu judges a successful general according to his ability to
create a situation in which the enemy is forced to engage. This
is accomplished by a carrot-and-stick approach in which the
enemy is enticed by the illusion of easy success, or pushed
into a position from which it can neither adequately defend
itself nor completely escape. If forcing the enemy into a trap,
Sun Tzu emphasizes that the best way to do this is to leave
open what looks like an escape route but is actually a
controlled route by which prisoners (and provisions) can be
captured.
Most significantly, as Sun Tzu points out, the first army to
arrive at the field of battle has the advantage of time to rest,
and to fully assess the best positions for their battalions. A
general who keeps his opponent in the dark about the details
of his plans can cause the opponent to attempt to strengthen
one area at the cost of leaving another vulnerable. One way to
guarantee success is to have the enemy attempt to fortify in
every direction because in so doing, its resources will be
spread so thin that no single position would be strong enough
to withstand an attack.
Commentator Tu Mu gives an example of how commander
Chu-ko Liang left a small force to defend a city, but the
attacking general Ssu-ma I was given misleading signs that the
defenders were planning an ambush. Assuming the defenders
were stronger than he had believed at first, the attacking
general fled with his troops into the mountains, only to learn
later he had been tricked into calling off a potentially
successful attack on the city.
According to Tu Yu, a wise general places separate units of his
army at varying distances from the appointed battlefield and
orders them to march at different times so they will all arrive
together "like people coming to a city market." So, as Sun Tzu
has said in the previous chapter, while signs and signals to
one's own forces must be clear and well understood, those
which the enemy is able to read and interpret must lead to
false conclusions so that the enemy will act on them, thus
compromising its own forces. A general can capitalize on his
opponent's weaknesses, while correspondingly making the
best use of his own strengths by constantly changing tactics to
The Art of War Study Guide
fit the conditions of the battle. Sun Tzu concludes the chapter
by stating that change is inevitable and that no condition in
nature is "always predominant."
Analysis
This chapter offers many examples of situations and
considerations, each of which contains a grain of its opposing
factor. This invokes the philosophy of Taoism, which rules that
each quality contains within it a bit of its own opposite. Sun Tzu
and his commentators discuss how good management of
weaknesses and strengths demonstrates this understanding.
The commanding general should know a good deal more about
himself and his forces than his enemy is able to find out. Also, it
isn't enough just to gather such information—it must also be
effectively applied.
This would enable a commander to, as Sun Tzu says, arrange
his army to "appear at places to which he [the enemy] must
hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you." Phrases
in this chapter, such as "come like the wind, go like the
lighting," not only continue the many references to the forces
of nature but are also very close to those posted by Mao
Zedong in the mid-1970s.
Tu Mu gives an example of how an adept general created an
effective ruse to defend his city against a superior force. The
subject of a traditional Chinese opera, "The Ruse of the Empty
City," is the story of how Chu-ko Liang tricked Ssu-ma I into
believing he was capable of carrying out an ambush of his
enemy's larger forces. Perhaps due to the long-term popularity
of this folk opera, the story provides an example of military
deception well known in China, even into modern times.
Chapter 7
Summary
The second statement Sun Tzu makes at the beginning of this
chapter is, "Nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuver."
He expands on this by saying the trick is to make what looks
like a convoluted and aimless course into one that is actually
direct and focused. He draws a distinction between "direct"
and "indirect" approaches designed to simultaneously confuse
the enemy and demonstrate the ability in the lower ranks to
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Chapter Summaries 17
obey complex and changing commands. Sun Tzu does caution,
however, that there are "both advantage[s] and danger" in
using this tactic, so it is one only the experienced and
seasoned general should attempt.
Tu Mu addresses the art of maneuvering, claiming an army
should only split up when absolutely necessary. It is better to
make sure all the troops arrive at the battlefield more or less in
good condition and at the same time, well ahead of the arrival
of the opposing army. This works better if the enemy must
rush, which exhausts the troops and supplies along the way. If
an army has a long march, those who are strongest and most
lightly equipped will arrive first, while the weaker soldiers
carrying heavier baggage will straggle behind, leaving
themselves open to ambush. Tu Mu cautions that this should
be done only "when there is no alternative and you must
contend for an advantageous position."
The entire army gathered together well before the enemy
arrives is considered an "advantageous position." Setting off on
an extended forced march with all troops—both strong and
weak—and all the equipment, could mean that critical sections
of the army are not prepared to face the enemy when they
arrive on the battlefield. The longer an army encamps to wait
for the arrival of the enemy, the longer the enemy has to
strategically size up and evaluate the assembled opposing
forces.
Sun Tzu cites The Book of Military Administration to explain the
use of banners, gongs, flags, and drums to signal troop
movements on the field based on the time of day or night. Tu
Mu's commentary describes how effective
castrametation—how a military encampment is laid out in
orderly sections—provides protection from nightly attacks. Tu
Mu adds that a cluster of smaller encampments surrounding
the commander's headquarters can signal an approaching
enemy incursion using torches. This is not just for signaling but
also to illuminate the entire camp so the defenders know the
location of the enemy.
The discussion then turns to control of the factors introduced
in Chapter 1, as they pertain to the relationship between a
commanding general and his army. The successful strategy is
one that can divide the host of an enemy army from its "head"
by controlling the factors of moral, mental, physical, and
changing circumstances. The questions Ho Yen-hsi poses
point out that all the things that weaken an opposing
commander's confidence and ability to plan must be avoided.
The Art of War Study Guide
The chapter ends with an explanation of how to "bait" a
surrounded enemy with a carefully controlled escape route. In
one example, Tu Yu describes how the enemy simply ran down
the escape route without looking, and offered no resistance.
Had they been forced to fight "to the death," many in the
surrounding army would have also been killed or wounded. By
treating the enemy like a cornered wild animal, a wise
commander positions it for control rather than destruction.
Analysis
Sun Tzu's statement about the troops' state of mind at
different times of the day are, according to Samuel B. Griffith, a
way of referring to periods in an extended campaign. So, while
spirits are strong in the morning (or at the start of a war), as
the "day" wears on those spirits begin to weaken. In the
evening, everybody just wants to get home. By implication, the
commander should be aware of this progression in morale, not
only among his own troops but in evaluating the state of mind
of enemy troops as well. For this reason, Sun Tzu advises that
the time to attack is not at the start of a campaign but toward
the "evening," when enemy troops are low on energy and have
little will to continue fighting. The reverse is true when it comes
to his own troops. They will be more willing to make an attack
in the "morning" of their campaign than they will be in the
"evening." The point drives home Sun Tzu's assertion in
Chapter 2 that a prolonged war does no one any good.
Griffith notes that The Book of Military Administration referred
to in this chapter was written after Sun Tzu's time, in which
case he could not have known anything about it. Griffith does
not precisely cite this work, but it is possible it refers to one of
the Seven Military Classics written by military scientist Wu Qi
(440 BCE–381 BCE). The reason is that this text includes
sections on military administration, laws, and government
policies.
Chapter 8
Summary
Sun Tzu identifies what should—and should not—be done in
five different types of ground to lay a foundation for the nine
variables. These kinds of ground are: low-lying (in which an
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Chapter Summaries 18
army should not camp), communicating (in which allies may be
joined), desolate (to be moved through as quickly as possible),
enclosed (requiring resourceful solutions to get out of), and
death (in which the only option is to fight).
The nine variables are based on an estimation of changing
conditions under which action is either indicated or not
indicated in any of the five types of ground. Tu Mu weighs in by
referring to the difficulties in attacking a well-provisioned city.
Sun Tzu and his commentators emphasize that simply knowing
these variables will not do any good; they must be put into
immediate action at the required time in order to succeed.
Once the sovereign has placed his confidence in his choice of
a commander, that commander must retain complete
autonomy and authority on the battlefield. Otherwise, attention
to rapidly changing conditions is thwarted, and the enemy is
given a chance to take control. Again, it is up to the
commander to make the decision regarding what ground to
take, when, and how. A careful assessment of possible
consequences must be made ahead of time. Chia Lin makes a
good point: "Ground ... is not to be fought for if one knows ... it
will be difficult to defend, or that he gains no advantage by
obtaining it."
The chapter concludes with a list of ways to undermine an
enemy commander, such as giving him "beautiful women to
bewilder him." Sun Tzu adds that a preoccupation with honor
and a compassionate nature are variables to be exploited in an
enemy and avoided in a general from whom victory can be
expected.
Analysis
The cutthroat nature of "real" war—as opposed to war as
recreational pastime practiced by the nobility—is particularly
emphasized in this chapter. The five qualities that may be
exploited against an enemy general parallel the five kinds of
ground discussed at the beginning of the chapter. They are
reckless, cowardly, quick-tempered, "too delicate a sense of
honor," and "a compassionate nature." While such traits might
not have been crucial in warfare in the previous Spring and
Autumn Annals period, warfare in the Warring States period of
Sun Tzu's time had no place for them.
The Art of War Study Guide
Chapter 9
Summary
This chapter addresses the organization of well-disciplined
marches and the arrangement of troops facing an approaching
enemy under a variety of conditions. Sun Tzu recommends
taking advantage of the positions of sunlight relative not only
to time of day but relative to rivers, mountains, salt marshes,
and level ground. Ho Yen-hsi references a battle that took
place during the Spring and Autumn Annals period. In this
incident, the Duke of Sung, whose army had crossed the river,
twice stopped his Minister of War from attacking the opposing
force before it had crossed and gathered itself to fight on the
other side. The result was that "the Sung army was defeated,
the Duke wounded in the thigh, and the officers of the Van
annihilated."
Sun Tzu cites the Yellow Emperor as having conquered "four
sovereigns" because he took full advantage of encampment
opportunities. He recommends taking "the sunny side and rest
your right and rear on them." In addition, placement of an army
facing "precipitous torrents" of rivers swollen with rains is an
advantage, especially if the opposing army can be forced to
place its back against it. This is followed by a list of observable
signs that indicate deceptive tactics the enemy might employ.
A column of dust, for example, indicates chariots are on the
move, whereas infantry movement is indicated by low and wide
dust.
Acute observations of signs in nature are important, but Sun
Tzu and his commentators add that learning about the enemy's
purposes through the behavior of envoys is also crucial.
Commentator Chang Yu gives an example of deceit by T'ien
Tan, defender of the city of Chi Mo, when he sent beautiful
women and money to lure the attackers. Thinking this event
would result in easy pickings, Ch'i Che relaxed his guard
enough that T'ien Tan could rush out and "inflict a crushing
defeat."
Ch'en Hao remarks on the effect a lax general has on his
troops, stating, "When the general's orders are not strict and
his deportment undignified, the officers will be disorderly." A
general can conduct an interview with one of his spies to
assess whether or not there is insubordination within the
enemy camp. It is up to the general to maintain consistent and
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Chapter Summaries 19
reliable orders down the chain of command to ensure solid
support from the troops.
Analysis
The reference Sun Tzu makes to the Yellow Emperor (reputed
to have begun ruling in 2697 BCE) and his conquest of four
sovereigns is likely part myth and part historical fact. The
Yellow Emperor was named Huangdi (also known as Emperor
Huang-ti) and was revered as the "patron saint" of Taoism. He
is credited with having stimulated advances in medicine,
architecture, writing, and coinage to establish a utopian
society. The people of the Zhou Empire during Sun Tzu's time
regarded the Yellow Emperor as their "true" Chinese ancestor,
and ruling houses claimed direct descent.
The advice to rest an army's right and rear flanks against an
embankment has to do with the fact that most troops are right-
handed, so they are trained to carry their shield on the left arm
and strike with a sword or spear in their right hand. It is
therefore a matter of balance to advance with the left foot
against an enemy so that the strike of the spear or sword
swinging forward is maximized. What this means is the left
flank of any army is stronger than its right. If an army must
defend its right flank, troops must turn to face attackers by
presenting their left—or shield arm—side to fend off the
opponent. Therefore, by resting a troop's right flank against an
embankment, the embankment serves as protection against
this detriment. A similar problem is presented by an attack
from the rear. Troops must turn and defend when attacked
from the rear instead of advancing forward in an attack. The
need to defend the rear flank while continuing to press forward
breaks an army in two, and divides its strength.
Chapter 10
Summary
Sun Tzu devotes this chapter to a study of the ground (or
terrain) on which a battle may be fought. However, in so doing,
he often shifts focus from the physical terrain itself to the
effects of those conditions on different psychological
"grounds." Sun Tzu explains that the nature of terrain may be
classified as one—or a combination—of six distinctive types.
The Art of War Study Guide
These types are: "accessible, entrapping, indecisive,
constricted, precipitous, and distant." After he and his
commentators have explained how to deal with each of these
by way of either engaging or not engaging the enemy, they
turn their attention to disasters that cannot be blamed on
natural surroundings but instead on faulty leadership.
The dangers inherent in a general's weakness or indecision
has just as much influence on the readiness of troops to fight
as the conditions of the terrain on which a battle takes place.
This holds true of all subcommanders and officers relative to
the units they command. The link must be as strong on one
side as it is on the other, because even a "valiant" officer
cannot make up for a poorly trained unit, and a well-trained unit
cannot overcome poor leadership. Sun Tzu says, "When the
general is morally weak and his discipline not strict ... when the
formations are slovenly the army is in disorder." It is therefore
up to the general to catch and correct problems within the
ranks. This will ensure the entire "body" of his fighting force
has the same goals and consistency of discipline.
Sun Tzu and his commentators then turn to the process of
choosing elite troops for special operations that require
efficiency, speed, and a "vanguard sharp point." Ho Yen-hsi
lists titles for the different types of elite troop actions, including
the "Leapers and Agitators" of the T'ang forces.
The chapter concludes with six conditions a general must
remain vigilant against, as they are signs of defeat. The first
two of these have to do with the physical terrain on which a
battle is fought and the capacity of the commander to estimate
the situation relative to both his own and his opponent's forces.
Discussion then turns to the metaphoric "terrain" of the army
structure, starting with the right of the general to disobey a
sovereign's orders for the good of the state. The point is made
that the decorum of the commander sets the tone for
everyone else, and several examples are given of generals who
shared hardship with their men, and were neither too strict nor
too indulgent: "He treats them as his own beloved sons and
they will die with him."
Analysis
The reference to the "disorder" of an army is one of several
implied allusions to family structure. "Family" in this sense
refers to the functioning of an extended family—parents,
grandparents, sons, and their wives living together—rather than
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Chapter Summaries 20
a nuclear family (father, mother, and children living together).
Extended families are traditional not only in China but
throughout Asia as well. Everyone in a family contributes to the
running of the large household according to their abilities. An
army works the same as a family. The commander in chief is a
respected elder, while sons are subcommanders and officers
in charge of their own family. Order of command is generally
given by chronological birth, so that the first-born son advises
and directs his younger brothers. The same holds true of the
wives, who also have an internal order among them according
to the position of their respective husbands. Every individual
has rights and responsibilities according to his or her ability,
age, and position.
Samuel B. Griffith points out in his note regarding the word
"slovenly" that this actually means "vertically and horizontally."
A vertical dysfunction has to do with the "up and down" levels
of rank, from the lowest commander to the highest. A
horizontal dysfunction refers to one common to everyone at a
certain level in the structure. For example, if several cousins
attempt to bully other cousins in an extended family, it is up to
the father or fathers of the disrupters to put a stop to it. And if
they can't, then the miscreants may be in for a good scolding
by their grandparents. An interesting point is that horizontal
and vertical integration of goods and services controlled by a
single entity has proven highly successful in modern times, as
shown by the economic rise of so-called "big box" stores.
Griffith also states that the elite corps of fighters, "Leapers and
Agitators," are not explained, but he suggests they may have
been experts in acrobatic "sword-play" that would
simultaneously encourage their fellow troops and distract the
enemy troops with their uncommon skill and ferocity. After all,
such displays of fighting in Chinese theater thrill audiences
even today, as evidenced by the popularity of such movies as
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon.
Chapter 11
Summary
Sun Tzu and his commentators quickly run through
descriptions of nine different varieties of ground on which a
battle may take place, ranging from the easiest to the most
desperate, with tactics on how to handle each. The first three
The Art of War Study Guide
are "dispersive" (within one's own territory), "frontier" (making a
shallow penetration into enemy land), and "key" (neutral, or
mutually advantageous). Sun Tzu recommends not engaging
the enemy on these varieties of ground because little can be
gained by doing so. However, on "communicating" ground
(which is expanded and level to accommodate fortifications), a
worthwhile engagement with the enemy can be conducted only
if the general sees to it his formations remain together.
"Focal" ground—that which is surrounded by three other
states—offers an opportunity to gain allies. Sun Tzu warns that
this approach requires careful preparation ahead of time and
involves a risk that allies may be undependable. The "serious"
type of ground is one in which deep incursion is made into
enemy territory. While this type of ground offers opportunity
for plunder, it is also "ground difficult to return from." When in
difficult ground, it is best not to linger because this is a terrain
of mountains, cliffs, swamps, and fast-running rivers that slow
down and expose troops to ambush and traps. An "encircled"
ground is one in which troops are pressed both by opposing
forces and rough terrain, and the best way out of it is to
"devise stratagems." The ninth classification of ground is
"death," meaning the army may survive only by fighting out of
desperation.
Following this identification and description of the nine
varieties of ground, Sun Tzu and his commentators weigh in on
specific elements that must be taken into account. For
example, when in serious ground, a wise general "ensures a
continuous flow of provisions." The example of being in death
ground is, by implication, the most severe test of an army's
internal discipline and order, something that must be solidly
forged ahead of time. A general must be sure his troops will
"fight to the death when there is no alternative, and when
desperate to follow commands implicitly."
Sun Tzu and his commentators turn their attention to various
means by which deception and division can be made to
frustrate the enemy's preparations. It is worthwhile to split
strong sections of the enemy off from its weaker ones, or to be
"seen in the west and march out of the east." Sun Tzu says a
general must take care of his troops. He must see to it that
they are well fed, rested, and disciplined (by both action and
the example of staunch self-discipline), and that they trust the
general's "unfathomable plans" invariably support the greater
good. It is only with this kind of strength in a fatherly type of
relationship that troops will give their all in battle, even in a
"death ground" situation.
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Chapter Summaries 21
Sun Tzu then states that the "Hegemonic King"—one who
"snatches the position of authority"—doesn't forge alliances
with other states. Instead, he inhibits the ability of the enemy to
do so, while keeping would-be allies at arm's length. The
reason for this is that a general who aims to dominate must
demonstrate from the start that he is the only authority, and
will not compromise this position by sharing authority with
anyone else. For one thing, the risk of the enemy obtaining
intelligence from an unreliable ally are minimized. Such plans
are to be shared with no one else, thereby ensuring the enemy
is unaware of when an action is a deceptive illusion or the real
thing.
Analysis
Samuel B. Griffith adds in his notes on the use of the word
"plunder" in serious ground that commentator Li Ch'uan
objects to it, because the goal is to win the affection and
support of the people, if possible. It is certainly preferable for
people to offer food and supplies willingly than to build
resentment when things are forcefully taken from them. This
tactic was vigorously employed by Mao Zedong in his
campaigns for "liberation" of the people of China. History
shows it worked very well. It is in the description of the
"Hegemonic King" that a distinction can be made between
Chairman Mao and his opponent, nationalist leader Chiang Kai-
shek. Chiang Kai-shek relied on foreign support, while Mao
built his army literally from groups of peasants who were, at
the beginning, "ill-assorted groups armed with bows and
arrows, spears, antique fowling pieces, several hundred rifles,
and half a dozen machine guns." Chairman Mao may not have
credited Sun Tzu directly, but he did apply important principles
of changing tactics—cementing the loyalty of his forces—and
the use of deception.
Chapter 12
Summary
This very short chapter is one in which Sun Tzu and his
commentators briefly describe "five methods of attacking with
fire." These methods depend on weather conditions, humidity,
and the direction and strength of winds. They advise that all
sorts of equipment for this kind of attack should be carefully
The Art of War Study Guide
planned out and arranged well ahead of time, so that
adjustments can be made to accommodate fluctuating
conditions. If, for example, fire-lit missiles strike the enemy
encampment, it is recommended to observe their response
before following up with an attack. If the fire throws the enemy
into confusion, an attack is encouraged. However, if the enemy
remains calm, the wisest course of action is to wait.
Analysis
From his discussion of fire as a means of throwing enemy
ranks into confusion, Sun Tzu turns—as is often the case in
these chapters—from the use of fire as a physical weapon, to
"fire" in the emotions of a weak or impetuous general. An
enraged, resentful opponent is going to act wastefully and
foolishly, a state in which the wise general can take advantage
of. But, as Sun Tzu warns, "If you cannot succeed, do not use
troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight." By implication,
then, if a general can inflame the perception of his enemy to
the point where the enemy will respond to it, the general holds
the advantage to strike with focused precision.
Chapter 13
Summary
This final chapter of The Art of War requires more than the
usual commentary to understand Sun Tzu's meanings. Sun Tzu
begins with a discussion of the costs of waging war, claiming
that "an army of one hundred thousand ... will amount to a
thousand pieces of gold daily." He then turns his attention to
the importance of foreknowledge to a prince and a general.
Valuable foreknowledge of a potential enemy that may seem to
the ordinary person to have come from supernatural sources
can, according to Sun Tzu, be obtained by employing five
different kinds of secret agents. These agents can work
together as the "Divine Skein," giving a sovereign an advantage
over his enemy.
"Native" agents are those from the enemy's country, while
"inside" agents are those already inside the opposing army's
structure. With these two kinds of agents, it is important, as Tu
Mu points out, to seek out anyone who has been slighted,
underpaid, or mistreated, or is simply greedy or ambitious.
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Chapter Summaries 22
Anyone nursing a grudge may be susceptible to flattery,
generous bribery, or persuasion by an emotional or logical
appeal. Such agents can pass on significant information, while
simultaneously working to "create cleavages between the
sovereign and his ministers."
"Doubled" agents are spies the enemy has sent who can be
bribed, then used to covey false information back to the
enemy. However, as commentator Li Ch'uan points out, these
kinds of agents must be handled with great care and caution. A
thorough knowledge of the kind of person a doubled agent is
will indicate the type of enticement to which he will most likely
be susceptible. On the other end of the spectrum,
"expendable" agents are those entrusted to feed the enemy
leaked information that is deliberately false. Such agents are
expendable because if caught in the deception, they will be
killed. "Living" agents, on the other hand, are those who return
with intelligence for the general's ears only. This information
can be used to gain an advantage over the enemy. This is what
Tu Mu calls "'mouth to ear' matters." This in itself is perilous,
because if a living spy has been compromised, premature
notice of secret plans might be leaked out, in which case such
an agent—and anyone else to whom he may have
spoken—should be killed immediately. Tu Mu follows up on this
by describing the kinds of details a good and well-rewarded
spy can provide the attentive general. Chia Lin sums up the
business of spies and their essential worth to a state at war by
saying, "An army without secret agents is exactly like a man
without eyes and ears."
Analysis
It seems logical to suggest that relating a discussion of secret
agents to the economic costs of waging a war may have been
tied to criticisms. Some may have believed the employment of
secret agents was a waste of time and resources, with
outcomes that were vague, hidden, or very difficult to assess in
quantitative terms. However, Sun Tzu repeatedly reiterates the
far more important need to establish long-term goals,
especially those that are not immediately realized by any single
event.
The Art of War Study Guide
g Quotes
"Those who master them win;
those who do not are defeated."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 1
Sun Tzu wrote this line as a statement of his own confidence in
the tactics he outlined in the 13 chapters, many of which have
proven true over time.
"All warfare is based on
deception."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 1
This statement is repeated from the standpoint of various
perspectives throughout all 13 chapters. While secret agents
expertly feed false information well ahead of the first
engagement, a commanding general should deceive the enemy
by appearing to march in one direction while actually arriving at
another. He should continually change tactics to suit changing
conditions on the battlefield without including anyone else in
his plans.
At the same time, the commanding general should know his
opponent's plans with accuracy, while keeping his opponent
guessing, or misinformed, as much as possible.
"For there has never been a
protracted war from which a
country has benefited."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 2
This statement implies three conditions a wise general should
take seriously. First is that careful preparation beforehand
should make an extended campaign unnecessary. Second, a
speedy and decisive conclusion encourages good morale
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Quotes 23
among the troops and the people supporting the war at home.
Third, the longer a campaign drags on, the more it places a
drain on the state to keep it going.
"One defends when his strength is
inadequate; he attacks when it is
abundant."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 4
The general is required to make careful assessments before
engaging in battle, so he will know the best time to be on the
defensive and when the opportunity to successfully attack
presents itself.
While keeping the enemy in doubt as to the true strength and
weaknesses of the army, the wise general makes every effort
to ascertain the disposition of the enemy in order to prepare
an appropriate offensive or defensive strategy.
"A victorious army wins its
victories before seeking battle."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 4
One of the strongest points Sun Tzu makes is that preparing
for war is, in many ways, the most important part of war-
making. He stresses that prebattle strategy and planning
based on sound intelligence of both armies gives one an
advantage over the other. It isn't always the stronger force that
wins. A small force led by a wise general can—with good
preparation and utilization of its best talents—defeat a much
larger one.
"There are only the normal and
extraordinary forces, but their
combinations are limitless."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 5
The Art of War Study Guide
A normal force is the effort it takes to make the enemy trust in
falsely created conditions—such as pulling off a section of
troops as if retreating so as to draw the pursuing enemy into
an ambush. An extraordinary force describes the planning it
takes to carry out an attack that is entirely unexpected by the
enemy—such as placing archers at precise points along a
narrow pass through which the enemy has been forced to
move.
Switching between normal and extraordinary force planning
and execution is the means to an effective and swift campaign.
"A skilled commander seeks
victory from the situation and does
not demand it of his subordinates."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 5
Sun Tzu is adamant that a commander's traits are of utmost
importance. It is his responsibility to see to it that the likelihood
of victory is assured well ahead of time by appointing qualified
subordinate officers. If they do not deliver the expected
outcome, it is the commander's fault for having appointed
inferior or disobedient subordinates, and not the fault of the
subordinates themselves.
However, disciplining disobedient officers should be swift,
severe, and executed in front of all, to serve as an example to
others.
"One who has few must prepare
against the enemy; one who has
many makes the enemy prepare
against him."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 6
This statement draws a distinction between defensive and
offensive strategy, and execution on the battlefield.
Whenever possible, Sun Tzu makes it clear that it is preferable
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Quotes 24
to act on the enemy rather than be acted upon. Even with a
lack of superior numbers, he states that undermining the
opposing commander, subverting his officers, and separating
the enemy from its allies can even the odds between numbers
of troops. What appears on the surface to be true need not
always prove to be so.
"An army may be likened to water."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 6
Sun Tzu and his commentators compare the effective use of
force on the battlefield with the force of water streaming
downhill. A general should build his forces both physically and
psychologically to act as an irresistible unit. This only happens
with preparation, the way a farmer holds back water and then
releases it at the right time so that it flows downhill to water his
fields. The allusion is one of several comparing an army with
forces of nature.
"He who knows the art of the
direct and the indirect approach
will be victorious."
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 7
This statement expands on the idea that the art of war is
based on deception. The purpose is to make the enemy believe
a direct approach is being made when it is really indirect, or
vice versa.
Rapid and acute shifts between indirect and direct approaches
must be practiced beforehand, so that the commander
may—depending on changing conditions in battle—quickly
concentrate his army's forces in a unified push, or just as
swiftly divide them. Signals for troop movements include
gongs, drums, banners. and torches.
"By taking into account the
unfavorable, he may resolve the
The Art of War Study Guide Quotes 25

While the superior general keeps the enemy guessing his true
difficulties."
directions and plans, he must also know as much as possible
about not only his opposing general's strengths and
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 8
weaknesses but also his strategic planning.

Any accurate intelligence of an enemy's tactical habits makes

Sun Tzu and his commentators place a heavy emphasis on the
it possible to gain an advantage. At the same time, shifting
expertise and character of the commanding general. This is
tactics will have the effect of keeping the enemy off-balance,
done by pairing opposites. A wise commander not only
guessing, and likely diffusing its forces in an effort to defend
examines favorable factors but must also balance these with
itself.
an objective estimation of unfavorable ones, to arrive at a
"reliable" or "workable" plan.

This is a fundamentally Tao approach because Tao states that "The tactical variations ... are
all conditions have a "grain" of its opposite embedded within it.
This is expressed in the yang (masculine) and yin (feminine)
matters the general must examine
icon in which a small amount of the yin is in the yang, and vice with the greatest care."
versa.

— Sun Tzu, Chapter 11

"You must take position on the

The tactical variations Sun Tzu and his commentators refer to
sunny side and rest your right and in this chapter are broadly identified by nine types of ground,
made up of both physical topography (whether to choose a
rear on them."
close or extended troop deployment)—and psychological
"ground" (using the principles of human nature).
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 9
As has been discussed in previous chapters, these nine
varieties may be combined and divided into unlimited variations
This advice applies to the army that manages to arrive first to
of combinations.
the battlefield, so it can take the most favorable position. The
weakest positions of an army are its rear and its flank (the right
or left side of a troop formation). If an army is attacked in the
rear, a portion of the army must turn away from the direction "They are called 'The Divine Skein'
pressing against it. If attacked on its flank, an army must also
and are the treasure of a
turn in a different direction to defend itself.
sovereign."
Hills provide a natural barrier, provided the enemy does not
reach higher ground. And a sunny side presumably offers
— Sun Tzu, Chapter 13
clarity of vision, while also reflecting off the metal of swords
and shields directly into the eyes of the enemy.
The five types of agents are "native, inside, doubled,
expendable, and living." A "skein" refers to a twisting of several

"Therefore, to estimate the enemy lengths of yarn together so that the twisted yarn is stronger
than any of the individual lengths. Griffith states in his notes
... so as to control victory are regarding this line that a skein refers to an efficient use of
different kinds of secret agents together, creating a "net" in
virtues of the superior general."
which the enemy becomes ensnared.

— Sun Tzu, Chapter 10 Espionage (spying on the enemy), a term coined during the

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The Art of War Study Guide
Spanish Civil War (1936–39), forms the "fifth column" (a group
of people used to undermine an opponent) of attack as a
means of weakening the strength of the opponent from within
as much as possible prior to battle.
l Symbols
Nature
Forces of nature are invoked in several chapters of The Art of
War by Sun Tzu and his commentators. The prevailing advice in
Chapter 4 is to use the troops as an irresistible force, as if they
were water streaming downhill: "A victorious general is able to
make his people fight with the effect of pent-up waters which,
suddenly released, plunge into a bottomless abyss." Sun Tzu
offers a similar analogy in Chapter 5 when he adds that stones
and logs can be made to roll downhill with a minimum of effort,
much like a well-trained army can be made to exert a powerful
force with a minimum expenditure of energy.
Family
The relationship of a general to his troops must be akin to that
of a loving yet strict father, guiding the efforts of his children to
the benefit of all. Extended family units—which often include
parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins—have been
the traditional norm in China. An effective army is forged based
on a hierarchy of command like that of an extended family.
Each brother acts like a subcommander over his own children
under the direction of the head of the household. In Chapter 5,
Sun Tzu states: "He [the general] selects his men and they
exploit the situation." Samuel B. Griffith adds a note of
explanation that this is not nepotism—the promotion of family
members solely because of blood relationships. As is made
clear in the rest of the treatise, the "family" of the army is
created through a system of rewards and punishments put in
place by the commanding general. Officers may even be drawn
from among enemy captives who prove their talent and loyalty:
"Because such a general regards his men as infants they will
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Symbols 26
march with him into the deepest valleys."
Ground
Ground in The Art of War refers both to the physical
topography upon which a general must plan his marches and
battles, and the psychological and emotional "ground" on which
a general establishes himself and his army. Chapters 9 and 10
specifically discuss types of ground, and how to handle
different army units to take maximum advantage of their
features, while correspondingly forcing the enemy onto ground
unfavorable to success. So while "an army prefers high ground
to low [and] esteems sunlight and dislikes shade," it is by
arriving first at the battlefield that Sun Tzu indicates a general
has the opportunity to take the high ground. Advice on reading
the psychological "ground" of the enemy is also given in such
statements as: "When his [the enemy's] flags and banners
move about constantly he is in disarray."
m Glossary
bingfa (n) military strategy and tactics found in Chinese
literature and instructional texts
Confucian (adj) followers or teachings of the Chinese
philosopher Confucius; attitude relating to harmonic balance of
opposites
divination (n) a method of foretelling future events;
interpretations of omens to reveal hidden information
hexagram (n) two-dimensional figure with six equal angles and
six equal sides, used in Chinese fortune-telling
Tao (n) Chinese guiding principle and mythical philosophy; the
path of right conduct, acting in harmony with fundamental
essence
yang (n) Chinese masculine principle, described as active in
nature, characterized by light, heat, or dryness; the opposite of
yin
yin (n) Chinese feminine principle, passive in nature,
The Art of War Study Guide
characterized by darkness, cold, or wetness; the opposite of
yang
zhu (n) Chinese title referring to an owner, master, or host
b Commentaries on The
Art of War
Commentaries on Sun Tzu's 13 chapters of The Art of War are
many, and the earliest ones in Chinese are briefly discussed by
Samuel B. Griffith in Appendix 1 of his translation. Beginning
with the commission of the scholar Liu Hsiang to compile
literature for the imperial library sometime in the first century
BCE, a mention is made of an "Art of War" by Sun Tzu. This is
followed by an 82-chapter version written at a later date, but
Griffith casts some doubt on the accuracy of this lengthier
version. Instead, he settles on the version supplied by
commentator Ts'ao Ts'ao, who wrote a "Brief Explanation" on
Sun Tzu's The Thirteen Chapters sometime around 200 CE.
Samuel B. Griffith speculates that materials had been
assembled on Sun Tzu and his treatise "without attempting to
distinguish the original text from accretions." Griffith notes that
each succeeding dynasty recorded discussions on Sun Tzu's
treatise, but interest spiked during the Sung dynasty
(960–1279 CE) when Emperor Sheng-tsung (1068–85)
required all army commission candidates to study Ts'ao Ts'ao's
version of Sun Tzu's treatise—along with "Lecture Notes"—at
the Imperial Military Academy.
Most modern translations of The Art of War also include
historical or strategic military commentaries related to the
work. Among them is Lionel Giles's 1910 version of The Art of
War and The Art of War: Translation, Essays, and Commentary
by the Denma Translation Group, published in 2009. Giles was
Assistant Curator of Oriental Books and Manuscripts at the
British Museum in the early 20th century. East Asian scholar
Dr. Thomas Cleary published a translation and commentary of
The Art of War in 1988, linking Sun Tzu's treatise with concepts
of Chinese philosophy expressed in the I-Ching (Book of
Changes) and the Tao Te Ching (The Book of the Way). Dr.
Cleary's lead in this connection has had a significant influence
in subsequent examinations of The Art of War.
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Commentaries on The Art of War 27
b Various Translations of
The Art of War
Samuel B. Griffith's Appendix 2 is devoted to Japanese
translations of The Art of War. He states that Sun Tzu's work
reached Japan when a Japanese scholar visiting China, Kibi-no
Makibi (693–775 CE), brought home a number of classical
texts, including The Art of War. Kibi-no Makibi is credited with
having used Sun Tzu's principles to instruct Japanese warriors.
But Griffith is fairly certain that, due to Japanese curiosity and
a connection with China through Korea around 516 CE, these
principles were already well-known.
Over the next several centuries, the Japanese kept military
strategy a closely guarded secret, with the samurai (skilled
warriors who were part of the nobility) showing evidence of
having been trained, at least in part, according to Sun Tzu's
ideas. Late in the 14th century one Japanese strategist,
Kusunoki Masashige, exhibited an affinity for Sun Tzu because
"his favorite tactics were to harass, weary, confuse, and
mislead the enemy."
Appendix 3 discusses the trail of translations of The Art of War
in Western languages. Griffith states the first known
publication of Sun Tzu's work in Europe appeared in French in
1772, titled Military Art of the Chinese. It was translated by
Father Jean Joseph Marie Amiot, a Jesuit priest who spent
many years in Peking. Amiot had been requested to make
translations of Chinese writings on military topics by the
Minister of State under King Louis XV. This translation was
critically acclaimed, and recommendations were made that Sun
Tzu's work be "placed in the hands of those who aspire to
command our armies as well as into those of simple officers"
However, Griffith notes that Amiot was not very careful to
distinguish Sun Tzu's words from those of his commentators,
and incorporated his own ideas into the work. Over the next
several centuries, French interest in Chinese military strategy
waxed and waned—Sun Tzu's approach to strategy was more
or less known but not central to military study.
The first English translation of The Art of War was published in
1905 by Captain E.F. Calthrop, based on a Japanese
translation. However, this version was criticized as "corrupt,"
and Lionel Giles published his own translation in 1910. Three
subsequent translations of The Art of War surfaced during
World War II—two in English and one in German—but Griffith
The Art of War Study Guide Suggested Reading 28

believes the German translation was not known to the German

military of the time. Russian translations appeared in 1860 and
1889, but it is Giles's translation that made it to the United
States, notably in a 1944 book compiled by Thomas R. Phillips,
titled Roots of Strategy.

e Suggested Reading
Durrant, Stephen, and Wai-yee Li. Zuo Tradition/Zuozhuan:
Commentary on the "Spring and Autumn Annals. U of
Washington P, 2016.

Major, John S., and Constance A. Cook. Ancient China: A

History. Routledge, 2017.

Sheetz-Runkle, Becky. The Art of War for Small Business:

Defeat the Competition and Dominate the Market with the
Masterful Strategies of Sun Tzu. Amacom, 2014.

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