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coadinaierhiah ndaerass

cortuoino indoniess accept his explanation. But I would not be satisfied with it. For I
am sure that I raise my arm because I want to, and that despite all the
indubitably real causes, I would not raise it if I didn’t want to. This is
why raising my arm is a gesture. Here, then, is the definition I suggest:
“a gesture is a movement of the body or of a tool connected to the body
for which there is no satisfactory causal explanation.” And I define sat-
isfactory as that point in a discourse after which any further discussion
is superfluous.
This definition should suggest that the discourse of gestures cannot
end with causal explanations, because such explanations do not account
for the specificity of gestures. Of course, causal (“scientific,” in the strong
sense of the word) explanations are needed to understand gestures, but they
don’t produce such understanding. To understand gestures, these specific
physical movements that we perform and that we observe around us, causal
explanations are not enough. Gestures have to be properly interpreted,
too. If someone points to a book with his finger, we could know all the
possible causes and still not understand the gesture. To understand it, one
must know its “significance.” That is exactly what we do continually, very
quickly and effectively. We “read” gesture, from