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www.emeraldinsight.com/0951-3574.htm
Management
Management accounting in less accounting
developed countries: what is
known and needs knowing
469
Trevor Hopper
Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK Received 27 January 2008
Mathew Tsamenyi Revised 3 July 2008
Accepted 11 September
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK 2008
Shahzad Uddin
University of Essex, Colchester, UK, and
Danture Wickramasinghe
Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to evaluate management accounting research in developing
countries and formulate suggestions for its progression.
Design/methodology/approach – This is a desk based study of existing literature analysed
through a framework of management control transformation in developing countries derived from the
authors’ research.
Findings – Research is growing, especially on accounting in state-owned and privatised enterprises
but more is needed on small and micro enterprises, agriculture, non-governmental organisations, and
transnational institutions.
Originality/value – This is the first review of this area and thus should help intending and existing
scholars.
Keywords Management accounting, Developing countries, Poverty, Privatization
Paper type Literature review
Introduction
Research on accounting in less developed countries (LDCs) has grown over the past
20 years. This is welcome for its previous neglect rendered the accounting needs of
poor people who constitute most of the world’s population as marginal and esoteric
despite their concerns being as pressing – if not more so – as in rich countries.
Moreover, LDCs form part of the mosaic of world trade and rich countries can learn
from them, e.g. on poverty reduction and reconciling ethnic tensions. The growth of
LDC research may be attributable to increased globalization of capital markets and
competition; structural adjustment programmes of development finance institutions;
newer less Western-centric accounting journals; the diaspora of accounting scholars Accounting, Auditing &
from LDCs to rich countries; and Western PhD programs that encourage candidates to Accountability Journal
Vol. 22 No. 3, 2009
pp. 469-514
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
The authors wish to thank the Research Foundation of the Chartered Institute of Management 0951-3574
Accountants for funding that made this paper possible. DOI 10.1108/09513570910945697
AAAJ conduct indigenous research. However, most research is on financial accounting. This
22,3 is unfortunate as management accounting systems (MAS) play an important role
within development:, e.g. central planning requires iterative budgeting between state
organs and enterprises, and current market-based policies are predicated upon private
interests fostering more efficient controls. Moreover, MASs bear directly on
development issues like governance, planning, employment and quality of life but
470 their enactment is problematic: local politics and cultures can transform them into tools
of coercion or external legitimacy rather than rational control and democratic
accountability.
Apart from editorial introductions summarising special editions of journals
(Alawattage et al., 2007; Hopper and Hoque, 2004) no review of MAS research in LDCs
exists. Previous reviews, notably Jaggi (1973), Samuels (1990), Wallace (1990), Needles
(1994, 1997), and Rahaman et al. (1997) focus on financial accounting but touch on MAS
issues[1]. This leaves potential MAS researchers ignorant of previous empirical
conclusions, and debates over policy, practice and theory. Hence the motivation for this
paper, which endeavours to voice to LDC concerns, stimulate interest in the area, and
debate how MASs might better serve humanitarian development.
The paper has three broad aims. First, it categorises MAS research by country,
stage of development, topic, methods and theory to track its themes to date. Second,
based on the authors’ work mainly in Bangladesh, Ghana and Sri Lanka, it outlines a
framework of MAS transition from colonial times to today. Third, this is used to
analyse discoveries to date and future research needs. The paper ends with
conclusions.
MASs
474
AAAJ
Table II.
ex-colonial LDCs:
Regimes of control in
Colonial Non-capitalist agricultural and Mainly Divide and rule Company states Imperialism TUs illegal and Colonial capital. Coercive control
despotism domestic production. Small traditional, tactics based on Minimal state weak Otherwise based on racial
(Actual capitalist merchant/and owner ethnocentric ethnicity regulation Weak labour minimal capital and ethnic
regime) class Closed and stable markets No capital market differences
Colonial capitalist enterprises in communities Nascent involving
primary sector unionism and physical violence
state regulation Accounting for
of industrial HQ regulations
relations and control
State Industrialisation Growth of Nationalism Bureaucratic Economic TUs recognised State banking Bureaucratic
capitalism Capitalist accumulation by modernistic, emphasised not state central development based Growth of Central bank rational-legal
(Ideal SOEs urban cultures ethnicity planning on industrialisation collective regulation accounting
regime) Fair distribution incorporating Legal-rational bargaining on Emerging but Enterprise
Continuation of small rational progress, authority industry basis weak capital budgeting within
merchants and traditional science and Intervention and market national central
agricultural production education, welfare oriented Deficit financing state planning
Closed economy meritocracy, Strong regulation for development Creation of
individualism and formal wage
and nuclear account-ability to bargaining and
family Parliament internal labour
markets
Politicised State extraction of surplus Cultural Divisions Legal-rational Factional and Powerful Weak politicised, Accounting for
state Hegemony of political criteria in fragmentation heightened structures of volatile political party and poorly external
capitalism commercial and production and diversity Ethnicity partly regulation Often unions regulated capital legitimacy
(Actual decisions More open and basis of party maintained but charismatic/dynastic Multi-unionism markets Ritual ceremonial
regime) Power with political elite linked less stable and political captured or leaders of parties Top down Bank failures practices only
to trade unions sub-cultures organisation ignored by rather than leadership Fiscal crises of MAS irrelevant
Distribution follows power and Increased politicians ideological Leaders from state lead to aid for internal
patronage urbanisation State patronage, Sometimes political elite dependency and controls
alongside strong often for party non-democratic TU membership reliance on Decisions for
traditional advantage Production and state and power in IMF/WB day-to-day
cultures Weak politics often public External activities
enforcement converge enterprises financing often captured by
for Cold War political players
reasons
(continued)
International
Ethnicity and State, regulation TU and labour finance and
Mode of production Culture race and law Politics markets capital market MASs
Market Market-based exchange Greater Considered Reduced state Democratic and Strong external Globalised Market based
capitalism relations and distribution individualism irrelevant. power, supply transparent labour markets capital controls
(Ideal Private ownership of and individual side economic government Weakened Trade Export zones Contemporary
regime) enterprises economic role Unions Stronger capital Western best
New public sector management self-betterment Oriented to Decline in markets practice
Consumerism attract industry-wide Greater financial Tight production
and materialistic multinational and collective regulation and targets
choice international bargaining enforcement Economic
capital Lowered Lessened political performance
Stronger capital employee intervention measurement
market and protection External
regulation, reporting for
especially of capital markets
utilities
Politicised Domination of capital over Mediation of Often the basis Regulatory Democratic parties Segmented External Private accounts,
market labour “modern” market of political and capture by based on labour markets financial agents top-down
capitalism Wider income differentials cultures with social decisions political-economic charismatic leaders between core especially physical budgets
(Actual Fractions of capital, ownership traditional and elites from socio-economic and periphery IMF/WB strong Return of
regime) diffuse/financial political Weak elites Trade unions influences on coercive control
institutions/multinationals/local enforcement Faction-alism based co-opted into policy but no physical
families Decisions on regions, religion political parties Family/crony violence
Crony capitalism politicised and ethnicity Lower labour capitalism Weak compliance
protection a alongside more of external
power multinational regulations –
capital financial and
Politicised non-financial
regulation and Toothless trade
privatisation. unions with low
bargaining power
Internal
sub-contracting
Management
accounting
475
Table II.
AAAJ delegated to regulatory institutions. State policies vary: usually they are instruments of
22,3 dominant elites but their interests and preferences may vary (Jessop, 1982). Access to
government resides in politics, be it in a legal-rational democracy, kingdom, or
dictatorship. In purportedly democratic systems (but not exclusively so) competing
political parties pursue interests and ideologies, though often LDCs have single and/or
dominant party systems that are not exclusively class-based and may represent a
476 shifting mix of ideology, race and ethnicity, regionalism, and religion, and be vehicles
for charismatic leadership. Often they are linked to trade unions – associations of
workers united in a single, representative entity seeking to improve workers’ economic
status and employment conditions by substituting individual bargaining within labour
markets with collective bargaining and workplace relations governed by rules and
regulations, i.e. an internal state. However, political and trade union action is
constrained by external capital markets (domestic capital markets being weak and
small). Development policies rely on finance from MNOs, international aid agencies,
foreign governments, and external financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF
who often influence domestic policies.
Each regime is rendered unstable by contradictions and conflicts that fuel political
struggles nationally and within production and lay the basis for new regimes.
Pre-colonial eras had indigenous MASs but subsequent MASs stem from external
interventions beginning with colonialism and, after independence, policy advice from
Western institutions promulgating state and then market capitalism. However, such
idealised regimes of control often presumed contextual factors at odds with actuality,
and ensuing contradictions and conflicts brought politicised state and market
capitalist regimes with unanticipated MASs. Thus MAS transformations are
contextually encircled, evolve historically, and are socially constructed. Figure 1
summarises this dynamic but contingent evolution: each epoch is illustrated with
examples from the authors’ research below. The expanded framework in Table II
provides the diagnostic tool used to analyse MAS research in LDCs.
477
Figure 1.
Stages in transition
accounting helps shape cultural identities. In Siam[6] apparently neutral and technical
accounts gave an economic base to Siamese national unity in the Bangkok period,
projected a Siamese national culture and political identity, and integrated regions into
the new nation-state (Constable and Kuasirikun, 2007).
However, colonialism was the norm. The colonial state assimilated traditional and
capitalist MOPs, initially through merchants’ capital, then commodity exports, and
finally through imperialism (Hindess and Hirst, 1977). Colonial rulers did not impose
capitalism generally but sought capital accumulation in the most profitable sectors –
often exports of primary products from plantations, estates, and mines. Nor did they
pursue industrialisation, e.g. jute manufacturing resided in Britain not Bangladesh
(Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980). Important segments like rural agriculture and cottage
industries were only reformed if attractive to finance capital. For instance, the East
India Company forced farmers to grow raw materials such as jute for export rather
than traditional produce. In Sri Lanka the British administration introduced a
plantation economy for tea, coconut, and rubber. But MOPs were not invariably
AAAJ capitalistic, e.g. in Ghana manual techniques predominated in cocoa production and
22,3 gold mining (Crisp, 1984; Robotham, 1989). Hence, particularly in rural areas with
feudal social relations, traditional cultures and pre-capitalist MOPs predominated in
sectors like agriculture, merchanting, and domestic manufacture, e.g. in Sri Lanka,
Sinhalese life centred on villages following a traditional Buddhist culture
(Jayawardena, 2000); in Ghana village life was based on tribes and subsistence
478 agriculture (Bryceson, 1999).
The colonial state had separate jurisdiction from companies. Formally, the imperial
centre was unique, unquestionable, and autocratic: it was the basis of politics and local
inhabitants could not question it despite being subject to taxes and rules. In rural areas
feudal politics often remained, albeit acquiescent to the colonial power. Accounting
was integral to subjectification. It promoted slavery in the British Empire and the USA,
especially on plantations (Oldroyd, n.d.; Tyson et al., 2004; Fleischman and Tyson,
2004); enabled absentee West Indian sugar plantation landlords to exert control from a
distance (Cowton and O’Shaughnessy, 1991), and helped imperial governments control
indigenous, slave and settler populations (Annisette and Neu, 2004). However,
subjectification was not invariably successful, e.g. taxation in British West Africa
failed to inculcate calculative and cultural values or gain consent to governance due to
local resistance (Bush and Maltby, 2004).
Research on indigenous people in developed countries gives insight on accounting
under colonialism (especially on Maoris, Aborigines, and first nation Americans – see
Auditing, Accountability & Accounting Journal, 2000, No. 3). For example, alien and
punitive accounting legitimated government confiscations of Maori wealth in New
Zealand (Hooper and Kearins, n.d.); colonialism and professional accounting firms
affected Maori women accountants’ experiences with deleterious impacts upon
individuals and communities (McNicholas et al., 2004); financial techniques and force
maintained colonial domination of indigenous Canadians and Mexicans (Neu and
Heincke, 2004); accounting discourses institutionalised and rationalised relations,
especially in land disputes, between the government and First Nations’ peoples during
Canada’s “birth” (Neu, 2000; Neu and Graham, 2006); and US government reports in the
1930s on overgrazing contained numeric tables, accounts and notional family budgets
constructed the Navajo as economic subjects and consumption units. Enacting the
recommendations brought economic and social disaster (Preston and Oakes, 2001;
Preston, 2006).
Colonial states relied on self-regulation by finance from international capital
markets operating within “company states” to control many economic activities
(Burawoy, 1984). Public administration concentrated on imposing capitalist
monopolies in selected sectors, and creating an infrastructure to procure raw
materials and labour, and shift commodities (Brewer, 1984). International cartels and
banks co-ordinated capital flows within territorial trade divisions agreed with the
imperial power, which produced a dual economy: traditional agricultural, merchant,
and domestic; and modern export. A small merchant and landowner class exercised
domestic capitalism but local capital accumulation was small, hence the limited
development of local capital markets, e.g. the Colombo Stock Market founded in 1896
confined its operations to MNOs.
Colonial politics divided people into white imperialists and local inhabitants. The
formers’ domination was justified through notions of racial superiority. Trade unions
were initially illegal. Rudimentary labour markets existed but many indigenous Management
workers had access to subsistence agriculture, so colonial firms often imported accounting
contract labour from rural areas or other colonies. The colonial power’s “divide and
rule” tactics compounded racial and ethnic divisions (Burawoy, 1985), e.g. Tamils
brought from India to work on Sri Lankan plantations had inferior prospects than
indigenous people; suffered discrimination; and subsequent Sinhalese and Tamil
worker conflicts produced ethnically driven MASs on tea estates (Alawattage and 479
Wickramasinghe, 2008). In Bangladesh the colonial state divided tasks according to
peoples’ religion, sending Hindu personnel to Muslim areas and vice versa to collect
rents and rates (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980). In Ghana, labourers brought forcefully
from the predominantly Moslem north to work in mines in the predominantly Christian
south were accorded lower status by Southerners who considered mining as dirty and
preferred managing (Crisp, 1984; Ayensu, 1997; Robotham, 1989). These ethnic
divisions still impact how MASs function in LDCs today.
Colonialism often brought despotic control regimes based on physical measures,
reinforced by sanctions like fines in large commercial companies[7]. Colonial
organisations had few concerns about securing consent as employees could not
question or resist colonial bosses and organised worker resistance was illegal.
Controllers were unregulated in the company state and had arbitrary powers that
extended beyond work, e.g. in Zambian mines, racial, physical and rudimentary rules
prevailed; physical violence was the rule despite native supervisors; workers’ wages
required completed “tickets” allocated at the whim of white bosses; and no job
structures or formal recruitment, promotion, and training rules existed (Burawoy,
1985). However, not all labour was “captive”: harsh controls fostered resistance
(Taylor, 1979), e.g. Sri Lanka plantation workers rioted against “white bosses” and
colonialism (Jayawardena, 1972). Disorganised resistance brought nascent trade
unions that linked with independence movements led by foreign-educated, left-minded,
local leaders and religious groups. Late colonial politics remained imperialistic but
political realities forced the state to recognise unions and rudimentary collective
bargaining (Kearney, 1971, 1973). Nevertheless, direct, coercive controls over labour
during colonialism meant abstract bureaucratic controls such as MASs probably had
little role. The emphasis of internal control lay upon production. Local costs were not
critical for profitability compared to international commodity prices and preferential
trading agreements. Imperial firms may have used MAS for planning and setting
targets for overseas operations but the emphasis lay on financial reporting for
stewardship and tracking remittances. However, these observations are tentative as
our search parameters omitted accounting history journals – in retrospect a
misjudgement.
State capitalism
Colonialism often bequeathed a relatively effective central state bureaucracy and legal
systems: elsewhere regulation was weak and underdeveloped. Many economies now
had capitalist and non-capitalist MOPs. However, agriculture and primary production,
and non-capitalist MOPs and cultures predominated, which left LDCs vulnerable to
commodity price shifts and the elements, and heightened their dependence on
international finance. Capital markets were small and weak: a small indigenous
capitalist class existed but large foreign firms were often dominant, e.g. Bangladesh’s
AAAJ small local capitalist class had little capital, concentrated on merchanting, and being
22,3 politically and economically marginal supported an expanded state sector (Sobhan,
1991, p.164). Within state capitalism the state dominates finance and capital markets as
it controls much of the Gross Domestic Product (and hence employment opportunities);
funds most industrial activities (often through international aid); and allocates
resources to public enterprises. Mobilising finance through capital markets was
480 deemed unnecessary – banking was concentrated in state banks and in Bangladesh
the Stock Exchange ceased activity. Similarly, in Sri Lanka and Ghana capital markets
remained inactive as most large companies were nationalised and state financed and
remaining large foreign owned enterprises raised capital abroad (Moss, 2003).
Influential, educated elites – often former employees of colonial organisations
and/or from privileged classes – held more modern Western beliefs. They supplied
many post independence leaders who embraced the politics of state capitalism[8]. This
advocated industrialisation, urbanisation, modern values, and nationalism. MOPs
based on central state planning of major commercial enterprises were introduced,
consistent with Western advice, socialist independence movements’ ideologies, and
pragmatic necessities. Building nationalism through state-led development sought to
counter subjects’ allegiances to families, regions, or ethnic groups that colonialism had
exacerbated. Issues of traditional culture were recognized but relegated to arts and
religious spheres in a purportedly secular state. Initially politics resided in
democratically elected governments in multi-party parliaments. The presumption,
reflected in constitutions, was that state executive action lay in a centralised
legal-rational bureaucracy staffed by officials appointed on merit and expertise to
serve the national well-being, reinforced by legal institutions left from colonial
administration.
Large SOEs were created with boards nominated by ministers. The intention was
for ministers and planners to set policy and managers to execute it, with accountability
to the minister-in Parliament. For example, in 1947 Bangladesh (East Pakistan) became
part of Pakistan (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980). The state created an industrial base with a
capitalist MOP, establishing state monopolies under state regulation in urban areas
(though raw materials and labour came from rural areas). The first Bangladesh
Government nationalised all industrial units but left rural agriculture and cottage
industry untouched. When it was overthrown SOEs held 92 per cent of fixed industrial
assets (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). After independence the Ghanaian government
nationalised foreign companies, consistent with allegiances to the Soviet Union.
Massive state investments in manufacturing SOEs and infrastructure in cities
followed – rural agriculture received little attention – despite employing 60 per cent of
the workforce. However, nationalisation was not total, e.g. some gold mines were
spared following deals between Western businessmen and politicians (Petchenkine,
1993). In Sri Lanka in 1956 a left-wing government nationalised all major public
services and most large industries but ignored agriculture and domestic industries
(Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005).
Ideologically governments were sympathetic to trade unions. Although labour
markets were weak, parties often had a trade union wing: they knew the political
significance of an organised working class, particularly in large organisations in urban
areas. Politicians, oft indebted to union backing during independence struggles,
reconstituted labour conflict into collective bargaining (Reuther, 1958). In Bangladesh
rules and regulations governed electing collective bargaining agents, labour courts, Management
consultation, and strikes. Workers gained rights to join trade unions but in return accounting
unions had to operate within an internal state that governed internal labour markets in
SOEs. For example, the Bangladesh soap company and the jute mills had detailed job
classifications; rules on wages, promotions, recruitment, and training; and permanent
employment (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). In Ghana, upon independence the Convention
People’s Party (CPP) government’s 1958 Industrial Relations Act recognised trade 481
unions and made collective bargaining binding but political rights for trade unions
were conditional upon registering within the CPP (Mihyo and Schiphorst, 1995).
Similarly, in Sri Lanka labour gained significant social and political status within
SOEs.
Nationalisation legislation gave the state considerable power over SOEs and
accounting was accorded crucial roles. The assumption was that central state planning
would act as a legal rational bureaucracy and some state intervention in management
control was expected. Audited financial accounts of enterprises, fed back through
Ministries to Parliament, formed the backbone of accountability and regulation.
Iterative budgeting that coordinated central plans with SOE activities formed the basis
of enterprise planning and control. Resource allocation decisions would be made
centrally according to relative returns and development priorities. For example, the
initial Bangladesh government formulated a two-year plan aimed at agricultural
self-sufficiency, import substitution, and industrialisation. Regulations, Financial
Control Directives, and Presidential Orders made enterprises accountable to state
institutions, especially the Ministries of Industries and Finance and Planning. Rigid
rules and regulations governed the preparation and approval of accounts. Each SOE
must submit annual accounts to the government under the Bangladesh Industrial
Enterprises Act. The Comptroller and Auditor-General through the Office of the
Director of Commercial Audit audited these, and the Public Accounts Committee
reviewed their reports on behalf of Parliament (Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Uddin and
Hopper, 1999, 2001). In Ghana the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning became
responsible for budget allocations in each SOE, which needed ministerial approval.
The Auditor General’s Department with the Comptroller and the Accountant General’s
Department annually audited accounts (Killick, 1978). In Sri Lanka, Parliament
established financial regulations and establishment codes for ministries to regulate
SOEs. The Auditor General audited public sector accounts, financial procedures,
budgets, and related reports and the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee could
investigate them (Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005).
Initial MAS and development research reflected beliefs in central state planning,
public ownership, and industrialization: it accorded accounting a central role. Ndzinge
and Briston (1999), and Seidler (1967) claimed timely and reliable accounting
information for investment decisions and national economic planning would promote
growth. Seiler (1966) claimed accounting systems supply important financial data to
business and the state but accountants were marginal and provided inadequate data,
hence the need for accounting education and professional development within a
self-governed accounting profession. Needles (1976) argued that institutions that
transfer accounting technology (education bodies; international organisations;
government agencies; MNOs; international accounting firms; and local companies
and accounting firms) should create a sub-plan within the overall economic plan to this
AAAJ end. Budgets were seen as cornerstones of planning and monitoring; accounting
22,3 information crucial to rational central resource allocation; and financial accounts to
accountability. Enthoven (1982) saw MAS as the most important as it, “assists
development programming in determining and improving efficiency and productivity”
(Enthoven, 1982, p. 109) and he sought an international, interdisciplinary MAS theory
serving socio-economic aims.
482 In retrospect these early writers identified the neglect of accounting in development
practice, policy and research. Their contributions were admirable if Utopian. They
subscribed to the idealised state capitalist development model and promoted Western
techniques and institutions. Their contributions were ambitious, deductive and
normative but light on empirics, application, or theory of any ilk. Some later papers
dissented. Needles (1976) emphasized that accounting choices required greater
understanding of LDCs’ social, cultural, political and legal environments. Mirghani
(1982) advocated broader MASs incorporating indigenous not Western development
models to reduce uncertainty in development planning. Ghartey (1985) expressed
pessimism, claiming that in most African countries, governments’ monopoly of power,
bureaucracy, conflicting policies, ineffective institutional structures, and cronyism
rendered MASs marginal and ineffective; poverty and dominant elites’ lack of
motivation stymied adoption of technologically advanced systems; cultures based on
extended families led to corruption, malpractice, and everyday life characterised by
fear, tension, insecurity; and the attendant uncertainty produced recurring managerial
crises. In short, he counselled that effective MASs require good governance. This paper
picks up these themes, arguing that when idealised state capitalist systems hit
actualities they often became vehicles for political factionalism[9] resulting in MASs
assuming unanticipated roles.
Market capitalism
Market capitalism often emanates from World Bank and IMF structural adjustment
programmes’ (SAP) loan preconditions stipulating free trade, competition, private
capital, limited government intervention, and public sector reforms (Toye, 1994; Cook
and Kirkpatrick, 1995; Hemming and Mansoor, 1988; Cook, 1986). SAPs instruct LDCs
to create conditions conducive for international finance capital and capital markets by
eliminating subsidies, price controls and import barriers; reorganising and lessening
public ownership of domestic banks; promoting private banks and domestic capital
markets; privatising or closing SOEs; and introducing “new public management”
(NPM) in government agencies. They promote legislation that forces trade unions
(especially public sector ones) into collective bargaining, severs their party links, and
AAAJ curtails labour rights, especially in export zones. Market mechanisms should
22,3 co-ordinate and control, and thence stimulate economic performance – not state
regulation reliant on problematic accounting inputs (Peasnell, 1993). Market capitalism
pays little heed to culture, race and ethnicity assuming a capitalist MOP with modern
management controls will induce worker discipline, effort and co-operation; empower
managers to exploit economic rent opportunities; and engender meritocracy,
486 individualism, legal rational beliefs, and obligations to employers. The aspiration is
for the state to play a greater supply-side role, follow legal-rational not partisan
decision making, and create infrastructures conducive to market capitalism by
promoting law and order, financial and commercial mobility, education and training
congruent with market needs, and regulatory bodies, especially for privatised utilities
where monopolies prevail; protecting property rights, and for politics to consist of
parties competing to deliver such regimes.
SAPs were enforced in many LDCs confronting fiscal deficits. In Bangladesh the
initial socialist government fell partly because SOEs’ losses consumed 30 per cent of
project aid. Subsequent military governments facing domestic opposition and fiscal
deficits had to accept loan conditions from financial agencies demanding privatisation
of SOEs (whether loss-making or not) (Uddin and Hopper, 2003). In Ghana Dr
Nkrumah’s government (1957 to 1966) fell and the military National Liberation Council
and then the civilian Progress Party (PP) governments implemented IMF/World Bank
economic policies incorporating privatisations in 1970 but Colonel Acheampong’s
military government deferred them after popular backlash. Nevertheless, the Soviet
bloc decline forced Ghana towards Western financial institutions. It became an early
Sub-Saharan African country to adopt SAPs (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Tsamenyi
et al., 2002). In 1983 Rawling’s military government accepted IMF/World Bank
recommendations to reduce government market interventions, encourage domestic
savings and foreign investment, privatise SOEs, and improve the balance of payments
(Petchenkine, 1993; Tsamenyi et al., 2004). In Sri Lanka in 1977 a new right-wing
government pursued an “open economy”, and under IMF and World Bank pressure
embarked on privatisations and rolling back the public sector (Wickramasinghe et al.,
2004).
SAPs require effective accounting but development economists and policy makers
often neglect this. They incline to macro-economic solutions presuming that
accounting is technical, unproblematic, and flows automatically from market
relations. Ndzinge and Briston (1999) despair at poor links between accountants and
development specialists, and accounting technology transfers unadapted to local
conditions. Too often non accountants assume that accounting, especially if it follows
international standards, will provide the information and transparency necessary for
financial markets to invest optimally and make enterprises accountable to them. It is
assumed that stronger agency relationships; fears of hostile takeovers and dismissals
of recalcitrant managers; improved technology; and greater competition will improve
controls within and over enterprises. However, this is questionable: SAPs may initiate
new forms of despotic control within reconstituted patronage politics.
SAPs provide macro-economic solutions to fiscal problems. They only indirectly
deal with delivering aid programmes. Here NGOs have assumed a major role[10]. Until
the 1980s they received little attention but they are now numerous: there are possibly
two million in India. They provide emergency relief, health care, education and
training, housing, legal services, and micro-credit. Their growth has been attributed to Management
government failures to promote and deliver development; NGOs’ superior efficiency, accounting
flexibility, honesty, transparency and accountability, and their reach to disadvantaged
groups, especially the very poor and women. International finance and aid agencies
(often NGOs), and foreign governments have increasingly transferred projects from
LDC governments to NGOs to transcend political factionalism in the belief that NGOs
are more transparent and accountable (especially to beneficiaries) and have more 487
effective internal controls. However, there is little accounting research on whether this
is so.
Conclusions
So, “What do we know about MAS in LDCs?” Research is growing, with a broad
geographical spread across LDCs at different development stages but is not extensive
in any country apart from China. However, many contextual factors and issues are not
AAAJ unique to LDCs – it is wrong to ghettoise LDC research as exotic and irrelevant to
22,3 mainstream accounting research. Nevertheless, LDCs are relatively distinctive as they
have a larger residue of traditional cultures and MOPs; their poverty renders them
more dependent on external finance, ideologies and structural reforms, with lower
institutional capacity to deliver change. This limits locals’ ability to determine political
choices and state mechanisms of governance. A primary MAS research aim must be to
496 foster understanding to facilitate local choice rather dictating systems from rich
countries premised on possibly alien values, to improve material conditions and
quality of life, especially for the most disadvantaged.
LDCs have shifted from traditional, often feudal MOPs (though some sectors had
MOPs akin to capitalist forms) to socialist state capitalist and then market capitalist.
Each embodies distinctive MASs, broadly conceived. The legacy of transition is MOPs
in tension with each other and local cultures, reinforced by ethnic differences.
Pre-colonial MOPs incorporated traditional cultures, whereas subsequent ones reflect
modern values. Local society often supported transition. However, the means were and
still are premised on Western practices imposed by external agencies. Research reveals
that subsequent MASs in SOEs and government departments often failed to operate as
intended, whereas in private companies, especially under market capitalism, they were
often adopted with alacrity as they helped secure commercial but not invariably
development aims. So how might research progress with regard to the interplay of
MOPs, culture, and ethnicity?
More needs knowing about MAS and cultures. First, historical studies and
ethnographies of traditional sectors (including indigenous peoples in rich countries)
need to identify how local cultural attributes are reproduced in distinctive forms of
accounting and accountability. Only then can MASs be adapted to local circumstances
and preferences. MAS research has much rhetoric on the failure to incorporate local
practices but it is weak on revealing what they are. Research concentrates on large
organisations, often foreign owned, and neglects indigenous small and
micro-organisations where cultures may be more collectivist and inclined to
informal trust. We need to ascertain whether the latters’ MASs incorporate local
cultures, not least regarding familial values, rights and obligations and their effects.
Second, more research is needed on NGOs, especially whether their work with the poor,
often in rural agriculture, domestic industry, and micro-enterprises develops effective
MASs that resonate with traditional cultures and MOPs whilst delivering the
development goals sought. This is almost virgin territory for accounting researchers.
Third, research in private companies suggests that economic liberalisation drives MAS
development but issues of culture, ethnicity, corruption, coercion, and political
patronage still abound. Studies here should assess MASs not merely on economic
performance criteria but also against broader development goals.
Next we turn to state and regulatory issues. LDCs in this review range from
so-called “failed states” with dictators unconcerned with development, sometimes
undergoing long-term civil wars or lacking rule of law, to “newly industrialized
countries” with advanced economies but lacking some developed country attributes.
This makes generalisation difficult but some issues warrant consideration. We need to
know more about the catalogue of indifference to MASs in SOEs and some government
agencies. The bleakness of MAS research here is surprising given that SOEs’
effectiveness compared to private corporations remains contested. Studies of MASs in
effective state organisations might resolve this conundrum. Also, in poor countries Management
greater consideration might be given to simple MASs for control rather than complex accounting
long run planning systems. LDCs often have weak regulatory structures – three issues
warrant further study. The first concerns labour. State capitalism recognised trade
unions and collective bargaining but fused them with parties and politics to the
detriment of commercial MASs and efficiency. However, market capitalism has
weakened unions and labour, sometimes to the detriment of work conditions, 497
remuneration and employment. Are commercially effective MASs predicated upon
weakening labour, and if not, then how are labour-capital conflicts reconciled? Second,
MAS deficiencies in local banks and their regulation are major development concerns
unaddressed by researchers. Bank failures and capital provision were problematic
under state capitalism due partly to weak accounting controls and it is not clear
whether market reforms have improved access to credit, especially for the poor. Third,
how capital market and financial accounting changes associated with market reforms
precipitate MAS change is poorly understood. For example, Egyptian accounting
development from 1961 to 1997 was partly related to stock market development and
SOE privatization (HassabElnaby et al., 2003); African countries that modified IASs to
local conditions had higher economic growth than those ignoring IASs (Larson, 1993)
but economic growth, equity market development and IAS adoption were negatively
correlated in 27 LDCs (Larson and Kenny, 1995). Only two studies have examined
whether capital markets affected MASs either directly or via financial accounting. The
first suggested that LDCs with weak capital markets and accounting infrastructure
investment avoided high risk projects at a cost to diversification (Lee, 2001); the second
found listed companies on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange that released timely audited
final annual reports had more modern technology and stronger internal controls
(Owusu-Ansah, 2000). More interchange of capital markets, financial accounting and
MAS research in LDCs is needed to integrate research findings and formulate policy.
Previous MAS research has concentrated on social and critical theories, possibly
because they are open, grounded, process oriented and exploratory; give voice to
neglected constituencies; are sensitive to ethnocentricity, and address dynamic
political issues ranging from ideology and language to class struggle and globalisation.
The scarcity of quantitative work may be attributable to the paucity of published data
on MASs, and difficulties obtaining reliable responses from subjects unused to and
suspicious of surveys. Exploratory bottom-up methods using case studies have yielded
rich pickings and remain apt. However, their preponderance may inadvertently
prioritise cultural and political factors over economic ones. Relating MAS change to
capital markets and financial accounting may require more aggregated economic and
archival work. Larger sample survey studies may identify what Western systems are
inapplicable to LDCs – is it in entirety, degree, or just parts, and when, where and how
(Baydoun and Willett, 1995). The volume of survey and statistical work in
development studies, financial accounting, and finance appertaining to LDCs suggests
this is feasible. However, triangulation and eclecticism over theories and research
methods is required: research on LDCs is too scarce to be discarded on grounds of
methodological predilection.
Lastly, we turn to politics. As our review reveals, many accounting problems in
LDCs are socio-economic and political not technical (Wallace, 1990). We found no MAS
unique to LDCs. Nor does this article prescribe any MAS for LDCs – rather it seeks
AAAJ understanding and systems that aid dialogue and choice within local political
22,3 processes. Two political issues warrant further research. First, more consideration
should be given to systems that empower civil society. Often LDCs have powerful
governments but weak and corruptible governance. State capitalism encouraged this,
but market reforms, especially NPM, may diminish local politics and civil society’s
influence. In addition, the turn to NGOs may weaken the state, though not the influence
498 of civil society. The association of MASs with such trends needs investigation: local
democracy may outweigh efficiency considerations, especially in the public sector.
There is a need to design systems that empower citizens, however disadvantaged, that
promote effective governance rather than relying on MASs imported from rich
countries.
Second, more needs knowing on how external institutions frame MAS policy and
practice. Wallace (1990) claims accounting in LDCs is a tale of importation of Western
practices and institutions by transnational accounting firms, Western professional
associations and consultants, MNOs, international projects, and recommendations of
international accounting committees. This raises concern. Hove (1986, 1990) alleges
that standardised accounting will fail LDCs as it favours colonialism, powerful foreign
investors and professional accountancy institutions from the developed world. For
example, MNOs not local companies’ influenced Fiji’s adoption of IASs (Chand, 2005).
Accounting, including MASs, in many LDCs remains influenced by professional
associations from former imperial powers (see Auditing, Accounting and
Accountability Journal, 1999, No. 3), often acting within a constellation of
transnational governance agencies, aid institutions, treaties, professional and
consulting firms, and MNOs. Their lobbies in Europe and the USA create a global
market for accounting and auditing services through World Trade Organization
agreements that negate domestic regulations, licensing and qualification requirements,
and technical standards reduce domestic regulation and democratic economic
governance (Arnold, 2005). Similarly, multinational audits promote globalization and
their commercialization facilitates audit firms’ diversification into advisory services
(Barrett et al., 2005). We know international capital providers influence MAS reforms in
LDCs but not much on how, by whom, on whose behalf, and its consequences within
everyday practices. An exception is Wickramasinghe et al. (2007) who claimed the
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants diffusion of balanced scorecards in
Sri Lanka typified attempts to globalise Western MAS knowledge. It failed in the firm
investigated due to professional rivalries, the rise of alternative fads or techniques, and
the owner’s reluctance to relinquish older financial tools. Also, many MAS reforms
emanate from international financiers like the World Bank, the IMF, and the United
Nations. Studies of Delco in Sierra Leone and a Latin American education project claim
that World Bank practices and discourses promote neo-liberalism, globalize Western
financial practice, and deny local experience (Neu and Ocampo, 2007), and accounting
in loan agreements re-structure governance mechanisms bringing financial
technologies alien to LDCs’ customs whilst reaffirming the World Bank’s expertise,
legitimacy and influence (Neu et al., 2006). Saravanamuthu (2004) alleges that World
Bank accounting cannot reconcile competing stakeholder needs as it emphasises
economic necessities and neglects social and environmental degradation. However,
Annisette (2004) claims this ignores institutional pressures on the Bank to manage the
global economy on private international capital’s behalf. Concern about international
capital providers has provoked calls for greater scrutiny of their knowledge diffusion Management
role, who they serve and how, and research on the IMF’s accountability and accounting
transparency; how it monitors debtor nations and projects; its links with the finance
industry; and accounting firms’ role in IMF programs (Arnold and Cooper, 1999).
Politics surrounding MAS reforms in LDCs transgress their boundaries and include a
constellation of institutions whose processes and effects remain poorly understood.
The politics of governance is not just a poor country problem: rich countries, 499
especially Luxembourg, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA are net recipients of capital
inflows from LDCs without resources and institutions to effectively regulate financial
transgressions. Rich countries must make corrupt business practices abroad illegal
and subject to domestic audit with meaningful sanctions for transgressions; and
enforce legislation, often from the United Nations, on capital flows into bank accounts,
reduced bank secrecy, transparent MNO accounts, regulating on-shore and off-shore
tax havens, sharing taxation returns with other countries, international transfer
pricing regulations, and protecting “whistleblowers”. MNOs, especially extractive
ones, have particular responsibilities. The exploitation of societies lacking capitalist
values or institutions, effective regulation, and symmetrical bargaining power raises
major ethical issues for MNOs operating overseas, their managers, governments
hosting MNO headquarters, international capital markets and accountants to fairly,
transparently and accurately assess profits, commissions and taxes due in particular
locales; help LDC governments strike economically sound contracts with MNOs; and
prevent environmental and social degradation. Caveat emptor cannot prevail in
inequitable situations. Professional responsibilities of accountants, businesses, and
MAS researchers transcend borders and should incorporate ethical and humanitarian
dimensions in the public interest. They should actively support NGO campaigns like
“Publish What You Pay” launched in 2002 seeking greater audited, transparent
payments, receipts, and management of revenues from the extractive sector; for
discrepancies to be reconciled; more effective use of resources within LDCs; greater
combating of corruption; and improved corporate social responsibility. MAS research
has a political dimension to prevent market-based regimes reverting to political
patronage and coercive controls.
Notes
1. Needles (1994) classified research on Asia-Pacific countries from 1965 to 1990 by country,
methodology, and subject over five-year periods but just 3 of the 100 papers are MAS.
Needle’s second review (1997) of International Journal of Accounting Research articles from
1965 to 1996 found only 6 of 126 were MAS: five deductive and descriptive, and one
empirical.
2. In LDCs external institutions and governments often commission policy papers from local
academics or consultants – alternative academic research funding is negligible and dividing
academic and practice is an unaffordable luxury.
3. The World Bank uses Gross National Income (GNI) criteria to categorise economies
according to four stages of development: low income ($905 or less); lower middle income
($906-$3,595); upper middle income ($3,596-$11,115); and high income ($11,116 or more).
4. The United Nations (UN) has two widely accepted indices. The human development index
(HDI) measures three dimensions: life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted real
income ($ per person). The human poverty index (HPI) measures deprivation using four
indices: percentage of people expected to die before age 40; percentage of illiterate adults;
AAAJ percentage of people without access to health services and safe water; and percentage of
underweight children under five. It classifies economies into four categories: LDCs (50);
22,3 developing economies (168); economies in transition (20); and developed economies (42).
5. Two similar frameworks were found. Gray (1989) identifies how global factors, culture and
politics, history, religion, professional associations, capital markets, and legal systems
influence national and international accounting. These broadly correspond with factors in
our framework. However, Gray’s model is oriented to financial accounting (but touches on
500 MNO controls and transfer pricing), only tangentially addresses LDCs, is oriented to
statistical testing of dubious validity (e.g. Hofstede’s (1980) measures of national cultures),
and neglects transformation. Olowo-Okere and Tomkins (1998) identify three evolutionary
stages of government financial controls in the UK and Nigeria, and attribute ineffective
financial changes in Nigeria to external pressures from the World Bank and IMF, internal
political instability, political ideology, the economic climate, and financial stress. Their
model is confined to Nigeria and government accounting but its dynamic, evolutionary and
contingent stages resonate with our own.
6. Now Thailand, one of few non-Western countries to escape colonialism.
7. Ensuing regimes of control are labelled “colonial” because one racial group dominated
through political, legal and economic rights denied to others (Spearpoint, 1937), and
“despotic” because management controls tended to be arbitrary, racial, physical, and
coercive. Despotic controls are also hegemonic as they secure consent by legitimizing
capitalism and downplay other stakeholders’ influence (see Ezzamel et al., 2008).
8. Defined as “the fusion of monopoly forces with the bourgeois state to form a single
mechanism of economic exploitation and political domination” (Jessop, 1982, p.32).
9. This is when a particular group assumes power and advances their positions through goals
and agendas not shared by other sectors of society, i.e. they pursue self interest at the
expense of the common good. Leadership is often personality based and power maintained
through exploiting offices and patronage.
10. NGOs form social movements within civil society, providing services and advocacy.
Defining them is problematic: Anheier (1992) identifies five features: formal, private,
non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary.
11. The World Bank defines NGOs as “private organizations that pursue activities to relieve
suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social
services, or undertake community development” (Operational Directive 14.70).
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Further reading
Burawoy, M. (1979), Manufacturing Consent, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Perera, M.H.B. (1989), “Accounting in LDCs: a case for localised uniformity”, British Accounting
Review, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 141-58.
Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J. (2002), Assessing Frontline Service Delivery, Development Research
Group, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Egypt (3)
Hassan, 2005; Kholeif et al., 2007; Van-Triest and Elshahat, 2007.
Ghana (5)
Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2002; 2004, n.d.; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005.
Malawi (2)
Mserembo and Hopper, 2004; Tambulasi, 2007.
Mauritius (1)
Soobaroyen and Sannassee, 2007.
Nigeria (3) Management
Asechemie and Ikeri, 1999; Olowo-Okere, 1999; Olowo-Okere and Tomkins, 1998).
accounting
South Africa (1)
Waweru et al., 2004.
Tanzania (2)
Goddard and Assad, 2006; Satta, 2006. 511
Uganda (1)
Awio et al., 2007.
Zambia (1)
Dixon et al., 2006.
Asia (38)
Bangladesh (8)
Alam, 1997; Alam and Lawrence, 1994; Hoque, 1995; Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 1997; Rahman,
and Scapens, 1986; Uddin, n.d.; Uddin and Hopper, 2001.
China (17)
Bromwich and Wang, 1991; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004, 2005; Chan and Chow, 2001; Chan and
Lee, 1997; Chan et al., 2001; Chu and Rask, 2002; Lin and Yu, 2002; Firth, 1996; Liu and Pan, 2007;
Maschmeyer and Ji-Liang, 1990; O’Connor et al., 2004, 2006; Scapens and Ben-Ling, 1995;
Scapens and Yan,1993; Skousen and Yang, 1988; Yan and Gray,1994.
India (1)
Anderson and Lanen, 1999.
Indonesia (3)
Efferin and Hopper, 2007; Marwata, 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2008.
Malaysia (2)
Chun, 1996; Tales and Sofian, 2007.
Pakistan (1)
Ansari and Bell, 1991.
Thailand (1)
Virameteekul et al., 1995.
Pacific (3)
Fiji (2)
Alam et al., 2004; Sharma and Lawrence, 2005.
AAAJ Kiribati (1)
Dixon, 2004.
22,3
Latin America (7)
Brasil (1)
Guerreiro et al., 2006.
512 México (2)
Frucot and Shearon, 1991; Leach-Lopez et al., 2007.
Venezuela (1)
Rivera, 1982.
Syria (1)
Abdeen, 1980).
Global (3)
Borkowski, 1997; Cools et al., n.d.; Satta, 2004.
NGOs (2)
Goddard and Assad, 2006; Soobaroyen and Sannassee, 2007.
Questionnaires (10)
Borkowski, 1997; Chun, 1996; Collins et al., 1997; Firth, 1996; Frucot and Shearon, 1991;
Leach-Lopez et al., 2007; O’Connor et al., 2004, 2006; Van-Triest and Elshahat, 2007; Virameteekul
et al., 1995.
Corresponding author
Trevor Hopper can be contacted at: trevor.hopper@manchester.ac.uk