140 ‘Har 0 Descng ane Pipe Cones ‘Rivers; Temario, 1068, Democrtic Gvernanoc and Late Indutiiation’ In Flomena Ste. ‘Ana IL ed The Stata he Markt Byron o Sail Oriented Philippine Kons Quezon (ity: tena de Manila University Pees 2001, “Political Clans and the Pilippine Stele A Rethinking” Paper read a Sophia ‘University Tokga, 18 May. $008, "The Crisis of Philippine Democracy” In Hsn-Huang Michal Hag ed. ian New Denaccee The Philippines South Horenand Taian Cinared alan: Taivan Four acon for Democracy. ‘Schad, et al. 1997, mera Grvrian ond Polis Tad CA: Wadsworth Publishing Com pay ‘Senufer, Robert 1970.“Congress in the Phiipine Pla! System In A. Kornberg and 1. D. Molt ed. Legare in Development Persp, Durham NC: Duke University Pres. ‘Third World Srdies Center (TWSC), 199, Ply Ess, Rayoues end Castiucie State Ciil ‘Sori lation in Policymating, Quezon City: UP Pres and UP-CIDS. Veletco,Rensto, 1687, “Does the Philippine Congress Promote Democracy?" In Felipe Mirands ed. Dasacrtcation: Philippine Pespecon. Queron City University af the Phe ippines Press ‘Wilson, Franic 1006. Const and nx Conparatoe Pole: New Sesay Prentice Hall, ‘Wars, Davia. 1088, Filo Politi, haes and Lendons Cornell University Press. lesan Sas Courts, Justices, and Judgeslan Ten 40 Cours nies aa cg fis chapter on the Philippine Judiciary has three parts The first presents and desribes the organizational arrangement and structure of the court system. ‘The second looks into the different powers and functions of. the courts. The third relates ‘the judicial system to democratization by discussing the role, contribution, and significance ofthe judiciary in the project of making the Republic truly a con stitutional democracy. ‘Tae Juprcrany: Oncanrzat10N Figure 4.1 presents the different courts in'the Philippine judicial system and hhow they are relatéd and interconnected: * TR ani] [Cerreenren] | [emaamanm = ' f amare | | aE a ea ; I a ‘Share Groat Cone Maopetan Tal Coats (ere) Muni Trl Cours nes 6 arco). unis Malco TC) Mriepa Cet Trl Couts (were). Floute 4.1: The Philippine Suc System [NB The arrows indese tht the deisons and reling ofthe lower court an be brought ‘up othe higher court for appel or review: [At the apex ofthe judicial hierarchy is the Supreme Court (SC), composed of 2 chief justice and 14 associate justices. Tt hears and decides eases either en banc (hat i, as 1 fall court of 15 members) or nS divisions of 5 justices each. Mostly constitutionality questions and cases—that ig esses inwalving the consttutionality ‘of laws and other legal isuances and instruments—ate heard and desided en bane. ‘Also, when, in a division of § justices, the required number to decide a case (8 jus tices) does not materialize, the-case is then decided en bane, Art VII, Sec 43) of the 1987 Constitution adds that “rio doctrine or principle of Iw laid down by the Court in a decision rendered on banc or in division may be modified or reversed ‘except by the Court sitting en banc” eArTE 60 Conn oe es M43 Direc below the Sis the Cout of Appeals (CA), compose of 1 presiding Jiutie and 68 justices. es organized inco 28 divisions with 3 justioas each. Cases ‘te heard and decided by these divisions. Fr purposes of assigning end locating the divisions the entire Philippines is divided. into thirteen judicial regions. The judicial regions corespond to the administrative regions. The divisions are am ranged as flows: + Divisions 1-17 (based in Man): covers che frst to thu Metro Manil (the National Capital Region judicial region; + Divisions 18-20 (bse in Cebu City) coves the sath to eighth judicial regions; and + Divisions 21-28 (based in Cagayan de Oro City: covers the ainth 10 the twelfth jul regions regions and En bane, or as one fll court, with ll 69 justices presens, i exercises adminis trative, ceremonial, and nonadjudicatory functions. Ft never hears and decides cases fen banc but always in its divisions. The CA had been called such for quive a time until it was renamed “Intermediate Appellate Court" by the Judiciary Reorganina- tion Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 198). But hes been called CA again since 1986, Directly below the CA are the Regional Trial Courts (RTC), formerly known (ntl 1988) as the Courts of First Instance (CFI), RT's are single, or monojudge, ‘courts. Thereis 1 judge per RTC, Thereis 1 RIC foreach ofthe 18 judicial regions” ‘An RIC for a judicial region (JR), owing to the size of 2 region, has several branchés located in keycities throughout the region. Allin all, there are 958 RTC. ‘ranches inthe 13 judieil regions ‘+ NCR IR: 276 branches “© JRA 72 branches. “© JR 2: 38 branches “JR 8: 99 branches “JR 498 branches “JR 5: 65 branches “JR 6: 69 branches “© JR 7 86 branches «JR & 49 branches “© JR 9: 30 branches 4+ JR 10: 44 branches + RA branches “+ TR 19: 25 branches Located at the base of the judicial hierarchy are the basic level tral court, for- erly called the “inferior courts’: The Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTC), Mu- nicipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), and the ‘Municipal Circuit Trial Cousts (MCTC), All these are on the sare level and all“4 crseren 0 Cours ses 2 aces are single, or monojidge, courts, They differ ony with respect to location, oF where sch a courts tbe ound, The MeTCs ae oun nly in Metco Man: their oun~ terparts in cities outside Metco Manila are the MTCCs, There are $2-MeTC branches distributed among the cites and municipalities in Metro Mani, Each city ouside Metro Manila has 1 MTCC. There are 12+ M'TCCs nationwide. MICs are fond in all-municipalities tha are not part of municipal circ. There are 458 ‘MICs nationwide, MCTCé are found in ll monicpal cieuits A municipal circuit isa group o cluster of beween 2 to $ small municipalities too small to have their ‘own MTCs There are 482 MCTC nationwide. Teri, for example, a MCTC cov ng the municipal crit of Asingan-San Manuel inch province of Pangasinan, and also 1 MCEC for the municipal circuit of Sellapaden-Bucloe-Daguiomaa in the province of Abra “The CA, RTC, and basic level tril courts were created by The Jadicary Reorgi- zation Act of 1980 (Baas Pambansa (BP) Big. 120). They replaced dhe old court system extablished'by ‘Te Jaiiary Act of 1918 (Republic Act CRA] No. 296) ‘The Sandiganbayan,populanly krown and called the “anigrafe court.” is com- posed of 1 presiding justice and 15 associate justices. Lik the CA, with which i is ‘on the same rang, it eXerises adjudicatory factions (ie, ears and decides cases) through ite 6 divisions of $ justizes each and exercises ronadjudicatory adminis- teatve, and ceremonial fanetions en bane. This special entigraft tribunal i 2 cre- ation of Presidential Deere (PD) 1605, issued by chen president Ferdinand E ‘Marco in. 1978, The PD bas been amended several times notably by RA Nos. 7976 (1995) and s2se (1997)! ‘The Court of Tax Appeals (CT), created by RA 1195 of 1954, as mended by RA 9282 (2008) and RA 9508 (2006) is composed oft presiding justice and 4 essociate justices. Like the SC, but unl the CA snd Sandiganbayan, it exer- cises adjudicatory fictions both en bane and through its 8 divisions of $jus- tices exch, Division decisions may be reviewed, reversed, modified, or affirmed by the GTA en bene “The sp~lled quas! judicial agencies are nt, tity epeakng, part ofthe ur 5 ranch ofthe government. They ae composed of independent consittional bodies end executive braich regulatory agencies and ofces authorized by law to bear and decide certain kinds of cases. The most important ones ae the: ‘+ Commission on Blestions (COMELEC) sl Service Commission (CSC) Commission on Audit (COA) National Labor Relations Commision (NLRC) Securities and Exchange Commision (SEC) Land Registration Authority (LRA) Social Security Comission Office of the President (OP)—when meting out preventive cuspension, suspension, and removal cases involving elected local government officials + Civil Aeronautie Board (CAB) (PTR Cosa ins egee 4s ‘+ Central Board of Assessments Appeal + Bureau of Patents Trademark and Technology Transfer + National Eletrifcetion Commission (NEC) ++ Bnergy Regulatory Commission (ERC) + Board of Investments (BOT) 7 + Philippine Atomic: Energy Commission ‘+ Department of Justice (DO!)— when making rulings and judgments on preliminary investigations in eiminal cases + Office othe Ombudsman (OMB)—when making rulings and judgments on preliminary investigations in graft exses involving public officials and also ‘when deciding administrative adjudication cases ‘+ Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) + Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), Rounding up the Philippine judicial system are the Shar's Courts. Thase spe cial civil courts for Muslims is.composed of a three-tier hierarchy: The Shari Appellate Court, the Shar’a District Courts, andthe Shari'a Circuit Courts. The latter twovare older, having been ereated by PD 1088 (The Muslim Personal Code of the Philippines), isued in 1977. The first Organic Act for the Autonomous Re- ‘gon for Muslim Mindanao (RA 6784 of 1989) created and added the Shari'a Ap- pellate Court, placing it on top of the hierarchy. The Appellate Court, on the same level with the CA is composed of 1 presiding justice and # associate justices, The 5 ‘Shari'a District Courts are loosted'and distributed among the 6 Shara districts as fallows: + First Shar’ District—covering Suls + Second Shar’ Distriot— covering Tawi-Tawi + Third Sharia District covering Basen, Zamboange del Norte and Sur, and the cities of Dipolog, Pagadian, and Zamboanga + Fourth Shari'a District— covering Lanao del Norte and Lango del Sur and the cities of Higan and Mara: + Filth Shari'a District—covering Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudaret, and the city of Cotabato, Finally the Shar'a Circuit Courts, at the bottom of the Shari'a hierarchy, are Uistributed as follows among the 5 Shari'a distriees: ‘+ 6 Sharis Circuit Courts in the First Shari'a + in the Second District +10 in the Third Distrie + 19 in the Fourth District 16 in the Fith District, From the discussion above, courts in the Philippine judicial system can be cas sifed as ether constitutional or statutory. Constitutional courts are courts crested(TO Car ce nee by the Constcution ite. Statutory courts are courts oeatd by statutes made by the legislature. The bass for this distinction is found in Art VII, Sect, ofthe 198% * Constitution: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court end in seh lower courts as may be established by law” From this provision, ony the Supreme Court is « constitutional court, deriving its existence ffom the fundamental lew ite self The rest of the courts are statutory, that is, “established by law” ‘The diferent courts can also be grouped ito either cllgiate o noneollegiat, ‘The collegiate courts are the SC, CA, Sandiganbayen, CTA, and Shar’a Appellate Court, These are courts with a college of judges and the judges of such courts are commonly called “justices” The rest are single, of monojudge, courts This difer. fence is germane in the context of Art VIIL, Sec 7, ofthe 1987 Constitution (2) No person shall be appointed! Metnher of the Supreme Court or any lower eol= legiate court unless he is @natural-born citizen of the Philipines (2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but 20 person may be appointed judge thereof unless he isa ctzen ofthe Philp, pines and a member of the Philippine Bar OF nore in this constitutional provision isthe mere stringent chizenship rex quirement for whoever i tobe designated a member ofthe SC and the “lower col Teglate courts" (CA, Sundiganbayan, CTA, and Sharia Appllete Court). Such Justices shouldbe natural-born Filipino citizens, unlike judges of lower courts who ave only required fo be Pilipino chien; inleating that even naturalized Filipina citizens.may be appointed juige of an-RTC, the basic lee trial courts, andthe Sharia District, and Cireuit Courts, ‘Tuk Jupicrany: Powers aNp FUNCTIONS Art VIL, Sec i, of the 1987 Constitution ereates the Supreme Court and exe bresaly vests judicial power in this Court and in lower court tobe established by Congress. The essence of “judicial power” isthe settlement of leg disputes or cor, {roversies between adverse parties so that rights are protected and wrongs are tes Aresse'In setting these legal disputes, courts are clled to interpret the law and apply it to the controversy at bar. To interpret the law” is meant simply thet it is ‘he courts that tel us, with binding authority, what tbe law means. Consider, for ‘example, a.controversial and dispited sentence in Art VII, Sec 4 ofthe 1987 Gon seltution: “The President shall not be eligible for any re-election" The provision ‘may seem self-explanatory to most people until a former president, ested under the 1957 Consttaton,dcltes tat he is eligible ro ran agin for the presidency tezuse he did not complete his sixyear term as he-was extraconstiitionally “ousted’ by a group of conspirators led by the then vice president. The formes resident offers hs interpretation of what this provision means and his interpre. tion is that this sentence supposes that an elected president completed his full six ‘Year term, That is that the reelection ban applies only to a president who served ‘he fal term, Those opposed to this interpretation wil post aother, saying that were) aoe Cours. et nes 7 mpd ea td ve ano who ha on pea dg Crp ene Bl 3m wi comin ee a et ieee tet ote) pte inating is ace rua Aaja SC hw ew a ‘means, And this judicial interpretation is binding on ail and settles a ca Me oon ue epee ‘courts themselves, Truly, the law is what the courts say it is, a a gt Se th th ns aps udp Te ita oes peda a fet eae chat el nd arin dee a enn ign aly dea etn repr) ite ener eo ete em cna tet peers ti nie! mt pry gaat cil ee anes fect et coco he ge ye ao intial ages ater ange at nmi or sing nyo te es ene ions arise Javon tothe partis is also a mater rch! wit jae fr cil suits Should the sued party be und Sully ofthe civil offense, s/he is obliged bythe ss i feof iged bythe court to pay damages to the pine part by the prosecutors from the Department of (DOD, agai ; ustce (D0), against another for many poral molt tht ae punished by the I as loves og eae There are ld ee hae 1 the country, the princial one i the Resace Penal Code, an “oll thet tok effect in 198. has been emenaey by Congress countless times Sines then but still stands as law, though smended, und today. Any law made by148 yarn 40 Cos ies ad es ‘Tame 4 ‘The Types of Action Givi Action (Criminal Action ‘Special Proceedings Ast brougheby one | Auitbroughthy theState | Inttated by partic that private pary against | agsinstaperson espected | seokto establish astra nother private party or | ofhaving commitecla | righ orapariealar fice the enoreement or floay defined and penal- protection oferightor | id by lw (eg the theprevention or redress | Ravsed Pessl Cos the of wrong. Plunder Act, the Ané-Graf. snd Corrupt Prstces Act, and other penal statues). Type Felonies dined nd Guardianship and 1. Ordinary-one party | penalized by che Revised custody of eidren: sins another for Penal Code (Acta 3616 | 2, Setdement of de- damages resating | of 1992) ceed person's state fromnonperiormance | 1, Crimes against national | 2. Adoption, ‘or violation of security andthe law of | 4. Rescsson and blgations arising revoution of dop- Fromlaws and ° tio, ceontsets fundamental laws of | 6, Habeas corpus, 2. Special estate, 6. Change of name, ‘+ Pattionfor certiorari; |. Crimesagsiastpublic | 7. Cancllstionor = + Pasion fr cer, ‘correction of entries in mandamus, 44. Crimes ageine public the cil registry, + Paton for incest 8. Legal separation prohibition; 5. Crimes aging pblic + Quo warren morals, + Expropriation 6. Crimes commited by | (eminent domain public offcers, + Acton forthe 1. Crimes against persons, reclame of 8 Grimes against per~ morigige: sonal Boer and + Paion for ~ security, | Gecaratry rela | 9, Crimes aginst prop- | + Aeon for partion of | erty el property, 10, Crimes against casi, | + Contempt ofcourt 1, Crimes aginst he cv proceedings status of persons; 1 Crimes agaist honor Cengress that says that suck and such act is a erie and provides punishment for any one found guilty of committing it is @ penal law, Felonies such as murder, bo- ricide, rebellion, legal possession of firearms, sedition, among others are enumer- ated, defined, andthe penalties for them prescribed in the Revised Penal Code It is (OPTED Cans ses re es Ms the DOL part of the executive brah of the govement, which posecute er sons or partis suspected oF having ented sch ein sts o omissions, is th uty ano ofthis exer departren to gather fats nore to eta the gulf the aeaused beyond reasonable doubt In eimin! ection, the esis that the acute eoniitted the erninal offense against the Sate and ot ure agaist he private vietim, By commiting the crime the acused offended the Sate and so the Stace isl fs these aghinet bm, ene, criminal cases are side “Parle varus 100" The “Pepe being the Sate The purshment Er ofeding the Stat/ People is deprivation of liberty imprisonment or ever of Ii (at the deat penalty if capital punishment allowed by aw). Te law provides, mar. ves, tht every person “rminlly ible or logis also lla (Art 100, eve Penal Cod) That a person convcied ofa riniralofense—found galley in erimialsit— ip alo ound guilty of ving commie a cv offense. The “emia sienna ibis done asia the State while te "se (ci ity) is commited ageinet the private vctn/s Hone a person und auilty of criminal charge not only commited to piso, but is ln ordred by the eourt to pay damages to his/her private vim In fc, Aris ofthe Revise Peal Coe provides: “Excae i ae of extinction of his cv ability as provided inthe next preceding rie, the ofeder shall continue tobe obliged to sts the Ci ity resting fom thecime commited by him, ocwthtanding theft thats served his eentenoe ontting of deprivation of Hort ote ht ‘or has nor been required to serve the sae by reson of amet. pardon, comm tron of sentence or anyother eens” ‘The einial- Eiligeioe Nitra Follee | PE fc he Constitutional Powers of the Supreme Court @aPjproracd det) a desonecfte | Shara it ‘The Constituional Powers of the Supreme Cou sad selec speimeices | Pru ema | e epas Jia ower | Quastiegstsve | Adninixratie | Speci Power = Eiytndprvindl sen | ofr Gta | jt ovr [pone Toner toseed atresia, enmiiner” | Jodgments a -« ovemtans ofthe Ofc of | broughetoitor | Tulings of Sh 1. Original Ponertomste ind | 1. Avi See | 1. Supreme theOnbotsinn andspecal | Teen | Groat Cours, ‘crmoinay | promlpteniss | 5} may Ossi the provers ¢. deco of te : sion wee | tegerding temporary | Presidential ~ Governimentownéd and Agile Sece- | Sars Iw spon | tioasfor | + Procedioaand, tasiga (ant Blectora, controled corporatians (GOCC) yen ‘only wh | ‘extraordinary enforcement of ‘more than six ‘Tribunal, and State Colleges and involving dumping | parties are Muslims writs, = ‘constitutional ‘months PET (Art Unive SEU) preideny |andoumterting | when ny bt eee cae a we Geeors testens managers i oe | ee 2 pple + Plating, pracies, | judge's the sole judge = Meads of Buestve Depa |Tanlfend Castoms | Shave lw eee shen tents nd Gabinete (Ces ade : antpecivein’ | cna ‘ll decton oes Saeguad metus errs Ree of | jig of prowess, = Member of Congres; eprint is Povertoreecig | Prosahiein Drercounsto | rvlving | 1 Minter oe fateary reve, cevien Gina Cut, | edertations | presidential ‘without peice to Supreme | 2. Eade orga im and meaty | and Specs 2. ArtViILScc | ind vice |” Grune predvets Judea ret decane oftowers | Proceings Ruler | (can order | presidental Gclneand damit lower | “nora coma cx Evens aetange ot | Sesion out jntesndjudgen cone ote Only etiusof | anrnal Res of | venuecr place | s. SC chiet | ~ Geman reson, | vt tw ar ee eae — oe ersofthe Constant | (th Nao tines Thatis, | subjectionpproal | 9, Are ViSees | Presiding Gonmneions nj Internal Revene . | i eoneappes- | by these) (happen | Oe fee Coe eogevete | Sle a Tit ac | ammo yd | atti ane berceuamlineabaanttesii “ajo” twxeoleton of the lower practice and employ- ‘Trial Court Graft cases are those involving casey tin ta ave coutshould | + Rates on Disber- ces ofthe (Senate) Sion of tng lave sehas. | vlton caer and provetatthe |” mentard Disc | jiaryin | when the PRN ore ofan terest es lower cout Binet Auornmys | seordnce | President it 2A tov ok tse, {nvlvng soon of jingecommit- | and duiger within ona (art D Ramet + | Pinlionormere tedanecrorin | +. Thelegrted “| 4, areVIlLSec | Xl, See) 2 RAbieot oot saying or Be ehasacnin- | 2. Sie sit + Critmes Committed by Public 1 Exclusive ppelite ‘interpreting & + Legal assistance to. istrative as members Officers under the Revised Fraie saapaigsad daw ‘the underprivi- supervision | of the Senate Pal a seco of RTCan » Rhecuses | ioe Suatewe | eee Se dota sere “trier offic and personnel. ‘Tribunal Serre Spee iteter ites | alliee Roles ae | chow (SET end 1 Serruptonof pli oficiels | + Decisions the CTA the acts of the | normally found inthe | + Poverto Howe EE ‘can be reviewed, ‘case established |- Rules of Court, oversee the Electoral 8 ovecoer femes/onies reviet eran, | tatielower | BicitesCry leo} operations of | Tribunal Sonate byte pb todd or afred ceureascne | cratenew miettat | allower (aRET art SHrantseetorel above wher | bytieca RA Soni oot | arenotputottie | commendio | Vike) thee were commie in “on and Ral 9 of taisfedwith | Rakes of Comc(eg | enurethat” | 4. SC Chet ‘elation to ther ofice” ‘be Rules of Cour) the cts | Raleon Amparo, they operate | Justi is ex ‘So FO (ose ob BA Non dw) RA Ne 1 (0) | Balen abe Dats) | i ‘td hy RA No 8008) ac} PD Nas (17) ane No 63100 a 206 (20).Curren Co pen ard sablishe, ‘may return the cueto the proper lower ceout(eg. RTO) tmestblish the fies, + Appea tothe SCisnevera mater of igh. Whether the SC willentertain or sive due course to ansppel is centre ite prerogative and ‘scretion The ‘one appesting should show and provera the SCesatisetion thatthe ower court judge comanited& preven, + Thethree shovemene tioned cond- sion arent apleallewben fhe ate involves persons con= ited of exer punishable by redlion perpen or ie Aimprisonment. Insthenres appeal becomes Amater oright sud otk ‘ston of aw and foctmay be reviewed by the sc, effectively, ficiently, and econo cally but swichout iteferesce to day-tocny activities Powerto require sslimission of reports and cnr the conduct of aut perfor= evaluation, sd inspecton to determine compliance with pois, standards and fpuielines of these, Power totake such action 34 say be neeesary fr. {he proper performance of oil fimetons, Including reetieation of vilains, abuses, and othe forms of rmildini- Are VIL, See Lispower to suspend and amis Lower courjusties and judges (celatd to this officio Chair ] oF the Sadia ena ‘Bar Conall (are VIM See ea) tne 50 Cau tes, es 55 Ji Rue 138, See 97 of the Rules of | Court that rants ewerto Aisbar o suspend rom fie ator | gj oe esos The CAsnd RICE say ho suspend an seorney for therame fees a8 the ‘SC may disbar cor eurperd— for example, deceit, sprain, sresiscor- (uct ino, | igressinmo- ality moral turpiude, | disobedience | | order et Rule 184 See 238, Rules of ‘Cours [Based on the tables presented above, the Pllippine courts may be farther classified into those vested with original jurisdiction, appellate Jurisdiction, or ‘oth, Courts with original jurisdiction can hear and-decide cases on first instance; that is cases could be fled before them directly without having to first go toa lower ‘court and then moving up to a higher court, Courts vested with appllate jurisdic ‘ion or appellate courts hear and desde appealed cases or cases on sppeal. Courts ‘with appellate jurisdiction, also knowa as review courts, are authorized to review, revise, reverse, modify, or alfirm the orders and decisions of the courts below it. ‘Among the Philippine courts, the following have both original and appellate juris- ition: Sandiganbayan, CTA, RTC, and Shari'a District Court. The basic level triad courts and the Shari'a Circuit Court, being located at the base of the judicial158 Covers Cour ea cgs ‘With respect to these extraordinary sit, the fllowing should be notes 1, In cases or proceedings involving petitions or any of these writ, there is al- ‘ways a petitioner (the one-who goes to court and asks the court to issue the ‘writ or take action) and a respondent (the one who is brought to coort and ‘whose actions are the subject of the petitioner's petition). 1, In cases involving petitions for writs of ‘cersiorai, prohibition, and mandamus, the respondent's affeays a-public offcer/ government office or agency: while in amparo, habeas data, habeas corpus, and quo warranto cases the respondent may either be a public oficer/agency or a private party. In all these eae, the petitioner is any aggrieved party (or the aggrieved party's relations), public or private 4. Inall these cases the petitioner has.to prove to the court that the respondent really has done something ilegil—that is that the respondent: «+ has acted “without oF in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction’ in certiorari and prokibition cases), «+ is legally bound to act in order to fala Tegal obligation or protec rights bout has not acted (in mandamus cases); « is illegally detaining-or legally has custody over the petitioner (in habeas corpus cases); «je volating or threatening ta violate the petitioner's right to lif liberty and security through an unlawlact or omission (in amparo cases is violating ‘or threatening to violate the petitioner's privacy and violation or threat of violation affects the petitioner’ life, Wberty, and security (in babeas data eases); of ilegally occupying or holding-public office or is ileglly functioning as @ corporation (in quo warranto cases) 44. Only when the court is convinced of the petitioners claim will the court take action and isue the petitioned wrt 5: Cases involving petitions for these writs are not criminal exses; rather, they are special civil cates (certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto}, spe cial proceedings (habeas corpus), or sui generis (armparo and habeas data). This ‘imply means that in cases involving petitions for these writs, che petitioner is not alleging that the respondent has committed a felony defined and penalized in the country’s penal laws. If the court finds the respondent guilty of the petitioner’ charge, the respondent will ot be sent to jail but his/its actions will be nullified and reversed: However, filing these noneriminel proceedings is with ‘out prejudice to filing separate crisinal actions against the respondent. For example: one who is patitioning for & writ of habeas corpus can also file rbi trary detention charges (a criminal case) against the police or military or kid ‘napping/llegal detention charges against the private party illegally holding the petitioner, COUPTEO Cau aa nd es 189 ‘Tae Jupiciakr ano Punuirenve Constitutional, DEMOCRACY Larry Disinond (196, 12) posit chat a tae that is truly a liberal democracy isan Bas tobe atthe same ime a canstituonal democracy. liberal democracy ix 2 regime that olds ie, si, and competitive elections; tat ig liberal democracy is an electoral democracy. But it goes beyond this minimal requirement for & de- rmocrany It has other characteristics that make it more than a mere electoral de- rocragg, such as constrtned exeetive power, minority groups with rights that are protected and: guaranteed, a vibrant civil society that affords citizens alternative avenes for polities! participation alernaive sources of information, guarantees forftesdom of speech and other related liberties, legal esi, judicial competence and independence, and the rule oflaw (11-19) A Iiberal demecracy is moreover a constitutional democracy, or “eonstttional state’ (Reckisaety tha isa “tate thet acts predictably. in acordance with che laws" with cours that enforce “restrictions cn populerly elected governments when they volt the laws or the constitutional rule” (12) A constitutional deroerac then, ia iberal electoral democracy with & constitution thats de facto and de jue supreme and ajicisystem that upholds ‘puarantets, and enfores this supremacy in order to counterval and balance polit- cal authority and protect individual and minority rights Fareed Zakaria (1997) makes a similar point when be observes that increas- ingly democracies worldwide are becoming “liberal demeeracies.” Increasingly, that i states continue to hold and conduct multiparty competitive elections, but Jeaders—in particular, chet exccuives—once elected, proceed to govers i x Iieral® fishin; outing institutional checks, circumventing if not completely contravening constitutional and legal-restraints, nd concentrating, too"much ‘ower in their own office. Alchouga used ina combined way in the term “bead democracy” and although really both observed in Western contexts, the v0 a pests oF component elements ofa “liberal democracy" “democracy” and 2con- situtondl Hberalism” —are “theoretically different end historically dstnct™ (22). Tat thsi indeed oo ie Becoming increasingly evident, he sys, outside the Wiest In these contexts while there is continued emphss on “democracy” (m= party competitive elections for policy-making positions). “constitutional Iiber- ali (Fepect for individual rights ‘and Ibert, separation of powers, rule of lew, nutual-check and balanes, impartial and independent judiciary) i neglected and often violated, Leaders value and pre multiparty electoral eompetiof, but once in-office use precisely thir “popular mandate” to disregeré institutional cheek, lout countervaling ules, and govern as they see fit. Thus are democra cies becoming more and more “liberal” Proceeding ftom Diamond and Zakari, the role, fanetion, and place of the diciary have more to do with upholding and ensuring “constitutional Nerf” rather than “democracy” We look t the jd sypter to guarantee, safeguard, and defend the fstittional arrangements ad rules tht make the tate “consti= tutional liberal state" and the regime a constitutional democrecy: «constitution tht,60, ‘CUeTER SC Cousens is supreme, and provides for mutual checks and balances, seperation of gowers, sad Individual rights and Uberti. In fact, the courts ae “undemocratic” given the way Judges and justices are seleted—they ae eppointed, not elected ofcals, Thomas Jefeson even oie rematted thet judges fore an “oligarchy” and tat co consider them as “the ultimate arbiters ofall consttuional querions woud pzee us under the despotism of an oligarehy"(Samtisgo 2000, 18) And yt this oligarchy is key to the establishment and consoldation ofan electoral demeeracy that atthe same time obseves and practices the principles and virtues of "consition Iiberalism; that, constitutional democracy “Two aspects cf the judiciary are germane and signicent to the project of building and conslidating a constitutional democracy: judicial independence and the power of judicial oF constitutional review. The first insulates the judiiary {rom the politcal branches of the government (presideney end Congres) and p tisan politi Its gal i also to preserve the judicial sytem against the vagaries of public opinion andthe corrupting effec of opaque legal pay. The second l= lowes the courts— notably and especially the SC—to counterail, chock, and bel= nce the other institutions of government, notably Congress ad the presidency. It is ¢ power that is necessarily adjunct tothe udal branch's ole as guarantor and sentinel ofthe Constitution, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE ‘The Philippine Conslution tks containe provisions tha: are designed and formulated to ensure and guarantee the independence ofthe jucial syste. In @ constitutional democracy the judiciary shouldbe rendered independent de jure and e facto fom three “pernicious Ps: (1) partisan polities (in parila, the two po- litical branches of the government: the presidency and Congres) (2) public opin- ion, and (2) payoffs The courts must decide onthe basis of what che law provides snd prescribes. It should not b beholden to any pod patron and so decide on the bass of political considerations. Neither hold ite decisions be determined oF influenced by the vagaries of public opinion or prejudice. And definitly corrupt deaing ilving pt desroy he cet od damage he very uty wo chines of the julia syste The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains provisions that together guarantee ‘nd ensure, at least on principle, judicial independence, These are the provisions on (1) the udiciary’s fiscal autonomy, (2) security of tenure of judicial officers, and (9) judicial sefxegulation or self-sdministration ‘rt VIL, Seo 8, provides that “the Jury shal enjoy ical autonomy.” It then proceeds to define in more specific tems what “sca autonomy” means and enc: "Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legstture below the amount appropriated forthe previous yetr and, after approval, shall be automatically and-regulrly related” The frst part of the sentence (appropria- tions may not be reduced) limits Congres’ ‘power of the parse” with respect othe APT 60 Cours as anges et Judiciny, Although Congress has the authority by virtue of its power of appro- Prations (Art VI, Sec 29) to decide how much funding 2 government entity or agency shall receive for a given fies] year, Art VIIL, See 8, mandates thatthe judi- cial department's budget for the present fiscal yeer ean never be lower than the previous year’s, The second part (approprasians once approved shall be autamati- cally and regularly releaoed) limits the executive branch's— notably the president's and Deparment of Budget and Management's (DBM)—power to release and dis- burse appropriated funds. An important adjunct to fiscal autonomy in Section $ is Section 10; “Fhe salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Sue ppreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their ‘continuance in ofc, their selary shall not be decreased” “Salary autonomy" is at ‘the heart of fiscal autonomy! ‘Are VII, Sees 2 and 11, together ensure and guarantee the seutity of tenure of the justices and judges of the courts Section & mandate that "No lav. hall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members” “Security of tenure” is then defined in Section 11, Ics the right of 1 jastce or judge to, once appointed to offic, continue to “hold office during gocd bbehavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to dis- charge the duties oftheir office” Helping uphold “security of tenure," notably of Justices of the SC, is Are XT, Sec 2, which provides that like the president, vice president, members of the Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and Civil Service Commission, and the Ombudsman, the chief justice and associate Justices of the SC may only be removed from office through the process of imm- ppeachment. Hence, although it i the president who, based on See 9 of Are VIII appoints members of the SC, the appointing authority has no power.to dismise ‘uch appointees. Jodicia sel-regulation and self-administration is provided for in Art VII, Sees (6), 6, and 11. Sec (6) gives the SC the authority to “appoint.all officials and ‘employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law” Sec 6 vest in the SC “administrative supervision overall courts and the personnel thereoé” Thus, the SC has the authority to 1) generally oversee the operations of ll courts and insure thet they are managed effectively, efficiently, and economically without ine terference-with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and ‘cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation, and inspection to determine compliance with policies, stendards, and guidelines; and (8) take zetlon as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, inluding rec- ‘ifation of violations, abuses, and other forms of maladninistation: This consti- tutional cuthority of the SC is exercised: through the Office of the Court ‘Administrator (OCA)? Sec 11 vests in the-SC the powe# to discipline judges of lower courts and order ther dismissal* The details ofthis constitutional provision are found in Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Therein it is provided that discipline ary proceedings ageinst lower court judges and callegiate court justices may be162 OurTE40 Conse anes instituted by the SC on its own (motu propio) or upon Verified complaint, Due pro- os is given the judge or justice subject ofthe proeelings The grounds for di plinary action ae classified into: +-Serious charges directo: indivee bribery dishonesty and violations ofthe Anti-Graftand-Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. $019} gross misconduct constituting violations of the: Code of Judicial Conduct; knowingly ren dering an unjust judgment or order a determined by a competent court in sm appropriate proceeding, convition of a crime invelving moral turpitude, ‘wilful fore to pay just dt; borrowing money or property from lawyers and itigants ina case pending before the cour: immorality, gross ignorance ofthe law or procedure; partisan politcal atvtes; and aleobolism and/or vicious habits 4+ "Less serious charges" undue delay in rendering a decision or.onder, or in teansmittng the cecords of cae frequent and unjustified absences without leave or habitul tardiness, unauthorized practice of law; violation of SC rules, directives and circulars; essiving addtional or double compensation unless specially authorized by law, untruthful statements in the certifeate of service and simple misconduct; 4 "Light charges": vulgar and. unbecoming conduc; gambling in pubic, featerizing with lawyers and litigants with pending easecases inhi court and undue delay in the submission of monthly reports Sanctions that may be imposed-— + For “serious charges’ dismissal from the service and disqualification from public office; suspension without salary and other benefits from three to six months oF fine of P30,000 to P0000: : + For “less serious charges’: suspension fom office without salary and other benefits from one to three months; or fine of P10,000 to 20,000, + For “ight charges fine of Pot0 to P1000; censure reprimand, or admonition with warning, Finally end equally important for judicial independence is Ar VII, See 8 svhich provides thc al justces and judges “shal be appointed by the President from alist of atlas thre nominees prepared by the Jia and Bar Counel fr every vacaney. Such appoinrients need no cbfirmation” This procedure dire from that provided in Are VIT, Se 5, ofthe 4935 Constintion: “The members of ‘he Supreme Court and al jigs of inferior courts sal be apeintd by the Presi denvwith the consent of the Commission of Appointments” The present Constit- ‘ion does avay with the need for Commision on Appentments (CA) coninration and instead creates aspeilcontional body called the Jail and Bar Council (786) thar has the “pineal faneion of recommending appointee tthe Jud ciary' (Art Vill, Seo (6)-Art VII, Seo o(t) provider thatthe JBC be under the supervision of the SC and be composed ofthe SC chief justice as ex officio cai, (sera Cans pic rs : 1a the secretary of justice and a member of Congress‘ as ex officio members and the following as regular members appointed by the president wich CA consent for a four-year term: a ropfesentative of the Integrated Barf a law professor, a retired ‘SC justice, and a representative from the private sector. A special body with mem- bers coming from all three branches of the government and from important legal and nonlegal circles outside government, the JBC functions as the “personnel de- partment” or "human retouzee departinent,” of the judiciary. "The creation ofthe JBC and the special function given to it and the removal of the CA from the ptocess of making appointments tothe judiciary are clear moves to insulate the courts from partisan politics. How effective has tis new setup been in achieving this goal? What now problems have arisen as a result ofthis novelty? ‘These are very important and essential questions to raise end study, but are clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. On parchment, 2t least, Art-VIIE, Sec 9, is another constitutional provision that seeks to ensure judicial independence JUDICIAL REVIEW Tadical review isthe power and duty given tothe courts—ultimately and no- ably the highest court—'to declare a law, treaty international or executive agree ‘ment, presidental decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional” (Bernas 2006, #42). It does not make for “judicial supremecy” bout rather affirms constittional supremacy. Inv de Philippines, che Constitution fel? grants the earls this poweis Art VIL, Sec 1, expressly states that included in judicial power is the duty “to detor= ‘mie whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack for excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality ofthe gov- cerament." The SC’ judicial review power is explicit in Are VIII Set 2), and Sec (2), () and (b), Sec #{2) states that all cases involving the consitutionality, appli- cation, or operation of treaties, international or executive agreements, laws, pres dential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations shall be heard by the SC en banc and "shall be decided with the conc rence of a majority ofthe members who actually igo part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted chereon.” Sec (2a) and (b) empowers the SC to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm” final decisions and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionalty or validity of anyteaty, nternatofal or cexcoutive agreement, law, presidential deere, proclamation, order, insiction, or= dinance, oF regulation is in question” and “all cases involving the legality of any tax, import, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto” Section ‘5 therefore implies that even lower courts are vested. with judicial review authoriey ‘Many if not most or even al, jucalreview cases aréinfict special civil ac~ ton cases under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (see the discussion above of the extraordinary writs) Looking into speifc cases involving parties going to court— notably the SC—to challenge the constitutionality, validity, or legality of a legis! tive actor presidential ordinance, the petitioners invariably file petitions for writs164 (uP Gon ens nd es of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus* The writs are the judicial instruments vequested and, if warranted, issued in order to (1) invalidate for being constitu tionally infirm x governmental act (certiorari), (2) prohibit the carrying out of such a constitutionally infirm law (prohibition), or (3) order the respondents to cease tnd desist from implementing the constitutionally iim law (andémus). Hence, the power ‘of judicial ceview could also be called “certiorari power” “mandamus ower,” or “prohibition power” Ae is the cae in petitions for extraordinary writs, ‘when the respondent in a judicial review case (or more accurately. a special civil ace ‘ion case invelving petitions for certiorari, mandamus, and/or prohibition) i found guilty" ofthe “grave abuse of discretion” charge, he is aot sent to jail ue his cial- Jenged act is nullifed and he is prohibited ffom continuing with such an act, ‘The doctrine or principle of judicial review is traced back to the landmark de- cision of che United States Supreme Court, Marbury x Medison In this 1808 ral= ing, judicial review was established as a constitutional necessity and imperative when the US SC forthe first time struck down as unconstitutional an act of the US ‘Congress. The USSG, through Chief Justice John Marshall who wrote che ponencio, id down two principal enets: (1) 2 writen constitution, the fondamental and paramount law of the nation, is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature and therefore am act of the lgislature that is repugnant to the constitution is void; and (2) the courts themselves are bound by this principle and so i i the duey of the Jjdiciary to uphold this principle every time. Marbury therefore deee not consider ‘the courts’ power of judicial review co much a power ata duly. Moreover, tis pa- tently clear and plain that this duty does not make the judiciary superior to the other branches of the government; moreover, tis judicial duty is precisely imposed (on the courts inorder that the supremacy of the written constitution be observed ‘and respected. Judicial review duty, in other words, is an imperative and necessity brought about by constitutional supremacy. ‘Vast and potentially unlimited as it may seem, the power and duty of judicial ‘or constitutional review has built-in restrictions, The first suc limits the fect that courts are passive They act only when their jurisdiction is invoked (Cruz 2002, 258). Judicial review is invoked whien& person or party files a petition calling for the court o intervene jn and pass judgment on the matter. But even when the jurisdiction of the court is invoked by a petition, the court, before it passes judgment on the consttutionality, validity, and legality of an ex ecutive or legislative det, first asks and answers some “preliminary questions” 1. Ts there an actual ease or controversy? Is the case or controversy before it ripe for adjudication; that is, has the challenged governmental act already had an adverse effet on the person or party challenging it? Does the petitioner—that is, the one challenging the governmental act—have standing, or lens stani, to file the petition? Does the petitioner have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has 2ctually sustained or i in immediate danger of sustaining an injury asa result ofthe actor omission com- plained of? vor AO Cour en nd es E 65 53. Was the constitutonality question rsised at the earliest opportunity? 44 Is touching upon and resolving the constituionality issue relly necessary forthe resolution of the case? Is it the very is nita ofthe case? Is the resolution ofthe constitutional issue indispensabe for the final determination of the controversy? ‘Only when the answers to the above questions are all "yes" will the court pro ‘ceed to pass judgment on the consttutionalty ofthe challenged governmental act ‘These preliminary questions serve as “judicial restraints on the power of ju ical review (Santiago 2000, $3), That is, certain conditions have to be first es- tablished before the court proceeds to decide on the merits of the constitutional controversy. Even then, these restraints are in fact “autoclimitatione”—that is, limits imposed by the courts on themselves (ibid). On many occasions, the SC, faced with very important and significant legal questions, did not hesitate to be more liberal in the aplication of these conditions. With respect to the “ripeness for adjudication” requisite, for example eis aorule that courts do not pass judy ment on "moot and seademic’ questions. There ae oxceptions to this general rule, however, In Randelf $. David x Gloria Macapagal-dirayo (3 May 2006), the SC, recalling previous decisions, sad that courts will sill deside cases that are “moot and academic’ if 1, There is a greve violation of the Constitution; ‘The situation is exceptional in character and paramount public interest is involved; 8. The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the br, and the publi and ‘4 The case is capable of repetition yet evading review ‘With respect to the locus standi requisite, the SC, also in David and again re- calling several vital past rulings, ruled that this is “a mere procedural technicality” that “may be waved by the Court in the exescise of ts discretion” When the cases present a matter, issue, or controversy that is of “transcendental importance” or that has "-reachng implications” the small mater of petitioners not having the proper legal standing to petition i eet aide. ‘Another restraint on judicial review i the doetrine of political questions. The principle or norm is that political questions are beyond the purview of courts, ‘What is politica question? When is a question a “political” one? The SC in Toad 1 Cueno (1987) sai [he term “politi! question connoies,nlega parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely a question of policy Inother words, inthe language of Corps Juris ‘Sccendun (supra), it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be davided by the peopl in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which ful deren «ary antority hasbeen delegated tothe Legslagure or executive branch of the Gow ernment” Itis concerned with issues dependent upon the radon, not legality of a particular measur Iai inthe orginal)196 rseTER40 Coss es ne es In Baker x. Corr (3968), the US Supreme Court sad that “prominent on the surface of any case held to involve political question s found «textually demon- strable constitutional commitment of the issue to apolitical department" Related to this formulation is, the personal guideline fllowed.and observed by Artemio Panganiban (2004), former chief justice of the SC, who said tn my ave his ue ha guided me: When the Conettation gan abst isre- vion to thelellative or te exctive department in the exercise specie conte al peogatve, thn te judy may nt retro Sith eins or mpose its own stands of widom or convenience onthe. Upon the oter han, when the Constiaton proves cute, nitions or rerieton inthe exe of 8 power vse ina specie agency of government, the courts may past upon the {Nereis of such powerbut only fo determine whether conntionally pose ‘oun tations reich in ct en obser tli in the eign Hare the gueston tobe reave tno longer pols becomes constitutional or ing in carter “Thus: a matter that i left to the fill discretionary authority of Congress oF of the executive isa politcal question that courts may not pass judgment on; but if matter i indeed left to the decision-making power ofthe legislature and the execu- tive, but legislative and executive discretion i limited by express provisions of law, then the matter is justiciable, not political “The politcal gueetione doctrine setually lows fram he principle of separa- tion of powers. The courts recognize that on certain matters it is Congress and the presidency that should decide as these are conceras properly belonging to the respective powers vested in each by the Constitution. Art VIII, Sec 1, of the present (1967) Constitution, however, imposes on the courts the duty “to deter~ mine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” This prvision does not effectively nullify the political questions Aoctrne, but it does make it more dificult for courts to “hide behind the political ‘questions doctrine* and aot pass judgment or become involved in controversial legislative or executive actions. tis the grave duty now of the judiciary to deter- rine whether the legislature or the executive las committed “grave abuse of dis- cretion” and to declare null and void legislative and executive acts if such offense is established Related to the politcal questions doctrine isthe well-settled norm that “ques- tions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not ad dressed to the jadciary’ (Santiago 2000, 36). Courts do not “pass upon questions of wisdom, justice, or expediency of legislation” (87), A law may be unwise; diff- cult to implement, unresponsive, or plainly ill conceived but so long as it does not violate any higher law (eg. the Constitution or, if the challenged law is apresiden- ‘ial or executive issuance statutes ato), thas to be sustained by the judiciary. Like the politcal quetions doctrine, chs norm fllows from separation of powers Her AC Coo faces nd ts 1 Finally, another norm the courts take to heart wen exercising its judical re view power and duty is the “presumption of constitutionality” (90-97). “The poiey ofthe courts isto avoid ruling on constitusonality questions and to pre- same thatthe ats ofthe polities deparements are valid in the absence of clear and ‘usstakable showing tothe contrary. To doubt isto sustain. Ths presumption is" based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon east department becoming respet forthe acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the Join: act of Congress snd the President of the Philippines «law hes been carfily ‘died and determined tobe in accordance with che fundamental aw before it was finally enacted In consttutionality questions therefore, “The borden of proof lies the party who alleges unconstitutionality. Courts have a ty to uphold any law enacted in ee ordinary exercise ofthe legislative power, if it is possible to do without disregarding the plain command or necessary implication (ofthe findamentl law. “The quantum of proof. necessary to overcome the presumption of constitutionality should mest any ofthe following grounds car or pai, fl, unequivocal, undoubtsd, palpable, convincing, substantia, onmitakable, highly persuasive, clear and eonvine- Ing. or itrelragable nother words, proof that che aw is unconstitutional should be proof beyond «reseonsble, substantial, or rational doubt. Thus, mere preponderabce bf evidence is not enough. The eonfic: between the iw and the constitution must be irreconcilable. (281) ‘The power anc-duty of judicial review gives'the jdicil branch of the govern~ sment—in particular, and epecilly the SC—in effect “general supervision” over the entire government: Congress, the presidency’ executive branch departments and ‘agencies, independent constitutional bodies, les! governments, andthe entire burea ‘racy In his commentary on Art X, See 4, of the 1987 Constitution—the provision that grants the president general supervision over local governments, Bernas defines (2006, 418) “the power of general supervision” as the power of superior officer 10 ‘se tot that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with Jw Using the ‘words from the Constitution: general supervision ifthe authority of the “general so pervisor” to “ensure that the acts of (the) component units are within the scope of their presribed powers and fanetion” This is precisely what the court are-duty ‘bound to do by the principle of judicid-xeview: This duty and power are truly vast and under Geran circumstances and conditions may be wellnigh unlimited. Hee, the four sefimposed "judicial restraints” of ripeness, locus stand, earliest opporti- nity, and lis mota-mey be brushed aad af "procedural technicalities” when a contro- ‘versy deinands adjadication and deSinitve judgment. The political questions doctrine ‘now qualified and its scope and applicability circumscribed by the constitutional, duty ofthe courts to “determine grave abuse of discretion.” Even the resumption of constitutionality can be overturned By clear and convincing “proof beyond reason- able, substantial, and’rational doubt” (Suntiago 2000, 181).