Suez Crisis

After the governments of Britain and the United States of America withdrew their support –

in terms of funding – for the building of the Aswan Dam (in response to Egypt’s recognition

of the People’s Republic of China), Egypt decided to take local control (nationalize) of the

Suez Canal on 26th July, 1956. In retaliation to that, an alliance – consisting of Britain, Israel

and France – launched their attack against Egypt on 29th October, 1956. It all started when

Egypt took over – illegally – the offices belonging to the Suez Canal Company. This was a

clear violation of the Treaty’s conditions, and hence, the alliance had no choice but to launch

their attack1.

The objectives of the member countries of the alliance were varied and different; the two

European superpowers were more interested in acquiring control of the Suez Canal, and

removing the protagonist of the drama – Gamel Abdel Nasser (Egypt’s president at that time)

– from power, while Israel was looking at getting some leeway in its quest to freely navigate

through the Straits of Tiran. Towards the end, it was observed that the former did not attain

their goals, while the latter did so, to a certain degree. The crisis came to an end with the

intervention of U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., via the United Nations (Lucas, 1995). The post-crisis

environment had the United Nations Emergency Force placing a temporary force on the

border of Egypt and Israel, to make sure that these two countries did not fall back into the

chasm of suspicion1. The crisis resulted in the United Nations drafting a resolution to force

Israeli forces to remove their armies from the area around Egypt. However, due to vetoes

issued by France and Britain, the draft ultimately failed1.

The fact that the two European superpowers were not able to make much of an impact

heralded their slow weakening as forces to be reckoned with on the global stage. This led to

the slow process of decolonization; many colonies that were under the rule of these two
countries started gaining independence as they tried to exploit their perceived weaknesses.

This was also seen as a big failure by the U.S. as they were viewed, by extension, as a

Western power. Additionally, Nasser was proclaimed as a hero – in the eyes of various

Middle Eastern countries - for not allowing the superpowers to take control of the canal.

Furthermore, due to the lack of the formation or drafting of a peace treaty2 following the

crisis, the stage was set for Six Day War that took place in 1967. Finally, this crisis was also

instrumental in making Dwight Eisenhower – the president of the U.S. at that time – to ask

Congress to approve the use of American military force if request for by any Middle Eastern

country (who were faced with any form of aggression or assault), and additionally, the set up

of a fund of US $200 million to aid any country from the same region if they so requested

(Delauche, 1992).

References

1
Kunz, Diane B.. The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis. (1991).

2
"Suez Canal Crisis." Nova Online. Nova Online, 15 June 2006. Web. 24 Mar. 2011.

<http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Suez56.htm>.

Delauche, Frederic Illustrated History of Europe: A Unique Guide to Europe's Common

Heritage (1992)

Lucas, Scott, Divided We Stand:  Britain, the US. and the Suez Crisis (1995);