May/June 2005
Election Transparency: How Ready Are States
Inside
3 Exhibit 1: Availability of Primary Data on
Super Tuesday Election Night
4 Exhibit 2: Items Necessary for Election
Transparency
5 Appendix 1: List of Documents
Requested from Ohio Counties
and Counties?
W
ith the close presidential elections in 2000 and 2004, there has been a call
for election transparency, the ability of the public to have access to data
and documents pertaining to the election process in a timely manner. The
non-partisan, non-profit Election Science Institute conducted data gathering efforts that
assessed the availability of election information and the quality of that information for
both the March, 2004 Super Tuesday Presidential Primary Election and the November,
2004 Presidential Election. The results showed that overall, most jurisdictions are not yet
able to provide the data needed for election transparency.
A review of Super Tuesday states found that responses ranged from an inability to
provide any election information on election night to the provision of complete, timely
information. In some cases, only newspapers, some of which charged a subscription to
access the information, collected needed information.
It is understood and acknowledged that there are time and resource pressures on
election officials to certify the election within the allotted time, and that public requests
for records exert additional demands on their limited resources. There needs to be
a mechanism in place that allows the officials to perform their duties while still hav-
continued
ELECTION The Election Science Institute is an independent, non-partisan election science
organization formed in 2002 under the name “Votewatch” to monitor and im-
SCIENCE prove elections nationwide. For further information, contact Steven Hertzberg:
INSTITUTE steven@electionscience.org
ing information available to the public. These systems should
be developed so that requested items critical to verifying the
transparency and accuracy of elections can be met with minimal
additional effort on the part of the election officials.
Having said this, the review of Ohio Counties following the
2004 Presidential Election showed at least half the counties had
trouble complying with public documents requests before elec-
tion certification. None of the requested Ohio counties were
able to provide a complete audit trail within the requested time
frame. Only one in eight counties was able to submit documen-
tation that was complete enough and of sufficient quality to
allow the vote counts to be reviewed.
Based on these and other findings, the Election Science
Institute developed recommendations to improve public data
availability in order to support increased election transparency.
These recommendations include recommendations for both
the type of data jurisdictions should supply as well as timeliness
and methods of access.
Results of The Election Science Institute
Investigation
Obtaining Election Night Information from Secretaries of
States
On Super Tuesday 2004, The Election Science Institute
conducted an experiment to identify in real-time, whether the
data needed for independent election monitoring was available
from Secretaries of State. Throughout the election night, staff
contacted the offices of Secretaries of State and accessed state
web sites in efforts to obtain information. The data items that
staff were looking for included vote totals for each candidate
and the total number of votes cast. Staff were looking for both
state-level and preferably county-level data. The total number
of votes cast was included because it was critical to examining
undervote issues raised in the 2000 election. County-level data
can be linked with data such as registration, voting equipment,
and demographics to perform a variety of statistical analyses.
The eight states that held primaries that day took a variety
of approaches to responding to information requests:
Timeliness: Five of the eight states reported real-time
election results on their websites on election night: California,
Connecticut, Georgia, Ohio and Rhode Island. One state, Mary-
page 
land, provided information on the web prior to certification but
not on election night. Results for Maryland were not available
on the website until two days after the election. Paper copies
of county-level results were also made available by the Board of
Elections. The Election Science Institute received this informa-
tion two days after the election.
Neither New York nor Massachusetts provides unofficial
results on their websites. Neither of these states makes elec-
tion results available until after they are certified. Communica-
tions representatives of both states confirmed that unofficial
election results are collected by the election news service and
made available by the newspapers. Members of the public inter-
ested in election results before they are certified were referred
to the news sources.
Unofficial results for Massachusetts were obtained the
morning after the election from the Boston Globe online edi-
tion. Data were available for each city/town; the only infor-
mation missing was the number of ballots cast. County-level
election results for New York could not be found on either
The New York Times or the Wall Street Journal websites. After
certification, New York posts final results to their website and
Massachusetts prints them in a booklet.
Completeness: California, Connecticut, Maryland and
Ohio provided complete information, including the number of
votes cast. Georgia and Rhode Island posted information but
it was not complete. Georgia reported real-time results on its
website, but information about the total number of votes cast
was not available. Rhode Island posted only statewide results
in real-time on its website, so town-by-town results had to
be obtained from The Providence Journal online, where it was
found on election night. A representative of Rhode Island’s Sec-
retary of State Office said final results, including data on ballots
cast, were to be available on their website 4 to 5 days after the
election. Georgia reported real-time results on its website on
election night, but information about the total number of votes
cast was not available until about three weeks later, even though
Georgia law requires certification of these numbers within 15
days of an election.
Quality/Usability: States varied in terms of the usability
of their data formats. The most complete and usable forms of
 Election Transparency: How Ready Are States and Counties?

data came from the state of EXHIBIT 1:  

Connecticut and Maryland Availability of Primary Data on Super Tuesday Election Night
counties. Results from Con-
Results Posted Results Posted
necticut were in a user-friend- on State Website Total Votes Cast Before or After
ly table. On the other hand, State Election Night? Available? Certification
once imported, California and CA Yes Yes Before
Ohio results had to be exten- CT Yes Yes Before
sively reformatted before any GA Yes No Before

analysis that might indicate MD No No Before

MA No No After
problems could be conducted.
NY No No After
Ohio reported results broken
OH Yes Yes Before
down by Democratic, Repub-
RI Yes No Before
lican, and Republican-At-Large.
It is not clear how Republican
and Republican-At-Large
Obtaining Election Documents from Counties
differently affected the vote count for Republican candidates,
Following the November 2004 Ohio Presidential Elec-
which caused some difficulty with analysis.
tions, the Election Science Institute submitted public documents
Overall, states differed in their approaches to providing
requests to 49 Ohio counties as part of a review of election
election monitoring data. While the majority of states had open
procedures. On November 15, 2004, documents were re-
data policies, there were still other states where data access
quested from all precincts in the six largest counties as well as a
was more difficult. Most disturbing were states in which news
random sample of precincts throughout Ohio. In all, 49 counties
organizations, but not the public, had access to election results
received public documents requests. The public documents
immediately following the election, thus allowing journalists
requests were thorough, requesting a long list of documents re-
preferential access to the information. Indeed, one of the easiest
lated to related to four key areas: appropriate machine distribu-
ways to obtain election monitoring information is to subscribe
tion, voting and counting equipment functioning; ballot tracking;
to the Associated Press data service. However, ordinary citizens,
polling place administration. (See Appendix 1 for the full list of
academics and non-profit organizations may find the cost
documents)
prohibitive.
Counties’ response to the public documents requests
In addition, this data service does not provide the total
showed that few counties were ready for election transparency.
number of ballots cast. While it is understandable that some
The majority of counties had problems with timeliness, and in
states are reluctant to publish unofficial information and want
the documents we received in a timely manner, there were also
to post only certified results, this stance is difficult to support
frequent issues with the completeness and quality of the docu-
in an era of greater election scrutiny, particularly when the
ments supplied.
unofficial numbers are given to the press. There seemed to
Timeliness: In all, counties had almost three weeks to
be little relationship between voting technology and ability to
respond to the public document requests before vote counts
produce timely data as the one state that used levers provided
were certified in early December. In addition, by submitting the
timely data and two states that both used touch screen voting
requests in mid-November, the requests were timed to arrive
equipment were tardy in their postings. Exhibit I shows the
well after the initial election results were tallied and absentees
availability of election results on Super Tuesday election night.
and provisional ballots reviewed. Still, barely half of counties (53%)
were able to respond before election certification. Only one in

page 
eight counties (12%) responded in less than two weeks.  While a few counties may have had
difficulties in complying, even cooperative counties had trouble assembling the requested EXHIBIT 2:
documents in a timely manner. Items Necessary for
Election Transparency
Completeness: None of the counties that supplied documents before election Data to be readily available
certification were able to supply all of the documents requested. From the original 49 and posted on the web
Before the election
counties, only one in six counties (16%) supplied more than half of the requested docu-
• Full list of precincts and polling locations
ments before certification and the remaining four in ten counties (39%) that had submit- (not just a look-up by address) with split
precincts noted (available 1 month before
ted documents, had submitted less than half the documents requested. Only one county election)
provided at least three-quarters of the requested documents. When election experts • Final voter registration by precincts (avail-
able as soon as possible after registration
reviewed the documents that were supplied, they found there was also incorrect identi- closes, where registration closes, but not
later than 10 days before the election.)
fication of documents submitted, and statements that certain documents (E.g., problem • Machine distribution statement by pre-
reports, audit logs, zero total reports from voting or central tabulating machines) did cinct (available 1 week before election)
As soon as the unofficial count is
not exist. In one case, a county informed us that an audit log from one of their central completed
tabulating machines had been destroyed. Another county indicated that they destroyed • Precinct level summaries (also posed at
the precinct, where equipment permits)
old cumulative reports as new ones were created. including ballots cast, votes recorded and
over- and under-votes
Quality: None of the counties were able to provide accurate copies of original
• Unofficial Canvass and precinct-level
documents that provided a complete audit trail of the election process. However, six statement of votes cast, including over-
and under-votes for each race (available
counties, comprising 12% of those reviewed, did supply sufficient documents so that on the web the day after election)
most of an audit could be completed. These counties submitted documents that were • Absentee Ballot Accounting Report
(by precinct, if absentees are tracked in
primarily copies of originals and the missing items were not critical ones. Critical items precincts, available on the web 10 days
after election)
included Ballot Accounting Charts, audit logs, accumulated totals reports, the Unof- • Provisional Ballot Disposition report and
ficial Canvass, as well as precinct totals from precinct and voting machines (for counties Accounting Report, by precinct (available
on the web 3 days after the provisionals
are completed and checked)
• Statement of ballots added or subtracted
post-Election Day (overseas absentee,
remade ballots, rediscovered ballots etc.)
by precinct; (one week prior to Official
Canvass certification)
• Problem statements and responses to
problems (by precinct, where applicable)
(web-based and posted on an on-going
basis during the election period)
At election certification
• Official Canvass and statement of votes
cast by precinct including over and
undervotes for each race (one day after
certification)
Data available quickly upon
request
• Pollworker training manual/guidelines
• Ballot Accounting Charts and records of
corrections to the charts
• Audit logs from any computerized equip-
ment
• Cumulative reports created during elec-
tion night
• Sample ballot books for punch cards
• Formula or guidelines for machine
distribution
• Written guidelines for ballot tracking and
vote counting procedures

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where in-precinct tabulation oc-
curred). There were document quality
issues with all of the types of records
requested, which ranged from miss-
ing documents (e.g. Ballot Account-
ing Charts which did not get copied
and sent) to forms missing needed
signatures, ballot counts or other key
pieces of information.
Key issues seen related to quality
include:
Without a complete set of docu-
ments, it is impossible to perform a
proper audit of election procedures,
including vote tabulation. It is disturb-
ing to see that one county only sub-
mitted the final cumulative report and
did not include the earlier ones as re-
quested because the county indicated
that it destroyed cumulative reports as
soon as the next one was printed.
Another factor hindering a full au-
dit is the incomplete content of elec-
tion reports. For example, cumulative
reports indicate how many precincts
were counted but fail to identify the
precincts or track the ballots and
votes cast.
Unofficial Canvass reports mix
the absentee and regular voted ballots
when reporting the countywide totals.
Absentee Ballot Reports show just
the total number of ballots issued and
returned. Only a few counties broke
down the totals by overseas, military
and in-house categories or submitted
reports showing the absentee ballots
by precinct.
Forms used at the precinct level
were also incomplete. For example,
Election Transparency: How Ready Are States and Counties?
APPENDIX 1:
List of Documents Requested from Ohio Counties
The following is a list of all the documents requested by VoteWatch in it’s initial
document request for the 2004 Ohio Presidential Election. Items vary in the amount
of time and effort needed to copy and supply them, and all items are not equally
crucial to examining election transparency.  They are provided here for your refer-
ence.
Machine distribution
• Serial numbers for each machine by precinct;
• The number of machines in each precinct;
• The serial number for each accumulator unit in a precinct.
Equipment function
• Results from pre-election and Election Day Logic & Accuracy tests, including the test script, serial
numbers of the machines tested and the signatures of the observers;
• The start of day zero total report, signed by the poll manager from each machine, countywide
(where applicable);
• Copies of problem reports from voters and poll workers, including trouble tickets relating to any
voting equipment problem/malfunction;
• Serial number of any voting machine that was taken out of service, serial number of machine that
replaced it, and polling location where replacement took place;
• Audit log from each touch screen, optical scan machine countywide on election night;
• Audit log for each accumulator unit in a precinct, countywide, (where applicable);
• Audit log from central tabulator(s) on election night;
• Chain of custody documents and serial numbers for all touch screen and optical scan machines,
countywide.
Tracking ballots
• Invoice(s) showing the number of punch card or optical scan ballots purchased by the county for
Election Day voting, including vendor(s) names/addresses;
• Invoice(s) showing the number of punch card or optical scan ballots purchased by the county for
absentee voting, including vendor(s) names/addresses;
• Records showing the number of absentee ballots that were mailed to absentee voters;
• Records showing the number of absentee ballots that were returned;
• Voter signature rosters from all precincts, countywide1;
• The precinct totals from each machine, countywide (where applicable);
• End of Election Day tallies from all precincts, countywide (where applicable);
• Ballot reconciliation sheets (also known as Ballot Accounting Charts, Certificate 1, etc.) from
all precincts, countywide (including number of voted, spoiled, provisional, and hand delivered
absentee ballots);
• All election night cumulative reports from county central vote tabulating machines;
• Unofficial countywide canvass of the vote totals and the Statement of Votes Cast for each pre-
cinct;
• Official countywide canvass and Statement of Votes Cast for each precinct.2
Polling place administration
• Poll worker training manual and any other written instructions given to poll workers;
• Map of the county showing all precincts and their number/name;
• A certification letter from the Independent Testing Authority and the Secretary of State for each
type of voting machine used in the county.
• Written policies and procedures regarding destruction of unused paper ballots, where
applicable. 
Note that the SOS told counties they did not have to provide these.
1
Official canvasses, provisional, absentee and recount reports were obtained after the original
2
records request, as they became available.
 Election Transparency: How Ready Are States and Counties?

many counties do not include the serial number of the transfer auditability, most will need to supplement their current tracking
case (which contains the voted paper ballots) on the Ballot Ac- systems and increase availability of the documents they do have
counting Chart. to ensure public confidence and process transparency. By pro-
Overall, the results of the Ohio 2004 public records viding the items listed above, counties and states can improve
requests show that counties have many areas in which they may the transparency of the election process and provide the public
need assistance to meet public records requests supporting with the information it needs. 
election transparency before election certification. In general,
but especially where elections are expected to be close, coun-
ties need to be prepared to respond quickly and accurately
to public documents requests. Ohio counties showed trouble
doing this in all areas, whether in terms of timeliness, complete-
ness or quality.

Improving the Process: Recommendations

on Public Data Availability
Based on its review of the public availability of state and
county election records, the Election Science Institute makes
the following recommendations for jurisdictions mov-
ing to provide election transparency.
1 In order to meet election transparency
requirements, counties will need to improve their
ability to provide records, strengthen their record
keeping process and develop data availability plans in
advance of Election Day. This may require additional
resources in terms of personnel, budget and technical
advice.
2 Counties’ data availability plans and capabili-
ties should include the data needed for a full review
of results. A recommended list of data is provided in
Exhibit 2.
3 States can assist counties in providing elec-
tion night information by providing real-time web
postings of county-level vote totals including total
ballots cast on election night. As part of this, states
should develop data availability plans that are coordi-
nated with counties.

Summary
The Election Science Institute’s investigations
show that, for the most part, local jurisdictions are
not ready for the increased scrutiny of close elec-
tions. While a few jurisdictions have almost complete

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