IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN, GERTRUDIS ABANGAN V.

ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL
40 P 476; NOVEMBER 12, 1919
AVANCENA, J.:

FACTS:
Ana Abangan executed a will consisting of only two pages. The CFI admitted the will for
probate. The oppositors on the other hand appealed contending that the will is invalid
because of the absence of the signatures of the testatrix and the witnesses on the margins
of each page. They also contended that the will is invalid since the same is not numbered or
paged accordingly which the law requires . Finally, they claimed that the testatrix do not
know the dialect used in the will.

ISSUE:
Whether the will coupled with the formalities prescribed by law.

HELD:
Yes, the SC held that in a will consisting of two sheets, the first of which contains all the
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witneses,
and the second page contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by
the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on the margins by
the testator and the witnesses.
Also, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object
of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered
cannot be hidden.
Lastly, the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the
city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbour is enough,
in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which
the will is written.

IN RE ESTATE OF PIRASO, DECEASED. SIXTO ACOP V. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL

G.R. NO. L-28946; JANUARY 16, 1929
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS:
A will purportedly and allegedly executed by the deceased Piraso was presented for
probate by petitioners herein but was refused on the ground that the will was written in
English, a language unknown to the testator. Hence the present appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the will complied with the requisite of language to be admitted for probate.

HELD:
No, the evidence shows that the deceased Piraso did not know the English language but
only the igorot dialect and little bit of the Ilocano dialect.
While the will is written in English, it cannot be admitted for probate since it runs
counter to the requirement of a will to be valid that the same should be written in a
language known by the testator. A requirement so important that when not complied with,
invalidates the will.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE J. JAVELLANA, DECEASED. CRISTETA JIMENEA VDA. DE
JAVELLANA, AND BENJAMIN JAVELLANA V. JOSE JAVELLANA Y AZAOLA AND JOSE
JAVELLANA, JR
46 P 750
BARRERA, J.:

FACTS:
Maria Tapia is a resident of the Province of Batangas, a taglog region, where she had real
properties for several years. When she executed her will, she requested Modesto Castillo to
write her will in tagalog. Of course, the sanabagan oppositors opposed the probate
contending their idiotic claim that the testator did not know the language of the will.

ISSUE:
Whether the will complied with the language required by law.

HELD:
Yes, a presumption arises from these facts that said testatrix knew the tagalog dialect,
which presumption is conclusive for not having been overthrown or rebutted by the
oppositors.

NENITA DE VERA SUROZA V. JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court
110 S 388
AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:
Marcelina Sunoza, a veteran’s widow purportedly, and allegedly executed a will naming her
“anak-anakan” Marilyn Sy as her sole heir in the will. The will was executed in English and
at that time, she was already 73 years old, illiterate and her thumbmark was used as her
signature in the will. The will was presented for probate and oppositor Nenita (the wife of
Agapito, who is the son of Marcelina) contended, inter alia, that the will was executed in a
language not known to the testatrix.

ISSUE:
Whether the will was executed in a language known to the testatrix.

HELD:
No, in the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
“understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it stated “that the
will was read to the testatrix, and translated into Filipino language”. That could only mean
that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and therefore, it
is void because of the mandatory provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will
must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
Thus, a will written in English, was not known to the Igorot Testator, is void and was
disallowed.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE,
V. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR
450 S 265
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Alipio Abada executed a will on June 4, 1932. The law inforce at that time was the old civil
code. When the will was presented for probate, oppositors assert that the will of Abada
does not indicate that it is written in a language/dialect known to the testator. Further, the
oppositor maintains that the will was not acknowledged before a notary public.
In addition, oppositor points out several defects in the attestation clause of the will
like failure to state the number of pages, failure to state that the testator signed the will on
its every page and in the presence of three witnesses, and failure to state the number of
witnesses.

ISSUE:
Whether the will complied with the formalities prescribed by law.

HELD:
The Code of civil Procedure, repealed Article 685 of the old civil code. Under the code of
civil procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.
Abada’s will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.
Oppositor points that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the
Spanish language, and that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the
will. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the
language used in the will. This is a matter a party may establish by proof aliunde. From the
evidences gathered, the testator was proven to know the Spanish language based from a
credible witness stating that the testator speaks in the Spanish language when he is visited
at home by his Spanish friends.
A close discerning of the will tell us that though it is written in Spanish, a careful
scrutiny shows that the number of pages were stated, that the testator signed the will and
its every page and in the presence of three witnesses. Although the attestation clause failed
to state the number of witnesses, the SC applied a liberal construction in determining the
number of witnesses in the will and it can be shown by the number of signatures appearing
in the pages of the will though absent in the attestation.

NOTARIAL WILL

GREGORIO MACAPINLAC V. MARIANO ALIMURONG

16 P 41; March 22, 1910
ARELLANO, C. J.:

FACTS:
Simplicia de los Santos executed a will on June 17, 1907. During the execution, a
rough copy of the will was made up, which rough copy was read to the testatrix and the
latter ordered an additional clause to be added thereto. After the rough copy was amended,
a clear copy was made up0 and was again read to the testatrix who approved of it in all its
parts. Since she was unable to sign the will, she requested Amando de Ocampo to sign for
her and wrote the following words:
‘at the request of the testatrix, Da. Simplicia de los Santos, I signed
‘for Simplicia de los Santos, “Amando de Ocampo”
The will was then presented for probate was opposed.

ISSUE:
Whether the will was executed with all the legal formalities required by law.
HELD:
Yes, The SC held in this wise, “And, as a question of law, it is claimed that the form of
signing for the testatrix "At the request of the testatrix Da. Simplicio de los Santos, I signed:
Amando de Ocampo," is not in accordance with the requirements of the law.
Regarding the first question, the trial court concluded that "the posterior insertion
of the words 'For Simplicia de los Santos' can not affect the validity of the will."
Therefore, it can be considered as nonexistent, and the other as the only fore of
signature by the testatrix, the authenticity of which has not been impugned or which the
trial court admits as conclusive, and is only one taken into account in its findings of fact.
Although the said words "For Simplicia de los Santos" be considered as inserted
subsequently, which we neither affirm nor deny, because a specific determination either
way is unnecessary, in our opinion the signature for the testatrix as if she signed the will,
and also the signature of the witness who, at her request, wrote the name of the testatrix
and signed for her, affirming the truth of this fact, attested by the other witnesses then
present. And this fully complies with the provisions of section 618 of the Act.”

IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF ANTERO MERCADO, DECEASED. ROSARIO GARCIA V.

JULIANA LACUESTA
G.R. NO. L-4067; NOVEMBER 29, 1951
PARAS, C.J.:

FACTS:
The deceased Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name
when he purportedly executed his last will and testament.

ISSUE:
Whether a cross sign constitutes a valid signature.

HELD:
No, the SC held that it is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual
signature of Antero Mercado or one of the ways by which he signs his name. After mature
reflection, the SC is not prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark and the
reason is obvious, the cross cannot and does not have the trust worthiness of a thumbmark.

TOMAS GUISON V. MARIA CONCEPCION, 

G.R. NO. 2586; JANUARY 19, 1906.
WILLARD, J. :

FACTS:
Jacoba Concepcion made her will in Manila on January 3, 1908. She requested Feliciano
Maglaqui to sign the will for her as she was not able to do so. However, Feliciano, instead of
writing the name of the testatrix, wrote his own on the same.

ISSUE:
Whether the signature of the witness constitutes a valid signature on behalf of the testatrix.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court held that the signature of the witness cannot constitute a valid
signature for the testator.
The Supreme Court’s ratio on this case cited the ratio on the previous landmark cases,
including the case of Ex parte Pedro Arcenas Et. Al., 1 No. 1708, August 24, 1905, the
pertinent of which states:
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the requisites of will, repealed,
among others article 695 of the Civil Code, the second paragraph of which reads as follows:
Should the testator declare that he does not know how, or is not able, to sign, one of the
attesting witnesses or another person shall do so for him at his request, the notary certifying
thereto. This shall also be done if any one of the witnesses can not sign.
This provision of the Civil Code has been expressly modified by the provisions of section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed
the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in
the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the
will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section
provided.

MARIANO LEAÑ O V. ARCADIO LEAÑ O

G.R. No. L-9150; March 31, 1915
CARSON, J.:

FACTS:
Cristina Valdez placed her costs against her name, attached by some other person to the
instrument and in the presence of three witnesses whose names are attached to the
attesting clause, stating inter alia, that they attested and subscribed the instrument in the
presence of the testatrix and in the presence of one another.

ISSUE:
Whether there was due execution of the will.

HELD:
Yes, the SC held in this wise:
“the placing of the cross opposite her name at the construction of the
instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that except where wills are
signed by some other person than the testator in the manner and from herein
indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator. The right of a testator to
sign his will by mark, executed animo testandi has been uniformly sustained
by the courts of last resort of the United States in construing statutory
provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in language identical
with, or substantially similar to that found in section 618 of our code, which
was taken from section 2349 of the Code of Vermont. (Page on Wills, par.
173, and the cases there cited in support of the doctrine just announced.)
The trial judge was of contrary opinion, and declined to admit the instrument
to probate as the last will and testament of the decedent. We are of opinion,
however, that the evidence of record satisfactorily establishes the execution
of that instrument as and for her last will and testament in the manner and
form prescribed by law.”
IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF ANTERO MERCADO, DECEASED. ROSARIO
GARCIA, PETITIONER V.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL
G.R. NO. L-4067; NOVEMBER 29, 1951
PARAS, C.J.:

FACTS:
Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name when he
purportedly executed his will.

ISSUE:
Whether a cross sign constitutes a valid signature in a will.

HELD:
No, the SC held that the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero
Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express
direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein petitioner
argues, however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross written by the
testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier
is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark,
the latter having been held sufficient by the court.
“It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature
of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature
reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the
reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a
thumbmark.” - SC

YAP TUA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE V. YAP CA KUAN AND YAP CA KUAN, OBJECTORS-

APPELLANTS.
G.R. NO. 6845; SEPTEMBER 1, 1914
JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS:
Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be
admitted to probate. It appears that the will was signed by the deceased, as well as
Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. after due notice was given, was
brought on for hearing on the 18th day of September, 1909. Timoteo Paez declared that he
was 48 years of age; that he had known the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that she had
died on the 11th day of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and
testament; that he was present at the time of the execution of the same; that he had signed
the will as a witness; that Anselmo Zacarias and Severo Tabora had also signed said will as
witnesses and that they had signed the will in the presence of the deceased.
The Judge ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be
allowed and admitted to probate. The will was attached to the record and marked. The
court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will.
Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they
were interested in the matters of the said will and desired to intervene and asked that a
guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in the cause alleging That the will dated
the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th day
of September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons:
(a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law
prescribes.
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was
not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness.
(c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal influence
Also, before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong had executed another will, with all the formalities required by law.
Upon the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the order of the
29th day of September, 1909, and to grant to said minors an opportunity to present new
proof relating to the due execution of said will. 

ISSUE:
Whether of not the allegation of the respondent deserves credence

HELD:
No. The mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not
execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in
accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life. She had a
perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her former wills and to make
a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke all former wills,
in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will. Said third assignment of
error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong,
in her first will was not identical with that which appears in her second will. Several
witnesses testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses
testified that she had written her full name. We are of the opinion, and we think the law
sustains our conclusion, that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name
tot he will, with the intention to sign the same, that the will amount to a signature. It has
been held time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the same by using a
mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is
sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then certainly
the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her
intention to execute the will.
During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that
they did not sign their names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that
question there is considerable conflict of proof.
In this case, It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was
possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is
absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses
and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of
the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not
necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the
necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.

SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant V. APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA

G.R. No. L-30289; March 26, 1929
OSTRAND, J.:

FACTS:
Severina Gonzales executed a will in which she designated her niece, Serapia de Gala as
executrix.
During the execution of the will she used her thumbmark as her signature in the
said will.
When the will was presented for probate, it was opposed by respondents, claiming
that the will did not comply with the formalities prescribed by law.

ISSUE:
Whether the omission of the fact about placing the thumbmark of the testatrix and signed
in the presence of the witnesses in the attestation clause nullified the will.
HELD:
No, the SC held that a statute acquiring a will be signed is satisfied if the signature is made by the
testator’s thumb-mark. Further, the findings show that it does appear that the signature was affixed
in the presence of the witnesses and four of the signatures are sufficiently described and
explained in the last clause of the body of the will.
A close scrutiny of the will would clearly state that it is not mentioned in the
attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the
signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is
sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe
conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it
does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last
clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative
intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.

TEODORO CANEDA, et al. V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA

 G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993
REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, already in the
twilight years of his life executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses
and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declared therein that,
among other things that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and
personal properties to specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo.
Not long after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will
and testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away
before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the
legatees named in the will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s
estate but due to his death, he was succeeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by
RTC which is already the probate court.
The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testator's will on the ground that it
was not executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since the testator was already
in a poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners
likewise contend that the will is null and void because its attestation clause is fatally
defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will
witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will
and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was of sound and disposing
mind and in good health when he executed his will. Further, they also contend that the
witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective
such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant to
Article 809 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses
certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the
execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under the 3 rd
paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the
invalidity of the will, should state:
The number of pages used upon which the will is written; That the testator signed,
or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
attesting witnesses; and That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator
of the will and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and
subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. “Attestation” and
“subscription” differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of sense, while subscription is the act
of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that while it recites that the testator
indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and
states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state
therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking is the
statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which
must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to
probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause
obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language
used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as
contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not
render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in
compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not apply where the attestation
clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not
only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific
element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will.
That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible
way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an
implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by
the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.