Topic: Going to and Coming from Place of Work

“Guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely:
(a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to
be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for the employer.”
(Doctrine)

Valeriano vs. ECC and GSIS,

G.R. 136200 | June 8, 2000

Facts: Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at

the San Juan Fire Station. In the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was
standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend and they
later decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for
dinner. On their way home, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in
figured in a head-on collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N.
Domingo and Broadway streets in Q.C. Due to the strong impact of the
collision, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured.
As a result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals for
treatment. Valeriano claimed for benefits with the Government Security
Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that
the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of
his work.

Issue 1: Whether or not the injuries sustained by Valeriano in the collision

was compensable.

Held 1:
For injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be
substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by
reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the
injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of the injury, the
employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and
performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto.

Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a
firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained
the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function -- having
dinner with some friends -- is clear from the records of the case. His injuries
were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was
performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an
order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the
appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-
connected and thus not compensable.

Issue 2: Valeriano argues that his claim for disability benefits is anchored on
the proposition that the exigency of his job as a fireman requires a constant
observance of his duties as such; thus, he should be considered to have
been "on call" when he met the accident. He underscores the applicability
of Hinoguin v. ECC[15] and Nitura v. ECC[16] to his case.

Issue 2a. Is Hinoguin applicable to Valeriano’s case?

In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he
was assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the
permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander
to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, "a place [where] soldiers
have secured lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking,
from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer" and
hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his
official functions.

Issue 2b. Is Nitura applicable to Valeriano’s case?

The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside
of his station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on
several personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party.

Held 2: We recognize the importance and laud the efforts of firemen in our
society. Indeed, the nature of their job requires them to be always on alert,
like soldiers and police officers, and to respond to fire alarms which may
occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances in the
present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following
the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to
petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in
pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more
important justification for the Court's stance is that he was not doing an act
within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such
nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any
reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck
driver.