Conservatism in India

The State as Guardian of the Studies in Indian Politics

6(1) 27–43
Social Order: Conservatism in © 2018 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
Indian Political Thought and SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
Its Modern Manifestations DOI: 10.1177/2321023018762674
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/inp

Pradeep Chhibber1
Susan L. Ostermann2
Rahul Verma3

Abstract
Conservative Indian political thought, in addition to being alive and well in contemporary discourse,
has a long lineage. We explore the intellectual roots of this tradition by examining older and more
contemporary writings ranging from the Manusmriti and the Ramayana to those of Gandhi and Maududi
and place them in contrast to those of more liberal thinkers like Ambedkar and Nehru. We find that,
in particular, the conservative idea of the ‘limited state’ has an extensive history embedded in sub-
continental religions, religious practices and social norms. Central to the concept of the limited state
is the belief that the state is subservient to society, the belief that dharma is ontological prior to the
state, the belief that the king or leader must preserve the social order and the belief that individual
reform is the primary source of social change. An understanding of this set of beliefs, and the idea
of the limited state more generally, is important not only for understanding India’s past, but also for
insight into contemporary politics. We demonstrate the continued vitality of these concepts through an
examination of recent National Election Studies (NES) and World Values Survey (WVS) data.

Keywords
Indian political thought, constituent assembly debates, conservatism, Bharatiya Janata Party, Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh, Nehru, Gandhi, Karpatri Maharaj, Aurobindo

Introduction
Writing in 1978 Howard Erdman observed that Indian conservatism was a weak political force ‘despite
the country’s well rooted traditions’ (Erdman, 1978, p. 791). This appears to no longer be the case.

1
Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA; Senior Visitor, IPERG, University of Barcelona, Spain.
2
Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA.
3
Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA.

Corresponding author:
Rahul Verma, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA.
E-mail: rahulverma@berkeley.edu
28 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

Conservative political ideas have found loud expression through the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). What,
however, are the conservative ideas that have found place in contemporary political discourse?4 In this
article, we argue that, there are powerful intellectual currents in Indian political thinking that have argued
for limits to the role and power of the state.5 The Mansumriti, the Arthashastra and the Mahabharata
offer clear guidelines to the limits of the role of the state. More contemporary manifestations, coming
from Aurobindo, Gandhi, Karpatri Maharaj, Maududi or Rajagopalchari, offer similar views regarding
the need to limit intervention by the state in social norms and in the redistribution of property. These
ideas are echoed in citizen attitudes that too seek limits to the extent to which the state should intervene
in social norms and practices and redistribute property.
The most striking aspect of this conservative tradition is that the state is subservient to society.6 The
king or the ruler has a far more limited role: he/she is the guardian and preserver of social order. The king
or the state is not an agent of social change. If the state is not an agent of social change, how social
change can be achieved, if at all? The conservative Indic tradition suggests that social change occurs not
at the hands of the state but by the transformation of individuals, a view most cogently theorized and
defended by Aurobindo and Gandhi. The state or the king, then, has one Raj Dharm, which, as in the
Mahabharata, ‘attempts to relate kingship with a morality and duty that is peculiar to the political
sphere’ (Singh, 2017, p. 75). The sources of ‘dharma include the Vedas, perception, and the conduct of
wise men’ (ibid.).7 Raj Dharm also requires the king to look after the poor and the infirm, and build the
infrastructure necessary for economic activity and political order.8 This view contrasts sharply with
the writings of others such as Ambedkar and Nehru, who advocate using state power to remake society
and the economy.9
We first define conservatism and place this current of intellectual thinking in the twentieth century
India. We then trace the origins of this thought. In turn, we emphasize three primary mandates of king-
ship, as first described in the Arthashastra, the Manusmriti, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, as well

4
  We understand conservatism in a manner that is consistent with Jaffrelot (2017, p. 205) in the introduction to this series of articles
on conservatism. He used two sets of criteria to define conservatism: ‘the resilience of non-individualistic values (related to the
extended family ethos and caste hierarchies) and attachment to a religious worldview (reflected in the observation of traditional
rituals and the valourization of ancient beliefs)’.
5
  Kaviraj (2005) too focuses on these texts to highlight the very different trajectories of the imaginary of the state in India and
Europe. In the paper, Kaviraj invokes an essay by Bhudev Mukhopadhyay in which Bhudev had argued that Indian and European
societies were organised around demonstrably different principles. Kaviraj further mentions that the discussion of Bhudev’s work
shows that Gandhi’s startling interventions on the question of modernity and the state had a long indigenous pan-Indian history.
6
  Myron Weiner (1962) too points to the limited role of the state in Indic political theory when he writes:
Ancient texts tell us that government’s main function was to maintain the existing social order. The primary duty of a king, according to the
ninth-century Sukra Niti, consists of the protection of his subjects and the constant keeping under control of evil elements. Since the state was to
preserve existing order, much of the literature focused on the functions and organizations of administration… The reconciliation of conflicts was
not conceived of as part of the function of the king, for Hindu political theory did not conceive of conflict as being part of the traditional order.

7
  The ‘king’s dharma is rooted in his varna-dharma, that is, in the dharma of the Kshatriya warrior’ (Singh, 2017, p. 67).
8
  This articulation of the role of the state is clearly different from that of the ancient Greek or the more dominant modern European
intellectual tradition (Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau, Hegel and Marx). For Aristotle, the polity was as a superior moral body, which
encompassed the family and the household. The contractarians envisioned society as being formed and realized through the state.
9
  We see liberalism in a manner that is consistent with Kymlicka (1991). A liberal state is one in which ‘government treats people
as equals’ (Kymlicka, 1991, p. 13). For liberals, especially those raised in the enlightenment tradition, religion is not the defining
trait of humans, equality is and should be the norm, and any social inequalities are man-made and structural in nature. Hence, a
liberal state should use its power to rid society of its social and economic inequalities using the power of the state. Social change
should emanate from the state.
Chhibber et al. 29

as writings by more contemporary figures.10 The first mandate is that the state remain subservient to
society, with its main task being to provide the preservation of the social order. The second mandate is
that any social change or transformation must come from the individual and not the body politic. The
third mandate is that the ruler must give alms to the poor and needy, introduce appropriate taxes and
build appropriate infrastructure, but not redistribute private property. We situate these aspects of con-
servative Indian political thought in contrast to ideas espoused by the more, ‘liberal’, Indian political
thinkers. Finally, we discuss the degree to which our findings match contemporary political divides
based on an analysis of survey data. The article has one other aim: to shed light on a long and independ-
ent tradition of political thinking in India. This article owes a large intellectual debt to V. R. Mehta for
his subtle but withering critiques of liberal political ideology in India.

Conservatism in the Twentieth Century India

Our understanding of conservatism largely draws upon Huntington’s (1957) formulation. Huntington
wrote that conservatism is a ‘system of ideas employed to justify any established social order … against
any fundamental challenge to its nature or being, no matter from what quarter… This does not mean that
conservatism opposes all change’ (Huntington, 1957, p. 455). Conservative traditions, despite their dif-
ferences, share some common elements, including the ideas that ‘Man is basically a religious animal,
and religion is the foundation of civil society;’ that ‘society is the natural, organic product of slow histori-
cal growth’; ‘the community is superior to the individual. The rights of men derive from the duties.
Evil is rooted in human nature, not in any particular social institutions;’ and that ‘men are unequal. Social
organization is complex and always includes a variety of classes, orders, and groups. Differentiation,
hierarchy, and leadership are the inevitable characteristics of any civil society’ (ibid., p. 456).
Who, then, were the carriers of such a thought in the twentieth century India? Jaffrelot (2017,
pp. 208–209) writes that in the Hindu public sphere, three types of conservatives coexisted at the beginn-
ing of the twentieth century: the reformists–revivalists (like the Arya Samajis), the traditionalists (like
the Tilakites) and the reactionaries (like the Sanatanists).11 These conservative influences greatly shaped
the thinking of multitude of politicians in pre-independence India, many of whom were part of the
Congress ministries pre-independence, the Constituent Assembly and later part of various national and
state level governments. Sanatanists (including Madan Mohan Malaviya), Arya Samajists (including
Lala Lajpat Rai) and Tilakites (including M. S. Aney) were all part-and-parcel of the pre-independence
Congress party.
These currents of thoughts also mixed and merged.12 For instance, Arya Samajists of Punjab and
Sanatanists of UP (United Provinces at that time) formed the Hindu Mahasabha in 1915 to oppose
Muslims. The Mahasabha for a long time remained a shadow organization of the Congress, when in
1934, the Congress resolved to forbid any of its members to simultaneously belong to the Hindu
Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) or the Muslim League. As Bruce Graham (1990)
suggests, the Hindu conservative elements at the time of independence were concentrated mainly
in three bodies: first of all, there was a large and influential group of Hindu traditionalists within the

10
  The resurgence of interest in the Bhagavad Gita and its reinterpretation have an interesting intellectual lineage. For a debate, see,
Kapila and Devji (2013). The authors acknowledge that the Gita and elements of the Mahabharata are part of the common sense
of Indian whatever a citizen’s religious affiliation. For a different and engaging discussion of evil in the Gita and its reinterpretation
(see Palshikar, 2014). He discusses the commentaries on the Bhagavad Gita by Aurobindo, Tilak and Gandhi all of whom see the
Bhagavad Gita as a foundational text.
11
  See Jaffrelot (2017) for a discussion on differences between these school of thoughts.
12
  See Chhibber and Verma (2018) on how the BJP became the confluence of various undercurrents of conservatism movement.
30 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

Congress; second, a mixture of Hindu traditionalists and Hindu nationalists within the Hindu Mahasabha
and Ram Rajya Parishad (RRP); and finally, a contingent of militant Hindu nationalists within the RSS.13
These conservatives, despite their differences on various issues, converged on one principle: they were
simply not in favour of changes imposed from outside the society. In the next section, we describe these
points of convergence in Indian conservative thinking.

The Limited Role of the State

Political conservatism, especially as far as the role of the state is concerned, has a long lineage and
deep roots in Indian political thinking. Indic conservativism can be contrasted with some elements
of Western political thinking and those in India who sought a more active role for the state. For many
Western thinkers, the body politic is the source of ethics and/or law. Aristotle sees the polity as the
supreme good, writing in the Nicomachean Ethics that

Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and
more complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler
and more divine to do so for a nation or city-state. (Nichomachean Ethics I.2.1094b7-10)

Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau argued that the theory of political rule arises from the need to maintain
order, preserve life, liberty and property, and represent the general will. The socialist tradition turned
to the state as a source of social and economic change and as the source of all law. Modern constitutional-
ists from Austin to Montesquieu take a similar position on the authority of the sovereign constitution.
In India, Ambedkar and Nehru wanted an active role by the state to address social and economic
inequalities.
In conservative Indian political thought, on the other hand, the role of the state is limited. Political
order is achieved not by a state being the source of all laws, but by limiting the power of the state to
that of an administrative body. The ‘king’ can establish political order by decentralizing, making use
of spies, focusing on appropriate taxation, keeping up close relations with Brahmins (in ancient texts),
etc., but the ‘king’ is not supposed to make social rules or be the source of all laws. To support this
argument, we draw on the Manusmriti, Arthashastra, Mahabharata and the Ramayana, as well as on the
writings of Aurobindo, Gandhi, Golwalkar, Karpatri Maharaj, Maulana Maududi, and critics such as
Ambedkar and Nehru.
One thread that runs through all these writers is that the rule of the king and the idea of kingship is not
and should not be disputed. Kingship is taken for granted, for only the king can use danda (the rod or
punishment), which is regarded as essential for maintaining political order. This is the only justification
for the rule of one man over all others in his domain. The main focus of the treatises is then on the exer-
cise (emphasis added) of danda, that is, as an administrative tool. Danda—at least in the Mahabharata—
is the ‘origin of kingship, and everything depends on it’ (Singh, 2017, p. 70). Once danda is given this
power, the concern of political theorists is on how to effectively manage danda, and this is done, more

13
  There were significant differences of temperament between those Hindus who were essentially focused on maintaining a
traditional religious perspective, the Hindu traditionalists, and those who, though revivalists, sought to use the power of the state
and a virulent nationalism (mixed with a healthy dose of anti-Muslim attitudes), the Hindu nationalists. Whereas the Hindu
traditionalists took a conservative approach, enlisting time-honoured values to justify the continuation of a hierarchical social
order, the Hindu nationalists wanted to remould Hindu society on corporatist lines and to fashion the state accordingly.
Chhibber et al. 31

often than not, by asking a king to follow dharma whose source is religion or social practices and norms.
Then, Indian political thinkers generally recognized that there are good, administratively effective kings
and bad, administratively ineffective kings. Commonalities amongst those who are good suggest that
these kings seem to follow certain rules or guidelines.14
In order to improve the administration of political power, which is used first and foremost to
preserve the social order, it is suggested that the state must give alms to the poor and the needy, focus on
reforming individuals and provide administrative remedies. Below, after articulating the close connec-
tion between religion and politics in the sub-continent that lends legitimacy to conservative political
thought, we consider each of the above requirements in turn before evaluating the degree to which these
ideas resonate today.

The State as Preserver of the Social Order

The focus on dharma as central to a king’s rule leads directly to a view among some conservative Hindu
political thinkers, that a king’s primary task is to preserve the social order—an order that has religious
sanction. Many of India’s foundational political/religious texts devote quite a bit of attention to the caste
system before turning their attention to how a king should go about preserving it and why.15 The
Manusmriti goes into great detail about the functional division of society into Brahmanas, Ksatriyas,
Vaisyas and Sudras, arguing that men are not equal in their executive capacity, though they are in terms
of their enjoyment of desires; it then details the hereditary aspects of this system (Chapter 10, verse
1–68). These ideas are echoed in the Arthashastra: ‘[t]he specific Law of a householder consists of
obtaining his livelihood in accordance with the Law specific to him’ (p. 68). In the Ramayana, Valmiki
argues that there should be a clear distinction between all castes:

To Brahmans, as the laws ordain, the Warrior caste were ever fain the reverence due to pay; and these the Vaisyas
peaceful crowd who trade and toil for gain, were proud to honor and obey; and all were by the Sudras served,
who never from their duty swerved. [canto VI, p. 41]

Valmiki’s caste distinctions hold even if movement between them is possible and depends upon one’s
qualities (Mehta, 1992, pp. 38–39). Caste, then, or at the very least the functional division of society, is
taken for granted in Indian political thought and thinkers instead turn their attention to the qualities of
kingship that will preserve this system.
The Manusmriti suggests that Brahmanas and Ksatriyas must act in concert with one another to
ensure order in society, with the king being subordinate to the authority of Brahmanas and loyalty to him
always being conditional on his maintenance of the varna system (Chapter 9, verse 326–336). Valmiki
makes a similar claim regarding the responsibilities of a king. Valmiki first states that ‘He guards
mankind from scathe and wrong, and lends his aid and ne’er in vain, the cause of justice to maintain’.16
Over time, and in the context of the larger poem, this has been interpreted to mean that the king is the
protector of all and defender of religion and the caste system (Mehta, 1992, p. 34). Valmiki illustrates all
that this role entails when he depicts Rama killing Shudra Shambuka for conducting a religious penance

14
  Danda, however, is not a neutral instrument of state power. It has been used for social oppression, especially of Dalits (see, Ilaiah
[2001]).
15
  The Ain-i-akbari, however, is silent on this issue.
16
  See the Ramayana, Griffiths Translation.
32 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

that was reserved for those of higher caste backgrounds.17 This is, at least in part, why Mehta suggests
that, in the Ramayana, the task of a good ruler is to discern the structure of the natural social order, relate
it to human beings and enforce it with severity (ibid., p. 39). In other words, kings exist to preserve the
social order.18
Not only did Hindu political thinkers devote quite a bit of attention to the social order and how a king
should maintain it, they also discussed why a king should do so. In the Mahabharata, Vyasa argues
that too much intermingling of the castes is problematic for the state (the Mahabharata, Section 25).
Dharma, Vyasa goes on, is necessary to create order in society, which is necessary for the sustenance
of society and forms the basis of the welfare of all (Mehta, 1992, pp. 38–39). The Manusmriti states that
a king’s power grows only when he maintains the caste system. Meanwhile, the Arthashastra justifies
the king’s support for the social system with a religious argument: ‘the king should not permit people
to violate the Law specific to each of them, for when they adhere to the Law specific to each of them they
rejoice here and in the hereafter’. It also provides a practical distinction:

When among a people, the bounds of the Arya way of life are firmly fixed and the social classes and orders of
life are firmly established, and when they are protected by the Triple (Sama, Rig, and Yajur Vedas) they prosper
and do not perish.

Conservative Hindu political thinkers agree then, for the most part, that the king’s maintenance of the
social order pays dividends to both the king and his subjects, both in this life and, perhaps, in the next.
Buddhist thinking on the role of state was similar (c. 500–525 bce).19 Buddhist views on the nature
and functions of the state passed through three distinct phases. The initial phase is contained in the theory
on the origin of the state as given in the mahdsammata story in the Digha Nikaya. The state begins as a
quasi-contractual arrangement under which the king agrees to perform specific functions on behalf of the
people in return for certain rights conferred on him, including taxation. The second phase is concerned
with the problem of relationships between Buddhism and a well-entrenched and all-powerful monarchi-
cal despotism. The tension is resolved by proposing two equal spheres of life, that of the dhamma and
that of samgha. In the third and final phase, Buddhists explicate their own ideal of the state in which the
state simply becomes an instrument of the dhamma, which now assumes the form of a cosmic force
capable not only of containing the challenge of the power of the state but also of regulating its behaviour.
In this sense, the state becomes an ethical institution drawing its authority from the dhamma and guided
by its repository, the samgha. Butr-Indr (1995, p. 155) writes that ‘the nature of kingship is essentially
based on the concept of righteousness (dhamma). The king is supposed to be the agent who maintains
the principle of righteousness in the worldly spheres’.
Islamic thinking in India also argues for a limited role for the state. Even though conservative Islamic
traditions took a decidedly different approach to the role of the state than either Hindu or Buddhist

17
  ‘O Rama, I was born of a Shudra alliance and I am performing this rigorous penance in order to acquire the status of a God in this
body. I am not telling a lie, O Rama, I wish to attain the Celestial Region. Know that I am a Shudra and my name is Shambuka’. As
he was yet speaking, Raghava [Rama], drawing his brilliant and stainless sword from its scabbard, cut off his head. The Shudra being
slain, all the Gods and their leaders with Agni’s followers, cried out, ‘Well done! Well done!’ overwhelming Rama with praise, and
a rain of celestial flowers of divine fragrance fell on all sides, scattered by Vayu. In their supreme satisfaction, the Gods said to that
hero, Rama: ‘Thou hast protected the interests of the Gods, O Highly Intelligent Prince, now ask a boon, O beloved Offspring of
Raghu, Destroyer of Thy Foes. By thy grace, this Shudra will not be able to attain heaven!’ (see, the Ramayana, Shastri Translation).
18
  The Arthashastra (p. 217) states that castes cannot insult each other’s character, though fines for doing so are higher if a Shudra
insults Brahman than if insults flow in the opposite direction. In other words, the role of the king is to mediate between castes and
classes, but not to disturb the social order itself.
19
  Gokhale (1969).
Chhibber et al. 33

thinking, they argued for a state that conformed to Islamic Law. Mujaddid Ahmad Sirhnadi, writing in
opposition to a more syncretic religion—Din-i Ilahi—that was proposed by the Emperor of India, Akbar,
in 1582 ad, eulogized the practice of taqlid (following). Taqlid makes the world an orderly place as long
as one is following the authority of the prophets. In his view, if everyone were left to his own whim,
nothing but evil and corruption would appear (Alam, 2010).
Maududi (1960), a leading Islamic scholar of the subcontinent in the twentieth century, described
Islamic thinking as being in opposition to those rulers who ‘are incapable of thinking except in terms of
the nature and pattern of a state of the Western secular type’ (p. vi). For him, free will functions as ‘gifts
from God’ (p. 48) and ‘independence of choice has been delegated to us by God’ (p. 48). The ‘harmoni-
zation of human life with the universe dictates the necessity of there being one Sovereign’ (p. 48)—this
sovereign is God and God, not man, is the source of Law in Muslim society (p. 49). The law he was
referring to was the Shariah—which is a ‘complete scheme of life and an all-embracing social order’
(p. 52) and ‘that the State, in exercising its powers, shall not be competent to transgress the limits laid
down by Islam’ (p. 101).
For Maududi, the political problem of contemporary times is the domination of man over man
(p. 133), so the first principle of Islamic political theory is ‘[n]one is entitled to make laws on his own
authority and none is obliged to abide by them. This right vests in Allah alone’ (p. 137) ‘…Islam, speak-
ing from the view-point of political philosophy, is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy’.
Despite appearances, however, his view was more subtle than a return to fundamentalism in two
important ways. First, for Maududi, the political foundation of Western thinking is the ‘sovereignty of
the people’ (p. 138). Islamic theocracy, however, has ruled differently from its Christian counterpart
in Europe, where a priestly class exercised domination: the ‘theocracy built by Islam is not ruled by
any particular religious class but by the whole community’ (p. 139) and hence, there was no need
for conceiving of an independent sovereign people. He writes that Islam uses the term ‘vicegerency’
(khilafat) instead of sovereignty (the latter belongs to God alone) (p. 149) and this is given to the whole
community—every believer is a Caliph of God. Maududi also advocates political pluralism. He writes
that a ‘characteristic’ of the Islamic state is that it is an ‘ideological state’ (p. 146) and its objective is
to establish that ideology; minorities should live according to their own cultures (p. 147). For him, ‘[t]he
law with which we have been and are concerned is the law of the land and not the personal law of any
community. In personal matters, every community is welcome to adopt its own personal law’ (p. 69).

Contemporary Views
Despite these differences the idea that a king is to preserve a social order resonates in more contemporary
conservative Indian thinking. Singh (2017) concludes her masterful discussion of Ashoka and his
legacy, the Mahabharata, and the Ramayana by observing that, despite some differences, these texts are
‘foundational to the way in which Indian political discourse evolved over the succeeding centuries’
(Singh, 2017, p. 91). These texts ‘recognize the king as a mediator between human society, nature, and
the gods… But more important is the fact that they represent the earliest attempts to anchor kingship in
a discourse of morality and duty…’ (ibid.).
These ideas are echoed Aurobindo’s writing who advises that a good king

will approach the zamindars, landholders and rich men generally, and endeavour—To promote sympathy
between the zamindars and the peasants and heal all discords and to turn the minds of rich men to works of
public beneficence and charity to those in their neighbourhood independent of the hope of reward and official
distinction. (Aurobindo, 1905, Appendix, p. 91)
34 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

Writing much later in The Ideal of Human Unity, Aurobindo (1977, p. 339) defends a limited role for the
state while criticizing the ossification of caste categories as a later development. He writes,

[w]e see a similar democratic equality, though of a different type, in the earlier records of Indian civilization.
The rigid hierarchy of castes with the pretensions and arrogance of the caste spirit was a later development; in
the simpler life of old, difference or even superiority of function did not carry with it a sense of personal or class
superiority: at the beginning, the most sacred religious and social function, that of the Rishi and sacrificer, seems
to have been open to men of all classes and occupations. Theocracy, caste and absolute kingship grew in force
pari passu like the Church and the monarchical power in mediaeval Europe under the compulsion of the new
circumstances created by the growth of large social and political aggregates.

Karpatri Maharaj—a monk in the Hindu dashnami monastic tradition, a teacher in the Advaita Vedanta
tradition and founder of the RRP, an orthodox Hindu religious political party—suggests that dharma must
guide the state’s actions.20 Dharma, he suggests, permeates the entire universe, including geopolitical
entities such as states.21
Maharaj lays out this principal in great detail in his book ‘Marxvaad and Ramrajya’,22 reflecting on
Western political philosophy and writing in great detail about political thinkers (Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes,
Rosseau, Locke, Hegel, Marx, Kant, Fichte, etc.) and political theories (Individualism, Utilitarianism,
Liberalism, Communism, Majoritarianism, Fascism, Anarchy and others). He then contrasts these to
analogs in Hindu political philosophy.23
In Maharaj’s view, the theory of the state propagated by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau is wrong
(emphasis added). He argues that in ‘in Indian tradition the society is always supreme and … the ruler is
accountable to dharma and society. The administrator and administration keep changing, but not the
society and dharma. The laws of the state must always be favorable to religious texts’ (Maharaj,
2013,  p.  88). He goes to say that the conception of the ‘state of nature’ in Hobbes and Rousseau are
irrelevant in the Indic tradition, because, in India, morality and civilization preceded the development of
the state. Since tradition was the only religion and the administration of the society was governed by
dharma, he did not see any ‘conflict between individual and society’ (p. 91).
If dharma is ontologically prior to the state, why, then, do we still need a king? In answer, Maharaj
relates a story about why citizens approached the gods to create political order and the basis of that order.
He writes

Lord Brahma created a dandniti shastra of one hundred thousand chapters. This text was first ratified by Indra,
Shiva and other deities and after that they went to Vishnu and asked him to give them a perfect king who could
implement these codes. The king and after him his son, followed these codes and established order. However,
the grandson became unbridled so the sages (protectors of the social order) dethroned him and then killed him.
After this Prithu (the murdered king’s son) asked the sages what he should do. The sages asked him to promise
that he would follow dharma. Prithu swore to follow everything and this was the social contract. (pp. 106–108)

20
  The RRP had pockets of influence in the Hindi belt. It won three Lok Sabha seats in the 1952 election and several Vidhan Sabha
sets. The RRP later merged with the Jana Sangha, the precursor to the BJP.
21
  See The election manifesto of the All-India Ramarajya Parishad (1951, pp. 2–3).
22
  The English term of Marxvaad is Marxism. Ramrajya, is a metaphorical term, that is open to interpretations. A loose translation
would be the kingdom of Lord Rama where Dharma was supreme. A large part of this book was written in 1953, while he was in
jail for spearheading a movement for the greater integration of Jammu and Kashmir with Indian Union. The book was written
in Sanskrit and later translated into Hindi by one of his disciples, Shri Vasudev Vyas, and later published by Gita Press.
23
  See the fascinating story of the spread of Hindu ideas in ‘Gita Press and Making of Hindu India’ (Mukul, 2015).
Chhibber et al. 35

In a compilation of his speeches, M. S. Golwalkar—the second sarsanghchalak of the RSS, also consid-
ered by many to be the chief ideologue of the movement—echoes very similar sentiments when he
writes that,

Our philosophy pictures the highest state of society and offers a cogent explanation for it. There was no state,
there was no king, there were no penalties, and there were no criminals. All protected one another by virtue of
dharma. ‘Dharma is the universal code of right conduct that awakens the Common Inner Bond, restrains selfish-
ness, and keeps the people together in that harmonious state, even without external authority. There will be no
selfishness, no hoarding, and all men will live and work for the whole. And it is dharma that is the distinguishing
feature of human life’. (p. 25)

In another passage, Golwalkar compares this system with governmental systems in other parts of the
world:

The basis of our national existence was not political power. Otherwise, our fate would have been no better those
of those nations, which remain today as only museum exhibits. The political rulers were never the standard
bearers of our society. They were never taken as the props of our national life. Saints and sages, who had risen
above the mundane temptations of self and power and had dedicated themselves wholly to establishing a happy,
virtuous, and integrated state of society, were its constant torch bearers. They presented the dharmasatta. The
king was only an ardent follower of that higher moral authority. Many a kingship bit the dust because of various
adverse and aggressive forces. But the dharmasatta continued to hold the people together. (p. 71)

As we have noted earlier in the article there is a fundamental difference between Hindu traditionalists
like Maharaj and Hindu nationalists like Golwalkar. Maharaj, commenting on the Ramayana, writes
that ‘the state was created to protect disintegration of social order and the king was given only those
powers that were required to do so. Thus, his powers were never like the “leviathan” as conceptualized
in Hobbes’ (pp. 102–103). Maharaj, in another book, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh aur Hindu Rashtra,
presented a scathing critique of RSS’s commitment to Hindu dharma because of the latters’ emphasis
on the nation-state. In Vicharapiyusa, he further refuted the nationalist agenda of M. S. Golwalkar
and V. D. Savarkar. In his view, the RSS and its allies were influenced by European nationalism and
modernist ideas brought by western Orientalists.
Minoo Masani and C. Rajagopalachari (Rajaji), the two founders of the Swatantra Party, also echo the
ideas behind the limited power of the state quite forcefully in a speech given in Bombay in 1965, Masani
mentioned how Gandhi foresaw the power of state and then Masani went on to quote Gandhi: ‘I look
upon an increase in the power of the State’, he said, ‘with the greatest fear because, although apparently
doing good by minimizing exploitation, it does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality,
which lies at the root of all progress’.24 Rajaji echoed similar sentiments when he wrote:

The loosening of the religious impulse is the worst of the disservices rendered by the Congress [Party] to
the nation. We must organize a new force and movement to replace the greed and the class hatred of Congress
materialism with a renovated spiritual outlook emphasizing the restraints of good conduct as of greater
importance than the triumphs of organized covetousness. Every effort should be made to foster and maintain
spiritual values and preserve what is good in our national culture and tradition and avoid dominance of a purely
material philosophy of life which thinks only in terms of the standard of life without any reference to its content
or quality.

  Even India’s leading Gandhian socialist, Jayaprakash Narayan wrote that ‘the welfare State under the name of welfare threatens
24

as much to enslave man to the State as the totalitarian. The people must cry halt to this creeping paralysis’.
36 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

Rajaji linked progress in India ‘to the maintenance of dharma, or moral duty, which is an organic growth
which it is our duty to respect and which we should not treat as mere Indian superstition or eccentricity’
(Erdman, 1967, p. 92). For him, ‘if there is any honesty in India today, any hospitality, any chastity, any
philanthropy, any tenderness to dumb creatures, any aversion to evil, any love to do good, it is due to
whatever remains of the old culture’. And, to put it briefly, he said that ‘if our four hundred million strike
out religion from their lives, India will be wiped out’.
For Nehru and Ambedkar, as well as several other twentieth century Indian liberals, the state’s support
for the existing social order benefits both the state itself and its most privileged subjects, but this does
not justify the harm that such a system causes to those at the bottom of the social order. Nehru states the
cases plainly as follows:

Social evils have a history and a background, roots in our past, and intimate connections with the economic
structure under which we live. Many of them are indeed the direct products of that economic system, just as
many others are of religious superstition and harmful custom. Any scientific consideration of the problem of
social welfare must, therefore, inevitably go down to these roots and seek out the causes. It must have the cour-
age to look deep down into the well of truth and to proclaim fearlessly what it finds there. If it avoids politics
and economics, and all that goes by the name of religion, for fear of treading on dangerous ground, then it moves
on the surface only and can neither command much respect, nor achieve results. (Agrawal & Aggarwal, 1989,
pp. 206–207)

For Nehru, the caste system inextricably links social and economic status; it follows that attempts to
change the economic welfare of many of India’s poor must, if they are to have any hope of success, also
address these individuals’ low social standing. Ambedkar had a similar view. He wanted a far more
expansive reading of rights into the Indian constitution that would make social discrimination, especially
when any individual prevented another from equal access to and enjoyment of public places, an offence.
To protect Dalits in particular, Ambedkar proposed that the state relocate them to separate villages, since
he saw this as the only way that Dalits would be able to escape the social tyranny of the upper castes
(Framing of India’s Constitution: 111).
Clearly, there is disagreement on the role of the state with respect to social norms. The conservative
view is distinct from the liberal view, which sees the state as responsible for changing rather than
preserving the social order.

Individual Reform as a Source of Social Change

If the role of the state is to preserve social order how can deep seated social inequalities be addressed?
For conservative Indian political thinkers, social change begins with an individual changing her ideas
and values, not the state changing the rules regarding the context in which she exists. In a similar vein,
Aurobindo (1977, pp. 272–273) writes that

[o]n one side is the engrossing authority, perfection and development of the State, on the other the distinctive free-
dom, perfection and development of the individual man. The State idea, the small or the vast living machine, and
the human idea, the more and more distinct and luminous Person, the increasing God, stand in perpetual opposition.

He further explains that the idea of the state is

the subordination of the individual to the good of all that is demanded; practically, it is his subordination to a
collective egoism, political, military, economic, which seeks to satisfy certain collective aims and ambitions
Chhibber et al. 37

shaped and imposed on the great mass of the individuals by a smaller or larger number of ruling persons who are
supposed in some way to represent the community. (ibid., p. 296)

The Arthshastra echoes this idea, that the path to change starts with the individual, and adds that those
leaders who cannot reform individuals are not true kings or Brahmins (Mitra & Liebig, 2016; Liebig,
2014). Meanwhile Valmiki, in the Ramayana, illustrates a very similar principle through the character of
Sita. Though Sita took no dishonorable action herself and indeed refuses Ravana’s attempts at seduction,
Sita takes her own life to preserve her honor and reputation. The lesson being that the individual is the
one who must take action to cure societal evils.
Gandhi (1909) too distrusts state-based change and focuses on the individual. In Hind Swaraj, he
writes that,

Civilization is that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty. Performance of duty and obser-
vance of morality are convertible terms. To observe morality is to attain mastery over our mind and our passions.
So doing, we know ourselves. The Gujarati equivalent for civilization means ‘good conduct’.

There are Indian political thinkers who part ways with conservative ones by suggesting that if the ideals
of a state and society stand in opposition to one another and that the state must seek to transform society.
This was most apparent in the debate on the Hindu Code Bill and the adoption of the Uniform Civil
Code. Ambedkar was an advocate of reforming the Hindu code to give women equal rights. As Law
Minster in Nehru’s cabinet he headed a Select Committee to look into the Hindu Code Bill. Ambedkar
introduced several important changes in the Bill including equal property rights for women, abolition
of customary law and specification of grounds for divorce. The Bill in its new form, however, created
uproar in the Constituent Assembly. For Nehru, Ambedkar and many others, the underlying principle of
Hindu law in the pre-independence era was inequality, the inferior position of the woman in all matters
governing personal law, like marriage, maintenance, inheritance and guardianship (Derrett, 1957, p. 57).
For Nehru in particular, thus codifying Hindu law was a necessary reform measure that fit into his plans
for all-round national development. As he put it,

We talk about Five Year Plans, of economic progress, industrialization, political freedom and all that. They are all
highly important. But I have no doubt in my mind that the real progress of the country means progress not only
on the political plane, not only on the economic plane, but also on the social plane. They have to be integrated,
all these, when the great nation goes forward (cited in Guha 2010).

Ambedkar too was an advocate of using state power to reform religious laws and norms. This was most
apparent when he objected to some Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly who wanted to give
personal laws constitutional status. In a lengthy statement, he said:

Sir, I am afraid I cannot accept the amendments which have been moved to this article. I think most of my friends
who have spoken on this amendment have quite forgotten that up to 1935 the North-West Frontier Province was
not subject to the Shariat Law. It followed the Hindu Law in the matter of succession and in other matters, so
much so that it was in 1939 that the Central Legislature had to come into the field and to abrogate the application
of the Hindu Law to the Muslims of the North-West Frontier Province and to apply the Shariat Law to them.
That is not all. My honourable friends have forgotten, that, apart from the North-West Frontier Province, up till
1937 in the rest of India, in various parts, such as the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and Bombay, the
Muslims to a large extent were governed by the Hindu Law in the matter of succession (..) I personally do not
understand why religion should be given this vast, expansive jurisdiction so as to cover the whole of life and
38 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

to prevent the legislature from encroaching upon that field. After all, what are we having this liberty for? We
are having this liberty in order to reform our social system, which is so full of inequities, so full of inequalities,
discriminations and other things, which conflict with our fundamental rights I should also like to point out that
all that the State is claiming in this matter is a power to legislate.25

Ambedkar’s speech quite succinctly represents the central position of those who wanted the state to take
it upon itself to reform society. Here the conservative and liberal divide largely matches that of its
Western counterparts. By way of example, in the United States, liberals often see epidemic gun violence
as a societal evil and believe that gun control and education are the proper ways to prevent or reduce it,
while conservatives place the blame, and by extension the route towards reform, on individuals, arguing
that ‘guns don’t kill people, people do’. This emphasis on individual-level reform—as opposed to state
led reform—is a hallmark of the Indian conservative tradition.

The Economic Role of the State

Here there is little disagreement amongst Indian political thinkers: one of the most important tasks of the
state is to provide for those who struggle to provide for themselves, presumably in exchange for contin-
ued support (otherwise known as patronage). As the primary role of the king is to preserve the social
order, it follows that, to preserve political order, a secondary role of the king is to make up for the short-
comings of the social order by distributing alms to the poor. There is variation amongst Indian political
thinkers, however, in terms of what is meant by this prerogative.
For many, this role entails the state providing for people in need on an individual basis, supplying
private rather than public or club goods. For instance, according to the Arthashastra, ‘[t]he king should
… provide for children, old people, those fallen into misfortune, and the helpless, as also women who
have not borne children and the sons of women who have borne children’ (p. 100). Valmiki, through
his description of Rama, also goes on at length about the requirement that the state provide for the poor.
The king, he suggests, ‘is the protector of all… the supporter of his kinsmen and friends… He always
gives shelter to his devoted followers’ (Narad, Shastri Translation). Valmiki doesn’t stop with friends and
devoted followers, however. He writes that the king should not ‘come into hostile contact with the
weak… [and] should not regard the weak as always subject to humiliation’ (the Mahabharata, Sec. 34).
Echoing these admonishments in more contemporary times, Aurobindo (1905, p. 198) writes, in Bhawani
Mandir, that the chief work of the Sannyasis, religious ascetics, ‘will be that of mass instruction and help
to the poor and ignorant, in the form of education and charity’. But perhaps more telling than any of these
authors’ statements is the lack, at least in the foundational texts included in this article, of any counter-
vailing sentiment. Welfare and distributive politics then, at least in the Indian context, is part and parcel
of conservative Indian political thinking.
Interestingly, conservative political thinkers do not stop with what is customarily considered to be char-
ity or the distribution of private goods on a patronage basis. For some authors, the state’s reach must extend
further and involves supporting industry and providing infrastructure, by way of public or club goods, to
alleviate societal needs. The Arthashastra suggests that the state should also help with infrastructure—by
providing reservoirs and assisting agriculturalists with farm animals and money, should they fall on hard
times, in addition to granting favours and exemptions (Arthashastra, p. 100). The Arthashastra also
suggests that the state (i.e., the king), should safeguard agriculture, particularly when it is stressed by the

25
  Constituent Assembly Debates (Vol. VII), 23 November 1948.
Chhibber et al. 39

hardship of fines, forced labour, and taxes, as well as by sickness, natural calamities, and war (p. 101).
More contemporaneously, Gandhi, while generally opposed to a powerful state—wanted the government
to actively ‘subsidize’ making khadi. He writes:

the Government should notify the villagers that they will be expected to manufacture Khaddar for the needs of
their villages within a fixed date after which no cloth will be supplied to them. The Government in their turn
will supply the villagers with cotton seed or cotton whenever required, at cost price and the tools of manufacture
also at cost, to be recovered in easy installments payable in, say, five years or more. They will supply them with
instructors wherever necessary and undertake to buy surplus stock of Khaddar, provided that the villagers in
question have their cloth requirements supplied from their own manufacture. This should do away with cloth
shortage without fuss and with very little overhead. (Harijan, 28 April 1946)

Similarly, Aurobindo suggests, in the Bhawani Mandir, that these types of projects are simply charity
provided to the middle classes.
Why should the state provide for the needy? Manu and Vyasa, in the Manusmriti and the Mahabharata
do provide a rationale for the obligation to provide for the poor and the needy, even if this rationale stops
short of theorizing the underpinnings of the state and political power more generally. Manu, for instance,
suggests that, without politics and kingship, the larger fish will swallow the smaller, and that this is a
violation of dharma (Doniger & Smith 1991, pp. 53–54). In other words, government ensures that no one
dominates all others, and, by virtue of this fact, the king is enjoined to protect the people and to prevent
violations of dharma. The Mahabharata echoes these sentiments, stating that the state arises out of our
desire to escape from natural anarchy, in which the strong eat the weak, as happens with fish living in
the same pond with snakes (Mehta, 1992, p. 36). Thus, the state comes into being to protect the weak.
According to the same logic, the state is only good so long as it does just that. And a ‘bad’ state is, at least
according to Vyasa, is a potentially threatened one: ‘Take care that the eyes of the weak do not burn the
race to its very roots. Weakness is more powerful that even the greatest power. Take care that the eyes of
the weak do not burn like a blazing fire’ (the Mahabharata, Sec. 91). But Valmiki does not seem to
suggest a threat of revolution or social unrest, but rather that a ‘bad’ king risks the wrath of the gods:
‘[w]hen a weak person fails to find a rescuer, the great rod of divine chastisement falls (upon the king)’
(the Mahabharata, Sec. 91).
Consistent with this line of thinking, Karpatri Maharaj opposed the redistributive emphasis of many
of the framers of the Indian constitution—Ambedkar and Nehru especially—who argued for state
redistribution of property. For Maharaj, in a society that is administered by dharma, the economic balance
between individuals is guided by a redistributive framework that is generated by society itself. Therefore,
there is no question of unemployment and hunger. Individuals are guided by the dharmic system are
‘providers of each other, not the exploiters’ (p. 89) Meanwhile, Maududi also argues that since ‘in a full-
fledged Islamic society wherein the wealthy pay Zukat to the state’, the state ‘provides for the basic
necessities of the needy and the destitute’ (pp. 53–54).
More recent anthropological research shows that there is a cultural or even ritualistic expectation of
patronage (Piliavsky, 2014). As political giving—or the dispensation of patronage—is never only a mat-
ter of redistributing resources, it is also necessarily a rhetorical act that conveys information a politi-
cian’s largesse to his or her actual and/or potential supporters. Displays of this variety may indicate the
degree to which a potential leader is ‘king-like’. Indeed, more than two decades ago Price (1989) argued
that this idea is heir (emphasis added) to the persistent, historically embedded kingship model. To be a
raja (king), one had to display one’s capacity to provide in grand spectacles of magnificence.
40 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

This view differs from that advocated by some within the liberal intellectual tradition. They argue that
improvement of the material situation of the poor is not possible within the confines of India’s social
structure. For instance, Nehru writes that:

[while] [t]here may be many who have the ordinary conveniences of life and are not hard put to it to find their
daily bread… To the vast masses of our fellow countrymen present conditions spell hunger and deepest poverty,
an empty stomach and a bare back… The most amazing and terrible thing about India is her poverty. It is not
a dispensation from Providence or an inevitable condition of society. India has enough or can have enough for
all her children if some of her own sons did not corner the good things and so deprive the masses of their dues.
‘Poverty’, said Ruskin, ‘is not due to natural inferiority of the poor or the inscrutable laws of God. Or drink, but
because others have picked their pockets’… The control of wealthy by the few no only means the unhappiness
of many, but it exercises a power over men’s minds… It is this mental outlook which paralyses the poor and the
oppressed. (Agrawal & Aggarwal, 1989, p. 205)

These statements stand in contrast to those of conservative Indian political thinkers. Providing welfare,
according to Nehru, is not just an economic or political problem, it is a social problem, and Indian society
will have to break the social order in order to truly provide welfare.
Ambedkar’s views largely align with Nehru’s. In his ‘Memorandum and Draft Articles on the Rights
of States and Minorities’, dated 24 March 1947, Ambedkar provides clear evidence that, in his opinion,
the state must redress both economic and social inequality. In his rendition of a proposed Preamble to the
Constitution, Ambedkar advocates that the United States of India will ‘remove social, political, and
economic inequality by providing better opportunities to the submerged classes’ (Framing of India’s
Constitution, p. 84). He also wanted a far greater role for the state in the economy. In his view India
should declare ‘as a part of the law of its Constitution’ that industries which are key industries or basic
industries will run by the state. Agriculture would be a state industry and Insurance a monopoly of the
state (Framing of India’s Constitution, p. 89). For Ambedkar’s view, the state also has ‘an obligation to
supply capital necessary for agriculture as well as industry’ (Framing of India’s Constitution, p. 99). He
is far more explicit about the role of the state in the notes to the proposed articles of the constitution.
He writes that his plan has

two special features. One is that it proposes State Socialism in important fields of economic life. The second spe-
cial feature of the plan is that it does not leave the establishment of State Socialism to the will of the Legislature.
It established State Socialism by the law of the constitution… (Framing of India’s Constitution, p. 99).

In Nehru’s and Ambedkar’s writings, we see the first evidence of the foundations of ideological politics
in India today. For conservatives and liberals alike, welfare is par for the course. Where they differ is on
whether charity will ever solve the ‘poverty problem’ in the absence of meaningful social reform.
Ambedkar and Nehru’s views contrast quite sharply with those of Gandhi, who believed in trustee-
ship and in a far more limited role for the state. He wrote that ‘[w]e have long been accustomed to think
that power comes only through Legislative Assemblies. I have regarded this belief as a grave error
brought about by inertia or hypnotism’. (Constructive Program, p. 5). This is not to say that he did not
advocate for economic equality. He believed that economic equality was ‘the master key to non-violent
Independence’, but for him the solution lay less in state power than in trusteeship. The core of trusteeship
was individual self-awareness (Constructive Program, p. 20). Gandhi believed that the rich person

must know that all that wealth does not belong to me; what belongs to me is the right to an honourable livelihood,
no better than that enjoyed by millions of others. The rest of my wealth belongs to the community and must be
used for the welfare of the community. I enunciated this theory when the socialist theory was placed before the
Chhibber et al. 41

country in respect to the possessions held by zamindars and ruling chiefs. They would do away with these privi-
leged classes. I want them to outgrow their greed and sense of possession, and to come down in spite of their
wealth to the level of those who earn their bread by labour. (Harijan, 3 June 1939)

Here, as above, we see ideological disagreement about how, rather than whether, to deal with economic
injustice. Conservative Indian political thinkers focus on providing alms to the poor, others seek state
directed and state led solutions to the problem of social and economic inequality.

Conservatism in Contemporary Indian Society

The conservative tradition in Indic political thinking, as we have argued above, is sceptical of the role of
the state in reforming the social and economic order. These ideas resonate in contemporary India. Many
Indian citizens remain deeply sceptical of an expanded role for the state in managing social norms, with
many believing that even if the state should not be involved in preserving the social order, it should not
be responsible for changing it either. A large plurality (43%) of respondents to the 2004 National Election
Studies (NES) survey conducted by Lokniti-CSDS favoured the idea that ‘every community should be
allowed to have its own law to govern marriage and property rights’ (Table 1). There was no difference
in the affirmative response to this question among the young or old, respondents of different castes, or
level of education. It is only in large metro areas where respondents, when compared to those from small
cities and villages, were less likely to agree that each community should have its own laws for marriage
and property. Even among metro dwellers, the plurality views favoured community-based laws for
marriage and property.
This is not a one-off finding. Chhibber and Verma (2018) using data from various rounds of NES
surveys show that there is a substantial divide among Indian citizens on whether the state can intervene
and redefine the contours of marital practice and inheritance. For example, the NES 2004 and 2009
surveys carried questions on the proper role of the state with respect to marriage norms. Voters were
asked whether inter-caste (both 2004 and 2009) and inter-religious (only in 2004) marriage should be
banned. The data presented in Table 2 shows that a large plurality of respondents would like the state to
preserve the marital norms, rather than change it.
Citizen attitudes towards private wealth and accumulation are also similarly divided. The World
Values Survey (WVS) 2005 asked respondents whether private ownership of businesses should be
increased or government ownership of businesses should be increased. A quarter of the respondents to
the question in India said that private ownership of businesses should be increased whereas one-third
opted for increasing government ownership of businesses. The remaining respondents (40%) expressed
views that were more balanced—asking for different mixes of increases in private and government

Table 1. Support for Community Based Laws for Marriage and Property Rights

Support Community Rights Percentage

Fully agree 42
Somewhat agree 12
Somewhat disagree  7
Fully disagree 20
No opinion 19
Source: NES (2004).
42 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

Table 2. The State as a Guardian of Social Norms of Marriage (in %)

Support Community Ban Inter-caste Ban Inter-caste Ban Inter-religious

Rights (2009) Marriage (2009) Marriage (2004) Marriage (2004)
Fully agree 35 31 43 45
Somewhat agree 22 16 10 11
Somewhat disagree 12 16 10 10
Fully disagree 11 23 27 25
No opinion 20 14 09 09
Source: NES (2004, 2009).

ownership of businesses. Respondents were also asked whether people could only grow rich at the
expense of others or whether wealth could grow so that there is enough for everyone. An almost identical
percentage of the respondents (28% and 29%, respectively) said that people grew rich at the expense of
others or that wealth could grow so that there is enough for everyone. The remaining respondents (40%)
expressed opinions in the middle. Similarly, in the NES 2009 survey voters were asked whether they
approve the idea that poor people with no land and property should occupy a part of land and property of
those who have large amount of land and property. Only a quarter (25%) of the respondents approved
of this idea, whereas a plurality disapproved of this method. Rest expressed no opinion on this question.

Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that conservative Indian political thought has a long lineage, in addition to
being alive and well in contemporary discourse. Conservative political thinking in India, and the idea of
the limited state, is rooted in elements of Indian religion, religious practices and social norms. In a deeply
religious country conservative ideas about the state rooted in religious understandings resonate widely.
This does not mean that contemporary Indian conservative thinking is simply a translation of more
ancient thinking or that it is static. India is much more exposed to outside influence than before. It is
changing socially and economically. With these changes the debates on the appropriate role of the state
are more vigorous. As the number of Indians who are exposed to global forces and ideas grows and as
democracy allows India’s political discourse to shift, we may witness the birth of very different ideas
about the role of the state.

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Amit Ahuja, Matt Baxter and Mark Bevir for their input and the helpful comments of
discussants—Ananya Vajpeyi, Christopher Jaffrelot, Adnan Naseemullah and Francesca Jensenius. Comments by
two anonymous reviewers helped improve the article.

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