017 UNIVERSAL TEXTILES v.
CIR (TAN)
Dec. 29, 1970 | Castro, J. | Judicial Notice of Documents Submitted
G.R. No. L-31287
PETITIONER: Universal Textile Mills, Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Court of Industrial Relations and Macario Umali
G.R. No. L-31332
PETITIONER: Universal Textile Mills Workers Union
RESPONDENTS: Court of Industrial Relations, Macario Umali, and
Leopoldo Francisco
SUMMARY: The CIR found both Universal Textile Mills, Inc.
(UTEX) and Universal Textile Mills Workers Union (Union), guilty of
unfair labor practice for the dismissal of Umali, and ordered his
reinstatement along with backwages. Union and UTEX filed their MR,
along with their respective memoranda. However, during the hearing,
counsel for the Union was barred from arguing because their
memoranda were allegedly filed out of time. The CIR held the Union
and UTEX’s arguments should be held in abeyance pending
investigation of the true mailing date of their memoranda. CIR then
issued a resolution which stated that only 3 and 5 copies of the
memoranda were filed by Union and UTEX, respectively. This means
that both did not comply with the requirement that at least 6 copies of
the memoranda should be filed with the CIR. Union argues that the
unresolved issue was the timeliness of their memoranda and that
dismissal based on an entirely different ground – insufficiency of
copies – amounts to GADLEJ. The issue is whether or not the CIR
properly took notice of the Union and UTEX’s failure to file the
correct number of copies even if the main issue in the original MRs
was the time of filing. The SC said that yes, CIR was correct because a
tribunal may at any time take judicial notice of the records of a
case pending before it, and satisfy itself that copies of the pleadings
filed by the parties are in the numbers required by its rules. failure
of a pleading to comply with such procedural imperative set by the
court, leaves the latter the discretion either to reject that pleading or
order completion of the number of copies thereof.
DOCTRINE: A tribunal may at any time take judicial notice of
the records of a case pending before it, and satisfy itself that copies
of the pleadings filed by the parties are in the numbers required by
its rules.
FACTS:
1.   The CIR found both Universal Textile Mills, Inc. (UTEX) and
Universal Textile Mills Workers Union (Union), guilty of unfair
labor practice for the dismissal of Umali, and ordered his
reinstatement along with backwages.
2.   Both Union and UTEX filed their motion for reconsideration within
the 5-day period as prescribed by the CIR’s rules, with notice that
each would submit their memoranda within 10 days after.
3.   UTEX stated that its memoranda were filed via messenger on Nov.
28 while Union claimed that its memoranda was filed via registered
mail on Nov. 27.
4.   These MRs were set for hearing but Union’s counsel moved it to a
later date – Feb. 6.
5.   On this day, in the course of the CIR’s session, counsel again for the
Union was barred from arguing because their memoranda were filed
out of time.
6.   Union’s counsel exhibited a registry receipt which indicated that the
post office received the mail on Nov. 28 – within the prescribed
period.
7.   The CIR conducted its own search to determine the date of receipt,
but not such document was found.
8.   Because of this, the CIR held that the Union and UTEX’s arguments
should be held in abeyance pending investigation of the true mailing
date of their memoranda.
9.   The CIR then issued a resolution which stated:
•   Incident to the issue of the memoranda being filed out of
time, the records of the case reveal that the original copy of
the memoranda is with the notation that only 3 copies were
filed by Union.
•   Moreover, records also show, as confirmed by the clerk, that
UTEX filed only 5 copies of their written arguments.
•   Regardless of whether or not Union’s memoranda were filed
on time, the memoranda filed by both UTEX and Union
failed to comply with the requirement that at least 6 copies
of the written arguments in support of their MR must we
filed with the Court. Therefore, they are DISMISSED.
10.   Both Union and UTEX filed MRs for this resolution. Both were
summarily denied, on the ground that resolutions of the CIR en banc
cannot be subject of any MR.
ISSUE/S:
 1.   W/N the CIR properly took notice of the Union and UTEX’s failure
to file the correct number of copies even if the main issue in the
original MRs was the time of filing? Yes.
RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions of the CIR en banc of March
25 and June 14, 1969 are hereby annulled and set aside, and the said Court en
banc subject to our observations made in the immediately preceding
paragraph, is hereby ordered to give due course to the petitioners' separate
motions for reconsideration of the decision of November 4, 1968, and
forthwith proceed to the consideration and resolution thereof. No costs.
10.   In denying UTEX and Union’s day in court, CIR clearly acted with
GADLEJ.
11.   The court's strict adherence to the letter of its procedural rules may
have been imbued with laudable intention bearing upon the
discouragement of unwarranted delay in labor cases.
12.   However, courts should remember that the adjudication of
substantial justice remains the paramount consideration in every
litigation before it.

RATIO:
1.   Union argues that the unresolved issue was the timeliness of their
memoranda and that dismissal based on an entirely different ground
– insufficiency of copies – amounts to GADLEJ.
2.   SC: CIR was correct. It is a settled rule that a tribunal may at any
time take judicial notice of the records of a case pending before
it, and satisfy itself that copies of the pleadings filed by the parties
are in the numbers required by its rules.
3.   The failure of a pleading to comply with such procedural imperative
set by the court, leaves the latter the discretion either to reject that
pleading or order completion of the number of copies thereof.
4.   Where, however, the party whose pleading has been shunted aside
offers to show that it has fully complied with the requirements of
the rules and that the records kept by the tribunal contain
inaccurate entries, the latter body should pause and listen, and give
that party a day in court.
5.   In its MR, UTEX offered to produce 10 extra copies of the
memorandum it kept which were stamped “received” by the CIR.
This means that it actually complied with the number of copies
required.
6.   On the other hand, Union also offered to prove that it had filed the 6
copies required.
7.   CIR brushed aside these contentions by just saying that its
resolutions cannot be subject to an MR.
8.   The rule that resolutions of the CIR en banc cannot be the subject of
motions for reconsideration is principally addressed to resolutions
reviewing the decisions of the individual judges of that court.
9.   The reason is that the court would have passed upon the issues a
second time. This could not have been intended to apply to
resolutions en banc which deal with matters not previously passed
upon.
 018 Baguio v. De Jalagat (UMANDAP)
25 May 1972 | Barredo, J. | Res Judicata; Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: GABRIEL BAGUIO
RESPONDENTS: TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in
representation of her minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all
surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL
JALAGAT
SUMMARY:
A complaint was filed for the quieting of title to real property by plaintiff,
and a motion to dismiss was later filed by the defendants. The motion to
dismiss alleged that the instant complaint or case is identical to or the same
as that of Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio
alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased, and whose legal heirs and successors in
interest are the very same defendants in the instant complaint.
There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff on the ground that for prior
judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be
apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was
nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Civil Case no. 1574 is a bar to the
filing of the case at bar? YES
There was no denial as to the truth that there was a previous dismissal of the
same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants,
who as expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased husband of one of
them and father of the rest.
There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of
the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would show that
appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore
futile for the court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior
judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower
court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was essentially
a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was predictable?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules
of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its
futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances,
the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a
judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it.
That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal.
Certainly such an order is not contrary to law.
DOCTRINE: The Court's dismissal of a previous case has the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded
in abatement of any subsequent action against the same parties over the same
issues and the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff.
FACTS:
1.   A complaint was filed for the quieting of title to real property by
plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio. Later, a motion to dismiss
was filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by a prior judgment.
2.   This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case,
besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the
same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and
against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal
heirs and successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant
complaint or Civil Case No. 2639.
3.   Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of
Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and involving practically
the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are
the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced
heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat.
4.   Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant
one, has already been duly and finally terminated. There was an
opposition on the part of plaintiff on the ground that for prior
judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be
apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there
was nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be
inferred.
5.   Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of :
"Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants
anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a
prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-founded as it has
 already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574, pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is
case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant case, not contrary to law.
as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby
dismissed. 4.   There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant
undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in
ISSUE/s: force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice
1.   Whether or not the dismissal of Civil Case no. 1574 is a bar to the better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part
filing of Civil Case 2639? YES – The Court's previous dismissal of and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a
Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal
and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any would not have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless
subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and appeal.
the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff.
5.   It has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor, a
RULING: WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the
hereby affirmed. With costs against plaintiff. altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law.
Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an
RATIO: imperative of our legal system in mind.
Issue 1
1.   The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be
raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on
the face of the complaint. What immediately calls attention in the
rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of
applicant is that there was no denial as to the truth of the statement
made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal of the
same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of
defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased
husband of one of them and father of the rest.

2.   There was no denial either of the property involved being the same
and of the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would
show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It
would be therefore futile for the court to continue with the case as
there had been such a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant.
What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense
in its being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as
the outcome was predictable?

3.   Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the

Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by
nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that
under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial
notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously
 019 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Industrial enterprises
(HORTALEZA)
January 15, 2014 | Brion, J. | Rule 129 Section 1-3
PETITIONER:Land Bank of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Yatco Industrial enterprises
SUMMARY: Yatco Industrial enterprises is the owner of Pursuant to
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405,7 the LBP valued the property at
₱1,126,132.89.8 Yatco did not find this valuation acceptable and thus
elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then
conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just
compensation. The PARAD computed the value of the property at
₱16,543,800.00;10 it used the property’s current market value (as shown in
the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula "MV x 2."
The PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any verified or authentic
document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s
valuation. In turn he RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property
at ₱200.00 per square meter. The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation by
adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City,
Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,14 which, in turn, adopted the
valuation that the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36 arrived at in Civil Case
No. 2259-95-C15 (collectively, civil cases). The RTC-SAC did not give
weight to the LBP’s evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the
LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and
likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The LBP contends
that the RTC-SAC made an erroneous adoptions of the cases previously in
the cases of branch 35 and 36, because it ignores the factors in this case such
as that the just compensation was pursuant to the (agrarian program). the
question of whether the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation
for the property was proper.? NO. The rules allow the courts to take
judicial notice of certain facts; the RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous.
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience
for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in
this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized
to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a
decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court
if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from
the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In
either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. We note that Yatco offered in
evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP
opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however,
that the April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer
in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient
compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s
previous ruling – to be legally erroneous. because firstly he RTC-SAC
fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO 5-98 and thus
acted outside the contemplation of the law. Lastly, The valuation fixed by
Branches 35 and 36 was inapplicable to the property. Thus the Petition is
Granted and Remanded to the RTC of San Pablo as both parties failed to
adduce the real value of the property.
DOCTRINE 1: The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of
certain facts; the RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous. The taking of
judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills
the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it
is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when
said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or
the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the
parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other
party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so.45 In either
case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. We note that Yatco offered in evidence
copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP opposed.
These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the
April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer in
evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient compliance
with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, still
we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s previous
ruling – to be legally erroneous.
FACTS:
1.   Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the
registered owner of a 27.5730-hectare parcel of agricultural land
(property) in Barangay Mabato, Calamba, Laguna, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49465.5 On April 30, 1999,6 the
 government placed the property under the coverage of its
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
2.   Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405,7 the LBP valued the
property at ₱1,126,132.89.8 Yatco did not find this valuation
acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then conducted summary
administrative proceedings for the determination of just
compensation
3.   The PARAD computed the value of the property at
₱16,543,800.00;10 it used the property’s current market value (as
shown in the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the
formula "MV x 2." The PARAD noted that the LBP did not present
any verified or authentic document to back up its computation;
hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s valuation.
4.   The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it
filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination of
just compensation.12
5.   The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at
₱200.00 per square meter.13 The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation
by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City,
6.   Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,14 which, in
turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36
(Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C15 (collectively,
civil cases). The RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBP’s
evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed
to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and likewise
failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL).
7.   The RTC-SAC subsequently denied the LBP’s motion for
reconsideration. The LBP appealed to the CA.
8.   The CA dismissed the LBP’s appeal.19 Significantly, it did not find
the LBP’s assigned errors – the RTC-SAC’s reliance on the
valuation made by Branches 35 and 36 in the civil cases – to be
persuasive. First, according to the CA, the parcels of land in the civil
cases were the very same properties in the appealed agrarian case.
Second, Branch 36’s valuation was based on the report of the duly
appointed commissioners and was arrived at after proper land
inspection. As the determination of just compensation is essentially a
judicial function, the CA thus affirmed the RTC-SAC’s valuation
which was founded on factual and legal bases. The LBP filed the
present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration in
the CA’s May 3, 2006 resolution.
9.  
ISSUE/s:
1.   WoN the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the
property was proper? (i put all the explanations even those that might
not be relevant to evidence. important is in bold) NO. The rules
allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the RTC-
SAC’s valuation is erroneous. The taking of judicial notice is a
matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose
that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is
equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to
"take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge." They may, however, take
judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another
case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in
evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the
court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts
must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court. We note that Yatco offered in evidence
copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP
opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming,
however, that the April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that
noted Yatco’s offer in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it)
constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section
3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s
valuation – based on Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be legally
erroneous.
RULING: Wherefore, in view of these considerations, we hereby
GRANT the petition. Accordingly, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
decision dated January 26, 2006 and the resolution dated May 3, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87530, and REMAND Agrarian
Case No. SP-064(02) to the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
Branch 30, for its determination of just compensation under the terms of
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Department of Agrarian
Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, as amended.
RATIO:
1.   The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial
function that the Judiciary exercises within the parameters of the law.
2.   The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial
function.26 Section 57 of R.A. No. 665727 explicitly vests the RTC-
SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just
compensation for lands under CARP coverage.
3.   To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into
account to correctly determine just compensation. The law (under
Section 49 of R.A. No. 665728) likewise empowers the DAR to
issue rules for its implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5-
98 incorporating the law’s listed factors in determining just
compensation into a basic formula that contains the details that take
these factors into account.
4.   That the RTC-SAC must consider the factors mentioned by the law
(and consequently the DAR’s implementing formula) is not a novel
concept.29 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,30 we said
that the RTC-SAC must consider the factors enumerated under
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as translated into a basic formula by
the DAR, in determining just compensation. We stressed the RTC-
SAC’s duty to apply the DAR formula in determining just
compensation in Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada31 and
reiterated this same ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim,32
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Luciano,33 and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Colarina,34 to name a few.
5.   in the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of
determining just compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted
unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-
enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors.
These factors and formula provide the uniform framework or
structure for the computation of the just compensation for a property
subject to agrarian reform. This uniform system will ensure that they
do not arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd, baseless and even
contradictory to the objectives of our agrarian reform laws as just
compensation. This system will likewise ensure that the just
compensation fixed represents, at the very least, a close
approximation of the full and real value of the property taken that is
fair and equitable for both the farmer-beneficiaries and the
landowner.
6.   When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-
SACs, however, are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to
its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not
warrant the formula’s strict application; they may, in the exercise of
their discretion, relax the formula’s application to fit the factual
situations before them.39 They must, however, clearly explain the
reason for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law
and the rules have provided.40
7.   The situation where a deviation is made in the exercise of judicial
discretion should at all times be distinguished from a situation where
there is utter and blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law
and by the implementing rules. For in such a case, the RTC-SAC’s
action already amounts to grave abuse of discretion for having been
taken outside of the contemplation of the law.41
8.   Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation teaches us that the use of the
wrong considerations by the ruling tribunal in deciding the case or a
particular matter in issue amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In
Gonzales, the CA reversed the NLRC’s ruling that ordered the
payment of interest on the total monetary award. In reversing this
CA ruling and reinstating the NLRC’s award of interest, the Court
pointed out that the CA relied solely on the doctrine of immutability
of judgments, a consideration that was completely erroneous
particularly in light of the other attendant and relevant factors, i.e.,
the law on the legal interests that final orders and rulings on
forbearance of money should bear, which the CA utterly ignored.
Accordingly, the Court considered the CA in grave abuse of
discretion as it used the wrong considerations and thereby acted
outside the contemplation of the law.
9.   This use of considerations that were completely outside the
contemplation of the law is the precise situation we find in the
present case, as fully explained below.
10.  The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the
RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous
11.  The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and
convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is
intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof.43
Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of
the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge."44 They may, however, take judicial notice of a
decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same
court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any
opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its
discretion, resolves to do so.45 In either case, the courts must
 observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court.
12.  We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in
the civil cases,46 which offer the LBP opposed.47 These were
duly noted by the court.48 Even assuming, however, that the
April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer
in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient
compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on
Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be legally erroneous.
13.  First, The RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657
and DAR AO 5-98 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the
law.
14.  Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 reads:
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment
made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of
taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
15.  While DAR AO 5-9850 pertinently provides:
A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands
covered by VOS or CA:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present,
relevant, and applicable.
A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are
applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are
applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is
applicable, the formula shall be: LV = MV x 2
In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2
exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate under
consideration or within the same barangay or municipality (in that
order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from receipt of
claimfolder.
16.  After considering these factors and formula, we are convinced that
the RTC-SAC completely disregarded them and simply relied on
Branch 36’s valuation. For one, the RTC-SAC did not point to any
specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in arriving at
the ₱200.00 per square meter valuation. It did not even consider the
property’s market value based on the current tax declaration that
Yatco insists the RTC-SAC considered in addition to Branch 36’s
valuation. Assuming that the RTC-SAC considered the property’s
market value (which, again, we find that it did not), this alone will
not suffice as basis, unless justified under Item II.A.3 of DAR AO 5-
98 (as provided above). Then too, it did not indicate the formula that
it used in arriving at its valuation or which led it to believe that
Branch 36’s valuation was applicable to this case. Lastly, the RTC-
SAC did not conduct an independent assessment and computation
using the considerations required by the law and the rules.
17.  To be exact, the RTC-SAC merely relied on Branch 36’s valuation
as it found the LBP’s evidence on the matter of just compensation
inadequate. While indeed we agree that the evidence presented by
the LBP was inadequate and did not also consider the legally
prescribed factors and formula, the RTC-SAC still legally erred in
solely relying on Yatco’s evidence which we find equally irrelevant
and off-tangent to the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657.
18.  Lastly, The valuation fixed by Branches 35 and 36 was inapplicable
to the property
19.  Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,52 decided by Branch 35, and Civil Case
No. 2259-95-C,53 decided by Branch 36, were both eminent domain
cases initiated by the NAPOCOR under the power granted to it by
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 120,54 as amended by R.A. No.
6395,55 i.e., to acquire property or easement of right of way.
20.  Evidently, the civil cases were not made under the provisions of the
CARL nor for agrarian reform purposes, as enunciated under R.A.
No. 6657.57 In exercising the power vested in it by the provisions of
C.A. No. 120 (as amended), the NAPOCOR did not seek to acquire
and distribute lands to farmers and regular farmworkers; the
 NAPOCOR sought easement of right of way to transmit electric fixed by Branches 35 and 36 – considerations that we find were
power as it was completely irrelevant and misplaced. This is an error that now
21.  Also, we point out that the RTC-SAC adopted Branch 36’s valuation requires fresh determination of just compensation again at the RTC-
without any qualification or condition. Yet, in disposing of the SAC level.
present case, the just compensation that it fixed for the property 26.  As a final note and clarificatory reminder, we agree that the LBP is
largely differed from the former. Note that Branch 36 fixed a primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation
valuation of ₱20.00 per square meter;58 while the RTC-SAC, in the for all private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes.64 But
present case, valued the property at ₱200.00 per square meter.59 this determination is only preliminary. The landowner may still take
Strangely, the RTC-SAC did not offer any explanation nor point to the matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication.65
any evidence, fact or particular that justified the obvious discrepancy Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original and exclusive jurisdiction
between these amounts. over all petitions for the determination of just compensation under
22.  Lastly, in ascertaining just compensation, the fair market value of the R.A. No. 6657 rests with the RTC-SAC.66 But, in its determination
expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking.60 The the RTC-SAC must take into consideration the factors laid down by
"time of taking" refers to that time when the State deprived the law and the pertinent DAR regulations.
landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State
acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the complaint, per
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.62
23.  The RTC-SAC, in the present case, rendered its decision in 2004; the
LBP filed the petition for judicial determination of just compensation
in 2002. Obviously, the "taking" of the property could not have been
made any earlier than 2002; otherwise, the parties would have
pointed these out. Between 1997 in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C and
the earliest taking in 2002 in this case is a difference of 5 years – a
significant gap in the matter of valuation since the lands involved are
not in the hinterlands, but in the rapidly industrializing Calamba,
Laguna.
24.  Under these circumstances – i.e., the insufficiency of the evidence
presented by both the LBP and Yatco on the issue of just
compensation - the more judicious approach that the RTC-SAC
could have taken was to exercise the authority granted to it by
Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657, rather than simply adopt Branch 36’s
valuation. Under Section 5863 of R.A. No. 6657, the RTC-SAC may
appoint one or more Commissioners to ascertain and report to it the
facts necessary for the determination of the just compensation for the
property. Unfortunately, the RTC-SAC did not avail of this
opportunity, with disastrous results for the parties in light of the time
gap between now and the time the RTC-SAC decision was made in
2004.1âwphi1
25.  We cannot help but highlight the attendant delay as the RTC-SAC
obviously erred in a manner that we cannot now remedy at our level.
The RTC-SAC erred and effectively abused its discretion by fixing
the just compensation for the property based solely on the valuation
 020 Board of Liquidators v. Ricma Trading (Vargas
29 August 1969 | Barredo, J. | What Need Not Be Proved
PETITIONER: Board of Liquidators, Trustee of the Land Settlement &
Development Corporation
RESPONDENTS: Ricma Trading Corporation and Ricardo M. Maipid
SUMMARY: In 1962, the Board of Liquidators filed a complaint against
RICMA to recover the sum of P2,800.00 as unpaid balance of the purchase
price of personal properties (equipment, tools, spare parts, etc). RICMA
moved to dismiss the complaint based mainly on the contention that the
cause of action is barred by statute of limitations. Inasmuch as there was no
written contract evidencing the sale between the parties nor any written
promise or commitment on the part of the defendants RICMA and Maipid to
pay the alleged unpaid balance, the cause of action ws merely based on an
oral contract, which, pursuant to art. 1139, should have been filed within 6
years from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e., from Oct. 24, 1955 – the
date when the last partial payment was made to the same day in 1961. The
complaint being filed in 1962, prescription had already set in. The lower
court ruled in favor of the petitioner BOL-LASEDECO. RICMA appealed.
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether or not the lower court erred
in not dismissing the case as against defendant RICMA on the ground that
the cause of action has already prescribed – NO. While there was no formal
written contract signed by the parties, separate documents (Res. 7173,
invoice receipt, official receipts) constitute written evidence of the
agreement because these documents, although separate, if taken together,
embody all the terms and conditions of the agreement of purchase and sale
between the BOL-LASEDECO and RICMA. Therefore, the cause of action
has not yet prescribed – the action being based on a written contract. Besides,
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that contractual transactions
with government or any of its instrumentalities are invariably in writing.
DOCTRINE: The reference to an action "upon a written contract" in Article
1144 of the Civil Code does not preclude instances when the agreement
may not be found in one single document but in two or more separate
writings related to each other, which when taken together contain all the
elements of a contract.
FACTS:
6.   On Aug. 15, 1962, The Board of Liquidators, as trustee of the
defunct Land Settlement and Development Corporation
(LASEDECO), filed a complaint to recover from defendants Ricma
Trading Corporation (RICMA) and its President/Gen. Manager
Maipid the sum of P2,800.00 as unpaid balance of the purchase price
of certain personal properties (equipment, tools, engine blocks, spare
parts, etc) located in its Bodega No. 2 at Sta Mesa Boulevard, Manila
which are described in the said complaint as “Lots Nos. 1 and 2,
Bodega 2, Sta Mesa Compound.”
7.   The defendants RICMA and Maipid moved to dismiss the complaint
on two grounds:
a.   The cause of action is barred by statute of limitations.
Inasmuch as there was no written contract evidencing the
sale between the parties nor any written promise or
commitment on the part of the defendants RICMA and
Maipid to pay the alleged unpaid balance, the cause of action
ws merely based on an oral contract, which, pursuant to art.
1139, should have been filed within 6 years from the accrual
of the cause of action, i.e., from Oct. 24, 1955 – the date
when the last partial payment was made to the same day in
1961. The complaint being filed in 1962, prescription had
already set in.
b.   The complaint states no cause of action in so far as
Maipid is concerned.
ISSUE/s:
1.   Whether or not the lower court erred in not dismissing the case as
against defendant RICMA on the ground that the cause of action has
already prescribed – NO. Thus, while there was no formal written
contract signed by the parties, separate documents (Res. 7173,
invoice receipt, official receipts) constitute written evidence of the
agreement because these documents, although separate, if taken
together, embody all the terms and conditions of the agreement of
purchase and sale between the BOL-LASEDECO and RICMA.
Therefore, the cause of action has not yet prescribed – the action
being based on a written contract.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with
costs against appellant.
RATIO:
Issue 1
1.   The main thesis of RICMA in regard to the issue of prescription is
that the transaction upon which the action is based was not evidenced
by any written agreement and, being verbal, said action prescribes in
six years, and, therefore, the complaint should have been dismissed,
considering that it was filed only on August 15, 1962 whereas the
said transaction took place in October, 1955.
2.   Overruling this contention, the court a quo sustained the claim of
 BOL-LASEDECO that even if the said transaction was verbal "the
renewal of the bond executed by the Manila Underwriters Insurance
Co., Inc., on December 28, 1955, to secure the payment of said
balance of P2,800.00, has interrupted the running of said period of
limitation." It held thus:
". . . The evidence show that on January 2, 1957, the
defendant, RicmaTrading Corporation, thru its President and General
Manager, R.M. Maipid, wrote a letter (Exhibit 'G-l ') to Mr.
Filomeno C. Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators, Manila, as
follows: 'In connection with our Bond #D-050 issued by the Manila
Underwriters Co. which expires on December 28, 1956, and in
compliance with your request for renewal, we beg to enclose
herewith the renewal policy for another Year.'
"In the opinion of the Court, this letter is a manifest acknowledgment
on the part of the defendant corporation to pay said balance of
P2,800.00 for it is certainly difficult to understand why the defendant
should renew the bond precisely to secure the payment of said
balance of P2,800.00 if it was not willing anymore to recognize it as
its legitimate obligation and to pay the same. It is true that the
execution of said bond was for the purpose of securing the verbal
obligation of the defendant with the Land Settlement and
Development Corporation but when it renewed said bond, especially
upon the request of the plaintiff, Board of Liquidators, as trustee of
the Land Settlement and Development Corporation, the defendant
expressly acknowledged that it was still indebted to the plaintiff in
the sum of P2,800.00. According to Article 1155 of the New Civil
Code, 'The prescription of actions is interrupted . . . when there
is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.'
Consequently, the contention of the defendants that plaintiff's
cause of action has already expired is devoid of any legal merit."
(Pp. 151-152, Record on Appeal)
3.   This ruling is on the whole correct, but the truth of the matter is that
although, according to His Honor, "it is admitted that the
transaction is not evidenced by any written contract of purchase
and sale and, therefore, it is verbal," it is clear from the record that
by this statement, His Honor must have meant only that there was
no formal contract executed in due form by the parties. For in the
stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, which this court may
not disregard, it is clearly stated that:
"1. That the Board of Liquidators which is the agency designated
under Republic Act No. 1160 to liquidate the assets of the Land
Settlement and Development Corporation, and is acting as trustee of
said LASEDECO has offered for bidding certain personal
properties consisting of equipment, tools, engine blocks, spare parts,
supplies, and other junks at its bodega No. 2 at Sta. Mesa, which are
designated as Lots Nos. I and 2, and defendant corporation through
its President, defendant Ricardo Maipid submitted its bid thereon on
September 7, 1955, but which is not acceptable to plaintiff;
"2. That subsequently the defendant corporation through defendant
Maipid negotiated with the plaintiff for the purchase of the
aforementioned personal properties, and which was awarded to said
corporation in the amount of P10,000.00 as per Resolution No. 7173,
dated October 14, 1955, as evidenced by a certified true copy of the
extract of the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Liquidators,
which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 'A';
"3. That in pursuance to said Resolution No. 7173 defendant
corporation through defendant Maipid received on October 15, 1955,
the above- mentioned properties as evidenced by Memorandum
Receipts which are attached hereto and marked as Exhibits 'B' and
'B-1';
"4. That defendant corporation paid the plaintiff the sums of
P5,000.00 and P3,000.00 only on October 15 and 24, 1955,
respectively, as evidenced by Official Receipts Nos. A-0266790 and
A-0263397, respectively, and which are attached hereto and marked
as Exhs. 'C' and 'C-1';
"5. That actual delivery and receipt of Lot No. 2 in bodega 2 was
effected on October 24, 1955, as evidenced by an Invoice Receipt
No. 61 which is attached hereto and marked as Exh. 'D';" (Pp. 146-
147, Record on Appeal)
4.   Thus, while there was no formal written contract signed by the
parties, it cannot be denied that the Resolution 7173 of appellee
Board, signed by all its members, and the invoice receipt signed
in two parts by defendant Maipid on behalf of appellant, not to
speak of the official receipts issued for the payment of the articles in
question, constitute written evidence of the agreement because
these documents, although actually separate ones, if taken
together, embody not only all the elements of a contract but even
all the terms and conditions of the agreement of purchase and
sale between the appellant and appellee.
5.   Besides, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that contractual
transactions with government or any of its instrumentalities are
invariably in writing.
6.   In the case of Peralta de Guerrero vs. Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc.,
the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss an action for the
 recovery of damages resulting from the death of a passenger of
defendant's ship when it capsized on the ground that the same was
not based on a written contract, there being none alleged in the
complaint. This Court rejected this contention thus:
"We are inclined to uphold the contention of appellants, for a cursory
reading of the complaint would show that their cause of action is
predicated upon the failure of appellee to comply with its contract of
carrying the deceased from Malangas, Zamboanga to the City of
Manila safely, in that the vessel on which he was riding belonging to
defendant capsized because of the reckless and imprudent manner it
was managed and steered by its crew. It is true that the complaint
does not in so many words state that the transportation was
undertaken by virtue of a written contract of carriage, but this can be
implied from the complaint because it is a matter of common
knowledge that whenever a passenger boards a ship for
transportation from one place to another he is issued a ticket by
the shipper wherein the terms of the contract are specified.
According to appellants, 'This ticket is in itself a complete written
contract by and between the shipper and the passenger.”
7.   With much more reason can We hold in the case at bar that
appellee's action is based on a written contract. The reference to
an action "upon a written contract" in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code does not preclude instances when the agreement may not be
found in one single document but in two or more separate
writings related to each other, which when taken together
contain all the elements of a contract.
 021 PEOPLE v. MAPA (VICENCIO)
March 31, 1993 | Nocon, J. | Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Elmer Mapa y de Gula
SUMMARY: Acting upon information that “Elmer” was engaged in drug-
pushing, policemen conducted a surveillance operation and buy-bust
operation in Valenzuela. Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, as a poseur-buyer, was
introduced to be a “score” of “damo.” Elmer Mapa, after recevieing two
marked 10.00 bills, left for a while to get marijuana. The policemen then saw
a certain person Serapio de Gula who handed something over to Elmer.
Then, Elmer returned and the handed to the poser-buyer a plastic bag
containing 12 sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Pat. Capangyarihan identified
himself as a policemen and arrested Mapa. Serapio, since he was also seen as
the person whom Elmer talked, was also arrested. They were charged for
violating Sec. 4, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The TC acquitted
Serapio for reasonable doubt, while Mapa was found guilty.
Issue: WoN Mapa’s conviction should be upheld – NO. “The conflicting and
contradictory evidence of the prosecution affirms the weakness of its case
thereby creating reasonable doubt as to his guilt.” The SC finds “several
glaring inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as to engender doubt on the moral certainty of Elmer's
guilt.” For one, the policemen had conflicting testimony on whether Mapa
was present when Serpaio was being arrested. Secondly, prosecution cannot
even determine what was really taken from Elmer, a tea bag or cigarettes
sticks. There were also inconsistencies on who requested for the seized
articles to be examined by the NBI
DOCTRINE: (From reviewer) Judidicial Notice of Presumption that Drug
User = Drug Dealer - It would be noteworthy to mention though, that
accused-appellant was subjected to a drug test to find out whether he was
likewise a drug user. It is often observed that a drug pusher usually, if not all
the time is also a drug user. The act of pushing drugs is a means to support
his being a drug dependent. For whatever its worth, accused-appellant was
found to be drug free. In the NBI Toxicology Report No. TDD-86-646, 20
blood and urine specimens of Elmer Mapa showed negative results for the
presence of prohibited and or regulated drugs. Though this report was not
presented during trial, such is made part of the records.
Records Indicate Falsity - The evident falsehood spread on the records before
Us creates a nagging doubt on the culpability of the accused-appellant. It is
sad to state that many innocent people become victims of physical violence
and/or harassment from police officers who are supposed to be the protectors
of the citizenry. We cannot condone such practices to continue in a civilized
society.
Judicial Notice of Bad Cops Who Plant Evidence - While this Court
commends the efforts of law enforcement agencies who are engaged in the
difficult and dangerous task of apprehending and prosecuting drug-
traffickers, it cannot, however, close its eyes nor ignore the many reports of
false arrests of innocent persons for extortion purposes and blackmail, or to
satisfy some hidden personal resentment of the "informer" or law enforcer
against the accused. Courts should be vigilant and alert to recognize trumped
up drug charges lest an innocent man, on the basis of planted evidence, be
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
FACTS:
The People’s version of the facts is as follows:
11.   Acting upon a confidential information that a certain "Elmer" was
engaged in drug pushing at T. de Gula St., Marulas Valenzuela,
Major Elias Casimiro, Chief of the Valenzuela Police Anti-Narcotics
Unit dispatched a team composed of Valenzuela policemen, namely:
Cpt. Romeo Martin, Pfc. Pedro Protestante, Patrolmen Eduardo
Pabalan, Wilfredo Lucero and a certain Pat. Garcia to conduct a
surveillance operation in the area.
12.   On July 16, 1986, at around 8 o’clock in the evening, the team
launched a buy-bust operation against Elmer Mapa y de Gula
(Elmer) at T. de Gula St., Marulas, Valenzuela using two (2) P10.00
marked bills.
13.   Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, who then acted as a poseur-buyer
together with the confidential informant proceeded to Elmer's
address at T. de Gula Street.
14.   Upon reaching the place, the confidential informant introduced Pat.
Capangyarihan to Elmer as a "scorer" of "damo."
15.   Pat. Capangyarihan asked for P20.00 worth of marijuana and then
handed to Elmer the two (2) marked P10.00 bills. After receipt of the
money, Elmer left for a while to get the "marijuana."
16.   Later, Elmer entered the yard of the house with a wooden fence and
talked briefly to a certain person (later identified as accused Serapio
de Gula) who was seen by Pat. Capangyarihan handing over
something to Elmer.
 17.   Thereafter, Elmer returned and handed over to the poseur-buyer a
plastic bag containing twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes.
18.   Pat. Capangyarihan identified himself as a policeman and grabbed
Elmer by the arms. Pat. Capangyarihan then signalled his
companions to come and help him subdue the suspect.
19.   At this juncture, Serapio de Gula approached the police team and
told them that Elmer is his nephew. The policemen told Serapio that
Elmer was placed under arrest for selling "marijuana".
20.   Since Pat. Capangyarihan recognized Serapio as the person with
whom Elmer talked after receiving the marked bills, Serapio was
also arrested.
21.   The two (2) marked bills were retrieved from the Elmer. Elmer and
Serapio were brought to the Valenzuela Police Headquarters for
further investigation.
22.   The plastic bag containing the twelve (12) sticks of suspected
marijuana were forwarded to the NBI for examination. Microscopic,
chemical and chromatographic tests was conducted on the seized
articles and all yielded "positive results" for "marijuana".
23.   Elmer Mapa y de Gula and Serapio de Gula y Tongco were both
charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Information
said: “... wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possessed and sell and
gave away twelve (12) sticks of marijuana treated cigarettes”
Elmer Mapa however, disputes the foregoing facts. Instead, the defense
maintains that the facts are as follows:
24.   At around 8 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1986, while accused
Elmer Mapa was inside their house with his co-accused/uncle
Serapio de Gula and their chess club members playing chess, two
men with drawn guns entered the premises of the accused's house
without permission, calling for accused Elmer Mapa, prompting
accused Serapio de Gula to tell them, "pare, anong problema,
trespassing kayo.”
25.   In answer, the men identified themselves as policemen and told
Serapio not to interfere. However, Serapio de Gula insisted that even
if they were police officers they should nevertheless ask permission
from the owner of the house before entering.
26.   In reply the police officers allegedly manhandled him while one of
them entered the house where accused Elmer Mapa was, pulled him
out and brought him to a waiting jeep.
27.   Serapio further testified that the four police officers who manhandled
him were Patrolman Puchero, Patrolman Inciong, Patrolman
Capangyarihan and Patrolman Protestante
28.   Serapio threatened to file charges against these police officers for
mauling him so much so that said officers likewise arrested him
29.   This was corroborated by a defense witness, Antonio Trinidad. In his
testimony, Antonio revealed that one unidentified man entered the
house and when questioned by Serapio de Gula, the man hit the latter
with gun. He could not do anything, much less the other chess
players present because guns were poked at them.
30.   Both the accused were brought to the sub-station where they were
mauled and forced to admit the charges against them.
31.   Serapio remembered Patrolman Inciong going to his cell and
showing (14) tea bags and jestingly said, “Never will you be able to
get out of this jail because we will charge you with drug pushing and
we will use these as evidence against you.”
32.   Tarried in jail during the early months of their apprehension, Elmer
Mapa learned that a policeman talked to a certain Dueñas who was
earlier detained for illegal possession of marijuana, that if he wanted
to be released, he must give a substitute or "palit-ulo" in jail lingo.
33.   That upon his apprehension, he learned that Eduardo Dueñas was
later released by the police.
34.   After a trial on the merits, Serapio de Gula was acquitted on
reasonable doubt while accused Elmer Mapa was found guilty of
the crime charged and was sentenced accordingly to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE/s:
1.   WoN Elmer Mapa’s conviction should be upheld – NO. “The
conflicting and contradictory evidence of the prosecution affirms the
weakness of its case thereby creating reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.” The SC finds “several glaring inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to
engender doubt on the moral certainty of Elmer's guilt.”
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed herefrom is hereby
REVERSED, and the accused-appellant, Elmer Mapa y de Gula, is hereby
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
RATIO:
13.   The prosecution presented only two of the members of the buy-
bust operation, whose testimonies unfortunately did not impress
this Court. On the contrary, it weakens the prosecution’s case.
14.   Take for instance the testimony of Pat. Capangyarihan who testified
that Serapio was arrested some 9 to 10 meters away from where
 Elmer Mapa was standing and that he was not present during the
arrest of Serapio de Gula.
15.   Contrary to his testimony however, Pat. Lucero testified that when
Serapio was apprehended by him Pat. Capangyarihan was present
and saw him effect the arrest (Note: I’m reproducing the cross-
examinations because they are important)
16.   Pat. Capangyarihan:
17.   Q Do you know who was that person?
18.   A. Later on, I came to know the name of that person and it appears
that his name is Serapio de Gula.
19.   Q And how far were you from them when they talked with each
other?
20.   A. From the witness stand up to that wall, sir (Which was estimated
to be 9 to 10 meters). 1
21.   xxx xxx xxx
22.   Q Mr. Witness, when you accosted Elmer Mapa, you actually were
not aware what happened to Serapio de Gula since you were not
present when he was accosted by Pat. Lucero?
23.   A It was Elmer Mapa who was first accosted and after he was
arrested, my other police companions ran.
24.   Q And they ran towards what direction?
25.   A Towards the place where Serapio de Gula was standing.
26.   Q And when you said the place where he was standing, it is the place
where he was talking with Elmer Mapa?
27.   A Yes, Ma'am.
28.   Patrolman Lucero on the other hand, testified differently on this
matter
29.   Q After you approached Pat. Capangyarihan, what happen next?
30.   A Subsequently a person pulled Elmer Mapa.
31.   Q Who was this person who arrived and pulled Emer Mapa?
32.   A Serapio de Gula, Sir.
33.   Q Did Serapio de Gula succeed in pulling out Elmer Mapa from the
hands of Pat. Capangyarihan?
34.   A. No, sir.
35.   Q What happened after that?
36.   A We got hold of Serafin de Gula and asked him why he is
interfering.
37.   xxx xxx xxx
38.   Q What did you do after you were informed about that?
39.   A We also got hold of Serapio de Gula and frisked him.
40.   Another glaring inconsistency lies in the seized articles. Pat.
Capangyarihan testifies:
41.   Q And after Elmer had approached you, what did he do?
42.   A He handed me a plastic container containing twelve (12)
handrolled suspected marijuana cigarettes.
43.   Q And what did you do?
44.   A After Emer handed to me that suspected handrolled marijuana
cigarettes, I introduced myself to him and then I arrested him.
45.   On the other hand, Pat. Lucero testified that what Elmer was holding
is a tea bag of marijuana and not a plastic container containing
twelve (12) handrolled marijuana cigarettes.
46.   Q When you saw Elmer Mapa being held by Pat. Capangyarihan, did
you see him holding the money, referring to accused Elmer Mapa?
47.   A Yes, sir.
48.   Q What was that?
49.   A One tea bag of marijuana.
50.   xxx xxx xxx
51.   Q What happened to the tea bag being held by Elmer Mapa and two
peso bills found in possession of Serapio de Gula?
52.   A The tea bag of marijuana was brought to the NBI for laboratory
examination.
53.   Realizing probably his mistake, Pat. Capangyarihan later on changed
his testimony by stating that he could not remember whether it was a
plastic container that was given to him or not. Thus —
54.   Q Mr. Witness, it appears that this alleged marijuana handrolled
cigarettes is contained in an envelope with the marking DDM, etc. Is
this also the same container when you received the marijuana from
the accused?
55.   A I cannot recall if this was the same thing wherein these 12 sticks of
marijuana were placed.
56.   xxx xxx xxx
57.   Q But you don't recall. Mr. witness, at the time you apprehended the
accused where was this marijuana cigarettes?
58.   A After having taken these marijuana cigarettes from Mapa, I took
hold of them.
59.   Q Meaning this was not contained in any container?
60.   A I cannot remember anymore if it was contained in any container or
not. 15
61.   The trial court observed the strange testimony of Pat. Lucero on a
material point on cross examination wherein he admitted that a tea
bag cannot be cigarette sticks. This shows that the prosecution
cannot even determine what was really taken from Elmer, a tea bag
or cigarettes sticks. Thus, the Court inquired:
62.   Q Now, Mr. Witness, who was in custody of the alleged tea bag
which was recovered by the team from Elmer Mapa, who was in
possession from the time Elmer Mapa was already arrested up to the
time he was brought to the police station?
63.   A It was Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, sir.
64.   Q But you admitted that you have occasion to look at the tea bag?
65.   A Yes, sir.
66.   Q What is the difference between the tea bag and the suspected
marijuana? What is the difference?
67.   A Tea bag is like a tea bag, it is square contained like cigarette.
68.   Q You will agree with me that as far as I know a roach is like what
we call "upos", a cigarette wrapped in a paper. I am referring to the
paper wrapper, rolling paper?
69.   A Yes, ma'am.
70.   Not only are there inconsistencies as to what was recovered but also
on who requested for the seized articles to be examined by the NBI.
Pat. Capangyarihan testified that it was police aide Carreon who
brought the seized articles to the NBI for examination, whereas Pat.
Lucero testified that it was he who forwarded the marijuana to the
NBI. Thus —
71.   Pat. Capangyarihan:
Q By the way who submitted this alleged marijuana handrolled cigarettes
to the NBI?
72.   A As far as I could remember, it was police aide Carreon who
brought it to the NBI. 17
73.   Pat. Lucero however testified:
74.   Q You said you forwarded this to the NBI for laboratory
examination. Did you come to know the result of the examination?
75.   A Yes, sir.
76.   Q How did you come to know the result?
77.   A There was a request to bring to the NBI and I waited for the result
and upon reaching the headquarters, we submit them to the
investigating Fiscal.
78.   The foregoing contradictory testimony of two prosecution witnesses
on who brought the marijuana to the NBI for laboratory examination
is significant. Is it police aide Carreon or Pat. Lucero?
79.   Carreon never testified on the matter or that the specimen submitted
to the NBI for examination was the same specimen allegedly taken
from the accused.
80.   Neither was Pat. Lucero's testimony clear on the matter. Obviously,
one of them is lying, Pat. Capangyarihan or Pat. Lucero. On
such kind of shaky testimony conviction cannot be had.
81.   The inconsistencies were never explained by the prosecution.
Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the culpability of the
Elmer and his guilt for the crime charged.
82.   As it is, the bungled testimonies of the police officers cannot be
given credence. We are more inclined to believe the testimony of
Elmer that he was a "target" to be arrested not for selling
marijuana but as a replacement for Eduardo Dueñas who was at
the time detained in the Municipal Jail, with Elmer as the
substitute or "palit-ulo" in jail lingo, so that the detainee could
be released.
83.   It would be noteworthy to mention though, that Elmer was subjected
to a drug test to find out whether he was likewise a drug user. It is
often observed that a drug pusher usually, if not all the time is also a
drug user. The act of pushing drugs is a means to support his being a
drug dependent.
84.   For whatever its worth, Elmer was found to be drug free. In the
NBI Toxicology Report No. TDD-86-646, blood and urine
specimens of Elmer Mapa showed negative results for the
presence of prohibited and or regulated drugs. Though this
report was not presented during trial, such is made part of the
records.
85.   The evident falsehood spread on the records before Us creates a
nagging doubt on the culpability of the Elmer. It is sad to state that
many innocent people become victims of physical violence and/or
harassment from police officers who are supposed to be the
protectors of the citizenry. We cannot condone such practices to
continue in a civilized society.
86.   While this Court commends the efforts of law enforcement agencies
who are engaged in the difficult and dangerous task of apprehending
and prosecuting drug-traffickers, it cannot, however, close its eyes
nor ignore the many reports of false arrests of innocent persons for
extortion purposes and blackmail, or to satisfy some hidden personal
resentment of the "informer" or law enforcer against the accused.
87.   Courts should be vigilant and alert to recognize trumped up drug
charges lest an innocent man, on the basis of planted evidence, be
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
 022 HEIRS OF CANQUE v. CA (YAP)
21 July 1997 | Panganiban, J. | Mandatory Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: The Heirs of Felicidad Canque namely: Surviving Spouse
Marcelino and Children Mariano, Leonilo, Perfecta, Mexiquela, Emilio,
Marcelino Jr., Alejandro, the Heirs of Jesus and Adriano, all surnamed
Canque
RESPONDENTS: CA, The Rural Bank of Matanao (Davao Del Sur), Inc.
and/or Conrado Antonio
SUMMARY: Pursuant to their first loan, Sps. Canque executed a real estate
mortgage over their parcel of land in Davao Del Sur in favor of the Rural
Bank of Matanao. This first loan was duly paid. When Felicidad Canque
died, Marcelino Canque obtained a second loan. Marcelino defaulted so the
rural bank (type of bank is material here) extrajudicially foreclosed on the
mortgage and was the highest bidder at the public sale. The Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale was registered on September 9, 1983. 7 years later, in
1990, Marcleino and his children offered to repurchase the land, but the rural
bank refused. They filed a petition for specific performance for the rural
bank to honor their offer of repurchase. The trial court ruled that there was a
continuing mortgage and that the right to purchase had not prescribed. The
CA reversed on the ground that the 5-year prescriptive period from the
foreclosure or registration of sheriff’s certificate of sale had lapsed. Hence,
this petition.
The pertinent issue is whether the right of repurchase had prescribed.
The SC ruled in the negative. First, the SC had recently decided in Rural
Bank of Davao City v. CA that when property is mortgaged to a RURAL
bank, the mortgagor has 2 years from either the date of foreclosure (if no
Torrens Title) or from the date of registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale (if with Torrens Title) to repurchase. After expiration of the 2-year
period, §119 of the Public Land Act provides that the mortgagor or his heirs
still have another 5 years to repurchase the property mortgaged. Second,
(doctrine).
DOCTRINE: Every court must take cognizance of decisions the SC has
rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice, and
more importantly form part of the legal system. Here, the CA should have
decided pursuant to Rural Bank of Davao City v. CA.
FACTS:
8.   Sps. Marcelino and Fecilidad Canque were the registered owners of a
parcel of land in Davao Del Sur, with an OCT issued by virtue of a
free patent granted to them.
9.   They supposedly sold 750sqm of the land to the Iglesia ni Kristo
Church.
10.   Sps. Canque obtained a first loan from theRural Bank of Matanao,
with the parcel of land as collateral, which they duly paid eventually.
11.   After his wife passed away, Marcelino obtained a second loan from
the rural ban, having the same collateral. The rural bank treated this
as an extension of the first loan.
12.   Marcelo failed to pay the second loan, so the rural bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and bought the
property as the highest bidder.
13.   September 9, 1983 – the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was registered.
14.   October 18, 1985 – the rural bank executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale.
15.   December 23, 1985 – TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in
favor of the rural bank.
16.   7 years later, Marcelino and his children offered to redeem the
property in question but the rural bank refused.
17.   RTC ruled in favor of Marcelino on the ground that the 5-year
redemption period had lapsed. CA reversed on the ground that the
correct date to reckon the start of the prescriptive period for
redemption is September 9, 1983, the date of the registration of the
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. However, Marcelino filed the suit to
redeem the property was filed only on September 7, 1990. The
period already prescribed back in 1988.
18.   Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
2.   Whether Marcelino, et. al.’s right of redemption had lapsed. NO —
since they actually have 7 years (2 years from the date of foreclosure
or from registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale + 5 years from
the expiration of the aforementioned 2-year period).
3.   Whether there was a continuing mortgage constituted over the parcel
of land. YES – because there was indeed a continuing credit secured
by mortgage whereby the payment on a particular day equaled the
amount of the mortgage.
RULING: WHEREFORE, petition GRANTED.
 advancements may be demanded, as Marclino did in this case by
RATIO: obtaining the second loan.
7.   GR: Factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed on
Prescriptive Period to Repurchase Not Prescribed appeal.
a.   EXC: Unless the trial court has overlooked or ignored some
2.   In Rural Bank of Davao City v. CA, the SC had already ruled on the fact or circumstance of sufficient weight or significance
issue of repurchase of property foreclosed by rural banks: which, if considered, would alter the situation.
8.   Hence, their factual finding as to the parties' intention in entering
§119, Public Land Act into a real mortgage under a continuing credit/mortgage arrangement
is binding upon this Court.
2 years form the registration of the 9.   In any event, this issue is really academic in view of our holding on
If covered by a sheriff’s certificate of sale + 5 years the first question.
If the land is Torrens Title from the expiration of the 2-year
mortgaged to a period (himself or by heirs)
rural bank If NOT 2 years from the date of foreclosure +
covered by a 5 years from the expiration of the 2-
Torrens Title year period (himself or by heirs)
If the land is
Within 1 year from the registration of sale. If he fails to
mortgaged to
do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property
parties OTHER
within 5 years from the expiration of the redemption
than rural
period.
banks

3.   Here, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was registered on September 9,

1983. Thus, the 2-year prescriptive period would end on September
9, 1985. In line with the Public Land Act, they would likewise have
an addition period of 5 years, or until September 9, 1990, to exercise
their right to purchase.
4.   Every court must take cognizance of decisions the SC has
rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial
notice, and more importantly form part of the legal system.
5.   The SC stressed that members of the bench have a responsibility to
know and to apply the latest holdings of the SC. The nature of their
calling requires no less.

Factual Finding of Continuing Mortgage

6.   The lower court had ruled that there was indeed a continuing credit
secured by mortgage whereby the payment on a particular day
equaled the amount of the mortgage. In such a situation, the
mortgage is not discharged as long as subsequent loans and/or
 023 PEOPLE v. BERSAMIN (YARTE)
5 March 1951 | Per Curiam | Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: Casimiro Bersamin, alias Mirong
RESPONDENTS: The People of the Philippines
SUMMARY: On the night of October 24, 1948, Caguing was alone in his
house at Mangatarem, Pangasinan. His wife spent the night at her parent’s
house. The following morning, his wife found him dead with 2 gunshot
wounds. Their househould articles were scattered and some of their
merchandise were missing. During trial for the robbery with homicide case,
the prosecution presented Emiliano Tolentino (Tolentino) and Francisco
Bulatao (Bulatao) as witnesses. Their testimonies in part narrated that they
were asked by Casimiro Bersamin (Bersamin) to accompany them to the
house of Caguing. They saw Bersamin had a gun- .45 caliber "rifle" as
described by Tolentino and a revolver according to Bulatao. At Caguing’s
house, Bersamin and De la Vega went upstairs and thereafter, Tolentino and
Bulatao heard 2 gunshots. They also De la Vega and Bersamin coming down
the stairs- De la Vega was holding a knapsack and Bersamin was holding a
sack. The lower cour promulgated a decision convicting Bersamin and
De la Vega for robbery with homicide. However, only Bersamin appealed
his conviction with a penalty of reclusion perpetua.The issue in the SC is
Whether or not Bulatao and Tolentino spoke the truth-Yes, their
testimony rings true in all material aspects, while Bersamin’s testimony is
irrational and conflicting. Bersamin also failed to call any witness to
corroborate him in his alibi. Furthermore, the court mentioned the
participation of Bersamin in a case for murder and double murder and
that he was hiding in order to avoid prosecution for those cases. In the
double murder case he was convicted with the penalty of life imprisonment,
while he is under preliminary investigation for the murder case. The court
believed that these instances proved the moral perversity of Bersamin.
Therefore, the penalty was changed from reclusion perpetua to death.
DOCTRINE: There is one other proof of moral perversity which, added to
the circumstances already mentioned, compels the Court to deal with the
appellant with utmost severity-when Bersamin pretreated the crime at bar, he
had been the ringleader in the case for murder and another case for double
murder and was in hiding to avoid arrest and prosecution in those cases.
FACTS:
19.   On the night of October 24, 1948, Dalmacio Caguing (Caguing) slept
alone in his home in Mangatarem, Pangasinan, for his wife spent the
night at her parent’s house in another Municipality 2 kilometer away.
20.   When his wife, Macaria Dalag returned the following morning, she
found her husband dead with 2 gunshot wounds. The household
articles were scattered around the house and merchandise were
missing.
21.   It was said that the couple had been running a small business. The
missing goods were salted fish, canned sardines, canned salmon,
Chinese wine, threads, glass jars with biscuits, and one Bible, with a
total value of Php 80.00.
22.   There were no eye-witnesses to the crime, and the main evidence for
the prosecution was given by the companions of Casimiro Bersamin
(Bersamin) during the robbery incident- Emiliano Tolentino
(Tolentino) and Francisco Bulatao (Bulatao).
23.   Tolentino testified that on the night of Oct. 24, he was “taken or
asked” by Bersamin and Francisco Bulatao to accompany them. On
the way to the house of Caguing, they were joined by other men.
Arriving at Caguing's house, Bersamin and De la Vega went upstairs,
Bersamin held a .45 caliber "rifle". Thereafter, he heard two
gunshots from the house while he was standing about six meters
away outside the house. A few moments after the shots De la Vega
and Bersamin came down, the former with a knapsack and the latter
with a sack.
24.   Bulatao testified that he was left at the road by Bersamin and De la
Vega while these walked toward the house of Caguing, Bersamin
carrying a revolver and De la Vega a carbine. Afterward shots rang
out inside the house. By and by Bersamin and De la Vega came
down bringing with them a sack and a knapsack respectively, the
latter of which contained bottle soft drinks. When the band arrived at
the "junction" after the crime they were given a bottle each by
Bersamin. A book was also taken from the house and was given to
him by Bersamin when they were returning home.
25.   For the defense, Bersamin testified that he was in his house in barrio
Galarin, Urbiztondo, about eight or nine kilometers from
Mangatarem. On foot, the trip from one place to the other would take
three and one-half hours. About six o'clock in the afternoon he went
with Domingo Palisoc to Caturay, Mangatarem, near the barrio
school. He also denied ownership of the pistol mentioned in
Bulatao’s testimony. The only reason why Bulatao testified against
him because Bulatao was mad at him.
26.   Bersamin and De la Vega were both convicted for robbery with
homicide in the lower court. However, only Bersamin appealed his
conviction which sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE/s:
4.   WoN Bulatao and Tolentino spoke the truth YES— their testimony
rings true in all material aspects, while Bersamin’s testimony is
irrational and conflicting.
RULING: The decision of the lower court is reversed as to the principal
penalty, and the appellant, Casimiro Bersamin, is hereby sentenced to
death to be carried out in the manner provided by law. The appealed
judgment is affirmed as to the rest of the sentence. Costs of this appeal will
be taxed against the appellant.
RATIO:
Discussion on the Testimony of Bulatao and Tolentino
the crime at bar, he had been the ringleader in the case for
murder and another case for double murder and was in hiding to
avoid arrest and prosecution in those cases.1
16.   In the case for double murder, Bersamin has been found guilty in a
decision which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance sentecing
him to life imprisonment, and which is being promulgated with this
decision.
17.   In the other case, one of the defendants, Crispin Licuanan, was found
guilty and sentenced to prison for life by the Court of First Instance
and by this Court (G.R. No. L-2960). As far as can be gathered from
the record of the present appeal, that case was pending preliminary
investigation with reference to Bersamin at the time of the trial of the
instant case for robbery with homicide.

10.   There is no sufficient justification for reversing the lower court's

findings on the appellant's guilt on the basis of the two principal
witnesses' evidence.
11.   The record discloses no ground for doubting the veracity of these
witnesses. Their testimony rings true in all its material aspects, while
Bersamin's testimony and his attempt to discredit Bulatao sounds
irrational and is conflicting.
12.   Furthermore, Bersamin did not impeach Tolentino's testimony, nor
did he call any witness to corroborate him in his alibi.
13.   It is immaterial that none of the witnesses saw who killed Caguing. It
has been proved that there was conspiracy to rob and Bersamin was
the moving spirit behind it. Conspiracy being established, each and
every one of the conspirators who took active part in its execution is
equally responsible for the ensuing crime embraced in the plan.

Discussion on Aggravating Circumstances (relevant to Rule 129)

14.   The CFI found the presence of the aggravating circumstances of

nighttime, superior strength, and use of unlicensed firearms. The
prosecution is right in eliminating the use of unlicensed firearms.
The use of unlicensed firearm is special aggravating circumstance
applicable only in cases of robbery in band. The crime established
here was one of simple robbery with homicide since only two of the
malefactors are shown to have been armed, Bersamin and de la
Vega.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.   There is one other proof of moral perversity which, added to the 1
I think this is the part relevant to our discussion on judicial notice. Since Bersamin
circumstances already mentioned, compels the Court to deal with has also been prosecuted and convicted for murder and double murder brought about
the appellant with utmost severity. When Bersamin pretreated the change in penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
 024 G HOLDINGS INC. v. NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED
WORKERS UNION (APASAN)
October, 16, 2009 | Nachura, J. | Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: G Holdings Inc.
RESPONDENTS: National Mines and Allied Worker’s Union Local
103 (NAMAWU); Sheriffs Richard Aprosta and Alberto Munoz; DOLE
Region VI, Bacolod District Office
SUMMARY: Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement, G Holdings
Inc., (GHI) bought ninety percent (90%) of Maricalum Mining
Corporation’s (MMC) shares and financial claims. For the financial
liabilities assumed, MMC issued three promissory notes in favor of GHI
amounting to P500M and secured several mortgages over MMC’s
properties. Four years thereafter, a labor dispute arose between MMC
and the National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU), which
was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of
MMC. NAMAWU got favorable decision from the labor secretary and
as a result, an alias writ of execution was issued against MMCs
properties to satisfy the order of payment of back wages and other
benefits (remember that GHI already bought substantial shares of
MMC). To protect its interests, GHI filed a case for injunction before the
RTC to prevent the execution of the order. The RTC issued a writ of
injunction. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC hinging its decision
on the fact that the mortgage between MMC and GHI was merely a
sham. Issue: WoN the RTC properly issued the writ of injunction –
Yes. But before the SC delved into the extended discussion, it first
discussed judicial notice. (see doctrine) In the present case, the decision
in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and
NAMAWU, the SC upheld the right of herein private respondent,
NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial
notice, the SC acknowledges its Decision in Republic of the Philippines,
through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G Holdings, Inc., in
which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of
stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes
accompanying the said purchase. To repeat, these decisions respectively
confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right
of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal
properties of MMC. Nonetheless, NAMAWU is not without any remedy
since it can file under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order to protect its
rights against MMC. These include the examination of the judgment
obligor when judgment is unsatisfied, the examination of the obligors of
judgment obligors, or even the resort to receivership.
DOCTRINE: Before a court delves into an extended discussion of an
issue, it is essential to take judicial cognizance of cases intimately linked
to the present controversy which had earlier been elevated to and
decided by such Court. Thus, Judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or
not a previous ruling is required before delving deeper into the issues
presented.
Parties
•   The petitioner, G Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation
primarily engaged in the business of owning and holding shares of
stock of different companies.
•   Private respondent, National Mines and Allied Workers Union
Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank and file employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC),
an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex at Sipalay,
Negros Occidental.
•   MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on October 19, 1984,
on account of their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporations assets. MMC started its commercial operations in
August 1985. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National
Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a
non-performing asset.
FACTS:
1.   On October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement
executed between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), the
former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMCs shares and financial
claims (liabilities).
a.   These financial claims were converted into three Promissory
Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and
secured by mortgages over MMCs properties. The notes,
which were similarly worded except for their amounts (see at
the end of the digest).
2.   Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the
full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHI immediately
took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took
 full control of the management and operation of MMC.
3.   Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute
(refusal to bargain collectively and unfair labor practice) arose
between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a
notice of strike.
4.   QUISUMBING ORDER: Then Labor Secretary, Leonardo A.
Quisumbing ruled in favor of NAMAWU.
a.   In his July 30, 1997 Order (Quisumbing Order), Secretary
Quisumbing declared that the lay-off (of workers)
implemented was illegal and that MMC committed unfair
labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-
off workers, with payment of full backwages and benefits,
and directed the execution of a new collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) incorporating the terms and conditions of
the previous CBA providing for an annual increase in the
workers daily wage.
5.   The Supreme Court sustained the validity of the Quisumbing order in
two separate cases – G.R. Nos. 133519 and 138996 – which became
final and executory.
6.   BRION WRIT (partial writ of execution): On May 11, 2001, then
Acting Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary,
Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the issuance of a
partial writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs
to proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the same.
7.   In 2006, the Supreme Court, in G.R. Nos. 157696-97,
entitled Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU,
affirmed the propriety of the issuance of the Brion Writ.
8.   STO. TOMAS WRIT (alias writ of execution and Break-Open
order): The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMCs
resident manager resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU,
then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered the issuance of
the July 18, 2002 Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order
(Sto. Tomas Writ).
9.   On October 11, 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs, the members of
the union, and several armed men implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ,
and levied on the properties of MMC located at its compound in
Sipalay, Negros Occidental.
10.   SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FILED BY GHI: On October 14,
2002, GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan
City, Negros Occidental, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 1127 for
Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the
Sheriffs Levy on Properties.
a.   GHI contended that the levied properties were the subject of
a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, dated
September 5, 1996 executed by MMC in favor of GHI to
secure the aforesaid P550M promissory notes;
b.   that this deed was registered on February 24, 2000; and
c.   that the mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially
foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest bidder
on December 3, 2001, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale
dated December 4, 2001.
11.   On October 17, 2002, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Injunction enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further enforcing the
Sto. Tomas Writ and from conducting any public sale of the levied-
on properties, subject to GHIs posting of a P5M bond.
12.   RTC RULING (in favor of GHI and SC affirmed this): RTC
issued its December 4, 2002 Omnibus Order, which denied
NAMAWUs motion to dismiss the writ of injunction and ordered the
return to GHI of the levied firearms and handguns subject to a bond
posted by the latter.
13.   NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
14.   CA RULING (reversed the RTC, but set aside by the SC): the
appellate court rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC issuances
and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas Writ.
a.   The CA ruled, among others, that the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the September 5, 1996 Deed of
Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the conclusion that
the deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent;
b.   The CA also found that the certificates of title to MMCs real
properties did not contain any annotation of a mortgage lien,
and, suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-
out labor proceedings to protect its right as a mortgagee of
 virtually all the properties of MMC.
c.   The CA further ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the
mortgage was irregular, effected precisely to prevent the
satisfaction of the judgment against MMC.
ISSUES: (NOTE: the evid issue was discussed by the SC prior to
resolving the issues below)
1.   WoN the RTC properly issued the writ of injunction to prevent the
enforcement of the Sto. Tomas Writ – Yes, it was the proper remedy
for GHI as a third-party claimant in a labor dispute
a.   WoN the mortgage of the MMCs properties to GHI was a
sham – No, the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the
Promissory Notes themselves are the best evidence that there
was ample consideration for the mortgage
b.   WoN there was an effective levy by the DOLE upon the
MMCs real and personal properties – No, since NAMAWU
had no properties of MMC to attach because the same had
been previously foreclosed by GHI as mortgagee thereof;
and
c.   WoN it was proper for the CA to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction between MMC and GHI – No, the mere interlocking
of directors and officers does not warrant piercing the
separate corporate personalities of MMC and GHI
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2003 is SET ASIDE. The Omnibus
Order dated December 4, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 of
Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
JUDICIAL NOTICE (Evid related, SC discussed this before going into
extended discussions of all the issues)
1.   Before the SC delve into an extended discussion of the foregoing
issues, it is essential to take judicial cognizance of cases
intimately linked to the present controversy which had earlier
been elevated to and decided by such Court.
2.   FIRST CASE: Judicial notice must be taken by the SC of its
Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion
and NAMAWU, in which they upheld the right of herein private
respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims.
3.   SECOND CASE: Upon the same principle of judicial notice, the SC
acknowledges its Decision in Republic of the Philippines, through its
trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G Holdings, Inc., in
which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the
shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the
company notes accompanying the said purchase.
a.   These company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory
Notes, were part of the documents executed in 1992 in the
privatization sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT) to GHI (fact no. 1). Each of these notes uniformly
contains stipulations establishing and constituting in favor
of GHI mortgages over MMCs real and personal
properties. The stipulations were subsequently formalized in
a separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate and
Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996.Thereafter, the
Deed was registered on February 4, 2000.
4.   The SC finds both decisions critically relevant to the instant
dispute. In fact, they should have guided the courts below in the
disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To repeat,
these decisions respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its
labor claims and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and
mortgage claims over the real and personal properties of MMC,
as will be explained below.
5.   The assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of
these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, the SC finds it timely to
reiterate that: courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one
or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case
under consideration.
6.   However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower
court to issue the challenged writ of injunction depends on the
validity of the third partys (GHIs) claim of ownership over the
property subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor
department (remember that the dispute was between MMC and
NAMAWU). Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA
decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third party or a
stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties were beyond the reach
of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001.
7.   In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial
notice of the two cases aforesaid, as they provide the necessary
 perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a
valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of
execution.
8.   In Juaban v. Espina, the SC held that in some instances, courts
have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that
are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases
may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to
invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases that the SC have
taken judicial notice of are of such character, and the instant
case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.
9.   The SC notes that the case filed with the lower court involves a
principal action for injunction to prohibit execution over properties
belonging to a third party (GHI) not impleaded in the legal dispute
(labor dispute) between NAMAWU and MMC. We have observed,
however, that the lower court and the CA failed to take judicial
notice of, or to consider, the SC Decisions in Republic, etc., v. G
Holdings, Inc., and Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and
NAMAWU, in which the SC respectively recognized the entitlement
of GHI to the shares and the company notes of MMC (under the
Purchase and Sale Agreement), and the rights of NAMAWU to its
labor claims. At this stage, therefore, neither the lower court nor
the CA, nor even the SC, can depart from its findings in those
two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis.
10.   The SC is unmindful, however, of the fact that the labor claims of
NAMAWU, acknowledged by such Court in Maricalum, still awaits
final execution. While, theoretically, this case is not ended by this
decision, since the lower court is still to try the case filed with it and
decide it on the merits, the matter of whether the mortgage and
foreclosure of the assets that are the subject of said foreclosure is
ended herein, for the third and final time. So also is the consequential
issue of the separate and distinct personalities of GHI and
MMC. Having resolved these principal issues with certainty, the
SC
finds no more need to remand the case to the lower court, only fo
r the purpose of resolving again the matter of whether GHI owns
the properties that were the subject of the latter’s foreclosure.
11.   REMEDY OF NAMAWU: As success fades from NAMAWUs
efforts to execute on the properties of MMC, which were validly
foreclosed by GHI, the SC sees that NAMAWU always had, and
may still have, ample supplemental remedies found in Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court in order to protect its rights against MMC. These
include the examination of the judgment obligor when judgment is
unsatisfied, the examination of the obligors of judgment obligors, or
even the resort to receivership.
The mortgage was NOT a sham
12.   The well-settled rule is that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the
property mortgaged. While it is true that GHIs foreclosure of MMCs
mortgaged properties may have had the effect to prevent satisfaction
of the judgment award against the specific mortgaged property that
first answers for a mortgage obligation ahead of any subsequent
creditors, that same foreclosure does not necessarily translate to
having been effected to prevent satisfaction of the judgment
award against MMC.
13.   The SC also observes the error in the CAs finding that the 1996 Deed
of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was not supported by any
consideration since at the time the deed was executed, all the real
and personal property of MMC had already been transferred in the
hands of G Holdings.
14.   It should be remembered that the Purchase and Sale Agreement
between GHI and APT involved large amounts (P550M) and even
spawned a subsequent court action (Civil Case No. 95-76132, RTC
of Manila). Yet, nowhere in the Agreement or in the RTC decision is
there any mention of real and personal properties of MMC being
included in the sale to GHI in 1992. These properties simply served
as mortgaged collateral for the 1992 Promissory Notes. The Purchase
and Sale Agreement and the Promissory Notes themselves are the
best evidence that there was ample consideration for the mortgage.
There was no effective levy
15.   There appears in the record a factual contradiction relating to
whether the foreclosure by GHI on July 13, 2001 over some of the
contested properties came ahead of the levy thereon, or the
 reverse. NAMAWU claims that the levy on two trucks was effected
on June 22, 2001, which GHI disputes as a misstatement because the
levy was attempted on July 18, 2002, and not 2001.
16.   What is undisputed though is that the mortgage of GHI was
registered on February 4, 2000, well ahead of any levy by
NAMAWU. Prior registration of a lien creates a preference, as the
act of registration is the operative act that conveys and affects the
land, even against subsequent judgment creditors, such as respondent
herein. Its registration of the mortgage was not intended to defraud
NAMAWU of its judgment claims, since even the courts were
already judicially aware of its existence since 1992. Thus, at that
moment in time, with the registration of the mortgage, either
NAMAWU had no properties of MMC to attach because the same
had been previously foreclosed by GHI as mortgagee thereof; or by
virtue of the DOLEs levy to enforce NAMAWUs claims, the latter’s
rights are subject to the notice of the foreclosure on the subject
properties by a prior mortgagees right.
17.   GHIs mortgage right had already been registered by then, and it is
basic that mortgaged properties answer primarily for the mortgaged
credit, not for the judgment credit of the mortgagors unsecured
creditor.
Piercing the veil was NOT warranted
18.   In this case, the mere interlocking of directors and officers does not
warrant piercing the separate corporate personalities of MMC and
GHI. Not only must there be a showing that there was majority or
complete control, but complete domination, not only of finances but
of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked,
so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no
separate mind, will or existence of its own. The mortgage deed
transaction attacked as a basis for piercing the corporate veil was a
transaction that was an offshoot, a derivative, of the mortgages
earlier constituted in the Promissory Notes dated October 2,
1992. But these Promissory Notes with mortgage were executed by
GHI with APT in the name of MMC, in a full privatization
process. It appears that if there was any control or domination
exercised over MMC, it was APT, not GHI, that wielded it. Neither
can we conclude that the constitution of the loan nearly four (4)
years prior to NAMAWUs notice of strike could have been the
proximate cause of the injury of NAMAWU for having been
deprived of MMCs corporate assets.
The injunction was properly issued by the RTC
19.   It is settled that a Regional Trial Court can validly issue a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and, later, a writ of preliminary injunction
to prevent enforcement of a writ of execution issued by a labor
tribunal on the basis of a third-partys claim of ownership over the
properties levied upon. While, as a rule, no temporary or permanent
injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute shall be issued by any court--where the writ of
execution issued by a labor tribunal is sought to be enforced upon the
property of a stranger to the labor dispute, even upon a mere prima
facie showing of ownership of such claimant--a separate action for
injunctive relief against such levy may be maintained in court, since
said action neither involves nor grows out of a labor dispute insofar
as the third party is concerned.
20.   Likewise, since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to
the action, he cannot, strictly speaking, appeal from the order
denying his claim, but he should file a separate reivindicatory action
against the execution creditor or the purchaser of the property after
the sale at public auction, or a complaint for damages against the
bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.
21.   A separate civil action for recovery of ownership of the property
would not constitute interference with the powers or processes of the
labor tribunal which rendered the judgment to execute upon the
levied properties. The property levied upon being that of a stranger is
not subject to levy. Thus, a separate action for recovery, upon a
claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the petitioner,
cannot be considered as interference.
22.   Upon the findings and conclusions we have reached above, GHI is
situated squarely as such third-party claimant. The questioned
restraining order of the lower court, as well as the order granting
preliminary injunction, does not constitute interference with the
powers or processes of the labor department. The registration of the
mortgage document operated as notice to all on the matter of the
mortgagees prior claims. Official proceedings relative to the
foreclosure of the subject properties constituted a prima
 facie showing of ownership of such claimant to support the issuance
of injunctive reliefs.

 

025 PILIPINAS SHELL v. FREDELUCES (Arcenas)
April 20, 2016 | LEONEN, J. | When hearing necessary for judicial notice
PETITIONER/S: PILIPINAS SHELL FOUNDATION
RESPONDENT/S: TOMAS M. FREDELUCES
SUMMARY: Pursuant to Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972, the
government engaged the services of SHELL for the exploration,
development and production of petroleum resources in northwest of Palawan.
SHELL needed to construct a concrete gravity structure and located site for
said construction in Subic, Zambales. Together with Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), PILIPINAS SHELL and SHELL determined a 40-
hectare site in Sitio Agusuhin but that 80 households would have to be
relocated within the Subic Seaport Economic Free Zone to carry out the
project. SHELL gave financial assistance for the relocated families and so
they voluntarily dismantled their houses (they signed quitclaims). Fredeluces
et al (former residents) filed a Complaint for damages (complaint 1) against
SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL for arbitrarily and unlawfully evicting them
while not giving them what they were allegedly due. Instead of answering the
Complaint, SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL moved to dismiss the complaint
based on the grounds of litis pendentia, failure to state a cause of action, and
lack of cause of action, alleging that five (5) of the complainants earlier filed
against them a Complaint for sum of money (complaint 2) in the same court
as complaint 1. RTC granted the MTD finding identity of parties, causes of
action, and reliefs sought. CA reversed and appreciated in evidence a
Revocation of Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by the five.
Complaint 2 was, thus, filed without their authority, and there was no litis
pendentia so as to bar the filing of Complaint. Hence, this petition. The
issues in this case are (1) whether Fredeluces, et al.'s Complaint for damages
should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. The court held in the
affirmative, BUT only as to Bebiana San Pedro since she did not execute a
Revocation and Cancellation of SPA. The other four complainants (who were
involved in complaint 2) are not bound by the decision in complaint 2 since
they executed the Revocation and Cancellation of SPA; hence, there was no
pending Complaint for sum of money when the Complaint for damages was
subsequently filed (no litis pendentia).
(2) whether the Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. The court also held in the affirmative. They
failed to allege any circumstance showing that they had occupied Sitio
Agusuhin under claim of ownership for the required number of years. They
admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin. The property belongs to the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227;
hence, it is a government property the possession of which, however long,
"never confers title tothe possessor.
Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are omitted in
pleadings, the hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and material
facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
However, it is mandatory that courts "consider other facts within the range of
judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence in resolving
motions to dismiss. BUT there are EXCEPTIONS:
In Dabuco v. Court of Appeals: There is no hypothetical admission of the
veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such
allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts which are
inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document included in the
pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to
the complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to the court by
stipulation of the parties, or in the course of hearings related to the case.’
DOCTRINE: When a motion to dismiss is filed, only allegations of ultimate
facts are hypothetically admitted. Allegations of evidentiary facts and
conclusions of law, as well as allegations whose falsity is subject to judicial
notice, those which are legally impossible, inadmissible in evidence, or
unfounded, are disregarded.
FACTS:
1.   Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 87, otherwise known as the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972, the Republic of the
Philippines entered into Service Contract No. 38 (the contract) and
engaged the services of Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (SHELL) for
the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in
an area offshore northwest of Palawan.
a.   The service contractors eventually discovered in offshore
Malampaya-Camago at least 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
deposits.
b.   Exploration and development of the Malampaya-Camago natural
gas reservoir required the construction and operation of a
shallow water platform off the coast of Palawan.
c.   The water platform further required a concrete gravity structure
that would sit on the seabed, and a topside or the platform's deck
which would sit on top of the concrete gravity structure
d.   The topside was constructed in Singapore.
e.   As for the concrete gravity structure, SHELL searched for
possible construction sites here in the Philippines. And so
identified a possible construction site in Subic, Zambales, and
 SHELL met with representatives of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Olongapo City for arbitrarily and unlawfully evicting Fredeluces, et al. 4
Authority (SBMA) from their place of abode and livelihood, and allegedly failing to act with
f.   SBMA proposed a 40-hectare site in Sitio Agusuhin as a possible justice, not giving them their due, and acted in bad faith. Fredeluces, et
construction site for the concrete gravity structure al. alleged the following
g.   The site formed part of the military reservation of the former a.   They resided in the area even prior to 1998 and lawful residents
naval base of the US in Subic, which, under Republic Act No. of Sitio Agusuhin.
7227, became part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) b.   constructed their houses and introduced improvements in Sitio
h.   Results of a socio-economic survey commissioned by SHELL Agusuhin, such as fruit trees and other seasonal plants.
showed that there were about 200 households living at or near c.   However, for the direct benefit of the SHELL and PILIPINAS
the proposed construction site. SHELL, Fredeluces, et al. were effectively evicted from their
i.   Together with the SBMA and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc., homes in "total disregard" of their rights.
(PILIPINAS SHELL), SHELL established contact with the d.   Admitting that some of the claimants were given financial
occupants of Sitio Agusuhin. It was ultimately determined that assistance, Fredeluces, et al. alleged that the amounts given were
80 households would have to be relocated to nearby areas within "insufficient to compensate the damages they sustained.
the Subic Seaport Economic Free Zone (Free Zone) to carry out e.   They were pressured, coerced or 'sweet talked'" into signing
the project. quitclaims and waivers.
2.   In May 1998, the SBMA and SHELL entered into a Lease and f.   ALSO, Fredeluces, et al. moved that they be allowed to litigate
Development Agreement (lease agreement) for the construction of the as paupers considering that the gross income of each of them and
concrete gravity structure in Sitio Agusuhin. SBMA relocated the the members of their families do not exceed P3,000.00, and that
affected households and SHELL gave financial assistance. none of them allegedly owned real property.
3.   The undertakings of SHELL were implemented through PILIPINAS 6.   Instead of answering the Complaint, SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL
SHELL and concluded agreements with some of the affected households. moved to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds of litis pendentia,
a.   In exchange for financial assistance, some of the claimants failure to state a cause of action, and lack of cause of action, alleging that
voluntarily dismantled their houses and relocated to nearby areas five (5) of the complainants5 earlier filed against them a Complaint for
within the Free Zone. sum of money (complaint 2) in the same court as complaint 1
b.   Other claims, however, were denied by SHELL for the a.   Complaint 2 allegedly prayed for payment of disturbance
claimant's failure to show that he or she resided in Sitio compensation for their eviction from Sitio Agusuhin for the
Agusuhin prior to the construction project construction of the concrete gravity structure.
c.   With the assistance of the Subic Sangguniang Bayan b.   Hence, both complaints had substantially similar causes of action
(Sanggunian), a Compensation Community Relations Study and relief sought, rendering complaint 1 (for damages)
Group was organized to re-evaluate the claims that had been dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.
previously denied by SHELL. c.   The companies allege that Fredeluces, et al. do not have right to
4.   In the meantime, the construction of the concrete gravity structure was pray for payment of damages in the amount of the value of the
completed, and the shallow water platform was successfully installed in land since they never owned the land in Sitio Agusuhin, and the
Palawan on June 2, 2000.2 same belonged to the SBMA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227;
5.   ACTION: On December 1, 2000, a Complaint for damages3 (complaint hence, lands in Sitio Agusuhin are government property not
1) was filed against SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL before the RTC of subject to private ownership

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4
Tomas M. Fredeluces, Marcos B. Corpuz, Jr., Reynaldo M. Samonte, Norma M. Samonte, Ambrocio
2
SHELL turned over Sitio Agusuhin to the SBMA, cleared, leveled, and elevated, together with Villanueva, Salvacion A. Bon, Ramiro A. Bon, Luzviminda B. Andillo, Ludivico F. Bon, Elmo Areglo,
improvements "consisting of a finger pier, a fence and gate, a drainage system, and a berthing facility for Rose A. San Pedro, Dante U. Santos, Sr., Miguel Santos, Efren U. Santos, Ric U. Santos, Simon Marce,
ferry sea crafts or similar vessels along the southern bank of the basin. Jr., Joel F. Salinel, Bebiana San Pedro, and Marina Santos
3 5
See end of digest for amount of actual damages being claimed Dante U. Santos, Sr., Efren U. Santos, Miguel Santos, Ric U. Santos, and Bebiana San Pedro
 d.   In addition, Fredeluces, et al.'s claims for the value of the
improvements were allegedly paid as evidenced by the
quitclaims they had signed. Consequently, the Complaint for
damages failed to state a cause of action.
e.   With respect to Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon, the
companies alleged that they never resided in Sitio Agusuhin and
not entitled to any compensation and, therefore, lacked a cause
of action against the companies.
7.   Fredeluces, et al. opposed the MTD and prayed for its denial. They argue
that in filing their MTD, hypothetically admitted the factual allegations
in their Complaint. Corollarily, the RTC may not inquire into the truth of
the allegations and may only resolve the MTD based on the facts as
alleged in the Complaint.
a.   First ground: The 5 complainants in Complaint 2 claim they
were not aware they were included in the said complaint and
already revoked the SPA executed in favor of the lawyer in
Complaint 2.
b.   2nd ground: they expressly admitted that they never owned Sitio
Agusuhin BUT they were peacefully settled in the area and
introduced improvements when the companies summarily
evicted them. It is for their "unlawful eviction” from, not
ownership of, Sitio Agusuhin for which Fredeluces, et al.
demand payment of damages.
c.   3rd ground: they assailed the validity of these quitclaims for lack
of consent, an issue requiring the presentation of evidence during
trial. They similarly argued that the issue of residence of Tomas
M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon required the presentation of
evidence during trial.
8.   RTC RULING ON MTD: granted in favor of SHELL and PILIPINAS
SHELL.
a.   Between Complaint 1 and 2, RTC found identity of parties,
causes of action, and reliefs sought.
b.   The trial court said that the 5 complainants in Complaint 2
"cannot feign ignorance that they were not aware that they were
included as party plaintiffs in the complaint because "they
actively secured copies of Certificates of Occupancy in Sitio
Agusuhin, which were annexed to the earlier filed Complaint.
c.   RTC held that Complaint 1 failed to state a cause of action. The
basis of the amount of actual damages they sought was the fair
market values of the parcels of land they occupied and of the
improvements introduced on the property. They cannot avail the
relief sought simply because they do not own the land in Sitio
Agusuhin.
d.   RTC held the quitclaims were valid since Fredeluces, et al.
voluntarily executed them and even voluntarily vacated Sitio
Agusuhin after they received financial assistance from SHELL
and PILIPINAS SHELL.
e.   In resolving the issue of whether Tomas M. Fredeluces and
Ludivico F. Bon were former residents of Sitio Agusuhin, the
RTC relied on the Affidavit of a certain Robert Hadji (Hadji), a
former resident of Sitio Agusuhin and PILIPINAS SHELL's
Community Coordinator in the site.
i.   Hadji stated in his Affidavit that Tomas and Ludivico
never resided in Sitio Agusuhin.
ii.   While the resolution of the issue would generally require
presentation of evidence during trial, the trial court said
that Fredeluces, et al. did not even bother to attend the
hearing of the Motion to Dismiss on April 20, 2001 to
present evidence contrary to the allegations of SHELL
and PILIPINAS SHELL. RTC said that in failing to
present such contrary evidence, Tomas and Ludivico
should be deemed non-residents of Sitio Agusuhin and,
therefore, were not entitled to any compensation.
9.   CA RULING: the CA appreciated in evidence a Revocation of Special
Power of Attorney allegedly executed by the five. Complaint 2 was, thus,
filed without their authority, and there was no litis pendentia so as to bar
the filing of Complaint 1.
a.   Despite Fredeluces, et al.'s admission that they did not own the
parcels of land they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin, the CA
nonetheless held that they may file a complaint for damages for
having been "adversely affected by SHELL’s construction
works. Fredeluces, et al. may likewise repudiate the quitclaims
they executed.
b.   As to the issue of residence, the CA found that Ludivico F. Bon
formerly resided in Sitio Agusuhin relying on the Report
submitted by the Compensation Community Relations Study
Group where Ludivico F. Bon was listed as one of the
beneficiaries. But Tomas M. Fredeluces, he was not listed on the
Report and so not entitled to any financial assistance.
c.   CA denied SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration and/or Clarification, which was denied.
10.   Hence, SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court.
 a.   The companies argue that the CA erred in limiting itself with the
allegations of the Complaint for damages when it ruled that
Fredeluces, et al. had the right to demand for compensation from
SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL.
b.   The rule that the allegations of the complaint are hypothetically
admitted when a motion to dismiss is filed is subject to
exceptions. Annexes to the complaint as well as matters of
judicial notice may be considered in dismissing a complaint on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
c.   One matter of judicial notice is that the SBMA, not Fredeluces,
et al., own Sitio Agusuhin, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227.
Not being owners, Fredeluces, et al. may not demand
compensation based on the value of the properties they formerly
occupied.
i.   They were possessors in bad faith who, under Article
449 of the Civil Code, are not entitled to any indemnity
with respect to improvements they have introduced in
Sitio Agusuhin.
ISSUE/s:
1.   whether Fredeluces, et al.'s Complaint for damages should be dismissed
on the ground of litis pendentia – YES, but only as to Bebiana San Pedro
since she did not execute a Revocation and Cancellation of SPA. The
other four complainants (who were involved in complaint 2) are not
bound by the decision in complaint 2 since they executed the Revocation
and Cancellation of SPA; hence, there was no pending Complaint for
sum of money when the Complaint for damages was subsequently filed
(no litis pendentia).
2.   whether the Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action – YES. they failed to allege any
circumstance showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under
claim of ownership for the required number of years. They admitted that
they do not own Sitio Agusuhin. The property belongs to the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227; hence, it is a
government property the possession of which, however long, "never
confers title tothe possessor.
RULING: The Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. CA decision
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for Damages is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1.   We grant the Petition. The Complaint for damages should have been
dismissed as to respondent Bebiana San Pedro on the ground of litis
pendentia. Complaint 1 failed to state a cause of action.
NO LITIS PENDENTIA
2.   Only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. Hence, any
suit subsequently filed for the same cause of action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious.
3.   When there is more than one suit pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action, litis pendentia exists and a motion to dismiss
may be filed on this ground as provided by Rule 16, Section 1(e)6 of the
Rules of Court.Occasionally referred to as lis pendens[116] or auter
action pendant,[117] litis pendentia has the following elements:
a.   identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing
the same interests in both actions;"
b.   identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts;
c.   identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case.
4.   No identity of parties. The first element of litis pendentia—identity of
parties—is absent with respect to respondents Dante U. Santos, Efren U.
Santos, Miguel Santos, and Ric U. Santos.
a.   They executed the Revocation and Cancellation of Special
Power of Attorney and withdrew the authority they had earlier
granted Atty. Renato M. Collado to file a case in their behalf.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that their signatures do
not appear on the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping appended to Complaint 2.
b.   Hence, they should be deemed non-plaintiffs in the said
complaint. Consequently, the pendency of the Complaint for sum
of money did not bar them from filing Complaint 1.
5.   The same cannot be said for Bebiana San Pedro since she was guilty of
forum shopping, repetitively filing complaints asserting "the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues"against the same defendants
a.   Bebiana San Pedro was a party plaintiff both complaints. She
did not sign any document similar to the Revocation and
6
SECTION 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (e) That there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause[.]
 Cancellation of Special Power of Attorney. Thus, she did not 4.   The ground of failure to state a cause of action is based on Rule 16,
revoke the authority of Atty. Renato H. Collado Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court8
6.   Identity of rights and relief. The second element of litis 5.   Failure to state a cause of action goes into the sufficiency of the
pendentia likewise exists with respect to Bebiana San Pedro. There is allegation of the cause of action in the complaint.
substantial identity of rights7 asserted and reliefs sought between the a.   "When the facts alleged in the complaint show that the defendant
complaints filed. The following allegations are similar: has committed acts constituting a delict or wrong by which he
a.   Both claim that the complainants are lawful residents and long- violates the rights of the plaintiff, causing [the plaintiff] loss or
term occupants of Sitio Agusuhin injury, there is sufficient allegation of a cause of action.
b.   That the companies allegedly failed to sufficiently compensate Otherwise, there is none."
them for their eviction from Sitio Agusuhin: 6.   In this respect, a pleading sufficiently states a cause of action if it
c.   Bebiana sought identical reliefs: Bebiana San Pedro prayed that "contain[s] in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise, and direct
she be paid P1,500,000.00 in addition to the prayer for payment statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his
of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. or her claim.
7.   Because of the substantial identity of parties, causes of action, and reliefs b.   Ultimate facts are the "important and substantial facts which
sought in the Complaint for sum of money and Complaint for damages, either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or
all the elements of litis pendentia are present with respect to Bebiana San which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
Pedro. defendant."
a.   Since the Complaint for sum of money and the Complaint for c.   Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law in a
damages assert substantially identical causes of action and seek pleading are omitted for they are unnecessary in determining
similar reliefs, the Decision dated February 27, 2004 binds whether the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
respondent Bebiana San Pedro. action.
b.   The Decision is res judicata with respect to the right of Bebiana d.   In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
San Pedro to recover compensation for vacating Sitio Agusuhin. cause of action, a defendant "hypothetically admits the truth of
c.   That Bebiana San Pedro received P100,000.00 from the the facts alleged in the complaint."
companies as disturbance compensation, and that she e.   Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law
voluntarily signed a quitclaim to waive any claims she might are omitted in pleadings, the hypothetical admission is
have over the parcel of land she occupied in Sitio Agusuhin, limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the
are conclusive upon this Court. complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
8.   In sum, Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos, Miguel Santos, and Ric U. However, it is mandatory that courts "consider other facts
Santos revoked the authority to file the Complaint for sum of money on within the range of judicial notice, as well as relevant laws
their behalf. As for the four (4) respondents, there was no pending and jurisprudence in resolving motions to dismiss. BUT
Complaint for sum of money when the Complaint for damages was there are EXCEPTIONS:
subsequently filed. The trial court, therefore, erred in dismissing their i.   In Dabuco v. Court of Appeals: There is no
Complaint for damages on the ground of litis pendentia. hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such
3.   The Complaint for damages (complaint 1) was initially dismissed on the allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to
ground of failure to state a cause of action, but the CA reversed and facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the
remanded the Complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. record or document included in the pleading these
allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." For a cause of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
action to exist, there must be "a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; a corresponding obligation on the SECTION 1. Grounds.— Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
part of the defendant to respect such right;" and, "an act or omission of the defendant which constitutes a asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (g) That the pleading
violation of the plaintiffs right which defendant had the duty to respect." asserting the claim states no cause of action
 confined to the complaint if there is evidence which has j.   Quitclaims are contracts in the nature of a compromise where
been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, parties make concessions, a lawful device to avoid litigation.
or in the course of hearings related to the case.’ That they perceived the amounts they received as
7.   Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for "insufficient" does not make the quitclaims invalid.
damages, the Complaint states no cause of action. They may have k.   As for the allegation that respondents were "pressured, coerced,
resided in Sitio Agusuhin, constructed their houses, and planted fruit or sweet-talked into receiving compensation, this is a conclusion
trees in the area. However, they failed to allege any circumstance of law that may not be hypothetically admitted. The
showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under claim of circumstances of fraud and mistake must be stated with
ownership for the required number of years. particularity. Nothing in the Complaint for damages show
f.   They admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin. The how respondents were particularly "pressured, coerced, or
property belongs to the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 'sweet-talked'" by Fredeluces et al into receiving
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227; hence, it is a government compensation. As found by the trial court, respondents
property the possession of which, however long, "never confers voluntarily vacated Sitio Agusuhin.
title tothe possessor.
g.   It follows that respondents may not ask compensation AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES BEING CLAIMED
equivalent to the value of the parcels of land they previously 1. Tomas Fredeluces P27,000,000.00
occupied in Sitio Agusuhin nor claim damages equivalent to 2. Marcos Corpuz, Jr. 905,000.00
the structures and improvements. The right to demand 3. Reynaldo Samonte 2,000,000.00
compensation for deprivation of property belongs to the 4. Norma Samonte 2,000,000.00
owner. 5. Ambrocio Villanueva 1,700,000.00
8.   Specifically with respect to Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon, 6. Salvacion Bon 750,000.00
the allegation that they resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the 7. Ramiro Bon 1,000,000.00
construction of the concrete gravity structure may not be hypothetically 8. Luzviminda Andillo 500,000.00
admitted. 9. Ludivico Bon 500,000.00
h.   Based on the evidence available during the hearing of the MTD, 10. Elmo Areglo 1,000,000.00
Tomas and Ludivico were indeed non-residents of Sitio 11. Rose San Pedro 500,000.00
Agusuhin prior to the construction of the concrete gravity 12. Dante Santos, Sr., 12,000,000.00
structure evidenced by the Report of the Compensation 13. Miguel Santos 4,000,000.00
Community Relations Study Group which declared Tomas a 14. Efren Santos 5,000,000.00
non-resident of Sitio Agusuhin. Moreover, as certified by the 15. Ric Santos 1,000,000.00
Punong Barangay of Barangay Cawag, none of the other 16. Simon Marce, Jr. 4,000,000.00
residents of Sitio Agusuhin recognized Tomas as a fellow 17. Joel Salinel (no amount)
resident. 18. Bebiana San Pedro 1,500,000.00
i.   As for Ludivico, the Office of the Punong Barangay of 19. Marina Santos 3,000,000.00
Barangay Matain, Subic, Zambales certified that he was a TOTAL P68,255,000.00[31]
resident of Barangay Matain, not of Sitio Agusuhin, corroborated
by Hadji, Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc.'s Community
Coordinator, in his Affidavit.
9.   Also, in receiving the amounts in the quitclaims, they declared in their
they waived, released, and abandoned any claims thait they might have
had over the parcels of land they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin as well as
the improvements they introduced in the property.
 026 Enriquez v. Isarog (Linds)
Nov. 16, 2016 | Peralta, J. | Judicial Notice; Exception to the rules on
admissibility
PETITIONER: William and Nelia-Vela Enriquez
RESPONDENTS: Isarog Lines and Victor Sedenio
SUMMARY: Sonny was a passenger of Isarog bus driven by Victor.
They met an accident with a Pantranco bus driven by Aya-ay, resulting
in Sonny’s death, among other passengers. Sonny’s parents, Sps.
Enriquez, sued Isarog and Victor for damages. RTC granted; CA
modified, deleted the award for unrealized income.
The issue is whether the Sps. Enriquez are entitled to the unrealized
income.
Yes, since under the Civil Code, heirs are entitled to the indemnity for
loss of earning capacity in such cases. General rule: The
indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of
actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the
best obtainable evidence thereof. Exception: damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased was self-employed and
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in
which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
'minimum wage under current labor laws.
In this case, the Sps. Enriquez were able to present the best obtainable
evidence of their son’s income – a certification from the employer of
Sonny’s wages. The defense did not object to its admissibility in trial,
and hence can be utilized to render a decision. The CA thus erred when
it ruled that certification is inadmissible since the signatory of the same
was not presented in court. The case of Serra is inapplicable; not on all
fours with this case, the party therein did not present any evidence at all
as regards its claim.
DOCTRINE: Damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased was
self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current
 50T
 indemnity,
 1.038M
 unrealized
 income,
 100T
 moral,
 25T
 exemplary
 and
 atty’s
labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
the deceased was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
'minimum wage under current labor laws.
The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment, as what the
RTC in this case aptly did, since it was indubitably in a better position to
assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.
FACTS:
1.   Sonny Enriquez was a passenger of a bus owned and operated by
respondent Isarog Line Express Transport, Inc. (Isarog Line) driven
by Victor Sedenio.
2.   While traversing the diversion road at Silangang Malicboy, Pagbilao,
Quezon, said bus collided with another bus owned by Philtranco
Service Enterprises, Inc. being driven by Primitivo Aya-ay.
3.   As a result of the impact between the two (2) buses, several
passengers died, including Sonny, who was twenty-six (26) years old
at that time.
4.   Sonny's parents, petitioners William Enriquez and Nelia Vela-
Enriquez (the Spouses Enriquez), filed a complaint for damages
against Isarog Line and Philtranco as well as their drivers before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
5.   RTC granted.9
6.   On appeal, CA affirmed with modification, deleting the unrealized
income portion of the award.
ISSUE/s:
1.   Whether the Sps. Enriquez are entitled to the unrealized income.
Yes, since they were able to substantiate the claim, and/or the
defense failed to object to the evidence presented by the spouses, the
consequence of which the alleged unusable piece of evidence may be
utilized and admitted in evidence.
RULING: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court
GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 13, 2013 and Resolution dated March 4, 2014 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 97376, and REINSTATES the Decision of the Regional Trial
9
fees.
Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch 29 dated February 24, 2011 in when the prosecution presented said document, it was deemed
Civil Case No. L-896, with interest at six percent (6%)14per annum of the admitted and could be validly utilized by the trial court.
amount of damages awarded from the time of the finality of this Decision 4.   In the case at bar, while the CA itself ruled that the certification from
until its full satisfaction. ASLAN stating that Sonny was earning P185.00 per day as a
security guard is admissible in evidence, it held that the same has no
RATIO: probative value since the signatory was never presented to testify.
1.   Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code,10 the heirs of the victim are However, the rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed
entitled to indemnity for loss of earning capacity. admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving
2.   Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but at its judgment, as what the RTC in this case aptly did, since it was
for loss of capacity to earn. The indemnification for loss of earning indubitably in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly presented during trial.
proven by competent proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof. 5.   Serra v. Mumar, as relied upon by the appellate court, does not apply
Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to because in said case they only presented testimonial evidence to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By prove damages for loss of earning capacity. No documentary
way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be evidence was submitted. The Court ruled that damages for loss of
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which must be
the deceased was self-employed and earning less than the duly proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the widow's
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial self-serving testimony. Also, in People v. Villar, the prosecution
notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no merely relied on the widow's self-serving statement on her deceased
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased was husband's monthly earning. Here, however, there is actual
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the documentary evidence to support the claim. The Spouses Enriquez
'minimum wage under current labor laws. presented a certification from Sonny's employer to duly prove his
3.   Contrary to the CA's pronouncement, the Spouses Enriquez were income.
able to present competent proof and the best obtainable evidence
of their departed son's income. There is no showing that the Computation: (not relevant)
defense objected when they presented the certification from ASLAN Net Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income13 - Living
Security Systems, Inc. (ASLAN) during the trial. In People v. Lopez, Expenses
the Court ruled that documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. The claimant = [2/3 (80 - age at death)] x GAI - [50% of GAI]
presented a similar certification from Tanod Publishing, showing that
the deceased was a photo correspondent for Tanod Newspaper and = [2/3 (80 - 26)] x P57,720.00 - P28,860.00
that his monthly salary ranges from P1,780.00 to P3,570.00 on per
story basis. The Court noted that since the defense did not object = [2/3 (54)] x P28,860.00

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  = 36 x P28,860.00
10

 Article
 2206.
 The
 amount
 of
 damages
 for
 death
 caused
 by
 a
 crime
 or
 quasi-­‐delict
 
shall
 be
 at
 least
 three
 thousand
 pesos,
 even
 though
 there
 may
 have
 been
 mitigating
  Net Earning Capacity = P1,038,960.00
circumstances.
 In
 addition:
 
(1)
  The
  defendant
  shall
  be
  liable
  for
  the
  loss
  of
  the
  earning
  capacity
  of
  the
 
deceased,
  and
  the
  indemnity
  shall
  be
  paid
  to
  the
  heirs
  of
  the
  latter;
  such
  indemnity
 
shall
 in
 every
 case
 be
 assessed
 and
 awarded
 by
 the
 court,
 unless
 the
 deceased
 on
 
account
  of
  permanent
  physical
  disability
  not
  caused
  by
  the
  defendant,
  had
  no
 
earning
 capacity
 at
 the
 time
 of
 his
 death;
 
 027 PITC v. COA (Buenaventura)
Nov. 21, 2017| Leonardo-De Castro, J. | what needs not to be proved
PETITIONER: Philippine International Trading Corporation
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Audit
SUMMARY:
PITC is a GOCC that was created by President Marcos, it granted
benefits to its employees (separation pay, retirement benefits etc.) PITC
was reorganized under a new law and it was given 6 months to
restructure and grant separation benefits to employees. PITC continued
giving out benefits even after 6 months. The legality of their policy was
resolved in G.R. No. 183517, wherein it was stated that PITC is included
in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6758, it is evidently no longer
exempted from OCPC rules and regulations, in keeping with said law's
intent to do away with multiple allowances and other incentive packages
as well as the resultant differences in compensation among government
personnel.
PITC argues that the decision must be applied prospectively and not
retroactively. COA argues that when the Court renders a decision that
merely interprets a particular provision of law - one that neither
establishes a new doctrine nor supplants an old doctrine - the
interpretation takes effect and becomes part of the law as of the date
when the law was originally passed.
The issue is WoN the the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be
applied prospectively from the time it became final on September 27,
2010.- The court held no. the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither
reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. the Court's
interpretation of the aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in
G.R. No. 183517 retroacts to the date when Executive Order No. 756
was enacted.
DOCTRINE:
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system.
It is elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court upon laws
constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since
this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.
FACTS:
1.   PITC is a government-owned and controlled corporation that was
created under Presidential Decree No. 252 issued by then President
Marcos. Thereafter, said law was repealed by Presidential Decree
No. 1071. On December 28, 1981, President Marcos issued
Executive Order No. 756, which authorized the reorganization of
PITC. Section 6 thereof states:
2.   SECTION 6. Exemption from OCPC. - In recognition of the special
nature of its operations, the Corporation shall continue to be exempt
from the application of the rules and regulations of the Office of the
Compensation and Position Classification or any other similar
agencies that may be established hereafter as provided under
Presidential Decree No. 1071. Likewise, any officer or employee
who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled
to one month pay for every year of service computed at highest
salary received including all allowances, in addition to the other
benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or
regulations to the contrary; Provided, That the employee shall have
served in the Corporation continuously for at least two
years: Provided, further,That in case of separated employees, the
separation or dismissal is not due to conviction for any offense the
penalty for which includes forfeiture of benefits: and Provided,
finally, That in the commutation of leave credits earned, the
employees who resigned, retired or is separated shall be entitled to
the full payment therefor computed with all the allowance then being
enjoined at the time of resignation, retirement of separation
regardless of any restriction or limitation provided for in other laws,
rules or regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
3.   On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive Order No.
877 that further authorized the reorganization of PITC. Section I
thereof reads:
Reorganization. - The Minister of Trade and Industry is hereby
designated Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation with full
powers to restructure and reorganize the Corporation and to
determine or fix its staffing pattern, compensation structure and
related organizational requirements. The Chairman shall complete
such restructuring and reorganization within six (6) months from the
date of this Executive Order. All personnel of the Corporation who
are not reappointed by the Chairman under the new reorganized
structure of the Corporation shall be deemed laid off; provided, that
personnel so laid off shall be entitled to the benefits accruing to
 separated employees under Executive Order No. 756 amending the
Revised Charter of the Corporation. (Emphasis supplied.)
4.   Apparently, PITC continued to grant the benefits provided under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 to its qualified employees
even after the lapse of the six-month period specified in Executive
Order No. 877.
5.   The legality of such policy was put in issue and directly resolved by
this Court in the Decision dated June 22, 2010 in G.R. No. 183517,
entitled Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission
on Audit. In said case, the COA disapproved the claim of a retired
PITC employee for the payment of retirement differentials based on
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. PITC's bid to oppugn the
COA's disallowance via a petition for certiorari was dismissed by
the Court, ruling in this wise:
6.   As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order
No. 756, we find that [Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756] cannot
be interpreted independent of the purpose or intent of the law. Rather
than the permanent retirement law for its employees that [PITC] now
characterizes it to be, we find that the provision of gratuities
equivalent to "one month pay for every year of service computed at
highest salary received including all allowances" was clearly meant
as an incentive for employees who retire, resign or are separated
from service during or as a consequence of the reorganization
[PITC's] Board of Directors was tasked to implement.
7.   PITC is included in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6758, it is
evidently no longer exempted from OCPC rules and regulations, in
keeping with said law's intent to do away with multiple allowances
and other incentive packages as well as the resultant differences in
compensation among government personnel.
8.   PITC moved for a reconsideration of the above ruling, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated August 10, 2010.1âwphi1 The
Decision in G.R. No. 183517 became final on September 27, 2010.
9.   Pending the resolution of the above motion, PITC still allocated part
of its Corporate Operating Budget for retirement benefits pursuant to
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The amount allocated therefor
was ₱46.36 million.
10.   On September 30, 2010, PITC resident COA Auditor Elizabeth
Liberato informed PITC that the accrual of the retirement benefits
under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was bereft of legal
basis. PITC was advised to stop the payment of such benefits or
reverse the amount already accrued.
11.   According to PITC, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be
applied prospectively from the time it became final on September 27,
2010. To apply said decision retroactively would allegedly unjustly
divest qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to receive the
benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The six-month
period in Executive Order No. 877 was only for the purpose of
implementing reorganization, but not for the purpose of amending
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
12.   In praying for the dismissal of the petition, the COA asserts that
when the Court renders a decision that merely interprets a particular
provision of law - one that neither establishes a new doctrine nor
supplants an old doctrine - the interpretation takes effect and
becomes part of the law as of the date when the law was originally
passed. The COA points out that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
did not overrule an old doctrine nor adopt a new one. The Decision
simply interpreted Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 and
clarified that the provision was effective in a temporary and limited
application when it was correlated with other laws.
ISSUES:
1.   WoN the the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied
prospectively from the time it became final on September 27, 2010.-
NO. the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither reversed an old
doctrine nor adopted a new one. the Court's interpretation of the
aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
retroacts to the date when Executive Order No. 756 was enacted.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.
RATIO:
2.   The Ruling of the Court
3.   At the outset, it did not escape our notice that PITC did not first
move for a reconsideration of the assailed COA decision before
filing the instant petition. Moreover, this is not the first time that
PITC made such an omission. In another petition for certiorari filed
by PITC against COA, which was docketed as G.R. No. 152688, the
Court noted that PITC took a similar procedural shortcut. However,
said technical issue was resolved as follows:
4.   We first address the failure of the PITC to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision. As a general rule, a petition
 for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the
inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a
chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2)
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a
fourth exception, it was also held that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is
not a condition sine qua non, when the questions raised are the
same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.
5.   In the case at bar, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed
with not only because the issue presented is purely of law, but also
because the question raised has already been extensively discussed in
the decisions of the Director, Corporate Audit Office II and the
COA.12 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
6.   In the present case, the same situation is availing in that the issue
presented in this case is purely of law, i.e., whether the Decision in
G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively upon its finality,
and the same had already been squarely addressed by the COA in its
assailed ruling.
7.   Article 8 of the Civil Code declares that "[j]udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines." While decisions of the Court
are not laws pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they
evidence the laws' meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have
the same binding force as the laws themselves.
8.   Article 4 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, enunciates the rule on
non-retroactivity of laws, in that ''(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided."
9.   In respectively arguing for and against the prospective application of
the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, both PITC and the COA invoke Co
v. Court of Appeals that cited, among others, the following ruling
in People v. Jabinal :
10.   Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system. The interpretation upon a law
by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date
that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate.
11.   PITC argues, however, that the COA erred in relying on the second
sentence in the above excerption from Jabinal,which PITC dismissed
as a "simple statement" that was "just an obiter dictum or an
incidental remark that this Honorable Court made in passing."
12.   PITC's misinformed argument deserves scant consideration.
13.   The Court declared in Senarillos:
14.   It is elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court
upon Republic Act [No.] 557 constitutes part of the law as of the
date it was originally passed, since this Court's construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the interpreted law carried into effect.
15.   Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as
an independent source of law; it cannot create law. While it is true
that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or
the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are
not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless
evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are
part of the legal system of the Philippines. Judicial decisions of the
Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself.
16.   Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code
and in light of the above disquisition, this Court emphatically
declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that the principle of
prospectivity applies not only to original amendatory statutes and
administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to
judicial decisions.
17.   It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part
of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only
to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal
thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and
acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law
of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of
what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
18.   Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present case, the Court
disagrees with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
should be applied prospectively.1âwphi1
19.   As the COA correctly argued, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
neither reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. The
Court merely construed therein the meaning and application of
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 by taking into consideration
the rationale behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing
retirement laws, and the subsequent enactments and statutes that
eventually repealed the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R. No.
183517, there was no other ruling from this Court that explained the
nature of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 756. Thus, the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid
provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts
to the date when Executive Order No. 756 was enacted.
 028 Vi Ve Chemical v. Commissioner of Customs (CELAJE)
G.R. No. L-28693 | September 30, 1974 | Fernando, J. | Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: VI VE CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, INC.,
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE
COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF MANILA, PEDRO PACIS
SUMMARY: On March 22, 1966, the petitioner Vi Ve imported from
Taiwan 250 drums of glutamic acid, an article used in the manufacture
of a food seasoning known as "vetsin", on which it was required to pay
the sum of P27,274.00 as customs duty. Contending that it is liable only
for the amount of P3,519.00, and not P27,274.00, it filed the necessary
protest and requested the refund of the difference in the sum of
P23,656.00. Petitioner Vi Ve claims that the price should be based on
the value of glutamic acid in 1966. But the Tariff Commission denied
such a claim, saying that the relevant EO was only passed in 1965 and
thus the 1966 price cannot be used. However, the Tariff Commission
based its computation on the value of said article in 1963, because it said
that Petitioner Vi Ve failed to prove the price of glutamic acid in 1964
and 1965.
But petitioner Vi Ve then presented the price of another chemical
compound, propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 and claimed that because
glutamic acid and propionic glycine are the same, the court should have
taken judicial notice of the similarity of the two and thus the CTA should
have attributed the price of propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 as being
the same price of glutamic acid in the same years. Issue: W/N the CA
should have taken judicial notice of the fact that propionic glycine and
glutamic acid are the same. No.
The courts cannot take judicial notice of the similarity in the chemical
components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid because the chemical
components of these article [propionic glycine and glutamic acid] are
technical in nature and only persons possessed of the required
knowledge know their similarity or difference. Neither did appellant
show that the chemistry book show the chemical components of
propionic glycine and glutamic acid are the same. This being so, it
cannot be said that these objects are of public knowledge or of
unquestionable demonstration to be the proper subject of judicial notice
by the Court
DOCTRINE: The courts cannot take judicial notice of something that is
technical in nature and that only experts in the particular field know.
FACTS:
1.   On March 22, 1966, the petitioner Vi Ve imported from Taiwan 250
drums of glutamic acid, an article used in the manufacture of a food
seasoning known as "vetsin", on which it was required to pay, as it
did pay, the sum of P27,274.00 as customs duty.
2.   Contending that it is liable only for the amount of P3,519.00, and not
P27,274.00, it filed the necessary protest and requested the refund of
the difference in the sum of P23,656.00."5
3.   The sum of P27,274.00 as customs duty on 250 drums (11,340 kilos)
of glutamic acid was levied and collected pursuant to Section 104,
par. 29.23, of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 225, dated December 13, 1965, which imposes
an alternate customs, duty, i.e., a specific duty of P2.40 per kilo of
glutamic acid or an ad valorem duty of 40%, whichever is higher.
4.   The specific duty at the rate of P2.40 per kilo was applied to
petitioner Vi Ve's importation as the same is higher than the ad
valorem duty of 40%. 40% of P35,190.00 is P14,076.00. Prior to the
amendment of Par. 29.23 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs
Code by Executive Order No. 225, the customs duty on glutamic
acid was 10% ad valorem, which, if applied to petitioner's
importation of glutamic acid valued at P35,190.00, it would be liable
to pay only the sum of P3,519.00."6
5.   Petitioner Vi Ve contends that Executive Order No. 225 is invalid for
failure to comply with Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
authorizing the President to increase or decrease tariff rates under the
conditions specified therein, hence, it filed the corresponding protest
with the Collector of Customs of Manila.
6.   The Collector denied the protest solely on the ground that he has no
power to nullify an executive order issued by the President. On
appeal to respondent Commissioner of Customs, the Collector's
decision was sustained also on the same ground."
7.   The grounds relied upon by petitioner in assailing the legality of
Executive Order No. 225 may be summarized as follows: (1) There
was no prior investigation by the Tariff Commission and
recommendation by the National Economic Council in regard to the
increase of the customs duty on imported glutamic acid; (2) it has not
 been shown that the increase in the customs duty on said article is
necessary in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national defense; and (3) the duty on said article was increased in
said Executive Order by more than five times the former rate of duty
... ." These were all rebutted.
8.   Petitioner Vi Ve claims that the price should be based on the value of
the article in 1966. The CTA stated that the value of glutamic acid
imported by petitioner Vi Ve in 1966 could not have been considered
in the computation of the maximum increase in said duty because
Executive Order No. 225 was promulgated only on December 13,
1965. Thus the value of glutamic acid in 1966 cannot be used in the
computation.
9.   However, CTA based the price of the article in 1963, stating that
petitioner Vi Ve also failed to produce evidence of the value of
glutamic acid in 1964 and 1965. In fact, according to the Tariff
Commission, there is no record of any importation of said article
during those years.
10.   But petitioner Vi Ve then presented the price of another chemical
compound, propionic glycine, in 1964 and 1965 and claimed that
because glutamic acid and propionic glycine are the same, the court
should have taken judicial notice of the similarity of the two, and
thus the CTA should have attributed the price of propionic glycine in
1964 and 1965 as being the same price of glutamic acid in the same
years. Petitioner Vi Ve then claims that the price of propionic
glycine in 1964/1965 should have been used as the base for the
computation of the tax, instead of the price of glutamic acid in 1963.
ISSUES:
1.   W/N the CTA should have taken judicial notice of the fact that
propionic glycine and glutamic acid are the same chemical
compounds. No. The chemical components of these article
[propionic glycine and glutamic acid] are technical in nature and
only persons possessed of the required knowledge know their
similarity or difference, and thus the chemical components of both
cannot be taken judicial notice by the court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of July
31, 1967 is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
1.   (1) The first error assigned would find fault with the Court of Tax
Appeals, for its finding that there was compliance with the statutory
grant of authority to the President under Section 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code. Thus the objection raised was that the required
investigation was not held. The Court of Tax Appeals, as shown
above, considered such ground and found it insubstantial. Then
petitioner also claimed that the statutory limit of the increase not to
exceed five times was exceeded. Again, the Court of Tax Appeals, as
made clear that it simply was not so. This Court is bound by the
finding of facts of the Court of Tax Appeals, especially so, where as
here, the evidence in support thereof is more than substantial.
2.   (2) The second alleged error of the Court of Tax Appeals was that no
judicial notice was taken of the similarity in the chemical
components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid.
3.   Petitioner Vi Ve claims that the CTA erred in concluding that
petitioner failed to produce evidence of the value of glutamic
acid in 1964 and 1965 because importations of glutamic acid
under the commercial name of "propionic glycine had been
made in the years 1964 and 1965."
4.   Simplified Version: Petitioner Vi Ve presented the price for
propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965, not for glutamic acid. But
Petitioner Vi Ve is also claiming that propionic glycine and glutamic
acid are the same, thus the CTA should treat the price of propionic
glycine in 1964 and 1965 as the same price for glutamic acid in 1964
and 1965.
5.   The Court of Tax Appeals, however, held that "the chemical
components of these article [propionic glycine and glutamic acid] are
technical in nature and only persons possessed of the required
knowledge know their similarity or difference."
6.   In other words, the CTA stated that it could NOT take judicial notice
of the price of propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 and attribute it as
the price of glutamic acid because it is not of judicial notice that the
two chemical components are actually the same
7.   Petitioner Vi Ve claimed that the similarity in the chemical
components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid should have been
taken judicial notice of by the Court of Tax Appeals because it is a
matter which is capable of immediate and accurate determination by
resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.
 Petitioner further claims that there is already a certification that
propionic glycine is just another name for glutamic acid.
8.   The above assigned error was refuted by the then Solicitor General,
now Associate Justice, Antonio B. Barredo, and the then Assistant
Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Pacifico P. de Castro, thus: "Relative to appellants assertion that the
decision is erroneous as the Court of Tax Appeals did not take
judicial notice of the fact that "propionic glycine" is the same as
glutamic acid, we maintain that the lower court was correct in stating
that the chemical components of these articles are technical in nature
and only persons possessed of the required knowledge know their
similarity or difference. Neither did appellant show that the
chemistry book show the chemical components of propionic
glycine and glutamic acid are the same. This being so, it cannot be
said that these objects are of public knowledge or of unquestionable
demonstration to be the proper subject of judicial notice by the
Court."
9.   Affirmed.
 029 FLUEMER, vs. HIX (CRUZ)
March 17, 1930 | Malcolm, J. | Rule 38
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix deceased.
PETITIONERS: A.W. Fluemer
RESPONDENT: Annie Coushing Hix
SUMMARY: Fluemer, the special administratix of the estate of Hix. It is
theory of Fluemer that the will of Hix was executed in Elkins, West Virginia,
on November 3, 1925, who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the
laws of West Verginia Code and as certified to by the Director of the
National Library shall govern. The CFI denied probate of the will of Sec 300
and 301 of the Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence this appeal.
The issue in this case is WoN it is necessary to prove in the jurisdiction of
the Philippines, the existence of the law of West Virginia as alleged by
Fluemer as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of the will of Hix.
The Court ruled in the affirmative. it is necessary to prove in the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, the existence of the law of West Virginia
as alleged by Fluemer as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording
of the will of Hix . The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of various states of the American Union.
Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was printed
or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under
the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.
DOCTRINE: The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in
our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
judicial notice of various states of the American Union. Such laws must be
proved as facts
Facts:
1.   The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix
(Hix), A.W. Fluemer (Fluemer) appeals from a decision of Judge of
First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to
by the last will and testament of the deceased.
2.   It is theory of Fluemer that the will of Hix was executed in Elkins,
West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, who had his residence in that
jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code and as certified
to by the Director of the National Library shall govern.
3.   The CFI denied probate of the will of Sec 300 and 301 of the Civil
Procedure were not complied with.
4.   Hence this appeal.
5.   While the appeal is pending submission in the SC, the attorney for
the Fluemer presented an unverified petition asking the court to
accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition.
a.   One of these documents discloses that a paper writing
purporting to have been presented for probate on June 8,
1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West
Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of
Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing
witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded and filed.
b.   It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June
8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West
Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as
administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of
Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
c.   In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for
the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on
February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia
appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929.
Issue:
1.   WoN it is necessary to prove in the jurisdiction of the Philippines,
the existence of the law of West Virginia as alleged by Fluemer as a
prerequisite to the allowance and recording of the will of Hix – YES,
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. It must be proved with facts.
2.   WoN Fluemer is authorized to carry the appeal – No but he is a party
in interest
Ruling: For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Ratio:
Fluemer is not authorized to carry on this appeal.
1.   However, Fluemer, who appears to have been the moving party in
these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or
 disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be 2.   Moreover, there is no showing that the deceased left any property at
permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he
the will left any in West Virginia.

it is necessary to prove in the jurisdiction of the Philippines, the

existence of the law of West Virginia as alleged by Fluemer as a
prerequisite to the allowance and recording of the will of Hix
1.   The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
judicial notice of various states of the American Union. Such laws
must be proved as facts.
2.   Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no
showing that the book from which an extract was printed or
published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3.   Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
4.   No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

The due execution of the will and the domicile of the testator was not
established
1.   The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the
Fluemer. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will
was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent
witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to
require.
2.   On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of Fluemer to prove
execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)

These facts under (facts #5) show the intention to make the Philippines the
principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration.
1.   However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with
Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a
will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been
requested.
 030 PCIB v. ESCOLIN (SIAPNO)
March 29, 1974 | Barredo, J. | Foreign Laws
PETITIONER: Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
RESPONDENTS: Honorable Venicio Escolin, Presiding Judge of the
CFI of Iloilo and Avelina Magno
SUMMARY (The original case is around 100 pages so please bear with
me J): Charles & Linnie Hodges, both Texan nationals, were domiciled
in Iloilo City for around 50 years. In Linnie’s will she provided that she
bequeaths remainder of estate to spouse. Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr.
Hodges appointed as EXECUTOR. In Financial Statements submitted
before the court, he made statements that the estate of Mrs. Hodges is
1/2 of conjugal estate. He allegedly renounced his inheritance in a tax
declaration in US. For 5 years before his death, he failed to make
accounting. It was incumbent upon Charles’ to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order for the “rest, residue, and remainder” to be
determined and distributed upon his death to Linnie’s surviving siblings,
pursuant to her will. Charles died. Initially, Magno, was the
administratrix of both spouse's estate. Later, PCIB became the
administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate,
including those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s
death. During probate proceedings, the administrators differed on
whether Philippine or Texan law should govern. Particularly, they
differed as to how much of the conjugal estate should go to the siblings
of Linnie.
PCIB: claims that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the Philippines
at the time of her death, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, construed in
relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what
should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil
Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than 1/4 of the
said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the
legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could not have disposed of
nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872).
Avelina: denied that Linnie died a resident of the Philippines, since
allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original
residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that,
anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being
indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code,
the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which,
according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, Linnie’s
brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her
share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half
thereof. ISSUE: WON Texan or Philippine law will govern the
legitime of Charles – No answer yet, remanded. The Court cannot
decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the
parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent
comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and reliable proof of what in
fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented It should be
borne in mind that the question of what are the laws of Texas
governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of
fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be
taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in
dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception
in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge
of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they
have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
But wharever happens, PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linney is not
entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal property, they having argued that it is
so which amounts to judicial admission.
DOCTRINE:
GR – Foreign Law, as a matter of fact, must be alleged and proven.
EXC - Where the foreign law is within the actual knowledge of the
court, such as when the law is generally well-known, had been ruled
upon in previous cases before it, and none of the parties claim otherwise,
the court may take judicial notice of the foreign law.
FACTS:
1.   Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally
from Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had acquired and
accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines
and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and
were domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years.
2.   In the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein
petitioner Charles Newton Hodges was directed to have the right to
manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two,
the following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during his
natural lifetime."
3.   Charles Hodges was engaged in the business of buying and selling
personal and real properties, and do such acts which petitioner may
think best.
4.   An Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Allow or Authorize Petitioner to
Continue the Business in which he was Engaged and to Perform Acts
which he had been doing while Deceased was Living was filed
praying that petitioner Charles Hodges be allowed or authorized to
continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts
which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was
living. The Hon. Court approved the motion.
5.   Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his
wife's will, to duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which
constituted her estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death,
"the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and
correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and
sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done.
6.   However, Charles died in without having liquidated Linnie’s estate,
which includes her share in the conjugal partnership.
7.   A longtime employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed
Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for
Charles’). Magno was appointed, but later Harold Davies
(representative of Charles’ heirs in the US) was designated Co-
Special Administrator, who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges,
Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-
administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration
were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
8.   SC was confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced that the
parties representing both estates were involved in a modus operandi
to settle money matters (a settlement with records the Court never
saw)—which, however, went wary, with more and more heirs from
the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers filing their
respective claims for retainer fees.
9.   Later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a
claim to all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed
to him upon Linnie Jane’s death.
10.   Magno opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the HIGDONS)
would be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her capacity as
administrator (entering into sales and other such conveyances).
11.   For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’
estate, to which she responded by locking up the premises being used
by PCIB as offices, which were among the estate’s properties.
PCIB’s Claims
12.   Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with
respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights,
and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions:
a.   Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will
b.   Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found, shall prevail”. However, the Conflict of
Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie
Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law)
should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables, and the law of the situs of the property
(also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) as
regards immovables.
c.   Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in
the Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should apply.
d.   Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate
of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between
them. Thus, upon Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of the assets of
the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained
automatically to Charles, not by way of inheritance, but in his
own right as partner in the conjugal partnership.
e.   The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnie’s estate,
cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be
enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments
accruing after her death. “All rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire."
f.   Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent
of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal
partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and
legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said
conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
g.   In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnie’s estate, Charles
appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all
the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection
 with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just
as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie
Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962,
therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and
control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
h.   As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the
estate. Neither was there any asset left to Linnie’s estate at the time
of Charles’ death, though Linnie’s estate may have referred to “all
of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate” which would go to
her siblings in the event of Charles death. The provision is thus
void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets.
Avelina’s Claims
(At one point, even Linnie’s heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her
capacity as administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant of
the motion, on account of a previous injunction it issued.)
a.   Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all
her estate, and gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over
the same estate, to her relatives.
b.   After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the
will, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations
and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated
his life-estate and usufruct.
c.   Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of
Linnie and Charles in the combined conjugal estate, as there has
been no such separation or segregation, and because of Charles’
repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the same
amount of rents, emoluments and income.
Summary:
PCIB Magno
The estate left by Mrs. Hodges < 1/2 of her Texas law applicable,
share in the conjugal estate (Apply Philippine wherein no system of
law), notwithstanding Art 16 of our Civil code legitime provided so estate
which mandates the application of Texas law, of Mrs. Hodges could not
Mr.Hodges being a citizen of Texas be less than her share or
>1/2
ISSUE/s: WON Philippine law governs the legitime of Charles –
Remanded
RULING:
RATIO:
1.   In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present
such further evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing
of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a
quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all
concerned that it should do so in the first instance.
2.   Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot
be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership
properties, it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations,
the point was raised as to whether or not said holding might be
inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no
reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A.
“with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights” that may be willed by a testator which, under
Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in
view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs.
Hodges, these cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that
the parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature for
Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the
testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of
inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are
entitled.
3.   It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of
what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is,
in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the
rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and
have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the
parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances
when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the
court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have
been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
4.   The case Aznar vs. Garcia could not have been a reference to certain
provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas because of the
disparity in the material dates of that case and the present ones would
not permit the Court to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said
provisions have not been amended or changed in the meantime.
(Aznar can't be used to show what Texas law may contain, as
there's a time difference between this case and that case, thus the
Texas law might have changed in between the rulings)
5.   In other words, since PCIB concedes that upon application of Article
16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of
the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and
Magno is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB
may not now or later pretend differently.
6.   Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain
that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other
heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And
since PCIB’s representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually
constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court
are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is “not permitted to
contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or
inconsistent with them.”
7.   It is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of these
proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of
Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-
fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and
effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the
position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the
laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such
contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it
would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to
claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be
proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws
of Texas;
 031 Sy Joc Lieng v. Petronila Encarnacion (DAYU)
March 19, 1910 | Torres, J. | Foreign Laws
PETITIONER: Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Jui Niu and Sy Chua Niu
RESPONDENTS: Petronila Encarnacion, Gregorio Sy Quia, Pedro Sy Quia,
Juan Sy Quia, and Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia
SUMMARY:
There is a man named Vicente Romero Sy Quia [Sy Quia], he died. Upon his
death, the defendants (Fam 2) took over the properties he left behind. This
caused the plaintiffs (Fam 1) to file a case against them. Plaintiffs allege that
they are the only legal heirs of Sy Quia, defendants claim this too. Fam 1 says
that Sy Quia, born and raised in China, eventually moved and lived in the
Philippines (Vigan), but then went back to Amoy, China and married their mom,
Yap Puan Niu, and stayed there for about 4 years before going back to the Phil—
this was when they were conceived. Upon returning to the Phil, no valid
marriage took place because Sy Quia was already married to their China mama.
Fam 2 denies everything and says that Sy Quia did not leave the Philippines 5
years prior to the marriage with Encarnacion (their mama). Also, Fam 1 wants
the properties of Sy Quia to be distributed to them according to laws of China
since Sy Quia is a China Man.
The issue is w/n Chinese law will apply. The SC said NO
Fam 1 mentions that since Sy Quia is a China man, then the partition of his
estate should follow Chinese Laws, not Philippine Laws. To this, the SC
counters by saying that Sy Quia has actually chosen to be governed by
Philippine law and is a Filipino Citizen. (1) He stayed in the Philippines for more
than 53 years, having obtained for the purpose the necessary license or
permission and having been converted to the Catholic religion; (2) he married a
native woman in the city of Vian and established his domicile in Ilocos first then
Manila, with the intention of residing here permanently; (3) engaging in business
generally and acquiring real estate—it is unquestionable then that he has
acquired a residence and became domiciled in the Phil. with the same rights as
any nationalized citizen. With this, the partitioning of his estate should follow
Philippine laws.
But most importantly, though the Philippines accepts the application of foreign
laws, these must be duly proven. The plaintiffs, Fam 1, were not able to properly
and adequately present the Chinese laws they claim to rule the partition of estate.
They simply showed a pamphlet/book of laws that are written in Chinese, with
no Spanish/English translation; hence, it could not be understood by the court.
Moreover, even the witness of plaintiff (Ly Ung Bing, the interpreter of the
American consulate, as to the written and unwritten laws of China), does not
show, as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, that he knew such laws or that
he was acquainted with the nature of the laws alleged to be contained in the said
books. He merely confined himself to expressing his own opinion with reference
to the two classes of laws. He, not being an expert on the subject throughly
conversant with the laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in
which laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in which he
testified, can not even be accepted as a partial evidence that the said four books
really contain the written and unwritten laws of China. Hence, there is no
evidence that these four books or pamphlets were printed by authority of the
Chinese Government or that they have been duly authenticated by the certificate
of competent authorities or that they are properly sealed with the seal of the
nation to which they belong. For this reason the said books or pamphlets can not,
under any circumstances, be considered as documentary proof of the laws of
China. Aside from the fact that it does not specifically appear from the record
what are the Chinese laws applicable to the issues of this case, there is no proof
of the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by the plaintiffs, nor is there
anything to show what the books or pamphlets introduced by them in evidence
contain any specific laws of the Celestial Empire.
DOCTRINE:
When in a litigation the application of a foreign law, for example the law of
China, is sought, it is necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands, in a
satisfactory manner, the existence of such a law as a question of fact; and when
proof of such a law is lacking, it is improper to apply unknown laws to suits
pending before the courts of the Islands.
Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our tribunals, its existence must be
satisfactory established as any other fact.
FACTS:
27.   Dec. 4, 1905—Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Joc Chay, Sy Jui and Sy Chua Niu
[Basically, Plaintiffs = Fam 1 from China Marriage] filed an amended
complaint against the said defendant [Basically, Encarnacion and children =
Defendants = Fam 2 from Philippine Marriage], alleging: That in or about
the year 1823, one Sy Quia, subsequently known in these Islands as Vicente
Romero Sy Quia [Sy Quia], was born in China, and in or about the year
1847 was married in the city of Amoy (in China) to Yap Puan Niu, of which
marriage they were born being the only legitimate heirs of Sy Quia;
28.   that in the year 1894 Sy Quia died intestate in this city of Manila, leaving
his surviving grandchildren, the plaintiffs, as his only legitimate heirs. à In
short, Sy Quia has Fam 1 in China, and now he is dead and his only
legitimate heirs are the China Fam (according to plaintiffs).
29.   Sy Quia acquired a large amount of property, consisting of personal and real
property in the Philippine Islands, mostly located in the city of Manila,
amounting to P 1,000,000 Philippine currency. With this, the plaintiffs
allege that defendants illegally took possession of all the said personal and
 real property left by Sy Quia and since then have managed and administered
the same, alleging to be owners thereof.
30.   Plaintiffs (Fam 1) allege that they are the only descendants and legitimate
heirs Sy Quia. They being entitled to the possession of all the property of
his estate, as well as of the real and personal property converted and
appropriated by the defendants.
31.   Plaintiffs prayed that defendants be directed to render under oath a complete
and detailed account of all the property left by Sy Quia, along with the
conversions and the rents and profits of the properties, and that upon the
giving of the necessary bond, a receiver be appointed to administer the
original property, as well as the property converted, during the pendency of
the present litigation.
32.   Plaintiffs further prayed that it adjudged and decreed that they are the only
descendants and heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia from and since
the time of his death, and that they are the only legitimate owners of the real
and personal property left by him, and of the whole of said property
converted by the defendants
33.   The defendants (Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro Sy Quia, and Juan Sy Quia;
AKA: Fam 2), as a special defense, the allege that prior to 1852, Vicente
was an infidel known only by the name of Sy Quia, he having resided in the
Philippine Islands for many years prior thereto. Also, that on June 8, 1852,
the said infidel Chinaman was converted to the Christian religion, and was
baptized in the parish church of San Vicente, Ilocos Sur, under the name of
Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, as shown by his certificate of baptism;
that on June 9, 1853, the Christian Chinaman contracted canonical marriage
in accordance with the laws then in force in these Islands, with the
defendant Petronila Encarnacion, a native of Vigan, Ilocos Sur; that the said
Vicente Sy Quia and his wife, Petronila Encarnacion, fixed their residence
and conjugal domicile in these Islands until the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership by the death of the husband on January 9, 1894; that at the time
of their marriage Vicente had no property, and brought no property into the
marriage, but that the wife brought to the marriage a small capital which
was the foundation of the subsequent fortune acquired by the spouses by
their labor and industry, and by the labor and industry of the children—
Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan—all of whom have always
been in continuous possession of the status of legitimate children. à In
short, Fam 2 says: Sy Quia married Encarnacion and was actually residing
in the Phil. for years prior to marriage. Also, he didn’t even contribute
anything to the marriage, the small capital was from Encarnacion (5000
pesos actually, this and hard work became the foundation of the fortune), so
kami yung legit kids.
34.   Defendants further state that on January 9, 1894, Sy Quia died intestate in
the city of Manila, and after the necessary legal proceedings under the
legislation then in force, his surviving children were declared by a decree of
the Court of First Instance of the district of Quiapo, to be the heirs abinstate
of the said deceased.
35.   January 31, 1906—Plaintiffs presented by way of reply to the answers of
the defendants an amendment to the original complaint, denying generally
and specifically all and each of the material allegations set out in the
answers of the defendants.
36.   Allege that pretended marriage between Vicente Romero Sy Quia and
Petronila Encarnacion was not a lawful marriage and the certificate of
marriage presented by the defendants not being a true and correct certificate
of marriage, for the reason that on June 9, 1853, Vicente Romero Sy Quia
was and thereafter continued to be the lawful husband of one Yap Puan Niu,
until the year 1891, when she died, and that the marriage of Sy Quia with
the said Yap Puan Niu, since 1847 and until her death in 1891, was
continuously in full force and effect,
37.   June 19, 1906—counsel for Petronila Encarnacion notified the court of the
death of Petronila Encarnacion.
38.   August 20, 1906—it was stipulated between counsel for both parties that by
order of the court the deposition of several witnesses then designated by the
plaintiffs be taken at Amoy, China, before the consul, vice-consul, or a
consular agent of the United States in the said city, during the days and in
the manner agreed upon.
39.   January 4, 1907—defendants presented a motion to the CFI, asking that the
depositions taken before the consul of the United States at Amoy, China, as
given by the witnesses for the plaintiffs, named Li Ung Bing, Sy Peng, Lim
Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chia, Sy Kay Tit, Yap Chong, Sy Boan, Sy Kong
Len, and Sy Hong Oan, whose testimony the plaintiffs attempted to
introduced in this action, be not admitted, defendants’ motion being based
on the ground that the said depositions contained a formal defects
concerning the manner in which the oath was administered to the
witnesses.
40.   Feb. 26, 1908—CFI rendered a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs and
the defendants as the administrator of the property, were the heirs of the
property of the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, now deceased, consisting
of one-half of the property distributed by the order of the Court of First
Instance of the district of Quiapo of the 3rd of August, 1900, in the
following form: To Sy Joc Lieng, one-ninth; Sy Yoc Chay, one-ninth; Sy
Chua Niu, one-ninth; C. W. O’Brien, as the guardian of Sian Han, one-
ninth; Pedro Sy Quia, one-ninth; Juan Sy Quia, one-ninth; Gregorio Sy
Quia, one-ninth; Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, one-ninth; and the heirs of
Petronila Encarnacion, represented by Pedro Sy Quia as the administrator of
the latter’s estate, one-ninth; the heirs of the said Petronila Encarnacion,
represented by the administrator of her estate, being the owners with the
right to possession of the other half of the property left by Vicente Romero
Sy Quia at the time of his death. (So lahat sila.) and that the defendants,
render a statement of the property which was distributed among them.
41.   To this decision of the trial court, the defendants duly excepted and asked
that the said judgment be set aside and a new trial granted on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision in favor of the
 plaintiffs, and because the decision of the trial court was contrary to law, the
findings of fact being plainly and manifestly against the weight of the
evidence.
42.   The plaintiffs, upon being notified of the said judgment of the court,
excepted thereto, and requested in writing that the court modify its decision.
43.   This action has for its purpose primarily to recover from the present
possessors the property left at the time of his death in this city by the
Christian Chinaman, Vicente Romero Sy Quia, the plaintiffs alleging that
three of them are the grandchildren and one of the great-grandson of the
deceased Sy Quia by his lawful marriage in his own country with their
deceased grandmother, Yap Puan Niu. So that the marriage of the said Sy
Quia with this woman in China is practically the fundamental basis of the
action brought by the plaintiffs for the recovery of the inheritance against
the defendants, who appear to be the children of the deceased Sy Quia by
his marriage in these Islands with the native, Petronila Encarnacion.
ISSUE/s:
5.   WoN the record show that the Chinaman Sy Quia removed from Vigan,
Philippine Islands, to his native town or village of Am Thau, Amoy, China,
in 1847, and then married in accordance with the rites and ceremonies of his
native country, Yap Puan Niu—NO, the testimonies of the witnesses are in
direct conflict, and no the laws, rites, and ceremonies of Chinese law were
not properly proven/substantiated.
RULING: For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that the judgment of the trial court, appealed from by both parties, should be
reversed, and that we should, and do hereby, absolve the defendants of the complaint
upon which this action was instituted, without any special order as to the costs of
both instances. The bond given by the receiver, Gregorio Sy Quia, is hereby
discharged and the petition heretofore made for the appointment of a new receiver is
hereby denied. It is so ordered.
RATIO:
18.   Plaintiffs having failed to present at the trial the matrimonial letters which
should have been exchanged between the contracting parties at the time the
said marriage was performed, according to the ancient laws and customs of
the Celestial Kingdom, and there being no allegation in the complaint as to
the day and month of the common calendar year, or of the Chinese calendar
year, when the said marriage took place, there is no ground on which to
base the conclusion that such an important act in the life of Sy Quia has
been duly established by authentic documents, nor is his alleged voyage to
China from the port of Manila for the purpose of contracting such marriage,
satisfactorily proven thereby, for the plaintiffs have likewise failed to
introduce in evidence the passport, required by the legislation then in force,
which should and would have been then issued to Vicente in order to enable
him to leave this country and return to his own.
19.   These matrimonial letters, once they have been mutually exchanged by the
contracting parties, constitute the essential requisite required by the laws of
that country in order that a Chinese marriage may be considered duly
solemnized, and at the same time are the best proofs of its having actually
taken place.
20.   The sworn statement by Vicente Romero Sy Quia before the civil and
ecclesiastical authorities of the city of Vigan in the proceedings which were
instituted in 1853 in connection with his marriage in the parish church of
that city, the continue possession for a period of many years of the status of
a single man enjoyed by him and recognized and accepted by the whole
community of the capital of the Province of Ilocos Sur, the belief on the part
of his townsmen and neighbors that he was in fact a single man, all these
facts corroborated, as they are, by the uniform testimony of the witnesses
for the defendants, and unexplained silence on the part of his alleged wife,
Yap Puan Niu, who might have asserted whatever rights she may have had
as the legitimate wife of Sy Quia before the tribunals of this country, if she
really had any, completely overcome and destroy the improvised parol
evidence as to be pretended marriage of Sy Quia in China.
21.   Counsel for plaintiffs now ask this court to modify the judgment appealed
from and to declare that the said plaintiffs are the only legitimate heirs of Sy
Quia and consequently entitled to his entire estate, together with all rents
and profits, for which judgment should be entered in their favor with costs.
In support of their contention they have assigned various errors as
committed by the trial court, among them that the court erred in finding as a
conclusion of law that the said Sy Quia was a subject of the Chinese Empire
and that his estate should be distributed in accordance with the laws of
China.
22.   It is an admitted fact that Sy Quia was a native Chinaman and therefore a
foreigner; that he came to this country in 1839 or 1840, when he was 12
years of age. He having resided in these Islands since then and until
January, 1894, when he died, that is to say, for a period of more than 53
years, having obtained for this purpose the necessary license or permission,
and having been converted to the Catholic religion, marrying a native
woman in the city of Vigan and establishing his domicile first in the
Province of Ilocos and later in this city of Manila, with the intention of
residing here permanently, engaging in business generally and acquiring
real estate, it is unquestionable that by virtue of all these acts he acquired a
residence and became definitely domiciled in these Islands with the same
rights as any nationalized citizen in accordance with the laws in force in
these Islands while he lived here and until his death.
23.   In order to determine what rights Sy Quia had actually since he removed to
the Philippines in 1839 or 1840, it will be necessary to resort to the laws in
force at that time;
24.   The legislation then in force on the subject of naturalization and residence
of foreigners in the Philippine Islands will be found in the following laws
(Novisima Recopilacion).
25.   Of the Chinaman Vicente Romero Sy Quia on account of his continuous
residence in these Islands for a period of more than fifty years, and by virtue
of the fact that he had permanently established himself in this country,
living in a house of his own, with his wife and children, and having
acquired real estate therein, did become a domiciled denizen under the laws
then in force.
26.   The plaintiffs in this case have invoked certain provisions of the Chinese
laws as one of the grounds of the action by them instituted and now contend
that the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased, should be distributed
in accordance with the laws of that country.
27.   Even disregarding the fact that the plaintiffs should have, but have not,
alleged in their complaint, as one of the facts constituting their cause of
action, the existence of a law passed and promulgated in China, the
existence of which law, being foreign, should have been alleged in the
complaint, the fact remains that there is absolutely no evidence in the
record as to the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by plaintiffs in
their subsequent pleadings, the evidence of this character introduced by
them consisting of books or pamphlets written in Chinese characters and
marked "Exhibits AH, AI, AJ, and AK,’ which they claim contain a
compilation of the laws of China, being useless and of no value.
28.   It may be that contain, as plaintiff claim, the laws of China, but we have no
Spanish translation of them, they being in the Chinese language, and written
with characters which are absolutely unknown to this court and to the
defendants. Further, the plaintiffs have not prescribed by section 292 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and, finally, there is no evidence that these four
books or pamphlets were printed by authority of the Chinese Government or
that they have been duly authenticated by the certificate of competent
authorities or that they are properly sealed with the seal of the nation to
which they belong. For this reason the said books or pamphlets can not,
under any circumstances, be considered as documentary proof of the laws
of China.
29.   Section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
"Books printed or published under the authority of the United States, or of
one of the States of the United States, or a foreign country, and purporting
to contain statutes, codes, or other written law of such State or country, or
proved to be commonly admitted in the tribunals of such State or country as
evidence of the written law thereof, are admissible in the Philippine Islands
as evidence of such law."
30.   Section 301 of the same code provides:
"A copy of the written law, or other public writing of any State or country,
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under
the seal of the State or country, is admissible as evidence of such law or
writing."
31.   Section 302 provides as follows:
"The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence
of the unwritten law of the United States or of any State of the United
States, or foreign country, as are also printed and published books of reports
of decisions of the courts of the United States or of such State or country, or
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts."
32.   The jurisprudence of American and Spanish tribunals is uniform on this
subject. For the purposes of this decision, however, it will be sufficient to
refer to the judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 26th of May,
1887, where in it is said: "Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our
tribunals, its existence must be satisfactory established as any other
fact.”
33.   If the pamphlets or books, written in Chinese characters, do not satisfactory
establish the existence of certain Chinese laws invoked by the plaintiffs, not
only because such pamphlets or books lack the aforesaid formalities and
requisites, but further because there is no evidence as to the nature of the
laws contained in those books or pamphlets and the subjects with which
they deal; on the other hand, the two witnesses whose testimony was
introduced for the purpose of establishing the authenticity of the laws
which, according to the plaintiffs, are contained in the said books, were
unable to say positively at least that the book marked Exhibit AH contains
an exact copy of the original. And the Chinese consul of this city, Sy Int
Chu, after stating that he had never made a regular study of the laws of his
country, simply consulting the same in connection with his official reports,
admitted that he had never read or seen the original copy of this alleged
compilation, the books not being duly certified, adding that he could not say
whether the book marked. "Exhibit AH" was an exact copy of the original.
34.   The testimony of the witness Ly Ung Bing, the interpreter, as to the written
and unwritten laws of China, does not show, as required by the Code of
Civil Procedure, that he knew such laws or that he was acquainted with the
nature of the laws alleged to be contained in the said books. He merely
confined himself to expressing his own opinion with reference to the two
classes of laws. He, not being an expert on the subject throughly conversant
with the laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in which
laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in which he testified,
can not even be accepted as a partial evidence that the said four books really
contain the written and unwritten laws of China.
35.   Aside from the fact that it does not specifically appear from the record what
are the Chinese laws applicable to the issues of this case, there is no proof
of the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by the plaintiffs, nor is there
anything to show what the books or pamphlets introduced by them in
evidence contain any specific laws of the Celestial Empire.
 001 CIR vs. FISHER (Eleazar)
January 28, 1961 | Barrera, J. | Proving foreign law, Doctrine Processual
Presumption
PETITIONERS: THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE
RESPONDENTS: DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and
the COURT OF TAX APPEALS
SUMMARY: Stevenson died in California, leaving a will instituting his
wife as his sole heir to real and personal properties acquired by them
while residing in the Philippines. The administrator of the estate filed an
estate and tax return with the CIR. In the return, the administrator
claimed deductions and exemptions pursuant to the reciprocity provisions
in the NIRC in relation to the California Internal Revenue Code which
also allows for deductions. It also argues that in computing the taxable
estate of the decedent, one-half (1⁄2) of the net estate should be deducted
therefrom as the share of the surviving spouse in accordance with the law
on conjugal partnership. The CIR disallowed the claims for deduction
stating that the property regime applicable is that provided for under
English laws which states that all properties acquired during marriage
belong exclusively to the husband. With regard to the reciprocity
provision, the CIR claims that Fisher failed to prove provisions of
California Internal Revenue Code providing for exemption. The issue in
this case is WoN deductions should be allowed pursuant to reciprocity
provisions? – YES, The lawyer of Fisher was able to adequately prove
the provisions of the California Internal Revenue Code. He testified that
as an active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with
the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by
the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption
of intangible personal properties, he cited pertinent sections of the
California Code. While there is a provision in the Rules of Court on how
to prove foreign law in Philippine Court, such does not preclude
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a
foreign law. Jurisprudence has already recognize that testimony is
sufficient to prove the existence of foreign law.
DOCTRINE: Testimony Can Serve as Other Competent Evidence to
Prove Foreign Law - Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court
prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals.
However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in
accordance with said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one
that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent
evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law."
In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil
Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law.
FACTS:
1.   Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents,
married in Manila to another British subject, Beatrice. He died in
1951 in California where he and his wife moved to.
2.   In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real
and personal properties, among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines (Mines).
3.   Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his
estate filed an estate and inheritance tax return. He made a
preliminary return to secure the waiver of the CIR on the inheritance
of the Mines shares of stock.
4.   In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to
the spouses Fisher.
5.   Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming
ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one of which is the estate and
inheritance tax on the Mines’ shares of stock pursuant to a
reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from
what he initially paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed
in the CFI of Manila for the said amount.
6.   CFI ruled that (a) the ½ share of Beatrice should be deducted from
the net estate of Walter, (b) the intangible personal property
belonging to the estate of Walter is exempt from inheritance tax
pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
ISSUE/s
WoN deductions should be allowed pursuant to reciprocity provisions? –
YES, The lawyer of Fisher was able to adequately prove the provisions of the
California Internal Revenue Code. He testified that as an active member of
the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation
laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the
pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal
properties, he cited pertinent sections of the California Code. While there is a
provision in the Rules of Court on how to prove foreign law in Philippine
Court, such does not preclude presentation of other competent evidence to
prove the existence of a foreign law. Jurisprudence has already recognize that
testimony is sufficient to prove the existence of foreign law.
RULING: WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated,
the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other respects not
inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.
RATIO:
1.   CIR disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the
respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the California Revenue and
Taxation Code, on the ground that: (1) the said proviso of the
California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly proven by
the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by
residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a state in the
United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the
Philippines and the state of California in that while the former
exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible
personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of
inheritance tax..
2.   To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs,
counsel for herein respondents, testified that as an active member of
the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and
taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower
court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of
intangible personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section
13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as
published in Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-
Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation
of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the
respondents.
3.   It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
4.   Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of
proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we
believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said
rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince
one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law."
5.   In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of
San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at
the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no
error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the
pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.
6.   We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from
transfer or death taxes, between the State of California and the
Philippines.
7.   Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part,
provides:
a.   ... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected
under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a)
if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose
a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of
intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the
foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the
time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer
taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis
supplied).
8.   On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax
Law, insofar as pertinent, reads:.
a.   "SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions.
Intangible personal property is exempt from the tax imposed
by this part if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a territory or another State of the United States or
of a foreign state or country which then imposed a legacy,
succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal
property of its own residents, but either:.
i.   (a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax
of any character in respect to intangible personal
property of residents of this State, or
 ii.   (b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under people. We, therefore, find and declare that the lower court erred in
which intangible personal property of a non-resident exempting the estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes 11.   We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal
of every character if the Territory or other State of Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6,
the United States or foreign state or country in which 1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H.
the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption Miller from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector
in respect to intangible personal property of of Internal Revenue. It will be noted, however, that the issue of
residents of the Territory or State of the United reciprocity between the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that
States or foreign state or country of residence of the of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and the
decedent." (Id.) ruling therein cannot control the determination of the case at bar. Be
9.   It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must that as it may, we now declare that in view of the express provisions
be total, that is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and of both the Philippine and California laws that the exemption would
every character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy, apply only if the law of the other grants an exemption from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of succession, or death taxes of every character, there could not be
the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states collects or partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.
imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or 12.   With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount
succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work. This of P4,000.00 based on the U.S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is also
is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in both laws. being claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in
10.   In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non- the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the
resident with properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an
and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under the
laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor
hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law.
non-residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does not provide
 
for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying these laws in
the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will
have a situation where a Californian, who is non-resident in the
Philippines but has intangible personal properties here, will the
subject to the payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the
payment of the inheritance tax. This being the case, will a Filipino,
non-resident of California, but with intangible personal properties
there, be entitled to the exemption clause of the California law, since
the Californian has not been exempted from every character of
legacy, succession, or death tax because he is, under our law, under
obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we exempt
the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a
Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California because
under the Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in California he
is bound to pay the same, there being no reciprocity recognized in
respect thereto. In both instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a
disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature has intended
such an unfair situation to the detriment of our own government and
 002 MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST v. GUERRERO
(Escalona)
February 19, 2003 | Carpio, J. | Foreign Laws as Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank
RESPONDENTS: Rafael Ma. Guerrero
SUMMARY: On May 17, 1994, Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against
Hanover and/or Chemical Bank (Bank) with the RTC of Manila.
Guerrero sought payment of damages for
a.   Illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank
b.   A returned check worth $18,000 due to signature verification
problems
c.   Unauthorized conversion of his account
The Bank answered that by stipulation, Guerrero’s account is governed by New
York law, and such law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual
damages. The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (PSJ),
contending that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages only.
The “Walden Affidavit” was presented by the Bank to support its Motion for
PSJ. The RTC and CA denied the Bank’s Motion for PSJ, stating that the
Walden Affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its Motion.
The issue is WoN the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York
law and jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ.
The SC ruled that the Walden Affidavit was insufficient. The Bank cannot rely
on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue
v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open
court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws
sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden Affidavit was taken
abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The Walden
Affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only
because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York
law on damages.
 The Bank also failed to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on
how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts. The Walden
Affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence.
Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and
jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
DOCTRINE: Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proven.
 
FACTS:
1.   On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (Guerrero)
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (the Bank) with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Guerrero sought payment of
damages allegedly for
a.   Illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank;
b.   A returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
verification problems; and
c.   An unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero
amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
2.   On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging that
by stipulation Guerreros account is governed by New York law
and this law does not permit any of Guerreros claims except
actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerreros
claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees on the same
ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial
should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero
opposed the motion.
3.   The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney,
supported the Banks Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Alyssa Waldens affidavit (Walden affidavit) stated
that Guerreros New York bank account stipulated that the
governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of
Guerreros claims except actual damages. The Philippine
Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden
affidavit.
4.   The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and its motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996
and July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing
the RTC Orders. In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14,
1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Banks motion for
reconsideration.
5.   The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for
partial summary judgment.

ISSUES:
1.   WoN the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ – NO. Because
the Bank failed to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a
foreign law and decisions of foreign courts. The Walden Affidavit did not
prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank
has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence
are on the matters at issue.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The ruling of
the CA is affirmed.
RATIO:
36.  The petition is devoid of merit.
37.  The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which
reads:
a.   Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party - A party against
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
38.  A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously
a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no
important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of
damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
39.  In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are
the issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious,
as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the motion?
40.  A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue
for trial.
41.  A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that
there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal
trial. Guerreros complaint before the RTC contains a statement
of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for
damages. He is seeking damages for what he asserts as illegally
withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00
due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized
conversion of his account. In its Answer, the Bank set up its
defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual
relation bars the recovery of damages other than
actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerreros complaint
while specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out in
the Banks answer.
42.  True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues
in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties to the court. However, as correctly
ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Banks motion for partial
summary judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit does
not demonstrate that Guerreros claims are sham, fictitious or
contrived. On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the
facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are
disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a
formal trial.
43.  There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are
in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in
dispute. The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only
the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as
the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of
judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether
New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerreros claims
present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be
resolved only by a trial on the merits.
44.  Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents
of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1)
an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official
publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be
issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular
 officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
45.  Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest
Limited v. Court of Appeals which held that:
a.   Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance
with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41,
Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court)
does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to
prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme
Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of
San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at
the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law.Accordingly, in line with this
view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law
of California as proved by the respondents witness. In that
case, the counsel for respondent testified that as an active member
of the California Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue
and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the
lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards
exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited
Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and
Revenue Code as published in Derrings California Code, a
publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his
testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in
evidence by respondents. Likewise, in several naturalization cases,
it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign
country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all
the circumstances, the Court is satisfied of the authenticity of the
written proof offered. Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General of Manila was held to be competent proof of
that law. (Emphasis supplied)
46.  The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys
testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and
quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On
the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex
parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The Walden
affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on
damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it
does not state the specific New York law on damages. We
reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as follows:
a.   3. In New York, [n]ominal damages are damages in name only,
trivial sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded
both in tort and contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a
cause of action against the defendant, but is unable to prove actual
damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since
Guerrero is claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask for nominal
damages.
b.   4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I
have reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not use
the phrase temperate damages in its index. I have also done a
computerized search for the phrase in all published New York
cases, and have found no cases that use it. I have never heard the
phrase used in American law.
c.   5. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs many aspects of
a Banks relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs
Guerreros claim arising out of the non-payment of the $18,000
check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful
dishonor. However, the UCC states that justifiable refusal to pay or
accept as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a
check for reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or
illegible signature or a forgery, 3-510, Official Comment 2. .. to
the Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no
signature card on . and could not verify Guerreros signature. In my
opinion, consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and
justifiable reason not to pay.
d.   6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of
a justifiable refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that neither
consequential or special or punitive damages may be had except as
specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of law. UCC 4-103
further provides that consequential damages can be recovered only
where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than the New
York common law, which may allow consequential damages in a
breach of contract case (as does the UCC where there is a wrongful
dishonor).
e.   7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to
reputation and mental distress are considered consequential
damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312,
319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits); Motif Construction
 Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S..2d
868, 869-70 (4th Dept 1975) damage to reputation); Dobbs, Law of
Remedies 12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
f.   8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress
cannot be recovered for a breach of contract. Geler v. National
Westminster Bank U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150 A.D.2d 860,540
N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (3d Dept 1989) Martin v. Donald Park Acres,
54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dept 1976). Damage to
reputation is also not recoverable for a contract. Motif
Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-
70.
g.   9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase
stock, New York courts will not take into consideration the
performance of the stock after the breach. Rather, damages will be
based on the value of the stock at the time of the breach, Aroneck
v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dept
1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463 N.Y.S.2d
1023 (1983).
h.   10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential
damages if they were the type that would naturally arise from the
breach and if they were brought within the contemplation of parties
as the probable result of the breach at the time of or prior to
contracting. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312,
319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting Chapman v. Fargo, 223
N.Y. 32, 36 (1918).
i.   11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys
fees unless they are provided by contract or statute.E.g., Geler v.
National Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc.,
179 A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dept 1992); Stanisic v.
Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281
(1st Dept 1991). There is no statute that permits attorneys fees in a
case of this type.
j.   12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach
of contract, even where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted
with malice. Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp.
210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue Service of chester_v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 74 A.D.2d 837, 838, 425
N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dept 1980); Senior v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 110 A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d
Dept 1985).
k.   13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where
it is alleged and proven that the wrong supposedly committed by
defendant amounts to a fraud aimed at the public generally and
involves a high moral culpability. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d
401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
l.   14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law
that exemplary damages are not available for a mere breach of
contract for in such a case, as a matter of law, only a private wrong
and not a public right is involved. Thaler v. The North Insurance
Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dept 1978).
47.  The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiants
personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a
vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in
particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S.
court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or
decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of
some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit,
these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on
proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
48.  The Banks intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to
prove New York law and jurisprudence. However, because of
the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to
prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden
affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the
matters at issue.
49.  Next, the Bank makes much of Guerreros failure to submit an
opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the
pertinent provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of
Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit
mandatory, thus:
a.   SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be
served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. (Emphasis supplied)
50.  It is axiomatic that the term may as used in remedial law, is
only permissive and not mandatory.
51.  Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the
Banks motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden
affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing
affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary
judgment, although he did not present an opposing
affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing
affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden
affidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to
prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or
impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the Walden
affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York
law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an
opposing affidavit. As the party moving for summary
judgment, the Bank has the burden of clearly demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issue of fact and that any doubt as to
the existence of such issue is resolved against the movant.
52.  Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for
Guerrero to submit an opposing affidavit considering that what
the Bank seeks to be opposed is the very subject matter of the
complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the
Walden affidavit because his complaint itself controverts the
matters set forth in the Banks motion and the Walden affidavit.
A party should not be made to deny matters already averred in
his complaint.
53.  There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the
courts a quo correctly denied the Banks motion for partial
summary judgment. There is a need to determine by
presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty
of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages under the
applicable laws.
54.  This case has been delayed long enough by the Banks resort to
a motion for partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank
has successfully defeated the very purpose for which summary
judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in
avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
 003 WILDVALLEY SHIPPING v. CA (FARCON)
October 6, 2000 | Buena, J. | Doctrine of Processual Presumption
PETITIONER: Wildvalley Shipping Co.
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals and Philippine President Lines Inc.
SUMMARY: The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc., arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron
ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready
to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of
Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to
navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Philippine
Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and
egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel
owned by Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of
Puerto Ordaz on that day. Wildvalley filed a suit with the RTC of Manila
against Philippine President Lines. The trial court rendered its decision
in favor of the petitioner Wildvalley. The CA reversed the Decision of
the lower court.
ISSUE: WoN Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar – NO.
Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of
Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, testified on the existence of the
Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)
and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). However, these written
laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. Both of these documents are considered in
Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written
official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela. It is not
enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain
Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the
documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his
office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such
certificate could be found in the records of the case. A foreign law is
considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about
the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the
event or transaction in issue. A review of the Complaint revealed that it
was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the
M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of
Venezuela.
DOCTRINE: Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of
pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is
known as processual presumption.
FACTS:
1.   The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by private respondent
Philippine President Lines, Inc., arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela,
to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the
vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano
Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the
harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas
through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on
February 11, 1988, boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.
2.   The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro
Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the
vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when
the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988. Captain
Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.
3.   The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered
the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its
way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a
result of the shallowness of the channel. Between mile 158 and 157,
the vessel again experienced some vibrations. These occurred at 4:12
a.m. It was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge.
4.   The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified
that it was in the centre of the channel. He then went to confirm, or
set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered
Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check
all the double bottom tanks.
5.   At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the
Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As
a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein
petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail
out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
 6.   Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is
the RTC of Manila against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions
Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest admitted in such courts. The court has interpreted Section 25 (now
thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and Section 24) to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
expenses of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
Company was dismissed. The trial court rendered its decision in 3.   We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the
favor of the petitioner Wildvalley, ordering Philippine President Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz,
Lines “to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S. $259,243.43, as actual Venezuela, to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de
and compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53, as expenses la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and the Reglamento
incurred abroad for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of U.S. Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the
$22,000.00, as and for attorney's fees of plaintiff's local lawyer, and navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has held the
to pay the cost of this suit.” aforementioned posts for eight years. As such he is in charge of
7.   Both parties appealed: petitioner Wildvalley appealing the non- designating the pilots for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco
award of interest, with the private respondent Philippine President River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into the office
Lines questioning the decision on the merits of the case. of the harbour masters.
8.   The CA reversed the Decision of the lower court. 4.   Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in
9.   Petitioner Wildvalley filed a motion for reconsideration but the same the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Court.
a.   The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was
ISSUE/s: published in the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of
1.   WoN Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar – NO. Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented
2.   WoN, under Philippine law, fault or negligence can be attributed to in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of
Philippine President Lines for the grounding of said vessel resulting Venezuela. The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1
in the blockage of the Rio Orinoco – NO. Philippine President Lines del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio
was not negligent. It was the pilot (Vasquez) who was negligent. de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the
said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
RULING: Petition denied. CA ruling affirmed. b.   Both of these documents are considered in Philippine
jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written
RATIO: official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
Venezuelan law not applicable because it was not pleaded before the lower Venezuela.
court. 5.   For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the
1.   It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2)
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
2.   A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
when
 admissible
 for
 any
 purpose,
 may
 be
 evidenced
 by
 an
 official
 publication
 thereof
 or
 by
 a
 
an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the copy
  attested
  by
  the
  officer
  having
  the
  legal
  custody
  of
  the
  record,
  or
  by
  his
  deputy,
  and
 
Rules of Court, as amended.11 Where the foreign law sought to be accompanied,
 if
 the
 record
 is
 not
 kept
 in
 the
 Philippines,
 with
 a
 certificate
 that
 such
 officer
 
has
 the
 custody.
 If
 the
 office
 in
 which
 the
 record
 is
 kept
 is
 in
 a
 foreign
 country,
 the
 certificate
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  may
 be
 made
 by
 a
 secretary
 of
 the
 embassy
 or
 legation,
 consul
 general,
 consul,
 vice
 consul,
 
11
Section
  24
  of
  Rule
  132
  of
  the
  Rules
  of
  Court,
  as
  amended,
  provides:
  "Sec.
  24.
  Proof
  of
  or
 consular
 agent
 or
 by
 any
 officer
 in
 the
 foreign
 service
 of
 the
 Philippines
 stationed
 in
 the
 
official
 record.
 -­‐-­‐
 The
 record
 of
 public
 documents
 referred
 to
 in
 paragraph
 (a)
 of
 Section
 19,
  foreign
 country
 in
 which
 the
 record
 is
 kept,
 and
 authenticated
 by
 the
 seal
 of
 his
 office."
 
 It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or
foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the
giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a
foreign country.
6.   It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the
Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had
legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying
the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found
in the records of the case.
7.   With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable,
for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the
weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best
evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy
of the statute.
8.   At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law
was not pleaded before the lower court. A foreign law is
considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading
about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue. A review of the
Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite
the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
9.   We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a
foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In
the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country,
or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or
domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.
No negligence on the part of Philippine President Lines.
10.   There being no contractual obligation, Philippine President Lines is
obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of a
family in accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New
Civil Code. The diligence of a good father of a family requires only
that diligence which an ordinary prudent man would exercise with
regard to his own property. This we have found Philippine President
Lines to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the "main
engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were checked and found
to be in good running condition; when the master left a competent
officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is
experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master
ordered the inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks when the
vibrations occurred anew.
11.   The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander
of the vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in
control of the ship as he can still perform the duties conferred upon
him by law despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in
charge of the vessel. It is not required of him to be on the bridge
while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot. However, Section 8 of
PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides that “for entering a
harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits
within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any
pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel
engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory
pilotage.” The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel
necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be
knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the
river.
12.   In his deposition, pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is
an official pilot in the Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela, and that he
had been a pilot for twelve (12) years. He also had experience in
navigating the waters of the Orinoco River.
13.   The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule
the order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the
Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop
the vessel, mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were
navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel. Moreover,
the pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was very
familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course
headings, and that he does not even refer to river charts when
navigating the Orinoco River.
14.   Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the
master chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited
knowledge of the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the
knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel
safely.
 15.   We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot.
When the vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what
was going on, and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the
middle of the channel and that the vibration was as (sic) a result of
the shallowness of the channel."
16.   Pilot Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas as
well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of
the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of
the portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to
determine the depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his
set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we
hold him as negligent and liable for its grounding.
17.   As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of
control over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a
compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary
for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur12, i.e., negligence and control, to
render respondent Philippine President Lines liable, are absent.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12

 For
 the
 doctrine
 of
 res
 ipsa
 loquitur
 to
 apply,
 the
 following
 conditions
 must
 be
 met:
 (1)
 the
 
accident
 was
 of
 such
 character
 as
 to
 warrant
 an
 inference
 that
 it
 would
 not
 have
 happened
 
except
 for
 defendant's
 negligence;
 (2)
 the
 accident
 must
 have
 been
 caused
 by
 an
 agency
 or
 
instrumentality
 within
 the
 exclusive
 management
 or
 control
 of
 the
 person
 charged
 with
 the
 
negligence
  complained
  of;
  and
  (3)
  the
  accident
  must
  not
  have
  been
  due
  to
  any
  voluntary
 
action
 or
 contribution
 on
 the
 part
 of
 the
 person
 injured.
 
 004 ATCI OVERSEAS v. ECHIN (Fordan)
Oct. 11, 2010 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Doctrine of Processual Presumption
PETITIONERS: ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal, and
Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait
RESPONDENT: Ma. Josefa Echin
SUMMARY: Echin was was hired by ATCI Overseas in behalf of its
principal, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of
medical technologist under a 2-year contract with a monthly salary of
US$1,200. It was stated in the MOA that all newly-hired employees undergo
a probationary period of 1 year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service
Board Employment Contract No. 2. Echin was deployed on Feb. 17, 2000
but was terminated on Feb. 11, 2001 after not having passed the probationary
period. She filed for reconsideration but the same was denied and on Mar.
17, 2001, she went home shoulding her own airfare. Echin filed with NLRC
a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI Overseas as the local
recruitment agency, represented by Ikdal, and the Ministry, as the foreign
principal. The LA held that Echin was illegally dismissed and accordingly
ordered ATCI Overseas and the Ministry to pay her US$3,600, salary for 3
months unexpired portion of her contract. It found that ATCI Overseas and
the Ministry neither showed that there was just cause to warrant Echin’s
dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee. On appeal to
NLRC and then to CA, both affirmed the LA’s ruling. Hence, the current
petition. ATCI Overseas claimed that they should not be held liable because
Echin’s employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment
shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They
thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the CA to
apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in
deciding the present case.
The issue is whether or not Philippine labor laws is applicable. YES. It is
hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a
foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of
processual presumption which, in this case, ATCI Overseas failed to
discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l. v. NLRC,
illuminates: In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided
for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones)
to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating
to the termination of the employment of Gran. In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
forum law. The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
with Secs. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the ROC. The documents (kindly see
Ratio 9 for the details), whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
sufficiently prove that Echin was validly terminated as a probationary
employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of
the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by
Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what ATCI Overseas
submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the
translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at
all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under
such Kuwaiti laws, Echin was validly terminated.
DOCTRINE: It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the
doctrine of processual presumption. In international law, the party who wants
to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of
a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law. To prove
a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
with Secs. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the ROC.
FACTS:
35.  Josefina Echin (Echin) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas
Corporation (ATCI Overseas) in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner,
the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position
of medical technologist under a 2-year contract, denominated as a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.
36.  Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary
period of 1 year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board
Employment Contract No. 2.
37.  Echin was deployed on Feb. 17, 2000 but was terminated from
employment on Feb. 11, 2001 for not having allegedly passed the
probationary period.
38.  As the Ministry denied Echin’s request for reconsideration, she
returned to the Philippines on Mar. 17, 2001, shouldering her own air
fare.
39.  On July 27, 2001, Echin filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI
Overseas as the local recruitment agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal
(Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
40.  The Labor Arbiter (LA) held that Echin was illegally dismissed and
accordingly ordered ATCI Overseas and the Ministry to pay her
US$3,600, salary for 3 months unexpired portion of her contract. It
found that ATCI Overseas and the Ministry neither showed that there
was just cause to warrant Echin’s dismissal nor that she failed to
qualify as a regular employee. NLRC also affirmed LA’s ruling.
41.  On appeal of ATCI and Ikdal to the CA, they claimed that their
principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune
from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that Echin
was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating
within the 1-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service
Laws. They also further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an
officer of ATCI.
42.  However, the CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution. It ruled that under
the law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities
for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas
worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign
principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.
43.  Hence, the current petition. ATCI Overseas and the Ministry claimed
that:
a.   they should not be held liable because Echin’s employment
contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals
and the CA to apply the Labor Code provisions governing
probationary employment in deciding the present case.
b.   even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules
relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the
POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the “customs,
practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the
host country.”
c.   assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given
that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune
from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be
held jointly and solidarily liable, ATCI Overseas cannot likewise be
held liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been
judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
ISSUES:
88.  Whether or not ATCI Overseas is held solidarily liable with the
Ministry for the unpaid portion of Echin’s salary. – YES, since it is
provided under RA No. 8042 which affords the OFWs with a recourse
and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due
them.
89.   Whether or not Philippine labor laws is applicable. – YES, since
ATCI Overseas failed to prove the Kuwaiti civil service laws, the
Philippine labor laws would apply.
90.  Whether or not Ikdal is also solidarily liable as corporate officer of
ATCI Overseas. – YES, as provided by Sec. 10 of RA No. 8042.
RULING: The petition is denied.
RATIO:
On solidary liability
1.   ATCI Overseas, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming
that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with
immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must first
be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable.
2.   In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment
agencies with their foreign principals, RA No. 8042 precisely affords
the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
Maguad explains:
“. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign
principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement
so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the
agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but
the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will
render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing
 the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was
enacted.” (emphasis supplied)
3.   The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy
of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.
Verily, to allow ATCI Overseas to simply invoke the immunity from
suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of
the foreign principal’s liability before ATCI Overseas can be held
liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
Applicability of Philippine labor laws (Important)
4.   ACTI Overseas’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on
probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly
provided in Echin’s employment contract, which she voluntarily
entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed
by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in
fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and
practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
5.   Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the
parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to
govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
6.   It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
ATCI Overseas failed to discharge.
7.   The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l. v. NLRC illuminates:
“In the present case, the employment contract signed by
Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern
matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to
the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine
of presumed- identity approach or processual presumption
comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the
same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us.” (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
8.   The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence,
they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Secs. 2413 and 2514 of Rule 132 of the ROC.
9.   To prove the Kuwaiti law, ATCI Overseas submitted the following:
a.   MOA between Echin and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI,
which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary
period of 1 year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and
Regulations apply;
b.   a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to
Echin stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without
specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the
certificate of termination, both of which documents were certified
by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign
Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and
Translation Unit; and
c.   Echin’s letter of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted
that in her first 8 months of employment, she was given a rating of
“Excellent” albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work
schedule.
10.  These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
sufficiently prove that Echin was validly terminated as a
probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of
submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly
13
“SEC. 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
14
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.—Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.”
 authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required
under the Rules, what ATCI Overseas submitted were mere
certifications15 attesting only to the correctness of the translations of
the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under
such Kuwaiti laws, Echin was validly terminated.

On Ikdal’s liability
11.   In respect to Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer,
the same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042
on money claims:
“SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall
be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond
to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by
law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves
be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.”
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15
“x x x x
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice
versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to be in
order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it
may serve.” (emphasis supplied)
 005 JORDAN v. MACE (GALINDEZ)
November 19, 1949 | Williamson, J. | Blood Grouping Tests
PETITIONER: Helen E. Jordan
RESPONDENTS: Kenneth N. Mace
SUMMARY: Mace in a bastardy action was found by a jury to be the
father of twins. His motion for a new trial is sustained.
Jordan asserts that Mace is the father of her twins. When asked if she
had accused anyone else of being the father, she replied, “No, I haven’t.
There is no other one to accuse.”
Pursuant to court orders, blood specimens were taken and collected.
These were submitted to Dr. Hooker of Boston “for said blood grouping
tests for the purpose of determining whether or not the paternity of the
respondent can be excluded." Dr. Hooker is considered one of the
leaders in research work relating to the exclusion of paternity by blood
grouping tests. Said tests were performed eleven times, and in each
instance, the results showed that Mace could not have been the father
[see Fact 11]. However, despite this, the jury found Mace to be the father
of the twins.
However, the court granted Mace’s motion for new trial because of the
result of the blood grouping tests, and the absence of evidence that
anyone else could have been the father should not react to the
disadvantage of Mace. He presented clear and precise tests, which
excluded paternity under biological law.
DOCTRINE: The blood grouping test statute was enacted to provide, in
our view, for the very situation in which a respondent, as a matter of
ordinary proof without the tests, can do no more than create a doubt
about the paternity of a child. Exclusion of paternity by blood grouping
tests under biological law is scientific proof that a respondent is not the
father.
ISSUE/s:
FACTS:
1.   On October 23, 1945, Jordan (complainant) had sexual intercourse
with Mace.
2.   On November 1, she told Mace that she had missed her monthly
period and that she thought she was pregnant.
3.   The twins were born on June 27, 1946.
4.   When asked if she had accused anyone else of being the father, she
replied, “No, I haven’t. There is no other one to accuse.”
5.   Mace discussed marriage and other matters to Jordan in a manner
consistent only with a belief that he was responsible for her
condition.
6.   Pursuant to court orders, blood specimens were taken and collected
by 2 local physicians and submitted to Dr. Hooker of Boston “for
said blood grouping tests for the purpose of determining whether or
not the paternity of the respondent can be excluded."
7.   Blood specimens were taken on July 31, 1947 for the first test, and
February 25, 1938 for the second.
8.   The physicians testified about the manner in which the blood
specimens were taken and prepared for shipment, and one physician
testified about mailing the specimens to Dr. Hooker by registered
mail. Their qualifications were not questioned.
9.   Dr. Hooker, who was considered one of the leaders in research work
relating to the exclusion of paternity by blood grouping tests, stated
the results of the tests made by him or at least under his direction and
the conclusions he drew therefrom based upon biological law.
10.   The tests to determine the group and type of the blood were
performed eleven times.
11.   In each instance, the results were as follows:
a.   Group Type Complainant A M Child A A M Child B A MN
Respondent A N
b.   Dr. Hooker gave his opinion, based on the two following
reasons, that the respondent could not be the father of the
twins:
c.   First, by the operation of the biological law, sometimes
called "the blood test law," a parent with blood of type "N"
can not have a child with blood of type "M", and thus
respondent's paternity of Child A was excluded.
d.   Second, the father of twins must be one and the same man.
12.   [The jury found Mace to be the father of the twins]
1.   WoN the verdict is manifestly wrong in the light of biological law
and of evidence of exclusion of paternity based upon the blood
grouping tests taken under R. S., Chap. 153, Sec. 34 – YES because
the absence of evidence that anyone else could have been the father
should not react to the disadvantage of Mace. He presented clear and
 precise tests which excluded paternity under biological law. paternity of a child. Exclusion of paternity by blood grouping tests
under biological law is scientific proof that a respondent is not the
RULING: Motion sustained. New trial granted. father.
9.   The skill and accuracy with which the blood grouping tests were here
RATIO: conducted were clearly and convincingly demonstrated by the
2.   It is not necessary that the court accepts, rejects or considers Dr. testimony of disinterested witnesses. There is nothing in their
Hooker’s testimony with respect to his second reason. testimony which even casts suspicion upon the accuracy of the
3.   The verdict that Mace is the father of the twins is indivisible. If findings or the consequent exclusion of the respondent as the father
paternity of one child is excluded, the verdict may not stand. The of Child A.
court, therefore, considers in reaching our decision only the 10.   The statement by Jordan, "There is no other one to accuse," even if
biological law relating to exclusion of paternity by blood grouping interpreted as a denial of intercourse with any man other than the
tests. respondent, is not sufficient to overcome the overwhelming effect of
4.   Jordan v. Davis, with reference to the blood grouping tests: this positive testimony by disinterested witnesses.
a.   It is not here necessary to discuss the intricate details by
which science has reached certain definite conclusions
founded on biological laws. We are told that by the
examination of the blood of the mother, the child, and the
putative father, non-paternity may be conclusively proved in
a certain proportion of cases. The statute in question accepts
this verdict of science, — that even though such tests cannot
prove paternity, they may in certain instances disprove it.
b.   We are not disposed to close our minds to conclusions which
science tells us are established. Nor do we propose to lay
down as a rule of law that the triers of fact may reject what
science says is true; for to do so would be to invite at some
future time a conflict between scientific truth and stare
decisis and in that contest the result could never be in doubt.
5.   The physicians who conducted the tests stated in detail the manner in
which their duties were performed from the taking of the blood
through the repeated tests to the making of the reports.
6.   What further safeguards could reasonably have been taken to protect
the integrity of the tests? If the jury may disregard the fact of non-
paternity shown here so clearly by men trained and skilled in
science, the purpose and intent of the Legislature, that the light of
science be brought to bear upon a case such as this, are given no
practical effect.
7.   The absence of evidence that anyone else could have been the father
should not react to the disadvantage of Mace. He presented clear and
precise tests which excluded paternity under biological law.
8.   The blood grouping test statute was enacted to provide, in our view,
for the very situation in which a respondent, as a matter of ordinary
proof without the tests, can do no more than create a doubt about the
 006 JAO v. CA (Gonzales)
July 28, 1987 | Padilla, J. | Admissibility and Conclusiviness of Blood
Grouping Test
PETITIONER: Janice Marie Jao, represented by her mother and guardian
ad litem, Arlene S. Salgado
RESPONDENTS: CA and Perico Jao
SUMMARY: Janice filed a case for recognition and support against Perico.
Perico denied paternity so the parties to do a blood group testing. The result
indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico and
Arlene. The trial court did not appreciate said result and ruled that Janice is
the child of Perico. However, the CA appreciated the result and reversed the
decision. Janice now brings before the SC the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
The issue is WoN the result of blood grouping tests is admissible and
conclusive to prove non-paternity – YES. *Doctrine*
DOCTRINE: There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to
paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the
child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the
possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged
father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged
father.
FACTS:
1.   Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and
guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and
support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against Perico
V. Jao.
2.   Perico denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test
which was conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test
indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of
Perico and Arlene.
3.   The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive
but upon Janice’s second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial
on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of Perico,
thus entitling her to his monthly support.
4.   Perico appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court's
failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there
was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake
in the conduct of the tests, Perico argued that the result of the tests
should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-
paternity.
5.   The Court of Appeals upheld Perico’s contentions.
a.   Perico was introduced to Arlene at the Saddle and Sirloin,
Bay Side Club, by Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, Perico
dated and courted Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had their
first sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together
as husband and wife.
b.   Arlene gave birth to Janice on August 16, 1968, after
completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that
Arlene must have conceived Janice on or about the first week
of December, 1967. Thus, one issue to be resolved in this
appeal is whether on or about that time, Perico and Arlene had
sexual intercourse and were already living with one another as
husband and wife.
c.   Arlene contends that she first met Perico sometime in the
third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and
Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after several dates, she had carnal
knowledge with him at her house at 30 Longbeach, Merville,
Parañaque, Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967, and
that he started to live with her at her dwelling after December
16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro Island.
d.   Perco, albeit admitting that he met Arlene at the Saddle and
Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on
December 14, 1967 because the day following, he and his
guests: Arlene, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie
Litonjua went to Mindoro by boat. He dated Arlene four times
in January, 1968. He had carnal knowledge of her for the first
time on January 18, 1968, because that was a week after his
birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started
cohabiting with her.
e.   These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in
resolving the paternity of Janice, the role of the blood
grouping tests.
f.   We cannot sustain the conclusion that the NBI is not in a
position to determine with mathematical precision the issue of
parentage by blood grouping test, considering the rulings of
this Court... where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were
 admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr.
Lorenzo Sunico who conducted the test and in the present
case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the findings and report.
The competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests
has been recognized as early as the 1950's.
g.   "Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of
blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged
father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not
the father of the child. But group blood testing cannot show
that a man is the father of a particular child, but at least can
show only a possibility that he is.
h.   "The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove
the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the
alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood
type may have been the father of the child."
i.   "the blood composition of a child may be some evidence as to
the child's paternity. But thus far this trait can be used
only negatively i.e. to evidence that a particular man F is not
the father of a particular child C."
j.   Janice claims that probative value was given to blood tests
only in cases where they tended to establish paternity; and
that there has been no case where the blood test was invoked
to establish non-paternity. This contention is fallacious. To
sustain her contention, in effect, would be recognizing only
the possible affirmative finding but not the blood grouping
test itself for if the result were negative, the test is regarded
worthless.
k.   After Janice was born, Perico did not recognize her as his
own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father in the
Janice’s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his
repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts of Perico
in cohabiting with Arlene, the attention given to her during
her pregnancy and the financial assistance extended to her
cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These
acts of Perico cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn
Janice as his own.
l.   Perico cannot be compelled to recognize Janice based on
paragraph 2 of Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the
New Civil Code.16 Nor can there be compulsory recognition
under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said article.17
m.   Janice could have been conceived from November 20, 1967 to
December 4, 1967. Indeed, Arlene claims that her first sexual
intercourse with Perico was on November 30, 1967 while the
latter avers it was one week after January 18, 1968. However,
to satisfy paragraph 3, Janice must have been conceived when
Arlene and Perico started to cohabit with one another. Since
Arlene herself testified that their cohabitation started only
after December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that
Janice was not conceived during this cohabitation. Hence, no
recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be had
under paragraph 4 as Janice has no other evidence or proof of
her alleged paternity.
n.   There is the claim of Perico that, at the critical time of
conception, Arlene had carnal knowledge with two other men:
"Oying" Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even
rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who
introduced Arlene to Perico at the Bayside Club.
o.   Moreover, the testimony of Arlene is not wholly reliable.
When the trial court said that "the Court is further convinced
of plaintiff's cause by Arlene’s manner of testifying in a most
straight-forward and candid manner," the fact that Arlene was
admittedly a movie actress may have been overlooked so that
not even the trial court could detect, by her acts, whether she
was lying or not.
6.   Janice now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-
paternity.
ISSUE:
1.   WoN the result of blood grouping tests is admissible and conclusive to
prove non-paternity – YES. There is now almost universal scientific
agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood
type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father
does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but,
if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the
16
"When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of
the latter."
17
"(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."
 blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched,
then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father
RULING: Petition denied.
RATIO:
1.   In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence,
to affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, an
action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In said case,
the NBI expert's report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood
groups and types, the Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From
this statement, the defendant contended that the child must have been
the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the
NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of
the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a `possible father.'
This possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances
brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that Co Tao is
the father of the child Manuel."
2.   Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping
tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in
their conclusions. There is now almost universal scientific agreement
that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of
the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does
not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if
the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the
blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched,
then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
3.   In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests
results to prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several
cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin the positive results of blood tests excluding
paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were
drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the
question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo evidence of non-paternity
consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a
finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within
the period of gestation. This ruling was also echoed in Clark v.
Rysedorph, a filiation proceeding where an uncontradicted blood
grouping test evidence, excluding paternity, was held conclusive.
4.   Tolentino, affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-paternity,
thus — "Although the presence of the same type of blood in two
persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the
fact that they are of different types will indicate the impossibility of
one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and
the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be
father and child by consanguinity." Moreover, "The cohabitation
between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a ground for
compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have produced
the conception of the child. This would be the case, for instance, if the
cohabitation took place outside of the period of conception of the
child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child and
the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation
by itself cannot be a ground for recognition."
5.   Janice has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests
in the instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI
personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the tests
themselves. Her allegations appear to be without merit. The NBI's
forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has
had extensive practice in this area for several years. The blood tests
were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized
blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System, under
witness and supervision.
6.   Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have
been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly
two years after the first blood test, she, represented by her mother,
declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their
allegations, even as Perico was willing to undergo such a test again.
7.   Thus, the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar,
are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of Perico vis-a-vis
Janice. No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the
testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards
for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be
accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
 007 People v Madera (Gustilo) cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellants by the
May 31, 1974 | Fernandez, J. | Admissibility prosecution witnesses. The house of Madera is just about 400 meters
PETITIONER: People away from that of the victim Bana.
RESPONDENTS: Raymundo Madera, Marianito Andres (Totoy), It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that
Generoso Andres (Ross) there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
SUMMARY: At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20, those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is further
1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should
Bana (Bana) in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the
gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Bana who was then sleeping on
the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds were inflicted
FACTS:
on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the abdominal
1.   The crime charged was murder. The facts are as follows as stated by
region. Bana did not die immediately. He was carried by his son-in-law,
the Court, there is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early
Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of some people. From the
morning of April 20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the
Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General
house of the victim Elino Bana (Bana) in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug,
Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970. The issue
Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of
is WoN the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun
Raymond Madera (Madera) was the one who fired the shots at Bana?
at Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the
Yes.
stairs. Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal
The Court held that prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
one was the one that hit him on the abdominal region.
Madera was the one who fired the shots at the victim Bana, one of which
2.   Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call
was the fatal shot, and that Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were
for his brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The
with Madera at the time Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that
victim's wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded
he was awakened by the gunfire and saw Madera standing on the first
man was no longer at home for he was already brought to the
step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw Marianito
Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law,
Andres and Generoso Andres just behind Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2
Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of some people. From the
meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that
Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General
she saw Madera as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long
Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.
firearm, and Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with
Madera. In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the
ISSUE/s:
prosecution presented the dying, declaration of the victim Bana. The
1.   WoN the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
Court said that the lower court was correct for not giving credence to the
that Raymond Madera (Madera) was the one who fired the shots at
testimony of Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way to
Bana? Yes because of the various testimonies identifying him
the Municipal Building, Bana told him that he could not identify the
persons who shot him It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
forensic chemist of the NBI, Madera was found negative in a paraffin
with respect to the appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of
test. But Obra himself admitted that, the paraffin test having been
the cost charged against him; and it is hereby reversed as regards appellants
conducted fourteen days after the incident, the test could have given a
Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are
negative result even if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier,
hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio.
because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have been washed off by
Their immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless they are
washing or could have been removed by perspiration.
held for another legal cause.
DOCTRINE: The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense

RATIO:
1.   The Court affirms the lower court's finding that the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt that Madera was the one who
fired the shots at the victim Bana, one of which was the fatal
shot, and that Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with
Madera at the time.
2.   Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by
the gunfire and saw Madera standing on the first step of their stairs
holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres just behind Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters
from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she
saw Madera as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long
firearm, and Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with
Madera.
3.   In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the
prosecution presented the dying, declaration of the victim Bana.
The trip from the house of Bana to the Municipal Building took only
about thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman
Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon who was fetched from his house
by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the
shooting incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman
Feliciano told Bana that he would have to take down his written
statement regarding the shooting incident, and the latter agreed. The
latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock in the morning. In
said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and the answer
was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not recognize.
4.   The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the
testimony of Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way
to the Municipal Building, Bana told him that he could not identify
the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator
in the police force since 1964. He should have asked. Bana while he
was giving his dying declaration in the Municipal Building why he
said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman
Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only Patrolman
Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying
declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
5.   The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right
away the identities of the appellants to the Victim himself and to
their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not militate
against their credibility. There is no evidence on record that they
were asked by their relatives about the identity of the appellants.
Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed
appellants' identities as they did to the Chief of Police and
Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful
incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the Office of
the Chief of Police when and where they executed their
respective sworn statements.
6.   In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970,
subscribed and sworn on the same date before the Mayor of
Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana categorically stated that
Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross
and Totoy Andres were downstairs.
7.   Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar
with their house. He testified on direct examination that he slept in
the balcony of their house. On cross examination, he said that he
slept inside their house. That does not show any inconsistency in his
testimony, because on further questioning, he said that the balcony
referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he
heard the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of
their house. The falsity of this statement has not been shown by the
defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently show that
there was no such opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall
grasses could obscure the back portion of the house where the
kitchen door was located.
8.   Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard
the burst of gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to
recognize the appellants: “An excited person may overlook the
presence of another whom he would otherwise have observed.Under
some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a
keen edge. In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that
the emotion incident to the impending peril may not be the kind of
excitement which confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to
scrutinize. the circumstance of the threatened danger in order to
avoid it.”
9.   The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature" and, under
this rule, of the time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day.
This not withstanding and for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to
get a certification from the Weather Bureau which shows that the
moon was bright at the time of the shooting incident.
10.   It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of
the NBI, Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra
himself admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted
fourteen days after the incident, the test could have given a
 negative result even if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen prosecution of criminal cases that the prosecutor's finest hour is not
days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have when he wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His finest
been washed off by washing or could have been removed by hour is still when, overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for
perspiration. victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the
11.   The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot conviction of the accused but for his acquittal.
prevail over the positive identification of the appellants by the
prosecution witnesses. The house of Madera is just about 400
 
meters away from that of the victim Bana.
12.   The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant
Madera when the latter fired shots at Bana, did not make them liable
for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any
conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. They
did nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive presence at the
scene of the crime did not make them liable either as co-
principals or accomplices.
13.   It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the
existence of a preconceived plan or agreement and in order to
establish the existence of such a circumstance, it is not enough
that the persons supposedly engaged or connected with the same
be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be
established a logical relationship between the commission of the
crime and the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and
more intimate connection between and among the latter, such as
by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design.
Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal conspiracy,
the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is
required to support a finding of its presence that is, it must be shown
to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.
14.   The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable,
upon the other hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he had
knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which may be
demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which contributes to
the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether physical or
moral. It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity,
not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by
the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of
the crime in an efficacious way.
15.   This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the
 008 People v. Dumananon (Hilario)
September 10 2001 | Vitug, J. | Tax Claims on the Estate
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: MARIO DUMANON y DUMANACAL and RICARDO
LABRADOR y SUACILLO
SUMMARY: Dominga Anib, the mother of Anacurita, filed a complaint for rape
against Dumanon and Labrador on behalf of Anacurita, who is mentally retarded.
The complaint alleged that Anacurita is a “retardate” and that she was raped at night
inside a vacant house. The MCTC found prima facie case for rape and confirmed
their arrest and detention. Instead of filing their counter-affidavits, Dumananon and
Labrador filed a joint motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the crime of
rape cannot be prosecuted de oficio and the complaint was not signed by the
offended party, there being no proof that the latter was incapacitated. MCTC ruled
that the complaint was properly filed by the mother of ANACURITA since the latter
is a retarded woman and stated that "by merely looking upon the victim, the Court
finds that indeed Anacurita Anib is a retarded woman." An information was filed,
and Dumanon and Labrador sought for a reinvestigation and questioned the unsigned
complaint. This was denied, and the trial court found them both guilty. They appeal,
still questioning the absene of expert testimony of Anacurita’s mental capacity.
SC ruled that mental retardation need not always be proven with expert
testimony. The appealed decision bears the trial court’s personal impression
that ANACURITA "appears to be mongoloid (physically) and mentally
deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions." We often call a
person who is suffering from mongolism as a mongoloid. Mongolism is a
condition characterized by a small, anteroposteriorly flattened skull, short, flat-
bridged nose, epicanthus, short-phalanges, and widened space between the first
and second digits of hands and feet, with moderate to severe mental retardation
and associated with a chromosomal abnormality. It is known as mongolism
because its physiognomic features are suggestive of those normally exhibited by
the Mongolian race. It is also known as Down’s Syndrome. Hence, the courts
can take judicial notice of the appearance and features of those suffering from
mongolism and based thereon, conclude that a victim, like ANACURITA, is a
mongoloid.
DOCTRINE: Mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical
evidence. Hence, the courts can take judicial notice of the appearance and
features of those suffering from mongolism and based thereon, conclude that a
victim, like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid.
FACTS:
44.   On 3 December 1993, Dominga Anib filed a complaint for rape against
MARIO DUMANON and RICARDO LABRADOR on behalf of her
mentally retarded daughter ANACURITA before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte.
45.   The complaint alleged that ANACURITA is a "retardate" and the crime was
committed at midnight of 2 December 1993. Submitted in support of the
complaint was a medical certificate issued by the Surigao Provincial
Hospital and the affidavits of Dominga Anib, Eduardo Diaz and Anita
Lisondra.
46.   After conducting a preliminary examination, the MCTC found a prima facie
case for rape, confirmed the arrest and detention of MARIO and RICARDO
without bail, and required them to submit their counter-affidavits. Instead of
filing their counter-affidavits, MARIO and RICARDO filed a joint motion
to dismiss the case on the grounds that the crime of rape cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and the complaint was not signed by the offended
party, there being no proof that the latter was incapacitated.
47.   MCTC ruled that the complaint was properly filed by the mother of
ANACURITA since the latter is a retarded woman and stated that "by
merely looking upon the victim, the Court finds that indeed Anacurita Anib
is a retarded woman." It also found probable cause that MARIO and
RICARDO committed the crime charged and forwarded the case to the
Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the information.
48.   An information was filed.
49.   MARIO and RICARDO sought for a reinvestigation of the case. They
questioned the unsigned complaint for rape and alleged that
ANACURITA’s filing of the complaint belied her mental incapacity.
Moreover, she never gave a categorical statement that she was raped. The
defense further asserted as hearsay the statement of Dominga Anib and
Anita Lisondra in their affidavits that ANACURITA confessed to them that
she was raped. They also assailed the prosecution for its failure to present
any eyewitness. Finally, they maintained that they were deprived of their
right to submit their counter-affidavits.
50.   The prosecution opposed the motion for reinvestigation. It claimed that
MARIO and RICARDO were actually required but failed to submit their
counter-affidavits. Moreover, since it was already resolved that
ANACURITA is a retardate, thus mentally incapacitated, the law
recognizes the right of her mother to file the complaint on her behalf.
However, as stated in the decision of the trial court, MARIO and
RICARDO abandoned the motion and instead proceeded with the
arraignment wherein they separately entered a plea of not guilty.
51.   During trial, ANACURITA testified in court seven months after she was
raped. She was then thirty-eight years old. According to her she knew
MARIO and RICARDO as they were her friends and townmates. In the
early evening of 2 December 1993, she was in the municipal gymnasium of
Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte, watching a parade of gays. At about 11:00
p.m. she left and headed for her home in barangay Aurora, Tagana-an. As
she was walking, she passed by RICARDO who was then sitting on a
bench, apparently drunk. Suddenly, RICARDO blocked her way. She tried
 to break free but he continued to obstruct her way. Then he pulled her and
brought her to the deserted house of Jaime Batac, which was just about nine
meters away from her home. Inside the house, RICARDO stripped off his
clothes and immediately removed her underwear. He then placed his penis
inside her vagina. After satisfying his lust, RICARDO ran away. Then she
put on her underwear. After a few minutes, MARIO, who was likewise
drunk, entered Jaime’s house, pulled her down and undressed her. Mario
inserted his penis inside her vagina and just like RICARDO ran away after
the sexual intercourse. ANACURITA went home and told her mother what
had happened.
52.   MARIO claimed that he and ANACURITA, his distant cousin, were lovers.
On the evening of 2 December 1993 he was also at the municipal
gymnasium to watch a coronation event. At about 10:15 p.m. he decided to
go home and along the way, he saw ANACURITA and they talked by the
fence of Jaime Batac’s house. He confessed his love for her and he
suggested if it was possible for them to have sexual intercourse.
ANACURITA nodded her head in consent and replied that she had yearned
to bear a child at her age. They talked for ten minutes. ANACURITA
invited him inside the abandoned house of Jaime so that they would not be
seen by her mother. Inside Jaime’s house, he asked her again if he could
have sexual intercourse with her. She consented. ANACURITA had no
reaction at all during their sexual intimacy. After they were done, he
escorted her to her house and then he walked toward his house. He
immediately heard Dominga Anib scold ANACURITA. Dominga
demanded to know where she came from and why she arrived late. In the
early morning of the following day the police arrested and detained him.
53.   The trial court rendered its decision of 21 June 1995, finding both accused
guilty. It specifically noted therein the trial judge’s personal impression
which he entered in his personal notes that ANACURITA is "a
mongoloid (physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in
understanding the questions." While conceding that ANACURITA’s
narration of how she was sexually abused by the accused-appellants was not
"detailed," it nevertheless concluded that it was "candidly told by one who
is mentally deficient." She was "able to show and convince the Court
that she, in fact, was taken advantage of by the two drunken
neighbors."
54.   It gave full credence to her testimony, which was supported by the
medical findings. It held that MARIO and RICARDO, especially the
former, who is her cousin, knew of ANACURITA’s mental condition. It
ruled that "(e)vidently, … Anacurita Anib, in her retarded
understanding, was overcome with shock, fear and, otherwise,
intimidated by her two drunken neighbors, who accosted her."
55.   The trial court characterized MARIO’s version as "simply out of this
world," and "even assuming that it was what has happened, it only
manifests that the victim is, in fact, abnormal, not capacitated to give a valid
consent."
56.   Mario and Ricardo appeal before the SC.
ISSUE/s:
2.   WoN the conviction should be sustained—YES,
3.   WoN expert testimony is needed to prove retardation—NO, there are
other ways to prove mental retardation.
RULING: SC upheld the lower court’s decision.
RATIO:
91.   It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence
other than medical evidence. Thus, it is our considered opinion that for
purposes of determining whether ANACURITA is mentally normal or
does not have the mental capacity of a normal person, the personal
observation of the trial judge would suffice as a measure of determining
the impact on her of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO and
RICARDO vis-a-vis the legal requirement to prove the commission of
the crime of rape.
92.   The original complaint alleged that ANACURITA is a retardate. The
translation of the affidavit of Dominga Anib, which was submitted in
support of the original complaint, alleged that ANACURITA is "not
mentally normal." During the preliminary examination Dominga
testified that ANACURITA is mentally retarded. The Resolution of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte
categorically declared that "by merely looking upon the victim,"
ANACURITA is indeed a "retarded woman." The transcript of
stenographic notes is also replete with particulars on ANACURITA’s
mental condition. When she first testified, the trial court ordered to
"make it on record the physical appearance of the witness
[ANACURITA] having [a] hard time in understanding the question of
the interpreter," and that she is "mentally deficient." As she continued
with her testimony, it further observed that she had difficulty
answering the questions and, under the circumstances, it allowed
leading questions during her direct examination.
93.   The appealed decision likewise bears the trial court’s personal
impression that ANACURITA "appears to be mongoloid (physically)
and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the
questions." We often call a person who is suffering from mongolism as
a mongoloid. Mongolism is a condition characterized by a small,
anteroposteriorly flattened skull, short, flat-bridged nose, epicanthus,
short-phalanges, and widened space between the first and second digits
of hands and feet, with moderate to severe mental retardation and
associated with a chromosomal abnormality. It is known as mongolism
because its physiognomic features are suggestive of those normally
exhibited by the Mongolian race. It is also known as Down’s Syndrome.
Hence, the courts can take judicial notice of the appearance and
features of those suffering from mongolism and based thereon,
conclude that a victim, like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid.

009 Gener v. De Leon (IGNACIO)
19 Oct 2001 | De Leon, Jr., J. | Judicial notice: court proceedings & records
PETITIONER: Hernando Gener
RESPONDENTS: Gregorio De Leon & Zenaida Faustino (Spouses De
Leon)
(please take note of the dates in this case!)
SUMMARY: The Sps. De Leon instituted a forcible entry case in the
MTC against Gener, alleging that on 8 MAY 1989, he took possession
of their land through force, threat & intimidation. Gener countered that
he had been in possession of the land since 10 OCT 1988, and that in
fact, it was Sps. De Leon which forcibly entered his land, on 2 separate
incidents (24 OCT 1988, 12 MAR 1989), and which resulted in Gener
filing criminal cases of malicious mischief against De Leon's land
helpers and brothers (they destroyed his trees & crops). The records of
these criminal cases were presented in evidence. The MTC ruled in
favor of the sps. De Leon. The RTC reversed this, and ruled for Gener.
The CA reinstated the MTC decision.
The Supreme Court ruled that the MTC should have taken judicial
notice of the 2 criminal cases, because they were not objected to by the
other party. Despite Gener being the sole witness of his defense, his
claims were aptly corroborated by the existence of the 2 criminal cases.
DOCTRINE: While, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, [...] this rule
is subject to the exception that "in the absence of objection and as a
matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any
part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the
records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some
other manner by which it is sufficiently designated."
ISSUE/s:
FACTS:
1.   30 APR 1990: The sps. De Leon filed a forcible entry case in MTC
Norzagaray, Bulacan, against Gener. They claimed that they are the
original claimants and actual possessors in good faith, under a bona
fide claim of ownership. The 4,404 sqm. parcel of land (and its
adjoining lots) were originally part of the course/bed of the Angat
River. The River was formerly on the east/north-east side of the
parcel of land.
a.   Allegedly, in 1978, the Angat River changed its course by
moving more than 100m to the east/north-east, leaving its
former course/bed along the boundary of De Leon's lot, so
they extended their occupation on it once it tried up.
2.   8 MAY 1989: Thus they were able to make use of the land until on
this date, Gener allegedly, through force, threat and intimidation,
unlawfully entered the property & deprived the sps. De Leon of the
possession of the same.
a.   Demands to vacate went unheeded and no settlement was
reached at the barangay level.
3.   Gener, on the other hand, insisted that he is the real owner of the
land, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated 10 OCT 1988 by
Benjamin Joaquin, heir of the previous owner, Proceso Joaquin.
Gener had the land declared for tax purposes and paid realty taxes
thereon.
a.   Gener also alleged that De Leon in fact recognized Proceso
as the owner, via an affidavit De Leon executed in 1961
which mentions Joaquin as a neighboring landowner.
b.   Gener also claimed it was sps. De Leon who forcibly entered
his lot, as evidenced by 2 criminal cases which Gener filed
against De Leon's helpers and brothers, who allegedly
entered the lot on 2 separate incidents (24 Oct 1988 & 12
March 1989) and destroyed his coconut, papaya and langka
trees.
c.   Gener also claimed that the case was filed beyond the 1 year
period
4.   19 FEB 1993: The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the sps. De
Leon
5.   3 APR 1995: RTC reversed the decision of the MTC, choosing
Gener's narrative of buying it from the heir of the former owner.
6.   The case went up to the CA, which reversed the RTC and reinstated
the MTC decision. The MR was denied.
1.   Whether or not the 2 criminal cases should have been considered in
evidence? – YES. Although the general rule is that courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other
cases, this rule may be disregarded in lieu of the rule that in absence
of the objection of the other party despite having full knowledge of
the existence such evidence, it may be properly considered.
 taken judicial notice of these facts in resolving the issue of prior
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The possession.
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 1997 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37346 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for forcible
entry is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action
in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. No pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:
1.   The Municipal Trial Court and Court of Appeals totally overlooked
the fact that while petitioner was his own sole witness, his testimony
of prior possession was substantiated by several documentary
evidence, which were quite damaging to the existence of respondents
alleged cause of action for forcible entry. This Court noted that there
were two (2) incidents that occurred on October 24, 1988 and March
12, 1989 which resulted in the institution by herein petitioner of
criminal complaints for malicious mischief. These twin incidents,
evidenced by Sinumpaang Salaysay and Complaint show that prior
to May 8, 1989, the alleged date of forcible entry of petitioner,
petitioner was already in possession of the disputed land. As against
the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents that they
were forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989, the
documentary evidence of petitioners prior possession, more
particularly the evidence of the two (2) incidents of October 24, 1988
and March 12, 1989, must prevail.
2.   The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have taken judicial
notice of the said criminal cases involving the subject parcel of land
and pending in its docket. While, as a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge, this
rule is subject to the exception that "in the absence of objection and
as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as
read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name
and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated." Sps. De Leon did not impugn nor object to the evidence
of petitioner on the existence of the said criminal cases of malicious
mischief that sprung from the alleged forcible entry of petitioners
alleged property. Thus, the said Municipal Trial Court should have
 010 REPUBLIC vs. CA (LAGUILLES)
Vitug, J. | Aug. 18, 1997 | Rule 129; Judicial notice; when mandatory
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals and Josefa Gacot
SUMMARY: Gacot claims that she owns the lot located in Palawan, but
the Republic insists that it is part of public domain, pursuant to a previous
decision rendered by Judge Garlitos declaring the lot in question as
property of the government. However, despite this declaration, the
government still allowed Gacot to use and occupy the lot, and even
accepted Gacot’s tax payments and even issued her tax declarations. The
trial court rendered a decision in favor of Gacot, so the Republic appealed
and invoked the previous decision rendered by Judge Garlitos declaring the
lot in question as part of public domain. Thus, the Republic filed a motion
with the CA to have the case reopened to allow the Republic to present the
decision of Judge Garlitos. This motion was granted. However, during the
rehearing, the government never presented the order of Judge Garlitos in
evidence. The court then declared Gacot as the lawful owner of the lot in
question because the government has not made any protest nor interposed
any objection on Gacot’s claim during the hearings. The Republic
appealed, but the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence
this petition.
The issue is WoN the Order of Judge Garlitos should have been considered
even if not formally offered as evidence – YES.
The Court held that technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves
but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper dispensation of
justice. Moreover, Justice Paras’ held that that a court will take judicial
notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in
prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court.
DOCTRINE: Technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but
primarily devised and designed to help in the proper dispensation of
justice.
FACTS:
1.   The entire lot is being claimed by Josefa Gacot located in Brgy. Los
Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan, but the area was not indicated. It also
appeared that Ceferino Sabenacio is her co-owner.
2.   The case was set for hearing and the Republic (petitioner) was
represented by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reynaldo Guayco and the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)
of Puerto Princesa City, while Gacot (claimant) appeared without
counsel, so the hearing was reset.
3.   Before the scheduled hearing, the court received a report from the
Land Registration Authority calling the court’s attention of the
decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring the lot in
question as property of the Republic but despite this declaration, the
government did not bar Gacot from filing her answer, possessing and
occupying the lot and in fact accepted her tax payments and issuing
her tax declarations.
4.   Gacot presented herself as witness and her son Vicente Dantic Jr.
The witnesses testified that Gacot was married to Vicente Dantic Sr.
and were in actual possession of the property for more than 30 years,
having bought the same from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera as per deed of
sale. Gacot continued occupation of the property and introduced
improvements therein and declared it for taxation purposes in her
name.
5.   Cipriano Sabenacio, the alleged co-owner of Gacot appeared in court
and manifested that he is waiving his claim over the lot in favor of
Gacot who is in actual possession of the property as he is only a
boundary owner.
6.   After the presentation of Gacot and Vicente, they offered their
exhibits and rested their case.
7.   The trial court rendered judgment declaring the lot to Gacot. The
Republic, through the Solicitor General, elevated the case to the CA.
During the pendency of the appeal, the OSG was able to verify that
the lot was earlier declared to be the property of the Republic in a
decision rendered by Judge Garlito on Oct. 20, 1950, following an
order of general default. The SolGen thus filed a motion with the CA
to have the case reopened and remanded to the trial court to allow the
Republic to present the decision of Judge Garlitos. The CA granted
the motion.
8.   Thereafter, the case was set for hearing several times. The trial court
then held that because of the aforementioned development, it is of
the opinion that the subsequent application of claim of Gacot on the
lot which became part of the public domain where her occupation
was well taken and therefore entitled to the lawful adjudication of the
lot in her name. Besides, the government has not made any protest
nor interposed any objection on Gacot’s claim during the hearings.
Neither was there a manifestation of protest of government use
 coming from the municipal officials of Palawan despite notice sent
to them of the cadastral hearing. And the sad part was that the
government had accepted without protest all the taxes due the
property paid by Gacot religiously. With this, there is no reason to
disturb the previous decision of the court.
9.   The Republic appealed, and the CA affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. The CA held that although Gacot filed her answer out
of time, the Republic still did not present as evidence in the rehearing
of the case the order of Judge Garlitos declaring the lot as property of
the Republic, because precisely, the purpose of the rehearing was to
enable the Republic to present in evidence the said order. During the
rehearing, however, the government failed to present the said order
in evidence.
10.   Thus, the CA held that it is the rule that the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. It is true that the order
has been appended to the records of the case, but it is misleading on
the part of the SolGen to state “that records of the rehearing show
that an order was, indeed, issued by Judge Garlitos…” for during the
rehearing, the government did not present any evidence despite
having been ordered by the trial court.
11.   The CA also held that it also cannot take judicial notice of the order
because as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
knowledge of the contents of the record of other cases. Indeed, the
government missed its opportunity to have the claim of Gacot
declared as a nullity.
12.   Hence this petition by the Republic.
ISSUE:
1.   WoN the Order of Judge Garlitos should have been considered even
if not formally offered as evidence – YES, because a court will take
judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity
of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the
files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file
in the same court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings for it to ascertain and resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties conformably with the foregoing opinion of the Court.
RATIO:
2.   The SolGen explains that the records of the reopened case would
show that a certified copy of the decision of Judge Garlitos has been
appended to page 19 thereof. But it is not evident by the prosecutor
and CENRO did not present it. The SolGen, nevertheless, invokes
the rule that the Republic is not estopped by the mistake or error of
its officials or agents.
3.   Indeed, the Court realizes the points observed by the CA. First, that
the rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of
evidentiary value, in ordinary trials, of evidence which is not
formally offered. Second, that adjective law is not to be taken lightly
for, without it, the enforcement of substantive law may not remain
assured.
4.   The Court adds, however, that technical rules of procedure are
not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to
help in the proper dispensation of justice.
5.   Section 1, Rule 129, provides:
SEC. 1, Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
6.   Justice Paras opined that a court will take judicial notice of its own
acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior
proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records
of another case between the same parties, of the les of related cases
in the same court, and of public records on le in the same court. In
addition, judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or
judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or
involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another
case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will
also be taken of court personnel.
7.   The remand of the case would likewise seem to be unavoidable. The
lot claimed and awarded to Gacot had not been specified in the
records. Indeed, on the basis of DENR, the lot would appear to
contain an area of 394,043 square meters, 300,000 of which were
classified as Alienable and Disposable land and 94,043 as
timberland.
 011 MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION v. CA (LEONG)
Oct. 8, 1974 | Barredo, J. | Topic Tags
PETITIONER: MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, and BENITO
MACROHON, in his capacity as Sheriff of Quezon City
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, PETRA R. FARIN and
BENJAMIN FARIN
SUMMARY: A Petition for certiorari and mandamus against the resolution
of the CA, denying the motion of Petitioners to dismiss the appeal of
Respondents upon the ground that the latter’s record of appeal does not
contain any statement to the effect that an appeal bond has been filed by
them. Counsel for appellant argues that that fact appears on the face of the
record of the case, as evidenced by a certification of the City Treasurer of
Quezon City, to the effect that petitioner-appellants' cash bond was actually
filed on October 30, 1970, simultaneously with the filing of petitioners-
appellants' Notice of Appeal. Respondents in their Answer admitted Par. 9
(#5) of Petitioner’s pleading which contained the statement that an appeal
bond has been filed together with their Notice of Appeal. The CA held that
based on the admissions in the pleadings in that case, all the requisites of a
valid appeal have been complied with. The issue in this case is whether the
CA should have dismissed the petition on the basis of failure to state in the
record of appeal that an appeal bond has been filed? NO. The SC held that
the CA did not in anyway abuse its discretion, but, on the contrary, acted in
accordance with law in refusing to dismiss the appeal of the Farins. The main
purpose of the rules requiring that a record on appeal should show on its
face, by means of statements of the corresponding specific data, that the
notice of appeal, the appeal bond and the record itself have been filed on
time is to enable the appellate court to determine on the basis of the record
on appeal itself and without the need of any independent evidence, that the
appeal has been made on time. HOWEVER, as illustrated in the
circumstances of this case, there could be instances when the timeliness of an
appeal is a matter which the court can take judicial notice of and,
consequently, it would be inconceivable that any controversy between the
parties in respect thereto could arise. In such instances, the court is no longer
supposed to receive any conflicting evidence. It would be bound by what it
has judicial notice of and none of the parties may be permitted to prove the
contrary.
DOCTRINE: Where a fact is one of which the court may judicially take
notice, no proof thereof is necessary. The maxim is "what is known need
not be proved." Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal
force. As a means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to
evidence. In its appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for
proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is designed to fulfill and
makes evidence unnecessary. It is frequently said that neither averment,
nor proof or admission, will prevail against matters which are judicially
known to the court.
FACTS:
44.   A Petition for certiorari and mandamus against the resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49342-R, Petra Farin, et al. vs.
Benito Macrohon, et al., denying the motion of private respondents
therein (herein petitioners) to dismiss the appeal of therein
petitioners (herein private respondents) upon the ground that the
latter's record on appeal does not contain any statement to the effect
that an appeal bond has been filed by them.
45.   The Court of Appeals held that in her Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss, appellant herein admits that there is no mention in the
Record on Appeal regarding fact that an appeal bond was filed on
time. But counsel for appellant argues that that fact appears on the
face of the record of the case, as evidenced by a certification of the
City Treasurer of Quezon City, to the effect that petitioner-
appellants' cash bond was actually filed on October 30, 1970,
simultaneously with the filing of petitioners-appellants' Notice of
Appeal. Appellants' counsel further contends that "obviously,
because said cash appeal bond was riled simultaneously with the
Notice of Appeal, the undersigned counsel, through oversight, failed
to state or make mention of the filing of the said cash appeal bond in
the record.
46.   Appellant also calls attention to petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction docketed with this Court in which a decision
was promulgated by this Court on August 20, 1971.
47.   One of the reasons for Section 3, Rule 41 is to appraise the appellate
court whether an appeal is seasonably filed or not. The purpose of
adding the clause "together with such data as will show that the
appeal was perfected on time" was "to avoid disputes in the appellate
court concerning the fact of the perfection of the appeal."
48.   It is to be noted that in the petition for certiorari above-mentioned the
 private parties were the same as appellants and appellees herein.
Paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof contained the following allegations:
"8) That on October 15, 1970, petitioner thru counsel, received a
copy of the decision of the respondent judge;
"9) That on October 30, 1970, petitioner filed their Notice of Appeal,
from the said decision, together with their Appeal Bond and Record
on Appeal.”
49.   Respondents therein, Honorable Judge Walfrido de los Angeles,
Sheriff Benito Macrohon (now Leonidas F. Villasenor) and Marcelo
Steel Corporation, in par. 1 of their Answer, averred:
Admissions
“1) That, respondents admit ... the allegations in paragraphs 3, 4, 6,
7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, of the petition."
50.   In consonance with the petitioner's allegations and respondents
"Admissions" the CA, in its statement of the case said:
“On Oct. 30, 1970, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal …”
51.   The CA further held: Under the circumstances, therefore, it cannot
be said that this Court has no way of determining whether the present
appeal is seasonably filed inasmuch as it has not only been appraised
thereof in the petition for certiorari but it has even made a clear,
unequivocal pronouncement based on the admissions in the
pleadings in that case, that all the requisites of a valid appeal have
been complied with. Judicial admissions contained in pleadings bind
the parties and the principle of estoppel operates. Hence, there would
be no justification to dismiss this appeal for failure to state in the
Record on Appeal a fact about which there can no longer be any
dispute inasmuch as it has already been judicially admitted in the
pleadings
ISSUE/s:
6.   Whether the CA should have dismissed the petition on the basis of
failure to state in the record of appeal that an appeal bond has been
filed? NO. There could be instances when the timeliness of an appeal
is a matter which the court can take judicial notice of and,
consequently, it would be inconceivable that any controversy
between the parties in respect thereto could arise. In such instances,
the court is no longer supposed to receive any conflicting evidence.
It would be bound by what it has judicial notice of and none of the
parties may be permitted to prove the contrary.
RULING: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is dismissed,
with costs against petitioners.
RATIO:
Issue 1
55.   The SC held that the CA did not in anyway abuse its discretion, but,
on the contrary, acted in accordance with law in refusing to dismiss
the appeal of the Farins.
56.   The main purpose of the rules requiring that a record on appeal
should show on its face, by means of statements of the corresponding
specific data, that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond and the
record itself have been filed on time is to enable the appellate court
to determine on the basis of the record on appeal itself and without
the need of any independent evidence, that the appeal has been made
on time. To allow the parties to indulge in a controversy regarding
the timeliness of the appeal and to present their respective conflicting
evidence on that point, which could take much of the time of the
court that it could otherwise devote to the disposition of other cases
demanding its attention, is detrimental to the interests of justice and
contrary to the public policy intended to be served by the provision
in question.
57.   But, as illustrated in the circumstances of the case at bar, there could
be instances when the timeliness of an appeal is a matter which the
court can take judicial notice of and, consequently, it would be
inconceivable that any controversy between the parties in respect
thereto could arise. In such instances, the court is no longer supposed
to receive any conflicting evidence. It would be bound by what it has
judicial notice of and none of the parties may be permitted to prove
the contrary.
58.   In the words of Chief Justice Moran, "Where a fact is one of which
the court may judicially take notice, no proof thereof is
necessary. The maxim is "what is known need not be proved."
Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. As a
means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to evidence. In
its appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof,
 it fulfills the object which the evidence is designed to fulfill and
makes evidence unnecessary. It is frequently said that neither
averment, nor proof or admission, will prevail against matters
which are judicially known to the court.

59.   When a matter of fact supposed to be proven to the court is one

capable of being taken judicial notice of, being already known to the
court because it has already been proven or was undisputed or
judicially admitted in a related proceeding before it, it would be the
height of absurdity and contrary to one's sense of justice and
propriety to still require the parties to reopen the issue and litigate
relative to the same matter all over again.
 012 PEOPLE v. BERNABE (LU)
November 21, 2001 | Melo J. | Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Virgilio Bernabe y Rafol
SUMMARY: Virgilio Bernabe was charged of raping his own daughter
Maria Esnelia Bernabe, then 17 years old. The People’s version of the
facts are as follows: While Maria was sleeping with her sister in their
house located in Pasay City on October 29, 1998, her father came home
drunk. Virgilio went in the room, approached Maria and started kissing
her nape and other parts of her body. He then removed her panty and
inserted his penis. Esnelia resisted but to no avail. This started since
1994. When Esnelia could no longer keep it to herself, she told her
cousin Cristina aunts Marcelina and Analyn. They then reported the
incident to the police precint and on 4 pm of the said date, Virgilio was
arrested. Upon examination by Dr. Soliman, the doctor reported that
there was no hymenal injury but noted that the opening of the hymen
could accommodate an average penis without causing hymenal injury.
Virgilio Bernabe alleges that he did not rape his own daughter and the
charge of rape was because Virgilio resented the boyfriend of Maria
Esnelia whom he found sleeping in their house. Furthermore, Virgilio's
sisters (the aunts) assisted his daughter in filing the case of rape
motivated by the land dispute between them. Moreover, the medico-legal
officer also made a finding that no rape was committed because there was
no hymen laceration. Lastly, Virgilio argues that it is impossible for
him to rape his daughter without being detected considering that his
family lives in a very congested place and that Maria was sharing the
room with her sister.
RTC: Convicted Virgilio with Rape under Art. 335 in relation to R.A.
7659 and imposed the penalty of death.
Thus this automatic review by the Supreme Court.
The issues are:
1) Whether Virgilio’s contention that it was impossible for him to rape
his daughter without being detected deserves consideration. – NO.
2) Whether the RTC erred in imposing the penalty of death – YES.
Ruling:
1st Issue: There is no rule that rape can only happen in seclusion. The
Court may take judicial notice of the fact that among poor couples with
big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other people around them.
2nd Issue: A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and
nor does a medical report stating that the hymen is intact negate rape.
However, before the death penalty can be imposed in relation to R.A.
7659, the allegation of complainant’s age as well as filial relationship
with the accused is essential. Though such was alleged in the
information, the prosecution failed to prove them using the baptismal
certificate for a baptismal certificate proves only the fact of baptism but
not the circumstances of birth.
DOCTRINE: Generally, probate courts are limited in inquiring into the
extrinsic validity of a will. However, when the will is intrinsically void
on its face, trial courts should either deny the probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will before
resolving the extrinsic validity of the will.
FACTS:
1.   Virgilio Bernabe was charged of raping his own daughter Maria
Esnelia Bernabe, then 17 years old. The People’s version of the facts
are as follows: While Maria was sleeping with her sister in their
house located in Pasay City on October 29, 1998, her father came
home drunk. Virgilio went in the room, approached Maria and
started kissing her nape and other parts of her body. He then
removed her panty and inserted his penis. Esnelia resisted but to no
avail. This started since 1994. When Esnelia could no longer keep it
to herself, she told her cousin Cristina aunts Marcelina and Analyn.
They then reported the incident to the police precint and on 4 pm of
the said date, Virgilio was arrested. Upon examination by Dr.
Soliman, the doctor reported that there was no hymenal injury but
noted that the opening of the hymen could accommodate an average
penis without causing hymenal injury.
2.  Virgilio Bernabe alleges that he did not rape his own daughter and the
charge of rape was because Virgilio resented the boyfriend of Maria
 Esnelia whom he found sleeping in their house. Furthermore,
Virgilio's sisters (the aunts) assisted his daughter in filing the case of
rape motivated by the land dispute between them. Moreover, the
medico-legal officer also made a finding that no rape was committed
because there was no hymen laceration. Lastly, Virgilio argues that
it is impossible for him to rape his daughter without being
detected considering that his family lives in a very congested
place and that Maria was sharing the room with her sister.
3.   RTC: Convicted Virgilio with Rape under Art. 335 in relation to
R.A. 7659 and imposed the penalty of death.
4.   Thus this automatic review by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/s:
1) Whether Virgilio’s contention that it was impossible for him to rape his
daughter without being detected deserves consideration. – NO.
2) Whether the RTC erred in imposing the penalty of death – YES.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed on appellant is
downgraded to reclusion perpetua, and with the awards for civil indemnity,
moral damages, and exemplary damages reduced to P50,000.00 for the first
two, and P25,000.00 for the last.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
RATIO:
1.   1st issue: Hackneyed and discredited too is the argument that the
place where the rape was committed is so congested and packed with
people that any untoward incident would be well-nigh impossible.
The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does
not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons
around them. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in
seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that “lust is no respecter of
time and place”
nd
1.   2 issue: In People vs. De la Cuesta, we reiterated an old doctrine to
the effect that the absence of external injury does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape. Lack of lacerated wounds does not
also negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape. Even the fact that the medical report states
that the hymen of the victim is still intact does not negate rape It is
well settled that full penetration is not even required, as proof of
entrance showing the slightest penetration of the male organ within
the labia or pudendum of the female organ is sufficient.
2.   However, before the death penalty can be properly imposed for the
crime of rape in accordance with Republic Act No. 7659, an
allegation of the complainant’s age as well as filial relationship. Both
minority and actual relationship between the parties must be alleged
and proved, otherwise, barred is any conviction for rape in its
qualified form supra).
3.   In the case at bar, while the Information alleged both the minority of
the victim and her relationship with appellant, the prosecution failed
to prove the victim’s age when it presented only the baptismal
certificate of Maria Esnelia and not her birth certificate.
4.   It is elementary that a baptismal certificate only proves the fact
of baptism but not the circumstances of birth. Without essential
proof on the matter of the date of birth of complainant, or other
convincing evidence in the absence thereof, we cannot rule with
certainty whether Maria Esnelia was indeed a minor at the time of
the commission of the crime, especially so because she does not
appear to be obviously a minor, as she allegedly was already 17
years old at the time of the assault. Verily, with our young girls now
looking, acting, and dressing up more maturely, one would be hard
put to conclude with any measure of certainty, that a budding lass is
13 or 18 years of age.
5.   Withal, the penalty of death imposed by the trial court on appellant
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua as provided for by law.