G.R. No.

L-4213
November 28, 1953
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
SERAFIN HERNANDEZ, accused-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for appellant.
Jose F. Tiburcio for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
The prosecution has appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the information against Serafin Hernandez,
which is of the following tenor:
That on or about the 23rd day of September 1949, in the municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on
the person of Amador Palor as a result of which the latter sustained physical injuries in the different parts of his body which required and
will require medical attendance for the period of 25 days, and incapacitated and will incapacitate him to perform his customary labor for
the same period of time, and as a consequence of said injuries the offended party lost the power to hear of his right ear.
Hernandez pleaded not guilty to the charge. Subsequently he was tried together with Apolonio Velasco, accused in another case for serious
physical injuries committed on the same occasion. The joint trial was agreed on all sides, witnesses testified and the court finding that both had
inflicted physical injuries, convicted Apolonio Velasco, but dismissed the information as to Hernandez holding it had no jurisdiction because the
crime charged therein was triable before the justice of the peace court. Said the judge,
The information against Serafin Hernandez charges an offense of less serious physical injuries falling under the first paragraph of Article
265 of the Revised Penal Code. However, at the trial, the prosecution intended to prove the crime as defined in article 263, paragraph 2
of the same code. Under the circumstances of the case, therefore, this court cannot convict the accused for the higher offense proved
but not charged because in no case can a conviction be sustained for a higher offense that charged in the complaint, a general rule which
has its foundation in the constitutional right of the accused to be advised at the outset of the proceedings as to the precise nature of the
charge against an accused and for the further reason that the crime charged in one triable by the Justice of the Peace Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. (Sec. 87-b, Republic Act No. 296). . . . As to accused Serafin Hernandez the court finds that the
information against him must be, as the same is, hereby dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction.
In this appeal the Solicitor General contends the crime described was serious physical injuries, under article 265, paragraph 2, which for
convenience is quoted:
SEC. 2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted,
the person shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a
leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore
habitually engaged.
Attention is invited by the prosecution to the last part of the information alleging that "as a consequence of said injuries, the offended party lost
the power to hear of his right ear." Loss "of the power to hear" is surely a serious physical injury. But is the loss "of the power to hear of his right
ear" a loss of the power to hear? As the offended party may still hear thru his left ear, it would seem he has not lost the power to hear. However
Article 263, paragraph 3, prescribes prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods if the person injured shall have lost "the use of any
other part of his body." A. Palor was deprived of the use of his right ear, a part of his body, and the offense described in the information was
cognizable by the court of first instance.
However a majority of the court believe that as the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction, the judgment dismissing the case is unappealable,
because the appeal places the accused in a second jeopardy. ((U.S. vs. Regala, 28 Phil., 57; People vs. Borja, 43 Phil., 618; People vs. Fajardo,
49 Phil., 206 Kenner vs. U.S. 195 U.S. 100).
In support of this appeal, the Salico precedent is invoked.1 But this is not conclusive because the main point raised there was dismissal of the
case with the consent or at the request of the accused, which is not the situation here.
Wherefore, this appeal is dismissed, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. 192123 : March 10, 2014
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

On June 2, 1992, Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born with an imperforate anus. Hence, two days after his birth, he
underwentcolostomy which enabled him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
Three years later or on May 17, 1995, he was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. The surgical team
consisted of Dr. Resurreccion, Dr. Luceo, Dr. Valea, and Dr. Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Abella, Dr. Razon and herein Petitioner
Dr. Solidum. It was during the said operation that Gerald experienced bradycardia or an abnormally slow heart rate of less than 60 beats per
minute. He subsequently went into a coma which lasted for two weeks. When he regained consciousness after a month, he could no longer
see, hear, or move. Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries against the attending
physicians.
The RTC found Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. The CA
affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.

ISSUES: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case? Whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum for criminal negligence?

HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is overruled.

TORTS: applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

The Court held that the application the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar is inappropriate. Res ipsa loquitur is literally
translated as he thing or the transaction speaks for itself. Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 187926 laid down that, here the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. Hence, the requisites for the doctrine to apply are as follows: (1) the accident was of the kind that does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
Elements 2 and 3 were present in the case at bar. However, the first element was undeniably wanting.

TORTS: elements of medical negligence

The Prosecution failed to prove the existence of the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt. Gaid v. People, G.R.
No. 171636 defined negligence as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
The following are the elements of medical negligence: (1) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-
patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (2) the breach of the duty by the
physician failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal
connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient.
Most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, therefore, witnesses with special medical qualifications must impart the
knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. In the case at bar, there were no witnesses with special medical qualifications in
anesthesia presented. Hence, it is difficult to assess whether the first three elements of medical negligence were present.

CRIMINAL LAW: subsidiary liability pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code

Ospital ng Maynila could not be held civilly liable because it was not a party to the case. To hold it so would be to deny it due process
of law. Furthermore, before it can be held subsidiary liable, the conditions therefor must first be established:(1) it must be a corporation engaged
in any kind of industry; (2) defendant must be shown to be an employee of the corporation engaged in industry for profit; and (3) defendant
must be insolvent.
Applying the conditions in the case at bar, Ospital ng Maynila cannot be held subsidiary liable because: (1) Ospital ng Maynila, being
a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work; (2) Dr. Solidumwas not an
employee of Ospital ng Maynila but a consultant; and (3) Dr. Solidum was not insolvent.

GRANTED.