NCLASSI FD * Hh/t DEPARTMENT OF STATE fi amines 02. 2850 us ‘The Secreta: Ko 693A) | Die! ana - unscy W. smaaucenan Sf ARA Monthly Report (July) the “third World War" GnT SOUER america The military regimes of the southern cone of South America see thenselves as embattled: ~~ on one side’ by international Marxism and-its terrorist exponents, and -- on the other by the hostility of the uncomprehending industrial democracies misled by Marxist propaganda. DECAPTIONED In response they are banding together in what may well | become a political bloc.of some cohesiveness. But, more~ , significantly, they are joining forces to ersadicate "subversion", H a word which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent from the left and center left. The security forces of the southern cane - ~- now coordinate intelligence activities closely; In Pull operate in the territory of one another's countries in pursuit of "subversives"; have established Operation Condor to find and kill terrorists of the “Revolutionary Coordinating Committee" in theix own countries and in Europe. Brazil is coopera- ting short of murder operations. - Dectassifyon 1 This siege mentality shading into paranoia is pefhaps ihe natural result of the convulsions of recent years in which ‘the societies of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have heen badly Shaken by assault trom’the extreme lett. But the military ‘leaders, despite rear decimation of the Marxist left in Chile and Uruguay, along with accelerating progress toward that goal in Argentina, insist that the threat remains and the war must goon. Some talk of the "Third World War", with the countries Of the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civiliza~ tion. PARGENTINA PROJECT (S200000044)"" : US, DEPT OF STATE, A/RPSIPS P. Grif, Director Donec (Bebe ( )Deay Exemption): CS Gassly ss C) Baend as ()Dawngade to Declassfy: ( Jin Part Date. . |/xcps-2 WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND NETHODS INVOLVED. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED. BY ORIGINATOR. ! — 660177 Box teed UNCLASSIFIEDLSS Somewhat more rationally, -- they consider their counter-terrorism every bit as justified as Israeli-actions against Palestinian terrorists; and ~~ they believe that the criticism from democracies ‘ of their war on terrorism reflects a double standard. The result of this mentals i magnify the isolation of the militar the civilian sector, thus narrowing the rar and economic options. The broader implications fey ug_and for future trends in_the hemisphere ate disturbing. The use of bloody counte terrorism by gimes tiréatens t from the West and the opening of Geep ideoclogicaa: divisions among the countries of the hemisphere. An outbreak of PLO-ty terrorism on a worldwide scaie in’ ri sponse is @tso a The dustrial. dem would be , is to utions from @ of political reir increas: This-month's trends’ time to, focus on leng: ~~ To emphasize the countries at every oppor -~ To depoliticize human rights. To oppose rhetorical exaggerations of the “ehird-world-war" type. ~~ To bring the potential bloc-members back—into our cognitive universe through systematic exchanges. UNCLASSIFIED : SS...- MRCLISSED Security Cooperation is a Fact = There is extensive cooperation between the security/ intelligence operations of six governments: Argentina, Drazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. their intelligence services hold formal meetings to plan "Operation Condor.“ It will include exténsive FBI-type exchanges of information on shady characters. There are plans for a epecial communications nctwork. These details are still secret, but broad security ccopere is net. Officials in Paraguay and Argentina have told us that they find it necessary to coogerate with each other and their neighbors against internationally~fux¢ terrorists and "subversives." od The problem ‘begins‘ with the definition of "subversion" One reportér writes Jaclude nearlfanyone w Ras ¢: opposes. go: + policy knows tliat subversives can wind up dead or tortured, educated people have an understandable concern about the boundaries of diss: The concezn duubles whea there is a chance of~: ion by foreign police > ¥ acting on indirect, unknown infornation. Numerous Uruguayan refugees have been murdered in Arcentina, ~ and there\are widespread azcusations that Argentina police are doing their Uraguayan colleagues a favo: These accusations are at least credible,whether or not they are exact. A “Third World War"? The Nature of the Left-F: iUruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco -- one of the brighter and noritally steadier members of the group ~~ was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists as a "Third World War." The description is interesting for “two reasons: i - and steeping "wartime" -- It justigies harsh measures. Ee ~~ It emphasizes the international and institution aspack, Ehareahy ju the exercina of pew UNCLASSIFIED cc see eeeee. The threat is not imaginary. It may be exaggérated. This is hard to suggest to a man like Blanco, who believes ~~ probably correctly -- that he and his family are targeted. One must admire his personal courage. Even by objective sta had substantial accomplish dards, the terrorists have ents over the year: At one time or ether, urban and rural gaerrillas have created severe problems for almost every South Amexican government, including those where democracy is still surviving. ~- Shey have provoxed repressive reactions, including torture and quasi-governmental death squads. (The guerrillas typicall claimed to welcoxe repression, but W@ wonder if they really like what they got.) o- They still pose a seriou at in and -~ arguably -- a lesser pro! or three other countries, “4 -- There ic a terror-oric: Coordinating Junta", in Faris, bly head hich is beth a counterpart of and Nevertheles speaking, both verrorists and ¥ 2aceru failed This is true evén in thé minds revolutionaries. Che Guevara's romantic fias hopes for rural revolution. Allende's fall is ta (perhaps pessimistically) as proving that the -electoral route cannot work. Urbap guerrillas collapseé in Brazil with Carlos Marighela and in Uruguay with the Tupamaros, The latter ropresented a high-water mark. Their solid, efficient structure posed a real wartime threat, Probably the military believe that torture was indispensabie to crack this structure. UNCLASSIFIED—— UAGAARyFIED There is still a major campaign in Argentina. We expect the military to pull up their socks and win. They have preced have no handy refuge in neighboring countries. What will remain .is a chi £ governm by Brazil in 1964, whose origin in battle against the extreme left. It is important to theiz ego, their salaries, and their equipment-budgets to believe in a Third World War. The like this, They already snick at Qvabout kid stufr like dcug smuggling when there is a real military campaion going on. ‘They accuse.us of applauding in Entebbe but not in; Montevideo. Qur_differing at avo raicing clspigions ahout zi What’ the Right-Wing & mes Mave in Common active: they derived the ction against terrorism, and (as they ) These govern: initial legi lefc-extremism, zhus, 3 Bo ion cf nation has been a in South America as it was in Buxope. (It may yet turn out to be as destructive; this papér Jooks only briefly at the poten between Latin nations and blecs.) Military establishrents, traditional protectors o boundaries end national integriiy, aré in a position to profit from the new nationalism. Economic development is'a pressing need and a public demand. Disciplined militery estab- lishments can work with technocrats to produce economic development. In the countries we are considering, the military is always the strongest national institution -- sometimes ——————— TLASSIFED eee —————O s to guide them, and the terrorists ts, started At best, when Argentina stabilizes, we can hope to convince them that they have already won, \ he defeat of terrorism ial for conflictsalwost the only one. It has, typically, - saved the nations from civilian chaos. National developmentalism is therefore real medicine, gloser €0 most Cltissas then. trondy jefe or xaaat-wing eauses. fo this stent, military power ean find @ populaz’ base. National developmentalism has obvious and bothersome parallels to National Socialisn. Opponents of the military regimes call them fascist. It is an \ effective pejorative, the more so kscause it can ke said to be technically accurate. But it is a pejorative. These days, to call a man fascist is not primarily to describe ‘his economic views. 7 In. practice, the military regim: full of the same inconsistencies. ¢ non-military, pragmatic, non-ideole: -~ Local political instituti (reasonably). considered to have been a failure, and it is suggested that “democracy doesn't work for us. Lea to organize the Yet there is, a an acceptance that democracy eventually to be sought. is the ideal ya) other institution is allowed to challenge military powsr, yet pol parties and . courts often exist and perfomm some valid functions. Brazil's teothicss parliament, for example, dozs cautiously articulate public opinion and provide @ dormant alter- native to military rule. -- Insecure, repressive gove: nts nevertheless allow substantial "democratic" freedoms, including varying degrees of freedom of expression. The ambiente is more Like Wachington than Moscow. You can buy a good newspaper, a pair of decadently-£ blue jeans, a girlie magazine, or a modern painting. LE UNCLASSIFIED(NCLSSED These military regimes do not expect to last + forever. There is nv thought-of -a-Thousand———. Year Reich, no pretense of having arrived at ultimate Narzist-style truth. : Exom the standvoint of our policy, the most important Tong-term charac: istic of may be preci thas theory and practice. They ‘now it. know what to do about Poli develupueat lay. Long after left-wing threats are squashed, the regimes are still terrified of them. Fighting the absent pinxos remains a central goal of national security, Threats and plots are discovered. Soma “mistakes" are made by torturers, who have ‘ aigficulty finding logical victims. Murder squads Kill harmless people and petty thieves. then- elections are held, the perverse electorate shows a desire te put the military out of rower. Officers see lhe liend eudiag with theirc/own bodies on the rack. ~ No more elections We do not sugges vicious circle. Since producing really solid economic officers may eventually trust civ them and provide sa ionvseble. ei! mili d it easier to ride the tiger t to disnovat, When an alternative government eventually has to be found, it might be that the only one available will ke at the far left. to | succee: So fai, ihe But There Az i In discussing the general characteristics of the southern military ceyimes, we have made indefensibly broad generalizations. The followi is an attempt to correct the worst distortions, country-by-country, It is important to be clear about the differences because, for reasons we shall develop later, our policy showid he to emphasize wl the countries do not have in common rather than w they do. - The £xont-burne: Uruguay. ———Saae. UNCLASSIFIED cases axe Argentina, Chile,andArgentina is the most. interesting, both..because———. it is important and because the directions of the new xegime are not clear, The Argentines are politically sophis B ians, but unlike the ‘ Brazilian Brazilians, the Argentines lack social and even military unity. To recover économically, they must break the power of traditional structures, and especial~ ly of the labor movement. There is also a genvine chal m. Let encoun. dimensions. We believe that the Brazilian. medel ’ will prevail. In the long run, thus, we think the military will win. Videla -- or his successor -~ will have more trouble with hard-l: ary officers and right-wing terror than with the left., Forces probably connected to the regiie have already been killing exiles and priest: thers, == | mush action o hear any almost ssive apparatus is one at the top to moder regime provides eee: isolated, even Uruguay is t pressing c2 and Chile). Foreign minister to talk about the “Third World wa: he still!insists that the thr in his country. Given this pictur of course, seger to cooperate with in defensive measures. Nevertheless, unlike the Chileans, the Ucuguayans have maint sense of proportion about hun: national public opinion. in the government, give the mil Uruguay is, WNCLASSIFEDTNCLSSFED Brazil: We can and should relate to Brazil as an emerging world power rather than as a trouble-spo | its 1964 “revolution is the basic model for ite ~ neighbors. The biggest problem is that, despite re- markable successes, the Brazilian ‘armed services still cannot find a way to relax their hold on power. On the other hand, th: ‘@ noi: much worried about it. have hoon’ ablo to tap civilian talent for economic purposes. The L is ed, but it is not clear. whether the President can control the zeal of his security forces. Attempts at political distensdo have largely flopped. (the vord carries both the English sense of “distending", or enlarging authority Yet y from a narrow milgary base, and the French sense of "relaxing". Better than detente?) Brazil, like the other large countries, dees see itself as & wor. actor, and this inhibits oxtremian, Bolivia is an Saree ae icace ee net autar thought he had a cor fail = con. seme menace: successful. it has been 1 Pa y is marchin is a mil the kind that looks gocd c the cartoon page. Paraguay, , has eminently sound reasons for being backward “and is not in the least apologetic. The Paraguayans mber that, in the Chaco War, they fought off t superior armed forces of three nei: ridiculously long time. .Pride was else. The governm than the kind of specific chal: countries. age posed UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIED A Political Bloc In Formation? e of a political bloc, our interests will be involved in , # for South America. conditions for its -- The conviction that an international leftist threat amounts to a."World War" and hence requires an alliance. philosophies and pol. her respects. previously had => Inproved transp neighboring coun} better links with the U.S. and Euroga than with each other. the U.S. has "lost against communism because and social decay. nt of humanteights often taken as just on: ie ened by the military of the civi: democratic interplay whic a sense of proportion. Thece are a Cew dohivs a bloc. Nationalistic thinking is the obvious one, Traditional feuds have largely shaped the sense of nation. With the exception of the Peru/Chile i however, border disputes-are no loager an ove: factor in the southern cone. To predict a political bloc would still be speculative. Commonsense could assert itself. There is pienty of it available in Uhese counteies and even sone in their armies. we do think that tne trend toward bloc thinking is present, cl and trouble- some. UNCLASSIFIEDMISA -li- Z If 2 Bloc De! in the early we will be a “casual ficiery" (as one it) for reasons are too ohvicus to need elaboration here. On East-Nest stage, right-wing regimes can hardly tilt toward the Soviets and Cubans, whe fact that we are jan apparent beneficiary can easily lull us into trou: as has historically been the case in this hemisy But we would expect a ranye of yuwily peuble: Some are already with us. Internationally, the Latin generals look like cur guys. We are especially iden tified with Chile. It cannot do us any good... Durop certainly, hate Pinochst & Cor with a paccion that rubs off on us. oe More problems -- Human rights abuses, as you know, are ct: more and nore problens of conscience, law, @ diplomacy. -- Chile's p status has alr trouble caomic recovery. to the he.drift goes in other-countries; the nore difficulties we can expect in cur econonmie links with them. ~~ We would like to shere with, say, the Brazilians @ perception that we are natural’ a Brazilian pailicipetion in a cightow would make this unlikely. ~- Eventually, we could even see serious’ strains with the democracies farther noth. Oxf told us that he thinks a confrontation possible. Uruguay and Venezuela have jus broken relations over #: incident involvin political asylim, & precetent? UNCLASSIFIED SSS... 2 eogee OSSD Ovex the horizon, there is a chance of serious world=scale tfouble. This is spedulacive put no longer, xidiculous. The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta now seems to have its headquarters in Paris, plus consider able activity in other Duropean cap! being forced out of Argentina, their Europe (and possibly the U.s.} will i The South American regimas kno: are planning their own cou tee. ri Europe. a ine, Chile, and Uruguay are Brazil is wary but is providing some tech: The next ht be for the terrorists to under- take a world on embassies and interests of 7 the six hated The PLO has shox ie van picture South american actuviti scale, using the industria battlefield The impossibilit: have tried & taken a long-term & a right-wing bloc Till now, thou moderating influenc?, we have no strategic view of the problems th would create, This paper has ‘tried We shall have more recommendations bu: following are a fai months to come, 2 1) Dis care. IF them to view themselves ay an ¢ ; dealings with each country and in Cong: . we should, for example, reflect recog: ith special Sc. in our ite virt Argentina, with a problem much different Z ay, with its substant y/civilian interpl de. Brazil has world- pers UNCLASSIFIED EEE for a sharper focus, we will be encouraging ssional testimony, ee—_—_—_—_——See ae — MBLASSTED “13-00. ‘ Our military-sales programs may also‘provide afi 4. Opportunity for distinction. Aid no longer provides t significant leverage. Thereis vast interest in overall economic relations ~~ but not much freedor of e 2) Try to got the politics and ideology o 8 Object Ill be hard to eéconcile ceuiay pressing need to multilateralize our oid charges of "intexvention," sly work through the Inter-American : Rights Comission. The countries that supgort us : there, he: will tend to be democracies (and perhaps one or two cal Caribbean governments). regimes will feel besieged. one or more of then with u: (as now seems likely), we Bake cleo that authoril This might pr officers and But there are mation susta g that we were badiy in we think ve should werk on systematics mid than exchanges. of infoxmat eed to achieve a perception nado is a threat to the legi detente nor di friendly regimes UNCLASSIFIED —————Uda FIED - nid- 7 jl In time, perhaps we -vaucouvince them that a vaird Worid War is undesirable. ARA/PLC: DCProper/WHLuers 8/2/76 x~29192 UNCLASSIFIED