энергетика Nyman chapter-5

‘Common Sense’ Energy Security in China
The Energy Security Paradox: Rethinking Energy

(In)security in the United States and China
Jonna Nyman
Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198820444
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2018
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198820444.001.0001

Jonna Nyman
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198820444.003.0005
Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 5 provides another analysis of common sense energy security practices
that cause insecurity, this time in China. The chapter provides some historical
context on energy in China and policy-making procedures, and then looks
directly at how energy security (nengyuan anquan) has been practised in
Chinese energy security policy since 2004. It examines how energy security was
constructed in official discourse in the same time period, drawing out key
themes. It notes the ways in which these practices interact to create an accepted
‘common sense’ notion of energy security, where self-sufficiency is key to
national security and how this leads to a focus on increasing domestic
production of coal, oil, and gas. The chapter concludes by showing how these
practices produce an energy security paradox.
Keywords: energy security, China, energy policy, security paradox, energy security paradox, national
security
China’s economic growth has astounded the rest of the world and pulled millions
of poor Chinese out of poverty. But it has also meant a growing need for energy.
China is now the world’s biggest energy consumer, producer, and net importer,
and its energy consumption is still rising. To the leadership, energy is incredibly
important: without reliable energy supplies the economy would crumble.
Economic growth would stall, and it would cast doubt on the economic miracle
on which the regime has staked its legitimacy. Thus energy is not just a question
of economic security and stability, it is also key to the political survival of the
regime, and by extension, the survival of the Chinese state as we know it.
Because of concerns over import dependence, oil supply (security of
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transportation in particular) and price have been central in China’s energy

security debate since the mid-1990s, and this focus can also be seen in China’s
efforts at energy diplomacy around the world. In contrast, domestic availability
made coal seem like a comparatively safe source of energy until very recently.
Today the environmental impact of China’s addiction to fossil fuels has become
an area of growing concern. China consumes almost as much coal as the rest of
the world combined, and it is feeling the effects. The term ‘airpocalypse’ was
coined in 2013 to describe China’s pollution crisis. On bad days, people are now
advised to remain indoors, and those venturing outside wear increasingly high-
tech facemasks in an attempt to mitigate the health effects of breathing in the
toxic combination of pollutants in the air.
Growing environmental protests are putting pressure on the government to

clean up but at the same time few are willing to compromise on economic
growth, leaving the government in a difficult position. This chapter looks at
energy security practices in China, tracing the process through which a
particular common sense understanding of energy security is created and
maintained, and the implications. I argue that energy security in China remains
narrowly focused on national security and economic goals; particularly
continued economic growth. Providing secure supplies at stable prices to secure
(p.86) the Chinese state remains central. That said, there has been a shift to
recognize the importance of sustainability. The difference between the
government’s position at the Copenhagen climate change summit in 2009—when
it was widely seen as resisting a global climate agreement—and at the Paris
summit in 2015, where it took an active role pushing for change, vividly
illustrate these changing attitudes. Yet when we look at the bigger picture,
China’s established energy security practices remain similar to those in the US.
They identify dependence on foreign states for supplies as bad and therefore
continue to emphasize domestic production, and fossil fuels continue to take
priority. Again, energy is considered to be a security issue: and yet again the
threat is framed as primarily to national security and political stability. The link
between energy security and the short-term survival of the status quo
reproduces a mindset where providing the state with continuous energy supplies
is central and difficult to question, even when it leads to policy choices which
call longer-term survival into question.
This chapter opens with a brief look at the history of energy and energy policy-
making in China. It then turns to look at Chinese energy security policy since
2004, focusing on legislation and regulation, production and consumption, the
policy-making process, and the role of energy security in foreign policy. The
following section examines the official discourse, to show how a particular
version of energy security is created and maintained as ‘common sense’,
drawing out four key themes. It then moves on to show how the common sense
created through these practices leads to an energy security paradox.
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Energy in China: History and Policy-making

For a long time, China treated fossil fuels as any other commodity.1 Self-
sufficient in energy and relatively late to industrialize, energy was viewed not as
an issue of national security but as a ‘domestic economic development
issue’ (Zhang 2011). Industrialization, economic reform, and opening up led to
increased energy demand by the late 1980s, and China became more and more
reliant on imports of crude and processed fuels. With growing import
dependence and growing energy demand, energy emerged on the security
agenda in the 1990s. It became a vital area of attention in 1993, when China
went from being a net oil exporter to becoming a net oil importer. So China has
only treated energy as a security issue in more recent times, and energy security
remains an evolving notion. Still, oil and oil supply have tended to be (p.87)
central because of fears of import dependence. As a result, much of the
discussion about energy security in China focuses on the international dimension
of energy policy, despite the fact that China remains largely self-sufficient in
energy. Self-sufficiency and the state are central in debates, with security closely
linked with state autonomy and survival.
China’s energy policy-making system remains somewhat opaque, but the

government’s broader direction and focus can be gleaned from its Five Year
Plans that set out core targets and direction of policy for the coming five years.
The most recent of these was introduced with a psychedelic promotional music
video in English urging people to ‘pay attention to the shisanwu’ (13–5, short for
13th Five Year Plan), chanting: ‘it’s a huge deal…like, China huge’. These work
as the top policy documents, with occasional white papers and other more
detailed programmes and policy plans released to follow up with more specific
details on different policy areas. With growing demand energy security became
a top priority in the early 2000s, as can be seen in the 10th Five Year Plan
(covering the period 2001–5). This is the point at which energy emerges clearly
framed as a security concern by policy-makers in China. The energy demand
shock in 2004 produced new questions about China’s energy security needs, and
the debate began to shift: from focusing solely on growing oil imports in the
1990s and early 2000s to recognizing the need to change consumption patterns
and look at other sources of energy to ensure continued economic growth. So in
a sense, the demand shock broadened the energy security debate (Interview
2012f). This is also reflected in a break between the 10th (2001–5) and the 11th
(2006–10) Five Year Plans—by the 11th there was a new focus on changing
energy consumption patterns and reducing energy intensity. From this point
there is a distinct shift to emphasize sustainability, although the scale of the
problem and implementation difficulties make it difficult to tell how much
impact this has had. The 12th Five Year Plan (2011–15) can be seen as a
continuation of this thinking but with actual quantitative targets, and the 13th
(2016–20) follows up with more targets covering both energy and environment.
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Like the US, China has had a debate over the whether to take a market/liberal or
a strategic/realist approach to energy security, and in practice China has
pursued a similar approach to the US, combining the two (Tunsjø 2010).
However, in China energy security underpins not just economic and national
security, but also the political survival of the Communist Party of China (CPC)
(Leung 2011). Statistics on China’s energy consumption and production vary,
and tend to use a range of measures. There are often accusations of government
tampering with statistics, but although uncertainty remains reliability has
improved. During most of its history, China has relied primarily on domestic
energy resources: its ‘rate of self-sufficiency has been above 90%, much higher
than that in most developed countries’ (Li 2011: 9). With (p.88)
industrialization, policy has focused on developing domestic energy resources to
retain self-sufficiency. Such initiatives have been largely successful: China
‘became the world’s largest energy producer during the 11th Five-Year period
[2005–10] with a strong foundation for energy production and supply’. This
period saw huge increases in domestic production of coal, doubled gas
production, and some increase in oil production, alongside major growth in
renewable energy (Li 2011: 9–12). But to put this in context, one source
suggests China’s primary energy consumption increased from 0.57 to 3.25 billion
ton coal equivalents between 1978 and 2010 (Fan and Xia 2012: 23):2 so
satisfying demand remains a concern. Oil imports have been of growing concern
since 1993, while coal has been seen as less of a security issue because domestic
supplies are plentiful.
Energy policy-making in China is a complex process with input from a number of

agencies and government departments, as well as industry stakeholders and
interest groups. The top leadership set out the energy security agenda, setting
targets for each five-year period in terms of energy production and consumption
by energy type, as well as efficiency and emissions. The leadership articulate
and implement national energy policies, and in the process try to satisfy a wide
range of interests. Policy debates in China differ from those in the United States,
in that debates ‘are often hidden and the participants frequently do not
acknowledge that differences of opinion exist’: in practice, this means that
rather than acknowledging differences of opinion openly officials often ‘talk
past’ each other (Downs 2004: 29)—as can be seen in the number of ‘key’
priorities identified by officials in this chapter. So there are still a number of
voices, approaches, and emphases on what energy security involves or should
involve, and the focus in this chapter is on the dominant strands.
China has not had an energy ministry since 1993. Energy administration, policy,
and planning duties are in the hands of the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), a planning department responsible for national economic
and social development. Within the NDRC, the National Energy Administration
(NEA) is the sub-department in charge of energy policy since 2008, when it
replaced the Energy Bureau. The NEA has a broad mandate, including
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‘managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies,
negotiating with international energy agencies, and approving foreign energy
investments’, but it ‘lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower, and tools to deal
with the country’s energy challenges’ (Downs 2008). In order to respond to this,
a National Energy Commission was established in 2010 with the prime minister
as its head ‘to step up strategic (p.89) policy-making and coordination’ (Xinhua
2010a). The Commission is responsible for ‘drafting national energy
development plans, reviewing energy security and major energy issues and
coordinating domestic energy development and international cooperation’,
according to the State Office Information Council, and it includes twenty-one
members from different government agencies (Xinhua 2010a). This also includes
the Minister of State Security as well as the head of the People’s Liberation
Army (CERS 2016), which illustrates the significance of energy as a national
security issue. In practice, the Commission coordinates different departments’
work on energy, while the NEA in the NDRC carries out its daily duties (PRC
NDRC 2012). So far, ‘the commission has functioned on a crisis-driven
basis’ (Zha 2014: 1).
Besides the NDRC’s NEA, a number of government departments play some role
in energy policy, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Commerce, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of
Environmental Protection. Unfortunately for Chinese energy policy-making, the
NDRC is a relatively weak planning agency, and China has had difficulties in
‘finding an appropriate mechanism for governing its energy industry’ (Zha 2006:
186). Problems in energy policy administration are long-standing, and the lack of
an energy ministry ‘greatly reduces the value of strategic plans the central
government wishes to implement’3 (Zha 2006: 186). The three big state-owned
enterprises (SOEs)—CNOOC, Sinopec, and China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC)—also play a role in forming energy policy. The relationship
between these companies and the state is debated and still evolving—they do not
simply follow government dictates, but work quite independently—sometimes
leading and pushing policy and occasionally even flouting government advice to
‘advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones’ (Downs 2008).
They are often consulted by government on policy and top staff ‘belong to the
pool of high-ranking cadres’; but on the other hand, most of the companies are
also publicly listed to various degrees, and thus also need to deliver profits to
share-holders (Zha 2014: 7). They remain a potential obstacle when it comes to
enforcing change and a shift towards sustainability since a continued focus on
fossil fuels is in their economic interest. As President Xi Jinping’s ongoing
corruption drive also demonstrates, corruption is a major concern in the ‘big
three’.
Energy is a relatively recent policy priority: the first white paper on energy was
published in 2007. It pointed to the need to strengthen energy legislation ‘to
provide a legal guarantee for increasing the energy supply, standardizing (p.90)
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the energy market, optimizing the energy structure and maintaining energy
security’ (PRC NDRC 2007a). Likewise marketization of the energy industry is
considered a priority, but alongside ‘national energy management’, which
remains key to ensuring energy security (PRC NDRC 2007b). The same areas
were noted in the 2012 white paper on energy, which recognized that markets
are ‘playing an increasingly important role in resource allocation’. It emphasized
the need for continuing work on legal reform to regulate the energy market
alongside marketization, together with the need to improve energy
administration and management (PRC Central Government 2012b: sections I and
VIII). End-use energy prices are still regulated by the government, though the
pricing system differs depending on the energy type (Li 2011: 13). The strategic
vs market debate is ongoing. China is often characterized (particularly by
foreign writers) as taking a strategic approach to energy security, with
mainstream thinking focused on securing state oil supply. But the debate is
opening up to include a wider range of perspectives, with a growing influence of
market-centred thinking as well as a focus on sustainability (Nyman and Zeng
2016).
While energy security and policy objectives are increasingly set out in white
papers by central government and the National Energy Commission with input
from the NEA as well as other government departments, bodies, and institutions,
China’s energy administration remains quite unclear. A large number of actors
are involved and these often have conflicting interests and/or overlapping
jurisdictions. Energy security is made up of a number of policy priorities, which
will be discussed in more detail later. The SOEs often resist change and
regulation, and energy administration and implementation remain relatively
weak. A recent documentary by Chinese journalist Chai Jing titled Under the
Dome discusses China’s energy and environmental problems, and points to the
ongoing monopoly of the ‘big three’. It found that petrochemical standards are
basically set by the industry since the dissolution of the Ministry of Petroleum.
Implementation of the government’s sustainability and efficiency targets at local
levels also remains a problem, compounded by the sheer scale of the country.
In some ways, shifting to a more sustainable energy mix is easier in China than
in the US: not only is the public pressuring the government for change, the
government also faces less political resistance. China already has regional cap
and trade trials and is developing a national scheme. The scale of China’s
environmental problems is also driving change. The growing space for
individuals and community groups to contest energy security is an important
development here, discussed further in chapter 6. That said, ensuring economic
growth remains a key concern and the economy is still heavily dependent on
fossil fuels, which limits possibilities for change. How this will play out in the era
of Xi Jinping remains to be seen. So far, his ‘China dream’ (p.91) strategy has
continued to emphasize economic growth and development, alongside
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crackdowns on corruption and dissent. However, he has also stressed the need
for ecological security to tackle China’s ‘environmental shortfalls’.
China’s Energy Security Policy

This section focuses on legislation and regulation, consumption and production,
change and continuity in the policy-making process, and the role of energy in
foreign policy.
Legislation and Regulation

China’s central government has released two white papers on energy, which set
out the broad aims and course for energy policy, including guidelines and
regulations for energy industries. They tend to follow after the Five Year Plans,
with the first appearing in 2007 and the second in 2012. The white papers have
provided a more coordinated direction for China’s energy policy, though calls for
reform in the energy policy-making process continue.
Appearing in 2007, the first white paper on energy was titled ‘China’s energy
conditions and policies’, and it set out the overall strategy and goals of energy
development; emphasizing conservation, increasing supply capacity, improving
energy technologies, coordinating energy and environmental development,
deepening energy system reform, and strengthening international cooperation
on energy. There was a focus on demand reduction and efficiency, reducing
reliance on foreign oil, and reducing dependence on coal. Overall, it avoided
quantitative goals, focusing on more generic aims, such as, ‘by 2010 the energy
supply will basically meet the demands of national economic and social
development; and obvious progress will have been made in energy
conservation’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: 13). The main exceptions to this are
reiterations of the goals already outlined in other plans, specifying a reduction in
per-unit GDP consumption of energy of 20 per cent from 2005 to 2010, and a 10
per cent reduction in the total amount of major pollutants discharged (PRC
NDRC 2007a: 13); as well as reiterating the goal of 10 per cent increase in
renewable energy consumption by 2010 and 15 per cent by 2020 (PRC NDRC
2007a: 23).
The 2012 white paper on energy was titled ‘China’s energy policy 2012’. It
contains similar key sections to the 2007 white paper, including continued focus
on conservation and improving energy technology and strengthening
international energy cooperation. It also adds a focus on ‘vigorously developing
new and renewable energy, promoting clean development of fossil energy;
improving universal energy service…[and] deepening institutional reform in the
energy sector’ (PRC Central Government 2012b). Like the 2007 white (p.92)
paper, it repeats goals set out in the preceding Five Year Plan, though this time
these goals are more specific, targeting consumption patterns in terms of energy
type: ‘by 2015 non-fossil energy will rise to 11.4 percent in the national total
primary energy consumption, energy consumption per unit of GDP will drop by
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16 percent from 2010, and CO2 emission per unit of GDP will decrease by 17
percent from 2010’. Likewise, ‘by 2020 non-fossil energy will account for 15
percent of its total primary energy consumption, and CO2 emission per unit of
GDP will be 40–45 percent lower than in 2005’ (both PRC Central Government
2012b: section II). It also contains more targeted goals for each energy industry.
It specifically addresses the problem of energy regulation in China, mentioning
ongoing work on an energy law, improvements to the ‘energy-related legal
regime to regulate the energy market’, and the need to ‘strengthen
administration’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section X).
In 2014 the central government released an Energy Development Strategy

Action Plan covering 2014–20 (for full text, see Xinhua 2014). This plays a
similar role to the previous white papers, setting out key targets and direction,
but in this case it preceded the Five Year Plan. The Plan reiterated the aim to
increase non-fossil fuels to 15 per cent of primary energy consumption by 2020.
It talked specifically about cutting coal consumption in the primary energy mix,
partly by increasing the total share of gas consumption. Here, the focus was also
on unconventional gas, in particular shale gas development. The Plan also
emphasized weaning the big city clusters off coal burning to ease air pollution in
these hotspots. Other relevant legislation includes the Renewable Energy Law
finalized in 2006, which set targets giving ‘first priority to the exploitation of
renewable energy and promotes the establishment and expansion of the market
for renewable energy by setting objectives for the total volumes of the
renewable energy to be exploited and taking appropriate measures’ (PRC
National People’s Congress 2007). It ‘comprises the legal framework for China’s
renewable energy policies…[covering] all relevant regulations, sectoral targets,
development plans, fiscal and subsidy policies, and national standards’ (Li 2011:
25). Likewise, China’s Energy Conservation Law was redrafted in 2007, coming
into effect 2008. This set out changes to the administration of energy
conservation, and stipulations by sector for improving conservation and
efficiency (PRC National People’s Congress 2009). It also referred to the
conservation of resources as ‘a fundamental State policy’ (article 4, PRC
National People’s Congress 2009). National targets feature clearly in these laws,
showing a new and clear commitment to renewable energy and conservation.
Production and Consumption

Historically, China has relied largely on domestically produced energy. For a
long time, the rate of self-sufficiency or energy independence was around (p.
93) 90 per cent, though today it lies around 85 per cent by most measures. Coal
remains key to the energy mix. Production and consumption patterns depend
largely on domestic resources, with the government playing a key role in setting
targets for all the relevant energy industries, as well as providing fiscal and tax
incentives to keep production and consumption in line with national targets. The
13th Five Year Plan (2016–20), released March 2016, focuses on restructuring
the economy, including making it less energy intensive (Xinhua 2016c). China
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remains a major energy producer. Its domestic coal reserves have made it
heavily dependent on coal, but thanks to growing energy consumption it is now
also a coal importer. China is facing large increases in energy demand with
increasing economic growth, though efforts have been made to limit
consumption increases through improved efficiency and conservation. It also
aims to increase domestic production to meet growing demand. Oil production
has declined as a percentage of total production, with increasing reliance on
imported oil (Fan and Xia 2012). China is also on schedule to meet renewable
energy targets set out in the Renewable Energy Law, and aims to increase shale
gas exploration and production.
In terms of consumption, China continues to rely heavily on coal, and its central
place in China’s energy mixture ‘will remain unchanged for a long time to
come’ (PRC NDRC 2007a), though environmental considerations increasingly
call this into question. Despite the overwhelming importance of coal, the oil
sector is the one most frequently emphasized in discussions about energy
security in China. This is largely down to the materiality of energy supplies in
China. The oil sector is particularly important because oil dominates
transportation, food production, and defence (all areas where it cannot be easily
replaced by another form of fuel), because consumption is growing with
development, and because oil resources are limited domestically and finite
globally—all of which makes securitization of oil more likely (Leung et al. 2014:
9). In terms of the overall mixture of sources of energy supply, it has remained
relatively unchanged in the period studied here, though total primary
consumption has increased heavily, as discussed in the previous section. Figure
5.1 shows China’s total energy consumption by fuel type in 2015.
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In 2015 coal made up 64 per

cent of China’s primary energy
mix: although this does
represent a decline in terms of
the overall energy mix, coal
consumption remains a major
concern in China. Recent
suggestions that coal
consumption may have peaked
are also still under debate,
though indications suggest it is
now decreasing. The high-
profile documentary Under the
Dome, which examined China’s Figure 5.1. China total energy
energy/air pollution crisis, consumption by fuel in 2015.
noted that China (as a country) Source: all data from BP Statistical
burns the most coal in the Review of World Energy 2016.
world, followed by Hebei
province: a single province in
China, albeit one with a huge heavy industry. The US is fourth on the list. Major
Chinese cities also suffer extra pollution from coal (p.94) being burnt in urban
areas. The 13th Five Year Plan builds on the targets from the 2014 Energy Plan,
to emphasize a shift towards cleaner energy as well as a bigger shift from
energy-intensive heavy industries to services and lighter industries. Many of the
key targets in the plan involve resources and/or environment, and it includes
new targets on reducing energy intensity and reducing carbon intensity. It also
encourages the development of non-fossil fuels. The emphasis is strongly on
building domestic energy capacity to ease supply concerns.
Growing energy demand is an increasing problem for China, and there is

recognition that ‘energy consumption has grown too quickly in recent years,
increasing the strain on energy supply…[f]ossil energy resources have been
exploited on a large scale, causing a certain amount of damage to the eco-
environment’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: preface). As a result, there have
been some calls for controls on energy consumption—in 2011 a senior NEA
official said the government will ‘boost energy production and control
consumption’, though no consumption control target was specified (Xinhua
2011). This was reiterated at the National Party Congress in November 2012,
(p.95) where outgoing President Hu stated: ‘[w]e should launch a revolution in
energy production and consumption, impose a ceiling on total energy
consumption, save energy and reduce its consumption’ (Hu 2012). However, it is
worth noting that the focus on conservation and efficiency has made some
impact—between 1978 and 2005 ‘China’s primary energy consumption rose by
5.16 percent on average each year, while GDP grew by 9.6 percent’ (Yang 2007).
Page 10 of 27
Total energy consumption is still increasing, though the rate of increase has
slowed dramatically (see Figure 5.2).
In terms of changing patterns of

consumption, there are also
ongoing calls to increase
natural gas consumption in
China in order to reduce
reliance on coal. While China
remains largely self-sufficient in
energy, imports are becoming
increasingly important, and are
often raised as a source of
concern.
Figure 5.2. China total energy
Policy-making Process: Change consumption 2000–15.
and Continuity
Source: all data from BP Statistical
There are increasing calls for Review of World Energy 2016.
strengthening China’s energy
policy-making process,
including legal reform to improve regulation of the market and energy
administration and management (PRC Central Government 2012b: sections I and
VIII). Institutional change and continuity has been largely covered in the earlier
part of this chapter, but it is worth noting that the energy planning and policy-
making process is continually evolving, with (p.96) increasing importance
placed on energy governance. The 2012 white paper on energy in particular
made this a clear priority, emphasizing the need to ‘strengthen top design and
overall planning’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section VIII). This can also be
seen in the 2010 creation of the National Energy Commission, headed by the
prime minister and including key staff in the NDRC and the NEA, as well as
other government departments (Xinhua 2010a). The creation of the new
Commission to oversee and coordinate energy policy above ministerial level is
an important indication of just how important energy has become. There has
been some talk about a shift in focus under Xi Jinping, with commitments to an
‘energy revolution’ and international energy cooperation. However, while this is
a significant shift in theory, serious energy sector reform has yet to be realized
(Interview 2016c). For genuine change to occur, the government would need to
break up the monopoly of the SOEs and introduce some competition in the
energy sector. There has been some modest progress but not enough to improve
the efficiency of the industry (Interview 2016c).
As in the US there is some division between staff working on energy security

and staff working on environmental issues, particularly before the 11th Five Year
Plan, which began in 2006 (Interview 2012e). From 2007 onwards, there was
more coordination between the NDRC and the Ministry of Environmental
Page 11 of 27
Protection as their objectives under the Plan coincided (Interview 2012e), and
this continues with the growing power of the Ministry of Environmental
Protection, granted by the increasing focus on environmental ‘shortfalls’ under
Xi Jinping.
Energy Security and Foreign Policy

Energy security is a major part of Chinese foreign policy, playing an important
role both in China’s bilateral relations with other states and in its international
engagement more broadly. It is mentioned as a key issue in most international
speeches by Chinese officials, ranging from diplomats and ambassadors to the
prime minister and president at G8 meetings, BRICS summits, the United
Nations, and so on. China also has a number of bilateral strategic partnerships
where energy plays a major role, both with energy exporters and others,
including the US and the EU. This can also be seen in China’s ‘Belt and Road
Initiative’ launched in 2016 to support economic development abroad, where
many of the projects supported are energy related. That said, it’s worth noting
that China is still not a member of the IEA, though it did achieve Association
Status in 2015. Maintaining political stability in oil-rich areas is also constructed
as key for ensuring energy security (Xinhua 2006). A more extreme example of
the growing link between energy and national security in Chinese thinking and
its impact on foreign policy can (p.97) be seen in China’s 2014 deployment of
peacekeeping troops to South Sudan. Despite a long-running policy of non-
interference, rising tensions in the region prompted the Chinese government to
deploy troops to protect its oil interests in the region. In terms of foreign policy,
China’s ambitious performance and national submission in the Paris climate
change negotiations is also notable. As one interviewee noted, China is no longer
being pushed on these issues—it is racing ahead. With the 13th Five Year Plan
China may even beat its Paris targets on carbon intensity. The Plan also includes
consumption controls, with quantitative targets: a major step forward in
environmental terms.
Energy Security in Official Discourse

Although China is largely self-sufficient in energy, security of oil supplies and the
stability of the oil market are key priorities—alongside retaining self-sufficiency.
Energy has been directly linked to national security both by Xi Jinping and by his
predecessor Hu Jintao, and security is central to contemporary Chinese thinking
on energy. Xi Jinping has placed more and more emphasis on security more
generally, too: in 2014 Xi opened a meeting of China’s new National Security
Commission with the announcement of a new ‘overall security outlook’
representing national security ‘with Chinese characteristics’ (Renmin Ribao
2014). He emphasized the complex nature of China’s security challenges, listing
eleven key areas of security, including traditional and non-traditional security
issues: resource security was on the list, alongside economic security and
ecological security. A new National Security Law (with an accompanying annual
‘National Security Day’) was passed in 2015, and it ‘covers almost every aspect
Page 12 of 27
of public life in China’, including the environment and resources as well as

protecting economic development from internal and external threats (Xinhua
2015). But although security remains central, the range of issues represented as
issues of security does suggest a shift in thinking on energy security. The
inclusion of ecological security in particular hints at a shift away from the
traditional focus on oil supply and growing focus on the links between energy
and climate change. This section draws out four intertwined key themes in
Chinese energy security discourses.
Supply Security and Price Security

China’s official discourse on energy security continually stresses the importance
of supply and price security. Increasing dependence on oil imports and
international markets make supply and price central concerns (Interview with
Gao 2012). Supply—particularly oil supply—largely takes priority, but today (p.
98) China is closer to the global energy market ‘so secure supplies at stable
prices are important’ (Interview with Gao 2012). Physical disruptions to oil
supply and volatile prices are considered core threats to China’s energy security.
China’s energy supply story is one of increasing tension between supply and
demand. Since the early 2000s the domestic energy industry has been subject to
growing marketization alongside increasing interaction with the international
energy market. Rapid development has led to huge growth in consumption,
putting heavy pressure on supply capacity and causing increasing environmental
pressure due to China’s heavy reliance on coal. Reliance on domestic sources of
energy forms the core of China’s energy supply strategy. However, increasing
imports have led to growing attention to global energy markets. In many
quarters, the response has been to call for increasing domestic energy supply to
‘ensure energy security’ (PRC Central Government 2005). Coal tends to be
emphasized here, since it is domestically available and could be used to reduce
dependence on foreign oil imports. The dual attention to domestic and
international supply security continues despite China’s high rate of energy self-
sufficiency.
Concerns over dependence on foreign supply are high and increasing domestic
supply remains the cornerstone of China’s response. The 2012 white paper notes
‘grave challenges to energy security’, listing China’s increasing dependence on
‘foreign energy sources’ in recent years, particularly oil (PRC Central
Government 2012b: section I). It continues the focus on domestic supplies,
suggesting that ‘China must rely on itself to increase the energy supply steadily
to satisfy such demands’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section V). In terms
of international supply security, the threat referenced is increasing dependence
on foreign oil and gas, and unstable international markets, as well as potential
political instability in energy-exporting regions. The 13th Five Year Plan similarly
stresses ‘building a modern energy system’ (to ensure self-sufficiency), including
changing patterns of energy production and consumption and ‘safeguarding
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national energy security’ (Xinhua 2016b). This includes a heavy emphasis on

renewables but also promoting ‘clean’ use of coal, and improving onshore and
offshore oil and gas development (including shale oil and gas). The security of
fossil fuel imports and energy transportation is also emphasized here.
Interviewees tended to emphasize supply as the central concern of China’s
energy security policy, pointing to diversification of oil supply and the build-up of
a strategic oil reserve for China as key developments (Interview 2016c). Both of
these can be seen as attempts to protect China from external threats.
Concerns over price stability largely relate to imports and therefore primarily to
oil. International energy prices remain a concern and are often linked to fears of
import dependence and the impact of price volatility on China’s economic
growth and stability. The international dimension is central here, (p.99) as
increasing marketization within China as well as increasing reliance on imported
oil have made China more vulnerable to volatile international energy markets.
China’s 2012 position paper to the UN pointed to the need for cooperation to
stabilize prices:
Joint efforts must be made to stabilize the prices of energy and other
commodities and prevent excessive speculation and market hype, so as to
meet the energy demands of all countries, particularly the developing
countries, and maintain order in the energy market.
(PRC Central Government 2012a)
The impact of international energy prices on domestic supply are considered

increasingly serious, with the 2012 white paper suggesting that ‘price
fluctuations in the international energy market make it more difficult to
guarantee domestic energy supply…[i]t will not be easy for China to maintain its
energy security since its energy [read oil] reserves are small and its emergency
response capability is weak’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I). The key
threat identified here is rising prices which damage economic growth.
Meanwhile, because of the volatility of the international oil market there are
calls for continued or even increased reliance on domestic coal, since it is
cheaper than importing oil or gas and not subject to volatile international prices
(PRC NDRC 2005a). Ultimately, the focus on supply and price security enables a
continued focus on domestic production and consumption of fossil fuels in China,
particularly coal.
National Security and Economic Growth

The importance of stable energy supplies and prices is closely related to national
security and economic growth: this is what needs to be protected according to
official discourse. Energy is constructed as important, as essential for national
security and economic growth, and here the role of energy in development plays
an important part. The thing being protected here is the survival and stability of
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the Chinese state. A 2003 report from China’s Energy Strategy and Policy
Research Group noted that ‘energy security, especially oil security, is
increasingly important’ (Chen et al. 2003). Likewise, the 2007 white paper states
that ‘energy is an essential material basis for human survival and
development’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: preface). In a 2011 white paper on China’s
development, energy is listed as a ‘common security issue’ that states need to
cooperate on, as a threat ‘to the world’, which will ‘have a major impact on
human survival and sustainable economic and social development’ (PRC Central
Government 2011: section IV). Around this period the development dimension is
central, and it is largely in this sense that energy is considered a security issue—
at the UN in 2005 President Hu listed energy security as a non-traditional
security issue posing a ‘severe challenge’ to development (Hu (p.100) 2005a).
Energy security is here considered a key issue for the policy agenda, and as
required to maintain both ‘economic security and national security’ (PRC NDRC
2006).
Energy is consistently listed as a new or ‘non-traditional’ security threat by

officials. The 2012 white paper reiterates this, calling energy ‘a major strategic
issue for China’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: preface), noting China’s
growing ‘dependence on foreign energy sources’, with a special emphasis on
imported petroleum (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I). Under Xi
Jinping the emphasis on resource security is more strongly linked to national
security and survival. The role and meaning of security has also been extended,
and the introduction to the 13th Five Year Plan argues that ‘traditional and non-
traditional security threats are intertwined’ (Xinhua 2016b). Chapter 73 of the
Plan focuses specifically on building a national security system, emphasizing
protecting national security, implementing the overall national security concept
(as promoted by Xi), and improving national security capabilities. Energy is also
mentioned here specifically as a risk to economic security. It is also noted under
general national security objectives, where ‘resources’ are listed as one of the
key areas of national security policy which could face risks. Reflecting on Xi
Jinping’s thoughts on the energy revolution, the director of the NEA, Nur Bekri,
argued that ‘in today’s world, energy is a national security area of national
priority’, central for development and security strategy (Bekri 2016). He also
raises dependence as an (energy) security concern, arguing that a low carbon
revolution is essential to protect long-term ‘national energy security’. But he has
also argued that coal is essential for China’s energy security (Renmin Ribao
2016), emphasizing clean coal and clean fossil fuel development and supply-side
reforms.
The role energy plays in economic growth and economic and social development
is continually highlighted. Economic growth as emphasized here is often
national, but sometimes also global. In 2005 Hu noted the need to address ‘the
growing constraint of energy, resources and environment on economic
development’ (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). Energy is noted as a key
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issue when it comes to ensuring continued economic growth. As part of this, Xi

Jinping (then president-in-waiting) said in 2008 that ‘China will try to meet the
demands for economic growth and the improvement of people’s life by
increasing domestic energy supply’ (Xinhua 2008). As part of this, China will
continue to rely on coal to fuel economic growth, though in a ‘greener
fashion’ (Xinhua 2010b). The 2007 white paper on energy sets out ‘developing
its economy and eliminating poverty’ as the main task for the Chinese
government (PRC NDRC 2007a: preface). Economic and social development
remains key to China’s energy industry targets (PRC NDRC 2007a: section II). In
2012 Li Keqiang noted:
As one of the major economies and the biggest developing country in the
world, China attaches great importance to energy supply and security, as
energy (p.101) provides the basic conditions for economic and social
development.
(PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a)
The 2012 white paper retains this focus on development, noting that energy is
‘an indispensable basic condition for the development of modern society’ (PRC
Central Government 2012b: preface). The key threat evident here is lack of
economic growth, which would have a serious impact on political legitimacy and
national security. Although the state remains the focus as referent object to be
secured in energy terms, two other referent objects are also present in these
discourses—global energy security is frequently promoted, and energy is also
occasionally linked with human survival.
Energy Self-sufficiency and the Importance of Domestic Supply

Energy self-sufficiency and continued reliance on domestic supply is another
central feature in Chinese energy security discourses. There are many parallels
with the American obsession with energy independence here. Fears of price
volatility and supply disruption make self-sufficiency central to any discussion of
China’s energy security. In 2005, Hu Jintao declared that:
Since the 1990s, China has always met over 90% of its overall energy
needs on its own. As a country with coal dominating its energy structure,
China still has a huge potential for domestic energy supply.
(PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005)
In the same year, Vice Premier Zeng also suggested that China needs ‘security of
supply based on domestic production’ (PRC NDRC 2005). The focus on the
domestic as secure is key. The 2007 white paper also emphasizes China’s
reliance on ‘domestic energy resources’, repeating the figure of 90 per cent self-
sufficiency (PRC NDRC 2007a: section IV): a statistic cited in most speeches and
documents discussing China’s supplies and energy security. Boosting domestic
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production of coal, as well as importing more coal, and increased domestic oil
and gas exploration, are seen as essential to ensure energy supplies due to
growing demand (Xinhua 2011). The 2012 white paper reiterated that ‘as the
world’s largest energy producer, China mainly relies on its own strength to
develop energy, and its rate of self-sufficiency has reached around 90
percent’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I). This is later reinforced as a
key part of China’s energy strategy: ‘The country relies on domestic resource
advantages…makes special efforts to enhance its energy supply capability and
security…and controls its dependence on foreign energy sources’ (PRC Central
Government 2012b: section II). Here the idea of secure domestic supplies is
clearly juxtaposed with ‘dependence’ on foreign energy sources, which needs to
be controlled. Leung et al. interviewed an official involved in the drafting of
China’s 2012 energy white paper, and (p.102) found that oil supply is
constructed as a security issue specifically because it can threaten the ‘self-
reliance’ of China in energy terms (Leung et al. 2014: 9): the security of the
state again remains at the centre here.
Because of the fear of increasing reliance on imported energy, coal remains

central. After the 11th Five Year Plan, a senior government energy researcher
suggested that while China will continue international cooperation to achieve
energy security in the period between ‘2006 to 2010, China will try to meet its
energy demand mainly with domestic supply, and will take coal as the main
source of energy’ (PRC Central Government 2006). Plans to increase natural gas
production and develop greener coal technologies are often suggested, and in
2011 an NEA official said that China would see continued increased coal
production and imports to fulfil demand, as well as a ‘focus on offshore oil and
gas exploitation during the 12th Five-year Plan (2011–15) period’ (Xinhua 2011,
2012). The 2012 white paper also states that ‘worldwide, fossil energy, including
coal and oil, will continue to play a dominant role in energy supply for a long
time to come. China is no exception. Therefore, China will continue to plan fossil
exploitation and utilization, with environmental protection taken into
account’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section V). Increased reliance on
imported oil is considered a key problem. To some, this means that ‘when you’re
talking about energy security in China, you’re really talking about oil
security’ (Interview 2012g).
The 2012 white paper notes increasing dependence on foreign energy sources as
a ‘grave challenge’ to energy security, particularly the rise in imported
petroleum to 57 per cent of total consumption, as well as the ‘ever-greater
security risks’ to ‘marine transportation of petroleum and cross-border pipeline
transmission of oil and gas’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I).
Increasing domestic supply of fossil fuels is usually cited as the solution to deal
with these potential threats. Lastly, new or ‘alternative’ energy is an increasingly
popular frame, playing a major part after the 12th Five Year Plan, with
quantitative targets for renewables (15 per cent by 2020), energy intensity,
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efficiency and conservation, as well as emissions targets (Xinhua 2010b). The

2012 white paper notes ‘rapid development in non-fossil energy. China has made
energetic efforts in developing new and renewable energy resources’ (PRC
Central Government 2012b: section I). The Energy Development Strategy Action
Plan from 2014 also emphasizes boosting ‘energy self-sufficiency’, noting that
the country is a major importer of fossil fuels (Xinhua 2014). The role of the
domestic as secure and the need for self-sufficiency, contrasted with foreign
energy sources constructed as insecure and volatile, plays a key role in justifying
increased fossil fuel production in China. However, though the focus remains on
fossil fuels, the same reasons are increasingly used to also call for new or
alternative energies.
(p.103) The Importance of a Stable International Environment

The need for a stable international environment and cooperation to ensure
energy security is another key theme in Chinese energy security discourses. It is
closely linked with the growing emphasis on stable international markets to
avoid price volatility for imported oil. Cooperation on energy is particularly
emphasized by leaders in speeches with an international audience. The global
nature of energy security is emphasized, particularly with both increasing
marketization of energy within China and with increasing reliance on imports, as
China becomes more vulnerable to unstable international energy markets.
Overall, ‘China is ready to strengthen energy dialogue and cooperation with all
countries, to jointly maintain energy security and stability of the world’ (PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). Energy is emphasized in bilateral meetings
with both energy producers and consumers, including Japan and South Korea,
India, the US, the EU, and Saudi Arabia. It is often noted that China needs to get
more involved in international energy organizations, including the IEA, of which
China is still not a full member. The 2007 white paper points to ‘strengthening
international cooperation in the field of energy’ as a key priority (PRC NDRC
2007a: section VIII). The emphasis on cooperation is tied in with a desire to not
be considered a threat. This also comes out in the 2012 white paper on energy,
which notes that ‘China did not, does not and will not pose any threat to the
world’s energy security’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: conclusion).
However, while cooperation is emphasized together with reliance on

international markets, there is also a perception that while there is scope for
cooperation between China and the United States on energy, their bargaining
power is asymmetric, and therefore ‘there is a need to rely on international
organisations to achieve China’s national interests’ in order to avoid
disadvantage (PRC NDRC 2006). Likewise, it is widely accepted that ‘energy is
clearly also a geopolitical issue’ (Interview 2012h). In this sense, the state and
national security remains at the centre of Chinese notions of energy security.
More recently, China appears not only interested in expanded cooperation, but
also in pursuing increased global energy governance. In 2012 Wen Jiabao
suggested that in order to ‘stabilize the oil and natural gas markets, we may
Page 18 of 27
consider establishing, under the G20 framework, a global energy market

governance mechanism…under the principle of mutual benefit’ (Wen 2012). This
theme contains a number of referent objects for energy security, particularly
evident in statements such as ‘[Prime Minister] Wen pointed out that energy
security is of great significance to the national economy and the people’s
livelihood as well as to ensuring a full recovery and long-term development of
the world economy’ (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012b). It is heavily related
to market and price security, as well as strategic (p.104) supply security, as a
stable international environment and international cooperation over energy
underpins all of these.
These four themes dominate the official discourse on energy security. Here,
energy security is primarily about securing energy supplies at stable prices to
protect national security and economic growth. Self-sufficiency and increasing
domestic energy supply is considered central to achieve this. Meanwhile, the
international environment is constructed as a context within which these
activities have to take place, and its political stability is considered paramount to
ensure the state continues to be secure in energy terms. China’s interaction in
the international sphere has been reluctant, and despite a discourse that
emphasizes cooperation its international engagement is one designed to protect
China’s (national, economic, energy) interests above all. It is also a counter-
discourse intended to ease international fears over China’s international energy
engagements. These different discursive themes interact with policy and other
practices to create a particular common sense where securing the state’s energy
supplies is central to protect national security and economic growth, and
increasing domestic supply to ensure self-sufficiency is considered the safest
route to achieving that. Again, dependence on the outside world for supplies is
considered problematic. All of this works to reproduce a mindset where energy
security necessarily equals providing the state with continuous energy supplies
at any cost, and this common sense becomes difficult to question.
There are some indications of changing thinking even in official discourse. These
are discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Official discourse
sometimes presents alternative constructions of energy security that are rarely
recognized in the academic literature, which tends to portray China’s thinking
as realist/strategic and mercantilist. There are some indications of a broadening
understanding of energy security to include sustainability and human well-being,
particularly more recently. While the emphasis on national, or domestic, security
remains, the inclusion of multiple referents of energy security is particularly
interesting. At the G8 meeting in 2006, Hu pointed to the need for increased
cooperation on clean energy as ‘part of the overall effort to ensure sustainable
development of human society’ (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). Xi Jinping
also justified increased domestic energy supply to meet demands for economic
growth and improve people’s lives (Xinhua 2008). The 2011 white paper on
development mentioned energy security among global security issues that have
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‘major impact on human survival and sustainable economic and social

development’ (PRC Central Government 2011). Sustainability, efficiency, and
conservation to improve the environment are also increasingly common topics in
discussions on energy security. The 2012 white paper also concluded that ‘the
Chinese government will strive to address the energy problem properly by
following (p.105) the sustainable road of energy development’ (PRC Central
Government 2012b: conclusion). At the 18th Party Congress in November 2012,
Hu advocated the need for major progress on ‘building a resource-conserving
and environmentally friendly society’ (Hu 2012). This has continued with
growing emphasis on tackling environmental problems.
So to some degree, it’s fair to say that China’s thinking on energy security is
changing. There is some debate over this, however—some of those interviewed
during this research suggest the leadership is still very strongly focused on
security of oil supplies. The changes that we can see more clearly tend to
highlight security ‘with Chinese characteristics’: security remains key, but the
meaning of security is widening. Some of this can be explained by the growing
rate of environmental degradation in China—in particular the visible effects of
air pollution—and resulting public demands for action. The survival and stability
of the state itself is therefore also increasingly threatened by the environmental
consequences of energy use. So I would suggest ‘security with Chinese
characteristics’ is primarily concerned with taking in new forms of threat to the
state, as opposed to broadening the referent of security beyond the state.
Sustainability and ecological security are increasingly considered to be
‘strategic’ tasks. This also comes out in the 13th Five Year Plan, which contains
a chapter on ‘protecting national ecological security’ (Xinhua 2016a: ch. 47).
That said, the preceding chapter also discusses the need to respond actively to
‘global climate change’, shifting the referent from the national to the global
level. It is often difficult to separate these different goals—China’s sustainable
development policy aims to balance economic growth with environmental
protection, ultimately in the aim of national security. But although China is
beginning to restructure its economy in response, change is slow and
implementing changes in the national energy security system is difficult,
particularly given both the relatively weak central administration over energy,
and the power of the SOEs.
Overall, the emphasis remains on national security and securing enough

resources of any kind to continue economic growth. The biggest problem here
remains continued heavy reliance on domestic coal supplies, justified in national
security terms. Official constructions of energy security still focus on securing
supplies for continued national economic growth, and China remains the biggest
greenhouse gas emitter.
Page 20 of 27
China’s Energy Security Paradox

The meaning of energy security in China is evolving, but as can be seen here a
number of themes characterize Chinese energy security practice and work
together to make up an accepted ‘common sense’ notion of energy security. (p.
106) China’s energy security practices emphasize the need for supply security
and stable prices, both of which are closely related to preserving continued
economic growth and national security. Oil security is a priority as the key
imported energy source, because continued self-sufficiency remains a central
goal. In part because of fears over increasing reliance on imported oil, coal
remains central to Chinese energy supply. While energy policy documents and
legislation emphasize conservation and sustainability, growing energy demand
and consumption make the effect negligible so far. China has made impressive
commitments and progress on renewable energy production, but when it comes
to energy security, increasing domestic production of coal, oil, and gas to ensure
stable supplies and prices by keeping China self-sufficient in energy takes
precedence. Because coal is domestically available, we are told that China
should take full advantage of domestic coal resources to reduce dependence on
foreign oil imports. In the name of ensuring ‘a stable energy supply’, continuing
increases in oil, gas, and coal production are sought through various energy
exploration programs (Xinhua 2012). Likewise, the policy-making process places
energy security, understood in national security terms, as the top priority.
Ultimately, national security takes precedence over the environment, and the
priority remains on secure (domestic) sources of energy to fuel continued
economic growth. The ‘domestic’—as both a source of security and the sphere to
be secured—is continually contrasted with the threat of dependence on ‘foreign’
sources of energy. In this sense, the state and national security remain at the
centre of Chinese notions of energy security. This works to create a reality
where increasing domestic fossil fuel supplies makes sense. Economic
development of the scale that China is undertaking makes rising energy
consumption difficult to avoid, but it does not necessitate prioritizing fossil fuels
in the name of self-sufficiency. There are some indications of a broadening
understanding of energy security more recently, and policy is changing to reflect
this, but it will take time before it has any real impact on production and
consumption patterns. The scale of China’s fossil fuel consumption necessitates
major improvements in renewable capacity before we can see real easing of
environmental problems. So although thinking on energy security is evolving,
current practices still produce a security paradox. This final section
demonstrates the two levels of the energy security paradox produced by these
‘common sense’ energy security practices in China.
On the first level, common sense energy security practices create insecurity for
the state itself, causing mutual hostility and making all less secure. Energy
security remains closely linked with a narrow notion of national security and
policies continue to emphasize providing continued supplies of fossil fuels to the
Page 21 of 27
state. It leads to a mindset where ‘we’ are distinguished from threatening

‘others’ who may harm our supply security, encouraging zero-sum (p.107)
competition over energy. The seemingly endless supplies of finance for China’s
state-owned energy companies to undertake engagements both domestically and
abroad clearly illustrate the priorities here. So current energy security practices
increase tension and provoke mutual hostility, encouraging competition to
maximize supplies. China’s internal debate between realist/strategic and more
liberal voices is ongoing, and can be seen clearly in discussions over energy. In
some cases, liberal voices in favour of cooperation and globalization have gained
prominence, as can be seen in China’s growing involvement in the IEA as well as
the role it played in the Paris climate negotiations.
But running parallel to this is a darker nationalist strand of thought, where the
nationalist sentiments of the populace are drawn upon to push a more
aggressive ‘China first’ foreign policy. This can be seen for example in China’s
aggressive security behaviour in the South and East China Seas, where it is
increasingly asserting territorial claims based on ‘historical rights’. Much of this
can also be linked to energy resources, since some of the island groups claimed
are also thought to have potential resources to exploit. This again reflects the
exclusive us/them logic of China’s common sense thinking on energy security.
This has spread mistrust and increased tension between China and its
neighbours, in particular Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, who have all been
contenders for territories, as well as between China and the United States,
which has long been a strong naval presence in the region. This in turn
undermines longer-term stability in the region.
Chapter 3 discussed CNOOC’s failed bid for US energy company Unocal,

withdrawn after US politicians called the attempted takeover a security threat.
In China, these actions were interpreted as an attempt by the US to contain
China’s rise, heightening tension and feelings of mistrust (see Nyman 2014). But
similar tensions can also be seen in the regions of the world where Chinese
companies seek energy supplies. China’s aggressive energy procurement in the
Middle East and Africa has been interpreted as threatening by and in the United
States, in particular because the main Chinese energy companies involved are
partially state-owned. This policy was pushed particularly strongly in the early
2000s as part of China’s ‘going out’ strategy, where government deals with oil-
and gas-producing nations were used to increase energy supply. Meanwhile,
China interprets US fears and actions as further attempts to contain China’s
rise. China continued energy deals with Iran for some time during US sanctions,
prioritizing energy supply and damaging bilateral relations. China has also
undertaken contentious energy deals with Myanmar among others, and has
continued to trade coal with North Korea despite international sanctions.
China’s energy security paradox can also be seen in its assertive dam-building as
it develops hydropower capacity to ease energy supply concerns. Here policies
that aim to increase China’s energy (p.108) security have gravely affected
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water supply in downstream nations, heightening bilateral tension and

damaging relations with affected countries, including Vietnam. In all of these
examples, China’s common sense energy security practices cause international
tension and mistrust, making all less secure.
Turning now to the second level of the energy security paradox, the common
sense also produces insecurity above and below the state level. China’s
obsession with energy self-sufficiency combined with its economic growth have
driven huge increases in energy production and consumption, the vast majority
of which is satisfied by domestically available fossil fuels. Energy security is
linked to development to justify exploiting domestic resources, while China’s
dependence on fossil fuels, particularly coal, has made it the world’s top energy-
related CO2 emitter (EIA 2015). The question of energy is at the heart of climate
change and China’s energy security policies are having a disastrous impact on
the global environment and climate as well as on its own environment. In its
attempt to protect national security, Chinese common sense energy security
practices legitimize choices that make the climate, environment, and ecosystems
less secure in the long term. Continued economic growth is emphasized
throughout. It is often explicitly linked to social development, and it is important
to remember that there is a complex relationship between security and
insecurity here: China’s economic growth is providing security and improving
life experiences for millions of very poor citizens, while at the same time it is
causing irreversible environmental damage that will affect the future survival of
those very same citizens.
China’s energy security practices have global consequences, affecting the global
climate and environment in unpredictable and irreversible ways. The established
common sense legitimizes a growing emphasis on unconventional oil and gas as
well as a continued focus on coal extraction. The obsession with economic
growth and economic prosperity and national security legitimizes a continued
focus on fossil fuels which are causing irreversible damage to the global climate
and environment. Increased domestic fossil fuel production is considered
unequivocally positive, and energy consumption is still rising. As the biggest
CO2 emitter globally, Chinese energy security practices affect all of us. In 2014
some statistics suggested that China’s emissions may have peaked, but updated
figures in 2016 illustrated that emissions likely continued to rise, though there
may have been a 0.1 per cent drop in 2015 (Korsbakken et al. 2016). Clearly, this
is not enough given the challenge we are facing globally. Meanwhile, China’s
SOEs continue to push for weaker environmental legislation, and their
entrenched position make changes difficult to implement. This not only affects
the global environment, China’s own government assessment notes that ‘China
is one of the countries most vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate
change’ (PRC Central Government 2012c). In China, climate change is likely to
have a particularly serious impact (p.109) on water and food security, affecting
human livelihoods as well as causing long-term displacement from heavily
Page 23 of 27
affected areas (Lewis 2009). Climate change is taken more seriously by the
government today, as can be seen in China’s shifting role in the Paris climate
change negotiations. But without technological developments to reverse some of
the damage already caused, current emissions targets leave a lot to be desired.
Beyond the global level, China is also experiencing more localized insecurities at
national and regional levels as a direct consequence of its energy security
practices. These relate particularly to the production processes of turning oil,
gas, and coal into energy, and affect human security, well-being, and survival as
well as environmental security and stability. Coal mining accidents are
particularly prevalent in China, although statistics vary widely. According to one
source, deaths averaged 7,619 annually, or twenty per day, between 1996 and
2000, though more recently it has been significantly lower: in 2015, deaths
dropped below 1,000 for the first time (Lelyveld 2015). Some regions have been
made unsafe for human habitation by excessive underground mining, causing
the ground itself to sink. As a result, Shanxi province alone will have moved over
650,000 people out of unsafe regions by 2017 (Cendrowski 2016). Alongside this,
oil and gas exploration accidents have caused major pollution incidents, though
these have received less international media attention than the BP Deepwater
Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico. China suffered major oil spills in Dalian
in north-east China in 2010, and in 2011 in Bohai Bay, also in north-east China.
In 2013 an oil pipeline exploded in Qingdao, killing sixty-two people. The
environmental contamination from these accidents also damage ecosystems and
local livelihoods, in particular for people dependent on farming and fishing.
China has abundant reserves of shale gas, and is very keen to develop these to
ease supply concerns. However, the geological and practical conditions differ
from those in the US, and it has yet to see a similar boom. This was an area
initially opened up for negotiation in the US–China climate talks in 2014, but
progress stalled over intellectual property disagreements. Despite these
difficulties, China’s gas production is increasing. Given growing evidence of the
harmful environmental impact of fracking in the United States, China’s
underdeveloped environmental regulations are highly unlikely to provide
sufficient protection. Like coal production, fracking is water intensive, and water
is another resource China does not have plenty of. But environmentally
questionable shale gas production is still considered more desirable than
importing gas, because of the priority placed on self-sufficiency. Fracking in
China comes at a serious environmental cost. Its shale reserves are ‘deeper
underground and in more complex geological formations’, which means they will
likely need up to twice as much water to extract (Lee and West 2014).
Groundwater and soil contamination is a major concern, because wastewater (p.
110) is rarely properly stored and/or disposed of—and the increased
earthquake risk related to fracking makes contamination even more likely (Lee
and West 2014). Jiaoshizhen has seen the dark side of China’s fracking industry:
a rig explosion in 2014 is said to have killed a number of workers, and villagers
Page 24 of 27
now say fields and streams are polluted (Bradsher 2014). But again, very little
information is available, and Sinopec (the SOE involved) has denied an accident
occurring at the time. All of these practices are justified and legitimized by the
accepted common sense understanding of energy security, which prioritizes
energy supply above environmental and human security.
Alongside these localized impacts on human and environmental stability, the

common sense also legitimizes a continued focus on fossil fuels, a major cause of
air pollution which in turn reproduces health insecurity. It has been associated
with a number of health effects as well as acid rain. China burns three to four
times more fossil fuels than Europe, and around 60 per cent of China’s air
pollution comes from burning fossil fuels (Chai 2015). The impact of air pollution
in China is increasingly well documented and to a large extent attributable to its
heavy reliance on coal:
In 2007…the World Bank estimated that outdoor air pollution in China was
causing between 350,000 and 400,000 premature deaths each year, more
than Chinese historians estimate their country suffered in the Korean War.
Sensitive to the outrage such figures could produce, the Chinese
government insisted that the World Bank not publish the figures, citing
threats to ‘social stability’.
(Kennedy 2010: 145)
Air pollution is an increasingly visible problem in China. A 2014 study by the

Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences found that pollution has made Beijing
almost ‘uninhabitable for human beings’ (Li 2014). It is causing increased rates
of lung cancer and breathing the air in Beijing has been likened to smoking
nearly forty cigarettes a day, with suggestions that air pollution is a cause of 1.6
million deaths just in China each year (Economist 2015b).
In 2015 Chai Jing’s documentary Under the Dome, which chronicles China’s air
pollution problems, went viral—some sources suggest it was viewed around 300
million times before it was taken offline after just a week. The film builds on
Chai’s personal experiences of giving birth to a daughter with a tumour that she
believes to be linked to pollution, combined with journalistic investigation into
China’s energy and environmental policy and regulation. It paints a dark picture
of the state of China’s climate, including interviews with children who have
never seen stars, white clouds, or a blue sky. This is now a daily reality for some
Chinese. Some schools have even built giant domes to protect students from
smog and allow them to play ‘outside’. The Carbon Map initiative traces social
vulnerability related to carbon emissions, and suggests that over 100 million
Chinese are ‘already suffering from droughts, floods or (p.111) extreme
temperatures’, which ranks China as a ‘very high risk’ country (Carbon Map
2016). China’s fossil fuel pollution threatens the environment and the health of
Page 25 of 27
millions of people, particularly bearing in mind that air pollution does not stop at
national borders. The human cost of pollution is high: it actively makes humans
less secure, directly and indirectly, and makes the environment less secure,
which in turn also undermines long-term human and planetary survival.
It is clear that the common sense legitimizes practices that cause an energy
security paradox, making states, human beings and the environment less secure.
Even in China, many still view energy security as something that is separate
from climate policy, suggesting that the ‘Paris Agreement is not strongly linked
to China’s energy security’ and ‘will not have a direct impact’ on China’s energy
security (Interview 2016c). When discussing the successes and failures of
China’s energy policy, one interviewee said:
I think the biggest success so far is the energy development itself—that it’s
not a barrier for the country’s economic development. If you look at
China’s economic growth, energy supply has generally kept pace with
economic development—this is the biggest success, that it hasn’t been a
barrier. But it’s also at the same time the biggest failure, when we consider
the environmental consequences of China’s economic development,
including air quality and air pollution. So the government needs to step up
its efforts to reduce energy related environmental impact.
(Interview 2016c)
Economic growth clearly remains the core priority, but as this quote suggests
and as the next chapter illustrates, environmental protection is now taken more
seriously, though it is rarely considered an integral part of energy policy. Tension
remains between these objectives, but environmental degradation is now in itself
becoming a potential threat to stability, which is pushing action. This can be
seen in Xi Jinping’s focus on China’s ‘environmental shortfall’—a vague term
which may also be an indirect attempt to turn this into a policy issue while
avoiding more serious/flammable rhetoric that could encourage protest. On the
ground, however, implementation of existing environmental legislation often
remains poor.
Notes:
(1) Some of this is also discussed in a co-authored paper, see Nyman and Zeng
(2016).
(2) The IEA measures this using ‘toe’ (tons of oil equivalent), to a consumption
increase from 420 million toe in 1980 to 2,150 million toe in 2009 (IEA 2012).
(3) Zha details that ‘the Ministry of Fuel Industries was abolished in 1955, when
separate ministries for coal, electricity and oil were established. In 1970 a new
Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries combined the functions of those three
ministries, but it had to be dissolved five years later. In 1988 a Ministry of
Page 26 of 27
Energy was launched to oversee coal, oil, nuclear and hydroelectric

development, but it was again dissolved in 1993’ (Zha 2006: 186).
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‘Common Sense’ Energy Security in China

The Energy Security Paradox: Rethinking Energy

Print publication date: 2018

‘Common Sense’ Energy Security in China

Abstract and Keywords

transportation in particular) and price have been central in China’s energy

Growing environmental protests are putting pressure on the government to

Energy in China: History and Policy-making

China’s energy policy-making system remains somewhat opaque, but the

Energy policy-making in China is a complex process with input from a number of

China’s Energy Security Policy

Legislation and Regulation

In 2014 the central government released an Energy Development Strategy

Production and Consumption

In 2015 coal made up 64 per

Growing energy demand is an increasing problem for China, and there is

In terms of changing patterns of

As in the US there is some division between staff working on energy security

Energy Security and Foreign Policy

Energy Security in Official Discourse

of public life in China’, including the environment and resources as well as

Supply Security and Price Security

national energy security’ (Xinhua 2016b). This includes a heavy emphasis on

(PRC Central Government 2012a)

The impact of international energy prices on domestic supply are considered

National Security and Economic Growth

Energy is consistently listed as a new or ‘non-traditional’ security threat by

issue when it comes to ensuring continued economic growth. As part of this, Xi

(PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a)

Energy Self-sufficiency and the Importance of Domestic Supply

(PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005)

Because of the fear of increasing reliance on imported energy, coal remains

efficiency and conservation, as well as emissions targets (Xinhua 2010b). The

(p.103) The Importance of a Stable International Environment

However, while cooperation is emphasized together with reliance on

consider establishing, under the G20 framework, a global energy market

‘major impact on human survival and sustainable economic and social

Overall, the emphasis remains on national security and securing enough

China’s Energy Security Paradox

state. It leads to a mindset where ‘we’ are distinguished from threatening

Chapter 3 discussed CNOOC’s failed bid for US energy company Unocal,

water supply in downstream nations, heightening bilateral tension and

Alongside these localized impacts on human and environmental stability, the

(Kennedy 2010: 145)

Air pollution is an increasingly visible problem in China. A 2014 study by the

Energy was launched to oversee coal, oil, nuclear and hydroelectric

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