1) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.

178552
October 5, 2010

VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

Distinguish "overbreadth doctrine" from "void-for-vagueness" doctrine. (2010 Bar) Overbreadth

doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. It assumes that individuals understand what a statute
prohibits and accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.

On the other hand, void-for-vagueness doctrine pertains to statutes which are too vague and people
of common intelligence would have to guess at the statute's meaning and differ as to its application.
The void- for-vagueness doctrine serves two purposes. First: All persons receive a fair notice of what is
punishable and what is not. Second: The vagueness doctrine helps prevent arbitrary enforcement of
the laws and arbitrary prosecutions (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010).

Note: Void-for-vagueness can be used to invalidate a criminal law, but only limited to "as applied"
challenge. Overbreadth doctrine applies only to facial challenge invalidation, and as such, limited to
free speech cases.

2) Segovia, et al. V. The Climate Change Commission, G.R. No.211010, March 7, 2017

C petitioned for a writ of kalikasan, alleging that the government has failed in its mandate to reduce
fossil fuel consumption, implement the Road Sharing Principle, devote public spaces along sidewalks
and reduce air pollutant emissions. Is the petition proper?

No. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
a. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology,
b. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, and
c. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

Where there are no substantial allegations that unlawful acts and omissions have been actually
committed, other than repeated'invocations of the constitutional right to health and a balanced and
healthful ecology, there is no showing that the requisites for the petition for a writ of kalikasan are
present (Segovia, et al. V. The Climate Change Commission, G.R. No.211010, March 7, 2017).

3) Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658,

231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017

Declaration of Martial Law and Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
Requisites and Parameters of Extension

Proclamation No. 216 was the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus which is effective for 60 days. Petitioner M posits that martial
law is a measure of last resort and should be invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less
severe remedies. It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed
sequentially,

i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces;

second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
and finally, the power to declare martial law. It maintains that the President has no discretion to
choose which extraordinary power to use.

a. Does the President have the discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use?
b. The petitioners contend that the President had no sufficient factual basis for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 because, among others, acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute
rebellion since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from
allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory, and that the President's Report contained "false,
inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts." Is the petitioners' contention
correct?
c. Distinguish the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article
VlI of the 1987 Constitution from the power to revoke by Congress.

A) Yes, the President has discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use. The 1987
Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated powers'. From
the most to the least benign, these are the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. However, this graduation refers only
to hierarchy based on scope and effect and it does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the
President decides which power to choose. The power to choose, initially, which among these
extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the
President. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which power to avail given a set of facts or conditions (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017, Covered Case).

B) No, the Constitution requires sufficiency of factual basis, not accuracy. The parameters for
determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows:
1) actual rebellion or invasion;
2) public safety requires
it; the first two requirements must concur; and
3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. The
phrase sufficiency of factual basis" in Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution should be understood as the
only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus." Accuracy is not the same as sufficiency as the former requires a higher
degree of standard. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden
him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making (Lagman V. Medialdea, G.R. Nos.
231658, 231771 & 231774 (Resolution), December 5, 2017, Covered Case).

C) The President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress. The Court may strike
down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of
lack of sufficient factual basis. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at
the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Congress may take into consideration not only data available
prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Congress could probe deeper and further; it
can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it. Congress' review mechanism is automatic
in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made (Lagman v. Medialdea, supra, Covered Case)

4) Lagman v. Pimentel Ill, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018

In May 2017, Pres. Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao effective for 60
days, to address the rebellion mounted by the Maute Group and the Abu Sayyaf. The proclamation
was approved by Congress. In June 2017, the President requested Congress to extend the effectivity
of Proclamation No. 216 up to December 2017, which the Congress granted. Pres. Duterte requested
another extension of the proclamation for a year. Again, Congress approved the extension. AAA
questions the validity of the extensions, arguing that the Constitution only allows one-time extension.

held: The subsequent extensions are valid and constitutional. Congress has the power to extend and
determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Sec 18, Art. Vil of the Constitution is silent as to how many times Congress may extend the
proclamation of martial law.
The only limitations are;
(1) that the extension should be upon the President's initiative;
(2) that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion, and the demands of
public safety; and
(3) that it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any
citizen. The said provision did not fix the period of extension. The Constitution clearly gave the
Congress authority to decide the duration of state of martial law (Lagman v. Pimentel Ill, G.R. No.
235935, February 6, 2018, Covered Case).

5) De Castro V. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

Midnight and Ad Interim Appointments

Margie has been in the judiciary for a long time, starting from the lowest court. Twenty (20) years
from her first year in the judiciary, she was nominated as a Justice in the Court of Appeals. Margie
also happens to be a first-degree cousin of the President. The Judicial and Bar Council included her in
the short-list submitted to the President whose term of office was about to end, it was a month
before the next presidential elections.

A) Can the President still make appointments to the judiciary during the so-called midnight
i appointment ban period?
B) Assuming that he can still make appointments, could he appoint Margie, his cousin? (2014 bar)

a) Yes, the President may still make appointments. The prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court (De Castro V. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010).

b) Yes, the President can appoint his cousin. Under Sec. 13, par. 2, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of
the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including GOCCs and their subsidiaries. Following the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
exclusion of the judiciary means that the above provision does not preclude the President from
appointing his spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree to the
judiciary.

6) (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017,

"A" is the accused in a criminal case for violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. "A" filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea-Bargaining Agreement. The
prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of RA 9165 which
provides for the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases. Is Section 23 of RA 9165
constitutional?
-No. The 1987 Constitution textually altered the 1935 and 1973 Constitution by deleting the
concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-
making powers. Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. It
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017, Covered Case).

7) Baguilat v.Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.,

The election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives was held with 252 members voting for A
and 8 members voting for B, the 2nd highest of votes. A "long-standing tradition" of the House is that,
the candidate who garnered the 2nd highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes
the Minority Leader. Pursuant to such tradition, B should be declared and recognized as the Minority
Leader. However, those who did not vote for Speaker A convened and elected X as the Minority
Leader. A petition for mandamus was filed insisting that B should be recognized as the Minority
Leader in light of the "long-standing tradition". Will the petition for mandamus lie?

-No, mandamus will not lie. The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representative, its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16, par. (1). Sec. 16 (3), Art. V of the Constitution vests
in the House of Representatives the sole authority to "determine the rules of its proceedings. These
"legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them". Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern
to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority of the House of Representatives]. As such, the method of choosing who will
be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision (Baguilat v.Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017, Perlas-
Bernabe, J.,Covered Case).
Therefore, X is rightfully elected as the Minority Leader.

8) Padilla V. Congress, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017

Does Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution require the Congress to automatically convene in joint
session in the event that the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part thereof?

No. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to
revoke the President's declaration or suspension. By the language of Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the Congress is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is worthy to stress that
the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." The provision only requires Congress to vote
jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension (Padilla V. Congress, G.R.
No. 231671, July 25, 2017, Covered Case).

9) Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017

Previous petitions challenging the intended burial of the mortal remains of Marcos at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani were dismissed by the Supreme Court. Marcos was finally laid to rest at the LNMB around
noontime of Nov 18, 2016. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be
allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of
revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial
Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship
charter" and a "human rights constitution." Does the Court have authority to check and override the
President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB?

No, Court has no authority to check and override the President's decision to bury Marcos at the
LNMB. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence. Judicial power covers only the recognition, review or reversal of the policy
crafted by the political departments if and when a case is browght before it on the ground of illegality,
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion (i.e., blatant abuse of power or capricious exercise
thereof). The determination of the wisdom, fairness, soundness, justice, equitableness or expediency
of a statute or what "ought to be as a matter of policy is within the realm of and should be addressed
to the legislature. If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government,
specifically the duly elected representatives who carry the mandate of the popular will, may be
exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. No matter how well-meaning, the
Court can only air its views in the hope that Congress would take notice (Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
225973, August 8, 2017, Covered Case)

10) Gamboa V. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011

BD Telecommunications, Inc. (BDTI), a Filipino-owned corporation, sold its 1,000 common shares of
stock in the Philippine Telecommunications Company (PTC), a public utility, to Australian
Telecommunications (AT), another stockholder of the PTC which also owns 1,000 common shares. A
Filipino stockholder of PTC questions the sale on the ground that it will increase the common shares
of AT, a foreign company, to more than 40% of the capital (stock) of PTC in violation of the 40%
limitation of foreign ownership of a public utility. AT argues that the sale does not violate the 60-40
ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens decreed in Section II, Article Xll of the Constitution
because Filipinos still own 70% of the capital of the PTC. AT points to the fact that it owns only 2,000
common voting shares and 1,000 non-voting preferred shares while Filipino stockholders own 1,000
common shares and 6,000 preferred shares, therefore, Filipino stockholders still own a majority of the
outstanding capital stock of the corporation, and both classes of shares have a par value of Php 20.00
per share. Decide. (2015 Bar)

The sale is unconstitutional for violating Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution. Under the Constitution,
no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the
laws of the Philippines at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens. The term "capital" in
Sec. 11, Art. Xll of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors, and not to the total outstanding capital stock, which is the combined total of common and
non-voting preferred shares (Gamboa V. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011).

In this case, although Filipino stockholders own a majority of the outstanding capital stock, AT in
reality owns more than 40% of the "capital."

11) Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034 & 199046, April 17, 2018,

The DOJ issued a Circular prescribing certain rules and regulations governing the issuance and
implementation of watchlist orders. It provides for the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue a
Watchlist Order against persons with criminal cases pending preliminary investigation or petition for
review before the DOJ. It states that the DOJ Secretary may issue an Allow Departure Order (ADO) to
a person subject of a Watch List Order who intends to leave the country for some exceptional
reasons. Is the Watch List Order constitutional?

No. By requiring an ADO before the subject of an HDO or WLO is allowed to leave the country, the
only plausible conclusion that can be made is that its mere issuance operates as a restraint on the
right to travel. To make it even more difficult, the individual will need to cite an exceptional reason to
justify the granting of an ADO. Sec. 6, Art. III of the Constitution provides that the right to travel may
be impaired only in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided
by law. The liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of the court and, on the one
hand, the right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety
or public health. Here, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the Secretary of
Justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health (Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034 & 199046, April 17, 2018, Covered
Case).