Methodology SRCM®

Compliant with SAE JA 1011 Standard

Summary
Various derivatives of the original aviation-oriented RCM methodology have emerged
and are currently being applied in different industries. In order to ensure these
derivatives meet the intent of the original RCM methodology, a set of standards were
published by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in 1999 to be used as a
benchmark for any RCM process. This paper describes the RCM methodology (SRCM®)
developed by ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc. (an SKF Group Company) and
discusses how this methodology complies with the standards set forth by SAE.

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Methodology SRCM
Table of contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................... 3
2. Background ............................................................................ 3
3. SRCM® Methodology And Compliance With SAE JA 1011 ........ 4
3.1. Select System ..................................................................................... 4
3.2. Data Collection.................................................................................... 6
3.3. Functions and Functional Failures .......................................................... 6
3.4. Criticality Analysis ............................................................................... 9
3.5. Task Selection....................................................................................11
3.6. Task Comparison ................................................................................13
3.7. Implementation..................................................................................13
3.8. Living Program ...................................................................................14
4. Conclusions .......................................................................... 14
5. References & Acknowledgements......................................... 14

Methodology SRCM © 2012 SKF Group 2 (19)


1. Introduction
Various derivatives of the original aviation-
oriented RCM methodology [1] have
emerged and are currently being applied in
different industries. In order to ensure
these derivatives meet the intent of the
original RCM methodology, a set of
standards [2] were published by the Society
of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in 1999 to be
used as a benchmark for any RCM process.
This paper describes the RCM methodology
(SRCM®) developed by ERIN Engineering
and Research, Inc. (an SKF Group Company)
and discusses how this methodology
complies with the standards set forth by
SAE.
2. Background
With the birth of 747 jumbo jet aircraft in
the late 1960s, the commercial aircraft
industry was faced with the challenge of
developing a maintenance program for the
747 which would be both FAA-certifiable and
cost-effective.
This challenge was met by the engineers at
the United Airlines. They completely
reviewed how maintenance was done, and
how it could best be accomplished. What
resulted from this effort was an entirely new
technique that employed a decision-tree
process for ranking PM tasks that were
necessary to preserve critical aircraft
functions during flight. This new technique
was subsequently approved by the FAA and
in 1975 it was officially named Reliability-
Centered Maintenance (RCM).
RCM can be defined as an approach that
employs reactive, preventive, and proactive
maintenance practices and strategies in an
integrated manner to increase the
probability that a machine or component will
Methodology SRCM
function in the required manner over its
design life cycle with minimum maintenance.
The goal of RCM is to preserve equipment
function with the required reliability and
availability at the lowest cost.
Since its inception, RCM has been used
extensively by the aircraft, space, defense,
and nuclear industries, among others. The
results are used to determine applicable and
cost-effective maintenance tasks based on
equipment criticality.
Various streamlined versions of the original
RCM methodology have been developed in
recent years to reduce the effort and
resources required to perform an RCM
analysis. In order to ensure these
streamlined versions meet the intent of the
original RCM methodology, a set of
standards [2] were published by the SAE in
1999 that constitute the framework for any
RCM process. Section 5 of SAE JA 1011 [2]
summarizes the key attributes of an RCM
process by posing the following questions in
the sequence shown:
• What are the functions and associated
desired standards of performance of the
asset in its present operating context
(functions)?
• In what ways can it fail to fulfill its
function (functional failure)?
• What causes each functional failure
(failure modes)?
• What happens when each failure occurs
(failure effects)?
• In what way does each failure matter
(failure consequences)?
• What should be done to predict or
prevent each failure (proactive tasks and
task intervals)?
• What should be done if a suitable
proactive task cannot be found (default
actions)?
© 2012 SKF Group 3 (19)
RCM processes that satisfactorily answer the
above questions in the sequence shown are
judged to meet the intent and spirit of the
original RCM methodology, and thus are
deemed to be acceptable.
3. SRCM® Methodology And
Compliance With SAE JA
1011
An optimized methodology, titled SRCM®,
was developed by ERIN in the late 1980s to
effectively address the needs of the process
industries. This methodology is a practical,
cost-effective, RCM approach that maintains
all of the key elements of the more rigorous,
time-consuming, original RCM process,
produces similar results, yet requires
significantly less effort.
The SRCM methodology is primarily geared
towards the process industries. Since its
inception, it has been successfully applied at
facilities in the Power, Manufacturing, Pulp
and Paper, and Petrochemical industries.
Due to economies of scale, the more
rigorous, aviation-oriented, classical RCM
approach is considered practical and cost-
effective when applied to a large number of
systems (e.g., aircrafts) that are of exactly
the same type. However, in the process
industries, due to significant variations in
system design and lack of adequate
operating data, application of the original
RCM approach facility-wide is judged to be
impractical and extremely time / resource
intensive.
The SRCM® methodology is depicted in
Figure 1. The various elements of SRCM®
and compliance with SAE JA 1011 standards
are discussed below. A tabulated
comparison of SAE JA 1011 standards and
SRCM is provided in Appendix A.
Methodology SRCM
3.1. Select System
The first step in an SRCM® analysis is to
select the system or systems that are going
to be analyzed.
Theoretically, it is desired that all systems in
a facility be analyzed in order to properly
allocate resources across the board and to
establish an overall cost-effective,
optimized, maintenance program. However,
in certain instances (e.g., lack of adequate
budget), it may not be feasible for all
systems to be analyzed, and therefore, the
facility may elect to analyze only a subset of
the systems. In such instances, the
following system characteristics could be
used as a guide in identifying systems that
should be analyzed:
• high number of PM tasks and costs
• high number of corrective maintenance
and cost
• large contribution to full or partial
outages/downtime/loss of throughput
• impact on safety/environment
Once systems have been selected for
analysis, the boundaries of each system
must be precisely defined. System
boundaries should encompass all
subsystems and equipment that support
system functions and that are dedicated to
the system being analyzed.
Boundaries should include all required
mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation
and control equipment, as appropriate.
© 2012 SKF Group 4 (19)
 • Resource Availability
• PM/CM Cost History
• Outage/Downtim e History Select System (s)
• Safety/Environm ental • Design Information
Im pact History • Equipm ent List
Collect Pertinent Data • P&IDs, Electrical Schem atics
• Other
Identify Key Im portant Design Information
Functions and Functional (including Perform ance
Failures (FFA) Standards)

Criticality Analysis
• Operating History
Equipm ent List Failure Modes and • Design Information
Effects Analysis (FMEA) • Expert Judgment

Critical and Non- Consequence Analysis

Critical Criteria

Organization Goals Yes At Least 1

and Objectives Critical Criteria
Met?

No

At Least 1 Yes
Non-Critical Criteria
Met?
No
Task Selection
Run-to-Failure

Com ponent “Critical” Com ponent “Non-Critical”

• Design
Inform ation
• Operating Identify Failure Causes
History
Assign Applicable, Cost-Effective
Tasks Commensurate
with Com ponent Criticality

Existing PMs Task Com parison

Im plem entation

Living Program

Figure 1 SRCM® Methodology.

Methodology SRCM © 2012 SKF Group 5 (19)

The SRCM® methodology, at the onset of the
analysis, allows exclusion of certain
components within system boundary from
further evaluation. These components
include those that are considered to have
comparatively lower failure rates and that do
not have safety or environmental impact.
Examples include manual valves, local
indications, piping systems, and manual
switches whose failure would not have
safety, environmental, or production
implications. These components have been
analyzed in the past and are typically found
to be non-critical and run-to-failure.
Evaluation of equipment such as pressure
vessels and high pressure piping systems
with respect to pressure boundary integrity
may also be omitted from the analysis if the
facility already has an inspection program in
place for addressing this issue for this
equipment. Exclusion of such evaluation
would imply that the existing inspection
programs are adequate and that no further
action is necessary to verify or question the
adequacy of these programs.
No specific guidance regarding system
selection and establishing system boundary
conditions is provided in SAE JA 1011. The
approach used in SRCM is judged to be
consistent with the original RCM
methodology.
3.2. Data Collection
All pertinent information required to perform
the analysis is collected and reviewed. This
includes Piping and Instrumentation
Diagrams (P & IDs), design information,
operating manuals, schematics, operating
history, equipment list, Code requirements,
pre-established commitments, insurance
requirements, etc. Operations,
Maintenance, and Engineering staff are also
Methodology SRCM
consulted to gain additional information that
would enhance the analysis.
No specific guidance regarding data
collection is provided in SAE JA 1011. The
approach used in SRCM is judged to be
consistent with the original RCM
methodology.
3.3. Functions and Functional
Failures
Consistent with the original RCM approach
[1] and Section 5.1 of SAE JA 1011 [2], the
objective of SRCM® is to develop a set of
applicable and cost-effective tasks, that
when applied would preserve the functions
of the asset being analyzed. As such,
functions and their operating context (e.g.,
continuous process, batch process) are
defined in this step of the analysis.
Functions are typically categorized as
primary and secondary functions. Primary
functions of a system are those functions for
which the system was acquired. For
example, the primary function of a feed
water system is to provide feed water from
the dearator to the boiler per design
specifications. The secondary functions are
those that are not primary but that must
also be satisfied. For example, in a feed
water system with two 100% capacity pump
trains, the operating pump discharge check
valve must open (or remain open) to satisfy
the primary function and the standby pump
discharge check valve must be in a closed
(seated) position to satisfy the secondary
function of protecting the redundant pump
against reverse flow. It should be noted
that although protection against reverse flow
is the primary function of the standby pump
discharge check valve itself, this function is
considered a secondary function within the
context of the feed water system analysis.
© 2012 SKF Group 6 (19)
In the original RCM approach, all primary
and secondary functions are explicitly
defined at the component level. However, in
SRCM only the primary functions are
explicitly defined, and furthermore, these
functions are defined at system and/or
subsystem level and not component level.
The secondary functions are not explicitly
defined in SRCM but nevertheless are
analyzed implicitly at component level under
the primary function analysis.
The SRCM methodology also provides
flexibility in the level at which the primary
functions are explicitly defined and analyzed.
Primary functions can be identified and
analyzed either at the system level or at
both the system and subsystem levels,
without affecting the analysis results.
For systems with no stand-alone support
subsystems, it may be more appropriate to
define the primary functions at the system
level whereas for systems with one or more
stand-alone support subsystems, it may be
more appropriate to define the primary
functions at both system and subsystem
levels. The determination of which approach
is most suitable is made by the system
analyst and the asset user/owner. In either
case, the analysis results are not affected.
Figure 2 can be used as an example to
illustrate the points discussed above. This
figure shows a simplified functional block
diagram for a turbine system. The block
diagram consists of the main turbine itself
and the associated support systems. In this
case, the system-level primary function can
be defined as:
“convert thermodynamic energy of main and
re-heat steam supply into mechanical
energy per design specifications”
Methodology SRCM
Similarly, the subsystem-level primary
functions can be defined as:
“provide lube oil to turbine bearings at
proper temperature and pressure via lube oil
subsystem”
“control steam flow through turbine via EHC
subsystem”
“monitor turbine operation via supervisory
control subsystem”
“provide steam at proper temperature,
pressure, and quality from main steam to
turbine via steam supply subsystem”
“provide for proper turbine coast-down and
ramp-up during shutdown and startup via
turning gear subsystem”
In this example, if only the system level
primary function is explicitly defined, then all
support system primary functions are
assumed to be included and analyzed
implicitly as part of the main system primary
function. However, if the primary functions
are explicitly defined at both system and
subsystem levels, then the primary functions
would be analyzed separately and explicitly.
In this example, the second approach may
provide more clarity, although, both
approaches will produce the same results.
To illustrate the analysis treatment of the
secondary functions, let’s look at the turbine
lube oil subsystem. Let’s assume that this
subsystem consists of a lube oil tank, a main
(AC) lube oil pump, a standby (DC)
emergency lube oil pump, a safety relief
valve, two 100% capacity lube oil coolers,
and a lube oil filter.
As stated above, the primary function of this
subsystem is to “provide lube oil to turbine
bearings at the proper pressure and
© 2012 SKF Group 7 (19)
temperature.” To accomplish this, the
suction
Figure 2 Main Turbine and Auxiliaries Functional Block Diagram
However, note that the function statement
for the primary function does not include the
secondary functions of equipment that are
part of the lube oil subsystem. These
secondary functions include:
• auto start of emergency (DC) pump on
main lube oil pump failure or low header
pressure (a protective function)
• lifting of safety relief valve on demand
(a protective function)
• opening of main pump motor breaker on
demand (a protective function)
• oil containment (containment function)
The design function of the emergency (DC)
pump is to auto start on main pump failure
or low header pressure in order to prevent
turbine bearing damage by allowing the
Methodology SRCM
path, pump, pump motor (and breaker),
discharge path, lube oil filter, and one lube
oil cooler must work in concert, as designed.
system to coast-down and allow for a
controlled shutdown.
Similarly, the design function of the safety
relief valve is to lift and relieve pressure
when system pressure reaches a pre-
determined set-point in order to prevent
system over-pressurization and damage.
The main pump motor circuit breaker must
remain in the closed position in order to
satisfy the lube oil subsystem primary
function; however, this circuit breaker has a
secondary function of opening on situations
like over-current in order to protect the
motor and circuitry from being damaged.
Within the context of the analysis, these
functions are considered secondary functions
and are analyzed implicitly under the
umbrella of the primary function (i.e.,
provide lube oil to turbine bearings at proper
© 2012 SKF Group 8 (19)
temperature and pressure) for the lube oil
subsystem.
Therefore, when analyzing the emergency
(DC) pump or the safety relief valve under
the lube oil subsystem primary function, the
pump and safety relief valve are analyzed
with respect to their intended design
function (i.e., protection) and not with
respect to the primary function of providing
lube oil to turbine bearings.
The main pump motor circuit breaker has a
dual function. It must remain closed in
order to satisfy the lube oil subsystem
primary function (i.e., provide lube oil flow)
and it must open when required in order to
satisfy the secondary function (i.e.,
protection).
Therefore, when analyzing this circuit
breaker under the lube oil subsystem
primary function, the function of circuit
breaker to remain closed is analyzed with
respect to the primary function (i.e., provide
lube oil flow) whereas the function of circuit
breaker to open, when required, is analyzed
with respect to the secondary function (i.e.,
protection).
Proper treatment of the secondary functions
in a manner consistent with the way the
primary functions are treated is implied in
SRCM. As such, application of SRCM
requires a knowledgeable, experienced,
practitioner, as does the original RCM
approach for similar reasons.
Consistent with SAE JA 1011, Sections 5.1.3
and 5.1.4, the system or subsystem primary
function statement in SRCM contains a verb,
an object, and a performance standard. The
performance standards incorporated into
function statements represent performance
desired by asset user/owner. These
standards can be qualifiers such as “proper”,
Methodology SRCM
“sufficient”, “adequate” or can be specific
values and thresholds, depending on the
situation, and what is acceptable to the
asset user/owner.
In SRCM, failure to meet the standards
defined in a primary function would
constitute functional failure of the primary
function. For example, for the lube oil
subsystem discussed above, functional
failure of the primary function would be
“failure to provide lube oil to turbine
bearings at proper temperature and
pressure.”
Failure of a secondary function in SRCM
would have no impact on the associated
primary function. However, the impact of
this failure is properly captured when
evaluating failure effects and consequences
in Criticality Analysis.
Total and partial failures are identified and
captured in SRCM as part of a Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This is
discussed below under Criticality Analysis.
The above discussion touches on specific
points identified in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of
SAE JA 1011. Based on the above
discussions, it can therefore be concluded
that the function and functional failure
approach used in SRCM meets the intent of
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of SAE JA 1011 [2].
3.4. Criticality Analysis
Once the primary functions are defined, the
components within function boundary are
subjected to a Criticality Analysis. The
Criticality Analysis performed in SRCM is a
combination of an FMEA and Consequence
Analysis.
The objective of the Criticality Analysis is to
determine component criticality (i.e.,
© 2012 SKF Group 9 (19)
whether the component is critical or non-
critical with respect to asset user/owner
business objectives). This in turn is used to
determine the level of resources that should
be allocated to each component
commensurate with its criticality. A
component that is determined to be critical
would command more attention and
resources in maintaining it than one that is
determined to be non-critical.
The Criticality Analysis begins with an FMEA.
Consistent with Section 5.3 of SAE JA 1011,
all credible failure modes for the component
being analyzed are identified. This effort
may include all or any of the following, as
appropriate, and as determined to be useful
by the analyst:
• review of operating history to identify
failure modes that have happened in the
past (this may also be achieved by
soliciting information from user/owner),
• review of the current maintenance tasks
to identify failure modes that are
actively addressed, and
• consideration of failure modes that have
not yet happened, but that are judged to
be credible.
It should be noted that in certain instances a
failure mode may be characterized as
component deterioration to an unacceptable
level and not total failure of the component.
This specifically addresses Section 5.3.5 of
SAE JA 1011.
Consistent with Section 5.3.1 of SAE JA
1011, all identified failure modes are
reviewed and approved to the satisfaction of
user/owner.
Once the failure modes are identified, the
effects of each failure mode are specifically
assessed in an FMEA. Failure effects
essentially describe what would happen if a
Methodology SRCM
failure mode were to occur. These effects
could include operational effects (e.g.,
functional failure or degradation of the
primary function, downtime, loss of
redundancy), safety effects (e.g., personnel
injury), environmental effects (e.g., releases
to environment), and collateral damage
(e.g., damage to other equipment). The
treatment of failure effects in SRCM is
consistent with Section 5.4 of SAE JA 1011.
The consequence evaluation part of
Criticality Analysis then focuses on the
degree to which the failure effects can or
cannot be tolerated by the asset user/owner.
To facilitate this effort, a set of user-defined
criticality criteria are developed based on the
user’s/owner’s overall goals and objectives.
These criticality criteria are categorized into
Critical and Non-Critical Criteria.
Examples of Critical Criteria include:
• personnel injury
• reduction in load/output > X units
• delay in startup > X hours
• unit trip
• violation of regulatory requirements
• equipment damage > $X
A component failure mode resulting in
meeting one or more of the above criteria
would render that component “Critical.” If
none of the failure modes result in meeting
at least one of the above criteria, then the
component is classified as “Non-Critical.”
For components that have been determined
to be Non-Critical, a different set of criteria
(i.e., Non-Critical Criteria) is further applied.
The intention here is to place more emphasis
on economic considerations rather than
equipment themselves. The Non-Critical
criteria are used to evaluate the benefit of
maintaining the component, rather than
© 2012 SKF Group 10 (19)
allowing the component to run-to-failure.
Examples of Non-Critical criteria include:
• high cost of repair if run-to-failure
• a simple cost-effective task can be
applied to ensure expected reliability
• failure leads to costly failure of other
components
• allowing run-to-failure may lead to
greater safety hazard
• failure could impact support activities
If at least one of these criteria is met,
component is classified as Non-Critical
requiring some level of maintenance
commensurate with its importance. If none
of the above criteria are met, the
determination has been made to allow the
component to run-to-failure and perform
corrective maintenance when required.
It should be noted that in SRCM, operator
action in response to events is explicitly
credited as part of the FMEA and
Consequence Analysis, when appropriate. In
certain instances, failures can be detected,
diagnosed, and successfully mitigated by the
operator without significant functional,
safety, or environmental impact.
Failure causes in SRCM are only identified
for components that are determined to be
Critical. Consistent with Section 5.3.3 of
SAE JA 1011, failure causes are identified at
a level that makes it possible to assign
appropriate tasks that would preclude the
occurrence of those failure causes.
Section 10.1.1 of SAE JA 1011 provides
provisions for treatment of hidden and
evident failures. Hidden and evident failures
are not explicitly defined in SRCM. Evident
failures are captured in the primary function
analysis and hidden failures are captured in
the secondary function analysis in SRCM.
For example, in the turbine lube oil
Methodology SRCM
subsystem discussed earlier, the auto start
control loop of the standby emergency (DC)
oil pump has a protective, hidden, function.
If the auto start control loop is in a failed
state, this failure would not be evident and
therefore will not be detected until the pump
is demanded. In SRCM, this assessment is
made during FMEA based on the analyst’s
understanding of the component’s intended
design function.
The above discussion touches on specific
points identified in Sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5
of SAE JA 1011. Based on the above
discussions, it can therefore be concluded
that the Criticality Analysis approach used in
SRCM meets the intent of Sections 5.3, 5.4,
and 5.5 of SAE JA 1011 [2].
3.5. Task Selection
Once a component has been determined to
be Critical or Non-Critical, but not allowed to
run-to-failure, the next step is to develop
applicable and cost-effective maintenance
tasks based on component criticality. As
mentioned earlier, components that have
been determined to be Critical would
command more attention and resources in
maintaining them than those determined to
be Non-Critical.
Task selection also takes into account
factors such as component design, operating
environment, frequency of use, component
age, operating mode (normally operating
versus standby), component replacement
cost, task cost, etc. These factors are
qualitatively assessed during the task
selection process in SRCM. Ultimately tasks
that are selected are those that are cost-
effective and applicable. Cost-effective
means that cost of performing a task is less
than cost of the failure over a specific period
of time. Applicable means that task
© 2012 SKF Group 11 (19)
performed is intended to preclude the
occurrence of the identified failure causes.
In SRCM, the use of non-intrusive tasks is
maximized to the extent possible. The task
type hierarchy used during task selection
process in SRCM (in order of task type
importance) can be listed as follows:
• Condition Monitoring Tasks
• Predictive Tasks
• Failure-Finding Tasks
• Time-Directed Tasks
The SRCM methodology places great
emphasis on the interaction between the
operator and the equipment. As such,
condition-monitoring tasks (operator rounds)
are judged to be the most important task
type. Operator rounds are non-intrusive and
are relatively inexpensive to perform.
Furthermore, operators have a great sense
of equipment condition due to their close
proximity to equipment. An example is
visual inspection of a heat exchanger for
external leakage and monitoring heat
exchanger inlet and outlet temperature
gauges for proper performance.
Involving operators in minor equipment
maintenance can also be a mechanism for
empowerment and asset ownership which
overall can have a tremendous value in
asset management.
Predictive tasks are next on the task type
hierarchy. These tasks are non-intrusive
and can be used to identify the onset of
failures so that proper action can be taken to
minimize consequences. Examples include
vibration monitoring, thermography, lube oil
analysis, and on-line motor current
signature analysis. Use of predictive tasks is
maximized in SRCM to the extent possible.
Methodology SRCM
Consistent with Section 5.7.2 of SAE JA
1011, for predictive tasks frequencies are
set such that task interval is always shorter
than the P-F interval (where P is the point at
which degradation is observed and F is the
point at which component is assumed to
have failed). The interval selected is set
such that upon reaching point P, sufficient
time is available to take action to prevent
failure.
Failure-finding tasks are applied to
equipment in standby mode to verify
operability. Examples include valve stroke
test, pump operability test, and
instrumentation calibration check. The
effectiveness of this type of task depends on
the task frequency. Failure-finding tasks are
more effective when performed more
frequently. However, the frequency must be
balanced against cost and potential for
human-induced failures.
Failure finding tasks in SRCM are applied
such that all hidden failure modes are
detected. For example, the emergency (DC)
oil pump in the turbine lube oil subsystem
discussed earlier, could be functionally
tested at appropriate intervals to determine
its operability. This functional test, if
possible, would include simulating a low
header pressure condition and then
observing to see if the pump actually starts
and develops the required head. This would
functionally test the auto start
instrumentation, as well as the pump and
motor.
Section 13.3.3 of SAE JA 1011, provides an
equation for calculating task frequencies for
failure-finding tasks based unavailability and
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). It
should be noted that in SRCM, task
frequencies for failure-finding tasks, and in
fact all task types, are determined
qualitatively and not quantitatively since
© 2012 SKF Group 12 (19)
failure mode-specific MTBF data most often
does not exist or at best is generic.
Time-directed tasks are considered to be the
least important task type in SRCM and to the
extent possible their use is minimized.
These are tasks that are performed at
specific intervals regardless of the condition
of equipment. Examples include detailed
inspections and overhauls. Time-directed
tasks should be performed on as as-needed
basis based on predictive and condition-
monitoring results.
Although the above discussion is focused on
each individual task type, in most
circumstances a combination of different
task types may be required to preclude the
identified component failure modes and
failure causes.
Again, it should also be emphasized that the
determination of task frequencies and task
intervals in SRCM is done qualitatively based
on operating experience, performance data,
operating condition, equipment age, and
engineering judgment to the satisfaction of
equipment user/owner.
Finally, it should be noted that during the
task selection process it may be determined
that in some cases an applicable task may
not exist. In such cases, it may be
necessary to recommend further actions to
be taken by equipment user/owner such that
the reliability of equipment is maintained
and adverse consequences are minimized.
These actions (or one-time changes) may
include design change, additional training,
revising procedures, among others.
The above discussion touches on specific
points identified in Sections 5.7 and 5.8 of
SAE JA 1011. Based on the above
discussion, it can therefore be concluded
that the task selection approach used in
Methodology SRCM
SRCM meets the intent of Sections 5.7 and
5.8 of SAE JA 1011 [2].
3.6. Task Comparison
Upon assignment of applicable and cost-
effective tasks, the recommended tasks are
compared against the existing tasks. The
purpose of this comparison is to identify the
needed changes in the existing program,
facilitate implementation of the task
recommendations, and to provide additional
check of the analysis to assure validity of
assumptions and completeness.
No specific guidance regarding task
comparison is provided in SAE JA 1011. The
approach used in SRCM is judged to be
consistent with the original RCM
methodology.
3.7. Implementation
Implementation of task recommendations
can be time consuming and labor intensive.
It is vital that the facility develops an
implementation plan that is realistic, yet
aggressive enough, so that the necessary
changes are made to the existing program
while the assumptions and basis are current
and still applicable.
Implementation generally requires
developing an action plan that includes the
following:
• formal approval of task
recommendations and one-time changes
• establishing priorities for implementing
changes
• determining the degree of difficulty for
implementing changes
• developing proper work packages
including job plans that describe the
detailed steps of each task
• identifying potential constraints
© 2012 SKF Group 13 (19)
Implementation may also include the Based on issues discussed in this paper, it
purchase of new technology, incorporating can be concluded that the SRCM
design changes, and training. methodology is a robust and defendable
approach that meets the intent of the
No specific guidance regarding standards set forth in SAE JA 1011.
implementation is provided in SAE JA 1011.
However, implementation is discussed in
Section 18.9 of SAE JA 1012 [3]. The 4. References &
approach used in SRCM is judged to be Acknowledgements
consistent SAE JA 1012.
[1] Nowlan, F. Stanley, and Howard F.
Heap, “Reliability-Centered Maintenance,”
Living Program
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.
Consistent with Section 5.9 of SAE JA1011, a
1978. Report Number AD-A066579.
living program is established in SRCM to
allow for periodic review of information used
[2] Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-
to support decisions and the decisions
Centered Maintenance (RCM) Processes, SAE
themselves. The living program will ensure
JA 1011, Issued August 1999.
that the PM Program is always optimized and
remains evergreen.
[3] A Guide to the Reliability-Centered
Maintenance (RCM) Standard, SAE JA 1012,
Conclusions
Issued January 2002.
Although SRCM is an optimized version of
the original RCM process, the SRCM
methodology does not exclude any of the
main elements of the original RCM approach.

Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Section Yes No
5.1 Functions 9 See 5.1.2.
5.1.1 Operating context of asset shall be 9 Operating context defined based on review of system
defined description, operating manual, design documents, etc.
5.1.2 All functions of asset/system 9 Primary functions identified explicitly at system and
(primary and secondary) shall be subsystem level; secondary functions identified and
identified analyzed implicitly at component level under primary
functions.
5.1.3 All function statements shall 9 Performance standards are defined for primary
contain a verb, an object, and a functions at system and/or subsystem level to the
performance standard satisfaction of asset user/owner; performance
standards are not explicitly defined for secondary
functions.
5.1.4 Performance standards shall be 9 See 5.1.3.
level of performance desired by
asset user in its operating context
5.2 Functional Failures – all failed 9 Failure to meet required standards as defined for
states associated with each primary functions would result in functional failure of
function shall be identified primary function; functional failure of secondary

Methodology SRCM © 2012 SKF Group 14 (19)

Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description
Section
5.3 Failure Modes
5.3.1 All failure modes reasonably likely
to cause each functional failure
shall be identified
5.3.2 Method used to decide what
constitutes a “reasonably likely”
failure mode shall be acceptable to
asset owner/user
5.3.3 Failure modes shall be identified at
a level of causation that makes it
possible to identify an appropriate
failure management policy
5.3.4 Failure modes should include
those that have happened before,
those that are currently being
prevented, and those that have not
happened but are likely
5.3.5 Failure modes should include any
event or process that is likely to
cause a functional failure including
deterioration, design defects, and
human error
5.4 Failure Effects
5.4.1 Failure effects shall describe what
would happen if no specific task is
done to anticipate, prevent, or
detect failure
5.4.2 Failure effects shall include all
information needed to support
evaluation of consequences of
failure
5.5 Failure consequence categories
5.5.1 Consequence of every failure
mode shall be formally categorized
5.5.1.1 Consequence categorization
process shall separate hidden
from evident failure modes
5.5.1.2 Consequence categorization
process shall clearly distinguish
events that have safety and/or
environmental consequences from
those that have economic
consequences
Methodology SRCM
SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Yes No
functions defined implicitly and analyzed with respect
to failure effects and consequences.
9 See 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4, and 5.3.5.
9 All credible (reasonably likely) failure modes are
identified and analyzed.
9 Credible failure modes are identified by the analyst to
the satisfaction of asset owner/user.
9 Failure causes identified for all Critical components and
are identified at a level that would allow for
identification of appropriate tasks that would preclude
those failure causes; failure causes not identified for
Non-Critical components. (see Criticality Analysis
below)
9 Historical data is reviewed to identify failure modes that
have happened in the past; discussion with asset
user/owner is used to determine what failure modes
are being prevented; and those failure modes that have
not yet happened but are likely are identified by the
analyst in FMEA.
9 In certain instances failure modes are characterized by
equipment degradation and not total failure; errors of
omission and commission are addressed separately;
this is acceptable per SAE JA 1012, 8.5.
9 See 5.4.1 and 5.4.2
9 Done as part of FMEA in Criticality Analysis.
9 Done as part of FMEA in Criticality Analysis.
9 See 5.5.1, 5.5.1.1, 5.5.1.2, and 5.5.2.
9 Done as part of establishing criticality criteria.
9 Hidden and evident failure modes are not explicitly
defined; all equipment analyzed based on their
intended design function; as such, hidden and evident
failures are properly captured in the analysis.
9 Done as part of establishing criticality criteria.
© 2012 SKF Group 15 (19)
Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description
Section
5.5.2 Assessment of failure
consequences shall be carried out
as if no specific task is currently
being done to anticipate, detect, or
prevent failure
5.6 Failure Management Policy
Selection
5.6.1 Failure management selection
process shall take into account
impact of age on conditional
probability of failure mode
5.6.2 All scheduled tasks shall be
technically feasible and worth
doing (applicable and effective)
5.6.3 If two or more proposed failure
management policies are
technically feasible, the most cost-
effective shall be selected
5.6.4 Selection of failure management
policies shall be carried out as if
no specific task is currently being
done to anticipate, prevent, or
detect failure
5.7 Failure Management Policies –
Scheduled Tasks
5.7.1 All scheduled tasks shall comply
with 5.7.1.1, 5.7.1.2, 5.7.1.3, and
5.7.1.4
5.7.1.1 For evident failure modes with
safety or environmental
consequences, task shall reduce
probability of failure mode to a
level tolerable by asset user/owner
5.7.1.2 For hidden failure modes with
safety or environmental
consequences, task shall reduce
probability of failure mode to a
level tolerable by asset user/owner
5.7.1.3 For evident failure modes w/o
safety or environmental
consequences, direct and indirect
costs of task shall be less than
direct and indirect costs of failure
mode over comparable time
periods
5.7.1.4 For hidden failure modes w/o
safety or environmental
consequences, direct and indirect
Methodology SRCM
SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Yes No
9 Done as part of Criticality Analysis.
9 See 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, and 5.6.4.
9 Effect of component age is captured through condition
monitoring for equipment that are monitored in this
manner; impact of equipment age is also assessed
when determining task frequency.
9 All scheduled tasks are devised to eliminate failure
causes for the associated failure modes; applicable
and most cost-effective tasks are selected.
9 Most cost-effective tasks are always selected.
9 Task selection is performed assuming no tasks
currently applied to anticipate, prevent, or detect
failure; intent of task selection is to come up with the
most cost-effective and applicable tasks w/o
considering current tasks.
9 See 5.7.1, 5.7.1.1, 5.7.1.2, 5.7.1.3, 5.7.1.4, 5.7.2,
5.7.2.1, 5.7.2.2, 5.7.2.3, 5.7.2.4, 5.7.2.5, 5.7.3, 5.7.3.1,
5.7.3.2, 5.7.4, 5.7.4.1, 5.7.4.2, 5.7.4.3, 5.7.5, 5.7.5.1,
5.7.5.2, 5.7.5.3, and 5.7.5.4.
9 See 5.7.1.1, 5.7.1.2, 5.7.1.3, and 5.7.1.4.
9 Done during task selection; for evident failures with
safety or environmental consequences, tasks are
assigned to eliminate failure causes and thus reduce
probability of failure to an acceptable level.
9 Done during task selection; for hidden failures with
safety or environmental consequences, tasks are
assigned to eliminate failure causes and thus reduce
probability of failure to an acceptable level.
9 Done during task selection; for evident failures w/o
safety or environmental consequences cost-effective
tasks are assigned.
9 Done during task selection; for hidden failures w/o
safety or environmental consequences cost-effective
tasks are assigned.
© 2012 SKF Group 16 (19)
Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Section Yes No
costs of tasks shall be less than
direct and indirect costs of failure
plus repair cost over comparable
time periods
5.7.2 On-condition tasks shall satisfy 9 See 5.7.2.1, 5.7.2.2, 5.7.2.3, 5.7.2.4, and 5.7.2.5.
additional criteria in 5.7.2.1,
5.7.2.2, 5.7.2.3, 5.7.2.4, and
5.7.2.5
5.7.2.1 There shall exist a clearly defined 9 Done during task selection; on-condition tasks are
potential failure assigned at proper frequency to detect the onset of
equipment failure.
5.7.2.2 There shall exist an identifiable 9 Task frequencies for on-condition tasks are determined
P-F interval qualitatively based on historical data, engineering
judgment, and user/owner experience; frequencies are
set to allows for detection of deterioration and time to
take action before equipment reaches a failed state
(frequency < P-F interval).
5.7.2.3 Task interval shall be less than 9 See 5.7.2.2.
shortest likely P-F interval
5.7.2.4 It shall be physically possible to do 9 This assessment is made during task and frequency
task at intervals less than P-F selection.
interval
5.7.2.5 Shortest time between discovery 9 This assessment is made during task and frequency
of a potential failure and selection.
occurrence of functional failure
shall be long enough for pre-
determined action to be taken to
avoid, eliminate, or minimize
consequences of failure mode
5.7.3 Any scheduled discard task shall 9 See 5.7.3.1 and 5.7.3.2.
satisfy additional criteria in 5.7.3.1
and 5.7.3.2
5.7.3.1 There shall be a clearly defined 9 Effects of age on conditional probability of failure
age at which there is an increase modes assessed qualitatively as part of task selection
in conditional probability of failure and frequency assignment.
mode
5.7.3.2 A sufficiently large proportion of 9 See 5.7.3.1.
occurrences of failure mode shall
occur after this age to reduce
probability of premature failure to a
level that is tolerable to asset
user/owner
5.7.4 Any scheduled restoration task 9 See 5.7.4.1, 5.7.4.2, and 5.7.4.3.
selected shall satisfy additional
criteria in 5.7.4.1, 5.7.4.2, and
5.7.4.3
5.7.4.1 There shall be a clearly defined 9 Effects of age on conditional probability of failure
age at which there is an increase modes assessed qualitatively as part of task selection
in conditional probability of failure and frequency assignment.
mode

Methodology SRCM © 2012 SKF Group 17 (19)

Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Section Yes No
5.7.4.2 A sufficiently large proportion of 9 See 5.7.4.1.
occurrences of failure mode shall
occur after this age to reduce
probability of premature failure to a
level that is tolerable to asset
user/owner
5.7.4.3 Task shall restore resistance to 9 See 5.7.4.1.
failure of component to a level that
is tolerable to asset user/owner
5.7.5 Any failure-finding task selected 9 See 5.7.5.1, 5.7.5.2, 5.7.5.3, and 5.7.5.4.
shall satisfy additional criteria in
5.7.5.1, 5.7.5.2, 5.7.5.3, and
5.7.5.4
5.7.5.1 Basis upon which task interval is 9 Task intervals for failure-finding tasks are determined
selected shall take into account based on historical data, operating experience, and
the need to reduce probability of best engineering judgment; they are devised to reduce
multiple failure of associated probability of failure to a level tolerable by asset
protected system to a level that is user/owner.
tolerable to asset user/owner
5.7.5.2 Task shall confirm that all 9 The intent of assigned failure finding tasks is to verify
components covered by failure functionality of component/asset in its entirety.
mode description are functional
5.7.5.3 Failure-finding task and associated 9 Task frequency is balanced against the potential
interval selection process should adverse effects of task during task selection.
take into account any probability
that task itself might leave the
hidden function in a failed state
5.7.5.4 It shall be physically possible to do 9 This determination is made during task selection; if
task at the specified intervals failure-finding task cannot be performed due to
inadequate access or w/o disturbing process or w/o
damaging equipment, task is considered not
applicable; other more applicable tasks are then
considered.
5.8 Failure Management Policies – 9 See 5.8.1 and 5.8.2.
One-time Changes and Run-to-
Failure
5.8.1 One-Time Changes 9 See 5.8.1.1 and 5.8.1.2.
5.8.1.1 RCM process shall endeavor to 9 Done as part of task selection.
extract desired performance of
system as it is currently configured
and operated by applying
appropriate scheduled tasks
5.8.1.2 In cases where such tasks cannot 9 Done as part of task selection.
be found, one-time changes to
asset or system may be necessary
subject to criteria in 5.8.1.2.1,
5.8.1.2.2, 5.8.1.2.3, and 5.8.1.2.4
5.8.1.2.1 In cases where failure is hidden, 9 Done as part of task selection.
and associated multiple failure has
safety or environmental

Methodology SRCM © 2012 SKF Group 18 (19)

Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Section Yes No
consequences, a one-time change
that reduces probability of multiple
failure to a level tolerable by asset
user/owner is compulsory
5.8.1.2.2 In cases where failure is evident 9 Done as part of task selection.
and has safety or environmental
consequences, a one-time change
that reduces probability of failure
to a level tolerable by asset
user/owner is compulsory
5.8.1.2.3 In cases where failure is hidden, 9 Done as part of task selection.
and the associated multiple failure
does not have safety or
environmental consequences, any
one-time change must be cost-
effective in opinion of asset
user/owner
5.8.1.2.4 In cases where failure is evident 9 Done as part of task selection.
and does not have safety or
environmental consequences, any
one-time change must be cost-
effective in opinion of asset
user/owner
5.8.2 Run-to-Failure – Any run-to-failure 9 See 5.8.2.1 and 5.8.2.2.
policy selected shall satisfy
appropriate criteria in 5.8.2.1 and
5.8.2.2
5.8.2.1 In cases where failure is hidden 9 Done as part of Criticality Analysis.
and there is no appropriate
scheduled task, associated
multiple failure shall not have
safety or environmental
consequences
5.8.2.2 In cases where failure is evident 9 Done as part of Criticality Analysis.
and there is no appropriate
scheduled task, associated failure
mode shall not have safety or
environmental consequences
5.9 A Living Program 9 See 5.9.1 and 5.9.2.
5.9.1 A periodic review is necessary to 9 Done as part of established living program.
ensure that assets continue to
fulfill the current functional
expectations of users/owners
5.9.2 Any RCM process shall provide for 9 Done as part of established living program.
a review of information used to
support decisions and decisions
themselves

Methodology SRCM © 2012 SKF Group 19 (19)