Professional Documents
Culture Documents
and
Michel
Crouhy
Head
of
Research
&
Development
Best Practice Risk Management
NATIXIS
michel.crouhy@na:xis.com
Michel Crouhy and Dan Galai
Dan
Galai
michel.crouhy@gmail.com dan@sigma-invest.co.il
Hebrew
University
and
SIGMA
dan@sigma-‐invest.co.il
EDHEC – London
May, 2021
Moscow, October 2013
5/11/21
Agenda
-‐ Banking and Risk Management in the New Digital World
Last 10
years
Reasons:
§ BeFer
explore
the
alternaCves
and
uncertainCes.
§ OpCmize
resources.
§ Make
controlled
decisions.
§ Make
raConal
decisions.
§ How
risk
exposures
can
affect
our
business?
§ Why
NOT
to
manage
risk
in
theory
(in
perfect
capital
markets)…
– M&M:
whatever
the
firm
can
accomplish
in
the
financial
markets,
the
individual
investor
in
the
firm
can
also
accomplish
or
unwind
on
the
same
condiCons.
(“Me
Too”)
– CAPM:
firms
should
not
worry
about
specific
risks
– Reducing
volaClity
through
hedging
simply
moves
earnings
and
cash-‐flows
from
one
year
to
another.
– RM
requires
skills,
knowledge,
infrastructure:
not
carefully
structured
and
monitored
can
lead
to
disasters.
§ QuesJon:
Why
and
how
should
a
firm
hedge
financial
risks
that
may
affect
its
business
by
means
of
financial
contracts
such
as
derivaJves?
– SEC
insists
on
increased
disclosures
around
risk
management
policies
and
financial
exposures;
– Sarbanes-‐Oxley
(SOX)
requires
internal
cerCficaCon
by
CEOs
and
CFOs
that
financial
statements
are
“true
and
fair”.
– Dodd-‐Frank
and
the
Consumer
ProtecCon
Act
calls
for
stronger
oversight
on
OTC
derivaCves
and
the
companies
that
use
them.
§ The
future
cannot
be
predicted:
it
is
uncertain
and
hard
to
forecast
(stock
market,
interest
rates,
exchange
rates,
commodity
prices,
systemic
events,…)
§ But
financial
risk
that
arises
from
uncertainty
can
be
managed:
– IdenCfy
risk
– Measure
risk
– Hedging,
miCgaCng
and
transferring
risk
§ Modern
risk
management:
– Ability
to
price
and
ensure
that
risks
are
correctly
rewarded
5/11/21
Copyright
©
Michel
Crouhy
&
Dan
Galai,
2021
18
Corporate
Risk
Management
§ Back
in
2002,
Alan
Greenspan,
then
chairman
of
the
U.S.
Federal
Reserve
Board,
made
some
opCmisCc
remarks
about
the
power
of
risk
management
to
improve
the
world,
but
the
condiConality
aFached
to
his
observaCons
proved
to
be
rather
important:
“The
development
of
our
paradigms
for
containing
risk
has
emphasized
dispersion
of
risk
to
those
willing,
and
presumably
able,
to
bear
it.
If
risk
is
properly
dispersed,
shocks
to
the
overall
economic
system
will
be
be>er
absorbed
and
less
likely
to
create
cascading
failures
that
could
threaten
financial
stability.”
§ In
the
financial
crisis
of
2007-‐2009,
risk
turned
out
to
have
been
concentrated
rather
than
dispersed!
• Next,
we
engage
in
the
typology
of
risk,
or
idenCfying
sources
of
risk
at
the
corporaCon.
Not included
in Pillar 1 of
Basel III
framework
General
Market
Risk
Equity Risk Trading Risk
Market Risk
Interest Rate Risk Specific
Gap Risk Risk”
Currency Risk
Credit Risk
Commodity Risk
Counterparty
Operational Risk
Risk
Financial Transaction Risk
Risks Reputational Issuer Risk
Risk Portfolio
Concentration
Business and Risk Issue Risk
strategic risks
* For more details, see Chapter-1 – Appendix 1.1, “The Essentials of Risk Management”, second
edition, by Crouhy, Galai and Mark
Liquidity
Risk:
– Funding
liquidity
risk
is
the
risk
that
the
bank
won’t
be
able
to
raise
the
necessary
cash
to
roll
over
its
debt
,
to
meet
cash
margins
and
collateral
calls
of
counterparCes,
and
to
saCsfy
cash
withdrawals.
– Trading
liquidity
risk
is
the
risk
of
not
being
able
to
execute
a
transacCon
at
the
current
prevailing
market
price.
OperaJonal
Risk
is
the
risk
for
potenCal
losses
resulCng
from
inadequate
systems,
management
failure,
faulty
controls,
frauds,
human
errors,
failure
of
technology.
Legal
and
Regulatory
Risk
(part
of
OR
under
Basel
II
Capital
Accord):
– A
counterparty
might
lack
the
legal
or
regulatory
authority
to
engage
in
a
risky
transacCon
– PotenCal
impact
of
a
change
in
the
tax
law
on
the
market
value
of
a
posiCon
(e.g.,
the
BriCsh
Government
changed
the
tax
code
to
remove
a
parCcular
tax
benefit
during
the
summer
of
1997)
• With
monetary
policy
remaining
very
easy,
global
equity
markets
rose
in
response
to
indicaCons
of
stronger
fiscal
policy
support,
notably
in
the
United
States,
and
a
brightening
earnings
outlook.
• The
increase
in
stock
prices
was
broad-‐based,
but
parCcularly
strong
in
EMEs
other
than
China
and
in
selected
AEs
such
as
Japan
(Graph
1,
first
panel).
• Over
Cme,
equity
indices
waxed
and
waned
in
line
with
the
prospect
of
a
major
US
fiscal
package
(verCcal
lines).
Later
in
the
review
period,
the
run-‐
up
in
US
stock
prices
paused
just
as
the
reflaCon
trade
gained
momentum
(see
below).
• In
the
background,
earnings
forecasts
conCnued
to
improve
in
the
United
States
but
stayed
rather
flat
in
Europe
(second
panel).
Actual
earnings
also
largely
surprised
on
the
upside,
with
about
three
quarters
of
US
companies
exceeding
analysts’
esCmates
for
Q4
2020.
• The
Company
may
use
interest
rate
swap
contracts
on
certain
invesCng
and
borrowing
transacCons
to
manage
its
net
exposure
to
interest
rate
changes
and
to
reduce
its
overall
cost
of
borrowing.
The
Company
does
not
use
leveraged
swaps
and,
in
general,
does
not
leverage
any
of
its
investment
acCviCes
that
would
put
principal
capital
at
risk.
•
In
May
2018,
four
interest
rate
swaps
with
noConal
amounts
aggregaCng
$1.0
billion
matured.
These
swaps
effecCvely
converted
the
Company’s
$1.0
billion,
1.30%
fixed-‐rate
notes
due
2018
to
variable
rate
debt.
In
December
2018,
in
connecCon
with
the
early
repayment
of
debt,
the
Company
seFled
three
interest
rate
swaps
with
noConal
amounts
aggregaCng
$550
million.
These
swaps
effecCvely
converted
a
porCon
of
the
Company’s
$1.25
billion,
5.00%
notes
due
2019
to
variable
rate
debt.
At
December
31,
2018,
the
Company
was
a
party
to
19
pay-‐floaCng,
receive-‐
fixed
interest
rate
swap
contracts
designated
as
fair
value
hedges
of
fixed-‐rate
notes
in
which
the
noConal
amounts
match
the
amount
of
the
hedged
fixed-‐rate
notes
Market
Credit
Risk
Risk
Liquidity
Risk
}
+ Facilitate Pricing
Management
+ Assign Reserves & RAROC
Allocate Economic Capital
}
+ Stress Test &
Scenario Analysis Risk
Analysis
+ Measure (e.g. MVaR & CVaR)
+ Monitor
Identify & Avoid } Limit
Management
Market
Asian Credit
Liquidity
Currencies Spreads
Dried
Declined Widened
Up
Enterprise Declining
Equities
Liquidity Credit
Fell
Dried Up Quality
Interest Financial
Defaults
Rates System
Increased
Unstable Under Stress
5/11/21
Copyright
©
Michel
Crouhy
&
Dan
Galai,
2021
52
Market
Risks
and
the
World
of
DerivaJves
-‐Disciplined
analysis.
-‐Focusing
on
important
factors.
-‐To
get
“Ball
Park”
figures.
-‐To
price
risks
(against
benchmarks).
Default risk of
debt of firm i
σ Bi , β Bi , N(−d2 )
Business risk of
Market Risk firm i
σ M2 σ vi , β vi Financial risk of
equity of firm i
σ si , β si ,η s ,v
1. Is
the
role
of
models
to
forecast?
2. Is
the
role
of
models
to
reduce
uncertainty?
3. Can
we
blame
the
models
for
failing
the
banks
and
the
hedge
funds?
§ MODELS
USE
PARAMETERS
AS
INPUTS
AND
DO
NOT
TELL
US,
HOW
TO
ESTIMATE
PARAMETERS.
§ MODELS
SHOULD
TELL
US
HOW
TO
MAKE
RATIONAL
DECISIONS
AT
PRESENT
TIME,
FACING
FUTURE
UNCERTAINTY.
§ ECONOMIC MODELS CAN BE USED TO DEFINE AND PRICE RISKS.
§ MODELS
CAN
BE
USED
TO
SET
RATIONAL
STRATEGY
TO
REDUCE
RISKS
OR
SELL
/
BUY
RISKS.
§ HEDGE
FUNDS
ARE
USUALLY
LEVERED
FUNDS
WITH
LONG
AND
SHORT
POSITIONS
IN
MANY
FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS.
§ NOT ALL POSITIONS IN HEDGED FUNDS ARE FULLY HEDGED.
§ ALL
MODELS
ARE
BASED
ON
THE
ASSUMPTION
OF
PERFECT
CAPITAL
MARKETS.
§ Banks
in
recent
years
were
highly
levered
effecCvely
through
securiCzaCon
and
structured
products.
§ Banks
were
let
oten
with
the
residual
credit
risk.
§ Banks
failed
to
tell
their
clients
about
the
risks
inherent
in
some
instruments,
e.g.,
aucCon
rates.
§ Investment
banks
were
not
regulated
by
Basel
requirements.
§ Define
the
“Risk
AppeCte”
of
the
organizaCon
and
its
willingness
to
take
risks.
§ Understand
that
for
higher
average
yield
the
organizaCon
must
assume
greater
risks
in
general.
Source: CiCgroup