Team Code: TC 46

35TH BCI ALL-INDIA INTER-UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Before

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF PINDIANA, CHIND

IN W.P (C) NO. __ OF 20__

ASMA …PETITIONER
V.
UNION OF INDIA & MUKHTAR …RESPONDENTS

with

IN SLP NO. __ OF 20__

MUKHTAR …APPELLANT
V.
UNION OF INDIA …RESPONDENT

Memorial Submitted to the Registry of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pindiana

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

 [TABLE OF CONTENTS]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................................. VII

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... VIII

ISSUES RAISED ..........................................................................................................................IX

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................................ X

PLEADINGS ................................................................................................................................. 1

I. Talaq-e-Biddat doesn’t fall under the purview of ‘Law’ as per Art. 13 ........................ 1

II. A restraint in the practice of talaq-e-biddat is a violation of freedom of religion......... 1

III. Promulgation of the Impugned Ordinance is in violation of Art 123 of the Constitution
……………………………………………………………………………………….2

IV. The Impugned Ordinance is in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution ............................................................................................................................ 3

A. Ordinance violates the principle of non-discrimination contained in Arts. 14 and 15

……………………………………………………………………………………..3

B. The Ordinance fails to satisfy the test of arbitrariness under Art. 14. ..................... 4

C. The Impugned Ordinance violates the right to life under Art. 21 ........................... 5

PRAYER.....................................................................................................................................XI

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 [LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS]

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR All India Reporter

A.P Andhra Pradesh
Art Article
Bom Bombay
Edn. Edition
Hon’ble Honourable
Pg. Page
S. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
UOI Union of India
Vol. Volume
W.B West Bengal

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 [INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
A.K Roy v. UOI, (1982) 1 SCC 271 2
A.P Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B Narsimha Reddy, (2011) 9 4
SCC 286
A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., (1996) 9 SCC 548. 2
Ahemdabad Women Action Group v. UOI, (1997) 3 SCC 573 1
Ahmedabad Women Action Group & Ors. v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 573, 2
para 11; Maharshi Avdhesh v. Union of India (1994) Supp (1) SCC 713.
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 4
C.K.Aboobacker v. Rahiyanath, Crl.MC.No. 2188 of 2004 5
Chiranjit Lal v. UOI, AIR 1951 SC 941 3
Daniel Latifi v. UOI, (2001) 7 SCC 740 3
E.P Royappa v. State of T.N, (1974) 4 SCC 3 4
Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P, AIR 1981 SC 2198 1
Gyanendra Kumar v. UOI, AIR 1997 Del 58 2
H.H.Srimad Perarulala v. State of T.N, AIR 1972 SC 1586, Pg 1593 1
Independent Thought v. UOI, AIR 2017 SC 4904 4
Joseph Shine v. UOI, (2019) 3 SCC 39 5
K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and others. (2017) 10 SCC 1 para 108 5
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, AIR 1980 SC 707; P.E. Mathew v. UOI, AIR 1999 1
Ker 345
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others, (2014) 5 SCC 438. 5
Naushad Hussain v. Razia 2018(2) UC 1242. 5
Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI, (2018) 10 SCC 1 4
O.N Agarwal v. Nagarpalika, Shahjahanpur, (1993) 2 SCC 242. 3
R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India 4
R.K Garg v. UOI, (1981) 4 SCC 675 2
Ram Prasad v. State of U.P, AIR 1957 All 411 1
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay & Ors., 1954 SCR 1055. 2
S Vasudbvan v. S.D Mittal, AIR 1962 Bom 53 4
Saumya Ann Thomas v. UOI, 2010 (1) KLJ 449 5

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 [INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]

Shakti Vahini v. UOI & Ors., AIR 2018 SC 1601 5

Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan, Criminal Appeal No.820 Of 2014 5
Shayara Bano and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2017 SC 4609 1
Shri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, 1958 SCR 895. 1
Srinivas Aiyar v. Saraswathi Ammal, AIR 1952 Mad 193 1
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84 1
State of J&K v. Triloki, (1974) 1 SCC 19 3
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 3

STATUTES
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 5
S. 3, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Second Ordinance, 3
2019
S. 4, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Second Ordinance, 4
2019
S. 7, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Second Ordinance, 4
2019
Schedule I, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 4
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 1
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, No. 43 of 2005, 5
Section 21

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Art. 123, Constitution of Pindiana 2
Art. 13, Constitution of Pindiana 1
Art. 25, Constitution of Pindiana 1
Art. 26, Constitution of Pindiana 1

BOOKS
Andrew Ashworth, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 30 (5th edn., 2006). 4
Durga Das Basu, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 5515 (8th edn., 2
Vol. 4, 2007)

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 [INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]

H.M Seervai, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 439 (4th edn., Vol. 1, 2014) 3

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 [STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION]

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent in W.P (C)__ of 20__ submits to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Pindiana under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Pindiana.

The Respondent in SLP No __ of 20__ submits to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Art. 136 of the Constitution of Pindiana.

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 [STATEMENT OF FACTS]

STATEMENT OF FACTS

MUKHTAR
Mukhtar is a Sunni Muslim married to Asma under Shariat Law. He has a habit of drinking
and resorts to forcible sex with his wife and beats her frequently. He continued to taunt and
abuse her regularly for their common negligence resulting in miscarriage of Asma.
ASMA
Wife of Mukhtar, Asma is Shia Muslim who is inclined towards Quran and follows traditions
firmly. She is a career oriented person. She was made a victim of violence (both physical and
mental) by her husband on a frequent basis. Despite all this, she tried to reconcile the matter,
but to no good as her husband continued to abuse her regularly.
PARVEEN
Parveen got married to Mukhtar (being his 2nd wife) soon after the miscarriage of Mukhtar and
Asma’s child.
MAINTENANCE
After an initial few months, Mukhtar stopped paying maintenance of Asma.
TRIPLE-TALAQ
On 12th April, 2017, Mukhtar pronounced Triple-Talaq (“talaq-e-biddat”) against Asma in the
presence of 2 witness and communicated the same to her via a letter through post.
ASMA INVOKED ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF PINDIANA
Asma filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Pindiana challenging the declaration
of talaq-e-biddat by Mukhtar.
THE ORDINANCE
The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Second Ordinance, 2019 (“Impugned
Ordinance”) was promulgated by the Union/Executive making talaq-e-biddat illegal.
Mukhtar, being aggrieved by the same approached this Court under a Special Leave Petition
under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
Both the matters filed by Asma and Mukhtar were combined for hearing before this Hon’ble
Bench.

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 [ISSUES RAISED]

ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT TALAQ-E-BIDDAT FALLS UNDER THE PURVIEW OF ‘LAW’ AS PER
ART. 13?

ISSUE 2: WHETHER OR NOT A RESTRAINT IN THE PRACTICE OF TALAQ-E-BIDDAT VIOLATES

FREEDOM OF RELIGION?

ISSUE 3: WHETHER OR NOT PROMULGATION OF THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION

OF ART. 123 OF THE CONSTITUTION?

ISSUE 4: WHETHER OR NOT THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION?

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 [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: TALAQ-E-BIDDAT DOESN’T FALL UNDER THE PURVIEW OF ‘LAW’ AS PER ART. 13
The Respondent contends that the practice of talaq-e-biddat is not codified The Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (hereinafter ‘Shariat’) under the and is outside
the purview of Art. 13. Therefore the same is not susceptible to meet the standards required by
Part III of the Constitution.
ISSUE 2: A RESTRAINT IN THE PRACTICE OF TALAQ-E-BIDDAT IS A VIOLATION OF FREEDOM
OF RELIGION

The Respondent contends that any restraint put in the practice of talaq-e-biddat would amount
to curtailment of freedom to practice and profess religion as enshrined under Art. 25 and Art.
26 of the Constitution. This is so as the practice of talaq-e-biddat is an essential religious
practice and is outside of the purview of court intervention.
ISSUE 3: PROMULGATION OF THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE VIOLATES ART. 123 OF THE

CONSTITUTION
The power to promulgate an Ordinance is dependent on the condition precedent of there being
a need for “immediate action.” To challenge the Ordinance on grounds of absence of need for
immediate action, a petitioner is required to make only a prima facie case showing non-
existence of circumstances necessary for promulgating an ordinance. Following this a burden
is cast on the Executive to establish such circumstances. It is contended that the circumstances
did not warrant promulgation of the Impugned Ordinance and a prima facie in that case has
been established.
ISSUE 4: THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
The Impugned Ordinance is challenged to be in violation of Part III of the Constitution on the
following grounds:
I. Violation of the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Arts. 14 and 15.
II. Failure to satisfy the test of arbitrariness under Art. 14.
III. Violation of right to life guaranteed under Art. 21.

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 [PLEADINGS]

PLEADINGS

I. TALAQ-E-BIDDAT DOESN’T FALL UNDER THE PURVIEW OF ‘LAW’ AS PER ART. 13

[¶1.] As per Art. 131 a ‘law’ which is in contravention with the fundamental rights would
void till the extent of this contravention. For this, the basic prerequisite is classification of the
practice in question as a ‘law’. It is to be noted that personal laws are by end large non-statutory
and courts have refrained from categorization of the same as ‘law’.2 This effectively makes
personal laws outside the purview of Part III3 and any changes made to such laws would have
to be done by the legislature.4
[¶2.] The alleged codification in question is the Shariat Act5 and as per the legislative
assembly debates preceding the passing of this Act, the object of the legislation was not to
express the details of the Muslim personal law but merely to do away with customs and usages
as were in conflict with it.6 This intention is reinforced through the non-obstante clause at the
beginning of S. 2 of the Act.
[¶3.] Therefore, it is humbly submitted that talaq-e-biddatis not given a statutory status by
the ShariatAct and cannot be included within the meaning of “laws in force” under Art. 13 of
the Constitution.

II. A RESTRAINT IN THE PRACTICE OF TALAQ-E-BIDDAT IS A VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF

RELIGION

[¶4.] Art. 257 r/w Art. 268 guarantees freedom to practice ones religion. The State cannot
interfere with the established customary religious rights to perform their function and
ceremonies9 as long as it formulates an ‘essential religious practice’.10 Therefore the protection
is extended to religious practice and affairs in matters of religion which form an integral part
of the religion itself.11
[¶5.] Further, determination of the same depends on understandings and beliefs regarded by

1
Art. 13, Constitution of Pindiana.
2
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84; Srinivas Aiyar v. Saraswathi Ammal, AIR 1952 Mad
193; Ram Prasad v. State of U.P, AIR 1957 All 411.
3
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, AIR 1980 SC 707; P.E. Mathew v. UOI, AIR 1999 Ker 345.
4
Ahemdabad Women Action Group v. UOI, (1997) 3 SCC 573.
5
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937.
6
Shayara Bano v. UOI, (2017) 9 SCC 1, Para 96.
7
Art. 25, Constitution of Pindiana.
8
Art. 26, Constitution of Pindiana.
9
Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P, AIR 1981 SC 2198.
10
H.H.Srimad Perarulala v. State of T.N, AIR 1972 SC 1586, Pg 1593.
11
Shri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, 1958 SCR 895.

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 [PLEADINGS]

community practicing that religion.12 Additionally a ‘practice’ to be religious need not be

adopted by all member of a religion and it cannot be denied if it is shown to be performed as
an article of faith by a religious denomination.13
[¶6.] It is also to be noted that the very concept of essentiality is not by itself a determinative
factor; but is one of the circumstances to be considered in determining whether a practice is an
integral part of that religion or not.14 Due to these factors, Courts on numerous occasions have
denied intervening in matters relating to personal laws- both codified and uncodified, and held
that such matters pertained to legislative action.15
[¶7.] It is submitted that talaq-e-biddat, is a 1400 years16 old practice and is followed by
Hanafi School Muslim which is the largest sect of Sunni Muslims in India17and the practice of
the same holds good in law.18 Thus, talaq-e-biddatis an integral part of religious practice
followed by Sunni Sect of Muslim and hence any interference by Court shall infringe the
freedom of religion.

III. PROMULGATION OF THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION OF ART. 123 OF

THE CONSTITUTION

[¶8.] The President of Pindiana is empowered to promulgate ordinances when the Houses of
the Parliament are not in session, if she is satisfied about the existence of an emergent
situation19 requiring ‘immediate action.’20 In order to challenge the validity of the ordinance, a
petitioner is required to make only a prima facie case showing non-existence of circumstances
necessary for promulgating an ordinance, following which a burden is cast on the executive to
establish such circumstances.21
[¶9.] It is submitted that talaq-e-biddat has been a part of Islam since centuries and there has
been no legislation for criminalizing it, until now. Given that a challenge to its constitutionality
was sub-judice before this Hon’ble Bench,22 it can be said that prima facie, there was no need
for an immediate action of promulgating the Impugned Ordinance. Therefore, unless the

12
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, Para 14.
13
Durga Das Basu, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 3462 (8th edn., Vol. 4, 2007).
14
A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P, (1996) 9 SCC 548.
15
Ahmedabad Women Action Group. v. UOI, (1997) 3 SCC 573, Para 11; Maharshi Avdhesh v. UOI (1994) Supp
(1) SCC 713.
16
Shayara Bano v. UOI, (2017) 9 SCC 1, Para 96.
17
Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN ISLAMIC FINANCE, 77-78 (1st edn., 2010).
18
D.F. Mulla, PRINCIPLES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW, 725 (1s tedn., 2011).
19
R.K Garg v. UOI, (1981) 4 SCC 675.
20
Art. 123, Constitution of Pindiana.
21
A.K Roy v. UOI, (1982) 1 SCC 271; Gyanendra Kumar v. UOI, AIR 1997 Del 58, Pg. 61.
22
Pg. 14, Moot Problem No. 1.

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 [PLEADINGS]

executive discharges the burden cast on it, it must be held that the promulgation of the
Impugned Ordinance is violative of Art. 123 and hence unconstitutional.

IV. THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

[¶10.] It is submitted that the Impugned Ordinance violates the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution, for the reasons that [A] it violates the principle of non-discrimination under
Art. 14 and 15; [B] it fails to satisfy the test of arbitrariness under Art. 14 and [C] it violates
the right to life under Art. 21.

A. Ordinance violates the principle of non-discrimination contained in Arts. 14 and 15

[¶11.] Art. 14 and 15 of the Constitution enshrines the principle of equality and non-
discrimination. It is submitted that the provisions of the Impugned Ordinance offend the above
tenets of equality to the extent [1] Criminalization of talaq-e-biddat under S. 3 amounts to
discrimination on the basis of religion and [2] Classification of the offence as cognizable is
against the principle of equal protection of laws.

1. CRIMINALIZATION OF TALAQ-E-BIDDAT UNDER S. 3 AMOUNTS TO DISCRIMINATION ON THE

GROUND OF RELIGION

[¶12.] Unfavourable treatment by legislation only on the ground of religion shall be hit by Art.
15(1).23 It is submitted that when S. 3 of the Impugned Ordinance criminalizes the
pronouncement of talaq-e-biddat by a Muslim husband,24 it imposes criminal liability for the
act of divorce as allowed under the respective personal law, only on Muslim men. There being
no other valid ground for such discrimination, S. 3 should be struck down as unconstitutional.

2. CLASSIFICATION OF THE OFFENCE AS COGNIZABLE IS AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL

PROTECTION OF LAWS.

[¶13.] Equal protection of laws under Art. 14 means according equal protection of laws to all
those who are similarly situated.25 It disallows discrimination between two persons if their
position is same/similar as regards the subject matter of the legislation.26
[¶14.] In the present case, S. 7 classifies pronouncement of talaq-e-biddat as a cognizable

23
Daniel Latifi v. UOI, (2001) 7 SCC 740; State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.
24
S. 3, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Second Ordinance, 2019.
25
H.M Seervai, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 439 (4th edn., Vol. 1, 2014); O.N Agarwal v. Nagarpalika,
Shahjahanpur, (1993) 2 SCC 242.
26
Chiranjit Lal v. UOI, AIR 1951 SC 941; State of J&K v. Triloki, (1974) 1 SCC 19.

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 [PLEADINGS]

offence.27 While it is in the nature of a matrimonial offence, all other matrimonial offences
under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are classified as non-cognisable.28 Hence, in effect, while
all persons accused of matrimonial offences are similarly situated they are not provided equal
protection of laws in terms of cognisability of their offences. Therefore, the provision is
violative of Art. 14.

B. The Ordinance fails to satisfy the test of arbitrariness under Art. 14.

[¶15.] Art. 14 of the Constitution aims to “strike at arbitrariness in State action”29 as acts of
arbitrariness are inherently unequal.30 A law is considered manifestly arbitrary when it is
“capricious, irrational, disproportionate, excessive and/or without adequate determining
principle.”31 Therefore, if a legislation32 or ordinance33 is found to be manifestly arbitrary, it
would be struck down for not confirming to the standards of Art. 14. It is submitted that the
Ordinance is manifestly arbitrary for the reasons that [1] S. 4 of the Impugned Ordinance has
the effect of criminalizing an act that is declared to be void as per S. 3 and [2] Impugned
Ordinance has the effect of criminalizing an act that is essentially civil in nature.

1. S. 4 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE HAS THE EFFECT OF CRIMINALIZING AN ACT THAT IS

DECLARED TO BE VOID AS PER S. 3

[¶16.] The ‘harm principle’ in criminal jurisprudence justifies criminalizing only those
conducts that cause harm or create an unacceptable risk of harm to others. 34 While S. 3 of the
Ordinance explicitly nullifies a pronouncement of talaq-e-biddat by declaring it as void, S. 4
makes the same void act punishable.35 However, if the talaq is void and the marriage continues
to subsist between the parties, there is no legal harm caused to the wife. Therefore, imposing
criminal sanctions when there is no actual harm caused reflects the lack of regard to a
determined principle of criminal jurisprudence, making the provision manifestly arbitrary.

2. IMPUGNED ORDINANCE HAS THE EFFECT OF CRIMINALIZING AN ACT THAT IS ESSENTIALLY

CIVIL IN NATURE

27
S. 7, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Second Ordinance, 2019.
28
Schedule I, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
29
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, (1978) 1 SCC 248, Para 7 (Bhagwati J.).
30
E.P Royappa v. State of T.N, (1974) 4 SCC 3, Para 8 (Bhagwati J.); R.D Shetty v. International Airport
Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489.
31
Shayara Bano v. UOI, (2017) 9 SCC 1, Para 95, (Nariman J.); Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
32
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722, Para 16; A.P Dairy Development Corporation
Federation v. B Narsimha Reddy, (2011) 9 SCC 286; Independent Thought v. UOI, AIR 2017 SC 4904.
33
S Vasudbvan v. S.D Mittal, AIR 1962 Bom 53.
34
Andrew Ashworth, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 30 (5thedn., 2006).
35
S. 4, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Second Ordinance, 2019.

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[¶17.] In Joseph Shine,36 it was held that criminal sanctions are justified in public wrongs, but
not in private wrongs. Criminalizing an act entails curtailment of individual autonomy and thus
requires stronger justification.37 Minimalist approach in criminalization of offences must be
adopted so that criminal law is used as the last resort.
[¶18.] In the present case, the act that is criminalized is essentially a form of divorce which is
a private matter falling in the realm of civil law. Secondly, the object of the Impugned
Ordinance, i.e., protection of rights of Muslim women is attainable even in the absence of a
penalizing provision. The step taken in the Impugned Ordinance is unnecessary and grossly
disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved by it. Such ‘unprincipled criminalization’
being manifestly arbitrary is violative of Art. 14.

C. The Impugned Ordinance violates the right to life under Art. 21

[¶19.] It has been held that imposing criminal sanctions that breaches the realm of privacy
existing in a matrimonial relationship is violative of Art.21.38 Further, expression of choice 39
and freedom of choosing a life partner40 are held to be essential part of right to liberty and
dignity41. Moreover, the right to dissolve a marriage is a part of fundamental right under Art.
21.42
[¶20.] In the present matter, the Impugned Ordinance imposing a criminal penalty in case of
marital discord serves contrary to the object of the Impugned Ordinance as it may cause
destitution of marriage rather than preserving it. Also, the detention of the husband while the
marriage still exists stands inconsistent with the conjugal rights43 inherent in a marital
relationship.
[¶21.] Furthermore, the Impugned Ordinance serves no purpose except for imposing criminal
sanctions on a particular community as law for maintenance44 and custody of child45 already
exists. Thus, the Ordinance violates the right of life and dignity of a Muslim marriage and
hence violates Art. 21 of the Constitution.

36
Joseph Shine v. UOI, (2019) 3 SCC 39, Para 17 (Malhotra J.).
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid
39
National Legal Services Authority v. UOI, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
40
Shakti Vahini v. UOI, AIR 2018 SC 1601.
41
K.S. Puttaswamy v. UOI, (2017) 10 SCC 1, Para 108.
42
Saumya Ann Thomas v. UOI, 2010 (1) KLJ 449.
43
Naushad Hussain v. Razia, 2018(2) UC 1242.
44
C.K. Aboobacker v. Rahiyanath, Crl.M.C.No. 2188 of 2004 (decided on 22.07.2008); S. 125, Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
45
S. 21, The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

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 [PRAYER]

PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pindiana
that it may be graciously pleased to adjudge and declare that:
I. Talaq-e-biddat doesn’t fall under the purview of ‘Law’ as per Art. 13 and thus not
susceptible to the conditions laid down in Part III.
II. A restraint in the practice of talaq-e-biddat is a violation of freedom of religion.
III. Promulgation of the Impugned Ordinance is in violation of Art. 123.
IV. Impugned Ordinance is in violation of fundamental rights.

Also, pass any other order that it may deem fit in the favour of the RESPONDENT in the light
of equity, justice and good conscience.

For this act of Kindness, the RESPONDENT shall duty bound forever pray.

Place: Chind sd /-
Dated: 20th April 2019 Counsel for Respondent

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