Bureaucracy’

1. Entire government office > or

known as bureau > permanent
office deliver public function >
regardless of changes of
political leaders
2. Entire public officers > persons
who carry out the day to day
administration of the state.

Hence, bureaucracy could be known

with various names; civil service,
public servants, public service, civil
servants, government service,
government servants, officials of
government, officials, permanent
executive and non-political
executive
 • Bureaucracy is the collective
organizational, procedures, protocols, and
set of regulations in place to manage
activity, usually in large organizations and
government.

• a concept in sociology and

political science referring to the
way that the administrative
execution and enforcement of
legal rules are socially organized.
 • constitutes the permanent and

Bureaucracy
professional part of the executive organ
of government.
• usually described as the non-political or
politically neutral, permanent, and
professionally trained civil service.
• the administration of the state according
to the policies and laws of the government
political executive.
• qualities and efficiency of bureaucracy
depends the quality and efficiency of the
state administration, including leadership
and control of the Political Executive.
 CHARACTERISTIC OF BUREAUCRACY

MAX WEBER (1864 –1920)

• A formal, hierarchical organization with many levels

in which tasks, responsibilities, and authority are
delegated among individuals, offices, or
departments, held together by a central
administration.
MAX WEBER
1. Fixed division of labor
2. Hierarchy of offices
3. Rational-legal authority
4. Creation of rules to govern
performance
5. Separation of personal
from official property and
rights
6. Selection based on
qualifications
7. Clear career paths
Fixed division of labor
• areas are clearly specified, and
each area has a specific set of
official duties and rights
• cannot be changed at the whim
of the leader
• This division of labor should
minimize arbitrary assignments
of duties
Hierarchy of offices
• should be controlled by a
higher ranking office.
• lower offices should
maintain a right to appeal
decisions made higher in
the hierarchy.
• replace a more traditional
system (power and
authority relations are
more diffuse, and not
based on a clear
hierarchical order. )
Rational-legal authority Creation of rules to govern
performance
• "legality" of formal rules and • Rules should be specified to
hierarchies, and in the right of
those elevated in the hierarchy to govern official decisions and
posses authority and issue actions.
commands. • This should displace old
• Authority is given to officials
based on their skills, position and systems
authority placed formally in each
position.
• This should supplant earlier
types administrative systems,
where authority was legitimized
based on other, and more
individual, aspects of authority
like wealth, position, ownership,
heritage etc.
Separation of personal from
official property and rights
• Personal property should be
separated from official
property.
Selection based on qualifications
• Officials are recruited based on
qualifications, and are
appointed, not elected, to the
office.
• People are compensated with a
salary, and are not compensated
with benefices such as rights to
land, power etc.
Clear career paths
• Employment in the
organizations should be seen
as a career for officials.
• An official is a full-time
employee, and anticipates a
lifelong career.
• After an introduction period,
the employee is given tenure,
which protects the employee
from arbitrary dismissal.
TYPES OF BUREAUCRACY
Representative Bureaucracy
• acts as representative of
citizens.
• The establishment of
bureaucracy based on citizens
ratio (race and ethnicity)
• to ensure the interests of
diverse groups are represented
in policy formulation and
implementation processes.
Neutral Bureaucracy
• Bureaucrats are supposed
to administer the rules
without bias. No one
should be given
preferential treatment.
•  Political neutrality of civil
service.
• Work based on policy,
rules and regulations
BUREAUCRACY - LIMITATIONS &CRITICS
• Overspecialization
• Rigidity of procedures
• A phenomenon of group
thinking
• Disregard for dissenting
opinions due to
extensive rules and
procedures
• Less use of common
sense
• Subject to multiple
political and moral
expectations
Role of bureaucracy
• part of modern government > serves as the principal tool in planning and
implementation of public policies and in the delivery of vital services to the people
• monitoring the overall policy implementation
• ensures coordination with other central ministries, federal agencies (i.e. national
line agencies) ie Economic Planning Unit
• significant role in the country’s development process
• Responsive to ruling party: 2 opinions
▫ To be partisan (responsive) to ruling politicians - Bureaucrats are servants to
ruling politicians and are expected to further the interest of the politicians
▫ To be neutral > to give equal service to whoever hold the political power of the
state
• respond to public demands promptly
• Accountable to the public - deliver crucial services such as government
administration, judicial, public security, national defence, health and education
FACTORS INFLUENCE THE
ADMINISTRATION
(ENVIRONMENT)
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
  Society – create conditions
necessary to stay/live together with
common identification.
 Network  Social interactions,
social interrelationship, patterned
behaviour
 Social institutions; traditions,
SOCIAL values, belief systems 
ENVIRONMENT inherited/developed (taking into
account  caste, colour, religion,
language etc
  social environment interacts with
administrative system and
influences administration as well as
influenced by it
  What influence public administration
of a particular country?
 1. Social stratification – birth
created division or socio-economic
inequalities

SOCIAL  Preferential treatment system

designed to bring equality  create
ENVIRONMEN internal tension of public
T administration
 2. familial and kinship ties 
extended family
 Nepotism, favouritism
  3. Social ethos and values –
 4. Social and voluntary associations
–
 5. Societal ambitiousness –
demanding society (due to social
consciousness);
SOCIAL  Expecting greater efficiency,
ENVIRONMENT efficacy, responsiveness from
administration
 Low societal ambitiousness  less
demanding and careful about their
rights and duties
  6. cultural environment – way of life
 7. Issue of languages – medium of
expressing and exchanging views
and ideas.
 8. Regionalism – regional feelings
 9. Religion – faith/belief that binds
people together
SOCIAL  10. Symbols – transmission of
ENVIRONMENT experiences through horizontal and
vertical transmission. Medium and
symbols are significant ways of
communication

  Economy of a country influences the
form, structure and nature of
activities of public administration
and vice versa.
 1. Prioritisation through planning 
the administration assess the
ECONOMIC existing resources, list of

ENVIRONMEN priorities/problems, and allocates

resources
T  2. Level of economic development
 3. Technology
 4. Technical manpower (R&D)
  5. Resources- availability of
physical/raw resources
 6. Infrastructure – means of
transportation; communication;
ECONOMIC electricity; banking etc. to establish
ENVIRONMENT proper coordination among
administrative units at various
levels
  Public administration functions
under the direction and control of
polity
 Impact of politics on public
administration
 Written constitutions

POLITICAL  1. nature of state: THREE (3) main

ENVIRONMENT functions
 Collection of revenue
 Maintenance of internal order
 Protection of the State from external
aggression

 Welfare state –
  2. Constitution – document
containing laws, rules and
regulations enacted by a
constituted body governing a
country.
 3. Political leadership
POLITICAL  4. Political parties
ENVIRONMEN  Party ideology

T  Party manifesto
 5. Pressure groups
 6. Public opinion and mass media
 7. Coalition government
 Utilising knowledge of your country
case study, explore the issues related
to
 recruitment and training,
DISCUSSIO  administrative accountability and
N responsibility, and
 government administration.
How do these factors mesh with the
political ideology, social values,
administrative efficiency and overall
development of the country
concerned
GOOD GOVERNANCE
 Concept of Good Governance

Good governance provides a platform that enables

the Government to operate efficiently, effectively
and transparently and to be accountable to the
public. Primary Principles of Good Governance
include:
• Public participation in Government
• Respect for the rule of law
• Freedom of expression and association
• Transparency and accountability
• Legitimacy of Government
 Civil Society & Good Governance

Civil Society’s involvement occupies a

critical place in the governance process and
promotes good governance by facilitating
people’s collective action for attaining
sustainable socio-economic outcomes for
the common good of the society.
Indicators for
Good Governance
Six Key Dimensions of Governance
(Worldwide Governance Indicators)

The WGI authors define governance as the traditions and

institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This
includes the process by which governments are selected,
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions
among them. The WGI measure six broad definitions of
governance capturing the key elements of this definition:
 1. Voice and Accountability: the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: the

likelihood that the government will be destabilized by
unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism.

 3. Government Effectiveness: the quality of public services, the

capacity of the civil service and its independence from political
pressures; and the quality of policy formulation.
 4. Regulatory Quality: the ability of the
government to provide sound policies and regulations
that enable and promote private sector development.

 5. Rule of Law: the extent to which agents have

confidence in and abide by the rules of society,
including the quality of contract enforcement and
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as
the likelihood of crime and violence.

 6. Control of Corruption: the extent to which public

power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
CHALLENGES

 High incidence of corruption

 Bureaucratic inefficiency
 Lack of competence
 Professionalism
 Procedural complication
 Delay in service provision
 Eroding competitiveness
 Financial Strength
 Unrealistic dreams
Chapter 3

Bureaucracy

The true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to

produce a good administration.
Alexander Hamilton (The Federalist)

Bureaucracy and Comparative Analysis

The administrative system of a country or its national bureaucracy refers to agen-
cies, bureaus, units, organizations, departments, ministries, or appointed com-
mittees of the public sector. In large governments, these units employ thousands
and, collectively, millions of public employees. They initiate, influence, interpret,
and implement the authoritative policies and laws of the state and its political
subunits. Bureaucracy is regarded as a system because its parts and units are inter-
related in serving the policies and goals of the state. While agencies and similar
units constitute subsystems of bureaucracy, each of these units and organizations
by itself may also be considered a system. Viewing bureaucracy as a large system
with many subsystems enables analysts to define and to measure its input of
resources, goals, and public demands as well as its output of goods, services, and
regulatory actions. Studying and analyzing bureaucracy as a system emphasizes
functional and complex relationships among and between actors, offices, and
their environment.
Focusing on the national administrative system in comparative studies places
the institution of bureaucracy at the center of analysis. At the outset, it is impor-
tant to point out that the national administrative system is conceived flexibly to

61
62 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

incorporate various subsequent theoretical and practical modifications, extensions,

and adaptations to the classic model of bureaucracy. At this macro level, one is able
to delineate overall administrative characteristics and their significance to the func-
tion of governance.­A close examination of the national bureaucracy also helps to
bring out and to define crucial relations with the political order. Interdependence of
the administrative and the political systems largely shapes the structure and defines
the formal functions of bureaucracy. It is not surprising, therefore, that studies of
comparative national bureaucracy and comparative politics converge or overlap on
various aspects.
Early comparative studies were preoccupied with attributes and functions of
political institutions in a handful of Western countries and a scattering of devel-
oping countries (Heady 2001). The emergence of many Third World countries
in the post–World War II era brought forward issues and problems of manage-
ment and nation building that heretofore were neglected or unfamiliar to scholars
of Western com­parative politics. Today, a major purpose of CPA is to improve
understanding of national administrative systems across countries by study-
ing institutions that are central to governance and, at the same time, constitute
suitable units for comparative research. The focus, therefore, is genuinely inter-
national rather than confined to a select few systems. Generally, the term bureau-
cracy is used to denote national administration, as in the classic conceptions, and
subsequent changes and adaptations that followed. A country’s bureaucracy is its
national administrative system in its present form and function. What a bureau-
cracy does in a particular country, and how it is doing it, are not assumptions to
be made but empirical questions to be answered through empirical investigation
and research.

Classic Bureaucratic Model

Bureaucracy is a specific institutional structure that has received its initial designa-
tion and its characterization from the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920)
in the early part of the twentieth century. Classic bureaucratic theory is linked to
Max Weber’s name as Scientific Management is to Frederick Taylor’s. Although
Max Weber devoted his studies to areas other than bureaucracy, his brief discus-
sion of bureaucracy—as the form of administration functioning in a legal-rational
system of authority—became the most widely recognized statement on the subject.
Weber (translated by Gerth and Mills, 1946) outlines the basic features of bureau-
cracy as the following:

1. Fixed and official jurisdictional areas are generally ordered by rules and laws.
2. Principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly
ordered system of superior-subordinate authority.
 Bureaucracy ◾ 63

3. Management of the modern office is based on written records and documents

(files).
4. Management usually presupposes thorough and expert training.
5. Official activity demands the full working capacity of officials (career
employees).
6. Management follows general rules, which are more or less stable and exhaus-
tive, and can be learned.

The core elements of the model are specialization, hierarchy of authority,

impersonality, system of rules, written records, and recruitment process based
on merit (education, training, and skills). Weber’s emphasis on generalizable
properties of bureaucracy tends to challenge the claim that Western civiliza-
tion and systems are distinct, thus superior. By accentuating the similarities
among bureaucratic systems in the West and between these and other earlier
and contemporary cultures, Weber’s drive to make his theory of bureaucratic
universal dictated that he play down the cultural differences while emphasizing
the process, its rationality, and the need for its institutionalization. The political
context, however, is a different issue altogether. The authority system dictates
fundamental properties of the administrative system. After a review of history
and effective use of the comparative approach, Weber identified three types of
authority systems:
In the first, the legal-rational system of authority, bureaucracy operates within
carefully prescribed rules and processes. A main feature of this system is that obe-
dience is based on legal and impersonal order. Offices, rather than persons, are the
basis of authority. These offices are organized in a hierarchy, occupied by staff paid
on a scale tied to their positions in this hierarchy, and according to their levels of
competence and expert knowledge. “The persons who exercise the power of com-
mand are typically superiors who are appointed or elected by legally sanctioned
procedures and are themselves oriented toward the maintenance of the legal order.
The persons subject to the commands are legal equals who obey ‘the law’ rather than
the persons implementing it” (Bendix 1962: 294).
The second, the traditional authority system, bases legitimacy on the “sanctity
of order.” Obedience is not to enacted rules, but to persons, who govern by tra-
dition and inherited status. “The persons subject to the command of the master
are followers or subjects in the literal sense—they obey out of personal loyalty to
the master or a pious regard for his time-honored status” (Bendix 1962: 295). The
administrative staff is usually recruited from among the favorites of the chief and
from those tied to him by purely personal loyalties. Kinship, wealth, and family
origin play an important role in the selection of the staff. Consequently, in contrast
to the legal rational model, the staff of traditional administrative systems lacks
defined spheres of competence, rational ordering of offices, and technical training
as a regular requirement.
64 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

The third, the charismatic authority system, is legitimized by the superhuman

qualities of the leader in power. Followers do not elect this leader; their duty is to
recognize the charisma and respond to it. The administrative staff consists of fol-
lowers and disciples chosen not in accordance with rules but, mainly, on the basis
of political loyalties. To be more than transitory, a system built on the charisma of
its leader has to routinize the line of succession (Diamant 1962).
Weber realized that in the “real world,” a mixture of the three patterns of
authority exists. However, usually one of the three designations—traditional, char-
ismatic, or legal-rational—predominates. During the past six decades, Weber’s
work attracted extraordinary attention by social scientists in the United States and
in Europe. Earlier American scholars such as C. Wright Mills, Philip Selznick,
Robert Merton, Reinhard Bendix, Peter Blau, Alvin Gouldner, Talcot Parson, and
others invested considerable energies in interpreting, evaluating, extending, and
examining what Weber said and meant. Weber’s impact on American sociology is
deep and lasting; sociologists regard Weber as “the founder of systematic study of
bureaucracy” (Merton 1952: 17). Weber’s formulations are considered the foun-
tainhead for much theoretical and empirical inquiry into bureaucracy.
It is true that Weber constructed an “ideal type” model designed to be logi-
cally precise and consistent, and never to be found fully manifested in a concrete
reality. An ideal conception, however, can help us think systematically and assess
the existing reality. In fact, some aspects of Weber’s ideal theory of bureaucracy
exist in all large-scale organizations—public or private. “The rational-legal form of
bureaucracy,” wrote Charles Perrow, “is the most efficient form of administration
known” (1984: 5). Perrow regarded the bureaucratic model as “superior to all others
we know or can hope to afford in the near and middle future.” The fact remains
that few administrative models excite as much debate and controversy as the sub-
ject of bureaucracy. Volumes have been dedicated to the subject without exhaust-
ing all salient issues. Thus, in this work, I discuss only selected issues to represent
general features and questions related to the role of bureaucracy in modern society.
Particularly, I seek to develop better understanding of the bureaucratic model and
its suitability for comparative analysis.
The bureaucratic model proved to be a paradox to administrative theory and
practice in many ways. Michel Crozier pointed out that Weber had furnished a
brilliant description of the ideal type of a bureaucratic organization and a sug-
gestive analysis of its historical development that apparently paved the way for a
positive, value-free sociological analysis. “Yet the discussion about bureaucracy is
still, to a large extent, the domain of the myths and pathos of ideology” (Crozier
1964: 175).
To examine Weber’s bureaucratic model only as an instrument of managerial
efficiency and effectiveness is to lose sight of its larger significance. Weber’s “par-
ticular genius,” Brian Fry noted, “was to place administration in a broad historical
context and to associate the processes of bureaucratization with the processes of
rationalization in the Western world” (1989: 42). The bureaucratic model was to
 Bureaucracy ◾ 65

emphasize technical skills, knowledge, merit, justice, due process, and all those
values featured in modern professional management. Thus, Weber applied the
comparative approach successfully over time and space in the search for regulari-
ties and common threads.

Assessments and Criticisms of Bureaucracy

Despite its significant role in modern society, bureaucracy rarely enjoys a positive
public image. Bureaucracy has been fending off bitter attacks from without and an
erosion of confidence, if not disillusionment, from within. But, even if bureaucracy
is unappreciated or reviled, it is a fact of contemporary life and of governance every-
where. The “American government, the society, and its citizens are now dependent
upon vast, interconnecting web of complicated administrative systems, processes,
and procedures” (Stillman 1998: xvii). Critics of bureaucracy are diverse; their ratio-
nales also vary. “Policies, organizations, and public officials have failed, all with con-
sequences ranging from unfortunate on a local level to egregious on a global level”
(Hill and Lynn 2009: xiii). At the same time, administrative accomplishments and
successes are no less numerous and compelling. “As a matter of fact, the daily business
of government at all levels is performed with commendable competence by officials
committed to public service” (Hill and Lynn 2009: viii). In popular views and in
scholarly literature, bureaucracy has been linked to various good and bad attributes.
It is possible to define and classify two clusters of negative views of bureaucracy:
One set of criticisms may be called the colloquial view, which equates bureau-
cracy with inefficiency, red tape, lengthy forms, lust for power, domination,
incompetence, and a host of similar scathing characterizations (Stillman 1998:
4; Goodsell 1994). Such images are often nurtured in popular stories, prejudicial
journalistic writings, and conservative political views that continually portray
bureaucracy as a pathological problem of modern society. Also, bureaucracy is
a convenient scapegoat, which can be blamed with impunity by political leaders
for public policy shortcomings and failures. Such accusations are rarely based
on dispassionate evaluation and analysis but often are politically motivated.1
Criticisms are usually based on personal beliefs, anecdotes, ideological prefer-
ences, political expediency, or simply conformity with a trend. Such negative
views, even if widely spread, are not a central concern of this study. Useful analy-
sis of bureaucracy has to be a value-neutral approach, accepting bureaucracy as a
structure that may perform well or poorly, and this to be ascertained by evidence.
Determining the characteristics of a particular bureaucracy remains essentially
an empirical question.
A second set of criticisms relies on theoretical analyses and empirical apprais-
als of bureaucracy and its role in modern society. This type of criticism is rooted
in inductive and deductive analysis, utilizing reliable social science methods. One
finds in such studies some influential arguments that actually reach beyond the
66 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

structure or formal functions of bureaucracy. These discussions often indicate a

wider scope of concerns, particularly on the question of impact on society and
relationships with the political system. The significant concerns that dominated
discussions on the subject of bureaucratic defects and pathologies may be divided
into four major clusters of issues:

1. The power concern

2. Political development and bureaucratic influence
3. Change and innovation
4. The “ideal-type” concept

The Power Issue

Bureaucracy is a powerful institution of modern society. Its performance can dras-
tically assist or hinder the state’s capacity for effective governance. Max Weber
himself acknowledged that the position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always
overpowering. Ralph Hummel explained that Weber believed bureaucracy converts
“man’s social relations into “control relations.” “His norms and beliefs concerning
human ends are torn from him and replaced with skills affirming the ascendency
of technical means, whether of administration or production” (Hummel 1977: 2).
But Weber repeatedly indicated that his model is an “ideal type” that does not exist
in a pure form but as a mixture of various characteristics. In practice, however, a
principal basis of this power is expertise, elevated by good training and superior
technical skills of those who join the bureaucracy (Gerth and Mills 1946: 228).
A high degree of specialization creates a need for coordination at a higher level
of authority as well as through processes of work. The purpose of such structural
articulation is to reach higher efficiency of performance. But the combination of
the bureaucratic processes often generates excessive power in the hands of such a
disciplined institution. Because the source of this bureaucratic power is not the will
of citizens, and the method of granting it is not through representation, even if
bureaucratic authority is answerable to duly elected representatives, bureaucracy is
almost always suspect or publicly charged on ideological grounds.
Critics contend that concentration of power in the hands of bureaucrats has
the potential of destroying the democratic process and weakening democratic
institutions. The problem of efficiency versus democracy is relevant to all formal
organizations. One clarification is offered by Blau and Meyer (1971: 13) based on
distinguishing three types of association:

◾◾ If an association is established for manufacturing a product or winning a war

then considerations of efficiency are of primary importance.
◾◾ If an association is established for the purpose of finding intrinsic satisfaction
in common activities, say religious worship, then considerations of efficiency
are less relevant.
 Bureaucracy ◾ 67

◾◾ Finally, if an association is established for the purpose of deciding upon com-

mon goals and courses of action to implement them, which is the function of
democratic government, the free expression of opinion must be safeguarded
against other considerations, including those of efficiency.

Thus, Blau and Meyer conclude that organizations of the first type (industrial
and services) would always be bureaucratized, but those of the third type (public
policy making) never would. The authors’ thesis, however, does not resolve the
problem in mixed situations. Also, for policy-making organizations, it is commonly
accepted (and Weber himself has recognized) that setting national goals and poli-
cies in a democratic system is a function of elected people rather than appointed
bureaucrats.
Although the issue of bureaucracy versus democracy is not new, it has been
the subject of a continuing debate that has changed in form and in substance over
time. From the right, as early as 1940s and before, conservatives saw a “danger
that our impatience for quick results may lead us to choose instruments which,
though perhaps more efficient for achieving the particular ends, are not compatible
with the preservation of a free society” (Hayek 1944: x). Accordingly, bureaucracy
is incompatible with democracy. This line of thinking perceives a historical pat-
tern. In The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich A. Hayek (1944: vii) took the position
that increasing government control over the economy would ultimately lead to
nation-wide socialism, which requires that a central plan to replace the market. He
offered this illustration: In 1934, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Japan applied central
planning; ten years later, they had all become totalitarian states. Such overdrawn
conclusion is tenuous for two reasons: First, several other countries employed cen-
tral planning, even considerable measures of socialism—for example, the United
Kingdom and India—but were not transformed into totalitarian states. Second,
the evidence of cause and effect relationship between planning and totalitarianism
is flimsy at best.
Similarly, some recent criticisms of the state regard the growth of bureaucracy
as incursion by the government, beyond what they perceive as its “acceptable” and
limited boundaries. The expansion of the role of public policy in the economies
of the U.S and other countries, after the economic disaster of the 2008–9, has
also been labeled socialism and communism by ideologues and extreme political
groups. Although state activism was often the result of weakened regulatory pro-
cesses and abuse of the market mechanisms that required state intervention, the
assertive regulatory process and the use of public expenditure as a stimulus have
faced rigorous negative reactions not unlike those attacks of earlier times.
From the left, bureaucracy is also considered an obstacle to the functioning of a
democratic society. For radical political left, bureaucracy is a problem that stands in
the way of creating a democratic society. According to the radical left, rules, regula-
tions, hierarchy, standardization, and impersonality of organizational decisions, essen-
tial elements of the Weberian bureaucracy, are manifestations of authoritarianism
68 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

and oppression of the individual. Views of the left are not unanimous or even harmo-
nious. The following statement, even if exaggerated, is illustrative:

A bureaucratic system is hierarchical in nature … in all bureaucratic

organizations authority rests on the ability to apply coercion. The
authority to apply coercion is delegated to subordinates by those at the
top. In a bureaucratic system it is assumed that there must be one per-
son or group of persons who can finally be held responsible for system’s
operation. The bureaucratic system fits exactly the description … of the
Stalinist system: It consists of a Stalin at the top and little Stalins all the
way down the line. (Megill 1970: 100)

Bureaucracy and Political Development

This issue is also a derivative of the democracy-versus-bureaucracy discourse.
Comparative public administration has always been concerned about the impact
of political authority and political culture on administrative performance. A major
debate among scholars, applying the comparative approach in the early 1960s,
has been focused on factors of power, efficacy, and the politics of bureaucracy.
The capacity developed by a truly bureaucratic organization presumably creates
or intensifies the issue of control in democratic governance. Such concern often
seems to reach a dead end or turn into abstracts and deductions of what Heady
calls the “imbalance thesis” (Heady 2001: 439–443). The well-known advocate of
the “imbalance thesis” is Fred W. Riggs, who had always maintained this position.
Namely, in developing countries, bureaucratic power and efficiency contribute to
lack of political development. Bureaucracy, as perceived by Riggs, constitutes a rul-
ing class with its own self-interest; thus, bureaucratic dominance has adverse effect
on the future of political institutions (Riggs 2000). The antithesis of Riggs’ propo-
sition has been restated by many authors over the years, including Ferrel Heady,
Milton Esman, Ralph Braibanti, and others.
Ralph Braibanti’s edited volume Political and Administrative Development
(1969) attracted contributions from prominent scholars in political science and
comparative public administration such as Carl Friedrich, Giovanni Sartori, Martin
Landau, Harold Lasswell, Fred Riggs, John Montgomery, and others. Braibanti’s
view on the “imbalance thesis” was clearly stated. He pointed out that compe-
tent bureaucracy is a prerequisite for national development. Thus, strengthening
the administrative structures must proceed irrespective of the rate of maturation
of the political process. “Nevertheless,” Braibanti pointed out, “in recognition of
the stress involved in rapid bureaucratic development occurring simultaneously
with expanded mass participation in political life, we seek here to explore means
of increasing the capability of other institutions not only to stimulate bureaucratic
innovation but also to moderate bureaucratic discretion, to enhance the symmetry
of political growth, and to improve the quality of participation” (1969: 1). The
 Bureaucracy ◾ 69

message is that developing administrative capability should not be impeded and

should not be at the expense of political development. Administrative development
should sustain political development rather than undermine it.
Despite contrary claims, effective political systems and effective administrative
systems often coexist in mutually reinforcing capacities rather than in a zero sum
game of competition. The primacy of political control over administration is not in
doubt, irrespective of the level of effectiveness in exercising it. Evidence from the
Arab states, for example, indicates that political leaders have kept very tight rein on
all powers of the state, particularly those related to public funds and military con-
trol. In reality, the political features of the state allowed the administrative process
many of its current attributes: highly centralized, beset by nepotism and politi-
cal patronage, and burdened by its own weight of swelled ranks of poorly trained
public employees (Jreisat 1997: 227). Under these political forms and processes,
professional management with neutral competence is hard to sustain. Similarly,
programs of administrative reform falter primarily for lack of political support and
incongruities with political regime values. Thus, the capacity for action by both of
the political and the administrative systems is weakened as is common in many
developing countries.
The challenge for comparative research, then, is to define links with the political
order that really matter, regardless whether such links strengthen or hinder oppor-
tunities for administrative reform. The objective is to specify conditions and vari-
ables that determine relationships through empirical evidence gathered from case
studies and refined middle-range propositions at the organizational level. Political
authority and political values not only determine the boundaries of administrative
change but also shape bureaucratic attitudes in the conduct of state affairs, par-
ticularly towards citizens. For too long, consultants and researchers on reform have
focused on issues of centralization, technical skills, civil service procedures, and
bureaucratic behavior. While these are important elements of the administrative
capacity building of any system, they must not overshadow crucial considerations
such as the form and the behavior of the political regime.
In developing countries, administrative change questions are linked to attitudes
of the political leaders. To what limit does the political authority support reform?
What elements of the bureaucracy may be changed? How much citizens’ partici-
pation is allowed in public decision making, and how different opinions are dealt
with? Who is to benefit by the change? Beyond studying regime types, it is essential
to define under what conditions regime’s support is possible. If not, the alternative
could be a waste of huge budgets and extensive efforts to a change that is incompat-
ible with existing political authority, hence with little chance of implementation.
Similarly, a frequently expressed theme equates big government with big and
rigid bureaucracy that wields excessive powers, potentially threatening to citizens’
free living. Instead of being the instrument of public policy implementation, the
critics argue, bureaucracy is becoming the master dictating the policy. The impor-
tant question, then, who has the power of control and on what grounds? Max
70 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

Weber’s formulation describes the three types of authority system (presented ear-
lier) each with a distinct foundation of authority. In the traditional system, legiti-
mate power comes from the tradition and the inherited status of family and wealth.
Consequently, when the political order is not representative of citizens, it would be
unrealistic to expect bureaucracy to be. Also, such system is not fully bureaucra-
tized (rules, technical competence of the staff, hierarchical responsibilities, etc.) and
so remains highly inefficient. In the charismatic system, the legitimacy of power is
tied to the exceptional qualities of the leader. Thus, again, it is not representation
that governs political or administrative authority. And in the legal-rational system,
legitimacy of power emanates from the belief in the rightness of the law and the
respect for it (Gerth and Mills 1946). Americans, for example, habitually describe
their political order as a “system of laws’” and they like to justify many public deci-
sions with the ultimate defense by pointing out that “it is the law.”
How can bureaucracy be made to conform with citizens’ views, preferences,
and values? If bureaucracy were always neutral in its values, obedient to the elected
superiors, and limiting its activities to enforcement of public laws and rules, then
most controversies surrounding bureaucracy would melt away. But size of bureau-
cracy, its continuity in office, its expert knowledge, and its effective channels of
communication with the public tipped the balance of power-structure in some soci-
eties in favor of bureaucracy. This is more noticeable in societies that experience
high turnover in the political and executive leadership such as frequent resignations
of the cabinet or the chief executive. Bureaucracy’s performance under these condi-
tions tends to fill in the gap created by the political vacuum rather than usurping
power, as the critics charge.
Certainly, performance seems to concern the public far more than the issue of
whether bureaucracy is an impediment to democracy, an issue relayed often in an
exaggerated form. Charles Goodsell, in The Case for Bureaucracy (1994), accumu-
lated “hard” data on citizens’ opinions of public bureaucracy, beginning with a sur-
vey by Leonard White in 1929 to public polls in the 1990s. He concluded that the
“hard” data on bureaucracy are “overwhelmingly favorable.” “Bureaucracy works.
To claim otherwise is either to ignore the evidence or to assert that we are being
totally fooled by the paradigm of rationality, with only a few critical theorists able
to escape the charade” (Goodsell 1994: 46).
Thus, fears of bureaucratic despotism in democratic societies are magnified for
ideological and political reasons. But this should not mean a defense of a per-
fect situation. Administrative reform is a continual objective of public policy and
strengthening tools of monitoring and control is a constant challenge. Generally,
combinations of control and monitoring mechanisms over bureaucratic powers are
found to varying degrees of effectiveness in all systems of governance:

◾◾ The power of “oversight” in the hands of elected officials is a versatile tool

when fairly and competently employed. “Oversight” is an instrument that
offers elected officials various channels to check, monitor, approve, and
 Bureaucracy ◾ 71

evaluate bureaucratic performance. One such instrument is budget approval,

which is a responsibility of elected representatives, in almost all systems that
have such election, at the national as well as the local levels of government.
The failure of the political system to perform its budgetary responsibilities
often adds to the problem rather than restrains it. Investigative powers as
well as the enactment of laws by representatives of the people are also effective
methods of oversight when and if properly executed.
◾◾ Various personnel policies such as recruitment, promotion, transfers, and
training when based on merit and transparency of decision making tend to
produce values essential for the functioning of democracy. Even if not in
office through citizens’ votes, one assumes that today’s bureaucracy is rep-
resentative of the society in its various economic and social strata and not
some novel or strange implant in the body politic of a society. It is not a far-
fetched thesis that the U.S. bureaucracy is more representative of the people
than the elected U.S. Senate, occasionally referred to as the “millionaires
club.” Moreover, conscious efforts have been made in many countries to
improve representation and equity concerns within the institution of bureau-
cracy. Acknowledging the considerable progress made in the United States,
Frederickson (2000: 5) proposes a theory of social equity as the “third pillar”
of public administration, “with the same status as economy and efficiency
as values or principles to which public administration should adhere.” Also,
“the concept of representative bureaucracy has now occupied an important
place in the literature of public administration and political science for some
three decades,” as Nachmias and Reosenbloom (2000: 39) point out. Thus,
harmony between bureaucratic values and preferences and those of citizens
is attainable; important advancements in this direction have already been
made. To be effective as an organization of high capacity and efficient meth-
ods of operation, bureaucracy has to be in tune with its larger environment,
and not to exist as a xenophobic organ implanted by invisible forces within
the institutions of governance.

Change and Innovation

Critics assume that bureaucracy as a systems is rigid, unable to change, and can-
not be innovative. Conventional wisdom has it that bureaucracy is conformist,
seeks standardization and routinization of work, therefore, causes inflexibility and
resistance to change in managing public organizations. Even training in adminis-
trative skills, considered appropriate under most conditions, may result in serious
maladjustments such as greater standardization and rigidities in the application of
newly acquired skills.
In a bureaucratic system, change must be universalistic, encompassing the entire
organization, Crozier (1964: 196) argues. In fact, change may even lead to further
centralization and further safeguarding of impersonality of the system. “Because
72 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

of the necessary long delays, because of the amplitude of the scope it must attain,
and because of the resistance it must overcome, change in bureaucratic organi-
zations is a deeply felt crisis” (Crozier 1964: 196). Various theoretical constructs
and derivative techniques evolved to modify early parochial assumptions of pub-
lic administration. Indeed, cross-cultural comparisons and the subsequent advent
of development administration are among the vigorous responses in this respect.
Development administration, in its early conception, has been viewed as an integral
part of societal development, as well as profoundly influenced by overall societal
attributes. In other terms, while development administration is to disconnect with
the known anomalies of traditional administration, it is, also, to associate with
overall change and development in the new nations. In the industrial countries,
however, responses to bureaucratic rigidities, over-conforma­nce to rules and regula-
tions, and unsatisfactory responsiveness to community needs and to policy objec-
tives, took different shapes and offered different alternatives:

◾◾ Promises of a free form of organizational setting and a relativist entrepre-

neurial leadership seem to offer options other than the known bureaucratic
hierarchical structure. Thus, what was really envisioned or assumed by those
seeking answers in managerialism and free marketing is the purge of the
classic bureaucratic edifice that dominating management accepted wisdom
for many decades. Team building, Total Quality Management (TQM), rein-
vention, and reengineering are some of the examples suggested as substitutes
or alternatives to the bureaucratic model. Total Quality Management in par-
ticular gained wide support as a theory and as a practice for its appealing
attributes. Some of these crucial attributes are its commitment to custom-
er-driven quality, employee participation in quality improvement, commit-
ment to continuous improvement and to actions based on facts and analysis
(Berman 1997: 282). A general assumption in a large segment of contempo-
rary management literature is that the attributed rigidity, and other negative
characteristics of the bureaucratic model, justify or require abandonment of
the model and expediting search for discovery of a better alternative.
◾◾ Political motives foster continual search by political leaders to escape from the
responsibility for budget deficits, incurring huge public debts, and retreating
on the front of social welfare policies. These political attitudes find bureau-
cracy an irresistible target for redirecting citizens’ dissatisfaction or rationaliz-
ing failures of their policies. Big government is the explanation for this camp,
even when the ratio of public employees to citizens is in decline. Increasing
poverty, rising crime levels, and deteriorating social conditions are connected
to bureaucratic mismanagement or poor administrative performance. Rarely,
we encounter political leaders who would consider their policies and their
lack of support to professional public management as a contributing factor to
governance problems. When faced with evidence, politicians have perfected
methods of ducking issues altogether.
 Bureaucracy ◾ 73

One suggestion for promoting change is by decoupling of public administra-

tion and bureaucracy. “An ingrained and narrowly focused pattern of thought, a
‘bureaucratic paradigm,’ is routinely attributed to public administration’s tradi-
tional literature” (Lynn 2001: 144). In attempting to disassociate the two, Lynn
(2001: 144) suggests that a “careful reading of that literature reveals, however, that
the ‘bureaucratic paradigm’ is, at best, a caricature and, at worst, a demonstrable
distortion of traditional thought that exhibited far more respect for law, politics,
citizens, and values than the new, customer-oriented managerialism and its variant.”
Interestingly enough, it seems that a mixture of caricature approximation, with a
measure of distortion, provided the backdrop for Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992)
characterization of bureaucracy to justify their “reinvention of government.” A less
subtle but still depreciating bureaucracy is the claim that the traditional public
administration is superseded by “a new approach to public sector governance, i.e.
contractualism” (Lane 2000: 3).
The common assumption is that bureaucracy, preoccupied with standardiza-
tion, setting rules and routine, tends to turn into a rigid, nonchanging, noncreative
edifice impeding effective governance. Less recognized, however, are the conditions
that induce the occurrence of such tendencies. Misunderstood also is the fact that
lack of rules and standards could create far more damaging conditions in manag-
ing public or private organizations. The issue, then, is excessiveness in reliance on
rules and standards, notion sociologists refer to as “ritualism” in applying rules that
they become the end rather than the means. In this context the following concepts
are germane: (1) Compliance with rules and regulations is a common phenomenon
encountered in managing organizations of all types. Rules are tools for ensuring
accountable behaviors and preventing chaos. (2) Excessive compliance often results
from an organizational culture that punishes mistakes by employees, fosters dis-
trust among various echelons of positions, and centralizes decision-making powers
in the hands of the few at the top of the organization. (3) Over-compliance could
follow overall management incompetence that employees use rules to cover lack of
wits and inability to exercise judgment.
Over and over, accountability and responsiveness to citizens’ needs and demands
by public employees come to the forefront of discussion. But accountability involves
various relationships, types of incentives, degree of control, and behavioral expecta-
tions (Romzek 1997: 35). Organization theory faces a real dilemma on this feature.
To improve administrative responsiveness and effectiveness, critics and reformers
seek deregulation and removal of layers of rules, regulations, and constraints. This
means also decentralization and more discretion and flexibility at lower levels of
authority. Problem is the result may be loss of control and even loss of account-
ability. As Romzek (1997: 36) points out, the trends correspond to a pendulum
that swings between two extremes: one is the direction of control, red tape, and
rigidity and the other is towards greater discretion and flexibility. Recent calls for
eliminating red tape, streamlining procedures, adopting customer service orien-
tation, engaging entrepreneurial management, and similar acts of managerialism
74 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

are another swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction of the bureaucratic
rigidity.
Fearing for their jobs in societies with high unemployment levels, and dread-
ing unrestrained political and administrative powers at the top, public employees
seek safety through compliance and by avoiding risk. “Following the rules” usually
means minimizing the chances of making punishable mistakes. Under these condi-
tions, changing organizational culture, empowering employees, and training and
personnel development usually go a long way to remedy some of these symptoms
and to stimulate creativity and change. Addressing the issue of costly bureaucracy
in the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pointed out that a simple
request for a dog-handling team in Afghanistan must be reviewed and assessed
at multiple high-level headquarters before it can be deployed to the war zone. The
secretary continued to say, “Can you believe it takes five four-star headquarters to
get a decision on a guy and a dog up to me?” (Jaffe 2010: A03).

The “Ideal-Type” Concept

Ideal or perfect bureaucracy is never achieved. Yet, ideal-type theoretical construct
serves useful analytical purposes such as guiding research, specifying relationships,
and clarifying basic characteristics. The critics contend that idealizing a condi-
tion defies testing or verification in a systematic research and, therefore, cannot be
elevated to the standing of a scientific knowledge. This is a major criticism of the
classic bureaucratic model. Concurring with this notion should not mean accept-
ing a derivative issue that a pure model is to be considered an idiosyncratic or a
mere aberration. Actually, the real world of organization and management often is
an approximation of ideal-type conceptions. Determination of such variation is a
major obligation of comparative analysis in the search for effective administrative
measures.
In doing their jobs, administrators will always have a measure of discretionary
power that allows a varying latitude in modifying the form and the process neces-
sary to reach their objectives. Of course, this discretion or latitude may be narrowly
or broadly defined, depending on many administrative and contextual factors.
Administrative literature, for instance, since Chester Barnard’s The Functions of the
Executive, and with the advent of the Human Relations School of management,
has accepted the idea of an informal organization often coexisting along with the
formal one. In contrast to the image of bureaucracy as a pure form, considerable
evidence suggests that to maintain its claims of efficiency, the bureaucratic model
allows for variation and flexibility in application. Indeed, informal relations and
unofficial practices often contribute to efficient operations (Blau and Meyer 1971:
26). Moreover, as Diamant (1962: 82) points out, “much of the misunderstand-
ing of the Weberian bureaucratic ideal-type stems from the failure to relate the
type of administrative staff and organization to the appropriate form of authority.”
Diamant emphasizes that Weber had no doubt that the kind of administrative staff
 Bureaucracy ◾ 75

one might expect to find in a given political system would vary with the form of
legitimate authority claimed and accepted in the society.
In sum, despite tendencies to discredit bureaucracy and to associate with it vari-
ous negative images, the merit of focusing on bureaucracy in the analysis remains
overriding. Anti-bureaucratic sentiments and the numerous myths and distortions
surrounding the subject often prevent objective assessments of the matter (Goodsell
1994). Unfavorable images have been internalized, particularly in the American
culture and to a lesser extent universally, that a balanced consideration of the issues
is becoming hard to reach. The negative conception of bureaucracy is misleading
as it is discouraging to students of the public administration. The negative per-
spectives seem to accumulate the dysfunctions and unanticipated consequences of
the Weberian formulation of bureaucracy to construct a straw man rather than to
provide a realistic analysis of organizational and managerial issues. This is like a
case of mistaken identity where a growing distrust of governance for failure and for
corruption of politics has been misdirected to blame bureaucracy and civil service.
“Diminished trust and confidence in government brought with it an onslaught of
attacks on civil servants that called into question the motivations of civil servants
and the control systems that direct them” (Perry and Hondeghem 2008: 2). Such
notions simply detract from realizing the full benefits of the analysis and hinder
neutral judgments on bureaucracy and its considerable role as an institution per-
forming essential functions for governance of modern society.
Another powerful source of the boisterous criticism is business mass media,
which are not totally altruistic or entirely motivated by concerns for the public
interest. Privatization usually opens up new opportunities for private profits; but
privatization is difficult to attain if public management is performing well. Thus,
although privatization did not always result in improvements in public service,
myths are perpetuated about efficiencies of the private sector that are unrealistic
and even contrived. In fact, government can never tolerate the waste and the high
cost of the incentive systems of the private sector. Imagine government compet-
ing with the private sector and paying the U.S. secretary of defense or any public
official the same as the CEO of Disney Corporation, for example, or as the nearly
100 large companies that awarded each of their top executives options mega grants
worth over $12 million annually.2 Nor can the public sector offer the other benefits
available to corporate managers, let alone justify the cost of huge failures such as
in the case of savings and loan associations, steel industry, Enron, AIG, and many
other businesses that lost out to foreign competitors, or were victimized by gigantic
schemes of fraud and mismanagement.
In the final analysis, the bureaucratic model in the Weberian sense is an ideal
model that rarely exists in practice. On the other hand, public administration has
incorporated enormous changes and modifications since Max Weber pronounced
his framework. Today’s public administration is an interdisciplinary field that con-
sists of clusters of frameworks; each derives its content from a variety of intellectual
roots. Whether in managing human resources, budgets, or whole organizations,
76 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

public administration regularly utilizes concepts from behavioral sciences, econom-

ics, sociology, political science, accounting, and anthropology to serve its objectives.
The assumed separation of politics and administration in the classic management
frameworks is considered inadequate and unrealistic, as Waldo (1984) and many
other scholars have repeatedly stated. Administrative theory and processes have
been seasoned with behavioral concepts that deal with people’s motivations, incen-
tives, and human developmental needs. Economics and accounting supply infor-
mation that improves our knowledge of public sector cost-utility, measurement of
output, and improved accountability practices. Laws implemented faithfully by
public administration institutions prohibit discrimination on basis of gender, race,
ethnicity, religion, or age. Public administration administers international agree-
ments and continually initiates actions to strengthen global linkages. The list of
interactions and mutual adjustments can be lengthy; many of the current activities
could not be foreseen or even contemplated by the Weber’s construction of the
bureaucratic model. The point is that the use of the term national bureaucracy is
tantamount to contemporary public administration rather than the Weberian for-
mulation. Because some features of the classic bureaucratic model are present in all
organizations, the term bureaucracy remains in use, but in a value-neutral sense.
Regardless, a “big question” facing public administration as a field of study is
how to sustain a genuine interdisciplinary status while adapting to progressively
more evident global concerns. At one level, public administration should be free
to adapt and to be influenced by insights from any field of knowledge that may
enhance its function and improve its processes of action. As Frank Thompson
pointed out, “The health of public administration as a field depends on its ability
to bring together the contributions of multiple disciplines in ways that foster bal-
ance, synthesis, and synergy” (1999: 119). There is also the perennial charge that
public administration is identified with having “inferior methodology,” possessing
a “weak scientific base,” “having no theory-building tradition,” and suffering from
a “reputation for low quality scholarship” (Thompson 1999; Lynn 1996; Kettle
1999). Perhaps, part of the reason for such bleak assessment is the mediocrity
of education and training in some universities as well as to migration to public
administration by scholars who have only thin understanding of public admin-
istration. This latter group are generally trained in related fields such as political
science and economics but shifted their careers to public administration mainly
due to job market considerations. These scholars continue to expect disciplin-
ary clarity and deterministic conceptions in a professional, interdisciplinary field
as public administration with overwhelmingly relativistic and eclectic concepts
and practices. Certainly, the contributions, commitment, and potential of public
administration cannot be evaluated by disciplinary criteria. Public administration
is substantively connected to more than one discipline. Moreover, the ultimate
value of public administration is in shaping the structure of government and in
efficiently and effectively managing its functions. Of course, we agree that “the
advancement of public administration as a field requires it to shed any vestige
 Bureaucracy ◾ 77

of its reputation for doing work of limited quality focused on a narrow domain”
(Thompson 1999: 120). What area of social science would not benefit by such
advice? But this is a different matter altogether.
The ultimate test of public administration, particularly the comparative aspect,
is inseparable from its ability to cultivate concepts and practices that produce sig-
nificant quantitative and qualitative improvements in the performance of public
organizations. This objective is well-served by (1) continued refinements of admin-
istrative theory in relation to application; and (2) by systematic monitoring of man-
agerial practices to identify complementary measures that create substantive effects,
thus enabling us to know, with a measure of confidence, “what really works.”
Indeed, as Donald Kettl points out, public administration does have important
things to say to public officials. “Public administration has a rich theory and even
richer tradition of analyzing what is truly public about government management,
and this is the piece most prominently missing from the public reform debate”
(Kettl 1999: 131).

Conclusion
Bureaucracy is a key institution of national as well as local governance. Today’s
bureaucracy, however, has largely been customized and profoundly adapted to fit
the conditions of its context. Also, within the national bureaucracy (administra-
tion), each organization is distinct in its practices and proficiency. Much advance-
ment in knowledge of human behavior over the past several decades has resulted in
modifications of Weber’s classic formulations. The impact of change in managerial
concepts and practices as a result of new approaches such as Human Relations
School, Team Building, and Total Quality Management has been profoundly man-
ifested. The rationale for the CPA in focusing on bureaucracy in its modern reality
is based on these factors:

1. Bureaucracy provides a framework that focuses on the administrative system

in a realistic way. It is more practical to observe, investigate, and evaluate
bureaucratic performance than to attempt managing grand abstract models,
seeking to incorporate prominent visions and characterizations with low oper-
ational applicability. This is a contrast to critics’ views that assume all com-
parative public administration studies are preoccupied with abstract grand
modeling, which would squeeze the universe to fit its mold. Incidentally, the
choice of the national bureaucracy as the unit of analysis is not a determina-
tion of the ultimate merit but a choice of the most appropriate level of analysis
for the CPA.
2. Bureaucracy is a prevalent institution, operating in almost all countries,
albeit with different competencies and accomplishments. It is hard to imag-
ine governance of the state without the institution of bureaucracy that brings
78 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

necessary insights and knowledge not only for delivery of public services, but
also for the greater domain of policy making and policy implementation.
Thus, more information is usually available on bureaucracy in different con-
texts because of institutional visibility, concrete structures and actions, and
having identifiable membership, definable objectives, and measurable levels
of performance (Heady 2001).
3. The study of national bureaucracy lends itself to a single case method as well
as to a multiple case analysis and comparison. To be sure, bureaucracy may
be a small or a large institution, depending on the size of the country and the
type of government. But bureaucracy has always been a manageable unit for
study and analysis. Utilizing bureaucracy as the unit of analysis, therefore,
means improved ability to generate middle-range hypotheses for testing
within one or more countries.
4. Most of the sins attributed to bureaucracy are either magnified misdeeds
or consequences of misapplication. A basic question is whether bureau-
cracy indeed exerts a hobbling effect on political development. Although
bureaucracy can accumulate excessive powers, more often than not, it
remains subservient to the political order. Bureaucratic power is the result
of attributes that make bureaucracy imperative in the first place such as
expertise and continuity in office. But, an effective political system has
the oversight means to check bureaucratic deviations, maintain reliability
of the processes of performance, and continually stimulate administra-
tive improvement to counterbalance any excess of bureaucratic influence.
To bypass some traditional shortcomings of bureaucracy in develop-
ing countries, development administration was prescribed with features
that promise to serve better the objectives of national development. The
comparativists seem to have confidence in development administration
as a unique set of structures and functions unencumbered by traditional
bureaucratic anomalies of legendry rigidity and resistance to change. But
even such conceived development administration cannot be detached from
the political context.
5. National bureaucracy operates within a web of relations and shares in the
stewardship for public policy. But bureaucracy is only one part of governance,
an inclusive concept that involves many structures and functions. In complex
processes of interactions, each of the legislative, executive, and judicial pow-
ers maintains autonomy but also shares responsibilities and powers. Thus,
the functioning of national bureaucracy has to be viewed in a broader under-
standing of governance. A balanced consideration of all institutions and pro-
cesses of decision making and their consequences is essential for effective
conduct of comparative analysis. As the classic model of bureaucracy stipu-
lates, the proper functioning of bureaucracy is not separate from its legal-
rational political context or in today’s terms a civil society with supremacy of
the law.
 Bureaucracy ◾ 79

Undeniably, powerless public institutions, often controlled by corrupt and

authoritarian leaders, have been at the root of the myriad of economic, political,
administrative, and social problems afflicting a large number of developing coun-
tries. In numerous cases, processes of public policy formulation and implemen-
tation—major vehicles of the governance processes—have been rendered almost
inoperable. The catalog of failures and deficiencies of governance in these situations
can be quite lengthy. Political leaders regularly decline the opportunity to develop
reliable methods of succession that evoke citizens’ confidence and trust. They fail to
advance sustainable and equitable political and economic policies that are institu-
tionally rather than personally based. From Latin America, to Asia, and to Africa,
the similarities of issues and problems of governance are truly remarkable: issues of
leadership succession, poor results of developmental policies, and lack of enforce-
able legal rights of citizens within a civil society.
Finally, the evolving complex global reality requires compliance or participa-
tion by all countries to share in its promised benefits and to minimize any poten-
tial negative consequences. Such involvement is not fruitful without developing
competent and ethical institution of national bureaucracy. To be sure, developing
countries are truly displeased with the rules of the game, but they are not against
globalization itself. To be equal players, not mere subjects of a new imperialist capi-
talism, these countries must recognize that good governance is no less important
than the free markets. Moreover, in preparing globally competent administrators
and organizations, as Donald Klingner points out, “the ability to manage diverse,
multi-disciplinary and multi-organizational work teams is critical” (2009: 19).
Effective governance and a properly functioning legal system and regulatory pro-
cess, supported by an accountable, legitimate political authority are also important
for professional bureaucratic performance in diverse global context. However, team
building, networking, and developing cooperative systems are increasingly becom-
ing central elements in global administration.
This review chapter is an attempt to convey the complexity and the diversity of
views on the subject of bureaucracy. Many of the assessments of bureaucracy are
directed at its dysfunctions rather than addressing its wide range of features and
functions with detachment. This is not to ignore the dysfunctions and unantici-
pated consequences of the model, but to state that they are neither intended nor
inevitable. Certainly, applying the bureaucratic model in its value neutral sense
would make it a functional framework for comparative analysis until we are able
to devise a more appropriate research model. In the meantime, while comparative
analysis is deliberating its own limitations and how to revive its research commit-
ment, the comparative study of bureaucracy raises additional questions and chal-
lenges. The resolution of most of these issues and concerns is possible only through
more empirical research and field observations. Effective application of comparative
methods of research is the most likely venue to resolve many pressing practical
issues and concerns as it is the certain path for the advancement of theory and
practice of public administration.
80 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

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Endnotes
1. A report by T. Yokota and Y. Nagaoka in Newsweek June 21, 2010, titled “Japan’s Not-
So-Prime Minister,” is telling. They say that Japan’s new prime minister [Naoto Kan]
“has a reputation as a flip-flopper.” He used to slam Tokyo’s powerful bureaucrats as “a
bunch of idiots.” But when he was sworn in as prime minister in June 2010, he prom-
ised to consult “their knowledge and expertise.” P. 5.
2. In 1998, the CEO of Disney was paid a total of $575.6 million, according to Business
Week. April 19, 1999. P. 72. (Over 70% of employees at Disney were making a little
more than minimum wage.) Annually business journals publish these figures and show
how they continue to grow. In 2010, USA Today (April 2: 2B) published the names
of the twenty-five most highly paid corporate chief executives in 2009. The pay per
person ranged between 5 and 50 million dollars annually.
Chapter 2

Comparative Public
Administration

Of ourselves, so long as we know only ourselves, we know nothing.

Woodrow Wilson (1887)

Introduction
Comparative public administration (CPA) is the study of administrative institu-
tions, processes, and behaviors across organizational, national, and cultural bound-
aries. The CPA is a method of investigation and analysis that compares attributes
and performance of administrative systems and subsystems as well as individuals or
groups in positions of decision making to generate knowledge and enhance under-
standing of public management. Comparison recognizes similarities and differ-
ences and underscores successful practices, thus, expanding options and alternative
strategies for improving the performance of public institutions.
The context (environment) of public administration consists of various exter-
nal factors that exert significant influences on management action and behavior
through different means and channels. External factors include societal values, legal
norms, politics, international-global accords, culture, and the state of the economy.
Together, these diverse external factors have considerable impact on public manage-
ment, stimulating or stifling systemic traits and performance. In democratic gover-
nance, however, the political environment “determines the scope and objectives of
the public services; it is the political environment which determines the values to
be applied when delivering these services; … and [the political environment] is the

33
34 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

most important factor in the differences between public administration and man-
agement or administration in other contexts” (Chapman 2000: 219). These external
influences on public administration are often loosely grouped together under the
terms environment, context, or even culture (Almond and Verba 1989).
The comparative approach has been an important thrust within the field of public
administration, committed to human learning and to discovery through compari-
son. The CPA seeks to advance administrative knowledge by focusing on adminis-
trative structures, functions, behaviors, and performance across organizational and
cultural boundaries to improve reliability and applicability of administrative con-
cepts and practices. As Bannister (2007: 171) notes, “The human urge to compare
one’s performance with that of others seems to be an intrinsic part of our psycho-
logical make-up.” Comparison is more prevalent in our expressions and formal judg-
ments than commonly acknowledged. We often compare performance to previous
years, to other people, to other organizations, to cost, to benchmarks, and to similar
functions and activities across jurisdictions and across national boundaries.
Consistently, the CPA seeks discovery of patterns and regularities of administra-
tive action and behavior to produce new knowledge and insights and to affirm and
refine existing information. The outcome, whether comparative research discovers
new knowledge or validates existing information, is that public administration schol-
ars and practitioners are better able to sort out and to adopt most worthy practices.
“Comparison is so central to good analysis that the scientific method is unavoidably
comparative” (Collier 1991: 7). Similarly, social scientists regard the comparative
approach as “the methodological core of the humanistic and scientific methods”
(Almond et al. 2000: 33). As a requirement of the scientific investigative process, the
comparative approach has frequently been noted and emphasized in public admin-
istration literature since Woodrow Wilson’s famous article in 1887. After many
decades, Dahl’s (1947: 8) widely quoted declaration remains true. Namely, as long as
the study of public administration is not comparative, “claims of a science of public
administration” sound rather hollow. Dahl concluded that the development of an
American, British, or French science of public administration is feasible. But he also
inquired: can there be “a science of public administration” in the sense of a body of
generalized principles, independent of their peculiar national setting?
Comparative studies of organizations and institutions also reinforce under-
standing of global influences while expanding the domain of intellectual inquiry
beyond traditional, parochial tendencies. Credible comparison of any aspect of
governance cannot be confined to culture-bound practices any more for certain
reasons: (1) The impact of globalization and regional integration in Europe, the
Americas, and the rest of the world, points out that many decisions are made
through multilateral negotiations and agreements that are binding to participating
countries and beyond. Also, a large number of international organizations are fre-
quently setting rules and policies that moderate the notion of unfettered authority
of the nation state. (2) The examination of administrative practices of other societ-
ies permits us to see a wider range of administrative actions and choices, beyond
 Comparative Public Administration ◾ 35

the horizon of our own experiences. Rephrasing Woodrow Wilson, if we study only
ourselves we know only about ourselves and remain isolated in an interconnected
world. The CPA scholarship, at various phases of its evolution, devoted much atten-
tion to learning about unfamiliar, non-Western countries and their aspirations to
transform and to modernize their administrative systems.
Comparative research broadens knowledge of conditions conducive to strong or
weak administrative performance by focusing on a range of patterns of administra-
tive activities and characteristics of the systems performing them. Much learning is
achieved from practices that worked well and from those that did not. Not surpris-
ing, therefore, that administrative reform and capacity building are major concerns
in the comparative literature. To learn from the best practices is to encourage the
recognition and the utilization of the most appropriate organizational structures
and processes. In many countries, irrespective of the results of reform plans for
improving performance of public organizations, the contents of such plans have
largely been based on lessons learned through cross-cultural comparative investi-
gations (Manning and Parison 2004). While explanatory research is essential for
the advancement of scholarship, it also benefits practitioners by expanding their
horizons of choice and their capacity to observe, learn, and improve performance.
Certainly, the practitioner gains deeper understanding of institutions, and the
political processes that influence them, by comparing experiences across boundaries
and across institutions.

Critical External Influences

Public administration is subject to significant formal and informal influences from
its environment. Because public administration is increasingly influenced by these
external variables, public management is far more informed when research find-
ings are based on examination of the practices in more than one context or one
country. Comparing few cases is preferable to a single case analysis for evaluating
hypotheses or verifying conclusions. Utilizing a manageable number of cases in the
analysis can be a more productive research effort than statistical or experimental
approaches with their almost unlimited scope for accumulating data and manipu-
lating variables. By comparing a limited number of administrative issues and ques-
tions, researchers are able to provide improved descriptions of conditions, sharper
definitions of variables, and greater focus on the subject and its most crucial aspects
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Manning and Parison 2004).
The ongoing dramatic change in information communication technology
(ICT), introduced many tools of management research and learning that were not
available a few years ago. These advanced tools of communication and information
gathering make the processes of cross-cultural learning easier and more manageable.
For many years, most developing countries have been seeking to build the knowl-
edge and skills of their public employees through various forms of training tailored
36 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

to the needs of their organizations. One form of learning has been the meetings of
managers from developed and developing countries, joining in a variety of seminars
and training activities in the United States, Europe, or in developing countries to
discuss and learn about administrative problems and solutions in many contexts.
Utilizing new information technologies, made the flow of information on adminis-
trative successes and failures constant and in all directions.
To cultivate the advantages of the comparative approach, one has to face the
invariable need for constructing a framework that would allow systematic compari-
son of administrative systems of different countries with different levels of develop-
ment. A broadly accepted framework has to meet the test of utility. Specifically, a
proficient framework for comparative studies has to manifest the following general
characteristics:

◾◾ Capacity for synthesis of current comparative administrative knowledge

◾◾ Balance between conceptual and practical concerns of the field
◾◾ Emphasis on constant and variable factors that matter in administering
public services
◾◾ Accounting for contextual variations of conditions on the ground

While scholarly productivity is continuous in comparative studies of public

and private administrations within single countries, much less research has been
conducted at the cross-cultural levels. Reasons for less cross-cultural research out-
put are many, including feasibility, language barriers, funding, lack of existing
empirical data, and less than desirable levels of transparency in many countries.
Nevertheless, a growing interest in contextual constraints has inspired reexamina-
tion of many organizational actions and relationships, especially those related to
political, economic, and social factors. We are told, for example, that a “number
of cross-national comparative analysis studies have been done … several of which
show that structure differs across cultures regardless of technology” (Roberts and
Grabowski 1996: 415). Conceptual insights derived from comparing international
experiences are a major source of guidance for a variety of organizational restruc-
turing initiatives.
Currently, comparative and development administration is undergoing major
shifts of focus in responding to the challenge of globalism. The CPA has to pro-
vide evidenced and practical knowledge of the real conditions on the ground.
Administrative knowledge generated through cross-cultural studies, particularly
in relation to reducing cost, improving quality of public services, and managing
national development has to demonstrate greater understanding of the operational
dimension of management. As a result of a growing commitment to what Ryan
(1994) called “anti-parochial, anti-ethnocentric drive,” the CPA has to construct
dependable models of administrative application and practice, derived through
worldwide effective descriptive and empirical comparisons. Diverse comparative
administration perspectives promise greater relevance and research versatility. Two
 Comparative Public Administration ◾ 37

illustrations underscore the inherent adaptability of the comparative approach and

the constant search for valid explanatory and prescriptive generalizations. These
perspectives do not claim “reinventing” the comparative administration, and do
not represent all such endeavors, but they are serious attempts to redirect and to
invigorate the analysis:

1. The primacy of the immediate context. A main premise of this perspective

is that improving the administrative function is linked to understand-
ing the attributes of the immediate political and administrative con-
text. In a comparative study of management reform in twelve developed
countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, UK, and the United States), Pollitt
and Bouckaert (2004: 39) “laid considerable stress on the characteristics
of existing political and administrative systems in influencing processes of
management change.” These political-administrative systems, they point
out; provide “the existing terrain—the topography over which reformers
must travel … different countries display different topographical features
and therefore different challenges to those who wish to carry through
reform” (2004: 39). Similarly, Manning and Parison (2004: xiii–xiv) ana-
lyzed public administrative reform experiences in fourteen countries in
their attempts to find out what reform initiatives could serve to reduce
public expenditures, improve policy responsiveness, improve government
as an employer, and improve service delivery. Many of these fourteen coun-
tries are in Pollitt and Bouckaert’s list of countries with additions of Brazil,
Chile, South Korea, and the Russian Federation. No African or Arab coun-
try was included in either list. The reform model applied by Pollitt and
Bouckaert (2004: 40) relies on comparative literature in developing the
“key features” of their model:
◾◾ The state structure, including the constitution
◾◾ The nature of the central executive government, including the type of
political system
◾◾ Functional elements, including relationships between political leaders
and top civil servants
◾◾ The dominant administrative culture
◾◾ Diversity of channels through which ideas come to stimulate public man-
agement reform
2. The globalist or internationalist perspective prompts the CPA to accommodate
growing global needs and intensifying international necessity. Globalization
of our world, Riggs (1991a: 473) noted, “compels us to rethink the context of
what we call Public Administration.” Public administration cannot remain
unaffected as globalization processes dramatically undermined geographi-
cal distance and deepened economic interdependence. Notwithstanding
the contributions of the early comparative administration, development
38 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

administration, and the “new public management,” the future of public

administration, Klingner (2009) concludes, is in being “international pur-
posive praxis,” serving what he calls the “Millennium Goals.” This public
administration is essentially purposive, data-driven, performance-oriented,
and sustaining smart practices (Klingner 2009: 8). “Administrators are
­coming to view the world as a vast organizational matrix which can be tapped
for solutions to economic development or environmental problems” (Ryan
1994: 24).

Whether the determiner of administrative reform is anchored in the state con-

text (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Manning and Parison 2004) or in the global
interdependence (Klingner 2009; Farazmand 1999; Ryan 1994; Riggs 1991a),
comparative analysis cannot do well without either perspective, and will continue
to rely on both dimensions. The primacy of internal reality versus external inter-
dependence is a question that can only be fulfilled empirically. A methodology of
comparative administration based on several cases or on global processes should
enhance reliability of results and improve evaluation of performance. Specific
information (descriptive and quantitative) on multiple cases, including global
management practices allows students and practitioners to be more confident in
considering evidence, verifying information, and evaluating cause and effect of
management actions and behaviors (Jreisat, 2005).
Moreover, an effective reform strategy to enhance institutional capacities has
to realize and to appreciate the importance of the civil service performance, and be
deeply mindful of the need for support of the political leadership for any reform
strategy. Civil service systems play critical roles, even if basic knowledge of civil
service systems in many countries is usually inadequate (Bekke, Perry, and Toonen,
1996: vii). Public personnel management has been studied extensively, from at least
four perspectives, according to Klingner and Nalbandian: (1) the functions needed
to manage human resources in public agencies; (2) the process by which public jobs
are allocated; (3) the interaction among fundamental societal values that often con-
flict over who gets public jobs and how they are allocated; and, (4) public personnel
management is personnel systems—the laws, rules, organizations, and procedures
used to express these abstract values in fulfilling personnel functions (1998: 1).
To meet its aims and to fill a knowledge gap, comparative research has to estab-
lish and define good practices in various settings. During the 1980s, conserva-
tive leaders in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia blamed
civil service for many problems in the society. The civil service stood accused of
“being bloated, expensive, unresponsive, a creation of routine deliberately resistant
to change, and largely incapable of dealing with new challenges” (Peters and
Savoie 1994: 419). The corrective measures taken by the political leaders of these
countries were mainly reducing the size of civil service, privatizing many of their
functions, and politicizing senior administrative appointment to increase political
control. The stated purpose of these policies was to introduce competitiveness in
 Comparative Public Administration ◾ 39

government operations, “debureaucratise” the system, and restructure governance

(Peters and Savoie 1994: 419). Ultimately, these measures did not produce what was
promised. On the contrary, implementation of public policies and the usual public
services got worse. The conclusion: “the political leadership not only misdiagnosed
the patient but also applied the wrong medicine” (Peters and Savoie 1994: 418).
Subsequently, many of the civil service alterations in these countries were reversed
or modified after change of the political leaders.
Learning from studies across national boundaries and analysis of multicultural
experiences would free public management from current “institutional ethnicities”
and advance a valuable learning process to include all countries. At the macro level
of administration, however, overall characteristics that affect the performance of
tradition­a l public services often overlap with comparative politics (Rowat 1988).
Comparative politics has been preoccupied with reflection on political institutions
in a handful of Western countries and a scattering of developing countries (Heady
2001). The emergence of many developing countries since World War II brought
forward issues and problems of management and nation building that were either
neglected or unfamiliar terrain to scholars of Western com­parative politics.

Distinctive Management for National Development

Comparative public administration has been at the front of social sciences, iden-
tifying and studying administrative problems and practices of developing societ-
ies soon after World War II. A consequence of this emphasis is the evolution of
a special compilation of concepts and applications which, subsequently, became
known as development administration. “The term ‘development administration’
came into use in the 1950s to represent those aspects of public administration and
those changes in public administration which are needed to carry out policies,
projects, and programs to improve social and economic conditions” (Gant 1979: 3).
Independence from the imperial rule created strong expectations by the people
looking for improved standards of living, correction of inequities and injustices
of the past colonial era, and governance that guides social and economic develop-
ment by planning, funding, and managing large investments in public enterprises
(Esman 1988). An important factor adding to the administrative workload in the
newly freed countries was the weakness of the private sector. Consequently, it was
essential, even urgent, for the incumbent regimes to fulfill the aspirations of their
people by being involved and supportive of economic and social development ini-
tiatives (Esman 1974; Gant 1979).
Developing countries quickly discovered that classic administrative concepts
and methods were most appropriate for managing public services that have clearly
defined goals, employ simple methods, and have predictable and specific outcomes
such as building roads and other public work projects, collecting taxes, delivering
standard services, and maintaining law and order. The rationalistic focus of Western
40 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

precepts of public administration, as Esman (1974: 7) pointed out, produced

emphasis on written rules, precedents, predictability, consistency, equity, routine,
efficiency, and techniques. Western administrative conceptualizations depoliticized
administration, deemphasized program outputs, and relegated public administra-
tion mission to attaining progressive efficiency. “Promoting social change brings
public service into different patterns of relationships that classic western adminis-
trative theories have not accounted for” (Esman 1974: 7).
While governments of developing countries were facing intense demands from
their people for public services, these newly decolonized regimes did not enjoy
secure political base, nor had the needed managerial and professional skills. Their
developing administrative systems were in a dire need for programmatic com-
mitment, managerial flexibility, and creative leadership, characteristics hindered
by existing rigid bureaucratic and hierarchical structures. “The pervasiveness of
social conflict in developing countries and the weak institutions and procedures for
mediating conflict place these polities in constant jeopardy. Economic growth and
political development tend to generate conflicts among social, economic, regional,
and ethnic groups faster than they produce methods and institutions for conflict
management” (Esman 1974: 14).
Development administration promised continuous attention to formulation,
evaluation, and implementation of projects to serve objectives of national socioeco-
nomic development. Countries that emphasized such development strongly utilized
two major instruments to prepare their management and institutions to handle the
new responsibilities:

1. Expand and cultivate a suitable workforce through education and training

that transform human resources into a public service possessing the necessary
skills, attitudes, and commitment to national development. A combination
of internal and external training initiatives were devised and implemented
in many countries that involved large numbers of public managers and
employees. Development plans included building universities, schools, and
training institutions committed to education, research, and advisory services
in development administration were established. Many emerging countries
contracted many consultants from outside to provide advice and technical
skills.
2. Central planning was adopted as the instrument of rationalizing develop-
mental policies. During the two decades after World War II, government-
sponsored national development plans were regarded as key instruments
for expanding the economy, improving justice and equity in the society,
and achieving the welfare state. The Keynesian economics provided the
backdrop to the welfare state and to mixed economies, assuring that big gov-
ernment is compatible with freedom, welfare, and efficiency. Public policies
of developing countries embraced the notion of state sponsorship of develop-
ment projects, investment in the economy, and managing a variety of public
 Comparative Public Administration ◾ 41

enterprises. The ascendency of Keynesian economics and the dominance of

the modernization paradigm “reinforced the notion of big government and
the salience of development administration as a moral and intellectual voca-
tion” (Esman 1988: 126).

Still, the overall results of central planning were largely disappointing. In gen-
eral, central plans lacked clarity and specificity of execution procedures and suffered
many other shortcomings such as weak commitment to projects, rigid and routine
management, no participation by citizens and private institutions from outside the
bureaucratic setting, and lack of information and expert knowledge about planned
projects. The accumulation of such problems and shortcomings resulted in serious
deviations from preconceived plans. Formal requirements of project preparation,
analysis, and management changed in the course of implementation (Rondinelli
1982: 46). Central ministries and departments assigned major development duties
failed to reorient and strengthen existing or newly created structures for manag-
ing development plans and projects. They simply presided over modestly effective
operations with dismal records of accomplishments.
Today, comparative and development administration occasionally appear
together as in the Handbook of Comparative and Development Administration
(Farazmand 2001). Others may routinely juxtapose the two terms in the literature,
implying a particular practical or conceptual association. By the end of the 1980s,
however, development administration is infrequently the subject of scholarly atten-
tion, even if the need for the knowledge, skills, and values represented in the devel-
opment administration perspective remain salient and compelling. An important
part of the explanation for the modest contribution by the development administra-
tion approach is that big government, statist involvement in the economy, and the
whole notion of central control through planning were widely disparaged after the
collapse of communist systems and the ascendance of the neoconservative move-
ment in the United States (the Washington Consensus) that sought to relegate most
functions of governance to the private sector. The New Public Management was
one alternative offered for a minimum state and maximum privatization. Moreover,
“donor agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, have attempted to transfer to a
development context theories and practices adopted at various times in developed
countries” (Bertucci 2008: 1002).
During the early years of the emerging countries, the limited available knowl-
edge of administrative systems was mainly derived from comparative administra-
tion studies of newly independent nations such as India, Pakistan, Egypt, and
Thailand. To be sure, this knowledge was insufficient in content and relevance, but
the CPA itself was also at an embryonic phase of conceptual articulation. Emphasis
on the administrative problems of developing countries in the early comparative
literature resulted in (1) forcing administrative reform to the top of the agenda
for action in many countries, (2) recognizing the significance of institutions with
capacity to act as foundations for developmental policies, and (3) breaking out
42 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

of the parochial mode and gradually developing shared experiences with a global
outlook on governance. Not surprising, therefore, that during the early years of
the comparative movement, the conventional practices for building administrative
capacity were preoccupied by the need to create instruments that can define and
champion administrative improvements (Riggs 1964).
Subsequently, development administration focused on the question of insti-
tution building as a sure path for developing administrative capacity in the new
nations. Building viable, capable, and innovative institutions to lead in develop-
ment efforts was advocated and promoted in education, training, and internation-
ally through the efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The
institutions that received the endorsement of consultants and financial support by
AID include national planning councils or boards, institutes of public adminis-
tration, development-oriented universities, and research institutes. Foreign consul-
tants followed the trail, also peddling all sorts of “development-oriented training
programs” for public employees in developing countries.
The institution-building framework appeared to have high promise in the 1960s.
It was developed by a consortium of scholars of development from universities of
Pittsburgh, Michigan, Indiana, and Syracuse with significant efforts from people
like Fred Riggs, Milton Esman, William Siffin, and others. An institution was
described and analyzed through three categories of variables:

◾◾ A category that attempts to explain organizational behavior through the

examination and measurement of five major variables: leadership, doctrine,
program, resources, and structure.
◾◾ A category of variables deals with linkages or interdependencies that exist
between an institution and relevant parts of the society: enabling linkages,
functional linkages, normative linkages, and diffused linkages.
◾◾ The concept of transactions denotes the exchange of goods and services,
power, and influence between the institutions and other social organizations
that interact with it. The content of these exchanges vary from seeking sup-
port to overcoming resistance, exchanging resources to transferring norms
and values (Jreisat 1975).

Despite variation, institutional analysis reveals similarities of assumptions

and goals, and appeals to practitioners. Also, institutional analysis received ear-
lier endorsement of many academicians, consultants, and foreign aid technicians.
Increasing global interdependence, however, requires comparative and develop-
ment administration to revive and to renew initial premises and concepts to deal
with change in economics, technology, management, travel, and cultural values.
The political boundaries of all countries are facing the pressure for free access and
for competent management that is able to make the necessary adjustments.
The issue of national culture is another conceptual and practical challenge to
comparative administrative analysis. How much of the variation in organizational
 Comparative Public Administration ◾ 43

management is caused by attributes of the national culture? Research findings are

often conveyed in terms of the impact of culture on managerial attitudes, beliefs,
and behavior (Graves 1972; Hofstede 1980) with the other organizational variables
either implied or ignored. A likely inconsistency is that “in both single-culture
and comparative studies, nation and culture have been used as if they were syn-
onymous, with national boundaries separating one cultural group from another”
(Adler, Doktor, and Redding 1986: 298). The difficulty in equating nation and
culture is readily demonstrable in many developing countries where cultural homo-
geneity is lacking. In these countries, frequently boundaries were drawn arbitrarily
by the colonial rulers for political reasons or after a military conquest as evident in
Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent.
Despite variation and complexity, comparative cultural studies of manage-
ment have not produced anything close to consensus on the importance or the
magnitude of cultural influences on public management. Methods of measure-
ment of cultural influences on organization and management remain basic, often
contradictory. One view argues that culture determines managerial practices
because culture is “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes
the members of one human group from another” (Hofstede 1980: 25). A different
perspective concludes that organizational variance is less dependent on culture
than on other contingencies such as technological development, interdependence
with other organizations, market considerations (Child and Tayeb 1983), and
type of political context. Cross-cultural studies of human behavior and psychol­
ogy, for example, have no adequate explanation to the finding that people behave
in one way with members of their own culture, and differently with members of
foreign cultures.
Still, a basic premise of the comparative perspective is that functional patterns
of organization and management are determinable and transferrable from one
system to another. For this reason, comparative public administration is always
searching to discover regular patterns and main practices throughout the human
experience, irrespective of place and time. As Riggs (1991a: 473) argued, scholars
can no longer afford to base their theories on the truly exceptional American expe-
rience and to limit CPA to the study of “foreign” governments. Essentially, the
processes of generating reliable administrative knowledge and developing trusted
administrative principles are inherently comparative. Comparative research con-
tinues to promote intercultural studies across national boundaries and to investi-
gate multicultural experiences that emerge out of “institutional ethnicities” within
a country.

Demand for Relevance

Comparative studies have been conducted for centuries, producing broad com-
parative surveys leading to broad generalizations. Most of these cross-state
Chapter 1

Governance and
Globalism

I want to rebuild this government. Rebuild it by bringing back compe-

tence; rebuild it by bringing back integrity; rebuild it by bringing back
performance; by bringing back people of talent; by bringing back people
of goodwill; rebuild it by bringing back professionalism and respect.
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo,
Inaugural Address, 20101

Introduction
To fulfill its professional responsibilities and to serve its authoritative obligations,
public administration as a profession continues to evolve and to search for the most
appropriate knowledge and competence. Early in the previous century, develop-
ment of the administrative state within the industrial nations was a major adjust-
ment that changed the structure and the functioning of contemporary governance.
As Kettl and Fesler (1991) note, increasing citizens’ demands of government for
delivery of public services as well as for securing and protecting the general wel-
fare have led to a multiplicity of administrative agencies, a large number of civil
servants, and swelling government budgets to pay for what citizens want, and for
developing the administrative capacity to meet such expectations. This brought
us into a new phase of governance, characterized as “the administrative state.”
Dwight Waldo was one of the earliest to use the term in the title of his semi-
nal work The Administrative State (1948). Since then, extensive literature focused

1
2 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

on the administrative state and its profound effect on society, such as Emmette
Redford’s Democracy and the Administrative State (1969), Fritz Morstein Marx’s The
Administrative State (1957), John Rohr’s To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of
the Administrative State (1986), and others.
The Industrial Revolution and subsequent technological advancements revolu-
tionized production with greater use of machines. This created new needs for ratio-
nalized organizational management, public or private, through design, planning,
measurement, and regularity in production. Two profound changes in the business
sector transformed corporate governance, permanently:

1. Professionalizing corporate management, mainly by separating ownership

and management. The landmark study by A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (1932, revised 1968), has been credited with
causing significant developments in legal and economic theory. The study is
also credited with changing the U.S. public policy and helping ratification of
the law that created the Securities and Exchange Commission.
2. The development of organization and management concepts and frameworks,
such as the Scientific Management movement (Taylorism) in the first decade
of the last century, was specifically aimed to improve organizational capaci-
ties for production and performance in the manufacturing firms.

As critical systems of production and service, organizations inspired many

theories and practices seeking to achieve valid and universal approaches to manag-
ing complex organizations. In this genre are the theories of Scientific Management,
Administrative Management, and the Bureaucratic Model that have been referred
to as traditional, classic, rational, or machine models (Jreisat 1997). Afterward,
an assortment of concepts grounded in the Human Relations perspective directed
research on organization theory and process into areas of human behavior that were
not familiar in earlier literature. The end result, organization theory and practice,
gained importance in teaching and research, particularly for the growing number
of large organizations in society performing key roles and objectives. The wide
acknowledgment of the impact of organizations on modern society led to the char-
acterization of “the organization society” (Presthus 1978).
By the end of World War II, the authority of the state had expanded and its legal
and administrative powers had increased. This was facilitated by growing resources
(financial and human), war, the welfare system, and the need to regulate the market
and the production systems to safeguard the common interest. In the United States,
the “New Deal” policies and programs of the 1930s exemplify the conceptual and
practical shift in governance. The change necessitated adapting and improving
public administration capacity, affirming what Woodrow Wilson recognized in
the 1880s—that public administration is “the cutting edge of ­government” and is
“government in action.”
 Governance and Globalism ◾ 3

Governance
Definition Issue
The considerable effects of governance on society have attracted wide interest in the
literature, conveying diverse conceptualizations and definitions (Ahern 2002; Jain
2002; Hyden 2002; Jreisat 2001a; Pierre 2000; Nye and Donahue 2000). Regardless
of how governance is perceived, public administration is a component of significance,
though with variable levels of capacity and professionalism. The association of politics
and administration within governance is intrinsic; each profoundly reflects the image
and values of the other. This connection is more real today because conventional
jurisdictional boundaries of administration no longer have the same relevance as in
the past in explaining what happens with formulation and implementation of policy
(Hyden 2002: 14). Public administration is the operational dimension of governance,
providing the tools for efficient and effective implementation of policies and deci-
sions. Governance can be powerless without the instruments to carry out its policies.
“A strategy paper without a road map is a paper, not a strategy; a decision without
implementation is a wish not a decision” (Schiavo-Campo and McFerson 2008: 3).
While one conception of governance refers to empirical manifestation of state
adaptation to its external environment, another denotes representation of coordi-
nated social systems and the role of the state in the pursuit of collective interests
through traditional, institutional channels (Pierre 2000: 3). Yet another conception
focuses on “the extent and form of [governance] intervention and the use of mar-
kets and quasi-markets to deliver ‘public’ service” (Rhodes 2000: 55). A distinction
is also made between “old governance,” focusing on how and what outcomes are
conceivable, and recent or new governance, conceived in terms of comparative poli-
tics and whether concepts “can ‘travel’ across a range of political systems and still
have substantial meaning and validity” (Peters 2000: 50). “In much of the public
and political debate, governance refers to sustaining co-ordination and coherence
among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives such as politi-
cal actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and transnational orga-
nizations” (Pierre 2000: 3–4).
Governance is an organizing inclusive function that encompasses, in addition to
central government, other players who share the responsibilities such as local authori-
ties, business, interest groups, voluntary organizations, and a variety of civic associa-
tions (Klingner 2006). Thus, governance is a system of many dimensions, continually
evolving and adapting its complex web of structures, processes, policies, behaviors,
traditions, visions, and outcomes. The United Nations Development Program defines
governance “as the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to
manage a country’s affairs at all levels, comprising the mechanisms, processes, and
institutions through which that authority is directed” (UNDP 2007: 1).
The term governance is derived from the Greek to steer, the process by which
a society or an organization steers itself (Rosell 1999: 1). Despite the apparent
4 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

conceptual amorphousness, it is possible to analyze governance through its con-

stant rudiments of structure, process, and outcome:

◾◾ Structure is the standard features and forms of the authority system in prac-
tice. Usually, structures reveal specific attributes of the system such as cen-
tralized or decentralized authority, type of organizational and institutional
setting, specificity of functions performed, and the overall authority pattern
that connects all such structural essentials for performance. The capacity of
institutional structures to perform the diverse functions of governance is a
crucial measure of effectiveness. Also, the structure signifies the extent of rep-
resentation of the people and the legitimacy of the authority system itself.
◾◾ Process defines the rules and operational methods of decision making. In
theory, the process promotes fairness and legitimacy of outcomes of public
policy and advances the common interests. In reality, however, outcomes of
the process often vary from expectations, specially when the process becomes
captured by powerful special interests, and serves mainly to accommodate
the objectives of organized interest groups. Although basic processes of gov-
ernance are designated by law or constitution, other factors may have impor-
tant modifying effects such as tradition and precedent. Still, an open and
transparent process indicates real responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and
attempt at sound reasoning in decision making. An impartial process raises
confidence in the integrity of governance.
◾◾ Outcome is the measured quality and quantity of the overall results of gov-
ernance performance, particularly in serving the collective interest, delivery
of public services, managing sustainable development, and improving the
effectiveness of a civil society. Outcomes exemplify accountability of public
decision making and illustrate the level of commitment to equity in the dis-
tribution of benefits and delivery of public services as well as the uniformity
in the application of law and justice in the society.

Shifting Role of Governance

Governance has wide-ranging effects on its people; it has major responsibilities of
coping with external challenges as well as making decisions that affect the wel-
fare and security of the society. Focus on governance encourages people to think
beyond the daily routine or the need for only incremental steps that do not call for
change in existing rules. Like strategic management, Hyden (2002: 18) points out,
governance becomes a way of looking at a problem in the context of the “big pic-
ture” of adapting systems of rules to changes in the environment. Effective leaders,
therefore, continually search to find consensual and creative solutions to problems
encountered by their constituents.
A system of governance is neither a static nor a preset condition. Invariably,
the system, the process, and the outcome of governance change, distinctly rather
 Governance and Globalism ◾ 5

than uniformly. After examination of administrative reform in fourteen countries,

Manning and Parison conclude: “Circumstances dictated action, but leverage avail-
able to reformers—the points of entry to comprehensive reform programs—and the
malleability of basic public sector institutions varied considerably among countries”
(2004: xv). Refinements and realignments of governance structures and functions
take place with change of internal conditions such as change of leadership or in
response to citizens’ demands. While external pressures and global challenges have
also been a source of systemic change in governance, such outside pressures tend
to promote value-laden propositions that reflect external values, as those of donor
countries, thus generate domestic resistance and contentions.
Mediating issues of change is a prime test and a reliable indicator of the effec-
tiveness and competence of leadership. Leadership, attitudes, values, tradition, and
overall political culture influence what and how change in governance is attained.
Leadership and political culture are mainly emphasized because of the realization
that societies change far more meaningfully through negotiation, reconciliation,
and consensus building than through upheaval or external pressures. “A growing
body of work suggests that important changes often take place incrementally and
through seemingly small adjustments that can, however, cumulate into significant
institutional transformation” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: xi).
Accumulation of incremental adjustments that result in gradual institutional
transformation assumes an open and representative system of government with
legitimate leadership that enjoys public trust and confidence in its competence and
integrity. During the early days of 2011, the world witnessed in the Arab world a
forceful public demand for reform. The popular uprisings were against autocratic
leaders, rampant corruption, incompetent institutions, and inept public leaders and
managers who have mainly been employed and appointed through nepotism and
favoritism. Moreover, lack of freedom and economic opportunity pushed previously
silent and frustrated young people to press forward for radical change of regime.
From Tunisia and Egypt to Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and the rest of the Arab world,
voices of massive public protests and acts of discontent forced political leaders out of
office in some countries, and threatened others with similar destiny unless the system
of governance is fundamentally reformed. Regardless of the wishes of the outside
world, the Arab people from the inside of their countries provided the determination
to change history.
The past few decades have been demanding for governance everywhere. Vigorous
debates, assessments, and evaluations of the domestic and the international roles of
governance were encouraged. During the 1980s and shortly after, the power of the
state in the industrialized countries and its ability to address societal issues was chal-
lenged from within. The rapid ascendance of neoliberal regimes in several advanced
democracies, regarded the state not as a source of collective action, or a base for solu-
tions, but rather as a main source of many societal problems (Pierre 2000: 3). The
thrust of this political thinking, and the ideological following it generated in various
countries, was manifested in determined confidence in a monetarist economic policy
6 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

supported by deregulation, privatization, drastic reductions of civil service, and the

push to “reinvent government” and to manage it “businesslike.” In the United States,
an assertive neoconservative extremist group, with their own particular agenda,
emerged within this camp pressing with a missionary zeal for minimum state inter-
vention domestically, and a maximum intervention externally (Margolick 2010).
Thus, the private sector, spearheaded by multinational corporations, seemed to
have won back at the global level the degree of freedom they had lost at the national
level with the advent of the welfare state. At the global level, they did not encounter
the equivalent of the state, an entity that can tax them, regulate them, and man-
age a redistributive process. This resulted in what Richard Falk (1999) refers to as
“predatory globalization.” These pressures encouraged the United States to walk
away from international agreements at the turn of this century, undermining the
concept and the practice of multilateralism, that has been “an underpinning of the
global system since the end of World War II” (Prestowitz 2003: 22). In September
2002, the U.S. administration published the National Security of the United States of
America, a report described as enshrining the doctrines of preventive war and over-
whelming U.S. military superiority (Prestowitz 2003: 22). Even free trade among
countries was often used to reward those who yield to certain hegemonic policies
and to punish those who do not.
Forces of globalizing capital mounted pressures worldwide for sweeping priva-
tization and contracting out public functions to business enterprises. During this
period, the New Public Management (NPM) emerged to offer a new paradigm
of entrepreneurial system of governance and administration based on the market
criteria of efficiency and flexibility (Farazmand 2002: 132). The NPM was not an
unqualified success story. The competitiveness envisioned to result from privatiza-
tion and to increase efficiency rarely materialized. Instead, minimizing the role
of the state and shrinking public service added greater complexity in the delivery
process and made coordination even more difficult. The critics point out that glo-
balizing capital promoted corruption, reduced accountability, violated territorial
sovereignty, and left no room for any choice for people or nations but to succumb
to the dictates of the globalizing corporate power structure (Farazmand 2002:
128–129; Gawthrop 1998; Korten 1995). Globalism changed the nature of the
administrative state worldwide (Farazmand 1999: 510).
Eventually, diluting the power of the state undermined professional public
­management by reducing its regulatory oversight, pressing on it a “businesslike”
and “bottom line” culture, and weakening its traditional values of representing and
serving the collective interest. By 2008, the industrial countries and the rest of the
world found themselves in the midst of one of the worst economic disasters in mod-
ern history. The neoliberal recipes not only proved to be vain but also brought many
countries to the edge of financial ruin. In foreign affairs, the consequences were
no less tragic: alienation of allies, undermining of international diplomacy, and
costly military adventures as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on false pretexts. Political
leaders and their associates of ideologically inclined pressure groups, captivated by
 Governance and Globalism ◾ 7

the “magic of the market,” sought, with some success, to restrict the role of gover-
nance. The recipe of such perspective was a profound institutional restructuring to
facilitate implementation of the measures of deregulation, privatization, reduction
of civil service, and introduction of business managerial practices in government
(Falk 1999; Pierre 2000: 2; Jreisat 2006). But, the huge size of business corpora-
tions compromised healthy competition, became impediments to innovation, and
exerted corrupting influence in politics (Greider 2009: 11–12). Weakening anti-
trust laws allowed concentration of economic power within a few corporate entities,
which were deemed “too big to fail” and thus had to be bailed out by taxpayers’
money.
Against a worsening economic crisis in 2008–9, reorientation of public policy
toward broader collective interests restored some of the power of public authority.
The internal economic disorder and global pressures required clarifying and rede-
fining public policy objectives, analyzing and evaluating possible solutions, and
authorizing new public policies. Among the most effective instruments of the newly
promised state activism is fiscal policy that is directed to stimulate employment
and achieve economic growth and stability. The state relies on the budget process
(taxes and expenditures) and the regulatory framework to execute its major policies
on the economy. The result of the economic crisis of 2008 was a plea to govern-
ments to assume greater responsibilities in ensuring orderly economic activities.
Activated governance requires effective managerial capacity to devise and
implement solutions. But the tilted perception of the role of the state and its policies
over the years created knowledge gaps and neglect. The new demands for pertinent
knowledge and renewed administrative competence are not attainable through the
traditional training and education. Broader views by managers and the ability to
incorporate and integrate knowledge in their decisions have become imperatives in
a fast-changing global context. As policy issues in areas such as health care, finance,
labor migration, environment protection, and international agreements acquired
higher importance, so did new administrative knowledge and skills.
An illustrative example of recent change of perspective on governance in the
United States is reliance on contracting out that has been a pillar of neoliberal pro-
business policies since the 1980s. Budget cuts announced by Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates (May 2010) recognized that defense contractors are a “significant
budgetary bloat.” As reported, Gates also said, “We ended up with contractors
supervising other contractors—with predictable results” (Jaffe 2010: A03).

Among Gates’ apparent targets for major cuts are the private contractors
the Pentagon has hired in large numbers over the past decade to take on
administrative tasks that the military used to handle. The defense sec-
retary estimated that this portion of the Pentagon budget has grown by
as much as $23 billion, a figure that does not include the tens of billions
of dollars spent on private firms supporting U.S. troops in Afghanistan
and Iraq. (Jaffe 2010: A03)
8 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

The shifting role of governance has instigated some of the most passionate politi-
cal and economic debates in recent history. The economic crisis of 2008–9 caused
the emergence of extreme positions on both sides of the political spectrum. On the
left, serious doubts are expressed about the functionality of capitalism and the free
market as viable systems. On the right, ominous warnings have been delivered about
state activism, charging that it creates destructive huge public debts and invites
socialism and communism. The politics of the middle has been struggling to govern
throughout the democratic systems with no support from either political extreme.
The dilemma is that a governing strategy with commitment to economic growth
and job creation cannot succeed without public spending that adds to already huge
public debts in many countries as it portends a tax increase in the future. The oppo-
site strategy of deep cuts in public spending to reduce the size of government and
public debt could cause deep recessions and impede economic growth.
An effective strategy of governing under conditions of economic stress requires
pragmatism and reliance on empirical evidence far more than ideology or rigid
dogma. Rational public policy formulation has to utilize all reasonable policy tools
available such as spending cuts, tax increase, fiscal austerity, and stimulus spend-
ing, or the opposite of each, as the situation requires. Successful execution of any
strategy of governance, however, has to be mindful of basic prerequisites: (1) main-
tenance of discipline, accountability, and transparency; (2) clear definition of the
strategy, ensuring broad support and wide communication of the strategic vision;
and (3) employment of an inclusionary approach, partnering with local govern-
ments, the private sector, and community organizations. Certainly, governance has
an important role in building and developing the society; it is the size of resources
used and the style of authority applied that, generally, raise questions and cause
concerns.

What Is Good Governance?

How does one define, recognize, evaluate, or measure good governance? These are
basic questions, continually asked by students, scholars, and practitioners alike.
Predictably, many positive attributes of good governance can be identified. Good
governance demonstrates capacity to aggregate and coordinate various interests to
bring about agreements on policy action while managing political and administra-
tive institutions with accountability and transparency. An operational and support-
able vision of good governance is necessary for a consensus to emerge and for a
system of measurement and evaluation of performance to be effective. Another com-
pelling reason to search for a true understanding of transcendent qualities of good
­governance is to be able to articulate, design, and execute relevant reform strategies.
According to J. Ahrens, an explanation of good governance essentially refers to
two of the most basic questions posed by political scientists since the foundation of
their discipline: “Who governs?” and “How well?” (2002: 119). The first part of the
question focuses on the issues of power and the distribution of power and resources
 Governance and Globalism ◾ 9

in the society. The second part is primarily concerned with “good government,” such
as effective institutions, efficient methods of operation, and equitable policy outcomes
(Ahrens 2002: 119). As a system, governance is continually changing, reflecting his-
torical, political, cultural, educational, and economic circumstances. Appraisal of
such a system has to consider many factors, particularly those that influence perfor-
mance. Evaluation indicators have also to convey a high priority among these indica-
tors to citizens’ satisfaction and participation in decisions affecting them.
Measuring results requires relevant criteria that incorporate compatible prin-
ciples and objectives with societal values and interests. Valid measurement has
to determine degree of fidelity to these values in principle and in practice. Some
widely conveyed core values of good governance are mutually reinforcing—that is,
the flaw of one causes difficulties in another. The following are some examples:

◾◾ Ethics and accountability infuse all aspects of governance. The “connection

between ethics and governance is immediate,” Rohr (2000: 203) concludes.
A report titled “Trust in Government” for the twenty-nine OECD countries
provides a comprehensive overview of ethics measures, trends, promising
practices, and innovative solutions taken by member countries. The report
clearly affirms that public ethics are a prerequisite to and underpin public
trust; they are a “keystone of good governance” (OECD 2000: 9). Whereas
integrity and capacity have become a condition for good governance, checks
and balance in the authority structure affirm accountability.
◾◾ Creation of trust and promotion of shared values such as sustained openness,
transparency, and equal justice under the law. This means the following:
(1) Relevant information is openly discussed, mass media are free to report,
and professional exploration and learning processes are unbound in conduct-
ing their functions. (2) A study by the OECD concludes that measures of
good government include the following: public servants’ behavior is in line
with the public purposes; citizens receive impartial treatment on the basis of
legality and justice; public resources are effectively and properly used; deci-
sion-making procedures are transparent to the public; and procedures are
in place to permit public scrutiny and redress (2000: 11). In brief, rules and
legal standards for orderly conduct and progressive social transformation are
constructed and impartially applied.
◾◾ Competent and ethical leadership is indispensable for establishing an overall
framework of collective and strategic goals as well as reflecting shared val-
ues—both within government and across society. It is often said that “leader-
ship defies simple formulations and easy solutions” (Beinecke 2009: 1). But,
Donna Shalala offers a perspective that sums up the main functions of profes-
sional organizational leaders and managers as to “set standards, communicate
a vision, choose staff based on competence and character, encourage team
work, cultivate transparency, care about employees, and respond construc-
tively to feedback” (2004: 349).
10 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

◾◾ Decentralization. Sharing authority and responsibility with local govern-

ments/authorities to improve access to public services, increase public par-
ticipation, and enhance government responsiveness. “The present interest in
decentralization is pervasive in that out of 75 developing and transitional
countries with populations greater than 5 million, all but 12 claim to have
embarked on some form of transfer of political power to local units of govern-
ment” (UNDP 1997: 1). Furthermore, decentralization stimulates meaning-
ful shifts in authority relationships to prevent its concentration at the top.
Indirectly, decentralization weakens authoritarianism and supports forces
of democratic values, economic competition, and global means of education
and communication. Centralized systems of governance, perpetuated by tra-
dition, culture, and other exceptional measures are often hesitant or slow
buying into the decentralization reform.

Public administration faces its own challenges in coping with decentraliza-

tion trends. The early legacy relied on models of organization and management
that are hierarchical, applying command and control paradigms. Attempts to
“reinvent” government and to emphasize total quality management, team build-
ing, performance measurement, and empowerment of employees have contributed
significantly to a meaningful transformation of contemporary governance, even if
application of these new organizational and managerial changes has hardly been
uniform. The diffusion of techniques of organizational learning played an impor-
tant role in ushering in a culture of governance that fosters delegation, representa-
tion, transparency, and accountability. This trend, however, has not been linear or
painless. Although decentralization and delegation of authority improve efficiency,
delegation may create problems of accountability and control when those receiving
the greater authority are not appropriately prepared. Still, recent history shows that
the power to govern has diffused away from the centralized autocratic rule to a
broader base of elected representatives, professional public management, and active
involvement of the governed (Michalski, Miller, and Stevens 2001: 7).
Ultimately, all factors presented so far in assessing good governance are as much
valuable as they yield good results—namely, provide effective delivery of public
services and enhance citizens’ trust and satisfaction. The list of failures and defi-
ciencies of governance in many parts of the world that did not adhere to core values
can be quite lengthy. Too many political leaders fail to advance sustainable and
equitable political and economic policies that are institutionally rather than person-
ally based. Worldwide similarities of governance failures to respond effectively to
the growing demands for integrity, protection of citizens’ rights and liberties, and
improving standards of living are remarkable.
Governance has been judged by the level of achievement of democratic ideals and
a self-sustained economic growth by stimulating the private sector. Reliance on the
private sector for steering socioeconomic development, however, assumes the pres-
ence of a lean state, thriving private sector in a civil society, and a non-monopolistic
 Governance and Globalism ◾ 11

free domestic and world markets. Achieving this synergy requires other precondi-
tions, particularly checks and balances in the market and a representative govern-
ment. Actual experiences in many countries indicate absence of many of the key
instruments of effective governance: lack of market competition and weak adherence
to cherished societal values of liberty and the rule of law. Various studies and politi-
cal declarations on governance and reform have not produced a universally accepted
analytical framework or model. With a more precise meaning of governance, Hyden
(2002: 17) argues, it is possible to distinguish between the distributive side of poli-
tics (how public resources are allocated), addressing the perennial question of “who
gets what, when, and how,” and the constitutive side that deals with the question of
“who sets what rules, when, and how?” This distinction is particularly important to
countries emphasizing policies for sustainable development. The conventional needs
approach that has dominated international development assistance, for example,
relies more on the distributive side, and does not ask for changes in the rules of the
game to achieve its objectives (Hyden 2002: 17). Yet, sustainable development that
focuses on empowerment and enhanced access to resources also requires a change
in the rules, and, by implication, a shift in power relations.
In sum, governance has identifiable qualities with multiple dimensions. Analysis
and measurement techniques in the past decades made it possible to delineate some
of the crucial qualities and attributes of good government that have received wide
recognition and acceptance. The following UNDP (1997: 4) list is inclusive and
representative of the literature:

UNDP List of Core Characteristics of Good Governance

Participation: All men and women have a voice in decision making.

Rule of Law: Legal frameworks are fair and enforced impartially.
Transparency: Free flow of information and enough information provided.
Responsiveness: Institutions and processes serve all stakeholders.
Consensus Orientation: Differing interests are mediated to reach broad consen-
sus on what is the common good.
Equity: All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their
well-being.
Effectiveness and Efficiency: Processes and institutions produce results that
meet needs.
Accountability: Public decision makers, private sector, and civic society orga-
nizations are accountable to constituents.
Strategic Vision: Leaders and the public share a long-range perspective on the
good society.
Legitimacy: Authority is consistent with established legal and institutional
frameworks.
Resource Prudence: Resources are managed and used to optimize the well-
being of people.
Ecological Soundness: The environment is protected and regenerated for
sustainability.
12 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

Empowering and Enabling: All in society are empowered to pursue legitimate

goals.
Partnership: Governance is a whole-system responsibility that involves insti-
tutionalized mechanisms and processes for working in partnerships with
non-governmental parties.
Spatially Grounded in Communities: Multi-level systems of people are empow-
ered to be self-reliant, self-organizing, and self-managing within the auton-
omy of local communities.

Measuring Governance
This is a difficult question for many reasons. Practices of governance continually
change, sometime precipitously, invalidating the result of measurement by the time
it was completed. Other aspects of governance generate particular dilemmas, defy-
ing measurement efforts. Over conformance and excessive compliance with rules
and procedures, for example, create rigidities, undermine creativity, and weaken
overall performance of basic duties. Procedural accountability cannot substitute for
performance accountability. Many efforts to measure good governance and deter-
mine its qualities—such as effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, and ethics—are
approximations or judgments that may have been subjected to particular predispo-
sitions. Measurement, however, is helpful in raising awareness, informing decisions,
pointing out trends, and underscoring strategies for improvement. The following
are some examples of notable measurement projects:

◾◾ Worldwide Governance Indicators have been developed by the World Bank,

as an attempt to build regular governance indicators that can be a crucial tool
for policy analysts and decision makers. The indicators seek to facilitate bench-
marking and measurement of performance. The World Bank Institute relies
on a set of standards for effective governance that consist of six measures:
(1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence,
(3) Government Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law, and
(6) Control of Corruption.2
◾◾ The UNDP (January 1997) published a policy document titled Governance
for Sustainable Human Development, articulating commitment to supporting
national efforts for good governance for sustainable human development. The
policy document followed UNDP’s first attempt to define the parameters of
good governance in a 1994 in Initiatives for Change, which stated that “the
goal of governance initiatives should be to develop capacities that are needed
to realize development that gives priority to the poor, advances women, sus-
tains the environment and creates needed opportunities for employment.”3
The UNDP also launched other initiatives to develop governance indicators
that provide guidance and technical assistance in governance. Two particular
programs have been the focus of field research and have significant practi-
cal thrusts: (1) The UNDP Governance Indicators Program (2007) is jointly
 Governance and Globalism ◾ 13

produced with the Oslo Governance Center to provide a “User’s Guide” that
measures the performance of governments, the quality of public institutions,
and people’s perceptions of various aspects of governance. This report points
out that “an indicator does not have to come in numeric form” such as clas-
sification of countries as free or not free. (2) Program on Governance in the
Arab Region (POGAR), initiated in early 2000, to promote capacity build-
ing of governance institutions including legislatures, judiciaries, and civil
society organizations. Advice and assistance have primarily focused on three
main aspects of governance: participation, rule of law, and transparency and
accountability.4
◾◾ A report by Lonti and Woods (2008) for the OECD countries sets some
specific ideas on measuring governance. The project emphasizes collecting
“core data that should enable comparative institutional arrangements and
performance” and shed some light on difference in institutional performance.
Comparative data, it is claimed, “enable countries to better understand their
own practices, to benchmark their achievements through international com-
parisons and to learn from experiences of other countries facing similar chal-
lenges” (Lonti and Woods, 2008: 7). The study underscores the importance
that core data be as stable as possible to detect trends. Core data suggested
includes indicators on government revenue and expenditure structures,
employment and compensation, executive government outcomes, and budget
procedures.

Other measurement attempts include those by the following:

◾◾ Transparency International has developed various indexes on ethical,

transparent, and accountable systems of governance. Progress in fight-
ing corruption at the international level considerably relies on such mea-
surement and benchmarking. The most widely recognized in this regard
is the Corruption Perception Index that covered 180 countries in 2010.
Primarily, Transparency International “seeks to provide reliable quantita-
tive diagnostic tools regarding levels of transparency and corruption at the
global and local levels.”5
◾◾ Freedom House Survey measures progress in developing political freedoms.
The index is widely used by news agencies and researchers and has exclu-
sively reported expert opinions on 192 countries since 1955. Experts, gener-
ally not based in the country, allocate a country rating based on responses
to a series of questions. The scores for political rights, civil liberties, and
combined freedom index run from 1 to 7, with 1 being most free and 7 being
least free.
◾◾ Newsweek’s rankings of “The Best Countries in the World” is worthy of note
as a measurement initiative that claims to achieve more than measuring vari-
ous aspects of countries by putting these aspects together (Newsweek 2010,
14 ◾ Globalism and Comparative Public Administration

August 23 & 30: 31–42). The Newsweek survey, utilizing a team of experts,
selected “five categories of national wellbeing—education, health, quality of
life, economic competitiveness, and political environment—and compiled
metrics within these categories across 100 nations” (2010: 31). Despite the
difficulty of gathering comparative data, the magazine acknowledges that
the outcome was a “snapshot” of how countries looked in 2008 and 2009.
The top four countries in this ranking are Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, and
Australia. The bottom four were Zambia, Cameron, Nigeria, and Burkina
Faso. The United States was ranked number 11 (Newsweek 2010, August 23
& 30: 32–33).

Question of Democratic Governance

The classification of countries as democratic and nondemocratic governance in the
literature and by mass media tends to group together under one descriptive term
significantly different systems with diverse forms and practices. Democratic consti-
tutional monarchies of Spain, UK, and the Netherlands, for example, are not the
same as the democratic presidential systems of the United States or France. The
variation is far greater among non-Western, large systems such as Japan, China,
Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. Over the years, democ-
racy has been loaded with meanings and conceptions, even myths and ideologies
that obscure its real values and attributes. The term democracy is one of the most
widely used and abused characterizations of governance. “The smug assertion that
liberal democratic regimes alone are morally acceptable cannot be sustained,” as
Rohr (2000: 215) points out. Not only would this be unrealistic, Rohr argues, “but,
more importantly, it would be a form of historical imperialism that stands aloof in
self-righteous judgment on how the vast majority of human beings have organized
their civic lives over the centuries.” This does not mean one may not favor a liberal
democracy over authoritarian rule. It means, however, that the moral excellence of
a liberal democracy cannot deprive a centralized or authoritarian system of moral
legitimacy (Rohr 2000: 215).
The attempt to define operationally what a democratic government looks like
runs into many obstacles and easily gets shrouded with ethnic and cultural biases.
A common description of democratic governance is as follows: “In the modern
world there are no democracies without constitutions” (Chapman 2000: 221). This
includes written and unwritten constitutions that encompass customs and conven-
tions. But, while Chapman recognizes constitutions and elections as determinants
of the legitimacy of governance, many examples exist of systems of governance that
conduct regular elections and have constitutions but lack fidelity to democratic
values. Conducting a national election and having a constitution is not a sufficient
indicator or does not constitute qualification for classifying a state as democratic.
Does governance remain democratic when it fails to recognize the particularities
 Governance and Globalism ◾ 15

of its minorities, oppresses them, practices open racism, or habitually disregards

international laws and conventions? Would a system of governance remain demo-
cratic when declaring itself as a Muslim, Jewish, or Christian state, providing policy
preferences to those who are members of the faith and, by such actions, placing
in disadvantage citizens who are not of the same faith or actively discriminating
against them?
These and similar questions should modify or qualify an absolutist ­perspective
of democracy. To be sure, a constitution is a basic document that specifies the
main structures and functions of a governance system, but history is replete with
examples of totalitarian systems that have constitutions and conduct election.
Many examples indicate that governance systems that seek to melt away or exclude
certain citizens on the basis of gender, religion, ethnicity, culture, or race, if not
reformed, tend to drift to greater chauvinistic, nationalistic, and extremist prac-
tices. Regardless, a constitution does enhance the democratic characteristics of a
governance system when such a constitution, explicitly, affirms unfettered equality
under the law of all citizens. While a constitution safeguards the principle of equal-
ity in word and indeed it should, also, ensure genuine representation of citizens
through free and fair election (Jreisat, 2004).
Concluding that “more countries than ever before are working to build demo-
cratic governance,” the UNDP has been promoting democracy through reform and
development of institutions and processes that are more responsive to the needs
of ordinary citizens. This approach also seeks to build partnerships and to share
ways to promote participation, accountability, and effectiveness at all levels. “We
help countries strengthen their electoral and legislative systems, improve access to
justice and public administration, and develop a greater capacity to deliver basic
services to those most in need.”6 Actually, it is ineffective and corrupt governance,
particularly in developing societies, that has been blamed for conditions of poverty,
economic stagnation, lack of political stability, confused priorities, and being an
obstacle to sustainable development (Jreisat 2004; Donahue and Nye 2003; Werlin
2003: 332). In contrast, as Rosell (1999: ix) explains, the ability of a society to pros-
per in a world of rapid change will largely depend on its ability to develop a more
participatory and a more effective governance system.

Globalization
Globalization has mainly been defined in terms of linkages, integration, interde-
pendence, and connectedness among economies, peoples, cultures, and countries.
Certainly, goods and services produced in one country are increasingly obtainable
anywhere in the world. International travel, finance, communication, and a variety
of exchanges are made simple and fast. Nevertheless, the consequences of global-
ization have been grounds for high praise as well as criticism and resentment. The
Field of study?
 Why is comparisons important to the practice
of Public Administration (PA)?
 What is the ultimate goal of Comparative
Public Administration (CPA)?
 What is relevant to PA to compare?
 What is the current state of knowledge of
CPA?
 What is the future of CPA?
Jreisat, using Ryan’s  Heady argues that CPA
(1994) ideas, started as a field
identifies three stage focusing of
of CPA development
1. Imperialist Missionary administration
(Post WW II-1960s)  The 1970s was a
decade of
2. Anti-parochial, Anti- retrenchment.
ethnocentric (1970- Financial support dried
1980) out. Scholars begin
3. Interdependence reappraising the field.
(1980s-Present)  Shift from technical
assistance to action-
goal oriented practice
 The emergence of CPA as a field is linked to the
process of decolonization and the expansion of
nation-states.
 CPA in its origins attempt to help develop the
administrative practice of developing nations.
 CPA was a “cold war” strategy to contain communism.

 CPA shifted from the development practice into

academic debate
 Changes around the world (foreign debt,
neoliberalism, etc.) offer a great opportunity for the
revival of the field.
 “CPA is the comparative study of
institutions, process, and behaviours in
many context. Context (or environment in
comparative analysis generally refers to all
external influences that affect management,
such as societal values, norms, religion,
political culture, and economy.” Jreisat
(2002: 1)
 “[Public] Administration is concerned with
means for the achievement of prescribed
ends…found in political settings. Concerned
primarily with the carrying out of public
policy decisions made by the authoritative
decision-makers in the political system.”
(Heady 1991:2]
INSTITUTIONS
◦ Branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial)
◦ Bureaucracies
◦ Political Parties
◦ Military
◦ Civil Society
PROCESSES
◦ Policy making
◦ Agenda setting
◦ Decision Making
◦ Implementation
BEHAVIOURS
◦ Self-interested behavior (rent-seeking, utility maximization)

◦ Socially motivated behavior

POLITICAL SYSTEM
◦ Democratic regime
◦ Authoritarian regime
CULTURE
◦ Traditional
◦ Modern
ECONOMY
◦ Market driven
◦ Command/planned
◦ Mixed
 Scope (as a field of research)
 Polity : the nature of State and of the form of
government (political leadership; political
ideology etc)
 Social welfare – problems pertaining to food,
housing, health, education, social security etc
 Economy –
 Education – elementary education as an
important obligation
 Defense – strategies
 Management of financial affairs – taxation;
debt structure
 Administrative efficiency – which
administrative structure is operating in a
more efficient manner
 Environmental protection – pollution
 Development of infrastructure – power
generations; communication
 Local – local bodies that are taken up in
diverse cultural settings
 1. inter-institutional comparisons
 Comparisons between two or more institutions
working in different environmental contexts
 Structure; the functions performed by that structure;
process involved in discharging the functions of
different institutions
 2. Intra-national comparison
 Comparisons of the different administrative structures
within a country
 3. Cross-national comparisons
Involve two or more nations
 4. Cross-cultural Comparisons
 Representing more than one culture
 Can be intra or inter national comparison
 5. Cross-temporal comparisons
 Studies conducted at different point of time
 Widening horizon of the discipline of PA
 Contribute formulating theoretical constructs
thereby providing scientific base to the discipline
 Helps in explaining factors responsible for cross-
national and cross-cultural similarities and
differences in those administrative systems
 Facilitate explanations in the literature of public
administration  factors responsible for failure
or success of administration of a country
 Contributes in highlighting which of the
environmental factors that help in the promotion
of administrative effectiveness and which
functions more successfully in what type of
environment (administrative capability)
 Comprehend how one particular administrative
system reacted to a particular problem
 Help in finding out how and with what
modification, can the administrative structure of
a particular country can be successfully
transplanted in another country given their
different cultural settings.
 ECOLOGICAL APPROACH
 STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
 BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH
 Latest approach (1970s)
 Emphasized by Prof Riggs.
 Need to relate the administrative systems of
developing countries with the environment
 Riggs : “nature of PA in any country cannot be
understood without grasping the social
setting in which it operates”
 Ecology studies:-
 To denote the relationship between the
organism and environment (biology);
 Interrelationships and interactions of
organisms and their environment
 How it relates to PA?
 1945 (Gaus – identifying key ecological
factors for an understanding of contemporary
American PA –people; place; technology;
social technology; catastrophe; personality
etc
 1947 ( Dahl – ecological approach to study PA
 1952 – US technical assistance programme
(Roscoe Martin) – (refer article)
 Emphasized on the ecological aspect with regard to
effective implementation of techno-assistance
programmes
 1. Interdisciplinary – understanding all
environmental forces (political, social,
economic, cultural etc)
 Forces exert considerable influence on the
administrative systems and get influenced
 2. Complex subject matter
 Primary forces  economic, social, symbolic,
communicative and political – most influence
the administration in any country (Riggs)
 3. importance of interactions
 Between administrative structures and their
environment (interplay)
 4. Mutual influences
 How administration is modified as a result of
interaction with its environment and vice-versa
 Arora (1996) - If an organisation is to survive, it must
adapt itself to the changing needs and conditions of
its external environment (continuously changing)
 Bureaucratic system is continually interacting with the
political, economic and socio-cultural sub-systems in
a society.
 It is both modifying influence upon these systems
and a system which is modified by their activity
 Focus on environmental forces  impact on
administrative systems
 Lacks of predictability (administrative
collapse)
 Example – crisis and collapse of Marcos’s
administration in Phillipines
 Taken from anthropologist’s work
 Waldo suggested this approach in 1955.
 Riggs utilized this approach (1957) – studied the
administrative systems of different societies from
ecological perspective in terms of structures and
functions
 Study and analysis of structures and functions
 Analyze the functions performed by society, the
structures that are responsible to carry out those
functions and method used in undertaking the
functions
 STRUCTURE – any pattern of behavior
become a standard feature of a social
system
 Concrete structures – physically separable
from others
 Analytical structure- those are perceptible
through our intellect and not physically
separable from others. (eg structures of
administrative authority and political power
 patterns)
 FUNCTION – outcome of the interdependence
and interaction of two or more structures
 Concrete function – can be observed as have
been performed or as being performed
 Analytical function – imperceptible to human
eyes (decision making, coordination etc)
 Manifest function  intended and observable
 Latent function happen automatically as a
result of manifest function. (impact of
manifest function)  not intended
 1. Presumed social and circumstantial
stability (no fundamental and drastic changes
in the structures and functions of the
administrative system under study)
 2. assume the cause of all happenings are
predetermined (teleological assumption)
 1. value free approach – focus on empirical
aspects rather than normative aspect
 2. descriptive and evaluative approach 
describes structures performing various
functions (comparative analysis and evaluation of
structures of different administrative systems
performing diverse function)
 3. status quo approach  consider only minor
changes (stability)
 4. focus on interaction  all administrative
system perform their functions with coordination
and interdependence
 Hollow (not solid) assumption of social and
circumstantial stability
 Teleological assumption – cause and impact
 Human relations movement
 Administrative system as a pattern of behavior
that depends on a network of human relations
 Modern approach
 Conducting and promoting scientific research
and developing systematic theory building
 Conducted several cross-national, cross-cultural
studies of administrative behavior  promoting
knowledge of PA in the comparative approach
 1. analytical approach
◦ Focus or analysis on behavior in different administrative
settings  how they behave?
◦ Descriptive as well as analytical
 2. inter-disciplinary (involve other social sciences
as well) in analyzing administration behavior
 3. scientific approach
 4. complex subject matter
 5. empirical approach  using rigorous methods
 6. long range venture
 1. scientific approach (hollow claim)
◦ Difficult to quantify people’s behavior
◦ Study of human attitude, values, norms etc
◦ Diverse cultural settings
 2. ignorance of the circumstances
 3. problem of observation  reliable?
 4. Problem of change
A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS?
CHRISTOPHER HOOD

This articte discusses: the doctrinal content of the group of ideas known as 'new public
management' (NPM); the intellectual provenance of those ideas; explcinations for their
apparent persuasiveness in the 1980s; and criticisms which have been made of the new doc-
trines. Particular attention is paid to the claim that NPM offers an all-purpose key to better
provision of public services. TTiis article argues that NPM has been most commonly criticized
in terms of a claimed contradiction between 'equity' and 'efficiency' values, but that any
critique which is to survive NPM's claim to 'infinite reprogrammability' must be couched in
terms of possible conflicts between administrative values. The conclusion is that the ESRC's
Ivlanagement in Government' research irutiative has been more valuable in helping to identify
rather than to definitively answer, the key conceptual questions raised by NPM.

THE RISE OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (NPM)

The rise of 'new public management' (hereafter NPM) over the past 15 years is one
of the most striking intemational trends in public administration. Though the
research reported in the other papers in this issue refers mainly to UK experience,
NPM is emphatically not a uniquely British development. NPM's rise seems to be
linked with four other administrative 'megatrends', namely:
(i) attempts to slow down or reverse govemment growth in terms of overt public
spending and staffing (Dunsire and Hood 1989);
(ii) the shift toward privatization and quasi-privatization and away from core
govemment institutions, with renewed emphasis on 'subsidiarity' in service
provision (cf. Hood and Schuppert 1988; Dunleavy 1989).
(iii) the development of automation, particularly in information technology, in
the production and distribution of public services; and
(iv) the development of a more intemational agenda, increasingly focused on
general issues of public management, policy design, decision styles and inter-
governmental cooperation, on top of the older tradition of individual country
specialisms in public administration.
(These trends are discussed further in Hood 1990b).
NPM, like most administrative labels, is a loose term. Its usefulness lies in its
convenience as a shorthand name for the set of broadly similar administrative
doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic reform agenda in many of the OECD

Christopher Hood is Professor of Public Administration and Public Policy in the University of London.

Public Administration Vol. 69 Spring 1991 (3-19)

© 1991 Royal Institute of Public Administration ISSN 0033-3298 $3.00
4 CHRISTOPHER HOOD

group of countries from the late 1970s (see Aucoin 1990; Hood 1990b; Pollitt 1990).
Although ill-defined, NPM aroused strong and varied emotions among bureaucrats.
At one extreme were those who held that NPM was the only way to correct for the
irretrievable failures and even moral bankruptcy in the 'old' public management (cf.
Keating 1989). At the other were those who dismissed much of the thrust of NPM as
a gratuitous and philistine destruction of more than a century's work in developing
a distinctive public service ethic and culture (cf. Martin 1988; Nethercote 1989b).
NPM's rise also sparked off debate as to how the movement was to be labelled,
interpreted and explained. What exactly was the public management Emperor now
wearing? Where did the design come from, and did its novelty lie mainly in
presentation or in content? Why did it find favour? Was it an all-purpose and
all-weather garment? This article attempts to discuss these questions, with par-
ticuleir attention to the last one.

WHAT THE EMPEROR WAS WEARING: THE DOCTRINES OF NPM

Different commentators and advocates of NPM have stressed different aspects of
doctrine. But the seven overlapping precepts summarized in table 1 below appear
in most discussions of NPM. Over the last decade, a 'typical' public sector policy
delivery unit in the UK, AustrcJia, New Zealand and many other OECD countries
would be likely to have had some exposure to most of these doctrines. But not
all of the seven elements were equally present in all cases; nor are they necessarily
fully consistent, partly because they do not have a single intellectual provenance.

TABLE 1 Doctrinal components of new public management

No. Doctrine Meaning Typical

justification

1 'Hands-on Active, visible. Accountability requires

professional discretionary control of clear assignment of
management' in organizations from responsibility for action
the public sector named persons at the not diffusion of power
top, 'free to
manage'
2 Explicit standards Definition of goals. Accountability requires
and measures of targets, indicators of clear statement of goals
performance success, preferably efficiency requires 'hard
expressed in quantitative look' at objectives
terms, especially for
professional services (cf.
Day and Klein 1987;
Carter 1989)
3 Greater emphasis Resource allocation and Need to stress results
on output controls rewards linked to rather than procedures
measured performance;
breakup of centralized
bureaucracy-wide
personnel management
 A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? 5

Table 1 continued

No. Doctrine Meaning Typical

justification

4 Shift to Break up of formerly Need to create

disaggregation of 'monolithic' units.
units in the public unbundling of U-form
sector management systems into
corporatized units
around products,
operating on
decentralized 'one-line'
budgets and dealing with
one another on an 'arms-
length' basis
'manageable' units.
separate provision and
production interests, gain
efficiency adveintages of
use of contract or
franchise arrangements
inside as well as outside
the public sector

5 Shift to greater Move to term contracts Rivalry as the key to

competition in and public tendering lower costs and better
public sector procedures standards

6 Stress on private- Move away from Need to use 'proven'

sector styles of military-style 'public private sector management
management service ethic', greater tools in the public sector
practice flexibility in hiring cind
rewards; greater use of PR
techniques

7 Stress on greater Cutting direct costs. Need to check resource

discipline and raising labour discipline. demands of public sector
parsimony in resisting union demands. and 'do more with less'
resource use limiting 'compliance costs'
to business

WHERE THE DESIGN CAME FROM: NPM AS A MARRIAGE OF OPPOSITES

One way of interpreting NPM's origins is as a marriage of two different streams
of ideas. One partner was the 'new institutional economies'. It was built on the
now very familiar story of the post-World War II development of public choice,
transactions cost theory and principal-agent theory - from the early work of Black
(1958) and Arrow (1963) to Niskanen's (1971) landmark theory of bureaucracy
and the spate of later work which built on it.
The new institutional economics movement helped to generate a set of adminis-
trative reform doctrines built on ideas of contestability, user choice, transparency
and close concentration on incentive structures. Such doctrines were very different
from traditional military-bureaucratic ideas of 'good administration', with their
emphasis on orderly hierarchies and elimination of duplication or overlap
(cf. Ostrom 1974).
The other partner in the 'marriage' was the latest of a set of successive waves of
business-type 'managerialism' in the public sector, in the tradition of the international
6 CHRISTOPHER HOOD

scientific management movement (Merkle 1980; Hume 1981; Pollitt 1990). This
movement helped to generate a set of administrative reform doctrines based on the
ideas of 'professional management' expertise as portable (Martin 1983), paramount
over techrucal expertise, requiring high discretionary power to achieve results ('free
to manage') and central and indispensable to better organizational performance,
through the development of appropriate cultures (Peters and Waterman 1982) and
the active measurement and adjustment of orgaruzational outputs.
Whether the partners in this union were fully compatible remains to be seen.
'Free to manage' is a rather different slogan from 'free to choose'. The two can
conflict, particularly where the NPM revolution is led from above (as it was in
the UK) rather than from below. The relative dominance of the two partners varied
in different countries even within the 'Westminster model' tradition (cf. Hood
1990c). For example, in the unique circumstances of New Zealand, the synthesis
of public choice, transactions cost theory and principal-agent theory was predomi-
nant, producing an analytically driven NPM movement of unusual coherence. But
in the UK and Australia business-type managerialism was much more salient,
producing a more pragmatic and less intellectually elegant strain of NPM or 'neo-
Taylorism' (Pollitt 1990, p. 56). Potential frictions between these partners were
not resolved by any single coherent or definitive exposition of the joint philosophy.
Indeed, the New Zealand Treasury's Government Management (1987) comes closest
to a coherent NPM 'manifesto', given that much of the academic literature on the
subject either lacks full-scale elaboration or enthusiastic commitment to NPM.
WHY NPM FOUND FAVOUR: THE ACCEPTANCE FACTOR
There is no single accepted explanation or interpretation of why NPM coalesced
and why it 'caught on' (cf. Hood 1990b; Hood and Jackson 1991 forthcoming,
ch. 8). Many academic commentators associate it with the political rise of the 'New
Right'. But that on its own does not explain why these particular doctrines found
favour, nor why NPM was so strongly endorsed by Labour governments ostensibly
opposed to the 'New Right', notably in Australia and New Zealand. Among the
possible explanations are the following four.
First, for those who take a sceptical view of administrative reform as a series
of evanescent fads and fashions, NPM's rise might be interpreted as a sudden and
unpredictable product of loquocentric' success (Minogue 1986). (Spann (1981) offers
a classic statement of the 'fashion' interpretation of administrative reform.) 'Cheap,
superficial and popular', like the industrial 'rationalization' doctrines of the 1930s
(Hannah 1976, p. 38, fn. p. 34), NPM had many of the necessary qualities for a
period of pop management stardom. A 'whim of fashion' interpretation has some
attractions, and can cope with the cycles and reversals that took place within NPM
- for instance, the radical shift in the UK, from the 'Heseitine creed' of Ministers
as the hands-on public managers to the 'Next Steps' corporatization creed of pro-
fessional managers at the top, with ministers in a strictly 'hands-off' role (cf. also
Sturgess 1989). But equally, the weakness of a simple 'whim of fashion' explana-
tion is that it does not account for the relative endurance of many of the seven
precepts identified in table 1 over more than a decade.
 A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? 7

An equally sceptical explanation, but one which better accommodates the

recurring or enduring features of many aspects of NPM, is the view of NPM as a
'cargo cult' phenomenon - the endless rebirth, in spite of repeated failures, of the
idea that substantive success ('cargo') can be gained by the practice of particular
kinds of (managerial) ritual. Downs and Larkey (1986) describe a recurring cycle
of euphoria and disillusion in the promulgation of simplistic and stereotyped recipes
for better public management in the USA, which shows striking similarities with
the well-documented cargo cults of Melanesia (Lawrence 1964; Worsley 1968).
However, this explanation cannot tell us why the NPM variant of the recurring
public management 'cargo cult' appeared at the time that it did, rather than at
any other.
A third, less sceptical, approach might be to view the rise of NPM through
Hegelian spectacles and interpret it as an epoch-making attraction of opposites.
The opposites in this case are two historically distinct approaches to public
administration which are in a sense fused in NPM. One is the German tradition
of state-led economic development {Volkswirtschaft) by professional public
managers, with its roots in cameralism (Small 1909). TTie other is the Anglo-Saxon
tradition of liberal economics, allied with a concern for matching self-interest with
duty in administration, that has its roots in utilitarianism (Hume 1981). But, like
the 'cargo cult' interpretation, the 'synthesis of opposites' interpretation on its own
does not help us to understand why those two distinct public administration tradi-
tions should have united at this particular time rather than at any other.
A fourth and perhaps more promising interpretation of the emergence of NPM
is as a response to a set of special social conditions developing in the long peace
in the developed countries since World War II, and the unique period of economic
growth which accompanied it (see Hood 1990b and 1991 forthcoming). Conditions
which may have helped to precipitate NPM include:

— changes in income level and distribution serving to weaken the Tocqueville

coalition' for government growth in the electorate, and laying the conditions
for a new tax-conscious winning electoral coalition (Tocqueville 1946, p. 152;
Peacock 1979; Meltzer and Richard 1981);
— changes in the socio-technical system associated with the development of the
lead technologies of the late twentieth-century Kondratiev cycle ('post-
industrialism', 'post-Fordism'), serving to remove the traditional barriers between
'public sector work' and 'private sector work' (cf. Bell 1973; Piore and Sabel
1984; Jessop 1988).
— A shift towards 'new machine polities', the advent of a new campaign technology
geared towards making public policy by intensive opinion polling of key groups
in the electorate, such that professional party strategists have greater clout in
policy-making relative to the voice of experience from the bureaucracy (cf. Mills
1986; Hood 1990c, p. 206).
— a shift to a more white-collar, socially heterogeneous population less tolerant
of 'statist' and uniform approaches in public policy (cf. Hood and Schuppert
1988, p. 250-2).
8 CHRISTOPHER HOOD

The fourth explanation is somewhat 'overdetermined', but it seems more

promising than the other three in that it has the power to explain what none of
the others can do, namely why NPM should have emerged in the particular time
and place that it did and under a variety of different auspices.

AN ALL-PURPOSE GARMENT? NPM's CLAIM TO UNIVERSALITY

Like many previous administrative philosophies, NPM was presented as a
framework of general applicability, a 'public management for all seasons'. The
claim to universality was laid in two main ways.
Portability and diffusion. First, much the same set of received doctrines was
advanced as the means to solve 'management ills' in many different contexts -
different organizations, policy fields, levels of government, countries. From
Denmark to New Zealand, from education to health care, from central to local
goverrunent and quangos, from rich North to poor South, similar remedies were
prescribed along the lines of the seven themes sketched out in table 1. Universalism
was not complete in practice; for instance, NPM seems to have had much less
impact on international bureaucracies than on national ones, and less on controlling
departments than on front-line delivery units. Moreover, much was made of the
need for local variation in management styles - so long as such variations did
not challenge the basic framework of NPM (Pollitt 1990, pp. 55-6). For critics,
however, much of the 'freedom to manage' under NPM was that brand of freedom
in which whatever is not forbidden tends to be compulsory (Larsen 1980, p. 54);
and the tendencies to uniformity and 'cloning' under FMI points to possible reasons
for the decline of FMI and its supersession by the corporatization creed of 'Next
Steps.'

Political neutrality. Second, NPM was claimed to be an 'apolitical' framework

within which many different values could be pursued effectively. The claim was
that different political priorities and circumstances could be accommodated by
altering the 'settings' of the management system, without the need to rewrite the
basic programme of NPM. That framework was not, according to NPM's advocates,
a machine exclusively tunable to respond to the demands of the New Right or
to any one political party or programme (see, for example, Scott Bushnell and
Sallee 1990, p. 162; Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1990, pp. ix, 22, 61).
In this respect, NPM followed the claims to universality of traditional Public
Administration, which also purported to offer a neutral and all-purpose instrument
for realizing whatever goals elected representatives might set (Ostrom 1974; Thomas
1978; Hood 1987).

COUNTER-CLAIMS: CRITICS OF NPM

If NPM has lacked a single definitive 'manifesto', the ideas of its critics are equally
scattered among a variety of often ephemeral sources. Most of the criticisms of
NPM have come in terms of four main counter-claims, none of which have been
definitively tested, in spite of the ESRC's 'Management in Government' initiative.
 A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS7 9

The first is the assertion that NPM is like the Emperor's New Clothes in the well-
known Hans Andersen story - all hype and no substance, and in that sense a true
product of the style-conscious 1980s. From this viewpoint, the advent of new
managerialism has changed little, apart from the language in which senior public
'managers' speak in public. Underneath, all the old problems and weaknesses
remain. Implicitly, from this viewpoint, the remedy lies in giving NPM some real
substance in order to move from 'smoke and mirrors' to reality - for example,
in making output contracts between ministers and chief executives legally binding
or in breaking up the public service employment structure, as has happened in
New Zealand (cf. Hood and Jones in Treasury and Civil Service Committee
1989-90).
The second is the assertion that NPM has damaged the public service while being
ineffective in its ability to deliver on its central claim to lower costs per (constant)
luiit of service. Critics of this type suggest that the main result of NPM in many
cases has been an 'aggrandizement of management' (Martin 1983) and a rapid
middle-level bureaucratization of new reporting systems (as in the remarkable
growth of the 'performance indicator industry'). Budgetary and control framework
changes such as 'top-slicing' and 'creative accounting' serve to destabilize the
bureaucracy and to weaken or destroy elementary but essential competences at
the front line (see, for instance, Nethercote 1989b, p. 17; Nethercote 1989c). From
this viewpoint, the remedy lies in applying to the NPM system the disciplines that
it urges upon service-delivery bureaucracies but so signally fails to impose on itself
- particularly in strict resource control and the imposition of a battery of published
and measurable performance indicators to determine the overall costs and benefits
of the system.
The third common criticism is the assertion that NPM, in spite of its professed
claims to promote the 'public good' (of cheaper and better public services for all),
is actually a vehicle for particularistic advantage. The claim is that NPM is a self-
serving movement designed to promote the career interests of an elite group of
'new managerialists' (top mariagers and officials in central controlling departments,
management consultants and business schools) rather than the mass of public service
customers or low-level staff (Dunleavy 1985; Yeatman 1987; Kelleher 1988; Pollitt
1990, pp. 134-7). Implicitly, the remedy suggested by these criticisms is to have
disproportionate cutbacks on 'managerial' rather than on 'operational' staff
(cf. Martin 1983), and measures to 'empower' consumers, for instance by new
systems of direct democracy (cf. Pollitt 1990, pp. 183-4).
The fourth line of criticism, to which most attention will be peiid in the remainder
of this paper, is directed towards NPM's claim of universality. Contrary to NPM's
claim to be a public management for all seasons, these critics argue that different
administrative values have different implications for fundamental aspects of
administrative design - implications which go beyond altering the 'settings' of the
systems.
In order for their counter<laim to have any significance, it must be able to survive
obvious objections. First, it must be able to show that the objection is more than
a semantic quibble about where the line comes between a different programme
10 CHRISTOPHER HOOD

and a change of 'settings'. For that, it must be able to show that the incompatibility
problem lies in NPM's 'hard core' research programme rather than in its 'elaborative
belts' (Lakatos 1970). Second, it must be able to show that it is more than a trivial
and obvious proposition. In order to survive this objection, it needs to show that
there are different management-system implications of different mainstream,
relatively orthodox values, without reference to values at the extremes of the
orthodox belief sf)ectrum (since it needs no elaborate treatise to show that different
'fundamentalist' values have different implications for public management). Third,
the 'incompatibility' argument needs to rest on a plausible case that an 'all-purpose
culture' either does not exist or cannot be engineered into existence. Unless it can
do so, it risks being dismissed for mechanically assuming that there is a particular
set of administrative design-characteristics which goes with the ability to achieve
a particular set of values. Finally, it needs to show that the debate relates to
administrative values - values that relate to conventional and relatively narrow
ideas about 'good administration' rather than to broader ideas about the proper
role of the state in society. Unless the critique of the 'all seasons' quality of NPM
relates to administrative values in this sense, it risks being dismissed simply as an
undercover way of advocating different political values from those currently held
by elected governments. A case built on such a basis would not essentially be an
administrative design argument, and would neither demonstrate that NPM is
incapable of being adapted to promote alternative political values nor that NPM
is a false recipe for achieving the narrow 'efficiency' values of the current orthodox
agenda.
Most of the orthodox criticisms of NPM in this vein are vulnerable to counter-
attack from this last objection. Most academic attacks on NPM have questioned
NPM's universality by focusing on the equity costs of a preoccupation with cost-
cutting and a focus on 'bottom line ethics' Qackson 1989, p. 173). For instance,
a focus on outputs allied with heavy 'hands-on' demands on managers is often
claimed to downgrade equity considerations, particularly in its implications for
the ability of female managers to reach top positions in the public service (cf. Bryson
1987; Pollitt 1990, pp. 141-2). A focus on disaggregation and a private-sector PR
style is likewise often claimed to reduce the accessibility of public services by
increasing the complexity and opacity of government (Nethercote 1990c), and
increasing the scope for buck-passing and denial of responsibility, especially for
disadvantaged consumers. However, any simple dichotomy between 'efficiency'
and 'equity' can be countered by NPM's advocates on the grounds that 'efficiency'
can be conceived in ways which do not fimdamentally conflict with equity (cf.
Wilenski 1986), and that equity values could perfectly well be programmed in to
the target-setting and performance indication process, if there was strong enough
politiccJ pressure to do so.

THREE CLUSTERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE VALUES

In administrative argument in the narrow sense, the rival values in play typically
do not fall into a neat dichotomy. At least three different 'families' of values
commonly appear in debates about administrative design, and these are summarized
 A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? 11

in table 2 below (cf. Hood and Jackson 1991 forthcoming). Broadly, the 'sigma'
family of values relates to economy and parsimony, the 'theta' family relates to
honesty and fairness, and the 'lambda' family relates to security and resilience.

TABLE 2 Three sets of core values in public management

Sigma-type Theta-type Lambda-type

values values values
KEEP IT LEAN KEEP IT HONEST KEEP IT ROBUST
AND AND AND
PURPOSEFUL FAIR RESILIENT

STANDARD OF Frugality Rectitude Resilience

SUCCESS (matching of (achievement of (achievement of
resources to tasks fairness, mutuality. reliability.
for given goals) the proper adaptivity.
discharge of robustness)
duties)

STANDARD OF Waste Malversation Catastrophe

FAILURE (muddle. (unfairness, bias. (risk, breakdown.
confusion. abuse of office) collapse)
inefficiency)

CURRENCY OF Money and time Tn4st and Security and

SUCCESS AND entitlements survival
FAILURE (resource costs of (consent. (confidence, life
producers and legitimacy, due and limb)
consumers) process, political
entitlements)

CONTROL EMPHASIS Output Process Input/Process

SLACK Low Medium High

GOALS Fixed/Single Incompatible Emergent/Multiple

'Double bind'

INFORMATION Costed, segmented Structured Rich exchange.

(commercial assets) collective asset

COUPUNG Tight Medium Loose

The trio corresponds roughly to the management values used by Susan Strange
(1988, pp. 1-6) in her account of the evolution of different regimes in the inter-
national sphere; and at least two of the three correspond to the groups of values
given by Harmon and Mayer (1986, pp. 34-53) in their well-known account of
the normative context of public sector organization. It cannot be claimed that these
values are esoteric or extreme, or that they are not 'administrative' values.
12 CHRISTOPHER HOOD

Sigma-type values: match resources to defined tasks. In the 'sigma' family come
administrative values connected with the matching of resources to narrowly defined
tasks and circumstances in a competent and sparing fashion. Such values are central,
mainstream and traditional in public management. From this viewpoint, frugality
of resource use in relation to given goals is the criterion of success, while failure
is counted in terms of instances of avoidable waste and incompetence. If sigma-
type values are emphasized, the central concern is to 'trim fat' and avoid 'slack'.
Classic expressions of sigma-type values include:
(i) 'just-in-time' inventory control systems (which avoid tying up resources in
storing what is not currently needed, pushing the onus of accessible storage
and rapid delivery on to suppliers);
(ii) pajmient-by-results reward systems (which avoid paying for what is not being
delivered); and
(iii) administrative 'cost er\gineering' (using resources sparingly to provide public
services of no greater cost, durability or quality than is absolutely necessary
for a defined task, without excessive concern for 'externalities').
The principal 'coin' in which success or failure to realize sigma-type values is
measured is time and money, in resource costs of consumers and producers.
It can be argued that an orthodox design for realizing sigma-type values would
closely parallel the 'mechanistic' structures which have frequently been identified
in contingency theory as applicable to defined and stable environmental conditions
(cf. Bums and Stalker 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Since the 'sigma' group
of values stresses the matching of resources to defined objectives, the setting of
fixed and 'checkable' goals must be central to any design for realizing such values.
The fewer incompatible objectives are included, the more readily can unnecessary
fat be identified and removed. Equally, the more that the control emphasis is on
output rather than on process or input, the more unambiguous the waste-finding
process can be. To make output control a reality, two features are necessary. One
is a heavy emphasis on output databases. Such an emphasis in tum requires a
technological irrfrastructure of reporting which will tend to make each managerial
unit 'tightly coupled' in informational terms. The other is the sharp definition of
responsibilities, involving separation of 'thinking' and 'executing' activities and the
breakup of organizations into separate, non-overlapping parts, to come as close
as possible to the ideal of single-objective, trackable and manageable units. It follows
that information in such a control system will be highly segmented and valuable,
so that it will be guarded with extreme care and traded rather than given away.
These design characteristics map closely on to the recipes offered by the corporate
management strain of NPM.

Theta-type values: honesty, fairness, mutuality. 'Theta-type' connotes values

broadly relating to the pursuit of honesty, fairness and mutuality through the
prevention of distortion, inequity, bias, and abuse of office. Such values are also
central and traditional in public management, and they are institutionalized in
appeal mechanisms, public reporting requirements, adversary bureaucracies.
 A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? 13

independent scrutiny systems, attempts to socialize public servants in something

more than 'bottom line ethics' or a high 'grovel count' (Self 1989). From this
viewpoint, success is counted in terms of 'rectitude', the proper discharge of duties
in procedural and substantive terms, while failure is measured in terms of 'malver-
sation' in a formal or substantive sense. If theta-typ>e values are placed at centre
stage, the central concern is to ensure honesty, prevent 'capture' of public bodies
by unrepresentative groups, and avoid all arbitrary proceedings.
Classic expressions of theta-type values include:
(i) recall systems for removing public officials from office by popular vote;
(ii) 'notice and comment' and 'hard look' requirements in administrative law
(Birkinshaw, Harden and Lewis 1990, p. 260);
(iii) independent anti-corruption investigatory bodies such as the 1987-9 Fitzgerald
Inquiry which effectively brought down the Queensland government in 1989
(cf. Prasser, Wear and Nethercote 1990).
The 'coin' in which success or failure is measured according to theta-type values
may be partly related to 'balance sheet' items (insofar as dishonesty and abuse
of office is often linked with palpable waste of resources), but also involves less
tangible stakes, notably public trust and confidence and the ability to exercise
citizenship effectively.
Putting theta-type values at the centre of the stage has implications for organiza-
tional design which are different from an emphasis on 'sigma-type' values. Where
honesty and fairness is a primary goal, the design-focus is likely to be on process-
controls rather than output controls. Goals, too, are less likely to be single in nature.
'Getting the job done' in terms of aggregate quantities is likely to be supplemented
by concerns about how the job is done (cf. March and Olsen 1989, pp. 47-52).
Hence 'double bind' elements (Hennestad 1990) may be central to goal setting,
with line management under complex cross-pressures and with control operating
through a shifting-balances style (Dunsire 1978). The cross pressures and 'double
bind' process may operate through the activities of independent adversary bureau-
cracies, rather than with corporate objectives settled in a single place - for example,
in the Hong Kong style of independent anti-corruption bodies. Similarly, concern
with process may cause the emphasis to go on the achievement of maximum
transparency in public operations - for example, extensive public reporting
requirements, 'angels' advocates' (the practice of incorporating representatives of
'public interest' groups on corporate boards), freedom of information laws, 'notice
and comment' procedures, rather than simple 'bottom line ethics'.
Indeed, the logical conclusion of putting theta-type values first in designing public
management would be to minimize the ability of those in high office to sell or
distort public decisions as a result of 'capture' by particular groups - for example,
by the entrenchment of adversarial processes within the bureaucracy or by greater
use of direct democracy in public decision-making (Walker 1986; Pollitt 1990,
pp. 183-4).
Lambda-type values: reliability, robustness, adaptivity. T-ambda-tyiJe' values relate
to resilience, endurance, robustness, survival and adaptivity - the capacity to
14 CHRISTOPHER HOOD

withstand and leam from the blows of fate, to avoid 'competency traps' in
adaptation processes (Levitt and March 1988; liebowitz and Margolis 1990), to keep
operating even in adverse 'worst case' conditions and to adapt rapidly in a crisis.
Expectations of security and reliability are central to traditional public administra-
tion values, and have often been associated with the choice of public rather than
private organization for the provision of a hazard-related task. Perhaps the classic
historical case is of the Venetian arsenal and Tana as instruments for ensuring the
security of Venice's maritime power by direct state production of ropes and vessels
(cf. Lane 1966).
From the viewpoint of lambda-type values, success is counted in terms of
resilience and reliability, while failure is measured in terms of catastrophe,
breakdown and learning failure. If lambda-type values are placed at centre stage,
the central concern is to avoid system failure, 'down time', paralysis in the face
of threat or challenge.
Classic expressions of lambda-type values include:
(i) redundancy, the maintenance of back-up systems to duplicate normal capacity;
(ii) diversity, the maintenance of quite separate, self-standing units (to avoid
'common mode failure', whether in technical terms or in terms of 'groupthink');
and
(iii) robustness, use of greater amounts of materials than would ordinarily be
necessary for the job (cf. Health and Safety Executive 1988, p. 11).
The 'coin' in which success or failure is measured in lambda-type values includes
security, survival and the robustness of basic assumptions about social defence
mechanisms.
Orthodox discussions of learning problems and catastrophes tend to focus on
specific failings of individuals rather than systemic or structural factors in organiza-
tional design (Turner et al. 1989, p. 3). But some tentative pointers to the
administrative design implications of putting lambda-type values at centre stage
can be gleaned from three closely related literatures: 'contingency theory' ideas
about structural factors related to highly uncertain environments (cf. Lawrence
and Lorsch 1967); the literature on the organization of socially created disasters
(Dixon 1976; Turner 1976 and 1978; Perrow 1984); and the developing and related
literature on 'safety culture' (Westrum 1987; Turner et al. 1989).
Some of the ideas to be found in this literature about the engineering of adap-
tivity and error-avoidance are contradictory. A case in point is the debate about
'anticipation' versus 'resilience' (Wildavsky 1988). Moreover, Perrow (1984) claims
that for some technologies, administrative design for error-avoidance is impossible,
even if safety is highly valued. However, much of this literature tends to relate
error-generation, capacity for resilience and learning failures to three elements of
institutional structure
(i) degree of integration - the extent to which interdependent parts of the system
are linked in decision and information terms rather than isolated into separate
compartments, each trying to insulate itself independently against system
failure;
 A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS7 15

(ii) degree of openness in the culture or management system, avoiding

authoritarian barriers to lateral or systemic thinking and feedback or learning
processes; and
(iii) the extent to which there are systemic pressures for misinformation, rather
than sharing of information, built in to the organizational process.
From the perspective of this literature, an organizational design which maximized
lambda-type values would need to involve: multiple-objective rather than single-
objective organization (van Gunsteren 1976, p. 61); a relatively high degree of 'slack'
to provide spare capacity for learning or deployment in crisis; a control framework
which focused on input or process rather than measured output in order to avoid
building up pressures for misinformation; a personnel management structure which
promoted cohesion without punishing unorthodox ideas; a task division structure
organized for systemic thinking rather than narrow compartmentalization; and
a responsibility structure which made mistakes and errors admissible. Relatively
loose coupling and an emphasis on information as a collective asset within the
organization would be features of such a design structure.
Compatibility. From this discussion, as summarized in table 2, one fundamental
implication is that these three sets of mainstream administrative values overlap
over some of their range, like intersecting circles in a Verm diagram. For example,
dishonesty frequently creates waste and sometimes leads to catastrophe. Frugality,
rectitude and resilience may all be satisfied by a particular set of institutional
arrangements in some contexts.
However, the discussion also suggests the hypothesis that any two out of the
three broad value sets may often be satisfied by the same organizing principle for
a set of basic administrative design dimensions; but that it is hard to satisfy all
three value sets equally for any of those dimensions, and probably impossible to
do so for all of them. Put simply, a central concern with honesty and the avoidance
of policy distortion in public administration may have different design implica-
tions from a central concern with frugality; and a central concern with resilience
may also have different design implications. If NPM is a design for putting frugality
at centre stage, it may at the limit be less capable of ensuring honesty and resilience
in public administration.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

The work of the ESRC's Management in Government Initiative has helped us to
identify the specific forms that NPM took in the UK and to trace its history. But,
like many research initiatives, it has perhaps been more successful in prompting
the critical questions rather than in answering them definitively. Two key questions
in particular seem to deserve more examination, in order to 'put NPM in its place'
intellectually.
First, NPM can be imderstood as primarily an expression of sigma-type values.
Its claims have lain mainly in the direction of cutting costs and doing more for
less as a result of better-quality management and different structural design.
Accordingly, one of the key tests of NPM's 'success' is whether and how it has
16 CHRISTOPHER HOOD

delivered on that claim, in addition to succeeding in terms of rhetorical acceptance.

We still have remarkably little independent evidence on this point, and work by
Dimsire et al. (1988) has some path-breaking qualities in that it is a serious attempt
to develop indicators of organizational structure and control systems in a way that
helps us to understand how privatization and corporatization works. It offers
tentative evidence for the proposition that a shift in management structures towards
decreased command-orientation and increased 'results-orientation' is associated with
improvements in productivity. But the results obtained so far are only indicative:
the study does not test fully for 'Hawthorne effects' or secular trends, and it has
no control groups. We need much more work in this vein.
However, the critics' questioning of NPM's universality also offers a way of
putting NPM in its place and involves crucial claims that need proper testing. Even
if further research established that NPM was clearly associated with the pursuit
of frugality, it remains to be fully investigated whether such successes are bought
at the expense of guarantees of honesty and fair dealing and of security and
resilience.
Broadly, NPM assumes a culture of public service honesty as given. Its recipes
to some degree removed devices instituted to ensure honesty and neutrality in the
public service in the past (fixed salaries, rules of procedure, permanence of tenure,
restraints on the power of line management, clear lines of division between public
and private sectors). The extent to which NPM is likely to induce corrosion in terms
of such traditional values remains to be tested. The effects of NPM 'clones' diffused
by public management 'consultocrats' and others into contexts where there is little
'capital base' of ingrained public service culture (as in many Third World countries
and perhaps in Eastern Europe too) will be particiJarly interesting to observe. The
consequences for 'theta-type' values are likely to be most visible, since the effects
are likely to be quicker and more dramatic there than in countries like Australia
and the UK which are still living off 'public service ethic' capital.'
Equally, the extent to which NPM's precepts are compatible with 'safety engineer-
ing' in terms of 'safety cultures' deserves more analysis. NPM broadly assumes that
public services can be divided into self-contained 'products', and that good public
management requires de-emphasis of overarching externalities and emphasis on
nmrung services within given parameters. Whether the emphasis on cost-cutting,
contracting-out, compartmentalizing and top-slicing is compatible with safety
culture at the front line needs to be tested. The new breed of organizationally created
disasters over the past fifteen years or so, of which some dramatic examples have
occurred in the UK, suggest that the issue at least needs investigation.
Only when we can test the limits of NPM in terms of relatively narrow
administrative values can we start to establish its proper scope and put it in its
historical place.

NOTE
1. I owe this idea to a suggestion by Dr. John Baker of John Baker and Associates.
 A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS7 17

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 A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? 19

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NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
(NPM)
Introduction

• Modern public sector management:

• Managerialism
• New Public Management
• Market-Based Public Administration
• Post-Bureaucratic Paradigm
• Entrepreneurial Government
 What is public sector reform?

• deliberate changes to the structures and processes

of public sector organizations with the objective of
getting them to run better.
• Consist of Structural change & Process Change
• Structural Change - may include merging or
splitting public sector organizations
• Process change - may include redesigning systems,
setting quality standards, and focusing on capacity-
building.
(IGI Global, 2020)
New Public Management
• NPM –radical reform approach in public sector
• Paradigm shift
• Inspired by the idea of using private sector
management techniques, values & market
mechanisms to improve public sector efficiency
• Result of criticism on public sector inefficiency-
rigidity, lack of accountability, poor performance
• Malaysia also committed implementing NPM after
early 1980s (John Antony Xaviera, Noore Alam
Siddiquee and Mohd Zin Mohamed; 2019)
HISTORY OF NPM

• NPM viewed as a modern approach of management in

public sector arose in UK in 1970s as the reaction toward
the insufficiencies of traditional public administration
approach.
• Critics towards unsatisfied public sector performance.
• Public sector organisations were seen unproductive,
inefficient, always suffer loss, low quality, poor
innovasion and creativity.
• These conditions triggered the movement to reform
public sector management.
• Then NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT emerged.
 HISTORY OF NPM

• The notion of New Public Management firstly introduced

by Christopher Hood in 1991.

• NPM emphasized decentralisation, devolution, and

modernized provision of public services.
GOAL OF NPM

• Improve efficiency and effectiveness in public

sector organization.
• Improve responsiveness to stakeholders.
• Improve quality of public services.
• Improve accountability and performance.
 ESSENCE OF NPM

• Public sector management assumed that private sector

management practices are better than management
practices in public sector.
• So, in order to improve its performance, public sector
should adopt practices and management techniques
applied in business sector, for example:
• Adoption of market mechanism.
• Compulsory competitive tendering contract.
• Privatisation of public corporations.
CHARACTERISTICS OF NPM

• Characteristics of NPM by Christopher Hood (1991):

• Professionalism in public sector.
• The existence of performance standard and performance
measure.
• The emphasis on control of output and outcome.
• Split of organization unit.
• Competition in public sector.
• Adoption of private sector management style into public sector.
• Discipline and economic used of resources.
 CHARACTERISTICS OF NPM

 Characteristics of NPM by Mathiasen (1999):

 A closer focus on results in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and
quality of service
 The replacement of highly centralized, hierarchical structures by
decentralized management environments where decisions on
resource allocation and service delivery are made closer to the
point of delivery
 The flexibility to explore alternatives to direct public provision
and regulation that might yield more cost-effective policy
outcomes
CHARACTERISTICS OF NPM

 A greater focus on efficiency in the services provided directly by

the public sector, involving the establishment of productivity
targets and the creation of competitive environments within and
among public sector organizations
 The strengthening of strategic capacities at the center to guide
the evolution of the state and allow it to respond to external
changes and diverse interests automatically flexibly, and at least
cost.
Adoption of Business Sector
Management Style
The Consequences

• Steer the ship, rather than row it;

• Empower communities, rather than simply
deliver services;
• Encourage competition rather than monopoly;
• Be mission driven rather than rule driven;
• Fund outcomes rather than inputs;
• Meet the demands of customers rather than
the bureaucracy
Manajemen Kinerja Sektor Publik © Mahmudi
• Concentrate on earning resources, not just
spending them;
• Decentralise authority;
• Solve problems by making use of the
marketplace rather than by creating public
programme

Manajemen Kinerja Sektor Publik © Mahmudi

• The pursuit of these inter-related reforms
would produce a different kind of public
management characterised by:
• A separation of strategic policy from
operational management;
• A concern with results rather than process;

Manajemen Kinerja Sektor Publik © Mahmudi

• An orientation to the needs of the customer
rather than the bureaucratic organisations;
• A withdrawal from direct provision in favour of
steering or enabling role;
• A transformed bureaucratic culture
“You cannot tailor-make the situations in life but you can
tailor-make the attitudes to fit those situations”

Zig Ziglar
 United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific

What is Good Governance?

Introduction institutes, religious leaders, finance

institutions political parties, the military etc.
The situation in urban areas is much more
Recently the terms "governance" and "good
complex. Figure 1 provides the
governance" are being increasingly used in
interconnections between actors involved in
development literature. Bad governance is
urban governance. At the national level, in
being increasingly regarded as one of the
addition to the above actors, media,
root causes of all evil within our societies.
lobbyists, international donors, multi-national
Major donors and international financial
corporations, etc. may play a role in decision-
institutions are increasingly basing their aid
making or in influencing the decision-making
and loans on the condition that reforms that
process.
ensure "good governance" are undertaken.
All actors other than government and the
This article tries to explain, as simply as
military are grouped together as part of the
possible, what "governance" and "good
"civil society." In some countries in addition to
governance" means.
the civil society, organized crime syndicates
also influence decision-making, particularly in
Governance urban areas and at the national level.

Similarly formal government structures are

The concept of "governance" is not new. It is
one means by which decisions are arrived at
as old as human civilization. Simply put
and implemented. At the national level,
"governance" means: the process of
informal decision-making structures, such as
decision-making and the process by
"kitchen cabinets" or informal advisors may
which decisions are implemented (or not
exist. In urban areas, organized crime
implemented). Governance can be used in
syndicates such as the "land Mafia" may
several contexts such as corporate
influence decision-making. In some rural
governance, international governance,
areas locally powerful families may make or
national governance and local governance.
influence decision-making. Such, informal
decision-making is often the result of corrupt
Since governance is the process of decision-
practices or leads to corrupt practices.
making and the process by which decisions
are implemented, an analysis of governance
focuses on the formal and informal actors Good Governance
involved in decision-making and
implementing the decisions made and the
Good governance has 8 major
formal and informal structures that have been
characteristics. It is participatory, consensus
set in place to arrive at and implement the
oriented, accountable, transparent,
decision.
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable
and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It
Government is one of the actors in
assures that corruption is minimized, the
governance. Other actors involved in
views of minorities are taken into account
governance vary depending on the level of
and that the voices of the most vulnerable in
government that is under discussion. In rural
society are heard in decision-making. It is
areas, for example, other actors may include
also responsive to the present and future
influential land lords, associations of peasant
needs of society.
farmers, cooperatives, NGOs, research
 Figure 1: Urban actors

judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible

Participation police force.
Participation by both men and women is a
key cornerstone of good governance. Transparency
Participation could be either direct or through
Transparency means that decisions taken
legitimate intermediate institutions or
and their enforcement are done in a manner
representatives. It is important to point out
that follows rules and regulations. It also
that representative democracy does not
means that information is freely available and
necessarily mean that the concerns of the
directly accessible to those who will be
most vulnerable in society would be taken
affected by such decisions and their
into consideration in decision making.
enforcement. It also means that enough
Participation needs to be informed and
information is provided and that it is provided
organized. This means freedom of
in easily understandable forms and media.
association and expression on the one hand
and an organized civil society on the other
hand. Responsiveness
Good governance requires that institutions
Rule of law and processes try to serve all stakeholders
within a reasonable timeframe.
Good governance requires fair legal
frameworks that are enforced impartially. It
also requires full protection of human rights,
particularly those of minorities. Impartial
enforcement of laws requires an independent
 institutional stakeholders. Who is
accountable to whom varies depending on
whether decisions or actions taken are
internal or external to an organization or
institution. In general an organization or an
institution is accountable to those who will be
affected by its decisions or actions.
Accountability cannot be enforced without
transparency and the rule of law.

Conclusion
Figure 2: Characteristics of good governance
From the above discussion it should be clear that
good governance is an ideal which is difficult to
Consensus oriented
achieve in its totality. Very few countries and
There are several actors and as many view societies have come close to achieving good
points in a given society. Good governance governance in its totality. However, to ensure
requires mediation of the different interests in sustainable human development, actions must be
society to reach a broad consensus in society taken to work towards this ideal with the aim of
on what is in the best interest of the whole making it a reality.
community and how this can be achieved. It
also requires a broad and long-term More information
perspective on what is needed for
sustainable human development and how to
Mr. Yap Kioe Sheng
achieve the goals of such development. This
Chief,
can only result from an understanding of the Poverty Reduction Section
historical, cultural and social contexts of a UNESCAP, UN Building,
given society or community. Rajdamnern Nok Ave.
Bangkok 10200, Thailand
Equity and inclusiveness
Tel: 66-2-288-1600
A society’s well being depends on ensuring Fax: 66-2-288 1056
that all its members feel that they have a
stake in it and do not feel excluded from the E-mail: escap-prs@un.org
mainstream of society. This requires all URL: <www.unescap.org/pdd>
groups, but particularly the most vulnerable,
have opportunities to improve or maintain
their well being.

Effectiveness and efficiency

Good governance means that processes and
institutions produce results that meet the
needs of society while making the best use of
resources at their disposal. The concept of
efficiency in the context of good governance
also covers the sustainable use of natural
resources and the protection of the
environment.

Accountability
Accountability is a key requirement of good
governance. Not only governmental
institutions but also the private sector and
civil society organizations must be
accountable to the public and to their
Public Management Research Association

Sorting Through: The Role of Representation in Bureaucracy

Author(s): Brandy A. Kennedy
Source: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 23, No. 4
(October 2013), pp. 791-816
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research
Association
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 J PART 23:791-816

Sorting Through: The Role of Representation

in Bureaucracy
Brandy A. Kennedy
Georgia College and State University

ABSTRACT

An ongoing weakness in the field of representative bureaucracy is an overreliance on quan

titative analysis, partly driven by limited data availability. Studies have consistently relied on
settings, such as education, where quantitative data are easily accessible. Although these
studies provide great insight, the findings may not translate into other policy settings. The
concept of role perception allows expansion of representative bureaucracy studies into
a variety of settings. Using Q-sort analysis, this project explores bureaucratic role percep
tion, focusing on how bureaucrats see their role as representatives and on the effects of
descriptive representation and organizational setting. Four perspectives on representative
bureaucracy are identified: leaders, traditional bureaucrats, identity empathizers, and diver
sity advocates. These perspectives reflect Pitkin's discussion of representation and provide
a more nuanced view of how bureaucrats see their roles. The findings suggest that (1)
substantive representation may not require descriptive representation, (2) characteristics
other than race and gender may be important, and (3) organizational variables may be
related to bureaucrats' role perceptions. These findings illuminate future theoretical and
empirical research possibilities.

INTRODUCTION

Bureaucracies, although primarily comprising unelected officials, are powerful insti

tutions in contemporary democracies, exercising power throughout the policymak
ing process. Yet, bureaucracies lack electoral accountability, which raises questions of
democratic legitimacy. The concept of representative bureaucracy offers the poten
tial to reconcile bureaucratic power and democratic legitimacy. The basic premise of
representative bureaucracy is that a diverse bureaucracy will lead to more responsive
public policy. In this way, representative bureaucracy may help ensure that all interests
are represented in the formulation and implementation of policy (Seiden 1997).
Although there is consensus among contemporary scholars regarding the most
basic underlying idea of representative bureaucracy, several important questions
remain unanswered. Most contemporary studies are contextually circumscribed,
focusing largely on descriptive representation of race and gender among street- and

Address correspondence to the author at brandy.kennedy@gcsu.edu.

doi: 10.1093/jopart/mut028
Advance Access publication May 13, 2013
©) The
The Author
Author 2013.
2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

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792 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

executive-level bureaucrats within redistributive agencies. Few contemporary schol

ars consider the possibility for representation to occur without demographic similari
ties, specifically race and gender. In addition, few studies look at management-level
bureaucrats or regulatory, distributive, or constituent agencies. Finally, few studies
attempt to compare bureaucratic representation across levels or policy areas.
In contrast with the narrow treatment in representative bureaucracy literature,
legislative literature has taken a much broader approach to questions of represen
tation. For example, Pitkin's (1967, 209) seminal analysis provides an in-depth dis
cussion of the multiple and competing definitions of representation. Ultimately, she
defines political representation as "acting in the interests of the represented in a man
ner responsive to them." From this definition, we can discern three important compo
nents of representation: responsiveness, interests, and actors. Figure 1 illustrates the
different components of representation. The current analysis suggests that bureau
cratic role perception may vary according to each of these components, necessitating
a more nuanced treatment. Incorporating Pitkin's conception of representation offers
the potential to advance the study of representative bureaucracy theoretically and
empirically.
Current empirical analysis is stymied by both theoretical restrictions and lim
ited data availability. Most empirical studies rely on quantitative policy output. For
example, education studies typically use standardized test scores to measure active
representation. Although these studies are informative, overreliance on quantitative
data poses an obstacle for studying organizations that lack accessible quantitative
policy outputs. In order to overcome these limitations, this project examines bureau
cratic role perception, focusing specifically on how bureaucrats view their role as

Figure 1
Components of Representation

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 793

representatives and what variables may shape this perception. This approach allows
representative bureaucracy to be studied regardless of the organizational context. In
addition, it offers the possibility of making comparisons among bureaucrats at differ
ent levels of the bureaucracy and across different types of agencies. Understanding
how bureaucrats view their role as representatives and how these perceptions differ
or remain constant across levels and agencies is a critical step in developing a deeper
understanding of representation in bureaucracies. Finally, studying role perception
offers the potential to provide insight into future empirical possibilities that may have
been overlooked.
This project uses the Q methodology, which incorporates both qualitative and
quantitative data in its analysis. From this analysis, four perspectives on representative
bureaucracy are identified: leaders, traditional bureaucrats, identity empathizers, and
diversity advocates. Reflecting the various components of Pitkin's definition, these
perspectives provide a nuanced view of how bureaucrats see their role as representa
tives within their organizations. In addition, the data suggest that substantive repre
sentation may not require descriptive representation, characteristics other than race
and gender may be important, and organizational variables may be related to bureau
crats' role perception. Although the project is exploratory, these findings illuminate
future theoretical and empirical research possibilities.

Evolution of Representative Bureaucracy

Kingsley (1944) coined the phrase "representative bureaucracy." According to

Kingsley, descriptive representation is central to bureaucratic responsibility. Kingsley's
major concern is the demographic composition of the bureaucracy, specifically social
class composition. Although scholars have shifted their focus away from social
class composition, most contemporary scholars continue to implicitly link the term
to descriptive representation. For example, citing Kingsley (1944) as the origin, Meier
and England (1984) argue that representative bureaucracy is inextricably linked to
descriptive representation. Few scholars examine the possibility for representation to
occur without descriptive likeness.
Although early scholars, such as Long (1952), discuss policy aspects of repre
sentative bureaucracy, Mosher (1968) is most often given credit for the division of
representation into passive and active forms, and most scholars of representative
bureaucracy divide representation into active and passive forms of representation
based on his discussion (Lim 2006). According to Mosher, passive representation
refers to mirroring the public demographically. Active representation is when bureau
crats make policy decisions in favor of the group they passively represent. Both pas
sive and active forms of representation are important to the democratic nature of the
bureaucracy. Passive representation, or the degree to which the bureaucracy demo
graphically reflects the population, provides legitimacy and symbolic benefits because
it demonstrates equal opportunity to all groups (Krislov 1974; Mosher 1968; Seiden
1997). Most early empirical research focused on measuring passive representation.
These studies examined the level of diversity within the bureaucracy or the extent to
which the bureaucracy reflected the demographic makeup of the population.

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794 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Many contemporary scholars have shifted their attention to studying active rep
resentation, measuring the extent to which passive representation leads to favora
ble policy outcomes for minority groups. Empirical studies of active representation
have found that increasing minorities in an organization can produce favorable ben
efits for minority constituents. For example, Meier and Stewart (1992) have exam
ined the link between the race of school teachers and administrators and various
discretionary decisions made on behalf of students. The findings suggest that as
the number of minority teachers and administrators increases, there are positive
outcomes for minority students. Other studies of the potential link between pas
sive and active forms of representation have found similar evidence supporting the
claim that descriptive representation leads to favorable policy outputs (Seiden 1997;
Hindera 1993).
The question remains whether passive representation is necessary for active rep
resentation. Most contemporary scholars ignore the possibility of active representa
tion occurring without passive representation, and this may lead to the overlooking
of instances of bureaucratic representation. Several important works demonstrate the
importance of looking beyond passive representation. Seiden, Brudney, and Kellough
(1998) examine "minority representative role," exploring both the factors that are
associated with adoption of this role and the effects of this role. Their findings suggest
that those who adopt a minority representative role are more likely to engage in active
representation of minority interests. They also find that although race and ethnic
ity are related to minority representative role, adoption of this role is not exclusive
to minorities and that other variables such as organizational factors and perceived
expectations also influence this role. Similarly, Bradbury and Kellough (2007) examine
attitude congruence between administrators and citizens. Their findings suggest that
minority administrators are more likely to share attitudes on questions of government
policy with minority citizens than white administrators. Further, their findings sug
gest that shared attitudes are an even stronger predictor than race for the adoption of
minority representative role. These two studies demonstrate the importance of look
ing beyond passive representation, the potential influence of organizational contexts,
and the utility of role perception to analyze these questions.
Although Kingsley's (1944) primary focus is social class, this treatment did not
translate well into the American context. In applying this concept to the American
context, scholars of representative bureaucracy initially examined a variety of
value sources such as income and religion (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999).
Contemporary scholars have narrowed their application of representative bureau
cracy, arguing that race and gender should be the primary focus because these are the
most salient characteristics in the United States. Thus, other characteristics are not
expected to influence administrative behavior (blindera 1993; Meier and Stewart 1992;
Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999). Although many scholars maintain this restricted
view of descriptive representation, there is a limited body of research indicating that
other characteristics may also be important. For example, recent scholars have argued
that characteristics such as sexual orientation, age, and disability may be important to
consider (Kelly 1998; Slack 2001; Thielmann and Stewart 1996). Scholars' failure to
examine other potentially important characteristics may lead to an incomplete image
of representative bureaucracy.

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 795

The Organizational Context

Although the literature up to this point has provided insight into the positive effects of
representative bureaucracy, the organizational context, including level of the bureau
cracy and policy area of the agency being studied, has been limited. Although some
scholars focus on a specific level, in general, scholars fail to theoretically differentiate
the bureaucracy into levels when analyzing representative bureaucracy (Meier and
Nigro 1976). In addition, few studies to date have compared representative bureau
cracy across different levels of the bureaucracy. Research in organizational theory
and a smaller body of literature on representative bureaucracy suggest that certain
variables, such as decision-making incentives and discretion, may differ according to
the level of the bureaucracy in which one works. These variables may, in turn, may
influence representation.
A limited body of research in representative bureaucracy literature has system
atically examined the level of employment as an independent variable. For example,
Meier (1993) analyzes and compares the effects of increasing the number of minor
ity teachers and administrators based on measures of minority school performance.
The findings suggest that street-level bureaucrats are more likely to actively represent
than their management counterparts. However, increasing the numbers of minority
administrators still produces positive (albeit weaker) results. These findings suggest
that the level of employment may be an important variable to consider in studying
representative bureaucracy.
When considering active representation, another important empirical question
within this literature is what policy area to study. Work in other fields distinguishes
among different types of organizations based on their policy area. For example, Lowi
(1985) classifies agencies according to four models based on the primary policy area of
the agency. Each of these agency types has a distinct political culture, political process,
elites, and group relationships. Regulatory agencies, such as law enforcement agencies,
implement control policies, generally through coercive measures. Distributive agen
cies, such as the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, are based on
client-patron relationships and they exist to foster and promote the needs of their cli
ents. The primary function of Redistributive agencies is to reallocate wealth; examples
include health, education, and welfare agencies. Finally, constituent agencies, such as
budgeting or personnel agencies, make rules that govern other agencies, rather than
making rules that govern citizen conduct or status (Newman 1994).
The type of agency examined in representative bureaucracy studies has been lim
ited. Much of the work up to this point dealing with specific bureaucracies and out
puts uses redistributive agencies, and much of the work focuses on education. Seiden
(1997) argues that work measuring the link between active and passive forms of repre
sentation has focused solely on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or
studies of education policy. Seiden examines the Farmers Home Administration, but
few other scholars provide any variation in policy area. It is difficult to evaluate the
nature and scope of representative bureaucracy while maintaining an exclusive focus
on one type of agency and excluding others.
Scholars have recently expanded their scope of analysis, looking at other types of
agencies such as law enforcement. For example, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006)

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796 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

examine the relationship between the gender of police officers and sexual assault
reports and arrests. The study found that police forces with larger numbers of female
officers filed more sexual assault reports and made more sexual assault arrests. This
study demonstrates the relevance and importance of extending studies of representa
tive bureaucracy to different organizational contexts.
In addition to simply adding different types of agencies to studies on representa
tive bureaucracy, scholars also need to compare different types of agencies and their
relationship to representative bureaucracy. The variations Lowi discusses (political cul
ture, political process, elites, and group relationships) may also be important variables
in the representational context. Different types of agencies may foster different cul
tures of representation. Several scholars demonstrate empirical links between Lowi's
typology or agency function and representative bureaucracy. For example, Newman
(1994) uses agency type as a variable to explain hiring and promotion of women in
state agencies. Other authors also use agency function as a variable that influences hir
ing practices in administrative agencies (Cayer and Sigelman 1980; Dometrius 1984).
Although scholars have established a representational link between agency function
and hiring practices, the use of this variable has so far been restricted to studies of
passive representation. It is possible that the same variables that structure hiring and
promotion practices or relationships within the agency may also influence relation
ships between the bureaucrats within the agency and their clientele.

Role Perception

One concept that offers the potential to overcome the aforementioned weaknesses in
the field of representative bureaucracy is role perception. Although a considerable
amount of work has examined bureaucratic behavior, very little work in representative
bureaucracy has attempted to understand this phenomenon through the use of role
perception. In contrast, much work in the legislative representation literature focuses
on the concept of role perception. In fact, Jewell (1983) argues that within the work on
representation, the volume of work dealing with legislative roles is enormous.
The first work linking role perception and representative bureaucracy is that
of Seiden (1997). Seiden juxtaposes two different bureaucratic role perceptions and
examines their relationship to active representation. The first role is the traditional
bureaucratic role and the second is the minority representative role. She finds that
bureaucrats who accept the minority representative role are more likely to actively rep
resent minorities in policy decisions. In addition, Seiden, Brewer, and Brudney (1999)
examine public administrator's role perceptions. They examine administrative roles
along two dimensions that form two intersecting continua. The horizontal is a contin
uum of political responsiveness versus proactive administration, and the vertical is a
continuum of managerial efficiency versus social equity. Administrative neutrality lies
at the center where the continua intersect. Under this framework, Seiden, Brewer, and
Brudney (1999) use a Q-sort approach and identify five different administrative roles:
stewards of the public interest, adapted realists, businesslike utilitarians, resigned cus
todians, and practical idealists. Stewards of the public interest want to participate
in formulating policies targeted toward all citizens, including disadvantaged groups.

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 797

Adapted realists attempt to balance fairness with efficiency. Businesslike utilitarians

place higher value on organizational and individual efficiency relative to fairness or
equity. Resigned custodians view themselves as neutral agents who place a premium
on the rules of the organization and the difference between elected and unelected offi
cials. Finally, practical idealists are committed to equity balanced with efficiency and
proper management. This group emphasizes professionalism and efficiency but also
advocates for policy in the public interest.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Building on earlier work, this project uses the Q methodology to examine bureaucratic
role perception, specifically as it relates to representation. Q Methodology also facili
tates comparison across organizational factors. Because qualitative methods are not
often used in this field and many of the questions under consideration have not been
well researched, this project focuses on exploratory analysis with the primary goal of
introducing new theoretical insight and many new empirical questions rather than
testing hypotheses.

Q Methodology: Overview and Application

Essentially, the Q technique is a sorting process intended to uncover different perspec

tives on a given topic. Participants are given a set of statements and are asked to rank
order them according to their level of agreement with each statement. The order in
which the statements are ranked illustrates each participant's perspective. These per
spectives are then analyzed, compared, and interpreted.
Q Methodology offers a unique insight into certain fields of study. One of Q's
strengths is that it captures respondents' expressed subjectivity rather than defining it
in advance as do R method surveys (Danielson 2009). In contrast with traditional sur
vey methods that provide information on respondents' views toward a specific topic
or statement, Q methodology provides a more comprehensive view of respondents'
attitudes (Brewer, Seiden, and Facer 2000). Past studies have shown Q methodology
to be an effective tool for studying role perception (Durning and Osuna 1994; Seiden,
Brewer, and Brudney 1999). Q methodology offers the potential to provide new insight
into how individuals think about their work, their agencies, and their policy roles. This
methodology provides a more in-depth understanding of how bureaucrats see them
selves and their agencies in the process of representation. Although the factors that
are uncovered represent generalizations of perspectives shared by the respondents, the
Q method does not indicate the frequency or occurrence of the worldviews uncovered
(Danielson 2009).

The Concourse and Q Sample

As Brown (1980) explains, there are multiple steps to using the Q methodology. First,
the concourse or universe of possible statements about a given topic must be identi
fied. The most common source for the concourse is through interviews with subjects

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798 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

(Brown 1991). For this study, the concourse is created from focus groups and inter
views with government employees.
There were a total of 39 participants for the initial focus groups and interviews.
Because Q methodology is not aimed at generalizability, there is no assumption that
all relevant population characteristics are reflected, and there is no claim that the
viewpoints uncovered are representative or exhaustive of those in the population
(McKeown and Thomas 1988).
Although not demographically representative, to ensure that the concourse was
sufficiently representative of possible views, when establishing the respondent sample
for this analysis, there was an attempt to include individuals from all three levels of the
bureaucracy (street level, middle management, and executive) in all four (redistribu
tive, distributive, regulatory, and constituent) policy areas. Table 1 shows the employ
ment makeup of the respondent sample.
The focus groups and interviews were administered from October 2007 to June
2008. Four focus groups ranging from 4 to 10 participants were conducted, which
included a total of 27 respondents. Focus group participants were in-service Master of
Public Administration (MPA) students at state universities in Georgia and Oklahoma
who were employed at various levels of local, state, or federal agencies. Twelve addi
tional interviews were conducted in order to more evenly represent levels of the
bureaucracy and policy areas. Interview participants were identified through a web
based search according to their level and policy area within the bureaucracy. All inter
viewees were management- or executive-level bureaucrats employed at local, state, or
federal agencies located in Georgia.
The sample includes 11 participants employed at local agencies, 21 state level
employees, and 7 federal employees. A variety of different departments and agen
cies are represented in the sample: Public Works, Soil and Conservation, Parks and
Recreation, Department of Human Resources, Community Development, Community
Affairs, Department of Agriculture, Office of Planning and Budget, Public Health,
Education, Police, Public Safety, Probation, Federal Aviation Administration, Human
Resource Management, Public Information, Planning and Urban Redevelopment,
General Services Administration, Veterans Affairs, Employment Security, Army, Air
force, Human Rights, and Board of Regents.
The sample is less diverse in terms of demographic composition. Sixty percent of
the sample comprised men and 40%, women. Respondents' age range is 24-59 years,
with a mean age of 37 years. Whites are overrepresented in the sample, making up 83%
of the total participants. The other 17% include black, Asian, and native American

Table 1
Phase 1 Participant Matrix (N = 39)

Level
Level Executive Management
Executive Street Level
Street Level
Management
Policy
Policyarea area
Distributive 2 1 3
Redistributive 2 4 3

Regulatory 3 6 4
Constituent 2 6 3

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 799

respondents. The sample is also skewed in terms of education level. All respondents
had completed a Bachelor's degree, and most had completed some graduate work.
Income levels range from less than $20,000 to more than $100,000, with a modal
income range between $40,000 and $75,000. Although not all demographic variables
are representative in the sample, this is not atypical for this type of project. The pur
pose of Q Methodology is not to produce a generalizable sample; therefore, the rep
resentativeness of the group with reference to these variables should not affect the
overall quality of the data and analysis.
Participants were first asked a series of general questions about their roles and the
role of others as representatives within the organization. Next, a series of questions
were asked in order to examine the role of descriptive representation and the potential
characteristics that may influence the process of representation. In order to evaluate
potential evidence of indirect representation, respondents were asked whether oth
ers in the organization helped shape their views on their role as a representative or
advocate in the organization. Finally, respondents were asked a series of questions
designed to analyze potential trade-offs or costs of representative bureaucracy.1
The focus groups and interviews yielded a total of 198 statements that make up
the concourse. These statements reflected and were categorized by six general areas
of interest: general representational role perception; objects of representation; indi
rect active representation; direct active representation; descriptive representation; and
potential trade-offs.
Once established, the concourse is used to produce the Q sample, which is a
representative subset of the concourse. These are the statements that are eventually
presented to participants for sorting (Brown 1991). For the current analysis, 50 state
ments were selected from the concourse based on their overall representation of the
original statements.

Q Sort Process

Once the Q sample is determined, the statements are printed on randomly numbered
cards.2 Respondents are asked to assign values to the statements on a continuum
according to how much they agree or disagree with the statement. Generally, when
the Q sort is complete, a brief follow-up interview is conducted in order to allow the
participants to elaborate on their own thinking about the subject and to add validity
to the sort responses. The sort itself is used as a guide for this interview (Brown 1980).
For this project, a second respondent group from the original focus group and inter
view participants was used for the sort. Although the Q Methodology allows for sample
sizes as small as 50, because one of the goals of this project is comparison across levels
and agency types, the N for this project is 60. Possible participants for the Q sort were
identified through a general Internet search of government agencies. Like the first phase,
participant selection for the second phase of data collection was based on purposive
sampling techniques. In hopes of creating samples large enough to facilitate comparison

1 See Appendix 1 for the interview instrument.

2 See Appendix 2 for the Q sort instrument.

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800 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Table 2
Phase 2 Participant Matrix (N = 60)
Level Executive
IjAclLiiivc Management
ivicuiagciiicni oucciStreet Level
l^cvei

Policy
Policyarea area
Distributive
Distributive 5 6 5 6 55
Redistributive
Redistributive 4 5 4 5 55
Regulatory
Regulatory 5 5 5 5 66
Constituent
Constituent 5 5 5 5 44

across organization
equal numbers of
types. Agencies inc
Georgia, and withi
lead to a geographi
tory nature of the
Q sorts were com
the respondents, 6
federal employees.
level of employme
ticipants were emp
Conservation, Fore
and Extension Serv
Rural Developmen
Justice, Police, E
Safety, Childcare
include Budgeting,
Relations, Human
from previous studi
Like the earlier s
sample, 55% of r
ranged from 26- 69
resented in the sam
ents were black. T
reported some coll
bachelor's degree o
more than $100,00

Statistical Analysis

The first step in Q

the sorts are corre
ber of outlooks id
which consist of an
those of the othe
significantly associ

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 801

perspective. . . . Therefore each respondents factor 'loading' indicates the degree of

association between that person's individual Q sort and the underlying composite
attitude or perspective of the factor."
Once the factor analysis is complete, the factors are then rotated to simplify the
structure. Under optimal conditions, Q sorts will load high on one factor and near
zero on others. The most common rotation method is varimax rotation (McKeown
and Thomas 1988). For the current analysis, the Q-sort data were analyzed using
PQMethod, a software designed for the purpose of analyzing Q sorts. For the factor
analysis, principal components analysis was selected based on its ability to maximize
the proportion of variance accounted for by each factor.

Interpreting the Factors

In Q methodology, factor interpretation is based on factor scores. The factor score is
essentially an average of scores given by participants for a given factor (Brown 1991).
The factor scores are determined by creating an "ideal type" Q sort for each factor.
The model sort is created by determining the sorts that are solely and significantly
loaded on a particular factor and then merging these sorts together. These values are
weighted according to the magnitude of association between the sort and the factor.
These scores are then compared to determine the statements that are the defining
items for each factor (McKeown and Thomas 1988).
Once the defining statements for the factors have been determined, they are
analyzed contextually in order to describe what each factor means substantively
(McKeown and Thomas 1988). After the factors were identified and interpreted
according to the identifying statements included in each factor, the factors were also
compared according to the participant characteristics in each factor. Of particular
interest are the organizational factors of the participants, such as the level of employ
ment and policy area of the agency.

FINDINGS

Using principal components analysis coupled with varimax rotation, a four-factor

solution was derived.3 The four-factor solution explains 51% of the overall variance.
Table 3 shows the correlation between factor scores. The higher correlations between
factors indicate that the distinctiveness of the specific factors is less than ideal. These
correlations are created by respondents' shared views reflected in similar statement
rankings across the factors. These shared views are illustrated in the multiple state
ments with high overall levels of agreement and disagreement. Although some of the
correlations between factors are somewhat high, models with more or less factors
maintained similar correlation levels between two or more factors.
The four factors identified illustrate different views toward representative bureau
cracy. Respondents in Factor 1 (Leaders) and Factor 2 (Traditional Bureaucrats) do
not appear to associate strongly with the typical values of representative bureaucracy
theory. Instead, their views are more consistent with traditional notions of bureaucracy.

3 Under the four-factor solution, 14 participants either did not load significantly on any factor or loaded
significantly on multiple factors, and these were subsequently not used to estimate factor scores.

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802 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Table 3
Factor Score Correlations

1 1 2 2 3
3 44
1 1 1.0000
1.0000 .5112
.5112 .2909
.2909 .6590.6590
2 2 .5112
.5112 1.0000
1.0000 .1711.1711 .4047.4047
3 3 .2909
.2909 .1711.1711 1.0000
1.0000 .3329.3329
4 4 .6590
.6590 .4047 .4047 .3329 .3329 1.0000
1.0000

Both Factor 3 (Identity Empathizers) and Factor 4 (Diversity Advocates) present

ideas consistent with representative bureaucracy theory. However, these views vary
along certain key aspects of the theory. Identity Empathizers present a view of repre
sentative bureaucracy most closely in line with contemporary representative bureau
cracy theory, emphasizing the role of specific demographic characteristics. In contrast,
Diversity Advocates present a perspective more consistent with traditional notions of
representative bureaucracy, whereby general demographic reflection is important but
not necessarily reliant on specific demographic characteristics. The high levels of cor
relation between Factors 1 and 4 indicate that respondents in these two factors may
also share perspectives. In other words, Leaders may also embrace elements of the
traditional representative bureaucracy theory. Similarly, Factors 1 and 2 have high
levels of correlation indicating shared perspectives among Leaders and Traditional
Bureaucrats. Each factor is discussed in further detail below.4

Factor 1 : Leaders

Leaders do not appear to place much value on characteristics associated with repre
sentative bureaucracy. Instead, they emphasize the role of leadership in the organ
ization and highlight the importance of individual values, such as hard work and
honesty, over diversity and demographic characteristics.
Few statements relating directly to representation are distinguishing for this
group. Participants in this factor do indicate that they possess some level of discretion
(Statements 3 and 11). This group also emphasizes that leadership in the organization
is more important than diversity for achieving the organizational goals of efficiency
and accountability (Statement 50). Leaders also feel that their ability to understand
and meet the needs of their constituents is dependent upon their constituents' values
as opposed to shared demographic characteristics (Statement 33). Most statements
referencing specific demographic characteristics are not significant for this group.
However, respondents in this factor reject ideology as a variable influencing whether
or not they can relate to or serve the needs of their constituents (Statement 42).
Although this group emphasizes the role of leadership, they also deviate some
what from traditional theories of bureaucratic hierarchy by rejecting the notion that
their primary accountability is to their supervisor (Statement 46). This may be due to
the high number of executives in this group.

4 See Appendix 3 for the significa

by factor.

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 803

Factor 2: Traditional Bureaucrats

Traditional Bureaucrats rank statements in a way that most closely reflects traditional
notions of bureaucracy rather than representative bureaucracy. The major emphasis
of this group is hierarchy and differentiation between levels of the organization. For
example, Traditional Bureaucrats indicate differences in both discretion and account
ability depending on the level within the organization (Statements 43, 36, and 17).
They indicate that those at the lower levels of the organization have little or no discre
tion (Statements 43 and 36). Also in line with traditional bureaucratic roles, this group
indicates that their primary accountability is with their supervisor (Statement 46).
However, Traditional Bureaucrats also indicate that they are accountable to multiple
other groups, including the organization, the community, and legislators (Statement
1). Similar to Leaders, this group emphasizes leadership rather than diversity in deter
mining efficiency and accountability (Statement 50). However, the strength of agree
ment among this group is much weaker than that for Leaders. The average Traditional
Bureaucrats rank this statement as one, whereas the average Leaders rank it five.
Interestingly, this group suggests that everyone in the organization should see
themselves as representatives, but it also suggests that individuals at higher levels of the
organization have a greater role in representation (Statement 49). In addition, for this
group, the target of representation is the public interest rather than specific group inter
ests (Statements 26). Most statements dealing directly with the relationship between
demographic characteristics and representation do not appear as significant statements
that define this group. However, they do reject race and gender as factors that influence
their ability to relate to or serve the needs of their constituents (Statement 22).

Factor 3: Identity Empathizers

Identity Empathizers exemplify many of the characteristics associated with contem

porary literature in the field of representative bureaucracy. Identity Empathizers indi
cate having discretion (Statements 36 and 40). They also suggest that demographic
characteristics influence their ability to relate to and/or serve the needs of their con
stituents (Statement 2). In addition, they designate multiple characteristics that may
influence whether or not they can understand and serve the needs of their constit
uents. These characteristics include the following: whether a person lives in a rural
or metropolitan area and the person's age, education, income, occupation, race, and
gender (Statements 8, 22, and 25). Participants in this group reject the relationship
between ideology and representation (42). Further, this group rejects central ideas
embedded in traditional theories of representative bureaucracy, expressing disagree
ment with statements relating their responsibility and accountability toward the pub
lic interest (Statements 19 and 26). Finally, this group rejects formal accountability,
indicating that their primary accountability is not to legislative mandates or elected
officials (Statements 27 and 45).
Interestingly, although this group suggests demographic characteristics may influ
ence their ability to relate to constituents, they are less consistent toward statements
directly tapping into topics of representation and advocacy. For example, this group
is neutral toward Statement 31 : "I see representation or advocacy as part of my role

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804 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

in my organization." Further, they express slight disagreement with the idea that eve
ryone in the organization should see themselves as an advocate (Statement 14). This
group presents inconsistent or possibly ambivalent views on the relationship between
representation and accountability. Identity Empathizers express slight agreement
with Statements 4 ("If you see yourself as a representative within the organization,
you will have more accountability") and 34 ("Representation or advocacy by indi
viduals in the organization decreases accountability"). Relative to the other groups,
Identity Empathizers have a lower level of agreement with Statement 4, and all the
other groups indicate disagreement with Statement 34. This inconsistency is interest
ing for this group because it seems to suggest positive effects of representation or
advocacy from the individual but a negative view toward representation or advocacy
from others in the organization. Additionally, in contrast to the other groups, Identity
Empathizers disagree that representation increases efficiency.

Factor 4: Diversity Advocates

Diversity Advocates emphasize ideas consistent with early notions of representa

tive bureaucracy. Rather than emphasizing specific demographic characteristics, they
highlight the importance of diversity and general demographic reflection. They indi
cate seeing representation or advocacy as part of their role (Statement 31). They also
indicate that it is important that the organization reflect the population that they
serve (Statement 10). However, most statements specifying particular characteristics
of importance are not significant for this group. This group rejects the notion that
whether a person lives in a rural or metropolitan area affects his/her ability to relate to
and/or serve their needs (Statement 8). They also reject the idea that a person's values
are important for determining whether or not they can relate to and meet the needs of
their constituents (Statement 33).

Organizational Variables and Role Perception

In order to explore the potential relationship between organizational variables and

role perception, the organizational characteristics of each factor were analyzed. Tables
4 and 5 summarize the organizational makeup of the factors. Due to the inductive,
exploratory nature of this project and small sample size, no statistical inferences or
projections can be made from these numbers as to the actual percentages of indi
viduals in the general population with these particular worldviews. The purpose for
presenting these data is simply to highlight interesting patterns and suggest the pos
sibility of questions worthy of further study between agency type, personnel level, and
perspectives on representation.
Table 4 illustrates the composition of factors according to policy area. Perhaps the
most interesting question that emerges from this cursory analysis is why no respondents
from redistributive agencies load significantly as Identity Empathizers. This is counter
to the focus of the literature, which has been almost exclusively directed toward redis
tributive agencies. Although interesting and noteworthy, one of the potential prob
lems complicating the interpretation of these percentages is the relatively low overall

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 805

Table 4
Policy Area and Factor Location
Traditional Identity Diversity
Leaders Bureaucrats Empathizers Advocates Excluded
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) N

Redistributive 21.4 7.1 0.0 28.6 42.9 14

Regulatory 25.0 18.8 18.8 25.0 12.5 16

Distributive 18.8 25.0 12.5 12.5 31.3 16
Constituent 35.7 14.3 21.4 21.4 7.1 14

Table 5
Level of Organization and Factor Location

Traditional Identity Diversity

Leaders Bureaucrats Empathizers Advocates Excluded
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) N

Street level 20.0 10.0 10.0 35.0 25.0 20

Management 14.3 28.6 9.5 23.8 23.8 21
Executive 42.1 10.5 21.1 5.3 21.1 19

numbers and the high percentage of redistributive and distributive participants who
do not load on any factor.
Exploring the factors relative to the organizational level also reveals some interest
ing patterns. These patterns partially align with existing literature; however, there are
some nuances that deviate from existing theory. As might be expected, nearly half of
the street-level employees load significantly on one of the factors associated with repre
sentative bureaucracy (Identity Empathizers or Diversity Advocates). However, a much
higher percentage of street-level bureaucrats associate with Diversity Advocates and are
opposed to Identity Empathizers. Additionally, a much higher percentage of executive
employees associate with Identity Empathizers than with street-level bureaucrats. Again,
although this evidence is not conclusive, it does affirm the need to expand the scope of
inquiry to include executives in studies of active representation. Table 5 illustrates the
relationship between level of the organization and respondent's factor locations.
Although these findings are based on exploratory analysis and no statistical infer
ences or generalizations can be made from the data, survey data and more traditional
quantitative analysis could be used to further examine these potential relationships.
As Danielson (2009, 219) explains, "Q Method is an effective way of identifying the
various shared perspectives that people may hold about a given topic. The ability to
measure those viewpoints in a later survey would allow the researcher to generalize the
findings to a larger population and to construct explanations in which the respond
ents' adherence to those perspectives is related to other variables."

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The four factors uncovered in this project add deeper, more nuanced understanding of
bureaucratic representation and also identify future research possibilities. Individuals

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806 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

emphasize the role of representation and different possible concepts of representation

among bureaucrats to different degrees.
The factors identified in the Q sort suggest that in the bureaucratic context,
variations may exist within each of the three major components of representation
defined by Pitkin (1967). Responsiveness may indicate symbolic representation such
as that embodied by theories of descriptive representation where the very presence
of a group leads to positive benefits for the group. Alternatively, responsiveness may
indicate advocacy where an individual or organization advocates for an interest but
lacks the ability or power to make a policy or implementation decision on behalf of
that interest. Finally, responsiveness may indicate a specific action taken on behalf of
an individual or group such as that described in contemporary theories of active rep
resentation. The interests represented may range from particular interests or specific
groups to broad representation of the public interest. Between these two, there is also
a mixed or intermediate-level interest representation, where particular interests are
represented but not specified or where there is a combination of specific and public
interest representation. Finally, the actor or source of representation may be an indi
vidual bureaucrat or the organization.
Leaders, Traditional Bureaucrats, Identity Empathizers, and Diversity Advocates
demonstrate variation along these three key dimensions of representation. Each of
the worldviews reflects a different combination of each of these components of repre
sentation. Thus, we can conceive of at least four different types of representation that
may occur in the bureaucracy. Figure 2 depicts these variations along three intersect
ing continua and where each worldview falls along each variable.
Leaders reflect a model of representation that focuses on the individual as the
actor, mixed interests (a combination of specified particular interests and broad pub
lic interest), and an active form of responsiveness. Traditional Bureaucrats, on the
other hand, embrace a view of representation where the organization is the actor and
responsiveness occurs through advocacy on behalf of the public interest. For Identity

Figure 2
Representative Worldviews

Interests

Particular * Public
Particular ► Public

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 807

Empathizers, the individual is the actor who is responsive to particularized interests

through active representation. Finally, Diversity Advocates reflect a model of repre
sentation where the public interest is the target of responsiveness by the organization
through symbolic activity.
The different models of representation are important to the field of representative
bureaucracy because they reveal several nuances that have been ignored in the litera
ture to this point. This model suggests that there may be important variations in the
actors, interests, and types of responsiveness that need to be considered in representa
tive bureaucracy studies. To this point, the actor has been primarily confined to the
individual, but this model suggests the importance of organizational representation
as well. Additionally, the focus up to this point has been on particular interests, pri
marily underrepresented groups, but Leaders, Traditional Bureaucrats, and Diversity
Advocates highlight the possibility of broader interest representation.
Although Traditional Bureaucrats do indicate seeing representation as part of
their role, neither Leaders nor Traditional Bureaucrats present ideas that are consist
ent with present theories of representative bureaucracy. Future theoretical and empir
ical research should direct attention toward alternative conceptions of representation.
What is it that these individuals are indicating as acts of representation? Interviews
and focus groups might be useful to probe this important question.
Further, among the respondents reflecting views consistent with theories of rep
resentative bureaucracy, there appear to be at least two different perspectives. Identity
Empathizers emphasize demographic characteristics and present views consistent
with contemporary representative bureaucracy theory ,whereas Diversity Advocates
highlight general diversity, reflecting earlier theories of representative bureaucracy.
Additional attention should be directed at more precisely defining the term repre
sentative bureaucracy based on these varying conceptions.
In addition to theoretical insights, this project also suggests that the empirical
framework by which we study representative bureaucracy needs to be expanded. One
of the central areas that this project sought to provide insight into was the role of
descriptive representation. Although the idea of descriptive representation remains
important, as evidenced by Identity Empathizers and Diversity Advocates, the view
point of Leaders and Traditional Bureaucrats suggest that it may not be necessary for
representation to occur. Additionally, the data suggest that characteristics other than
race and gender should be analyzed.
This project also explores the organizational settings appropriate for studies of
representative bureaucracy. The exploratory evidence here suggests the possibility of a
relationship between policy type, organizational level, and role perception. The focus
on street-level bureaucrats at redistributive agencies may be excessively restrictive and
may miss important opportunities for expanding our understanding of representation
in the bureaucracy. Survey data could be used to further explore these possibilities.
Within this analysis, all policy areas and levels should be considered valid for studies
of representative bureaucracy.
Continued circumscription in this field of study threatens the ability for this
theory to reach its goal of reconciling bureaucratic power and legitimacy. The the
ory of representative bureaucracy posits that despite their lack of electoral account
ability mechanisms, bureaucracies are actors in the policy process, whose legitimacy

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808 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

can be sustained through their representative nature. Moving forward, the question
the field must address is this: If legitimacy is conferred by representation, but only
certain levels of the organization and certain types of agencies are potential sources of
representation, how do we legitimize the power of the other levels and types of organi
zations? Given the existing power of contemporary bureaucracies and the potential
for them to gain even more power, the importance of legitimizing bureaucracies goes
far beyond an academic endeavor. It is ultimately a question over the quality of con
temporary democracy and governance. Conversations over the potential illegitimacy
of bureaucracy are not confined to academic discussion but have become a central
component of popular discourse in US culture. Thus, it is fundamental not only for
scholars but for policymakers and, ultimately, good government that we probe further
into the remaining questions in this field.
The findings of this project suggest that the field of representative bureaucracy has
undersold its ability to legitimize the power of the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats across all
levels and policy areas indicate that they see themselves as representatives and should
be considered valid subjects of study. In order to do this, alternative data sources may
be necessary. One interesting research possibility is studying executive-level bureaucrats
using policy advocacy as a way to measure representation. In the initial open-ended
interviews, several executives indicated going to the legislature to advocate for policy
as an act of representation. This is an important avenue of research that should be
pursued.
This study highlights ways in which the field of representative bureaucracy can
be expanded in order to achieve this goal and legitimize bureaucracies more fully.
In order to accomplish this goal, the field needs to revisit some important theoreti
cal issues. This study probes the question of how to best define representation as
it applies to bureaucracy. However, a much more in-depth theoretical analysis is
needed in the field. Due to the inductive nature of this project, it is not possible to
project the prevalence of the different views of representation. Future empirical
research should try to determine the prevalence of these varying perspectives on
representation and also assess additional factors that may be related to respondents'
worldviews.

APPENDIX 1 : Focus Group/Initial Interview Questionnaire

Questions about Role Perceptions in general:

1. What do you see as your primary role in your agency? How would you describe the
primary role of your supervisor and/or subordinates?
2. Is client advocacy a part of your role? How central is this?
3. Do you think that individuals above or below you have more or less of a representa
tive role in the organization?
4. Do you think that bureaucrats in general have a representative role in policymak
ing? Do you see yourself or others in your organization as representatives? Of what
or whom? Do you see your role as a representative as one that is similar or different
from legislators or the President?
5. How would you define public interest?

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 809

6. Would you say your primary responsibility as a representative is toward the public
interest, specific groups, or legislators?
7. In your view, are there groups in society (such as racial or gender groups) that have
been traditionally underrepresented by your organization or other public agencies?
If so, do you think this places a special responsibility on bureaucrats to include
these groups in the policy process?

Questions measuring Active Representation:

1. If you view yourself as a representative, what specific tasks do you perform in your
organization that you consider representation or advocacy?
2. What are the primary tools you use to assess clients and their need for services? Do
you use any informal methods to assess clients?
3. Do you possess information that can potentially help clients maneuver through the
process of receiving services more easily, by this, I mean information that you are
not required to share with clients as part of the application process? What types of
factors may influence your decision to share or not share this information?
4. Do you ever feel that your clients would be better served if their posture or behavior
toward the organization were altered?
5. Do you feel that it is part of your job to stimulate demand from potential clients?
If so, do you have formal outreach programs? Describe how these programs work,
specifically in terms of determining who to contact for such programs? Do you use
any informal mechanisms?
6. Do you feel that you relate more easily to clients who share your background or
demographic characteristics? What sort of characteristics would you say are most
likely to influence your ability to relate to clients? Do you feel that this in any way
influences the way in which you handle individuals' cases?
7. Have you ever noticed behavior by others in your organization that you felt were
discriminatory, either toward coworkers or clients? If so, how did you handle the
situation?

8. Do you feel that others in your organization (peers, subordinates, or supervisors)

have helped to shape your views on your role as a representative? In what way?

Questions measuring potential Trade-Offs:

1. Do you think there is a relationship between bureaucrats' advocacy behavior and

organizational efficiency?
2. Similarly, do you think there is a relationship between advocacy and accountability?
3. Do you perceive the benefits provided to clients by your organization as finite or
zero-sum?

Agency and Level of participants' employment—Demographic makeup of the group:

1. Gender
2. Year of birth
3. Race

4. Religion
5. Marital status
6. Party affiliation

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810 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

7. Native language
8. What is your highest level of education?
9. What is your country, city, and state of birth?
10. Do you have any physical or mental disabilities?
11. Have you ever served in the armed forces?
12. Which of the following best describes your current household income level?

$0-$20,000 $20,000-$40,000 $40,000-$75,000 $75,000-8100,000 Above S100,000

APPENDIX 2: Q Sort Response Matrix

Respondent #

-5-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

1. There are 50 cards numbered 1 to 50. As you read the cards, sort the cards into three
piles. Place those you agree with in one pile. Place those you disagree with in a second
pile. Put the cards you feel neutral about or have no opinion of in a third pile.
2. From the disagree pile, choose the TWO with which you most disagree. Write the
number of the statements with which you most disagree in the pile labeled -5.
3. From the disagree pile, choose the THREE with which you most disagree. Write the
number of the statements with which you most disagree in the pile labeled -4.
4. From the disagree pile, choose the FOUR with which you most disagree. Write the
number of the statements with which you most disagree in the pile labeled -3.
5. From the disagree pile, choose the FIVE with which you most disagree. Write the
number of the statements with which you most disagree in the pile labeled -2.

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 811

6. From the disagree pile, choose the SEVEN with which you most disagree. Write the
number of the statements with which you most disagree in the pile labeled -1.
7. If at any time you do not have enough cards in the disagree pile, choose the cards
you most disagree with from the neutral pile to complete the step. Place any
remaining cards in the neutral pile.
8. At this time, do not fill in the 0 column. Go to the agree pile and select the TWO
with which you most agree and write the numbers in the column labeled +5.
9. Go to the agree pile and select the THREE statements with which you most agree
and write the numbers in the column labeled +4.

10. Go to the agree pile and select the FOUR statements with which you most agree
and write the numbers in the column labeled +3.
11. Go to the agree pile and select the FIVE statements with which you most agree and
write the numbers in the column labeled +2.

12. Go to the agree pile and select the SEVEN statements with which you most agree
and write the numbers in the column labeled +1.

13. Now write down the numbers of the remaining cards in the 0 column. When
you are finished you should have no cards left over and no blank spaces on your
answering sheet.

APPENDIX 3: Statements by Category

General representational
representational role
role perception
perception
31. I see representation
representation or
or advocacy
advocacy as
as part
partof
ofmy
myrole
roleininmy
myorganization.
organization.
14. Ideally, everyone
everyone in
in my
my organization
organization should
shouldsee
seerepresentation
representationasaspart
partofoftheir
theirrole
roleininthe
the
organization.
49. Those who work above me have more of representational or advocacy role, and those below
me have less.

23. Everyone in my organization is an advocate, but we do not all advocate to the same groups.
9. I believe that the frontline staff under me have a more direct role of representation, and
those above me have less of a role.
43. Individuals at lower levels of my organization do not have the same power to influence policy
as those at higher levels.
36. I work in a very top-down organization where policies are set at a much higher level. I do
not have discretion or influence over policy.
Objects of representation
26. My primary responsibility as a representative is toward the public interest, rather than
specific groups or legislators.
45. My primary responsibility as a representative is to represent legislative mandates.
48. My primary responsibility as a representative is to advocate for specific groups.
35. I represent multiple interests including specific groups, the public interest, and legislative
mandates.

47. Individuals in my organization have a special ability and/or responsibility to represent groups
that are otherwise underrepresented.

Continued

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812 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Appendix 3 (Continued)

Indirect representation
lUUUCtl ICpiCSCUldUUll

29.
29.MyMy peers,
peers,
staff, staff,
and/or supervisors
and/or have supervisors
helped to shape
havethe helped
way I see to
myself
shape
as a the way I see myse
representative
representative in my in
organization.
my organization.
6.
6.MyMy peers,
peers,
subordinates,
subordinates,
and supervisors
andhave
supervisors
encouraged andhave
supported
encouraged
my views asand
a supported m
representative
representative but they
buthave
they
not really
have shaped
not these
really
views.
shaped these views.
38.
38.I try
I try
to mentor
to mentor
my staffmyand/or
staff
peers and/or
and to empower
peers them
and to to
be more
empower
effectivethem to be more eff
representatives.
representatives.
Direct
Direct representation
representation
40.
40.I am
I am
able able
to influence
to influence
policymaking
policymaking
and/or program development.
and/or program development.
24.
24.I advocate
I advocateon behalf
on of
behalf
my constituents,
of my constituents,
but I do not personally
buthave
I do
thenot
power
personally
to make have the
decisions about their case.
39. My organization encourages public input and participation.
11. I use informal procedures for needs' assessments.
32. Sometimes, constituents misunderstand my organization and this may influence the quality
of services they receive.
15. I have information that I can choose to give to my constituents and that may help them get
faster or better services from my organization.
16. I make decisions such as resource allocation or information provision that I consider acts of
representation or advocacy.
28. We have formal outreach programs, and we target certain groups in our outreach programs
such as lower-income individuals.
3. I make daily decisions on how to implement policy.
5. It is part of my job to ensure quality service provision from my staff or others in the
organization.
30. We have outreach programs, but we do not target specific groups.
37. Constituents will be better served if they are more educated on the services of our
organization.
Descriptive representation
2. I sometimes feel that I am able to better relate to and meet the needs of constituents who
share my background or demographic characteristics.
22. Race and gender are characteristics that may influence my ability to relate to and understand
the needs of my constituents and serve them.
10. It is important that our organizations reflect the demographic makeup of the population we
serve.

8. Whether a person lives in a rural or metropolitan area may influence my ability to

understand and meet their needs.
21. Having a diverse workforce where our employees speak many different languages and
understand differences in beliefs, customs, and ways of interacting helps the organization to
better serve our customers.
13. Language barriers are an important factor in service provision for my agency.
42. An individual's ideological beliefs influence my ability to understand and meet someone's
needs.
25. Characteristics such as age, education, income, and occupation may influence my ability to
understand and serve constituents.
33. A person's values such as honesty and hard work are more important than demographic
characteristics in determining whether or not I can relate to them and understand their
needs.

Continued

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 813

Appendix 3 (Continued)

Trade-offs
Trade-offs
17.
17. Individuals
Individualsininthe
theorganization
organization
above
aboveandand
below
below
me me
havehave
similar
similar
levels
levels
of accountability.
of accountability.
18. Our
Our organization
organizationisisprimarily
primarilyaccountable
accountable to to
thethe
community
community we serve.
we serve.
1. II am
am accountable
accountabletotomultiple
multiplegroups—my
groups—my supervisor,
supervisor,
mymy organization,
organization,
the community,
the community,
and and
legislators.
My primary accountability is to the public at large.
My primary accountability is to my supervisor.
I am primarily accountable to politicians or elected officials.
Representation or advocacy increases efficiency because it allows you to better understand
the needs of certain groups and to better serve them.
Representation or advocacy decreases efficiency because the more interests you represent, the
more difficult it becomes to make decisions.
Representation or advocacy by individuals in the organization decreases accountability.
If you see yourself as a representative within the organization, you will have more
accountability.
The services I provide to my constituents are not finite or zero-sum.
I do provide some services that are finite or zero-sum.
Organizational efficiency and accountability are related to leadership, not the diversity of the
organization.
In my organization, I feel that assumptions are sometimes made about constituents based on
their background or demographic characteristics.

APPENDIX 4: Distinguishing Statements for Factors

Traditional Identity Diversity

Leaders Bureaucrats Empathizers Advocates
Number
Number Rank
Rank Score
Score Rank
Rank Score
Score Rank
Rank Score
ScoreRank
RankScore
See

Distinguishing
Distinguishing statements
statements for
for leaders
leaders
50 5 1.79* 1 0.70 -2 -0.76 -1 -0.37
33 5 1.66* 1 0.49 2 0.80 -2 -0.84
3 1 0.65 1 0.23 4 1.41 3 1.23
11 1 0.63* 0 0.01 -2 -0.64 -1 -0.32
32 1 0.18 1 0.69 3 1.10 -2 -0.84
30 0 0.08* -5 -2.21 -3 -1.00 -1 -0.74
16 0 -0.26 0 0.15 2 0.82 3 1.21
15 -1 -0.48* 2 0.84 1 0.18 1 0.48
28 -1 -0.55 0 -0.12 1 0.63 0 0.25
46 -2 -0.83* 3 1.29 -5 -1.87 -5 -1.91
42 -3 -0.88 -4 -1.28 -1 -0.30 -3 -1.27

Distinguishing statements for traditional bureaucrats

1 4 1.5 5 2.17* 2 0.89 5 1.50
49 -1 -.068 5 1.81* -3 -0.92 -1 -0.73
43 -4 -1.20 4 1.39* -2 -0.85 0 -0.17
46 -2 -0.83 3 1.29* -5 -1.87 -5 -1.91
14 3 1.42 2 0.94 -1 -0.44 4 1.39

Continued

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814 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Appendix 4 (Continued)

Traditional Identity Diversity

Leaders Bureaucrats Empathizers Advocates
Number Rank Score Rank Score
Score Rank Score
Score Rank Score
50 5 1.79 1 0.70*
0.70* -2 -0.76 -1
-1 -0.37
26 2 1.09
1.09 1 0.0.6868 -2 -0.73 4 1.43
1.43
36 -3
-3 -0.94 1 0.43* -5-5 -2.50 -3
-3 -1.30
3 1 0.0.65
65 1 0.23 4 1.41 3 1.23
16 0 -0.26 0 0.15 2 0.82 3 1.21
25 -4 -1.48 0 -0.02* 3 1.01 -4 -1.54
4 3 1.12 0 -0.13 1 0.0.3838 2 0.93
40 2 1.12
1.12 0 -0.17* 5 1.90 2 0.97
39 2 0.97 -1
-1 -0.39* 4 1.28 2 0.95
17 1 0.0.70
70 -2 -0.97* -4 -1.65 1 0.34
27 -5
-5 -1.85 -3 -1.13 -2 -0.53 -4 -1.56
22 -4 -1.63 -3 -1.19 1 0.0.4040 -5 -1.81
30 0 0.08
0.08 -5
-5 -2.21* -3 -1.00 -1
-1 -0.74

Distinguishing
Distinguishing statements
statementsfor
foridentity
identityempathizers
empathizers
40 2 1.12
1.12 0 -0.17 5 1.90* 2 0.97
2 -1-1 -0.56 -2
-2 -0.73 3 1.21*
1.21* -3-3 -1.10
8 -3 -1.13 -3 -0.97 3 1.02* -4 -1.67
25 -4 -1.48 0 -0.02 3 1.01* -4 -1.54
1 4 1.50
1.50 5 2.17 2 0.89*
0.89* 5 1.50
22 -4 -1.63 -3
-3 -1.19 1 0.40*
0.40* -5 -1.81
4 3 1.12 0 -0.13 1 0.38 2 0.93
0.93
34 -3 -1.13 -4 -1.24 1 0.22* -3 -1.15
31 2 0.71
0.71 2 0.80 0 0.03*
0.03* 4 1.42
19 1 0.41 2 0.87
0.87 -1
-1 -0.03* 1 0.70.74
4
42 -3
-3 -0.88 -4 -1.28 -1
-1 -0.30* -3 -1.27
14 3 1.42
1.42 2 0.94
0.94 -1
-1 -0.44* 4 1.38
12 2 0.76 1 0.42 -1 -0.50* 1 0.0.6666
27 -5
-5 -1.85 -3
-3 -1.13 -2 -0.53 -4 -1.56
26 2 1.09
1.09 1 0.68 -2-2 -0.73* 4 1.43
1.43
7 0 -0.20 -1 -0.29 -3 -0.17* -1 -0.34
17 1 0.0.70
70 -2-2 -0.97 -4 -1.65* 1 0.34
0.34
45 -2 -0.78 -2
-2 -0.78 -4 -1.84* -2 -0.78
36 -3
-3 -0.94 1 0.43
0.43 -5 -2.50* -3
-3 -1.30

Distinguishing
Distinguishing statements
statements for
for diversity
diversity advocates
advocates
31 2 0.71 2 0.80 0 0.03 4 1.42*
10 1 0.20.22
2 -1-1 -0.62 -1
-1 -0.18 3 0.98*
37 3 1.22 4 1.38 4 1.46
1.46 0 0.24*
13 -2
-2 -0.79 -2
-2 -0.90 -1 -0.40 0 0.09
43 -4 -1.20 4 1.39
1.39 -2
-2 -0.85 0 -0.17*
32 1 0.10.18
8 1 0.60.69
9 3 1.10 -2 -0.84*
33 5 1.66 1 0.49 2 0.80
0.80 -2
-2 -0.84*
8 -3 -1.13 -3
-3 -0.97 3 1.02 -4 -1.67*

p
p << .05;
.05; *p
*p << .01.
.01.

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 Kennedy Role of Representation in Bureaucracy 815

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See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273461439

Public Administration and Globalisation

Conference Paper · August 2013

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 Recent Researches in Law Science and Finances

Public Administration and Globalisation

SORIN PUREC
Faculty of International Relations, Law and Administrative Sciences
University Constantin Brancusi of Targu-Jiu
Calea Eroilor Nr.30, Targu-Jiu, Gorj,
ROMANIA
sorin.purec@gmail.com

Abstract: Globalization with the revolution of information technology has been dramatically changing
human behavior, management of corporations, and governance of states much more than the industrial
revolution transformed the agricultural society. Public administration systems appear to help some
countries to have far more benefits than others, even if many social scientists believe that international
economic, trade, and political systems have played more significant role in helping some countries to
get far more benefits than others. Globalization and public administration are enmeshed in a complex
pattern of interdependence that cannot easily be untangled, but the World Wide Web provides a
transparent window through which to take a closer look at these linkages. The Internet may be viewed
both as a cause and consequence of globalization, and as an interactive link to connect it with
administrative phenomena.

Key-Words: Globalization, public administration, regionalization, Public policies, political systems,

integration

1. Introduction. What is the Globalization is forcing the states to restructure

their national economies, to interconnect with the
globalisation? global economic flows, making them also more
The last decade of the XX century put us in front of
vulnerable to the developments in the global
two very importants moments: the european
economy and to the oscillations of the flows in the
revolutions from 1989-1990 and also the
world economy. The new ways of economic
negociation and the launch of the euro. They have
management of the states, the various competitions
triggered debates and led to a rethinking of the
between the states competences, plus a number of
international relationships and of the political,
specific local factors (such as secessionist trends)
administrative, economic and financial concepts. [1]
facilitate a fragmentation of the society. The nation-
Thus, the end of the century and beginning of the
state ceases to be an effective economic manager[3].
new millennium has been characterized by a tight
Although the states continue to be the main actors in
competition between the forces and the conventional
international business they already suffer losses of
methods of social organization (state, nation) and
sovereignty, functions, power[4]. Many
the new appearances (integration,
international institutions take over from the states
internationalization, globalization)[2], so that, in the
prerogatives, in almost all cases with their consent
international system that configures, some concepts
and they have the right to judge and to coerce what
seem to impose, by their frequency: integration,
the states make on their own territory even to
globalization, major concepts, considered by some
exercise jurisdiction and control over national
as a way of reshaping the world, while others are
issues.
unpredictable sources of trouble.
This way, nation-states receive a double blow, on
The state as the traditional major factor in
the one hand from the international institutions
international relations, is in competition with a
becoming stronger and more influential, which
variety of economical, political, cultural forces in a
make a dent in the control over their economies,
new formula called governance. A global
judicial system, etc. and make them more and more
civilization seems to be the solution towards is
unable to maintain their national character and their
heading the society in which we live.
cultural homogeneity, and on the other hand, the
global market and the globalization mechanisms

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 Recent Researches in Law Science and Finances

which dissolve the authority of the national states, 2. Globalization and regionalization -
shaping national decisions bassing on supranational
parameters[5] via many international actors more or
correlative phenomena?
Many questions arise regarding the phenomenon of
less institutionalized. "Called in French
globalization: What is globalizing? What escapes to
mondialization, globalization is often understood as
the globalization? How does the process of
a result of advances in transport and
globalization connect to the regionalization process?
communications which have created networks more
Usually it is considered that the debate on
and more efficient and faster, covering the whole
globalization includes sectors such as the economy
surface of the Earth. In a broader sense,
(trade, finance, production), immigration, the
globalization means the universalization of the
ecological military, cultural and political field[9],
economy by reducing national barriers regarding the
public administration having tangency with the last
trade and investment, telecommunications and
one but far from identifying with it. Rightfully says
information systems development, the growth of
Tiberiu Braila that globalisation is the most
financial markets located outside the the national
important event of the contemporary events as it
borders, the increasing of the role of multinational
involves a change of perception where the national
companies, regional economic integration, in
administrations, the national state are no longer the
essence, creating a single global market "[6].
best suppliers of goods and services for their regions
Although at national and regional level, different
[10], their role being replaced by other entities. "But
countries are facing a multitude of specific problems
like any action arises reaction, globalization is
of the economic and social process, those essentials
accompanied by a contrary process of
for the development are common, regardless of the
regionalization, localization, organization of social
geographic region or the development of the
and economic life closer to the person and his needs,
countries. So, globalization involves processes of
a process that can sometimes take extreme forms of
the high interdependence in the modern world,
"tribelisation", degenerating into nationalisms and
generated by the international, economical, political
fundamentalisms of all sorts "[11]. Without being
and cultural cooperation expanded, and also by the
new phenomena, globalization and regionalization
need to face together the global problems which can
know emphasized forms of development today.
not be solved but on a global scale[7].
From their intersection derives a series of important
Contemporary society has generated a series of
implications in many fields: economic, social,
problems of global nature, whose management goes
moral, political, cultural, philosophical, the
beyond the national borders and requires a large
appearance of new mentalities, from where it comes
cooperation of the states in international relations.
the need of some new actions, of a reformed
Economic and social phenomena such as the
institutional framework, new categories of thinking
internationalization of production, the
politics and lawmakings that could shape a new
unprecedented increase of international trade,
international order. The globalization engine is the
capital finance global markets formation, the
economy that succeeded much deeper than politics
persistence of underdevelopment and poverty, the
or administration to become global, forcing us to
high rates of unemployment, illicit drug trafficking
update our concepts as much as our behaviors.
and consumption, resource depletion and
"Globalization leads to an increased polarization of
environmental degradation are some of the main
the richness, to the appearance of richness without
topics of the international interaction between the
nations and of nations without richness. The result
economies and the states[8]. Globalization is meant
of these evolutions, particularly of the deregulation,
to be a response to the action of finalizing the new
liberalization of the markets and the capital
international order, glimpsed since the early '70s,
movements makes that, slowly but surely , the link
marked, however, after the 1990, by a series of
between the state, the territory, the population and
elements of instability, the contemporary world
the richness disappear, from where the significant
today still facing the economic gap between the
erosion of the national sovereignty, fiscal
developed countries and those which are still
fundaments and economical and social policies . At
developing, with the crise of energy shortage, raw
least in economic terms, the war with the space was
materials and the drinking water, the ecological
won."[12] Thanks to a particular technical support,
crisis and the attempts to reduce the effects of armed
transactions are carried over longer distances with
conflicts of the last few years, but also with the
more accelerated speeds. The dynamic became the
possibility of releasing new conflicts.
spirit of the world and one of the most significant
aspects wich illustrates the paradigm of the

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 Recent Researches in Law Science and Finances
globalization, a factor of imbalance and at the same
time, of transition to a new equilibrium. The
increasing of the complexity of the international
organizations and of their role and force, came as a
consequence. Although they talk a lot about
flexibility, they have adopted working patterns
somewhat standardized, smoothed for all the
countries, that are applied with the power help and
the centralization of the informational system,
supporting the hegemony of the strong ones on the
global market . Thus the force and domination of the
multinationals companies,of the large corporations
and economical conglomerates grew as never
before. Globalization indicates the appearance of a
new economy. The traditional system of the closed
national economies, or at least protected, entities
that establish between them economic relationships
through trade and foreign investment leave place to
some form of integration-cooperation, increasingly
extended to some new specialization and to some
increased interdependence, the companies change
their international strategies, developing extensive
global network,that are using the resources the
capacities and potentialities of the market, of the
different countries and geographical areas,
absorbing them inside a single global strategy. "The
time of an unipolar world has past. The U.S.
dominated the world as the only global power for
only a generation . The future will belong to the
continental and regional blocks and to their
competition. In the last few years there has been a
growing regionalization and internationalization of
the production and of the finance, so for both real
and monetary economy. "[13]. The balance of the
economical power has shifted significantly, being
called into question the national sovereignty and
even the legitimacy of the nation-states, the
governmental autonomy and the role of the State .
There have appeared other important sub- or
supranationals actors such as" IMF, World Bank,
World Trade Organization as well as numerous
regional and local actors, seemingly disparate but
connected by invisible wires in a network of
interdependencies and potentialities. This lead to
talking about a new medievalism, a new political
organization, fragmented and decentralized, similar
to that of the Middle Ages and opposed to the
Westphalian state system that has dominated the
modern era, specifically the last three hundred
years. This "new medievalism" is only a metaphor
that wants to better highlight the fact that the State
does not have the same role in the international
system, that he is confronting with the emergence of
the competing authorities at local, regional and
global level, with redefinitions of communitar
ISBN: 978-960-474-327-8
identities [14]. Globalization and regionalization are
not contradictory but complementary processes, thet
are mutually supporting. You might even say that
globalization incites regionalization, both public
actors (going as far as the state) and private ones
seeking to integrate themselvs in the different
formulas to become more credible on the market,
stronger in the competitive battle and more
attractive for the potential investments or
placements of capital. Regional constructions can be
considered laboratories for the development of some
institutions better suited to the context of
globalization, but every experience is interested to
identify the best its ambitions, if it aims to succeed,
including the EU [15]. There is even a tendency to
exacerbate the regionalism, even the separatism, a
phenomenon that can be seen even in the countries
the most involved in globalization: Canada, Spain,
Belgium, Italy, Ireland. The phenomenon resulted
after the fall of communism, the disintegration of
the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,
different and extremely interesting cases for
analysts.
This tendency of regrouping or separating the
regions has mainly economic reasons. Thus,
supranational integration allows to the actors in
question the access to a larger market, allows a more
diversified production structure, opened to the
different compensation or complementarities
between the provinces and between the different
economic sectors, such entities or networks can
deliver superior advantages in terms of collective
goods, infrastructure and improving relationships
with the outside . Regional or nationalist attitudes
take into consideration the correlative phenomenon
of globalization, of uneven distribution of the
richness in the world, differences in the
development of the countries, important differences
in the structure of the labor market, wages etc. What
is the role of the state and of the national
administrations in dealing with the unavoidable
phenomenon of globalization? The answer is given
by Joseph Stiglitz: "In my activity – both in the
works and in my role as an economical adviser of
the the U.S. President and Chief Economist of the
World Bank - I have supported the need for a
balanced conception regarding the role of the state,
of a concept that takes into account both the
limitations or the shortcomings of the market and of
the state, but in which the two should be seen as
acting together as an association, the exact nature of
this association being different from one country to
another depending on their political and economical
development stage. Regardless of the political and
economical development stage of a country, the
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 Recent Researches in Law Science and Finances
state plays an important role, weak governments as
much as the strong ones have negatively influenced
both stability and growth. The Asian financial crisis
was caused by the inadequate regulation of the
financial sector activity, and the Russian mafia
capitalism arose due to the lack of the basic law and
order. Without the existence of institutional
infrastructure, privatization has led in countries in
transition to the assets circumvention, not to the
creation of richness. In other countries, given the
lack of regulations, privatized monopolies have
been able to exploit the consumers better than the
state monopolies has made it before some
regulations, enterprise restructuring and their solid
management led to the acceleration of the
economical growth.[16] "Therefore, the state
should limit itself to adapt his own socio-economic
system to the requirements of the global markets, to
ensure the social justice. The dissatisfaction
regarding the globalization doesn't come necessarily
from the fact that the economical theory is put
above all , but rather from the fact that a certain
economical concept - market fundamentalism - is
placed before all the other concepts [17], perhaps
even before the national interests. The opposition to
globalization manifested in many parts of the world
does not concern globalization itself - the new
sources of funds destinated to promote the
economical growth or the new export markets - but
a certain set of doctrines, the politics covered by the
Washington Consensus which were imposed by the
international financial institutions.”, Stiglitz adds. In
this global context, the public administration suffers
from powerful influences, although they were
characterized by an identification with the own
interests of the state. What is noticeable is that in the
majority of the EU states the only obligatory
conditions that every candidate must fulfil in order
to have a public function is not only to belong to a
specific state belonging to EU, but also to take an
oath at the acceptance of a specific function, where
the party swears to serve only the interests of the EU
as whole and not the interests of a specific state
belonging to the EU, this prevents the rising of
opposing morals to rise within the EU along with
other kinds of interests, such as global ones. Public
administration stays strongly linked to the national
states, most of the time to the regional and local
administration , serving their interests exclusively,
in opposition with the global interests .
3. Globalization and public
administration – influences
ISBN: 978-960-474-327-8
The public administrations of the well-developed
countries make unstoppable efforts to adapt to the
global market with the purpose of taking advantage
of the benefits and opportunities that are offered by
the globalization . That is why they adapt their
operating mechanisms using as model the
corporatist management in the attempt of using in
the interest of the public welfare the financial
flows and the global economic processes . Also,
mostly on the specialists level, it has been
questioned the problem of standardization of the
administrative activities for achieving a global
compatibility . This process had success regionally,
generally determined by the ideological barriers ,
but even nowadays with no agreement on the
organization of the public administration and still
existing the centralized and decentralized systems.
Although at the practical level it was expected that
the political projects became the globalization
engine of the administrative phenomena , it was
noticed that technological phenomena generated
the necessary feed-back for reforming the
administrations for being able to answer to the
global needs. It is about the appearance of the public
institutions sites, that became step-by-step a
condition imposed by law and their translation in
English or in various languages of international
circulation. Practically, from each corner of the
world it is possible to observe the activity and
effectiveness of an institution, and the institutions
had to present themselves mutually in an
comprehensible manner. Another phenomenon that
supports the public administration globalization is
the appearance of the high level education
institutions in the administrative domain that will
create specialists in public administration with
similar abilities – as long as the higher educational
system answers to some global demanding . A brief
research proved that in most of world states, from
the American continent to the Arabic states, exist
higher education institutions and institutions
specialized in forming officials that have a
transparent activity, with training programs that are
displayed on their sites , at the same time showing a
tendency to match them . Even so, the general
tendency of this higher educational institutions is
given by the accent on the national administration of
the sovereign states, under the impact of
globalization being necessary that the notion of
public administration expands to domains which
the specialists in public administration avoid despite
the fact that the administration is always facing
those problems. We speak about research fields
such as : gaps in the covering area of the states with
mass communication, the role of patronage,
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 Recent Researches in Law Science and Finances
military forces in public administration,
international administration, public policies, “the
third sector” – the ONG, non-state organizations
,external intervention and technical assistance [18].
The research domain is so unexplored that even the
announcing of a possible research direction is a
progress.
Globalization changed dramatically the priorities
of public administration because of the modification
and the extension of administrative actions both
inside and outside the states . Even though the state
bureaucracies stay fundamental, their functions were
considerably modified by the new-made structures
by the globalization extension .For understanding
the impact of globalization on public administration,
generally , we do not only need to look at what
happens to the state bureaucracy, but we also need
to look at many other levels , including the trans-
states ones , or internal organizations or private
administrations .
Gaps in the covering area of the states with mass
communication ways. Many states can’t afford the
luxury to have the public administration connected
to a global communication system through sites of
institutions posted on the Internet . For these states
the science-based administration is more difficult
and the globalization influence is lower . There are
situations when , due to the lack of administrative
culture , the sites of institutions don’t have a
relevant content , which means that instead of
posting things regarding administrative issues , they
are filled with politicians speeches , so they are used
in a propaganda purpose . The public
administration from each corner of the world must
realize that , belonging to a global world, the usage
of sites leads to easier mobilization of resources that
could help them handle the huge problems that they
are facing .
The influence of politics
Generally bureaucratic career are spoken about
and it is necessary that this idea is strengthened for
an optimized work of administrative systems
formed by professional clerks. Even so, some sort of
preferences when hiring equally important as
technical skills are maintained in different public
organizations especially in the under-state ones (the
case of federal states) or non-state. We are talking
about those specific discriminations, the public
administrations or the ONGs ( that can discriminate
ethnically, sexually, racialist, etc.). It gets even
worse if these discriminations are found in public
administrations too , at this level existing a
political influence , with a considerably negative
influence , so it can be said that not only in the
occidental industrialized states the recruitment is
ISBN: 978-960-474-327-8
based on skills . Unfortunately, the decision makers
from the public administrations , because they are
politicians , don’t have the necessary competences
for the job they have , and , at a brief analysis of the
public politics application process, it becomes clear
that exactly them are the ones that still benefit from
favoritism .
Interesting are that the states from Eastern Asia
and Eastern Europe , in European countries , so-
called states in development that benefited from the
globalization, they tried to rationalize the public
bureaucracy through the liberalization and
privatization , by reducing the government functions
and services, also by the mobilization of information
technology in public administration. The public
administration’s systems of transition from
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia helped their countries to
benefit from the globalization. For example, the
government of South Korea has established “The
open system of competitive jobs” in 1999, which
was conceived to pick up remarkable talents from
the public and private sectors and approximately
20% of their jobs were selected through this system;
plus the government introduced the payment
system depending on the performance of the
worker, also the program of bonus performance for
encouraging the competition through the public
officials [19]. The Singapore government created
the portal eCitizen in 1997 as an unique access to
the governmental services, information regarding
the integration of governmental services and
information according to the intuitive categories,
such as “education”, ”home”, etc.[20]. In addition
to this, these countries seem to have benefited from
the globalization, because of the powerful political
leading, the technocratic plans of economic
development and the efforts of the citizen . The
public management of Eastern Asia and Eastern
Europe is truly expected to be more rational , more
efficient ,receptive ,responsible and transparent due
to the fact that presently the professionalism and the
rationality aren’t established regarding the behavior
and the institutions on this large scale of
bureaucracy. [21]
Military forces in public administration
Another category of officials that are usually
ignored by the specialists in public administration
are the military personnel. Traditionally, it was
analyzed only the civil service and the military
forces were ignored. This fact not only ruins the
understanding of the way in which states manage
the public affairs , although until now we see more
and more military personnel involved in
maintaining the peace, humanitarian and military
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 Recent Researches in Law Science and Finances
actions and ONU functions and international and
regional organizations or other kinds of
organizations. Military schools are even older than
the public administration ones and this educational
component is necessary because it happens
frequently that military personnel have to
administrate regions, have to be involved in the
management of public functions or even have to
become a leading elite.
International administrations: ONU, FMI, OMC,
The World Bank, UNESCO, etc.
Public policies
Generally the public policies were conceived as
part of the administration act and subordinated by it.
There is a new approach of public policies from a
global perspective taken from the national behaviors
that are specific for public administrations. That’s
why the attention is drawn to the fact that the
domain of public administration doesn’t identify
with the public policies domain. In this way, in USA
the differences between public policies and public
administration were institutionalized by creating the
Association for Public Policy Analysis, APPAM,
with main objectives such as: producing instruments
and technics for taking public decisions as well as
announcing the results of the analysis of politics
and studies of management for public organizations
and non-profit organizations with the purpose of
supporting the decisional factors . At international
level it isn’t similar to APPAM, maybe it will be
possible in the future , especially because the good
American practices were imported in many other
states.
The third sector – ONGs
This third sector of administration becomes
more and more powerful and more important at
global level, taking day by day more public
activities , from the environmental protection ,
disadvantaged people , to every level of education ,
researches and different public services . Starting
with the idea that the state is a far too expensive
administrator, the third sector takes step-by-step
more responsibilities that belong to the
administration field. This thing isn’t lacked of
dangers because the level of responsibilities are
lower , as well as their control of the state . This
kind of organizations also have the disadvantage of
having extremely different types of management .
Without any doubt, they have in common
administrative characteristics, with or without
having an orientation to the market . Regarding the
educational system , these organizations are being
discussed mostly in institutions specialized in
economics, and less in those specialized in
administration , which can be considered a big gap .
ISBN: 978-960-474-327-8
The globalization created the third sector because of
the free access to the world financial resources , and
this field is still growing up . It is possible to find
out more about this third sector through the
International Society of research of the Third Sector
,quoting from the declaration of intention the
following statement : „ In this era of deep change in
the way societies are organized, the third sector
plays a critical role and won a significant
importance in several countries. International
research for a better understanding of implications
from an economical, sociological, cultural, juridical
and political perspective of these changes continues
to amplify”[22].
It is compulsory that the ONG sector to be taken
seriously into consideration and not only because of
its economical aspect , but mostly for the political
and administrative one because it has a big capacity
to lobby.
Non-state organizations
The public administration, drawn to its own
issues , has the tendency to ignore the international
organizations that belong to the public authorities .
Also, and now we refer especially to the federal
states and those ones with a more powerful regional
component , the national governments , the under
states and the regional pay less attention to the
specific of the administration at this level .
Regarding this subject, there is the International
Union of Local Authorities, IULA , created with the
purpose of being a source of key information , at a
world scale, a source of learning ,of exchanging and
of the consolidation programs of the capacities for
the local democratic government.
External interventions and technical assistance
From the many international organizations that
try to offer technical assistance in the field of public
administration located in the countries in course of
development ONU has the best view.
These organizations that offer technical
assistance are real creations of the globalization
process . They appeared, generally, in the first half
of the XX century, lots of governments turned to
their support. The activities spectrum is extremely
large: from consultancy in the financial and
economical field , to the one in the political field
under the shape of technical assistance for passing
to democratic regimes or even electoral
advisory.
4. Conclusions
We close this presentation with the remark that ,
despite of national and regional oppositions , the
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 Recent Researches in Law Science and Finances
globalization already had a powerful impact on the
public administration field , and this thing is
obvious , not only by researching information on the
governments sites , the university sites ,associations
and others actors interested in it all over the world .
The globalization continues to change the public
administration in the non-occidental countries, as
well as in the occidental nations and makes it easier
to compare the similarities between the non-
occidental states and the occidental ones ,regarding
the systems of public administration and
government . The impact of globalization on public
administration in the non-occidental states and the
states in course of development , even so , is not yet
remarkable, as in the west or the well-developed
countries. Also, the systems of public administration
in many countries in course of development aren’t
proactive or positives to the globalization yet .
The powerful systems of public administration
seem to help more their countries to have more
benefits from this process than others, despite the
fact that a variety of social and political systems
limit the proactive role of the public administration .
The public administration from North America
and Western Europe simplified the systems,
including the personal , the budget , the
organizations through privatization , outsourcing
and subcontracting , liberalization , reducing the
personal and the government functions and
services, and that’s why they become more efficient,
productive , receptive and transparent . This has an
important role and it could help countries to
maintain themselves powerful economically and
financially, while the well-developed countries have
remarkable advantages regarding the transnational
corporations or multinationals and the supranational
global organizations or the non-government
organizations.
Even so, it is yet unknown if the weak systems of
public administrations run their countries to have
less benefits from the globalization than the other
countries because the systems of public
administration and government in many countries
still in development : states from Africa , Asia and
South America are mostly determined by the
behavior and instable political structure and weak
education . The poor nations have big disadvantages
on the world market, because of poor resources,
workforce and technology. The poor nations and
their citizens are all under the influence of rich
nations that have corporative national interests are
favorably made for the poor and undeveloped
countries economically and technologically. In this
situation, the autonomy of public administrations
ISBN: 978-960-474-327-8
and the role of public administrations for answering
the global forces are likely to be limited.
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internaţional,Bucureşti: Lumina Lex, 1999, p.3;
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[13]. Brăilean, T., Globalizarea. Nenumele
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[14]. Brăilean, T., Globalizarea. Nenumele
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[19]. Kamarck, E. C., 2004. Government
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(Faculty Research Working Articles Series:
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ISBN: 978-960-474-327-8
View publication stats
[21]. Chon-Kyun Kim, Public Administraţion in
the Age og Globalizaţion, in International
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[22]. http://www.jhu.edu/
167
SUMMARY

From Old Public Administration to the New Public Service

Implications for Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries
Introduction
Public administration in the 21st century is undergoing
dramatic change. Globalization and the pluralization of
service provision are the driving forces behind these changes
and policy problems faced are often complex, wicked
and global rather than simple, linear, and national. Yet the
prevailing paradigms through which public sector reforms
are designed and implemented are relatively static and do
not fully encompass the significance of these wider changes.
While public sector reforms in the developing world are
influenced by policy experiments and organizational practices
originating in OECD countries they tend to operate within
traditional public administration paradigms. Consequently,
BY-NC-ND Tom Perry / World Bank Broadband internet has
discrepancies remain between the thrust of public sector
significantly improved medical services at Tonga’s Vaiola Hospital.
reform efforts in the developing world and changes in the
nature of governance and contemporary approaches to public A separation between politics and elected politicians and
management in OECD countries. the administration, with appointed administrators
Administration is continuous, predictable and
Models of public administration and approaches rule-governed
to public sector reform Administrators are trained professionals who are
appointed on qualifications
There are three models: Public Administration (PA-statist and
There is a functional division of labour, and a hierarchy of
bureaucratic), New Public Management (NPM-competitive tasks and people
and minimalist) and New Public Governance (NPG-plural and
pluralist). McCourt (2013) summarizes these as follows: Resources belong to the organization, not to the
individuals who work in it

The “Old” public administration Public servants serve public rather than private interest.

The prevailing approach to public administration drew on a This “command and control” approach was introduced in most
model of bureaucracy based on hierarchy and meritocracy. Commonwealth countries, including in Singapore where the
McCourt (2013) lists the principal features of this model: post-independence political leadership built a high quality and
efficient civil service (see Box, overleaf ).

Table 1. Public service reform problems and approaches

Problem Approach Main action period

How can we put government on an orderly efficient “Weberian” public administration and
1. Post-independence
footing? capacity-building
How can we get government closer to the
2. Decentralization 1970s to present
grassroots?
3. How can we make government more affordable? Pay and employment reform 1980s and 1990s
How can we make government perform better and
4. New Public Management 1990s to present
deliver on our key objectives?
5. How can we make government more honest? Integrity and anti-corruption reforms 1990s to present
How can we make government more responsive to
6. “Bottom-up” reforms Late 1990s to present
citizens?

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www.undp.org/publicservice

Singapore’s model of public management
Reforms and achievements
The Singapore model of public management is
premised on meritocratic principles. Success derives
from four policies: comprehensive reform of the
Singapore Civil Service; strong and enforceable
anti-corruption measures; decentralisation of
the Public Service Commission; and payment of
competitive salaries to attract and retain the best
candidates (Quah, 2013).
Singapore selectively introduced NPM reforms
by adopting market-based principles in creating
arms-length public corporations, and adopting
new management models and e-government
techniques (Lee and Haque, 2006). The government
established “Public Service for the 21st Century”
to nurture public service excellence and
promoted “whole-of-government” thinking on key
strategic challenges (Ho, 2012).
Challenges and limitations
The model is not without its challenges: retention of
public service leaders with the right skills and attitudes;
meeting the changing needs and rising aspirations of
the population; public concerns about meritocracy,
accountability and high salaries in the senior civil service;
shortcomings in transparency and responsiveness;
and dealing with uncertainty and complexity in cross-
cutting policy issues (Saxena, 2011).
Singapore’s success in public management has limited
potential for replicability, as such sustained political will
on the part of the government is rare elsewhere. Singapore
is also a small city-state with a relatively homogenous
Chinese majority population (Quah, 2013).
Lessons learnt
The importance of integrity and strong anti-corruption
measures; meritocracy expressed through recruitment
of the best talent; results-orientation in which pay
and promotion reflect individual performance and
contribution to innovative outcomes; and competitive
salaries for the public service to mitigate the risk of
corruption; operational autonomy for public sector
corporations; rewarding performance through
incentives and recognition; a practice of continuous
innovation; and leadership by example (Saxena, 2011).
The new public management (NPM)
The key elements of NPM can be summarised as follows
(Osborne, 2006):
Incorporates lessons from private-sector management;
Growth of hands-on “management” and of “arm’s-
length” organizations where policy implementation is
organizationally distanced from the policy makers;
Focus is on entrepreneurial leadership;
Emphasis on input/output control, evaluation,
Page 2
performance management and audit;
Disaggregation of public services into basic units and a
focus on savings;
Increased of use of market principles for resource
allocation and service delivery.
Some aspects of NPM reforms have been criticized: the idea
that its success is dependent on buy-in from top officials
and central departments; its singular emphasis on private
sector principles; the weakening of democratic accountability
with the creation of executive agencies; and failure to
foreground the needs of citizens as the primary focus for
public sector reforms (Peters and Savoie, 1998). NPM is said
to have diminished coherence across government owing to
fragmentation between policy and delivery (Denhardt and
Denhardt, 2000), and it has also been described as a cluster of
different approaches (Osborne, 2006).
The new public governance (NPG)
NPG places citizens and the public interest, rather than
government, at the centre of its frame. NPG conceives the
state as both plural and pluralist; government is no longer the
sole force shaping public policy and implementation. Several
strands of NPG are identified in the literature:
New public service (NPS) argues that the focus of public
management should be citizens, community and civil
society, and the primary role of public servants is to help
citizens articulate and meet shared interests (Denhardt
and Denhardt, 2000). Bourgon (2007, p.22) suggests that
this approach has four elements:
● Build collaborative relationships with citizens and
groups;
● Encourage shared responsibilities;
● Disseminate information to elevate public
discourse; and
● Seek opportunities to involve citizens in government
activities.
The “whole-of-government” approach arose in response
to a lack of coherence and coordination problems in the
NPM approach. It strengthened central oversight and
increased horizontal collaboration.
The “motivation of public officials” approach, takes the
view that changes in organizational arrangements require
attention to the values and incentives that govern the
behaviour and performance of public officials. A study of
public officials in one state government in Brazil identified
four key elements in explaining motivation and dedication
(Tendler, 2007; Rao, 2013):
● Dedication and civic duty is appreciated by
communities;
● Recognition by rewards and public information
campaigns is effective;
● Officials exhibit voluntarism and willingness to carry
out a larger range of tasks;
● Downward accountability through scrutiny of
performance by local communities.
The following table summarizes the three approaches
examined so far:
 Table 2. Comparing perspectives: Old public administration, new public management, and the new
public service
Old Public
Administration
Political theory, naïve social Economic theory, positivist
Theoretical foundations
science
Rationality and models Administrative rationality,
of human behaviour public interest
Conception of the
Political, enshrined in law
public interest
To whom are civil
Clients and constituents
servants responsive?
“Rowing”, implementation
Role of government focused on politically
defined objectives
Mechanisms for Administering
achieving policy programmes through
objectives government agencies
Hierarchical -
Approach to
administrators responsible
accountability
to elected leaders
Administrative Limited discretion granted
discretion to public officials
Assumed Bureaucratic organizations
organizational with top-down authority
structure and control of clients
Assumed motivational Pay and benefits, civil-
basis of public servants service protections
Source: Adapted from Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, p.554)
New Public Management New Public Service
Democratic theory
social science
Technical and economic
Strategic rationality, citizen interest
rationality, self-interest
Aggregation of individual
Dialogue about shared values
interests
Customers Citizens
“Steering”, serving as
“Serving”, negotiating and
catalyst to unleash market
brokering interests among citizens
forces
Creating mechanisms and
Building coalitions of public, non-
incentives through private
profit private agencies
and non-profit agencies
Market-drive-outcomes Multifaceted-public servants
result from accumulation of guided by law, values, professional
self-interests norms and citizen interests
Wide latitude to meet Discretion needed but constrained
entrepreneurial goals and accountable
Decentralized public
Collaborative structures with
organisations with primary
shared leadership
control within agency
Entrepreneurial spirit, desire
Public service, desire to contribute
to reduce size and functions
to society
of government

Globalization, complexity and wicked problems
Koppell (2010, S50-51) identifies three institutional forms and
practices that transcend boundaries: (i) organizations with
mixed governmental and non-governmental characteristics
play a central role in the delivery of public goods and
services; (ii) the regulation and allocation of scarce resources
using market mechanisms is favoured in numerous policy
areas; and (iii) cross-border cooperation and reliance on
institutions that span nation states is a common response
to transnational policy challenges.
There is growing recognition that many contemporary public
policy problems are complex, relentless and contested, that is,
they are “wicked problems” that cannot be addressed through
single interventions by individual agencies. Collaborative
networks between public managers, citizens and not-for-profit
actors become critical for addressing such wicked problems
(Weber and Khademian, 2008).
control and staff recruitment. In practice many countries
adopt an approach that combines elements of different
models of public administration. Organizational hybridity in
the public sector has several distinct features, among them a
mix of organizations at the interface of the public and private
sector, located in the market or civil society, a mix of market
and hierarchy, or a mixture of different organizational forms
inside ministries that encompass specialized agencies, state
enterprises and different levels of government (Christensen
and Laegreid, 2011). In some African countries this has
produced “governance states” where finance ministries have
acquired strong internal capacity and have adopted NPM-
style market reforms (Harrison, 2004). Elsewhere successive
civil service reforms did not substantially improve efficiency
or reduce corruption (McCourt, 2013). While the NPG and
NPS approaches offer useful correctives by focusing on inter-
organizational relationships and citizen engagement, they
do not offer a comprehensive solution to problems of public
service efficiency and effectiveness.

Implications for public sector reform

Nunberg (1992) argued that developing countries should focus
on strengthening centralized civil service management models
and that public sector reforms should prioritize establishment

Page 3
Next steps?
First, public sector reform efforts should be sensitive to
context and draw on various approaches; no single model
of public management offers a magic bullet solution for
deep-seated problems.
Second, only those countries that have established the
basic organizational requirement of a functioning public
administration will be in a position to experiment with
NPM. A whole-of-government perspective can mitigate
the risks of incoherence and fragmentation associated
with the NPM approach and digital governance offers
the potential simultaneously to increase efficiency and
transparency.
Third, and by extension, a heterodox approach that draws
selectively on a range of public management traditions
( “best fit”) will be more appropriate for developing
countries than a singular approach to reform grounded
in models that have evolved in the political and economic
conditions of advanced countries (“best practice”).
For a more detailed coverage of Public Sector Reform please
refer to the full paper and GCPSE’s other publications:
www.bit.ly/GCPSE-evidence.
References
Bourgon, J. (2007). Responsive, Responsible and Respected
Government: Towards a New Public Administration Theory.
International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 73,
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Christensen, T. and P. Laegreid (2011). Complexity and Hybrid
Public Administration—Theoretical and Empirical Challenges.
Public Organization Review, vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 407-423.
Denhardt, R. B. and J. V. Denhardt (2000). The New Public
Service: Serving Rather Than Steering. Public Administration
Review, vol. 60, No. 6, pp. 549–559.
Harrison, G. (2004).The World Bank and Africa: The
Construction of Governance States. London: Routledge.
Ho, P. (2012). Governing for the Future: What Governments
Can Do. RSIS Working Paper, No. 248. Singapore: Nanyang
University. Available from www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/
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Administration Review. Special Issue on the Future of Public
Administration in 2020, vol. 70, S1, S46-S55.
Lee, E.W. and M. Shamsul Haque (2006). The New Public
Management Reforms and Governance in Asian NICs: A
Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore. Governance, vol.
19, No. 4, pp. 605-26.
UNDP Global Centre for Public
Service Excellence
#08-01, Block A
29 Heng Mui Keng Terrace West Coast,
Singapore 119620
T: +65 6908 1063
F: +65 6774 4571
E: registry.sg@undp.org
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Problem-Solving Approach. Policy Research Working
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Governance.pdf.
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© 2015 UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence
Author: Mark Robinson
www.undp.org/publicservice
twitter.com/UNDPpublicserv
www.fb.com/GCPSE
unteamworks.org/node/421576
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© International Review of Public Administration 115
2013, Vol. 18, No. 3

A CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN WEBERIAN BUREAUCRACY AND
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE*

WONHYUK CHO
Seoul National University, South Korea

TOBIN IM
Seoul National University, South Korea

GREGORY A. PORUMBESCU
Florida International University, USA

HYUNKUK LEE
Seoul National University, South Korea
&
JUNGHO PARK
Seoul National University, South Korea

This paper challenges the long-term criticism of the efficiency of the

Weberian model of bureaucracy, on the hypothesis that its performance
or competitiveness might be context specific, as what works best in some
bureaucratic settings is unlikely to work to the same degree in others.
To perform this assessment, this study analyzes relationships between
characteristics of the Weberian model of bureaucracy and government
performance in nations possessing different levels of democratic development.
The key finding of this research is that the Weberian characteristic of
bureaucratic professionalism is most strongly and positively associated with
good government performance in nations where democracy is less developed.
This can have special implications for developing countries, where democracy
is usually not well established and furnishing good governance with a well-
functioning bureaucracy is an urgent goal for effective implementation of
development programs.

Key words: bureaucracy, Weber, government performance

116 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

INTRODUCTION

From a public management perspective, Weberian bureaucracy (WB) has been

criticized for the heavy emphasis it places upon efficiency. While no strict definition exists,
the concept of WB generally refers to a cluster of administrative values rather than distinct
practices, and therefore cannot be directly falsified in the process of administration. As such,
WB has served as a prime research subject for the prescription of public sector reforms
over the course of the past several decades (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004).Accordingly, over
time scholars have often stereotyped the according to its dysfunctions (e.g., Merton 1957).
More recently, this form of bureaucracy has also sustained heavy criticism from those
espousing new public management (NPM). NPM advocates the pursuit of bureaucratic
reforms that ostensibly intend to alter the way a bureaucracy functions, primarily through
the introduction of “market principles” (Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Hood 1991; Pollitt
&Bouckaert 2004; Pollitt 2009).Prominent streams of logic guiding NPM reforms are
new institutional economics, which advocates the use of various forms of incentive to
bolster employee output, as well as managerialism, which advocates greater emphasis
upon results and value, as opposed to process (Hood 1991; Rhodes 1996; Evans &Rauch
1999; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004).Thus, ultimately what is advocated by NPM is a shift
away from traditional WB and toward more market-based and therefore flexible forms of
administrative bureaucracy (Osborne & Gaebler 1992).
However, this debate over the desirability of WB is often couched in rather absolute
terms; it is viewed as something that either works well, or not. Yet the appropriateness
of such an absolutist perspective has been called into question, with some suggesting the
performance of public sector models of bureaucracy may be contingent upon context. To
elaborate, previous research has observed that the performance of a bureaucracy is heavily
influenced by the characteristics of the environment it operates in (Wilkins & Ouchi
1983; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004). Accordingly, cultural, historical, economic, and political
contexts may serve to differentiate the performance of WB across different national
contexts, implying that the decisions regarding the form of a public sector bureaucracy
should take into consideration the context in which it operates (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004).
As an example, we may consider pioneering work done by Rauch and Evans (2000), which
highlighted the importance of the political context of a bureaucracy because, for example,
political will to engage in vigorous monitoring and to implement appropriate strategies is
often lacking in less politically developed countries.
Few empirical studies of cross-national comparisons on this topic have been conducted
(Dahlström et al. 2010), and the reason for this dearth of comparative literature regarding
government bureaucracies may be attributable to an absence of reliable data on national
bureaucratic structures (Brans 2003, 426; Lapuente 2007, 301;Im et al. 2011). Yet, despite
the data limitations, cross-national comparisons of bureaucratic performance are important
to pursue because they offer tangible insights into optimal bureaucratic structures for
December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 117

countries with different contexts.

This research intends to contribute to the discussion over the desirability of WB
by empirically examining the relationship between features of WB and bureaucratic
performance across different nations, and government competitiveness more generally.
Accordingly, the specific research question this study asks is “Do the impacts of WB on
performance vary across different political contexts?”More specifically, this research
will focus upon addressing the contextual factor of level of democratization, which will
be included in our empirical model. This factor is particularly important, as the level of
democracy is linked to a variety of contextual factors, related to economic wealth, history,
geography, and government competitiveness (Jackman 1975; Rothstein 2005).
Theoretically, the findings of this research will contribute to debates over the benefits
associated with WB by demonstrating how certain contextual features, such as level of
democratization, may serve to differentiate performance. In terms of practical contributions,
the empirical evidence provided by this research will provide practitioners with concrete
suggestions for how to pursue administrative reforms that are suitable for particular national
contexts. Taken together, the overarching contribution of this research is to shed light on
ways in which the civil service can be reformed in order to increase bureaucracy’s ability to
foster the competiveness of government according to certain contextual factors.

The Weberian Model of Bureaucracy and its Virtues

Weberian bureaucracy is referred to most often in a pathological manner. WB is

typically contrasted with models of bureaucracy that borrow features from market-oriented
bureaucratic structures, although the ideals espoused by WB and NPM are not mutually
exclusive and can even be said to hold a lot in common. Neither the WB nor NPM model
of bureaucracy is easily defined, as both have theoretical and practical uses. Nevertheless,
WB has generally been discussed more from a theoretical perspective, while NPM models
of bureaucracy have been discussed from a more practical perspective. These different
points of emphasis in the discourse surrounding the two approaches to bureaucracy are
likely to cause some degree of confusion. Nevertheless, one commonly agreed-upon point
of distinction between the two bureaucratic models is that NPM structures are said to place
particular emphasis upon flexibility, which is said to stem from blurring the distinction
between the state bureaucracy and other areas of society (Pollitt 2009), whileWB is
generally said to emphasize rigidity. Accordingly, it is commonly argued that the NPM
form of bureaucracy is most adept at dealing with a perpetually changing environment with
a basis in market principles (Christensen & Laegreid 2001). On the other hand, WB, which
focuses primarily upon the importance of process, has been found by previous research
to increase levels of red tape, decrease levels of job satisfaction, lead to a greater sense of
alienation among employees, and ultimately reduce levels of organizational performance
(DeHart-Davis & Pandey 2005).
118 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

Accordingly, this vein of criticism has led to calls to “let managers manage” (Norman
2001), and to the subsequent introduction of market-oriented human resource practices
that facilitate lateral entry into the civil service and introduce monetary incentives (Pollitt
& Bouckaert 2004).Such changes are said to stimulate an emphasis upon results and
flexibility, which may in turn result in the production of public services that better satisfy
citizens (Van Ryzin 2007; Brewer 2007; Pollitt 2009). Ostensibly, those who stand to
benefit from a more responsive and results-oriented state bureaucracy first and foremost are
the citizens.
Another criticism of WB is that it is too insulated from society. Ideally, the state must
answer to the demands and needs of citizens and its environment, as opposed to dictating
them. However, in WB, citizens’ ability to guide the actions of their bureaucracy is limited,
as bureaucracy is separated from actors in its environment, such as citizens. Additionally,
given bureaucrats’ obligation to faithfully execute the law, public sector bureaucracy is also
said to be separated from political influence. In order to protect bureaucrats from external
pressure, Weber(1968) argued that bureaucrats should be anonymous to outsiders, which
implied non-transparency. Thus, WB stands in clear contrast to the NPM model, which
emphasizes customer-oriented and transparent administration. Here, it is important to
emphasize that WB was actually identified by Weber (1968:975) as “efficient” and “rational”
way of organizing. Max Weber’s ideal bureaucracy is characterized by features such as
rules implemented by neutral officials, merit-based recruitment and career advancement,
expert training, rule-based action, clear lines of authority, and hierarchical organization.
These features, which Weber considered to be inherent to modern bureaucracy, resulted in
its technical superiority over other forms of organization.
Drawing on the original insight of Weber(1968: 1904–1911), Evans and Rauch
(1999, 2000) further investigated the virtues of the Weberian model of bureaucracy by
focusing on specific features of WB, such as meritocratic recruitment, internal promotion,
career stability, and competitive salaries; they identified these characteristics of WB as
determinants of bureaucratic performance and predictors of economic growth. This is
referred to as the “Weberian state hypothesis.”More interested in low-income countries,
Evans (1992, 1995) argued that the replacement of a patronage system by recruitment
of state officials to a professional merit-based state bureaucracy is a necessary condition
for a nation to be “developmental.” More concretely, they suggest that governments in
less developed countries should form what they call Weberian bureaucracy, which has
institutional characteristics of meritocratic recruitment through competitive examinations,
civil service procedures for hiring and firing rather than political appointments and
dismissals, and filling higher levels of the hierarchy through internal promotion.
Evans (1992, 1995) explains how those ingredients of the Weberian state combine
to produce good bureaucratic performance. A capable pool of officials can be cultivated
by making entry to the bureaucracy conditional on passing a civil service exam, and
paying salaries comparable to those for private positions that require similar skills and
December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 119

responsibility.1 Internal promotion provides job stability, and this stability forms stronger
ties among bureaucrats, in turn improving communication and effectiveness. This causes
members of the organization to consider at greater length what their colleagues think of
them, which leads to greater adherence to behavioral norms. Their job performance is
valued because they entered the bureaucracy on the basis of merit and skill rather than
political connections; concerns about how much they can accomplish on behalf of their
political clan are less important under this system. Internal promotion generates long-term
career rewards that reinforce adherence to codified rules of behavior and can also offer a
sense of commitment to corporate goals, thus developing “esprit de corps.”
These features of WB are in line with descriptions of Asian bureaucracy by
Frederickson(2002) and Ouch(1981). Bureaucracies in countries adhering to Confucian
value systemshave for long operated on principles such as recruitment by highly
competitive exam, placed strong emphasis on merit and morality, and possessed a
strong hierarchy based upon internal promotion and lifetime employment. The Asian
bureaucracies run by these personnel administration methods are commonly argued to have
produced remarkable performance, as evidenced by the “Asian Tigers” success stories.
Bureaucratic performance is often analyzed based on a principal-agent model in the
economics literature. Rauch (1995) attempted to marry this principal-agent framework to
the Weberian state hypothesis. In his analytic framework, internal promotion is viewed as
the recruitment of the principal from the ranks of agents. The principal is the only actor who
exercises power in the sense of deciding or influencing the mix of services the bureaucracy
supplies. Rauch assumes individuals have different levels of desire to impose their
preferences over collective goods on the public, and imposing preferences requires effective
bureaucracy that can fulfill the mission. A principal values exercising power and spends
more time and effort supervising his or her agents to insure that agents are implementing
the principal’s preferences, while spending less time and effort looking for ways to line his
or her own pockets. In order to increase the chances of becoming a principal, agents in an
internal promotion system are more responsive to supervision. Because agents who care
about power are more likely to become principal, principals are, in turn, more likely to care
about power, and as a result principals supervise their agents more closely.By this process,
a virtuous circle is generated by internal promotion; internal promotion increases the value
or expectation that the principal places on exercising power, and this increases the extent to
which the bureaucracy as a whole carries out its assigned tasks of providing public goods,
while decreasing the extent to which it implicitly taxes the private sector through large-
scale corruption (Rauch 1995).

Weberian Model of Bureaucracy in LDCs

Analysis of incentive-based bureaucratic forms has generated challenges to the

Weberian state hypothesis (Rauch &Evans 2000). The meritocratic civil service system
120 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

has civil service protection as well as formal examinations. It is argued that civil service
protection de-motivates public officials, because firing them is difficult. A civil service
system based on WB, in other words, has worse monitoring, from this perspective.
Requirements such as formal examinations can prevent qualified outsiders from being
hired. In the same respect, internal promotion can function as a barrier to entry that blocks
the best candidates, who could be appointed to higher positions in an open system. These
arguments are often addressed by NPM advocates in the discussion of bureaucratic reform.
Even though NPM approaches to bureaucratic reform are somewhat contradictory to
WB, some have even argued that WB can be seen as a precondition for implementation
of NPM reforms (Bale &Dale 1998; Schick 1998). In the 1990s, developmental studies
started to debate the applicability of NPM-style reform such as that of New Zealand to
less developed countries, and they found that some preconditions were needed as a basis
for the NPM reforms to ensure their success (Wallis & Dollery 2001; Common 1998).
In New Zealand for example, there was a well-functioning political market; relatively
competent civil service with a tradition of political neutrality; little concern about corruption
or nepotism; a consistent and well-enforced legal code, including contract law; and a
competent but suppressed private sector. It has been argued that an appropriate reform
mix for developing countries should reflect major differences in these preconditions, and
NPM reforms in developed countries, such as the reform carried out in New Zealand,
are simply notable to be transplanted (Bale &Dale 1998; Schick 1998; Wallis & Dollery
2001; Common 1998; Neshkova & Kostadinova 2012).In addition, establishing a modern
bureaucracy can be a necessary condition for many developing countries. In the same
vein, Randma-Liiv (2008,2009) highlights specific characteristics in Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries as to bureaucratic reforms, summarizing key findings with
further suggestions:

It is clear […] that NPM provides a wrong medicine for the CEE problems.
Meanwhile, many of the above-made points refer to the necessity to Weberian
principles before introducing modern management mechanisms in CEE […] The
key for further development in CEE countries is to first ensure the presence of the
“Weberian” elements […] and only then start gradually building the “Neo” elements
by introducing individual modern management tools. (Randma-Liiv 2008; 2009,
12–13).

Then why do political context and more specifically democracy matter for the
performance of a bureaucratic organization? Rauch and Evans (2000) pointed out
shortcomings in assumptions guiding the theoretical predictions made by NPM, indicating
that political context can make a difference; the organizational performance of NPM has
been advocated according to analysis using the principal-agent model, but Rauch and Evans
(2000) argue that this principal-agent approach to NPM can be not applicable to developing
December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 121

countries. In the principal-agent model supporting NPM, a powerful and determined

outside monitor (principal) is believed to reduce corruption and improve delivery of
services by his bureaucratic agents (Klitgaard 1991), and the principal can elicit better
performance from his agents using strategies such as performance-based pay (Caiden 1988;
Aucoin 1990; Boston et al. 1991).However, there is a flaw in this principal-agent approach
to NPM in that it assumes away the problems in developing countries, where the political
will to engage in vigorous monitoring is lacking, or worse yet, the principal is corrupt (Rauch
&Evans 2000; Rauch 1995). In other words, the standard assumption of such a principal-
agent approach is that the principal is not corrupt, which misses the reality of what Rauch
(1995) called “the predatory state” in less developed countries. In this respect, Rauch (1995)
extended the modeling to the side of the principal as well as to the side of the agent to retain
the utility of this approach, considering different levels of political control. Rauch (1995)
and Rauch and Evans (2000) conclude that WB is better suited to less developed countries
than NPM when considering the political context of those countries.
Drawing on the discussion above, the level of democratization in the environment
where a government bureaucracy works is likely to be a crucial factor. The failure of
previous empirical research to question the impact of democracy on administrative
performance is surprising, as the tension between administrative and democratic values has
been highlighted for quite some time (Rosenbloom 2008). In particular, from the time of
Wilson and his landmark essay, “The Study of Administration” (1887), the question of how
to reconcile bureaucratic performance with democratic ideals has remained high on the
scholarly research agenda. At the crux of the argument made by Wilson, as well as more
contemporary research, is the difficulty in reconciling WB with the democratic demands
of popular oversight and accountability (Pollitt 2009). They pointed out the incompatibility
between WB and democracy.
Among the empirical studies, Rauch and Evans (2000) have tested the relationship
between the aforementioned structural characteristics of WB and bureaucratic performance,
focusing their analysis in particular upon WB’s impact on economic growth in developing
nations (Evans & Rauch 2000). Their empirical studies have made initial steps toward
testing so the called Weberian state hypothesis, but their data and empirical modeling
needs to be elaborated upon. More specifically, the empirical studies by Rauch and
Evans conducted statistical tests using only a sample of less developed countries, but did
not explicitly assess the role of political context as a key moderator in their theoretical
modeling. Therefore, this study tested the moderating role of democracy to see whether
the political context is actually a factor that differentiates the performance of WB. Further,
Evans and Rauch collected data from thirty-five countries, and so there is a need to check
the reliability of the result by testing it with a larger sample of nations.
Our study used recently collected Quality of Government data that cover more than
one hundred countries, providing better rigor to the results. Rauch and Evans measured
bureaucratic performance with proxy measures such as corruption or the economic growth
122 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

rate, but we think government performance indices can be a better measure because
theyare closer to the theoretical approach used by Rauch (1999). Therefore, this study uses
government performance indices as a dependent variable.

Dimensions of the Weberian Model of Bureaucracy

As we mentioned earlier, this study focuses on several specific features of WB as

identified by Rauch and Evans (2000). Those features are meritocratic recruitment,
internal promotion, career stability, and competitive salaries. While they identified these
features independently, Dahlström et al. (2011) assert that there are structural dimensions
with respect to what Rauch and Evans call Weberian features. Using expert survey data,
Dahlström et al. (2011) grouped the Weberian features by factor analysis methods, and
found that the features can be categorized into three dimensions, which they labeled
bureaucratic professionalism, bureaucratic closedness, and competitive salaries.
Bureaucratic professionalism can be thought of as placing greater emphasis upon
the merit-based qualities of potential members of the state bureaucracy (Berman et
al. 2010;Teodoro 2010) and therefore judging applicants according to their “technical
knowledge”(Stewart 1985), as opposed to their political loyalties (Neshkova&Kostadinova
2012). Thus, professionalism-oriented bureaucracies are beneficial, as they serve to imbue
state bureaucracies with capacity (Haga et al. 1974).Commonly, senior-level positions are
filled by internally promoting members of the organization (Rauch &Evans 2000, Pollitt
& Bouckaert 2004). Promotions are based upon a mixture of seniority and performance,
as opposed to political affiliations and loyalty (Pollitt 2009).Dahlström et al. (2011) see the
dimension of bureaucratic professionalism as a mixture of meritocratic recruitment and
internally recruited senior officials.
The second dimension is bureaucratic closedness. In their research on twentieth-
century civil service systems, Auer and colleagues (1996)created a two-type typology of
the national bureaucracies they studied with a focus on hiring practices. These two types
of state bureaucracy were categorized as “open” civil service systems (e.g., U.S., UK,
Netherlands) and “closed” civil service systems (e.g., France, Germany, Spain). Bekke and
Van der Meer (2000), finding cleavages similar to those found by Auer et al., clarify the
“open” and “closed” system typology, asserting that an “open” system is characterized by
hiring practices in the state bureaucracy similar to those of the private sector, implying freer
movement of employees into and out of the public sector. In contrast, “closed” systems are
marked by restrictions to entry into the administrative system in the form of a rigorous civil
service examination and low incentive to move out of the state administrative system due to
the prospect of lifetime tenure (Auer et al. 1996).Dahlström et al (2011) view the dimension
of bureaucratic closedness as a mixture of a formal examination system, lifelong tenure,
and regulation by special employment laws.
Competitive salaries are a relatively straightforward component of WB. In order to
December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 123

attract competent personnel, salaries offered in the public sector must be on par with those
offered in the private sector (Rauch &Evans 2000). Failure to offer such salaries runs the
risk of attracting personnel from a less talented labor pool, or not attracting personnel at all.
Our study put less emphasis on this feature of WB, because this research focused mainly on
the role of political context in the relationship between WB and government performance,
and competitive salary, Rauch and Evans posit, is less influenced by political context in
terms of its impact on performance. We do not, however, neglect the role of monetary
rewards in forming competitive bureaucracy, therefore we tested the effect of performance-
based pay, which is what NPM reform strategy emphasizes. In other words, we tested two
types of monetary reward, one advocated by WB and the other advocated by NPM, even
though those two are not conflicting strategies but, rather, complementary.

Model and Methodology

In order to test WB’s applicability to different contexts, here we must designate

bureaucratic “efficiency” as the dependent variable. Although there is a lack of
internationally comparable data on bureaucratic efficiency, several datasets of overall
government performance exist. These indicators of government performance are weak in
exclusively measuring bureaucratic efficiency, because those indicators are a composite of
different aspects of the performance of various government activities. Yet these indicators
are still valid as a proxy for bureaucratic efficiency. Thus, the dependent variable of this
study is government performance, while the independent variable is the degree to which
the features of the Weberian model of bureaucracy are present. More precisely, we will
examine bureaucratic professionalism, bureaucratic closedness, and competitive salaries as
independent variables.
To see the moderating role of democracy, we used an interaction term between
bureaucratic professionalism and democracy, and between bureaucratic closedness and
democracy. We don’t consider the interaction between competitive salaries and democracy,
because competitive salary is actually somewhat context-free, as we discussed earlier.
For the controlling factors, we considered the level of economic development and that of
parliamentary power, which are identified as effective and useful variables to reduce the
problem of endogeneity caused by omitted factors.
In performing our analysis, this paper uses the Quality of Government Institute’s
Quality of Government Survey to measure the bureaucratic characteristics of a country.
We have supplemented the Quality of Government Institute’s survey data in order to
address other contemporary bureaucratic perspectives, such as new public management
(Pollitt &Bouckaert 2004),with data on factors such as performance-based pay (Rothstein
&Teorell 2008).A detailed explanation of the Quality of Government data, including survey
questionnaires, is given in Appendix 1.
The Quality of Government Institute first conducted the survey in 2008, and then
124 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

updated it in 2010 with expanded country coverage. Considering possible systematic errors
in combining the two survey datasets, our study conducted data analysis for both survey
datasets and compared the results in order to check the reliability and consistency of our
findings.
The countries that each dataset includes are listed in Table 1. The survey questionnaires
of bureaucratic professionalism and closedness are measured by a 1–10 scale; however we
standardized the variables into a range from -3 to 3.

Table 1. Countries in QoG Expert Survey Data in 2008 and in 2010

QoG data 2008
Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South
Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uzbekistan
N=55
QoG data 2010
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium,
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Kazakhstan, South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania ,Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela
N=103

For other variables, we have used data from the World Bank, ICRG, and Freedom
House, which are all widely used in comparative research. The data source for each
variable is listed in Table 1. We used two different indicators as dependent variables in order
December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 125

to enhance the robustness of our findings: the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness
indicator and ICRG’s Quality of Government indicator. The Government Effectiveness
(World Bank) index combines into a single grouping the responses on indicators such
as quality of public service provision, quality of the bureaucracy, competence of civil
servants, and credibility of the government’s commitment to policies, while in the Quality
of Government (ICRG) index, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has
the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in
government services.

Results

Table 2 presents the summary statistics. The source of each variable is in parentheses.
We standardized the scores of bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic closedness;
therefore the standard deviations of these indicators are exactly 1.00,with a mean of zero.

Table 2. Summary Statistics

Variable (source) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Quality of Government (ICRG) 0.66 0.22 0.22 1.00
Government Effectiveness (World Bank) 0.70 1.09 -1.12 2.25
Bureaucratic Professionalism (QoG 2008) 0.00 1.00 -1.96 2.28
Bureaucratic Professionalism (QoG 2010) 0.00 1.00 -1.97 2.27
Bureaucratic Closedness (QoG 2008) 0.00 1.00 -2.16 2.18
Bureaucratic Closedness (QoG 2010) 0.00 1.00 -2.16 2.17
Performance based pay (QoG 2008) 3.25 0.98 1.00 5.33
Performance based pay (QoG 2010) 3.01 1.19 1.00 7.00
Competitive Salary (QoG 2008) 3.46 1.10 1.67 6.00
Competitive Salary (QoG 2010) 3.10 1.17 1.00 7.00
Per Capita GDP (World Bank) 15476.74 10535.11 1088.51 48589.14
Parliamentary Powers (Fish and Kroenig, 2009) 0.65 0.15 0.25 0.84
Democracy (Freedom House) 8.24 2.61 0.67 10.00

Figure 1 describes relative differences in the level of bureaucratic closedness for

each country in the 2008 QoG dataset. We can see from the figure that New Zealand,
Uzbekistan, South Africa, Georgia, and Australia have the most open bureaucracies, while
Luxembourg, India, France, Brazil, and Serbia have relatively closed bureaucratic systems.
126 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

Figure 1. Bureaucratic closedness in 2008 data

December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 127

The scores for bureaucratic professionalism in the sample countries are shown in Figure
2, which reveals that bureaucracies in Macedonia, South Africa, Serbia, Albania, and
Bosnia are the most politicized, while those in New Zealand, Ireland, Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden are the most professionalized.

Figure 2. Bureaucratic professionalism in 2008 data

128 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis testing the relationships between
Weberianess variables and government performance indicators with the 2008 QoG dataset.
Model 1 is the base model, which includes Weberianess variables and control variables.
Model 2 added the democracy variable and the democracy variable multiplied by the
bureaucratic professionalism variable in order to test the moderating role of the democracy
variable in the relationship between professionalism and government performance. Model 3
tests the moderating role of democracy in the relationship between bureaucratic closedness
and government performance in the same way. Model 4 includes both democracy variables
multiplied by professionalism and the democracy variable multiplied by closedness.

Table 3. Regression Results for Government Performance Indicators (2008 data)

Government Effectiveness Quality of Government

(World Bank) (ICRG)
Model 1-1 Model 2-1 Model 3-1 Model 4-1 Model 1-2 Model 2-2 Model 3-2 Model 4-2
-1.718*** -1.277*** -1.296** -1.132*** 0.248* 0.325*** 0.269** 0.327***
Constant
(0.344) (0.303) (0.308) (0.299) (0.081) (0.083) (0.082) (0.085)
0.165* 0.848** 0.161* 0.865** 0.079** 0.291** 0.077*** 0.085*
Bureaucratic Professionalism
(0.074) (0.300) (0.064) (0.288) (0.017) (0.101) (0.018) (0.119)
0.034 -0.023 0.270 0.263 -0.013 -0.024 0.026 -0.038
Bureaucratic Closedness
(0.056) (0.049) (0.146) (0.139) (0.013) (0.013) (0.055) (0.063)
0.076 0.065 0.048 0.037 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0007
Performance-based Pay
(0.066) (0.056) (0.058) (0.055) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
-0.054 -0.096* -0.080 -0.070 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
Competitive Salary
(0.049) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
7.64e-05*** 6.46e-05*** 6.51e-05*** 6.97e-05*** 1.34e-05*** 1.32e-05*** 1.28e-05*** 1.31e-05***
Per Capita GDP
(7.88e-06) (7.87e-06) (8.12e-06) (7.91e-06) (1.75e-06) (1.98e-06) (2.17e-06) (2.11e-06)
1.803** 0.296 0.231 0.233 0.278* 0.128 0.140 0.130
Parliamentary Powers
(0.376) (0.491) (0.499) (0.473) (0.087) (0.124) (0.140) (0.126)
0.116** 0.117*** 0.098** 0.006 0.011 0.006
Democracy 0.2330.473)
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Bureaucratic Professionalism -0.075* -8.080* -0.023* -0.024
* Democracy (0.033) (0.032) (0.011) (0.012)
Bureaucratic Closedness -0.033 -0.035* -0.004 0.001
* Democracy (0.017) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006)
N of Observations 55
Note: statistically significant at *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, standard errors are in parentheses
December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 129

The results in Table 3 suggest that bureaucratic professionalism is significantly

and positively associated with government performance in all models, both when the
dependent variable is measured by the World Bank indicator and when measured by
the ICRG indicator. This means that government performs better when the bureaucracy
is professionalized in a Weberiansense. The moderators show significant relationships;
the interaction term between democracy and professionalism presents a significant and
negative relationship with government performance in model 2-1, model 4-1, and model
2-2, and democracy multiplied by closedness shows a significant and negative relationship
with government performance only in model 4-1, while remaining insignificant in other
models. In other words, the moderating role of democracy is more consistently significant
in the analysis when it moderates the relationship between professionalism and government
performance, which implies that the moderating role of professionalism is stronger in
less democratic countries. This finding is particularly interesting, as it means that staffing
policies pursued within a democratic context may impact government effectiveness and
quality differently.
The Weberian characteristics of bureaucratic closedness and performance-based pay
were found to have no significant relationship with regard to quality of governance and
the effectiveness of government, in both the presence and the absence of democracy.
Thus these results suggest that the flow of staff into and out of the state bureaucracy
has little to no influence upon the effectiveness and quality of the work performed. In
other words, reforms such as those often guided by NPM doctrines that favor increasing
mobility between public and private organizations have little influence upon government
competitiveness. Further, the lack of a significant relationship between performance-
based pay and government effectiveness and quality offers, though partial, support for the
arguments made by public service motivation (PSM) advocates who argue that members
of the government bureaucracy may be motivated by more than just personal gain (Perry
&Wise 1990; Perry et al. 2010).
Still more possible support for PSM may be found in the suggested relationship between
competitive salary and government effectiveness and quality. Competitive salary was found
to have a significant relationship with government effectiveness only in model 2-1, while it
remains insignificant in other models.
For control variables, per capita GDP shows a very consistent and significant
relationship with the dependent variable, while other variables do not show consistent
results, though they are partially significant in some of the models.
As mentioned earlier, we tested the same models with QoG 2010 survey data in order to
check for systematic errors when changes are made in country coverage and data collection.
The tests with 2010 data show results consistent with analysis of the 2008 data, as we can
see from Table 4.
130 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

Table 4. Regression Results for Government Effectiveness Indicators (2010 data)

Government Effectiveness Quality of Government
(World Bank) (ICRG)
Model 1-1 Model 2-1 Model 3-1 Model 4-1 Model 1-2 Model 2-2 Model 3-2 Model 4-2
-1.403*** -1.363*** -1.396*** -1.369*** 0.322*** 0.332*** 0.320*** 0.329***
Constant
(0.175) (0.158) (0.155) (0.151) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
0.222*** 0.682*** 0.183*** 0.589*** 0.087*** 0.168*** 0.083*** 0.158***
Bureaucratic Professionalism
(0.059) (0.161) (0.053) (0.156) (0.014) (0.042) (0.014) (0.044)
0.053 0.026 0.473*** 0.402* -0.014 -0.019 0.038 0.015
Bureaucratic Closedness
(0.049) (0.045) (0.124) (0.123) (0.011) (0.011) (0.046) (0.047)
0.057 0.040 0.053 0.038 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009
Performance-based Pay
(0.038) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
-0.002 -0.014 0.004*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
Competitive Salary
(0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
7.49E-5*** 7.35E-5*** 7.26E-5*** 7.54E-5*** 1.33E-5*** 1.36E-5*** 1.34E-5*** 1.38E-5***
Per Capita GDP
(5.68E-06) (5.41E-06) (5.26E-06) (5.19E-06) (1.30E-06) (1.35E-06) (1.37E-06) (1.37E-06)
1.196*** 0.352 0.239 0.307 0.206*** 0.182* 0.162 0.174*
Parliamentary Powers
(0.258) (0.337) (0.332) (0.322) (0.059) (0.085) (0.087) (0.086)
0.078*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.002 0.003 0.008*
Democracy
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Bureaucratic Professionalism -0.057** -0.049** -0.009* -0.008
* Democracy (0.018) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004)
Bureaucratic Closedness -0.052*** -0.047** -0.006 -0.004
* Democracy (0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005)
N of Observations 103
Note: statistically significant at *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, standard errors are in parenthesis

Bureaucratic professionalism presents a significant and positive relationship with

government performance variables in all models. The interaction terms show similar results
with the 2008 data analysis: Professionalism multiplied by democracy shows a significant
and negative relationship with government performance in model 2-1, model 4-1, and
model 2-2, and the interaction term between bureaucratic closedness and democracy is
significantly and negatively associated with government performance in model 3-1 and
model 4-1.

Implications and Conclusion

The Weberianmodel of bureaucracy possesses core components of bureaucratic

December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 131

professionalism, bureaucratic closedness, and competitive salaries(Evans 1995; Rauch

1995; Evans &Rauch 1999; Rauch &Evans 2000; Neshkova & Kostadinova 2012). Rauch
and Evans (2000) claim that these elements are essential, as they facilitate monitoring of the
work done by the bureaucracy, serve to prevent corruption, and work as an “effective set of
internal controls.” As such, these characteristics are mechanisms that are believed to serve
to rationalize and formalize relationships and processes within government bureaucracy
(Rauch 1995). Through the rationalization and formalization of relationships and processes
within government bureaucracy, these core attributes of the Weberian model of bureaucracy
are said to combine to produce enhanced bureaucratic performance, as they move state
bureaucracies away from informal patronage paradigms toward those of a professional
bureaucracy (Nigro et al. 2007).
Of the features associated with WB, our findings suggest that bureaucratic
professionalism is the only feature to consistently and positively affect the quality and
effectiveness of government, regardless of context. However, perhaps more interestingly,
our study also illustrates that bureaucratic professionalism functions differently within
different democratic contexts. More specifically, the results of our analysis indicate that
bureaucratic professionalism works better in less democratic countries in terms of its
impact on bureaucratic performance. As such, these findings offer interesting theoretical
and practical implications.
In terms of theoretical implications, the differing impact of professionalism on
performance, according to level of democratic development, at a broad level suggests that a
single conceptualization of “good governance” may not exist. For example, Andrews (2010)
has suggested that countries that perform well on commonly accepted “good governance
indicators” often possess different administrative features. Accordingly, the author argues
that the meaning of good government is likely to vary according to context (Andrews,
2010: 2). Indeed, the results of this research offer similar theoretical implications, as they
contribute to the debate on whether establishing a framework of “best administrative
practices” is a feasible objective. In other words, the results and therefore desirability of
bureaucratic reform efforts will vary by context. Rose (1993) has argued that the extent
to which the administrative practices of one country can be successfully implemented in
another is largely, if not entirely, contingent upon the institutional characteristics of the
nation adopting the administrative practices. Guided by such logic, it is likely that the level
of democracy within a particular national context will also influence the way administrative
features associated with that state’s bureaucracy function, such as those associated with
WB.
To build upon the point above, the mitigating effect of democratic development on the
positive influence of professionalism on performance suggests that in more democratically
developed contexts, it may be better for the bureaucracy to be less insulated than in
developing contexts. To this end, while definitions of good government may hold constant,
the paths to good government may differ.
132 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

In terms of the practical implications, most notably this research has found that of the
features associated with WB, professionalism may be the most important with respect to
performance. Moreover, the findings of this research also imply that, in terms of personnel
policies of the public sector, different approaches should be taken according to the level of
democratic development. In particular, those nations possessing higher levels of democratic
development may be advised to pursue employment policies that permit political
nominations to senior-level posts, for example, whereas in less democratically developed
nations such practices should be avoided.
The aforementioned practical implication is embedded within a broader vein of
literature related to corruption and democratization. A curvilinear relationship (inverted
“u”) is found to exist between levels of democratization and corruption; as democratization
begins, corruption is said to increase to a certain level of democratization, and then
eventually decrease (Rock 2008). Therefore, as professionalism is a useful tool in
combating corruption, it is a particularly useful personnel practice during the beginning
of the democratic transition phase, but the effect gradually reduces over time as the nation
becomes increasingly democratized and is therefore less susceptible to corruption (Rock
2008; Neshkova & Kostadinova2012).

NOTES

* This study is supported by Young Scholar's Research Support Program of the Korea
Association for Public Administration and by National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF-
2011-330-B00195)

1. However, not accounted for by Evans is that a “comparable” salary is not possible for
bureaucrats in most developing countries.

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———. 2000.Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed
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Wonhyuk Cho earned his PhD at the Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul
National University. He is affiliated with the Korea Institute of Public Affairs at Seoul
National University. His research interests include organizational behavior, performance
management, and developmental and social policy. Lead/first author. Email:wonhyukcho@
gmail.com

Tobin Im is a professor in the Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National

University. His teaching and research focus is on government competitiveness, performance
management, and time study on organization. Email:tobin@snu.ac.kr
136 A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship Between Weberian Bureaucracy and Vol. 18, No. 3
Government Performance

Gregory A. Porumbescu is a visiting professor in the Department of Public Administration

at Florida International University. His research interests include trust in government,
e-government, and public performance management. Email: gporumbescu@gmail.com

Hyunkuk Lee earned his PhD at the Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul
National University. He is affiliated with the Government Competitiveness Research
Centerat Seoul National University. His interests include public budgeting and finance and
public performance and management. Corresponding author. Email:hyunkuklee@gmail.
com

Jungho Park earned his PhD at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs,
University of Pittsburgh. He is affiliated with the Government Competitiveness Research
Center at Seoul National University. His research interests include human resource
management and organization theories, particularly public service motivation (PSM), trust
in public agencies, and performance management. Email:fulled78@gmail.com

Received: July 11, 2013

Accepted: September 23, 2013(no revision)

 
December 2013 Wonhyuk Cho, Tobin Im, Gregory A. Porumbescu, Hyunkuk Lee, & Jungho Park 137

APPENDIX 1. Quality of Government data

The Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden,

conducted an online survey from September 2008 to 2010,targeting public administration
experts in a multitude of countries. The sample of experts was obtained by drawing on
a pool of members of four major international academic public administration networks
(NISPACEE, EGPA, EIPA, and SOG). This was elaborated upon by performing Internet
searches, making use of personal contacts, drawing on a list of experts recruited from a
pilot survey, and incorporating a limited snowballing component. In sum, a sample of 1,361
persons was obtained, of whom528, or 39 percent, responded.
The survey's questions for key characteristics are as follows:
(1) Bureaucratic Professionalism
* Meritocratic recruitment – Q. When recruiting public sector employees,the skills and
merits of the applicants decide who gets the job?
*Political recruitment – Q. When recruiting public employees, the political connections of
the applicants decide who gets the job? (reverse)
* Political elite recruits senior officials – Q. The top political leadership hires and fires
senior public officials? (reverse)
* Senior officials internally recruited – Q. Senior public officials are recruited from within
the ranks of the public sector?
(2) Bureaucratic Closed-ness
* Formal examination system – Q. Public sector employees are hired via a formal
examination system?
* Lifelong careers – Q. once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one stays a public
sector employee for the rest of one’s career?
* Special employment laws – Q. The terms of employment for public sector employees are
regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees?
(3) Competitive Salary
* Salary – Q. Senior officials have salaries that are comparable with the salaries of private
sector managers with roughly similar training and responsibilities?
(4)Performance-based pay
* Performance-based pay – Q. Salaries of public sector employees are linked to appraisals
of their performance?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.
World Economic
Situation
Prospects

and

asdf
United Nations
New York, 2020
Statistical annex
 Country classifications

Data sources, country classifications

and aggregation methodology
The statistical annex contains a set of data that the World Economic Situation and Prospects
(WESP) employs to delineate trends in various dimensions of the world economy.

Data sources
The annex was prepared by the Economic Analysis and Policy Division (EAPD) of the De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UN DESA).
It is based on information obtained from the Statistics Division and the Population Di-
vision of UN DESA, as well as from the five United Nations regional commissions, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Eurostat and national sources. Estimates for 2019 and forecasts for
2020 and 2021 were made by EAPD in consultation with the regional commissions and
UNCTAD, partly guided by the World Economic Forecasting Model (WEFM) of EAPD.1
Longer-term projections are based on a technical model-based extension of the WEFM.
Data presented in the WESP may differ from those published by other organizations
for several reasons, including differences in timing, sample composition and aggregation
methods. Historical data may differ from those in previous editions of the WESP because
of updating and changes in the availability of data for individual countries.

Country classifications
For analytical purposes, the WESP classifies all countries of the world into one of three
broad categories: developed economies, economies in transition and developing econo-
mies.2 The composition of these analytical groupings, specified in tables A, B and C, is
intended to reflect basic economic country conditions, and are not strictly aligned with the
regional classifications defined by the Statistics Division of UN DESA known as M49.3 Ta-
ble A.XX reports estimates for regional GDP growth according to the M49 definitions for
comparison. Several countries (in particular the economies in transition) have characteris-
tics that could place them in more than one category; however, for purposes of analysis, the
groupings have been made mutually exclusive. Within each broad category, some subgroups
are defined based either on geographical location or on ad hoc criteria, such as the subgroup
of “major developed economies”, which is based on the membership of the Group of Seven.

1 See Altshuler et al. (2016).

2 These analytical groupings are not strictly aligned with geographic groupings of Developed Regions
and Developing Regions designated by the Statistics Division of UN DESA.
3 Full details of the M49 standard can be found on the Statistics Division website at https://unstats.
un.org/unsd/methodology/m49.
164 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

In parts of the analysis, a distinction is made between fuel exporters and fuel import-
ers. An economy is classified as a fuel exporter if the share of fuel exports in its total mer-
chandise exports is greater than 20 per cent and the level of fuel exports is at least 20 per
cent higher than that of the country’s fuel imports (table D). This criterion is drawn from
the share of fuel exports in the total value of world merchandise trade. Fuels include coal,
oil and natural gas.
For other parts of the analysis, countries have been classified by their level of develop-
ment as measured by per capita gross national income (GNI). Accordingly, countries have
been grouped as high-income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income and low-in-
come (table E). To maintain compatibility with similar classifications used elsewhere, the
threshold levels of GNI per capita are those established by the World Bank. Countries with
less than $1,025 GNI per capita are classified as low-income countries, those with between
$1,026 and $3,995 as lower-middle-income countries, those with between $3,996 and
$12,375 as upper-middle-income countries, and those with incomes of more than $12,375
as high-income countries. GNI per capita in dollar terms is estimated using the World
Bank Atlas method,4 and the classification in table E is based on data for 2018.
The list of the least developed countries (LDCs) is determined by the United Nations
Economic and Social Council and, ultimately, by the General Assembly, on the basis of
recommendations made by the Committee for Development Policy. The basic criteria for
inclusion require that certain thresholds be met with regard to per capita GNI, a human
assets index and an economic vulnerability index.5 As of December 2018, there were 47
LDCs (table F).
The WESP also makes reference to the group of heavily indebted poor countries
(HIPCs), which are considered by the World Bank and IMF as part of their debt-relief ini-
tiative (the Enhanced HIPC Initiative).6 In December 2018, there were 39 HIPCs (table G).

Aggregation methodology
Aggregate data are either sums or weighted averages of individual country data. Unless
otherwise indicated, multi-year averages of growth rates are expressed as compound annual
percentage rates of change. The convention followed is to omit the base year in a multi-year
growth rate. For example, the 10-year average growth rate for the decade of the 2000s
would be identified as the average annual growth rate for the period from 2001 to 2010.
The WESP utilizes market exchange rate conversions of national data in order to
aggregate output of individual countries into regional and global totals. The growth of out-
put in each group of countries is calculated from the sum of gross domestic product (GDP)
of individual countries measured at 2010 prices and exchange rates. This method supplies
a reasonable set of aggregate growth rates for a period of about 15 years, centred on 2010.
The exchange rate-based aggregation method differs from the one mainly applied
by the IMF for their estimates of world and regional economic growth, which is based on
purchasing power parity (PPP) weights. Over the past two decades, the growth of world

4 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications.
5 Handbook on the Least Developed Country Category: Inclusion, Graduation and Special Support
Measures (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.18.II.A.1). Available from https://www.un.org/
development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/2018CDPhandbook.pdf .
6 International Monetary Fund, Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) In-
itiative. Available from https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-
Relief- Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative.
 Country classification 165

gross product (WGP) on the basis of the exchange rate-based approach has been below that
based on PPP weights. This is because developing countries, in the aggregate, have seen
significantly higher economic growth than the rest of the world in the 1990s and 2000s and
the share in WGP of these countries is larger under PPP measurements than under market
exchange rates. Table I.1 in Chapter I reports world output growth with PPP weights as a
comparator.

Table A
Developed economies

Europe
Major developed
North America European Union Other Europe economies (G7)
Canada EU-15 Iceland Canada
United States Austriaa Norway France
Belgiuma Switzerland Germany
Denmark Italy
Finlanda Japan
Francea United Kingdom
Germanya United States
Greecea
Irelanda
Italya
Luxembourga
Netherlandsa
Portugala
Spaina
Sweden
United Kingdomb
Developed Asia
and Pacific EU-13c
Bulgaria
Australia
Croatia
Japan
Cyprusa
New Zealand a Member of Euro area.
Czechia
Estoniaa b At the time of writing, the
Hungary United Kingdom was a member
Latviaa of the EU and is therefore
Lithuaniaa included in all EU aggregations.
Maltaa The country is scheduled to
withdraw from the EU at the end
Poland
of January 2020.
Romania
c Used in reference to the
Slovakiaa
13 countries that joined the
Sloveniaa
EU since 2004.

Table B a  Georgia officially left the

Economies in transition Commonwealth of Independent
States on 18 August 2009.
However, its performance is
South-Eastern Europe Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgiaa discussed in the context of this
group of countries for reasons
Albania Armenia Republic of Moldova of geographic proximity
Bosnia and Herzegovina Azerbaijan Russian Federation and similarities in economic
structure.
Montenegro Belarus Tajikistan
b Starting in 2010, data for
North Macedonia Georgiaa Turkmenistan the Ukraine excludes the
Serbia Kazakhstan Ukraineb temporarily occupied territory
Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea and Sevastopol.
166 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table C
a
Developing economies by region

Latin America
Africa Asia and the Caribbean
North Africa Southern Africa East Asiab Caribbean
Algeria Angola Brunei Darussalam Bahamas
Egypt Botswana Cambodia Barbados
Libya Eswatini China Belize
Mauritania Lesotho Democratic People’s Guyana
Republic of Korea
Morocco Malawi Fiji Jamaica
Sudan Mauritius Hong Kong SARc Suriname
Tunisia Mozambique Indonesia Trinidad and Tobago
Namibia Kiribati
Central Africa Mexico and Central America
South Africa Lao People’s Democratic
Cameroon Zambia Republic Costa Rica
Central African Malaysia Cuba
Zimbabwe
Republic Mongolia Dominican Republic
Chad West Africa Myanmar
El Salvador
Congo Papua New Guinea
Benin Philippines Guatemala
Equatorial Guinea Burkina Faso Haiti
Republic of Korea
Gabon Cabo Verde Honduras
Samoa
Sao Tome and Côte d’Ivoire Singapore Mexico
Prinicipe
Gambia Solomon Islands Nicaragua
East Africa Ghana Taiwan Province of China Panama
Thailand
Burundi Guinea South America
Timor-Leste
Comoros Guinea-Bissau Vanuatu
Democratic Republic Liberia Argentina
Viet Nam
of the Congo Mali Bolivia (Plurinational
Djibouti South Asia State of)
Niger
Eritrea Brazil
Nigeria Afghanistan
Ethiopia Chile
Senegal Bangladesh
Kenya Bhutan Colombia
Sierra Leone
Madagascar India Ecuador
Togo
Rwanda Iran (Islamic Republic of) Paraguay
Somalia Maldives Peru
Nepal Uruguay
South Sudan
Pakistan Venezuela (Bolivarian
Uganda
Sri Lanka Republic of)
United Republic
of Tanzania Western Asia
Bahrain
a  Economies systematically Iraq
monitored for the World Israel
Economic Situation and Jordan
Prospects report. These
Kuwait
analytical groupings differ
from the geographical Lebanon
aggregations defined Oman
according to M49. Qatar
b Throughout the report Saudi Arabia
the term ‘East Asia’ is used State of Palestine
in reference to this set of Syrian Arab Republic
developing countries, and Turkey
excludes Japan. United Arab Emirates
c  Special Administrative Yemen
Region of China.
 Country classification 167

Table D
Fuel-exporting countries

Developing countries

Latin America
Developed Economies and the
countries in transition Caribbean Africa East Asia South Asia

Australia Azerbaijan Bolivia Algeria Brunei Iran (Islamic

Norway Kazakhstan (Plurinational Angola Darussalam Republic of)
State of)
Russian Cameroon Democratic
Federation Colombia People’s Western Asia
Chad
Ecuador Republic of
Turkmenistan Congo Bahrain
Trinidad Korea
Iraq
and Tobago Equatorial Indonesia
Guinea Kuwait
Venezuela Mongolia
(Bolivarian Gabon Oman
Papua New
Republic of) Libya Guinea Qatar
Mozambique Saudi Arabia
Nigeria United Arab
Emirates
Yemen
Source:  UN DESA, based on data
from UNCTAD.
168 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table E a
Economies by per capita GNI in June 2019

High-income Upper-middle-income Lower-middle-income

Australia Latvia Albania Jamaica Angola Lesotho

Austria Lithuania Algeria Jordan Bangladesh Mauritania
Bahamas Luxembourg Argentinab Kazakhstan Bhutan Mongolia
Bahrain Malta Armenia Lebanon Bolivia (Plurinational Morocco
Barbados Netherlands Azerbaijan Libya State of) Myanmar
Belgium New Zealand Belarus Malaysia Cabo Verde Nicaragua
Brunei Norway Belize Maldives Cambodia Nigeria
Darussalam Oman Bosnia and Mauritius Cameroon Pakistan
Canada Panama Herzegovina Mexico Comorosc Papua New Guinea
Chile Poland Botswana Montenegro Congo Philippines
Croatia Portugal Brazil Namibia Côte d’Ivoire Republic of Moldova
Cyprus Qatar Bulgaria North Macedonia Djibouti Sao Tome and
Czechia Republic of Korea China Paraguay Egypt Principe
Denmark Saudi Arabia Colombia Peru El Salvador Senegalc
Estonia Singapore Costa Rica Romania Eswatini Solomon Islands
Finland Slovak Republic Cuba Russian Federation Ghana State of Palestine
France Slovenia Dominican Republic Samoa Honduras Sudan
Germany Spain Ecuador Serbia India Timor-Leste
Greece Sweden Equatorial Guinea South Africa Indonesia Tunisia
Hong Kong SARd Switzerland Fiji Sri Lankac Kenya Ukraine
Hungary Taiwan Province of Gabon Suriname Kiribati Uzbekistan
Iceland China Georgiac Thailand Kyrgyzstan Vanuatu
Ireland Trinidad and Tobago Guatemala Turkey Lao People’s Viet Nam
Israel United Arab Emirates Guyana Turkmenistan Democratic Zambia
Italy United Kingdom Iran (Islamic Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic Zimbabwec
Japan United States Republic of) Republic of)
Kuwait Uruguay Iraq

Low-income

Afghanistan Democratic Republic Malawi Syrian Arab

Benin of the Congo Mali Republic
Burkina Faso Eritrea Mozambique Tajikistan
Burundi Ethiopia Nepal Togo
Central African Gambia Niger Uganda
Republic Guinea Rwanda United Republic of
Chad Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone Tanzania
Comoros Haiti Somalia Yemen
Democratic People’s Liberia South Sudan
Republic of Korea Madagascar

Source: World Bank, Country classification by income (https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519).

a  Economies systematically monitored for the World Economic Situation and Prospects report, based on World Bank country classifications by income.
b  Indicates the country has been shifted downward by one category from previous year’s classification.
c  Indicates the country has been shifted upward by one category from previous year’s classification.
d  Special Administrative Region of China.
 Country classification 169

Table F
Least developed countries (as of December 2018)

Latin America
Africa East Asia South Asia Western Asia and the Caribbean

Angola Malawi Cambodia Afghanistan Yemen Haiti

Benin Mali Kiribati Bangladesh
Burkina Faso Mauritania Lao People’s Bhutan
Burundi Mozambique Democratic Nepal
Central African Republic Niger Republic
Chad Rwanda Myanmar
Comoros Sao Tome and Principe Solomon
Democratic Republic of Senegal Islands
the Congo Sierra Leone Timor Leste
Djibouti Somalia Tuvalua
Eritrea South Sudan Vanuatu
Ethiopia Sudan
Gambia Togo
Guinea Uganda
Guinea-Bissau United Republic
Lesotho of Tanzania
Liberia Zambia
Madagascar
Source:  UN DESA (https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf).
a  Economies not systematically monitored for the World Economic Situation and Prospects report.

Table G
Heavily indebted poor countries (as of December 2018)

Post-completion point HIPCsa Pre-decision point HIPCsb

Afghanistan Haiti Eritrea

Benin Honduras Somalia
Bolivia Liberia Sudan
Burkina Faso Madagascar
Burundi Malawi
Cameroon Mali
Central African Republic Mauritania
Chad Mozambique
Comoros Nicaragua
Congo Niger
Côte D’Ivoire Rwanda
Democratic Republic of the Congo Sao Tome and Principe
Ethiopia Senegal
Gambia Sierra Leone
Ghana Togo
Guinea Uganda
Guinea-Bissau United Republic of Tanzania
Guyana Zambia
Source:  The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief- Under-
the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative).
a  Countries that have qualified for irrevocable debt relief under the HIPC Initiative.
b  Countries that are potentially eligible and may wish to avail themselves of the HIPC Initiative or the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).
170 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table H
Small island developing States

Non-UN members/Associate members

United Nations members of the Regional Commissionsa

Antigua and Barbudaa Marshall Islandsa American Samoa

Bahamas Mauritius Anguilla
Bahrain Naurua Aruba
Bermuda
Barbados Palaua
British Virgin Islands
Belize Papua New Guinea
Cayman Islands
Cabo Verde Saint Kitts and Nevisa
Commonwealth of
Comoros Saint Luciaa Northern Marianas
Cuba Saint Vincent and Cook Islands
Dominicaa the Grenadinesa Curaçao
Dominican Republic Samoa French Polynesia
Federated States Sao Tome and Príncipe Guadeloupe
of Micronesiaa Seychellesa Guam
Fiji Singapore Martinique
a Montserrat
Grenada Solomon Islands
Guinea-Bissau Suriname New Caledonia
Guyana Timor-Leste Niue
Source:  UN DESA (https://
sustainabledevelopment. Haiti Tongaa Puerto Rico
un.org/topics/sids/list). Sint Maarten
Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
a  Economies not systematically Turks and Caicos Islands
monitored for the World Kiribati Tuvalua
Economic Situation and U.S. Virgin Islands
Maldives Vanuatu
Prospects report.

Table I
Landlocked developing countries

Landlocked developing countries

Afghanistan Ethiopia North Macedonia

Armenia Kazakhstan Paraguay
Azerbaijan Kyrgystan Republic of Moldova
Bhutan Lao People’s Democratic Rwanda
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Republic South Sudan
Botswana Lesotho Tajikistan
Burkina Faso Malawi Turkmenistan
Burundi Mali Uganda
Central African Republic Mongolia Uzbekistan
Chad Nepal Zambia
Source:  UN-OHRLLS (http://
unohrlls.org/about-lldcs/ Eswatini Niger Zimbabwe
country-profiles/).
 Country classification 171

Table J
International Organization for Standardization of Country Codes

ISO ISO ISO ISO

Code Country Code Country Code Country Code Country

AFG Afghanistan DZA Algeria LBN Lebanon ROU Romania

AGO Angola ECU Ecuador LBR Liberia RUS Russian Federation
AIA Anguilla EGY Egypt LBY Libya RWA Rwanda
ALB Albania ERI Eritrea LCA Saint Lucia SAU Saudi Arabia
AND Andorra ESP Spain LIE Liechtenstein SDN Sudan
ARE United Arab Emirates EST Estonia LKA Sri Lanka SEN Senegal
ARG Argentina ETH Ethiopia LSO Lesotho SGP Singapore
ARM Armenia FIN Finland LTU Lithuania SLB Solomon Islands
ATG Antigua and Barbuda FJI Fiji LUX Luxembourg SLE Sierra Leone
AUS Australia FRA France LVA Latvia SLV El Salvador
AUT Austria FSM Micronesia (Federated MAR Morocco SMR San Marino
AZE Azerbaijan States of) MCO Monaco SOM Somalia
BDI Burundi GAB Gabon MDA Republic of Moldova SRB Serbia
BEL Belgium GBR United Kingdom of MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan
BEN Benin Great Britain and MDV Maldives STP Sao Tome and
BFA Burkina Faso Northern Ireland MEX Mexico Principe
BGD Bangladesh GEO Georgia MHL Marshall Islands SUR Suriname
BGR Bulgaria GHA Ghana MKD North Macedonia SVK Slovakia
BHR Bahrain GIN Guinea MLI Mali SVN Slovenia
BHS Bahamas GMB Gambia MLT Malta SWE Sweden
BIH Bosnia and GNB Guinea-Bissau MMR Myanmar SWZ Eswatini
Herzegovina GNQ Equatorial Guinea MNE Montenegro SYC Seychelles
BLR Belarus GRC Greece MNG Mongolia SYR Syrian Arab Republic
BLZ Belize GRD Grenada MOZ Mozambique TCD Chad
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational GTM Guatemala MRT Mauritania TGO Togo
State of) GUY Guyana MSR Montserrat THA Thailand
BRA Brazil HND Honduras MUS Mauritius TJK Tajikistan
BRB Barbados HRV Croatia MWI Malawi TKM Turkmenistan
BRN Brunei Darussalam HTI Haiti MYS Malaysia TLS Timor-Leste
BTN Bhutan HUN Hungary NAM Namibia TON Tonga
BWA Botswana IDN Indonesia NER Niger TTO Trinidad and Tobago
CAF Central African IND India NGA Nigeria TUN Tunisia
Republic IRL Ireland NIC Nicaragua TUR Turkey
CAN Canada IRN Iran (Islamic NLD Netherlands TUV Tuvalu
CHE Switzerland Republic of) NOR Norway TZA United Republic of
CHL Chile IRQ Iraq NPL Nepal Tanzania
CHN China ISL Iceland NRU Nauru UGA Uganda
CIV Côte D’Ivoire ISR Israel NZL New Zealand UKR Ukraine
CMR Cameroon ITA Italy OMN Oman URY Uruguay
COD Democratic Republic JAM Jamaica PAK Pakistan USA United States of
of the Congo JOR Jordan PAN Panama America
COG Congo JPN Japan PER Peru UZB Uzbekistan
COL Colombia KAZ Kazakhstan PHL Philippines VCT Saint Vincent and the
COM Comoros KEN Kenya PLW Palau Grenadines
CPV Cabo Verde KGZ Kyrgyzstan PNG Papua New Guinea VEN Venezuela (Bolivarian
CRI Costa Rica KHM Cambodia POL Poland Republic of)
CUB Cuba KIR Kiribati PRK Democratic People’s VNM Viet Nam
CYP Cyprus KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis Republic of Korea VUT Vanuatu
CZE Czechia KOR Republic of Korea PRT Portugal WSM Samoa
DEU Germany KWT Kuwait PRY Paraguay YEM Yemen
DJI Djibouti LAO Lao People’s PSE State of Palestine ZAF South Africa
DMA Dominica Democratic QAT Qatar ZMB Zambia
DNK Denmark Republic ZWE Zimbabwe
DOM Dominican Republic
Annex tables
 Annex tables 175

Table A.1
Developed economies: rates of growth of real GDP
Annual percentage change
1997–2011a 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Developed economies 2.0 1.1 1.2 1.9 2.3 1.7 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.7
United States 2.4 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.9 1.6 2.4 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.8
Canada 2.7 1.8 2.3 2.9 0.7 1.1 3.0 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.6
Japan 0.6 1.5 2.0 0.4 1.2 0.6 1.9 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.3
Australia 3.3 3.9 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.7 1.8 2.1 2.2
New Zealand 2.8 2.6 2.2 3.1 4.1 4.2 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.8
European Union 1.9 -0.4 0.3 1.7 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.7
EU-15 1.8 -0.5 0.2 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.4 1.8 1.2 1.4 1.6
Austria 2.1 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.0 2.1 2.5 2.4 1.3 1.5 1.6
Belgium 2.1 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.6 2.0
Denmark 1.4 0.2 0.9 1.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.0
Finland 2.7 -1.4 -1.0 -0.4 0.6 2.6 3.1 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.7
France 1.9 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.3 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.6
Germany 1.4 0.4 0.4 2.2 1.7 2.2 2.5 1.5 0.7 1.3 1.4
Greece 1.5 -7.3 -3.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.2 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.0
Ireland 4.6 0.2 1.4 8.6 25.2 3.7 8.1 8.2 4.3 3.1 3.2
Italy 0.8 -3.0 -1.8 0.0 0.8 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.7
Luxembourg 3.8 -0.4 3.7 4.3 4.3 4.6 1.8 3.1 2.1 2.3 2.0
Netherlands 2.2 -1.0 -0.1 1.4 2.0 2.2 2.9 2.6 1.6 1.8 1.2
Portugal 1.5 -4.1 -0.9 0.8 1.8 2.0 3.5 2.4 2.0 2.1 1.9
Spain 2.6 -3.0 -1.4 1.4 3.8 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.9
Sweden 2.7 -0.6 1.1 2.7 4.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.8 1.9 2.2
United Kingdom 2.1 1.5 2.1 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.8
EU-13 3.4 0.7 1.2 3.0 3.9 3.2 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.2
Bulgaria 3.3 0.4 0.3 1.9 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.1 3.6 3.0 2.9
Croatia 2.4 -2.2 -0.6 -0.1 2.5 3.4 3.2 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.5
Cyprus 3.5 -3.5 -6.5 -1.9 3.4 6.7 4.4 4.0 3.4 2.7 2.9
Czechia 2.5 -0.8 -0.5 2.7 5.3 2.5 4.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.4
Estonia 4.4 3.1 1.3 3.0 1.8 2.6 5.7 4.8 3.9 3.5 3.0
Hungary 2.5 -1.5 2.0 4.2 3.8 2.2 4.3 5.1 5.0 3.8 3.5
Latvia 4.5 4.0 2.4 1.9 3.0 2.1 4.6 4.8 2.6 3.0 3.0
Lithuania 4.5 3.8 3.6 3.5 2.0 2.6 4.2 3.6 3.8 3.0 2.7
Malta 2.9 2.8 4.6 8.7 10.8 5.7 6.7 6.8 4.8 5.0 4.5
Poland 4.3 1.6 1.4 3.3 3.8 3.1 4.9 5.1 4.3 3.6 3.6
Romania 2.6 2.1 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.8 7.0 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.5
Slovakia 4.2 1.7 1.5 2.8 4.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 2.5 2.7 2.9
Slovenia 3.0 -2.6 -1.0 2.8 2.2 3.1 4.8 4.1 2.6 2.7 2.7
Other Europe 2.0 1.7 1.5 2.2 1.6 1.5 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.9 2.1
Iceland 3.4 1.3 4.1 2.1 4.7 6.6 4.4 4.8 3.8 2.8 2.6
Norway 2.0 2.7 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.1 2.3 1.3 1.9 2.1 2.2
Switzerland 2.1 1.0 1.9 2.4 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.8 1.7 1.8 1.9
Memorandum items
North America 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.6 2.7 1.6 2.4 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.7
Developed Asia and Pacific 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.8 1.5 1.1 2.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.5
Europe 1.9 -0.3 0.3 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.7
Major developed economies 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.1 1.5 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.6
Euro area 1.8 -0.9 -0.3 1.4 2.1 1.9 2.5 1.9 1.2 1.4 1.5
Source:  UN DESA, based on data of the United Nations Statistics Division and UN DESA forecasts.
Note:  Regional aggregates calculated at 2010 prices and exchange rates.
a  Average percentage change.
b  Partly estimated.
c  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
176 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.2
Economies in transition: rates of growth of real GDP
Annual percentage change
1997–2011a 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Economies in transition 4.5 3.5 2.4 1.0 -1.8 0.8 2.2 2.7 1.9 2.3 2.5
South-Eastern Europe 4.1 -0.5 2.6 0.2 2.4 3.2 2.5 3.9 3.1 3.4 3.4
Albania 5.0 1.5 1.0 1.8 2.2 3.3 3.8 4.1 2.6 3.0 3.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.7 -0.9 2.4 1.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.5 3.0 3.0
Montenegro 3.5 -2.7 3.5 1.8 3.4 2.9 4.7 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
North Macedonia 3.0 -0.4 2.9 3.6 3.8 2.9 0.2 2.7 3.4 3.2 3.4
Serbia 3.3 -0.7 3.0 -1.6 1.8 3.4 2.0 4.5 3.4 3.8 3.8
Commonwealth of Independent
States and Georgiad 4.6 3.6 2.4 1.0 -1.9 0.7 2.1 2.7 1.8 2.3 2.4
Commonwealth of Independent
States and Georgia –
net fuel exporters 4.6 3.8 2.4 1.3 -1.7 0.4 1.9 2.5 1.5 2.1 2.2
Azerbaijan 11.9 2.2 5.8 2.8 1.0 -3.1 0.1 1.4 2.3 2.5 2.6
Kazakhstan 6.9 4.8 6.0 4.2 1.2 1.1 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.5 3.5
Russian Federation 4.2 3.7 1.8 0.7 -2.3 0.3 1.6 2.3 1.1 1.8 2.0
Turkmenistan 7.1 11.1 10.2 10.3 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.2 5.6 5.2
Commonwealth of Independent
States and Georgia –
net fuel importers 4.5 2.4 2.3 -0.8 -3.3 2.3 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.8
Armenia 7.0 7.2 3.3 3.6 3.2 0.2 7.5 7.5 6.5 5.4 5.6
Belarus 7.2 1.7 1.0 1.7 -3.8 -2.5 2.5 3.0 1.1 2.0 2.5
Georgiad 5.9 6.4 3.4 4.6 2.9 2.8 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.5
Kyrgyzstan 4.5 -0.1 10.9 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.6 3.5 5.8 4.5 4.1
Republic of Moldova 3.3 -0.6 9.0 5.0 -0.3 4.4 4.7 2.8 5.2 3.9 3.8
Tajikistan 6.8 7.5 7.4 6.7 6.0 6.9 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.0 5.9
Ukrainee 3.0 0.2 0.0 -6.6 -9.8 2.4 2.5 3.3 3.6 3.0 3.0
Uzbekistan 6.4 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.9 6.2 5.2 5.1 5.7 5.7 5.5
Source:  UN DESA, based on data of the United Nations Statistics Division and UN DESA forecasts.
Note:  Regional aggregates calculated at 2010 prices and exchange rates.
a  Average percentage change.
b  Partly estimated.
c  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
d  Georgia officially left the Commonwealth of Independent States on 18 August 2009. However, its performance is discussed in the context of this group of
countries for reasons of geographic proximity and similarities in economic structure.
e  Starting in 2010, data for Ukraine excludes the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.
 Annex tables 177

Table A.3
Developing economies: rates of growth of real GDP
Annual percentage change
1997–2011a 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Developing countriesd 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.1 4.0 4.5 4.2 3.4 4.0 4.3
Africa 4.5 5.7 2.3 3.6 2.7 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.5
North Africa 3.9 8.6 -2.9 0.7 2.6 2.9 4.0 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.7
Algeria 3.6 3.4 2.8 3.8 3.7 3.2 1.4 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.5
Egypte 4.8 2.2 2.2 2.9 4.4 4.3 4.2 5.3 5.5 5.8 5.3
Libya -2.4 124.7 -52.1 -50.1 -45.5 -16.1 64.0 17.9 5.2 4.5 4.3
Mauritania 3.8 5.8 6.1 5.6 0.9 1.7 3.5 3.0 4.2 4.6 4.7
Morocco 4.4 3.0 4.5 2.7 4.5 1.1 4.1 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.8
Sudane 6.4 -2.2 2.2 3.2 3.0 3.5 3.2 -2.1 -1.0 -0.1 1.5
Tunisia 4.2 4.0 2.9 3.0 1.2 1.3 1.8 2.5 1.4 2.0 3.0
East Africa 4.9 1.5 7.8 7.7 6.3 5.4 5.4 6.3 6.0 6.0 6.2
Burundi 2.6 4.4 4.9 4.2 -0.4 2.8 0.0 0.1 1.8 1.9 2.5
Comoros 1.8 6.3 8.9 3.9 2.0 4.1 3.4 2.8 2.5 3.2 3.5
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2.2 7.1 8.5 9.5 6.9 2.4 3.7 5.8 4.8 5.0 5.6
Djibouti 3.9 4.8 5.0 8.9 9.7 8.7 4.1 6.7 6.8 6.0 6.3
Eritrea 1.3 7.0 4.7 2.9 2.6 1.8 5.0 4.2 4.8 5.0 4.9
Ethiopia 7.4 9.6 10.4 10.3 9.0 8.5 8.1 6.8 7.3 7.5 7.4
Kenya 3.7 4.6 5.9 5.4 5.7 5.9 4.9 6.3 5.6 5.5 5.7
Madagascar 3.0 3.0 2.3 3.3 3.1 4.0 3.9 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.1
Rwanda 8.5 8.6 4.7 7.6 8.9 6.0 6.1 8.6 7.4 7.3 7.1
Somalia 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.7 2.7 4.9 2.3 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.5
South Sudan 5.6 -49.8 29.9 21.7 3.4 0.3 -0.7 -1.2 7.8 8.1 7.0
Uganda 7.3 3.2 4.7 4.5 5.7 2.6 5.0 8.9 6.2 6.0 6.1
United Republic of Tanzania 6.0 5.1 6.8 6.7 6.2 6.9 6.8 7.0 5.8 5.5 6.2
Central Africa 4.9 6.7 0.9 4.7 -0.8 -0.1 0.3 1.6 2.7 2.9 3.1
Cameroon 4.1 4.5 5.4 5.9 5.7 4.6 3.5 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.7
Central African Republic 2.5 5.1 -36.4 0.1 4.3 4.8 4.5 3.8 4.6 4.8 4.9
Chad 7.1 8.2 3.2 2.6 3.9 -2.6 -1.9 3.1 3.8 5.5 4.9
Congo 4.4 9.6 -2.5 9.7 -13.2 -2.8 -3.1 0.8 3.5 2.3 1.4
Equatorial Guinea 19.2 8.3 -4.1 0.4 -9.1 -8.6 -3.2 -4.7 -2.5 -2.9 -2.6
Gabon 0.9 5.3 5.6 4.3 3.9 2.1 0.5 1.2 2.5 2.8 3.3
Sao Tome and Principe 4.2 3.1 4.8 6.5 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.0 3.0 3.5 4.6
West Africa 6.0 5.4 5.8 5.9 3.2 0.5 2.7 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8
Benin 4.2 4.6 6.9 6.5 6.5 5.0 5.8 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.5
Burkina Faso 5.8 6.5 5.8 4.3 3.9 5.9 6.3 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.0
Cabo Verde 6.1 1.1 0.8 0.6 1.0 4.7 4.0 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.6
Côte D’Ivoire 1.1 10.1 9.3 8.8 8.8 8.0 7.7 7.4 7.4 7.1 6.9
Gambia 3.2 5.2 2.9 -1.4 4.1 1.9 4.8 6.5 5.7 5.5 4.7
Ghana 5.9 9.3 7.3 2.9 2.2 3.4 8.1 6.3 7.0 6.0 5.3
Guinea 3.5 5.9 3.9 3.7 3.8 10.5 8.2 5.8 6.1 6.0 6.0
Guinea-Bissau 2.1 -1.7 3.3 1.0 6.1 6.3 5.9 3.8 4.9 4.6 5.2
Liberia 14.0 11.3 4.6 5.2 9.3 -0.5 2.4 1.2 0.4 1.6 1.3
Mali 8.6 11.2 7.0 7.8 7.6 8.8 6.9 6.7 5.2 5.3 5.4
Niger 4.1 11.8 5.3 7.5 4.3 4.9 4.9 5.2 6.1 5.9 5.7
178 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.3
Developing economies: rates of growth of real GDP (continued)

Annual percentage change

1997–2011a 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Nigeria 6.8 4.3 5.4 6.3 2.7 -1.6 0.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.7
Senegal 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.1 6.4 6.2 6.7 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.4
Sierra Leone 4.5 15.2 20.7 4.6 -20.5 6.3 3.8 4.6 5.0 5.1 5.2
Togo 2.1 6.5 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.6 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.3
Southern Africa 3.9 3.9 3.4 2.8 1.4 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.9 1.9
Angola 7.2 8.5 5.0 4.8 0.9 -2.6 -2.5 -1.7 -1.5 -1.0 1.5
Botswana 4.5 4.5 11.3 4.1 -1.7 4.3 2.9 4.5 4.0 3.2 4.9
Eswatini 3.0 4.7 6.4 1.9 0.4 1.4 2.0 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.6
Lesotho 3.7 6.0 1.8 3.1 1.6 3.6 0.1 1.5 2.0 0.5 1.9
Malawi 4.0 -0.6 6.3 6.2 3.3 2.7 5.2 4.0 4.2 5.0 4.5
Mauritius 4.5 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.5 4.0 3.9
Mozambique 8.0 7.2 7.1 7.4 6.6 3.8 3.7 3.3 1.5 5.5 6.0
Namibia 4.4 5.1 5.6 6.4 6.1 1.1 -0.9 -0.1 -1.0 1.2 2.0
South Africa 3.2 2.2 2.5 1.8 1.2 0.4 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.9 1.4
Zambia 6.1 7.6 5.1 4.7 2.9 3.8 3.5 3.5 1.5 2.3 3.1
Zimbabwe 2.1 16.7 2.0 2.4 1.8 0.8 4.7 4.8 -5.5 -2.5 3.0
Africa - net fuel exporters 5.1 9.8 -0.4 3.2 1.4 -0.6 1.1 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.7
Africa - net fuel importers 4.2 3.1 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.0 3.9 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.0
East and South Asia 6.8 5.9 6.1 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.1 5.7 4.8 5.2 5.2
East Asia 7.2 6.5 6.4 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.2 5.2 5.2
Brunei Darussalam 1.4 0.9 -2.1 -2.5 -0.4 -2.5 1.3 0.1 1.1 1.5 2.5
Cambodia 7.9 7.3 7.5 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.7 7.1 6.9 6.8
China 9.9 7.9 7.8 7.3 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.6 6.1 6.0 5.9
Democratic People’s Republic of 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.0 -1.1 3.9 -3.5 -4.2 1.8 2.2 2.8
Korea
Fiji 1.6 1.4 4.7 5.6 4.7 2.6 5.2 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.3
Hong Kong SARf 3.6 1.7 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 3.8 3.0 -1.0 1.6 2.0
Indonesia 3.6 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.1 5.2
Kiribati 1.5 4.8 4.1 -0.5 10.3 1.3 3.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.7
Lao People's Democratic Republic 7.0 7.9 8.0 7.6 7.3 7.0 6.9 6.3 6.2 6.4 6.5
Malaysia 4.4 5.5 4.7 6.0 5.1 4.4 5.7 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.5
Mongolia 6.2 12.5 11.6 8.1 2.5 1.4 5.4 6.6 7.0 6.3 6.2
Myanmare 10.7 7.3 8.4 8.0 7.0 5.9 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.8 7.0
Papua New Guinea 2.6 4.7 3.8 12.1 6.9 -0.7 -1.5 0.0 3.6 3.4 4.6
Philippines 4.2 6.7 7.1 6.1 6.1 6.9 6.7 6.2 5.9 6.2 6.3
Republic of Korea 4.5 2.4 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.9 3.2 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.4
Samoa 3.0 -4.0 0.8 2.6 6.7 3.7 -0.6 0.7 3.0 5.0 5.1
Singapore 5.7 4.4 4.8 3.9 2.9 3.0 3.7 3.1 0.4 1.2 1.8
Solomon Islands 2.6 2.6 3.0 2.3 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.4 2.5
Taiwan Province of China 4.6 2.1 2.2 4.0 0.8 1.5 3.1 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4
Thailand 3.0 7.2 2.7 1.0 3.1 3.4 4.0 4.1 3.0 3.1 3.3
Timor-Leste 7.2 5.0 -11.0 -26.0 20.9 0.8 -8.0 0.8 4.5 4.8 5.0
Vanuatu 3.0 1.8 2.0 2.3 0.2 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.3
Viet Nam 6.6 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.7 6.2 6.8 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.5
 Annex tables 179

Table A.3
Developing economies: rates of growth of real GDP (continued)

Annual percentage change

1997–2011a 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
South Asia 5.6 3.5 4.6 6.3 6.2 8.0 6.8 5.6 3.3 5.1 5.3
Afghanistane 6.7 10.9 6.5 3.1 1.0 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.7 4.3
Bangladeshe 5.7 6.5 6.0 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.3 7.9 8.1 7.8 7.1
Bhutan 8.2 5.1 2.1 6.6 6.6 8.0 4.6 5.3 6.0 6.4 6.5
Indiae 6.4 5.5 6.4 7.4 8.0 8.2 7.2 6.8 5.7 6.6 6.3
Iran (Islamic Republic of)e 3.9 -7.4 -0.2 4.6 -1.3 13.4 3.8 -2.0 -7.1 -2.7 -1.2
Maldives 5.5 2.5 7.3 7.3 2.9 7.3 6.9 7.3 6.4 7.1 5.9
Nepale 4.1 4.8 4.1 6.0 3.3 0.6 8.2 6.7 7.1 6.3 5.3
Pakistane 3.7 4.4 4.7 4.7 5.5 5.6 5.8 3.3 3.3 2.1 3.3
Sri Lanka 5.4 9.1 3.4 5.0 5.0 4.5 3.4 3.2 2.6 3.4 4.1
East and South Asia –
net fuel exporters 3.7 1.9 2.9 4.5 3.2 6.4 5.1 3.3 0.9 2.7 3.4
East and South Asia –
net fuel importers 7.3 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.0 5.2 5.4 5.4
Western Asia 4.4 4.4 4.9 3.5 4.1 3.3 2.6 2.3 1.0 2.4 2.8
Western Asia – net fuel exporters 4.6 6.1 3.9 2.9 3.5 3.3 -0.7 1.6 0.9 2.2 2.9
Bahrain 5.0 3.7 5.4 4.4 2.9 3.6 4.2 2.2 1.8 2.3 2.5
Iraq 7.3 13.9 7.6 0.2 4.7 13.8 -3.8 -1.0 3.2 4.8 5.8
Kuwait 4.3 6.6 1.1 0.5 0.6 2.9 -3.5 1.2 0.7 2.3 2.6
Oman 3.1 9.0 5.1 1.5 4.6 5.1 0.3 1.8 0.9 1.7 2.6
Qatar 13.0 4.7 4.4 4.0 3.7 2.1 1.6 1.4 0.1 3.1 4.0
Saudi Arabia 3.3 5.4 2.7 3.7 4.1 1.7 -0.8 2.2 0.3 1.3 1.9
United Arab Emirates 4.8 4.5 5.1 4.3 5.1 3.1 0.5 1.7 1.1 2.4 2.9
Yemen 3.4 2.2 3.6 -10.6 -30.3 -14.8 -5.9 -2.7 1.2 3.6 4.3
Western Asia – net fuel importers 4.2 2.6 6.0 4.3 4.8 3.1 6.3 3.0 1.1 2.5 2.8
Israel 3.8 2.1 4.2 4.0 2.2 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.2
Jordan 5.3 2.1 2.4 3.4 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.0
Lebanon 4.0 2.7 2.6 1.9 0.4 1.6 0.6 0.3 -0.5 0.3 1.4
State of Palestine 4.9 6.3 2.2 -0.2 3.4 4.7 3.1 0.9 1.4 2.6 2.6
Syrian Arab Republic 4.2 -26.3 -26.3 -14.7 -6.1 -4.0 1.9 11.5 10.1 3.7 3.3
Turkey 4.3 4.8 8.5 5.2 6.1 3.2 7.5 2.8 0.4 2.4 2.8
Latin America and the Caribbeang 3.2 2.8 2.9 1.2 -0.2 -1.1 1.2 0.9 0.1 1.3 2.0
South America 3.3 2.4 3.3 0.5 -1.6 -2.6 0.7 0.4 -0.1 1.1 2.0
Argentina 3.2 -1.0 2.4 -2.5 2.7 -2.1 2.7 -2.5 -3.0 -1.3 0.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 3.8 5.1 6.8 5.5 4.9 4.3 4.2 4.2 3.0 3.0 3.2
Brazil 3.2 1.9 3.0 0.5 -3.5 -3.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.7 2.3
Chile 4.1 5.3 4.0 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.3 4.0 0.8 1.0 1.8
Colombia 3.3 3.9 4.6 4.7 3.0 2.1 1.4 2.6 3.2 3.5 3.3
Ecuador 3.5 5.6 4.9 3.8 0.1 -1.2 2.4 1.4 -0.2 0.1 0.6
Paraguay 3.8 -0.5 8.4 4.9 3.1 4.3 5.0 3.7 0.2 3.0 3.0
Peru 4.8 6.1 5.9 2.4 3.3 4.0 2.5 4.0 2.3 3.2 3.5
Uruguay 2.7 3.5 4.6 3.2 0.4 1.7 2.6 1.6 0.3 1.5 1.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2.6 5.6 1.3 -3.9 -6.2 -17.0 -15.7 -19.6 -25.5 -14.0 -7.2
180 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.3
Developing economies: rates of growth of real GDP (continued)

Annual percentage change

1997–2011a 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Mexico and Central America 2.9 3.7 1.9 3.0 3.6 3.1 2.4 2.3 0.5 1.6 1.9
Costa Rica 4.5 4.8 2.3 3.5 3.6 4.2 3.4 2.7 1.8 1.9 2.2
Cuba 4.6 3.0 2.8 1.0 4.4 0.5 1.8 2.2 0.5 0.5 1.5
Dominican Republic 5.3 2.7 4.9 7.1 6.9 6.7 4.7 7.0 4.8 4.7 4.5
El Salvador 2.5 2.8 2.2 1.7 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.2
Guatemala 3.6 3.0 3.7 4.2 4.1 3.1 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.3
Haitie 1.0 2.9 4.2 2.8 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 -0.7 0.3 0.6
Honduras 3.8 4.1 2.8 3.1 3.8 3.9 4.8 3.7 2.9 2.9 3.2
Mexico 2.5 3.6 1.4 2.8 3.3 2.9 2.1 2.0 0.0 1.3 1.6
Nicaragua 3.6 6.5 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.7 -3.8 -5.3 -1.4 0.0
Panama 6.0 9.8 6.9 5.1 5.7 5.0 5.3 3.7 3.5 3.8 4.1
Caribbean 3.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 1.1 -2.2 -0.2 1.6 1.2 5.7 3.4
Bahamas 1.9 0.0 -3.0 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.1 1.6 0.9 -0.6 2.1
Barbados 1.1 -0.1 -1.4 -0.2 2.2 2.3 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 1.3 1.5
Belize 4.7 2.9 0.9 3.7 3.4 -0.6 1.4 3.0 2.1 1.9 1.8
Guyana 2.4 5.3 5.0 3.9 3.1 3.4 2.2 4.1 4.5 85.6 17.0
Jamaica 1.4 -0.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.9
Suriname 4.2 2.7 2.9 0.3 -3.4 -5.6 1.7 -0.3 2.1 1.7 2.3
Trinidad and Tobago 6.0 1.3 2.0 -1.0 1.8 -6.5 -1.9 1.9 0.4 1.5 2.0
Latin America and the Caribbean – 3.2 4.7 3.4 1.3 -0.5 -4.8 -3.4 -3.1 -3.3 0.2 1.4
net fuel exporters
Latin America and the Caribbean – 3.2 2.5 2.8 1.2 -0.1 -0.5 1.9 1.5 0.5 1.5 2.1
net fuel importers
Memorandum items:
Least developed countries 5.8 4.8 5.7 5.3 3.8 4.0 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.4
Africa (excluding Libya) 4.7 3.8 4.2 4.4 3.0 1.7 2.7 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.5
North Africa (excluding Libya) 4.4 2.5 2.8 3.4 3.8 3.1 3.4 2.3 3.4 3.6 3.7
East Asia (excluding China) 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.0 3.2 3.6 3.7
South Asia (excluding India) 4.3 0.0 1.6 4.5 2.8 7.8 5.6 2.8 -1.4 1.2 2.5
Western Asia 4.6 4.6 2.9 2.5 3.2 3.2 -0.6 1.7 1.0 2.2 2.8
(excluding Israel and Turkey)
Arab Statesh 4.4 5.7 1.2 2.0 3.1 3.1 0.7 1.9 1.7 2.6 3.1
Landlocked developing economies 6.2 4.4 6.8 5.6 3.4 3.1 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.5
Small island developing economies 4.9 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.6 2.5 3.0 3.2 1.4 2.3 2.5
Source:  UN DESA, based on data of the United Nations Statistics Division, UN/ECLAC and UN DESA forecasts.
Note:  Regional aggregates calculated at 2010 prices and exchange rates.
a  Average percentage change.
b  Partly estimated.
c  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
d  Covering countries that account for 98 per cent of the population of all developing countries.
e  Fiscal-year basis.
f   Special Administrative Region of China.
g  Figures for Latin America and the Caribbean for 2012–2020 were provided by UN/ECLAC.
h  Includes data for Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
 Annex tables 181

Table A.4
Growth of world output and gross domestic product by SDG regions
Annual percentage change
2017 2018 2019a 2020b 2021b
World 3.2 3.0 2.3 2.5 2.7
Developed regions 2.4 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.7
Developing regions 4.5 4.2 3.4 4.1 4.3
Africa 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.5
Northern Africa 4.0 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.7
Eastern Africa 5.5 6.0 4.8 5.2 5.7
Middle Africa -0.5 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.8
Southern Africa 1.4 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.6
Western Africa 2.7 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8
Americas 2.1 2.4 1.7 1.6 1.8
Northern America 2.4 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.2 0.9 0.1 1.3 2.0
Caribbean 2.2 3.7 2.2 2.3 2.8
Central America 2.3 2.1 0.3 1.5 1.8
South America 0.8 0.4 -0.1 1.2 2.1
Asia 4.8 4.3 3.6 4.0 4.2
Central Asia 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.3 4.2
Eastern Asia 4.8 4.3 3.9 4.0 4.1
Southern Asia 6.8 5.6 3.3 5.1 5.3
South-eastern Asia 5.1 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.7
Western Asia 2.6 2.3 1.1 2.4 2.9
Europe 2.5 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.8
Eastern Europe 3.0 3.2 2.4 2.5 2.6
Northern Europe 2.6 2.1 1.6 1.6 2.0
Southern Europe 2.3 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.4
Western Europe 2.4 1.8 1.1 1.4 1.5
Oceania 2.5 2.7 1.9 2.2 2.3
Sources: UN DESA, based on data of the United Nations Statistics Division and UN DESA forecasts.
Notes: Regional aggregates in this table follow geographic regions defined under the Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use (known as M49)
and are not strictly comparable to those in the WESP. Full details on the M49 standard can be found on the United Nations Statistics Division website at
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49. Calculated at 2010 prices and exchange rates.
a  Partly estimated.
b  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
182 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.5
Developed economies: consumer price inflation
Annual percentage changea
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Developed economies 2.6 1.9 1.3 1.4 0.3 0.7 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.9
United States 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.6 0.1 1.3 2.1 2.4 1.8 2.0 2.1
Canada 2.9 1.5 0.9 1.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8
Japan -0.3 -0.1 0.3 2.8 0.8 -0.1 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.7 1.3
Australia 3.3 1.8 2.4 2.5 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.9
New Zealand 4.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.6 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.1
European Union 3.0 2.6 1.5 0.6 0.1 0.3 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.9
EU-15 1.9 2.9 2.5 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.6
Austria 3.6 2.6 2.1 1.5 0.8 1.0 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.1 2.0
Belgium 3.4 2.6 1.2 0.5 0.6 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4
Denmark 2.7 2.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.7 1.2 1.6 2.1
Finland 3.3 3.2 2.2 1.2 -0.2 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6
France 2.3 2.2 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.3 1.2 2.1 1.2 1.4 1.7
Germany 2.5 2.1 1.6 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.9
Greece 3.1 1.0 -0.9 -1.4 -1.1 0.0 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.5
Ireland 1.2 1.8 0.5 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.4
Italy 2.9 3.3 1.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.3
Luxembourg 3.7 2.9 1.7 0.7 0.1 0.0 2.1 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.5
Netherlands 2.5 2.8 2.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.2
Portugal 3.6 2.8 0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.4
Spain 3.0 2.4 1.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.9
Sweden 1.4 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.7 1.1 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1
United Kingdom 4.5 2.9 2.5 1.5 0.0 0.7 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.1
EU-13 3.7 3.7 1.4 0.3 -0.4 -0.2 1.8 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.2
Bulgaria 3.4 2.4 0.4 -1.6 -1.1 -1.3 1.2 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.0
Croatia 2.2 3.4 2.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.6
Cyprus 3.5 3.1 0.4 -0.3 -1.5 -1.2 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.3
Czechia 2.2 3.6 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.7 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.0 2.0
Estonia 5.1 4.2 3.2 0.5 0.1 0.8 3.7 3.4 2.5 2.1 2.1
Hungary 3.9 5.7 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.5 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9
Latvia 4.2 2.3 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 2.9 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.0
Lithuania 4.1 3.2 1.2 0.2 -0.7 0.7 3.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.3
Malta 2.5 3.2 1.0 0.8 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.2
Poland 3.9 3.6 0.8 0.1 -0.7 -0.2 1.6 1.2 2.7 2.3 2.1
Romania 5.8 3.4 3.2 1.4 -0.4 -1.1 1.1 4.1 3.9 3.0 3.0
Slovakia 4.1 3.7 1.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 1.4 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1
Slovenia 2.1 2.8 1.9 0.4 -0.8 -0.2 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.6
Other European countries 0.6 -0.2 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.3 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.6
Iceland 4.2 6.0 4.1 1.0 0.3 0.8 -1.6 0.7 1.8 1.9 2.1
Norway 1.3 0.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 3.9 1.8 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.0
Switzerland 0.1 -0.7 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.5 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.3
Memorandum items:
North America 3.1 2.0 1.4 1.6 0.2 1.3 2.1 2.4 1.8 2.0 2.1
Developed Asia and Pacific 0.4 0.3 0.7 2.7 0.9 0.1 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.4
Europe 2.9 2.4 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.9
Major developed economies 2.5 1.8 1.3 1.6 0.3 0.7 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.8
Euro area 2.7 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.8
Sources:  UN DESA, based on OECD Main Economic Indicators; Eurostat; individual national sources; and UN DESA forecasts.
a  Data for country groups are weighted averages, where weights for each year are based on 2010 GDP in United States dollars.
b  Partly estimated.
c  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
 Annex tables 183

Table A.6
Economies in transition: consumer price inflation
Annual percentage changea
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Economies in transition 9.6 6.2 6.4 7.8 15.7 7.9 5.1 4.0 4.9 4.3 4.1
South-Eastern Europe 7.2 4.7 4.4 1.1 0.9 0.6 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9
Albania 3.4 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.8 2.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.7 2.1 -0.1 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.7
Montenegro 3.5 4.1 2.2 -0.7 1.5 -0.3 2.4 2.6 0.5 0.9 0.9
North Macedonia 3.2 1.8 2.7 0.0 0.1 0.2 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Serbia 11.2 7.3 7.7 2.3 1.5 1.3 3.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2
Commonwealth of Independent States
and Georgiad 9.7 6.3 6.5 8.1 16.3 8.2 5.2 4.1 5.0 4.4 4.1
Commonwealth of Independent States 8.4 5.0 6.6 7.5 14.3 7.8 4.3 3.3 4.6 4.1 3.8
and Georgia – net fuel exporters
Azerbaijan 7.9 1.1 2.4 1.4 4.0 12.4 12.9 1.9 3.0 2.8 3.0
Kazakhstan 8.5 5.2 5.9 6.8 6.7 14.4 7.4 6.0 5.8 5.2 5.0
Russian Federation 8.4 5.1 6.8 7.8 15.5 7.0 3.7 2.9 4.4 4.0 3.7
Turkmenistan 5.3 5.3 6.8 6.0 7.4 3.6 8.0 13.6 11.0 8.0 6.0
Commonwealth of Independent States 18.4 14.9 6.0 11.8 29.3 11.0 11.0 9.5 7.8 6.5 6.1
and Georgia – net fuel importers
Armenia 7.7 2.6 5.8 3.0 3.7 -1.4 1.0 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.0
Belarus 53.2 59.2 18.3 18.1 13.5 11.8 6.0 4.9 5.4 5.0 4.8
Georgiad 8.5 -0.9 -0.5 3.1 4.0 2.1 6.0 2.6 4.0 3.5 3.4
Kyrgyzstan 16.6 2.8 6.6 7.5 6.5 0.4 3.2 1.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Republic of Moldova 7.7 4.5 4.6 5.1 9.7 6.4 6.6 3.0 4.3 3.8 3.5
Tajikistan 12.4 5.8 5.0 6.1 5.7 6.0 7.3 3.8 5.4 6.2 6.7
Ukrainee 8.0 0.6 -0.2 12.1 48.7 13.9 14.4 11.0 8.0 7.0 6.5
Uzbekistan 12.4 11.9 11.7 9.1 8.5 8.0 12.5 17.9 14.5 10.1 8.9
Sources: UN DESA, based on data of the United Nations Statistics Division, individual national sources and UN DESA forecasts.
a  Data for country groups are weighted averages, where weights for each year are based on 2010 GDP in United States dollars.
b  Partly estimated.
c  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
d  Georgia officially left the Commonwealth of Independent States on 18 August 2009. However, its performance is discussed in the context of this group of
countries for reasons of geographic proximity and similarities in economic structure.
e  Starting in 2010, data for Ukraine excludes the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.
184 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.7
Developing economies: consumer price inflation
Annual percentage changea
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Developing countries by regiond 6.3 5.3 5.6 4.7 4.4 5.4 4.5 5.2 5.4 5.1 4.6
Africa 8.9 9.0 6.9 6.8 7.3 13.8 14.7 10.6 9.1 8.2 7.3
North Africa 8.2 8.6 7.8 7.7 7.8 11.3 17.7 13.3 8.8 8.6 7.9
Algeria 4.5 8.9 3.3 2.9 4.8 6.4 5.6 4.3 3.8 3.6 2.9
Egypt 10.1 7.1 9.4 10.1 10.4 13.8 29.5 14.4 9.8 10.2 9.3
Libya 15.5 6.1 2.6 2.4 9.8 25.9 25.8 13.6 -1.0 6.9 5.3
Mauritania 5.7 4.9 4.1 3.5 3.3 1.5 2.3 3.1 2.2 3.1 3.7
Morocco 0.9 1.3 1.9 0.4 1.6 1.6 0.8 1.9 0.4 2.1 2.3
Sudan 18.1 35.6 36.5 36.9 16.9 17.8 32.4 63.3 53.1 35.1 34.5
Tunisia 3.2 4.6 5.3 4.6 4.4 3.6 5.3 7.3 6.9 6.0 5.0
East Africa 19.3 16.2 5.4 5.2 9.7 38.9 28.8 16.6 12.6 9.0 8.1
Burundi 9.6 18.2 7.9 4.4 5.5 5.6 16.1 -2.8 -1.9 5.2 5.7
Comoros 1.8 6.3 -4.3 1.3 2.0 1.8 1.0 2.0 2.9 2.5 3.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo 15.3 9.7 0.8 1.2 0.7 2.9 41.5 29.3 14.9 7.7 4.0
Djibouti 5.1 3.7 2.7 1.3 -0.8 2.7 0.6 0.1 1.4 2.5 3.2
Eritrea 3.9 6.0 6.5 10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.4 8.9 7.8
Ethiopia 33.3 24.1 8.1 7.4 10.1 7.3 9.8 13.8 11.5 8.8 8.4
Kenya 14.0 9.4 5.7 6.9 6.6 6.3 8.0 4.7 6.2 6.4 6.3
Madagascar 9.5 5.7 5.8 6.1 7.4 6.7 8.3 7.3 6.4 6.1 5.9
Rwanda 3.1 10.3 5.9 2.4 2.5 7.2 8.3 -0.3 2.3 5.3 5.3
Somalia -3.0 -1.9 -3.2 -5.6 -5.6 -0.9 3.7 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.0
South Sudan 47.3 45.1 1.7 3.4 50.4 401.8 213.6 99.7 72.0 40.8 34.0
Uganda 16.6 12.7 4.9 3.1 5.6 5.7 5.2 2.6 2.9 4.1 4.6
United Republic of Tanzania 12.7 16.0 7.9 6.1 5.6 5.2 5.3 3.5 3.8 3.6 4.3
Central Africa 1.9 4.8 2.1 3.2 3.0 1.4 0.9 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.6
Cameroon 2.9 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.7 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.7 2.2
Central African Republic 1.3 5.8 1.5 25.3 37.1 4.6 4.1 3.0 1.1 0.1 -0.1
Chad -3.7 14.0 0.1 1.7 3.7 -1.1 -0.9 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.7
Congo 1.8 5.0 4.6 0.9 3.2 3.2 0.5 1.2 2.1 2.9 3.3
Equatorial Guinea 4.8 3.7 2.9 4.3 1.7 1.4 0.7 1.1 2.2 2.6 2.8
Gabon 1.3 2.7 0.5 4.7 -0.3 2.1 2.7 4.7 4.3 3.7 3.0
Sao Tome and Principe 14.3 10.6 8.1 7.0 5.2 5.4 5.7 7.9 4.9 3.1 2.1
West Africa 9.6 10.2 7.6 7.4 8.4 13.2 13.6 10.2 9.0 7.6 6.4
Benin 2.7 6.7 0.9 -1.0 0.3 -0.8 0.1 1.0 2.3 2.6 2.7
Burkina Faso 2.8 3.8 0.5 -0.3 1.0 -0.2 0.4 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.6
Cabo Verde 4.5 2.5 1.5 -0.2 0.1 -1.4 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.5
Côte D’Ivoire 4.9 1.3 2.6 0.4 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.4 2.1 2.6
Gambia 4.8 4.3 5.7 5.9 6.8 7.2 8.0 6.5 6.6 6.3 5.5
Ghana 8.7 7.1 11.7 15.5 17.1 17.5 12.4 9.8 9.4 8.4 7.7
Guinea 21.4 15.2 11.9 9.7 8.2 8.2 8.9 9.8 9.1 8.8 8.8
Guinea-Bissau 5.0 2.1 1.2 -1.5 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.7
Liberia 8.5 6.8 7.6 9.9 7.7 8.8 12.4 23.6 15.0 7.7 2.3
Mali 3.0 5.3 -0.6 0.9 1.5 -1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9
Niger 2.9 0.5 2.3 -0.9 -0.6 1.7 2.8 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.4
 Annex tables 185

Table A.7
Developing economies: consumer price inflation (continued)

Annual percentage changea

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Nigeria 10.8 12.2 8.5 8.1 9.0 15.7 16.5 12.1 10.4 8.6 7.0
Senegal 3.4 1.4 0.7 -1.1 0.1 0.8 1.3 0.5 1.3 1.9 2.5
Sierra Leone 6.8 6.6 5.5 4.6 6.7 10.9 18.2 16.9 18.8 17.2 14.2
Togo 3.6 2.6 1.8 0.2 2.6 1.3 -1.0 0.9 1.1 1.6 2.2
Southern Africa 6.6 6.6 6.4 6.3 5.6 11.0 9.4 7.2 9.6 8.7 7.8
Angola 13.5 10.3 8.8 7.3 10.3 32.4 31.7 20.2 18.9 17.2 15.9
Botswana 8.5 7.5 5.9 4.4 3.1 2.8 3.3 3.2 3.8 3.7 4.3
Eswatini 6.1 8.9 5.6 5.7 5.0 7.8 6.2 4.8 3.0 4.5 5.4
Lesotho 5.0 6.1 5.0 5.3 3.2 6.6 5.3 4.0 5.1 5.3 5.3
Malawi 7.6 21.3 27.3 23.8 21.9 21.7 11.5 12.4 9.4 9.1 8.9
Mauritius 6.5 3.9 3.5 3.2 1.3 1.0 3.7 3.2 1.8 3.0 4.1
Mozambique 11.2 2.6 4.3 2.6 3.6 17.4 15.1 3.9 4.9 4.9 4.7
Namibia 5.0 6.7 5.6 5.3 3.4 6.7 6.1 4.3 3.5 4.1 5.1
South Africa 5.0 5.7 5.8 6.1 4.5 6.6 5.2 4.5 4.6 5.0 5.2
Zambia 6.4 6.6 7.0 7.8 10.1 17.9 6.6 7.5 8.5 8.7 8.6
Zimbabwe 3.5 3.7 1.6 -0.2 -2.4 -1.6 0.9 10.6 148.7 99.9 50.4
Africa – net fuel exporters 9.4 9.8 6.1 5.7 7.6 15.1 15.2 10.4 7.9 7.6 6.5
Africa – net fuel importers 8.6 8.5 7.4 7.6 7.1 13.0 14.3 10.8 10.0 8.5 7.8
East and South Asia 6.4 4.7 5.4 3.5 2.7 2.6 2.3 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.3
East Asia 5.2 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1
Brunei Darussalam 0.1 0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.3 1.0 -0.1 0.8 1.5
Cambodia 5.5 2.9 2.9 3.9 1.2 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.7
China 5.6 2.6 2.6 1.9 1.4 2.0 1.6 2.1 2.6 2.2 2.0
Democratic People’s Republic 6.8 4.0 1.6 3.7 3.1 -0.6 7.2 4.7 4.8 5.0 4.9
of Korea
Fiji 7.3 3.4 2.9 0.5 1.4 3.9 3.4 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.5
Hong Kong SARe 5.3 4.1 4.3 4.4 3.0 2.4 1.5 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.3
Indonesia 5.4 4.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 3.5 3.8 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2
Kiribati 1.5 -3.0 -1.5 2.1 0.6 1.9 0.4 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.8
Lao People's Democratic Republic 7.6 4.3 6.4 4.1 1.3 1.6 0.8 2.0 2.6 3.0 2.8
Malaysia 3.2 1.7 2.1 3.1 2.1 2.1 3.9 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.0
Mongolia 8.4 14.3 10.5 12.2 6.6 1.1 4.1 6.8 8.5 7.6 7.1
Myanmar 5.0 1.5 5.5 5.0 9.5 7.0 4.6 6.9 7.8 7.0 6.3
Papua New Guinea 4.4 4.5 5.0 5.2 6.0 6.7 5.4 4.7 4.3 4.1 4.2
Philippines 4.7 3.0 2.6 3.6 0.7 1.3 2.9 5.2 2.8 3.0 3.2
Republic of Korea 4.0 2.2 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.9 1.5 0.5 1.4 1.6
Samoa 5.2 2.0 0.6 -0.4 0.7 1.3 1.7 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.4
Singapore 5.2 4.6 2.4 1.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Solomon Islands 7.3 5.9 5.4 5.2 -0.6 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.4
Taiwan Province of China 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.2 -0.3 1.4 0.6 1.3 0.5 0.9 1.6
Thailand 3.8 3.0 2.2 1.9 -0.9 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.2
Timor-Leste 13.5 11.8 11.1 0.7 0.6 -1.3 0.6 2.3 1.2 2.1 2.6
Vanuatu 0.9 1.3 1.5 0.8 2.5 0.8 3.1 2.8 2.3 1.7 1.5
Viet Nam 18.7 9.1 6.6 4.7 0.9 3.2 3.5 3.5 2.6 3.0 3.2
186 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.7
Developing economies: consumer price inflation (continued)

Annual percentage changea

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
South Asia 11.5 12.2 15.7 8.4 7.0 5.6 4.3 9.8 10.2 9.6 8.4
Afghanistan 11.8 6.4 7.4 4.7 -0.7 4.4 5.0 0.6 1.7 3.3 3.8
Bangladesh 11.4 6.2 7.5 7.0 6.2 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.1 5.9 2.0
Bhutan 8.8 10.9 7.0 8.3 4.5 4.3 3.9 2.7 3.0 3.6 4.2
India 8.9 9.3 10.9 6.4 5.9 4.9 2.5 4.9 4.1 3.9 3.7
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 20.9 25.7 39.3 17.2 13.7 8.7 10.0 31.2 33.5 32.4 27.8
Maldives 11.3 10.9 3.8 2.1 1.0 0.5 2.8 -0.1 0.9 1.7 2.2
Nepal 9.2 9.5 9.0 8.4 7.9 8.8 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1
Pakistan 11.9 9.7 7.7 7.2 2.5 3.8 4.1 5.1 9.8 6.8 5.8
Sri Lanka 6.7 7.5 6.9 3.2 3.8 4.0 7.7 2.1 3.0 3.2 3.5
East and South Asia – 11.1 12.2 18.4 10.3 9.0 5.3 6.1 13.6 14.4 14.1 12.3
net fuel exporters
East and South Asia – 5.9 3.9 3.9 2.8 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3
net fuel importers
Western Asia 4.9 5.6 6.2 4.9 4.7 4.7 4.5 6.8 5.6 6.1 5.9
Western Asia – net fuel exporters 4.3 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.2 0.8 2.6 -0.1 2.2 2.9
Bahrain -0.4 2.8 3.3 2.6 1.8 2.8 1.4 2.1 1.4 2.0 2.2
Iraq 5.8 6.1 1.9 2.2 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 2.2 2.8
Kuwait 4.8 3.3 2.7 3.1 3.7 3.5 1.5 0.6 1.1 2.0 2.1
Oman 4.0 2.9 1.0 1.0 0.1 1.1 1.6 0.9 0.7 2.3 2.5
Qatar 1.1 2.3 3.2 3.4 1.6 2.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.3 2.7
Saudi Arabia 5.8 2.9 3.5 2.2 1.2 2.1 -0.8 2.5 -0.9 1.5 2.6
United Arab Emirates 0.9 0.7 1.1 2.3 4.1 1.6 2.0 3.1 -1.5 2.8 2.9
Yemen 19.5 9.9 11.0 8.1 23.9 11.9 18.0 30.7 14.7 12.3 11.7
Western Asia – net fuel importers 5.6 8.7 10.0 7.5 7.0 7.6 8.8 11.6 12.0 10.6 9.2
Israel 3.5 1.7 1.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.0
Jordan 4.2 4.5 4.8 2.9 -0.9 -0.8 3.3 4.5 0.7 2.4 1.8
Lebanon 5.0 6.6 4.8 1.9 -3.7 -0.8 4.3 6.1 2.9 4.0 2.4
State of Palestine 2.9 2.8 1.7 1.7 1.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 2.0 1.6 1.7
Syrian Arab Republic 4.8 36.5 82.3 22.6 38.4 47.7 18.1 0.9 24.1 26.1 12.0
Turkey 6.5 9.0 7.5 8.9 7.7 7.7 11.1 16.3 15.3 12.8 11.9
Latin America and the Caribbeand 5.7 5.2 5.3 6.5 7.6 9.2 5.9 6.4 7.7 7.1 5.9
South Americad 6.4 5.6 5.9 7.6 9.5 11.8 6.1 7.2 9.5 8.6 7.0
Argentina 9.8 10.0 10.6 21.4 21.5 40.5 25.7 34.2 53.1 44.2 30.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 9.9 4.5 5.8 5.8 4.1 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.6
Brazil 6.6 5.4 6.2 6.3 9.0 8.7 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.0
Chile 3.3 3.0 1.9 4.7 4.3 3.8 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.6 2.7
Colombia 3.4 3.2 2.0 2.9 5.0 7.5 4.3 3.2 3.6 3.7 4.0
Ecuador 4.5 5.1 2.7 3.6 4.0 1.7 0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.7 1.4
Paraguay 8.3 3.7 2.7 5.0 3.1 4.1 3.6 4.0 2.5 3.2 3.5
Peru 3.4 3.7 2.8 3.2 3.6 3.6 2.8 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.9
Uruguay 8.1 8.1 8.6 8.9 8.7 9.6 6.2 7.6 7.7 7.0 6.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 26.1 21.1 40.6 62.2 121.7 254.9 438.1 65374.1 ... ... ...
 Annex tables 187

Table A.7
Developing economies: consumer price inflation (continued)

Annual percentage changea

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Mexico and Central America 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.8 2.7 2.5 5.2 4.5 3.3 3.2 3.2
Costa Rica 4.9 4.5 5.2 4.5 0.9 0.0 1.6 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.5
Cuba 1.3 1.9 0.6 1.1 4.9 -0.5 -1.1 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.4
Dominican Republic 8.5 3.7 4.8 3.0 0.8 1.6 3.3 3.6 1.4 2.2 2.9
El Salvador 5.1 1.7 0.8 1.1 -0.7 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.6
Guatemala 6.2 3.8 4.3 3.4 2.4 4.4 4.4 3.8 3.9 3.5 3.7
Haiti 8.4 6.3 5.9 4.6 9.0 13.8 14.7 14.0 18.5 19.0 16.0
Honduras 6.8 5.2 5.2 6.1 3.2 2.7 3.9 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.7
Mexico 3.4 4.1 3.8 4.0 2.8 2.8 6.0 4.9 3.5 3.4 3.2
Nicaragua 8.5 7.5 7.1 6.0 3.9 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.0 5.6
Panama 5.9 5.7 4.0 2.6 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.8 -0.6 0.4 0.8
Caribbean 6.5 6.3 4.6 4.7 3.3 5.8 4.1 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.7
Bahamas 3.2 2.0 0.3 1.2 1.9 -0.3 1.5 2.3 2.8 2.4 2.1
Barbados 9.4 4.5 1.8 1.9 -1.1 1.1 4.7 3.7 2.3 2.0 1.8
Belize 1.5 1.4 0.5 1.0 -0.7 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.6
Guyana 5.0 2.4 2.1 0.6 -1.0 0.8 1.9 1.2 0.3 2.4 3.4
Jamaica 7.5 6.9 9.4 8.3 3.7 2.3 4.4 3.7 3.5 4.4 5.0
Suriname 17.7 5.0 1.9 3.4 6.9 53.0 21.5 6.9 5.0 4.4 6.3
Trinidad and Tobago 5.1 9.3 5.2 5.7 4.6 3.1 1.9 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 4.0 3.9 2.5 3.3 4.7 6.1 3.4 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.3
– net fuel exporters
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.8 5.3 5.6 6.8 7.8 9.5 6.1 6.7 8.2 7.4 6.1
– net fuel importers
Memorandum items:
Least developed countries 12.8 11.6 8.9 8.1 9.1 19.6 17.5 15.9 13.1 10.5 9.2
East Asia (excluding China) 4.6 3.2 3.0 3.0 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.1 1.6 2.0 2.1
South Asia (excluding India) 16.2 17.6 24.5 12.2 9.1 6.7 7.7 18.8 21.1 20.0 16.8
Western Asia
(excluding Israel and Turkey) 4.3 4.4 6.2 3.4 3.9 4.0 1.7 2.7 1.0 3.2 3.2
Arab Statesf 5.6 5.7 6.7 4.8 5.1 6.3 6.8 6.1 3.5 5.0 4.7
Landlocked developing economies 10.6 8.2 5.8 5.6 7.0 19.1 12.4 8.7 10.0 7.8 6.5
Small island developing States 5.1 4.3 2.9 2.0 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.1

Sources: UN DESA, based on data of the United Nations Statistics Division, individual national sources and UN DESA forecasts.
a  Data for country groups are weighted averages, where weights for each year are based on 2010 GDP in United States dollars.
b  Partly estimated.
c  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
d  Regional aggregates exclude Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
e  Special Administrative Region of China.
f  Includes data for Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
188 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.8
Developed economies: unemployment ratesa,b
Percentage of labour force
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019c 2020d 2021d
Developed economies 8.5 9.5 8.5 7.8 7.1 6.5 5.8 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.9
United States 8.9 8.1 7.4 6.2 5.3 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.7
Canada 7.5 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.0 6.3 5.8 5.6 5.9 6.2
Japan 4.6 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3
Australia 5.1 5.2 5.7 6.1 6.1 5.7 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.7 6.0
New Zealand 6.0 6.4 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.0 4.0
European Union 9.7 10.5 10.9 10.2 9.4 8.5 7.6 6.8 6.4 6.3 6.1
EU-15 9.6 10.6 11.1 10.5 9.8 9.0 8.2 7.5 7.0 6.9 6.8
Austria 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.7 6.0 5.5 4.9 4.7 5.2 5.3
Belgium 7.2 7.6 8.4 8.5 8.5 7.8 7.1 6.0 5.4 5.1 4.9
Denmark 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.2 6.2 5.7 5.0 4.5 4.4 3.9
Finland 7.8 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.4 8.8 8.6 7.4 6.7 6.4 6.0
France 9.2 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.1 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.7 8.5
Germany 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.4
Greece 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 24.9 23.6 21.5 19.3 17.5 15.9 14.3
Ireland 15.4 15.5 13.8 11.9 10.0 8.4 6.7 5.8 5.3 6.4 7.3
Italy 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7 11.9 11.7 11.2 10.6 10.4 10.7 10.8
Luxembourg 4.8 5.1 5.9 6.0 6.5 6.3 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.8 5.9
Netherlands 5.0 5.8 7.3 7.4 6.9 6.0 4.9 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.7
Portugal 12.9 15.8 16.4 14.1 12.6 11.2 9.0 7.0 5.6 4.7 4.3
Spain 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 22.1 19.6 17.2 15.3 13.8 12.8 11.8
Sweden 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.4 6.9 6.7 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.8
United Kingdom 8.1 7.9 7.5 6.1 5.3 4.8 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.3
EU-13 9.8 10.0 10.1 9.0 7.9 6.6 5.4 4.4 3.9 3.8 3.6
Bulgaria 11.3 12.3 13.0 11.4 9.2 7.6 6.2 5.2 4.5 4.2 3.9
Croatia 13.7 15.8 17.4 17.2 16.1 13.4 11.0 8.4 6.8 6.0 5.5
Cyprus 7.9 11.9 15.9 16.1 15.0 13.0 11.1 8.4 6.8 6.0 5.3
Czech Republic 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.1 5.1 4.0 2.9 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.0
Estonia 12.3 10.0 8.6 7.4 6.2 6.8 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.1 4.8
Hungary 11.0 11.0 10.2 7.7 6.8 5.1 4.2 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.5
Latvia 16.2 15.0 11.9 10.8 9.9 9.6 8.7 7.4 7.1 6.8 6.7
Lithuania 15.4 13.4 11.8 10.7 9.1 7.9 7.1 6.2 5.6 5.2 4.8
Malta 6.4 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.4 4.7 4.0 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.1
Poland 9.7 10.1 10.3 9.0 7.5 6.2 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.3
Romania 7.2 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.8 5.9 4.9 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.4
Slovakia 13.7 14.0 14.2 13.2 11.5 9.7 8.1 6.5 5.9 5.5 5.3
Slovenia 8.2 8.9 10.1 9.7 9.0 8.0 6.6 5.1 4.1 3.7 3.3
Other Europe 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.2
Iceland 7.1 6.0 5.4 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.0 2.4 2.6
Norway 3.4 3.3 3.8 3.6 4.5 4.8 4.2 3.9 3.4 3.2 2.8
Switzerland 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.9 5.1
Memorandum items:
North America 8.8 8.0 7.3 6.2 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.0
Developed Asia and Pacific 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0
Europe 9.5 10.3 10.7 10.0 9.3 8.4 7.5 6.8 6.3 6.2 6.1
Major developed economies 7.6 7.4 7.1 6.4 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.5
Euro area 10.2 11.4 12.0 11.6 10.9 10.0 9.1 8.2 7.7 7.5 7.3
Sources:  UN DESA, based on data from Eurostat; OECD Main Economic Indicators; ILOSTAT; and UN DESA forecasts.
a  Unemployment rates are standardized by the OECD and Eurostat for comparability across countries and over time, in conformity with the definitions of
the International Labout Organization (see OECD, Standardized Unemployment Rates: Sources and Methods (Paris, 1985)).
b  Data for country groups are weighted averages, where labour force is used for weights.
c  Partly estimated.
d  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
 Annex tables 189

Table A.9
Economies in transition and developing economies: unemployment ratesa
Percentage of labour force
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b
South-Eastern Europe
Albania 13.5 13.4 15.9 17.5 17.1 15.2 13.8 12.3 12.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 27.6 28.0 27.5 27.5 24.4 22.4 18.1 18.4 18.1
Montenegro 19.7 20.0 19.5 18.0 17.5 17.7 16.1 15.2 14.5
North Macedonia 31.4 46.1 29.0 39.3 26.1 23.7 22.4 20.7 17.9
Serbia 23.0 24.0 22.2 19.2 17.7 15.3 13.5 12.7 11.0
Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia c
Armenia 21.6 17.3 16.2 15.5 15.8 15.6 13.7 12.2 10.9
Azerbaijan 5.5 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8
Belarus 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 5.8 5.7 4.8 4.6
Georgiac 19.6 19.7 19.4 17.4 16.5 16.6 13.9 12.2 10.6
Kazakhstan 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.7 4.5
Kyrgyzstan 8.5 8.4 4.1 8.1 7.6 7.2 6.9 6.7 6.6
Republic of Moldova 6.7 5.6 5.1 3.9 3.7 4.2 4.1 3.0 5.1
Russian Federation 6.5 5.4 5.5 5.2 5.6 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.5
Tajikistan 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2
Turkmenistan 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8
Ukrained 7.9 7.5 7.2 9.3 9.1 9.3 9.5 8.8 8.6
Uzbekistan 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.8 6.2 6.1
Africa
Algeria 10.0 11.0 9.8 10.2 11.2 10.2 9.4 8.7 8.1
Botswana 17.8 17.9 18.3 18.2 18.0 17.7 17.7 17.8 17.8
Egypt 11.8 12.6 13.2 13.1 13.1 12.4 11.7 11.0 10.1
Mauritius 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.5 7.4 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9
Morocco 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.7 9.5 9.3 9.2 9.9 10.2
South Africa 24.7 24.7 24.6 24.9 25.2 26.6 27.1 26.9 27.3
Tunisia 18.3 17.6 15.9 15.1 15.2 15.5 15.4 15.5 15.7
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.3 6.5 8.5 8.4 9.2 10.5
Barbados 11.2 11.6 11.6 12.3 11.3 9.7 10.0 10.1 11.9
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 3.8 3.2 4.0 3.5 4.4 4.7 5.1 4.9 4.7
Brazil 6.0 8.2 8.0 7.8 9.3 13.0 14.5 14.2 14.3
Chile 7.4 6.7 6.2 6.7 6.4 6.8 6.9 7.3 7.1
Colombia 11.8 11.4 10.7 10.0 9.8 10.3 10.5 10.9 11.0
Costa Rica 7.7 9.8 9.1 9.5 9.7 9.6 9.0 10.3 11.6
Dominican Republic 6.7 7.2 7.9 7.2 7.9 7.9 6.1 6.1 5.9
Ecuador 5.0 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.9 5.0 4.7 5.8
El Salvador 6.6 6.2 5.6 6.7 6.5 6.9 6.8 6.1 6.0
Guatemala 3.1 4.0 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.9 4.3
Honduras 6.8 5.6 6.0 7.5 8.8 9.0 8.2 8.0 9.7
Jamaica 12.6 13.9 15.2 13.7 13.5 13.2 11.7 9.1 8.0
Mexico 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.3 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.6 3.7
Nicaragua 8.1 8.7 7.7 8.5 7.7 6.3 5.2 7.5 10.4
190 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.9
Economies in transition and developing economies: unemployment ratesa (continued)
Percentage of labour force
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b
Latin America and the Caribbean (continued)
Panama 5.4 4.8 4.7 5.4 5.8 6.4 6.9 7.1 7.8
Paraguay 6.9 7.9 7.7 7.8 6.5 7.7 6.9 7.1 7.4
Peru 5.1 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.4 5.2 5.0 4.8 6.2
Trinidad and Tobago 5.1 5.0 3.6 3.3 3.5 4.0 4.8 5.1 5.5
Uruguay 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.8 8.2 8.3 8.6 8.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 8.3 8.1 7.8 7.2 7.0 7.3 7.6 … …
Developing Asia
China 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6
Hong Kong SARe 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.5 3.6
India 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5
Indonesia 5.2 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.5 4.3 4.2 3.3 2.6
Iran, Islamic Republic of 12.5 12.6 10.4 10.6 11.1 12.4 12.1 12.0 12.8
Israel 5.6 6.9 6.2 5.9 5.2 4.8 4.2 4.0 3.8
Jordan 12.9 12.2 12.6 11.9 13.1 15.3 16.6 17.3 17.8
Malaysia 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Pakistan 0.8 1.7 3.0 1.8 3.6 4.6 4.3 4.1 5.8
Philippines 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.2
Republic of Korea 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2
Saudi Arabia 5.8 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.4
Singapore 1.9 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.5 4.8 5.2
Sri Lanka 4.1 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.5
Taiwan Province of China 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7
Thailand 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.6
Turkey 8.8 8.2 8.7 10.0 10.3 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.4
Viet Nam 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8
Sources:  UN DESA, based on data from Eurostat; UN/ECLAC, OECD Main Economic Indicators; ILOSTAT; and UN DESA estimates.
a As a percentage of labour force. Reflects national definitions and coverage. Not comparable across economies.
b Partly estimated.
c Georgia officially left the Commonwealth of Independent States on 18 August 2009. However, its performance is discussed in the context of this group of
countries for reasons of geographic proximity and similarities in economic structure.
d Starting in 2010, data for the Ukraine excludes the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.
e Special Administrative Region of China.
 Annex tables 191

Table A.10
Selected economies: real effective exchange rates, broad measurementa, b

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019c
Developed economies
Australia 92.9 99.3 100.0 94.8 90.1 81.0 81.8 84.6 81.4 77.2
Austria 100.6 101.1 100.0 101.7 103.2 101.0 102.6 103.5 104.7 104.2
Belgium 101.4 102.2 100.0 101.2 101.2 97.4 100.0 101.4 103.3 103.0
Bulgaria 100.8 101.8 100.0 99.9 99.6 96.9 96.8 96.7 100.1 100.2
Canada 98.6 100.8 100.0 96.4 90.3 81.2 79.4 80.8 80.0 79.5
Croatia 104.6 101.5 100.0 100.7 100.4 98.6 99.6 99.9 101.3 99.8
Czechia 100.4 102.5 100.0 97.4 92.2 91.4 93.8 97.0 100.9 100.9
Denmark 103.7 102.9 100.0 100.6 101.5 97.2 98.3 98.7 99.7 98.5
Finland 102.6 102.3 100.0 102.3 104.8 101.9 103.2 102.1 104.4 103.5
France 103.6 103.1 100.0 101.1 101.2 96.2 97.5 97.9 99.7 98.3
Germany 103.7 103.2 100.0 102.0 102.6 98.2 99.8 100.5 102.5 101.5
Greece 104.6 105.2 100.0 99.3 98.0 92.1 93.6 94.3 93.2 91.6
Hungary 102.2 101.7 100.0 98.4 95.0 92.5 93.1 94.5 93.6 92.6
Ireland 105.9 104.9 100.0 101.5 100.5 92.7 93.9 94.1 95.1 93.1
Italy 101.8 102.0 100.0 101.6 101.7 96.9 98.0 98.5 99.4 97.6
Japan 99.9 101.6 100.0 80.1 75.2 69.9 78.6 74.9 74.6 77.2
Netherlands 103.1 102.6 100.0 102.8 102.8 98.3 99.6 99.8 101.1 100.4
New Zealand 93.9 97.9 100.0 102.4 105.1 96.1 97.3 99.2 94.0 92.8
Norway 100.3 101.0 100.0 97.9 92.7 84.9 86.1 86.9 87.5 86.3
Poland 104.5 102.2 100.0 100.0 101.1 98.4 94.9 97.0 97.6 96.6
Portugal 101.1 101.9 100.0 100.0 99.3 96.8 98.7 98.8 98.3 98.3
Romania 103.4 105.9 100.0 103.6 105.0 102.5 101.3 99.2 101.0 100.6
Slovakia 98.8 99.7 100.0 101.1 101.8 99.8 100.0 98.9 100.4 100.6
Spain 102.1 102.8 100.0 101.6 101.0 95.8 96.8 98.3 98.5 97.7
Sweden 96.1 100.3 100.0 101.3 96.3 91.1 91.8 91.0 86.7 83.8
Switzerland 95.0 104.3 100.0 98.5 99.1 104.6 102.7 101.0 98.0 99.3
United Kingdom 95.5 96.3 100.0 98.7 105.5 110.3 98.5 93.8 95.4 93.1
United States 102.1 97.8 100.0 100.1 101.9 112.8 117.7 118.5 115.7 121.4
Economies in transition
Azerbaijan 94.3 96.7 100.0 99.7 103.5 95.5 70.1 71.0 72.2 75.5
Belarus 124.9 104.3 100.0 107.8 119.6 110.1 101.6 99.5 97.8 101.0
Kazakhstan 96.1 96.0 100.0 100.6 93.5 93.4 71.0 76.9 75.8 72.7
Russian Federation 93.7 98.3 100.0 100.2 90.0 74.3 74.4 86.8 79.5 80.9
Ukrained 97.5 98.0 100.0 96.4 73.9 69.9 70.1 73.6 77.8 87.9
Developing economies
Algeria 96.1 95.5 100.0 98.0 99.8 95.3 94.4 95.4 92.0 95.1
Argentina 102.4 99.2 100.0 90.9 74.3 87.6 77.7 85.6 59.7 60.8
Bangladesh 106.9 103.7 100.0 110.7 118.6 135.4 143.3 145.0 142.8 150.0
Brazil 106.3 111.8 100.0 94.5 92.4 75.5 80.2 89.8 73.7 72.8
Chile 97.2 98.4 100.0 98.9 89.6 87.1 88.5 92.4 91.3 87.4
China 93.2 96.1 100.0 103.8 106.5 114.3 109.0 106.3 106.5 105.2
192 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.10
Selected economies: real effective exchange rates, broad measurementa, b (continued)

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019c
Developing economies (continued)
Colombia 94.2 95.4 100.0 96.3 91.4 74.1 72.8 79.4 68.4 65.4
Dominican Republic 99.4 100.3 100.0 96.8 94.7 96.3 96.6 95.4 86.0 85.7
Egypt 97.1 94.8 100.0 94.2 101.0 111.9 98.3 69.4 77.5 89.5
Ethiopia 79.5 84.7 100.0 100.4 100.8 109.9 112.1 108.4 104.2 110.5
Guatemala 94.3 98.4 100.0 102.0 106.4 114.5 122.0 130.0 124.5 126.0
Hong Kong SARe 102.4 98.2 100.0 101.9 105.0 112.2 117.4 117.2 115.3 119.5
India 106.4 105.9 100.0 99.4 101.0 107.4 108.5 112.8 107.6 109.0
Indonesia 104.3 104.3 100.0 95.1 89.1 89.9 94.1 95.5 89.9 93.4
Iran, Islamic Republic of 83.5 91.8 100.0 90.3 74.5 79.4 82.0 82.7 86.5 96.6
Israel 104.4 105.8 100.0 106.2 107.3 105.8 107.8 112.6 111.0 113.6
Korea, Republic of 101.1 101.4 100.0 103.3 108.6 107.5 106.3 109.6 110.8 104.3
Kuwait 97.5 99.0 100.0 100.6 102.1 105.3 108.9 108.3 106.3 107.6
Malaysia 101.8 101.1 100.0 99.3 98.6 89.7 86.6 85.3 89.1 87.8
Mexico 102.7 103.3 100.0 105.6 104.3 92.4 80.2 82.4 81.1 83.3
Morocco 104.6 102.4 100.0 101.5 102.0 101.8 104.1 103.5 104.3 104.5
Nigeria 89.1 89.6 100.0 106.7 113.9 110.4 98.0 91.7 99.6 110.6
Pakistan 96.6 99.6 100.0 97.2 103.7 109.5 112.9 114.4 100.9 89.0
Peru 94.4 93.1 100.0 98.8 96.7 95.1 94.1 98.0 93.8 94.8
Philippines 95.8 96.2 100.0 102.0 100.9 104.9 101.7 96.9 94.6 98.5
Qatar 103.7 97.7 100.0 103.7 106.3 115.4 118.4 117.0 113.7 114.7
Saudi Arabia 98.4 97.3 100.0 102.9 104.4 112.1 114.6 111.4 110.8 110.4
Singapore 90.7 95.7 100.0 101.7 101.2 99.0 98.2 97.0 96.2 95.8
South Africa 108.5 106.6 100.0 88.9 83.7 81.1 76.5 85.7 86.8 81.3
Sri Lanka 105.4 107.4 100.0 104.4 105.6 110.4 107.9 108.3 100.3 94.7
Taiwan Province of China 100.5 100.8 100.0 100.1 98.6 98.9 98.8 104.2 103.4 100.7
Thailand 101.2 100.3 100.0 103.7 99.9 100.0 97.0 100.1 103.6 108.3
Turkey 110.1 97.1 100.0 98.7 94.4 92.1 90.8 80.7 68.0 68.1
United Arab Erirates 107.2 100.1 100.0 100.9 103.4 113.0 114.9 115.0 115.6 113.3
Uruguay 92.0 96.5 100.0 106.8 103.3 104.7 106.9 117.9 103.7 102.2
Viet Nam 94.7 94.2 100.0 104.9 108.1 112.8 116.0 115.3 114.7 117.8
Source:  UN DESA.
a 2012=100.
b  CPI-based indices. The real effective exchange rate gauges the effect on international price competitiveness of currency changes and inflation
differentials. A rise in the index implies a fall in competitiveness and vice versa.
c  Average for the first ten months.
d  Starting in 2010, data for Ukraine excludes the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol.
e  Special Administrative Region of China.
 Annex tables 193

Table A.11
Free market commodity price indices
Index: Year 2015=100
Non-fuel commodities

Vegetable Agricultural All groups

Tropical oilseeds raw Minerals and excluding
Food beverages and oils materials metals All groups fuels Fuels
2010 111 110 121 142 136 142 129 150
2011 135 144 151 177 164 182 158 198
2012 127 112 152 143 153 177 145 197
2013 120 90 136 131 138 170 131 194
2014 118 111 123 115 121 157 119 180
2015 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2016 104 97 107 100 105 91 104 83
2017 103 94 106 105 116 106 110 104
2018 96 86 100 103 118 123 109 132
2016
I 95 91 98 93 95 76 95 65
II 104 94 110 99 102 90 102 83
III 109 101 109 101 110 94 108 86
IV 108 101 110 105 111 101 109 96
2017
I 109 99 109 114 117 107 113 104
II 105 93 104 103 112 101 108 97
III 100 93 107 102 118 104 110 100
IV 97 90 106 101 119 113 110 115
2018
I 100 90 107 105 124 120 114 124
II 100 90 106 105 121 126 112 135
III 92 80 95 103 113 126 104 140
IV 94 82 92 100 114 121 105 131
2019
I 96 79 94 101 120 115 109 119
II 97 80 89 101 123 117 110 121
III 98 81 92 97 130 112 114 110
Source: UNCTADSTAT.
194 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.12
World oil supply and demand

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019a

World oil supplyb,c
(millions of barrels per day) 86.9 89.0 89.3 91.7 94.3 94.7 95.5 98.2 97.7
Developed economies 16.1 17.0 18.1 20.1 21.4 21.0 22.0 24.7 26.5
Economies in transition 13.7 13.7 13.9 14.0 14.1 14.3 14.4 14.7 15.0
Developing economies 55.0 56.2 55.1 55.3 56.6 57.1 56.8 56.5 53.9
OPEC 35.8 37.5 37.7 37.7 39.1 39.6 39.5 39.5 37.3
Non-OPEC 19.2 18.7 17.4 17.6 17.6 17.5 17.2 16.9 16.5
Processing gains d 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4
Global biofuelse 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.8
World total demandf 89.5 90.7 92.0 93.2 95.0 96.1 97.9 99.2 100.5
Oil prices (dollars per barrel)
OPEC basketg 107.5 109.5 105.9 96.3 49.5 40.8 52.4 69.8 64.1
Brent oil 110.9 112.0 108.9 98.9 52.3 43.7 54.2 71.2 63.4
Source:  UN DESA, International Energy Agency; U.S. Energy Information Administration; and OPEC.
a  Partly estimated.
b  Including global biofuels, crude oil, condensates, natural gas liquids (NGLs), oil from non-conventional sources and other sources of supply.
c  Totals may not add up because of rounding.
d  Net volumetric gains and losses in the refining process and marine transportation losses.
e  Global biofuels comprise all world biofuel production including fuel ethanol from Brazil and the United States.
f  Measured as deliveries from refineries and primary stocks, comprises inland deliveries, international marine bunkers, refinery fuel, crude for
direct burning.
g  As of January 2019, the basket price excludes the Qatari crude “Qatar Marine”.
 Annex tables 195

Table A.13
World trade:a changes in value and volume of exports and imports, by major country group
Annual percentage change
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Dollar value of exports
World 18.9 1.5 2.7 1.9 -10.9 -2.2 9.9 10.3 -1.7 3.3 4.9
Developed economies 15.6 -1.6 3.3 3.2 -9.6 0.3 8.4 8.4 -0.4 3.6 4.8
North America 14.4 3.5 3.2 3.9 -6.2 -2.2 6.3 6.5 -1.1 3.6 4.7
Europe 16.6 -3.1 4.9 3.2 -10.5 0.8 8.9 9.3 -0.4 3.4 4.6
Developed Asia and Pacific 11.5 -2.3 -6.6 1.8 -11.7 3.4 10.5 7.1 0.8 5.1 5.7
Economies in transition 30.6 3.2 -0.6 -5.7 -28.7 -11.7 21.9 20.8 -1.7 2.9 4.9
South-Eastern Europe 20.8 -6.1 15.3 4.1 -10.2 9.2 15.1 15.7 2.5 6.3 7.2
Commonwealth of Independent States
and Georgia d 31.0 3.6 -1.1 -6.1 -29.5 -12.8 22.3 21.2 -2.0 2.7 4.8
Developing economies 22.6 5.5 2.3 1.0 -11.1 -4.7 11.2 12.0 -3.3 2.8 5.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 19.4 1.9 0.1 -3.2 -12.0 -3.1 11.2 8.7 -0.3 3.0 5.1
Africa 15.7 7.9 -10.4 -3.5 -27.9 -7.8 16.6 11.1 -2.0 2.8 5.4
East Asia 20.9 5.1 5.1 4.1 -5.9 -5.1 10.4 12.1 -4.6 2.4 4.7
South Asia 24.5 0.9 3.2 -4.4 -9.0 2.2 13.6 10.7 -2.7 4.3 6.2
Western Asia 36.1 11.2 0.3 -2.5 -23.5 -6.7 11.6 15.8 -0.6 3.9 6.5
Dollar value of imports
World 19.0 1.2 2.7 2.1 -10.0 -2.5 9.7 9.8 -1.5 3.1 4.9
Developed economies 16.2 -2.0 1.7 3.0 -9.9 -0.5 8.6 9.0 -0.2 3.1 4.4
North America 13.6 3.0 0.1 3.4 -4.3 -1.9 7.0 7.1 -0.4 3.7 4.8
Europe 16.2 -5.3 3.7 3.0 -11.2 0.8 9.1 9.8 0.1 3.0 4.4
Developed Asia and Pacific 22.9 5.3 -5.4 1.5 -16.8 -4.5 9.5 9.6 -1.0 1.5 3.9
Economies in transition 27.8 8.5 3.3 -9.1 -28.3 -4.7 19.2 10.7 0.8 4.1 5.4
South-Eastern Europe 20.0 -6.6 4.9 4.1 -14.0 5.3 14.6 16.3 2.2 5.7 6.4
Commonwealth of Independent States
and Georgia d 28.4 9.6 3.2 -9.9 -29.3 -5.6 19.6 10.1 0.6 4.0 5.3
Developing economies 22.6 5.2 4.1 1.9 -8.8 -5.1 10.7 10.8 -3.4 3.1 5.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 20.7 5.1 4.4 -0.2 -2.4 -14.0 5.1 9.7 -1.5 2.5 4.7
Africa 15.4 3.4 5.6 1.7 -17.0 -6.7 5.8 10.2 -0.7 5.5 7.7
East Asia 24.5 4.9 5.0 2.9 -9.9 -3.0 12.8 12.2 -4.7 3.0 5.3
South Asia 24.4 6.0 -3.6 -3.9 -7.5 0.7 17.8 11.4 -3.3 4.2 8.3
Western Asia 20.5 7.3 4.7 3.9 -6.9 -6.7 5.8 5.3 -0.9 2.1 4.7
Volume of exports
World 7.1 3.3 3.2 4.2 3.1 2.5 5.5 3.9 0.2 2.3 3.2
Developed economies 5.9 2.2 2.7 4.5 4.7 2.8 4.9 3.1 1.5 2.3 3.0
North America 6.7 3.3 3.3 4.6 1.0 0.3 3.0 3.1 -0.5 2.3 3.0
Europe 6.6 2.0 2.6 3.9 6.1 3.5 5.4 3.0 2.0 2.2 2.8
Developed Asia and Pacific -0.2 1.3 2.0 8.5 3.9 3.0 5.9 3.8 1.9 3.3 4.0
Economies in transition 2.4 1.3 2.6 -0.5 2.0 3.0 6.0 5.9 2.9 3.3 3.4
South-Eastern Europe 7.5 1.7 11.2 5.4 7.9 10.6 9.0 8.3 5.8 5.4 5.3
Commonwealth of Independent States
and Georgiad 2.2 1.3 2.2 -0.8 1.7 2.7 5.8 5.7 2.7 3.2 3.3
196 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.13
World tradea: Changes in value and volume of exports and imports by major country group (continued)

Annual percentage change

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019b 2020c 2021c
Developing economies 9.4 5.0 3.9 4.1 1.0 2.0 6.3 4.8 -1.7 2.2 3.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 6.6 2.9 1.1 1.1 4.1 1.6 2.7 4.4 1.7 2.1 2.9
Africa -0.2 6.7 -8.6 3.8 -0.9 4.2 7.5 4.8 2.9 3.8 4.7
East Asia 9.9 4.6 6.6 5.7 1.0 1.4 7.8 4.4 -3.5 1.7 3.3
South Asia 12.6 2.7 4.2 3.0 -1.3 7.0 5.8 9.1 -3.5 2.6 4.0
Western Asia 14.2 8.9 2.3 1.4 0.6 1.5 3.2 4.4 1.5 3.1 4.1
Volume of imports
World 7.7 2.9 3.4 3.6 2.7 2.4 5.8 3.9 0.4 2.4 3.2
Developed economies 5.1 0.9 2.1 4.7 5.6 3.2 4.8 3.3 1.6 2.2 2.7
North America 5.6 2.9 1.6 4.5 4.5 1.7 4.6 4.1 0.9 2.8 3.1
Europe 4.7 -0.6 2.3 4.5 6.9 4.5 4.9 2.9 2.1 2.0 2.5
Developed Asia and Pacific 7.0 5.4 2.1 5.9 1.1 -1.0 4.5 3.7 0.5 1.3 2.3
Economies in transition 16.8 9.4 2.7 -6.1 -16.2 0.1 12.9 4.2 2.7 3.3 3.6
South-Eastern Europe 5.8 0.0 3.0 6.6 3.4 7.9 9.2 8.4 5.0 4.7 4.6
Commonwealth of Independent States 17.7 10.1 2.7 -6.9 -17.6 -0.6 13.3 3.7 2.5 3.1 3.5
and Georgia d
Developing economies 10.8 5.2 5.2 3.0 0.1 1.5 7.0 4.8 -1.6 2.6 4.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 10.4 4.5 3.1 0.0 -1.8 -2.3 5.1 5.4 0.1 1.8 3.0
Africa 3.6 7.2 7.2 -1.5 -1.4 0.0 4.2 3.3 2.3 4.7 5.7
East Asia 11.6 4.8 7.0 4.9 1.3 3.5 7.9 4.6 -2.9 2.4 3.8
South Asia 14.2 5.1 -5.0 -1.0 -2.9 2.5 13.7 13.4 -0.6 5.2 7.2
Western Asia 10.7 6.9 5.8 3.7 0.2 -3.1 2.1 -0.1 0.2 1.2 2.9
Source:  UN DESA.
a  Includes goods and services.
b  Partly estimated.
c  Baseline scenario forecasts, based in part on UN DESA World Economic Forecasting Model.
d Georgia officially left the Commonwealth of Independent States on 18 August 2009. However, its performance is discussed in the context of this group of
countries for reasons of geographic proximity and similarities in economic structure.
 Annex tables 197

Table A.14
Balance of payments on current accounts, by country or country group, summary table
Billions of dollars
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019a
Developed economies -184.8 -213.8 -150.1 -1.4 -20.9 23.0 105.1 189.6 86.6 40.4
Japan 220.9 129.6 60.1 46.4 36.4 136.5 197.0 201.6 174.7 213.4
United States -431.3 -445.7 -426.8 -348.8 -365.2 -407.8 -428.4 -439.6 -491.0 -521.3
Europeb 131.9 201.3 353.7 414.2 400.8 412.0 430.8 515.6 486.2 432.3
EU-15 47.5 130.5 249.9 281.5 289.4 302.6 343.9 439.7 384.9 339.8
EU-13 -50.8 -49.6 -30.5 -1.4 -4.2 1.0 7.3 7.3 -6.8 -10.9
Economies in transition 62.2 97.6 58.9 12.5 51.5 48.3 -2.4 15.4 102.5 91.2
South-Eastern Europe -6.1 -9.4 -8.4 -5.6 -6.1 -3.8 -3.9 -5.0 -5.5 -5.7
Commonwealth of Independent States 68.3 107.0 67.3 18.2 57.6 52.2 1.5 20.4 107.9 96.9
and Georgiac
Developing economies 395.4 456.5 478.8 344.2 345.5 157.1 191.9 259.6 155.2 123.7
Net fuel exporters 310.8 620.6 560.7 423.3 274.6 -131.9 -107.8 50.4 270.0 218.2
Net fuel importers 84.6 -164.1 -81.9 -79.1 71.0 289.0 299.6 209.2 -114.8 -94.5
Latin America and the Caribbean -98.1 -111.1 -143.9 -167.2 -179.5 -167.7 -95.2 -75.9 -95.9 -82.6
Net fuel exporters 0.3 11.0 -3.6 -2.4 -10.9 -36.9 -17.3 -2.9 -8.9 -13.3
Net fuel importers -98.5 -122.2 -140.2 -164.8 -168.5 -130.8 -77.9 -73.1 -87.1 -69.3
Africa 4.6 -13.5 -22.0 -62.4 -118.4 -159.7 -118.7 -74.0 -74.6 -82.3
Net fuel exporters 46.2 43.3 62.6 22.7 -38.7 -78.0 -42.6 -14.9 -5.5 -13.1
Net fuel importers -41.6 -56.8 -84.6 -85.1 -79.7 -81.7 -76.1 -59.1 -69.2 -69.2
Western Asia 103.3 278.7 355.2 287.9 203.7 -65.6 -70.4 -4.3 131.1 126.3
Net fuel exporters 150.4 358.2 419.5 361.7 251.7 -34.3 -32.5 51.8 167.6 157.7
Net fuel importers -47.0 -79.5 -64.3 -73.8 -48.0 -31.3 -37.9 -56.2 -36.4 -31.3
East and South Asia 385.6 302.5 289.4 285.9 439.6 550.1 476.2 413.8 194.5 162.3
Net fuel exporters 27.3 61.7 -5.0 -9.0 -10.3 -12.4 3.4 4.6 -8.8 1.1
Net fuel importers 358.3 240.8 294.5 294.9 449.9 562.5 472.8 409.2 203.3 161.2
World residuald 272.8 340.3 387.5 355.4 376.2 228.5 294.5 464.6 344.2 255.2
Source:  UN DESA based on data from IMF International Financial Statistics and UN DESA estimates.
a  Partly estimated.
b  Europe consists of the EU-15, the EU-13 and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (Table A).
c  Georgia officially left the Commonwealth of Independent States on 18 August 2009. However, its performance is discussed in the context of this group
of countries for reasons of geographic proximity and similarities in economic structure.
d  Statistical discrepancy.
198 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.15
Net ODA from major sources, by type

ODA as a Total ODA Percentage distribution of ODA by type, 2018

Growth rate of ODA percentage (millions
(2016 prices and exchange rates) of GNI of dollars) Bilateral Multilateral

Total
Donor group 1997– 2007– (United Nations United
or country 2007 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018 Total & Other) Nations Other
Total DAC countries 5.9 8.8 10.7 -0.3 -2.7 0.30 149333 70.8 29.2 4.5 24.7
Total EU 6.4 9.4 14.5 -0.1 -1.2 0.48 87392 62.4 37.6 4.8 32.8
Austria 11.9 12.0 22.2 -25.9 -12.3 0.26 1167 41.4 58.6 2.7 55.9
Belgium 7.1 10.9 19.0 -7.9 1.0 0.44 2361 57.1 42.9 6.2 36.7
Denmark 3.4 5.0 -8.2 -0.1 0.0 0.71 2568 67.8 32.2 07.9 24.2
Finland 8.3 10.8 -18.0 -0.4 -14.6 0.36 983 47.9 52.1 11.3 40.8
Francea 2.6 5.1 6.6 14.8 4.4 0.44 12504 56.0 44.0 3.9 40.1
Germany 4.5 8.2 36.4 -2.3 -3.0 0.63 25886 76.0 24.0 2.1 21.9
Greece 9.6 13.6 55.2 -17.0 -12.0 0.13 290 13.3 86.7 5.4 81.3
Ireland 18.8 19.5 12.9 2.0 6.3 0.31 934 56.8 43.2 11.5 31.7
Italy 4.6 13.0 26.4 12.3 -21.3 0.23 4900 39.1 60.9 4.5 56.4
Luxembourg 14.8 14.4 7.1 4.2 3.7 0.98 473 70.8 29.2 11.4 17.9
Netherlands 6.1 8.2 -13.4 -3.2 5.8 0.61 5616 64.1 35.9 8.7 27.2
Portugal 7.2 8.6 9.8 7.2 -15.6 0.15 341 25.5 74.5 2.2 72.3
Spain 13.7 16.9 202.4 -41.3 -4.6 0.18 2581 27.6 72.4 2.6 69.8
Sweden 7.3 9.6 -31.1 11.1 4.5 1.04 5847 65.6 34.4 14.2 20.2
United Kingdom 10.8 11.6 7.9 3.0 1.8 0.70 19455 63.3 36.7 4.1 32.7
Australia 8.6 9.8 -6.3 -13.1 3.8 0.23 3119 78.3 21.7 4.3 17.4
Canada 7.7 8.1 -5.3 4.9 5.0 0.27 4616 75.1 24.9 4.7 20.1
Japan -1.8 0.2 1.5 13.7 -13.4 0.20 10064 73.7 26.3 4.5 21.7
New Zealand 9.2 7.7 -0.5 -4.6 25.6 0.28 556 83.3 16.7 8.3 8.5
Norway 10.0 10.7 7.9 -10.7 -4.2 0.94 4257 75.9 24.1 10.3 13.8
Switzerland 4.6 7.6 4.6 -12.1 -2.9 0.44 3091 75.3 24.7 7.7 17.0
United States 8.0 13.0 9.9 -1.0 -5.0 0.16 33741 88.6 11.4 2.8 8.6
Source:  UN DESA, based on OECD/DAC online database, available from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/statistics.
a  Excluding flows from France to the Overseas Departments, namely Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion.
 Annex tables 199

Table A.16
Total net ODA flows from OECD Development Assistance Committee countries, by type

Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates (billions of dollars)

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Official Development Assistance 105.4 104.9 122.8 120.6 128.4 135.0 126.9 134.7 137.2 131.6
Bilateral official development assistance 77.5 73.7 87.1 83.9 90.6 94.8 88.4 93.4 94.7 94.4
in the form of:
Technical cooperation 22.4 15.1 17.3 17.6 18.6 18.0 18.2 16.9 17.3 ..
Humanitarian aid 6.8 6.5 8.8 8.6 9.3 9.7 8.5 10.5 13.1 ..
Debt forgiveness 18.9 9.7 11.1 2.0 4.2 6.3 3.3 6.1 1.4 ..
Bilateral loans -2.4 -2.2 -1.1 2.5 3.8 1.9 2.6 1.4 5.2 ..
Contributions to multilateral institutionsa 27.9 31.2 35.7 36.6 37.8 40.2 38.5 41.3 42.6 37.2
of which are:
UN agencies 5.3 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.9 6.8 7.6
EU institutions 10.1 12.0 13.5 14.2 13.6 13.7 12.0 12.8 13.3 12.0
World Bank 7.2 6.2 8.6 7.6 8.8 10.2 8.6 9.3 9.8 8.6
Regional development banks 2.5 2.4 3.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.2
Others 2.7 4.7 4.4 5.4 5.7 5.8 7.5 8.4 8.7 ..
Memorandum item
Bilateral ODA to least developed countries 17.4 19.7 23.5 24.3 28.2 30.7 27.4 30.0 26.3 ..
Source:  UN DESA, based on OECD/DAC online database, available from http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.
a  Grants and capital subscriptions. Does not include concessional lending to multilateral agencies.
200 World Economic Situation and Prospects 2020

Table A.17
Commitments and net flows of financial resources, by selected multilateral institutions
Billions of dollars
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Resource commitmentsa 193.7 245.4 163.8 189.8 130.8 185.0 119.9 245.4 256.7 224.8
Financial institutions, excluding
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 114.5 119.6 106.8 96.5 98.8 99.2 99.9 106.9 108.0 114.6
Regional development banksb 55.1 46.2 46.9 43.0 45.8 41.1 46.9 49.8 54.0 56.0
World Bank Groupc 59.4 73.4 59.9 53.5 53.0 58.1 53.0 57.0 54.0 58.6
International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) 32.9 44.2 26.7 20.6 15.2 18.6 23.5 29.7 22.6 23.0
International Development
Association (IDA) 14.0 14.6 16.3 14.8 16.3 22.2 19.0 16.2 19.5 24.0
International Financial Corporation
(IFC)d 12.4 14.6 16.9 9.2 11.0 10.0 10.5 11.1 11.9 11.6
International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.3 1.3
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 68.2 114.1 45.7 82.5 19.6 72.7 6.2 123.9 132.9 89.9
United Nations operational agenciese 11.0 11.6 11.3 10.8 12.4 13.1 13.7 14.7 15.8 20.4
Net flows 54.6 64.6 78.7 35.1 8.8 -5.1 17.7 32.2 36.3 82.6
Financial institutions, excluding IMF 22.6 27.2 38.0 26.3 22.2 25.0 35.5 33.8 36.6 46.8
Regional development banksb 15.7 9.9 10.5 8.6 5.7 11.2 15.4 14.2 13.1 14.2
World Bank Groupc 6.9 17.2 27.6 17.7 16.5 13.8 20.1 19.6 23.6 32.7
International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) -2.1 8.3 17.2 8.0 7.8 6.4 9.0 10.0 13.2 17.4
International Development
Association (IDA) 7.0 7.0 9.1 7.8 7.0 7.4 9.9 8.8 8.8 14.7
International Financial Corporation
(IFC) 2.1 1.9 1.2 1.9 1.6 0.1 1.3 0.8 1.6 0.6
International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 32.0 37.4 40.7 8.9 -13.4 -30.1 -17.9 -1.5 -0.4 35.8
Source:  Annual reports of the relevant multilateral institutions, various issues.
a  Loans, grants, technical assistance and equity participation, as appropriate; all data are on a calendar-year basis.
b  African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IaDB) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).
c  Data is for fiscal year.
d  Effective 2012, data does not include short-term finance.
e  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World
Food Programme (WFP).