have come to be used too loosely, to mean whatever is on one's mind at

the moment. The new term discrete state of consciousness (d-SoC0 is

proposed for greater precision. A d-SoC is a unique, dynamic pattern or
configuration of psychological structures, an active system of
psychological subsystems. Although the component
structures/subsystems show some variation within a d-SoC, the overall
pattern, the overall system properties remain recognizably the same. If, as
you sit reading, you think, "I am dreaming," instead of "I am awake," you
have changed a small cognitive element in your consciousness but not
affected at all the basic pattern we call your waking state. In spite of
subsystem variation and environmental variation, a d-SoC is stabilized by
a number of processes so that it retains its identity and function. By
analogy, an automobile remains an automobile whether on a road or in a
garage (environment change), whether you change the brand of spark
plugs or the color of the seat covers (internal variation).
Examples of d-SoCs are the ordinary waking state, nondreaming sleep,
dreaming sleep, hypnosis, alcohol intoxication, marijuana intoxication,
and meditative states.
A discrete altered state of consciousness (d-ASC) refers to a d-SoC
that is different from some baseline state of consciousness (b-SoC).
Usually the ordinary state is taken as the baseline state. A d-ASC is a new
system with unique properties of its own, a restructuring of
consciousness. Altered is intended as a purely descriptive term, carrying
no values.
A d-SoC is stabilized by four kinds of processes: (1) loading
stabilization—keeping attention/awareness and other psychological
energies deployed in habitual, desired structures by loading the person's
system heavily with appropriate tasks; (2) negative feedback
stabilization—correcting the functioning of erring structures/subsystems
when they deviate too far from the normal range that ensures stability; (3)
positive feedback stabilization—strengthening activity and/or providing
rewarding experiences when structure/subsystems are functioning within
desired limits; and (4) limiting stabilization—restricting the range of
functioning of structures/subsystems whose intense operation would
destabilize the system.
In terms of current psychological knowledge, ten major subsystems
(collections of related structures) that show important variations over
known d-ASCs need to be distinguished: (1) Exteroception—sensing the