Jurisprudence - Ejectment Cases

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797 Phil. 369
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 211539, October 17, 2016 ]
THAMERLANE M. PEREZ, PETITIONER, VS. DOMINADOR PRISCILLA
RASACEÑA, NAVARRO AND ADELFA LIM, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's Resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Thamerlane
M. Perez assailing the Decision[1] dated July 29, 2013 and Resolution[2] dated March 4, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124234. The CA reversed the Decision[3] dated
September 30, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.
11-125644, which affirmed the April 13, 2011 Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Decision.[4]
The factual and procedural antecedents follow.
The dispute centers on the right of possession of the subject property denominated as Lot 28,
Block No. 2 located at 800 Loyola' Street corner San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, with a
total area of 187.50 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 284213 registered under the name of LNC 3 Asset Management, Inc. (LNC).
On August 18, 2010, petitioner filed a Complaint[5] for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 11 against respondents Dominador Rasacefia, Priscilla Navarro, and Adelfa Lim.
He alleged that he is the absolute owner of the property in controversy. He acquired the property
from LNC through a Deed of Conditional Sale dated January 13, 2010 and, subsequently,
through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 29, 2010. The previous owner, LNC, tolerated
respondents' occupancy of the subject property.
In a letter dated April 19, 2010, petitioner, through his counsel demanded respondents to vacate
the property, but the latter refused to heed. At the proceedings initiated by petitioner before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 521, Manila, the parties failed to settle amicably. Hence,
the complaint, praying that respondents be ordered to vacate the premises and restore the
possession of the property to the petitioner; to pay a reasonable rent in the amount of P30,000.00
for the use and occupation of the same; and, to pay P100,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00
as attorney's fees and costs.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[6] respondents alleged that they leased the property from
Agus Development Corporation (Agus). They contended that: the court has no jurisdiction over
the person of the respondents; the case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata; there is no
lessor-lessee relationship between the parties; petitioner has no cause of action against
respondents; and the condition precedent for the filing of the complaint was not complied with as
there was no demand to vacate.
In a Decision dated April 13, 2011, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner, with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered m favor of [petitioner] and against the

[respondents]. The court orders the [respondents]:
1. To immediately vacate and peacefully surrender the possession of the

occupied subject premises located at 800 Loyola corner San Diego Streets,
Sampaloc, Manila;
2. To pay the [petitioner] [P]5,000.00 as reasonable monthly compensation

for the use and occupancy of the premises beginning April 2010 and every
month thereafter until [respondents] shall have finally and actually vacated
the subject premises;
3. To pay the amount of [P]10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
4. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Thereafter, respondents elevated the case before the RTC of Manila. On September 30, 2011, the
RTC affirmed in toto the Decision of the MeTC.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC. Petitioner failed to prove that his predecessor-in-interest tolerated
respondents' possession of the property. He did not offer any evidence attesting that LNC
tolerated the occupation. His complaint was silent as to the factual circumstances surrounding the
alleged tolerance, or averment of an overt act indicative of LNC's permission. The CA
considered the Deed of Absolute Sale from which petitioner anchors his right of possession
highly dubious and questionable because: the same was not registered with the proper Registry
of Deeds; no affidavit of the lawyer who notarized the same was submitted; and there was no
proof of authority of the persons who signed in the contract for LNC. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2011
Decision and the February 24, 2012 Omnibus Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 11-125644 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
187245-CV for unlawful detainer filed by Thamerlane M. Perez against Dominador Rasaceña,
Priscilla Navarro and Adelfa Lim before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 11 of Manila is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On March 4, 2014, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.[9]
Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO
ALLEGE AND PROVE THAT RESPONDENTS['] POSSESSION WAS BY
MERE TOLERANCE OF HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE OF THE PETITIONER IS HIGHLY DUBIOUS AND
QUESTIONABLE CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME WAS NOT
REGISTERED WITH THE PROPER REGISTRY OF DEEDS; NO AFFIDAVIT
BY THE LAWYER WHO NOTARIZED THE SAME WAS SUBMITTED AND
NO PROOF WAS SHOWN THAT THE PERSONS WHO SIGNED FOR THE
REGISTERED OWNER, LNC ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., WERE
AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.[10]
To begin with, in summary ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the only
issue to be determined is who between the contending parties has better possession of the
contested property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts in Cities, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases and the
proceedings are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.[11] The summary character of the
proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of
preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to
resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible
entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the
principal issue of possession.[12]
We note that the arguments raised here would necessarily require a re-evaluation of the parties'
submissions and the CA's factual findings. Ordinarily, this course of action is proscribed in a
petition for review on certiorari, i.e., a Rule 45 petition resolves only questions of law. By way
of exception, however, the Court resolves factual issues when the findings of the MTCC and the
RTC differ from those of the CA, as in the case at bar.[13]
Petitioner averred that he sufficiently alleged in his Complaint and established that respondents'
possession of the subject property is by mere tolerance of his predecessor-in-interest. That LNC
has allowed several years to pass without requiring respondents to vacate the premises nor filed
an ejectment case against them supports the fact that LNC has acquiesced to respondents'
possession and use of the property.
It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states
the following:
(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about
the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
its enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[14]
A review of petitioner's complaint shows that: (a) by tolerance of the previous owner, LNC,
respondents were allowed to occupy the property on the promise to vacate upon demand; (b) in a
letter dated April 19, 2010, petitioner demanded the respondents to vacate the property; (c) the
respondents refused to vacate; (d) petitioner filed the complaint on August 18, 2010 or within
one year from the formal demand to vacate was made. Clearly, the Complaint established a case
for unlawful detainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdiction over it.
Case law introduced the concept of possession by tolerance in ejectment cases as follows upon
failure of the tenant to pay the stipulated rents, the landlord might consider the contract broken
and demand immediate possession of the rented property, thus, converting a legal possession into
illegal possession. However, the landlord might choose to give the tenant credit for the payment
of the rents and allow him to continue indefinitely in the possession of the property, such that
during that period, the tenant would not be in illegal possession of the property and the landlord
could not maintain an action of desahucio until after the latter had taken steps to convert the
legal possession into illegal possession. [15]
As held in Canaynay v. Sarmiento: [16]
x x x There is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a defaulting tenant to remain in the rented
property one month, one year, several years, or even decades. That consent, no matter how long
it may last, makes lawful tenant's possession. Only when that consent is withdrawn and the
owner demands tenant to leave the property is the owner's right of possession asserted and the
tenant's refusal or failure to move out makes his possession unlawful, because it is violative of
the owner's preferential right of possession. [17]
We further elucidated the concept of possession by mere tolerance in Calubayan, et al. v.

Pascual,[18] thus:
x x x In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the
premises nor filing action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendant's possession
and use of the premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against them. x x x.
xxxx
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the various notifications for defendant to see the
plaintiffs could be construed as demands upon the defendant to vacate, the length of time that
defendant detained the premises is to be reckoned with from the date of the last demand.
Plaintiffs' failure to file an action in court shortly after defendant had ignored their
previous notices is to be considered as a waiver on their part to eject the defendant in the
meantime.
x x x.[19]
A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally
lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the
possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established.
Acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's
tolerance or permission for him to occupy the disputed property.[20]
To establish the tolerance on the part of petitioner's predecessor, petitioner presented a letter 21
dated October 15, 2002 wherein Agus apprised one Isidra Millanes, who was a lessee on a
month-to-month basis, the transfer of ownership of Lot No. 28, Block No. 2 at 800 Loyola Street
corner San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank); and a letter dated March 25, 2004, wherein Metrobank, through its counsel,
demanded the spouses Ricardo and Precilla[22] Navarro and all persons claiming title or rights
under him to vacate the premises and pay rental in arrears.[23]
Respondents, as lessees of Agus and then Metrobank, were the legal possessors of the subject
property by virtue of a contract of lease. Metrobank's failure to file an action in court shortly
after respondents failed to heed to its demand to vacate in 2004 was a waiver on its part to eject
respondents in the meantime. It would appear that Metrobank permitted or tolerated respondents'
possession of the property even before LNC acquired the property and eventually sold the same
to petitioner. It can be surmised that LNC maintained the status quo. Otherwise, petitioner would
not have found respondents on the premises. Hence, petitioner was able to establish that
respondents' possession was by tolerance of his predecessors. As such, they are necessarily
bound by an implied promise that they will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[24]
With the issue on possession by tolerance settled, We now scrutinize the issue of who is entitled
to physical possession of the property or possession de facto.
To reiterate, the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled
to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. Where
the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order
to determine who has the right to possess the property.[25]
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his claim of ownership and right to possess the property on
the strength of a notarized Deed of Conditional Sale and a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
between. him and LNC.
The CA opined that the Deed of Absolute Sale invoked by petitioner is highly dubious and
questionable considering that the same was not registered with the proper Registry of Deeds, no
affidavit by the lawyer who notarized the same was submitted, and no proof was shown that the
persons who signed for LNC were authorized to do so.
We disagree. There is no rule which requires a party, who relies on a notarized deed of sale for
establishing his ownership, to present further evidence of such deed's genuineness lest the
presumption of its due execution be for naught.[26] Regarded as evidence of the facts therein
expressed in a clear, unequivocal manner, public documents enjoy a presumption of regularity
which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity. The burden of proof to overcome said presumptions lies with the party
contesting the notarial document.[27]
We note that the respondents presented a Certification dated November 15, 2011 that the Notary
Public who signed and affixed his notarial seal on the deed has not yet submitted his notarial
report for 2010 intending to prove that the deed was not a public document.[28] However, the
same was only alleged and offered before the CA. Basic consideration of due process impels the
rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.[29] It is erroneous for the CA to base its ruling that the deed is dubious
on the certification that was not presented before the trial courts. As such, respondents failed to
present clear and convincing evidence as to overcome the presumption of regularity of the
notarized deed, from which petitioner anchored his claim of ownership.
As to respondents, it appears that they initially admitted that they were lessees of Agus. They
merely denied petitioner's ownership and contested the notarized deed of sale through bare
allegations. According to respondents, petitioner has no right to demand on April 19, 2010 for
them to vacate since the alleged undated deed of absolute sale was notarized on July 29, 2010.
Thus, there was no demand to vacate the premises. On appeal before the RTC, the respondents,
to bolster their claim of better right of possession, alleged that the premises which they occupied
are covered by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Law. They insist
that they are qualified and legitimate beneficiaries of the property. They have been paying rental
deposits since August 1, 1984 as proved by a certification dated September 14, 2010.[30]
In their Comment on the instant petition, respondents reiterate that the MeTC and the RTC have
no jurisdiction over herein subject property as there is a pending expropriation case filed by the
City Government of Manila before the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, in connection with its
distribution to qualified beneficiaries like the respondents.[31]
From the foregoing, this Court rules in favor of the petitioner. We agree with the MeTC, as
affirmed by the RTC, that petitioner has proven that he is better entitled to the material
possession of the property as against the unsubstantiated claims of respondents.
Respondents admitted in their Answer that they were lessees of Agus, predecessor of petitioner.
As such, they recognized the ownership of the lot by the petitioner, which includes the right of
possession. As discussed, respondents failed to rebut the deed of sale from which petitioner
anchored his claim of ownership and right of possession of the property. Also, they belatedly
alleged and presented evidence to substantiate their claim of better right of possession.
Anent respondents' argument that petitioner had no right to evict them on April 19, 2010 since he
became the owner only on July 29, 2010, this Court is not persuaded. Although denominated as
conditional, a deed of sale is absolute in nature in the absence of any stipulation reserving title to
the seller until full payment of the purchase price. In such case, ownership of the thing sold
passes to the buyer upon actual or constructive delivery. In a contract of sale, the title to the
property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. On the other hand, in a contract
to sell, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee
until full payment of the purchase price.[32]
A perusal of the contract readily reveals that there was nothing in the Deed of Conditional Sale[33]
which expressly provides for LNC's retention of title or ownership of the property until full
payment of the purchase price or any provision which would impose payment of the price as a
condition for the contract's entering into force. The condition imposed was only on the
performance of the obligations of the parties. As such, there was already a perfected contract,
and the ownership of the property already passed to petitioner as the buyer upon the execution of
the deed of conditional sale on January 13, 2010. Thus, petitioner was deemed to have been
unlawfully deprived of the lawful possession of the property upon respondents' failure to heed
his demand to vacate on April 19, 2010.
Respondents insisted that petitioner has no right to eject them since the subject property is
covered by P.D. No. 1517, and that they are qualified beneficiaries under the same.
It is settled in the case of Spouses Friltes v. Spouses Yambao[34] that the purpose of P.D. No. 1517
is to protect the rights of legitimate tenants who have resided for 10 years or more on specific
parcels of land situated in declared Urban Land Reform Zones or Urban Zones, and who have
built their homes thereon. These legitimate tenants have the right not to be dispossessed and
to have the right of first refusal to purchase the property under reasonable terms and
conditions to be determined by the appropriate government agency. Thus, a legitimate tenant's
right of first refusal to purchase the leased property under P.D. No. 1517 depends on whether the
disputed property in Metropolitan Manila is situated in an area specifically declared to be both
an Area for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone.[35]
These circumstances do not obtain in the present case as it was not alleged nor proven that
respondents built their dwelling on the land. They merely presented certification that they were
paying rentals since 1984. Assuming the aforementioned circumstances are present, the
respondents still cannot qualify under P.D. No. 1517 in the absence of any showing that the
subject land had been declared an area for priority development and urban land reform zone. The
said documents, letters and memorandum which purportedly establish that the respondents'
occupied property is covered by P.D. No. 1517 pertain to the implementation of Ordinance No.
8022 concerning the expropriation of parcels of land, which specifically mentioned Barangay
536, Zone 53.[36] However, the said documents did not prove that the area of Barangay 521
where the property (TCT No. 284213) was situated was declared as Area for Priority
Development and Urban Land Reform Zone. A copy of the said Ordinance was not even
presented. Lastly, P.D. No. 1517 will still not apply as the issue raised in the case at bar was
respondents' refusal to vacate the subject property and not their right of first refusal.
As to the issue of the pending expropriation case filed by the City Government of Manila raised
for the first time in the RTC by the respondents, the same is proscribed as all issues raised for the
first time in the reviewing court are proscribed.[37] Assuming arguendo that We entertain the
issue, We rule that the pending expropriation will not affect the resolution of this petition. First,
respondents can raise their issue in the appropriate legal proceeding. Second, respondents' pieces
of evidence, which include a certification[38] from the Urban Settlement Office, that a pending
expropriation case was filed relative to the implementation of Ordinance No. 8022, were silent as
to the scope of the said Ordinance, or that the subject property was indeed included therein.
It must be stressed that the ruling in the instant case is limited only to the determination as to
who between the parties has a better right to possession. It will not bar any of the parties from
filing an action with the proper court to resolve conclusively the issue of ownership.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Thamerlane M. Perez,
assailing the Decision dated July 29, 2013 and the Resolution dated March 4, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124234, is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated April 13,
2011 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 187245-CV is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
November 9, 2016
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___October 17, 2016___ a Decision, copy attached hereto, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by
this Office on November 9, 2016 at 11:15 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Normandie B.
Pizarro and Pedro B. Corales, concurring, rollo, pp. 22-29.
[2]
Id. at 30-31.
[3]
Penned by Judge Dinnah C. Aguila Topacio; id. at 124-126.
[4]
Penned by Judge J. Ermin Ernest Louie R. Miguel; id at 85-88.
[5]
Id. at 32-36.
[6]
Id. at 46-50.
[7]
Id. at 87-88.
[8]
Id. at 28.
[9]
Id. at 30-31.
[10]
Id. at 11.
[11]
Norberte, Jr. v. Mejia. G.R. No. 182886, March 9, 2015,752 SCRA 120, 124.
[12]
Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation. G.R.
No. 161589, November 24, 2014,, 742 SCRA 426, 441.
[13]
Nenita Quality Foods Corp. v. Galabo, et al., 702 Phil. 506, 515 (2013).
[14]
Macaslang v. Spouses Zamora, 664 Phil. 337, 351 (2011 ).
[15]
Lucido and Lucido v. Vita, 25 Phil. 414, 425 (1913), as cited in Dela Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, 539 Phil. 158, 176 (2006).
[16]
79 Phil. 36 (1947).
[17]
Canaynay v. Sarmiento, supra, at 40.
[18]
128 Phil. 160 (1967).
[19]
Calubayan, et al. v. Pascual, supra, at 163-164. (Emphases supplied)
[20]
Quijano v. Amante, G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014, 737 SCRA 552, 564-565.
[21]
Rollo, p. 73.
[22]
As spelled in the demand letter.
[23]
Rollo, p. 74.
[24]
Calubayan, et al. v. Pascual, supra note 18, at 163.
[25]
Barrientos v. Rapal, 669 Phil. 438, 444 (2011).
[26]
Destreza v. Atty. Riñoza-Plazo, et al., 619 Phil. 775,783 (2009).
[27]
Dela Peña, et al. v. Avila, et al., 681 Phil. 553, 567 (2012). CA rollo, p. 153.
[29]
Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 632 Phil. 143, 155 (2010).
[30]
CA rollo, pp. 112-122.
[31]
Rollo, pp. 242-243.
[32]
Norberte, Jr. v. Mejia, supra, note 11, at 125.
[33]
Rollo, pp. 65-68.
[34]
433 Phil. 715, 721-724 (2002). (Citations omitted)
[35]
Esteban v. Spouses Marcelo, 715 Phil. 806, 815 (2013), citing Sps. Frilles v. Sps. Yamhao,
supra, (Emphases supplied).
[36]
CA rollo, pp. 123-126.
[37]
Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., supra note 29.
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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 204361, July 04, 2018 ]
CECILIA T. JAVELOSA, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
MA. DIANA J. JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, V. EZEQUIEL TAPUS, MARIO
MADRIAGA, DANNY M. TAPUZ,[1] JUANITA TAPUS AND AURORA
MADRIAGA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J:
Under the law and the Rules of Court, an owner is given an assortment of legal remedies to
recover possession of real property from the illegal occupant. The choice of which action to
pursue rests on the owner. Should he/she elect to file a summary action for unlawful detainer,
he/she must prove all the essential jurisdictional facts for such action to prosper. The most
important of which, is the fact that the respondent's entry into the land was lawful and based on
the former's permission or tolerance. Absent this essential jurisdictional fact, the action for
unlawful detainer must be dismissed.
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[3] dated March 30, 2012, and Resolution[4] dated
October 30, 2012, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 03115,
which dismissed the case for unlawful detainer filed by Cecilia T. Javelosa (petitioner).
The Antecedents
The petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Barangay
Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan (subject property). The subject property contains an area
of 10,198 square meters, more or less, and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-35394.[5] The subject property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 2222, which the petitioner acquired by donation from her predecessor-in-interest Ciriaco
Tirol (Tirol).[6]
The subject property was occupied by Ezequiel Tapus (Ezequiel), Mario Madriaga (Mario),
DannyM. Tapuz (Danny), Juanita Tapus (Juanita) and Aurora Madriaga (Aurora) (collectively
referred to as the respondents). Allegedly, the respondents' predecessor was assigned as a
caretaker of the subject property, and therefore possessed and occupied a portion thereof upon
the tolerance and permission of Tirol.[7]
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner's daughter, Diane J. Jimenez (Jimenez), learned that Expedito
Tapus, Jr., a relative of the respondents offered the subject property for sale.[8] Alarmed, Jimenez
sought the assistance of the Office of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan.
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa for a possible
alternative resolution of the conflict. However, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
[9]
In October 2003, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate
the subject property. The demand was unheeded.[10] This prompted the petitioner to file a case for
unlawful detainer.
Juanita filed her Answer[11] claiming that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been
occupying the subject property since time immemorial. She emphasized that they are actual,
adverse and exclusive possessors under a claim of ownership. She further averred that they are
indigenous occupants and tribal settlers of the land in dispute, and hence their rights are
protected by law. In contrast, the petitioner and Jimenez have never even set foot on the
property.
The other respondents, Ezequiel, Mario, Danny and Aurora, filed a separate Answer with
Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss[12] dated March 18, 2004. They claimed that they inherited
the subject property from their late grandfather Antonio Tapus. Consequently, they are the lawful
and actual possessors of the subject property. In fact, they have been occupying the said property
for 60 years. They likewise claimed that the petitioner and her predecessors are land grabbers,
whose title over the property was fake and spurious.[13]
Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
In its Decision[14] on November 18, 2005, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) awarded the
subject property in favor of the petitioner, and consequently, ordered the respondents to vacate,
and pay the petitioner a monthly rental of Php 500.00. To properly determine the issue of
possession, the MCTC first provisionally delved into the issue of ownership. In this regard, the
MCTC held that the petitioner, being the registered owner of the subject property is entitled to its
possession.[15]
Likewise, the MCTC gave credence to the petitioner's contention that the respondents' stay in the
subject property was merely upon the permission granted by her predecessor to the respondents.
Accordingly, the respondents' possession became illegal from the moment the petitioner ordered
them to vacate. [16]
Moreover, the MCTC noted that the respondents did not submit any proof to establish their
purported claim of ownership. Neither were they able to prove their allegation that the source of
the petitioner's title was spurious. At any rate, the MCTC held that such a defense constituted a
collateral attack on the petitioner's title, which shall not be permitted in an action for unlawful
detainer. Consequently, the MCTC regarded the petitioner's title as valid, unless declared null
and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.[17]
The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring that the [petitioner] has a better right to physical possession of the land in question;
2. Ordering the [respondents] and all other persons claiming rights under them to immediately
vacate the land in question designated as Lot 30-G-5 in the Commissioner's Sketch and to turn
over the possession thereof to the [petitioner]
3. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner] monthly rental of Php 500.00, reckoned
from the filing of the complaint on February 27, 2004, until the [petitioner] shall have been
completely restored in actual possession thereof; and
4. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner] the sum of Php 10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal against the MCTC decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision[19] affirming the ruling
of the MCTC.
First, the RTC affirmed the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case. It observed that the
allegations of the complaint sufficiently made out a case for unlawful detainer. As to the merits
of the case, the RTC agreed with the MCTC's conclusion that the petitioner, being the owner of
the subject property is entitled to possess the same. It noted that the respondents merely occupied
the subject property upon the tolerance of the petitioner. Consequently, they must vacate as soon
as the said permission was withdrawn.[20]
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding no reversible error, the decision appealed from
is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the respondents filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On March 30, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,[22] reversing the disquisitions of the
MCTC and the RTC.
The CA ratiocinated that although the MCTC had jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case,
the trial court however erred in upholding the petitioner's right to possess the subject property.
The CA pointed out that the petitioner failed to prove the fact that the respondents indeed
occupied the subject property through her permission and tolerance. It stressed that to make out a
case for unlawful detainer, the petitioner must concomitantly prove that the respondents' prior
lawful possession has become unlawful due to the expiration of the right to possess the property.
The petitioner failed to show that the respondents occupied the subject property pursuant to her
tolerance, and that such permission was present from the very start of their occupation. Absent
the fact of tolerance, the remedy of unlawful detainer would be inappropriate.[23]
The decretal portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decision,
dated August 8, 2007, of the RTC Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 2 relative to Civil Case No. 7652 for
Unlawful Detainer is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. A new one is entered in its stead declaring
respondent's case as DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Aggrieved by the ruling of the CA, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in its Resolution[25] dated October 30, 2012.
Undeterred, the petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[26] before the Court.
The Issues
The main issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the
case for unlawful detainer.
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA decision, the petitioner claims that she had proven
her ownership of the subject property, and consequently, her right to possess the same.[27] She
points out that she submitted a verified consolidated position paper, which supported the
allegations in her complaint, as well as copies of TCT No. T-35394 and OCT No. 2222, which
established her ownership over the subject property.[28] The petitioner bewails that in contrast to
the evidence she submitted, the respondents failed to present affidavits of their witnesses or any
evidence- documentary or otherwise, that would prove their right to possess the subject property.
[29]
Aside from the photocopy of a Sketch Plan, the respondents did not have any evidence to
support their claim of purported ownership of over 60 years.[30] Also, the respondents' prior
physical possession does not automatically entitle them to the subject property, especially as
against her- the lawful owner of the same.[31]
Likewise, the petitioner avers that her failure to reside in the property should not be taken against
her. The subject property was an agricultural land, which was not meant for residential purposes.
In fact, it was precisely for this purpose that the respondents' predecessors-in-interest were
employed as caretakers of the land.[32] Finally, the petitioner asserts that her tolerance of the
respondents' occupation was obvious from the fact that she allowed them to stay in the subject
property for several years, without ordering them to vacate the premises, or filing an action to
eject them. This allegedly proves her acquiescence to the respondents' occupation.[33]
On the other hand, the respondents pray for the outright dismissal of the instant petition due to
the petitioners' failure to raise a question of law, and show that the CA committed a reversible
error.[34] Particularly, the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner failed to prove her supposed
tolerance of the respondents' stay in the subject property.[35] In fact, the respondents point out that
the purported tolerance by the petitioner of their occupation for over 71 years is contrary to
human experience.[36] The respondents further aver that tolerance can only exist insofar as there
is a recognition of the right asserted by the tolerating party.[37] Their predecessor-in-interest never
recognized the ownership of the petitioner or any of her predecessors-in-interest.[38]
Similarly, the respondents counter that the petitioner could not acquire a better right to possess,
as she has in fact never been in actual physical possession of the subject property, while they
have been occupying the same property since time immemorial.[39] The petitioner anchors her
claim from the right of her predecessor-in-interest Tirol, who himself never occupied the subject
property.[40]
Finally, the respondents claim that the MCTC should have dismissed the action for unlawful
detainer considering that the principal issue determined before the MCTC was the ownership of
the property. As such, jurisdiction should have been with the RTC considering that the assessed
value of the subject property exceeded Php 20,000.00.[41]
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
It must be noted at the outset that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to reviewing errors of law,
not of fact.[42] A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain set
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.[43]
Essentially, the issue as to who between the parties has a better right of possession will
necessarily entail a review of the evidence presented, which is beyond the province of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
At any rate, the CA did not commit any error that would warrant a reversal of its assailed
decision.
The owner of real property cannot wrest

possession from the occupant, through the
simple expedient of filing an action for
unlawful detainer without sufficiently proving
the essential requisites for such action to
prosper.
It is an elementary principle of civil law that the owner of real property is entitled to the
possession thereof as an attribute of his or her ownership. In fact, the holder of a Torrens Title is
the rightful owner of the property thereby covered, and is entitled to its possession.[44] This
notwithstanding, "the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual
occupation of the property."[45] Rather, to recover possession, the owner must first resort to the
proper judicial remedy, and thereafter, satisfy all the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper.[46]
Accordingly, the owner may choose among three kinds of actions to recover possession of real
property - an accion interdictal, accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.
Notably, an accion interdictal is summary in nature, and is cognizable by the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. It comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible
entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of the
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth,
whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. An action for
forcible entry is distinguished from an unlawful detainer case, such that in the former, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, whereas in the latter action, the
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of
actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of
unlawful detainer. The only issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.[47]
On the other hand, an accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession,
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title.[48]
Lastly, an accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership, also brought in the proper
RTC in an ordinary civil proceeding.[49]
In the case at bar, the petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the subject property, elected to file
an action for unlawful detainer. In making this choice, she bore the correlative burden to
sufficiently allege, and thereafter prove by a preponderance of evidence all the jurisdictional
facts in the said type of action. Specifically, the petitioner was charged with proving the
following jurisdictional facts, to wit:
(i) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(ii) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
(iv) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.[50]
Particularly, the complaint stated that (i) the respondents occupied the subject property upon the
tolerance of the petitioner; (ii) the petitioner sent the respondents a demand to vacate sometime
in October 2003; (iii) the same demand was unheeded; and (iv) the action for unlawful detainer
was filed within one year from the date of the demand.[51] Verily, the following jurisdictional
facts properly vested the MCTC of Buruanga, Aklan, with jurisdiction over the case.
However, in order for the petitioner to successfully prosecute her case for unlawful detainer, it is
imperative upon her to prove all the assertions in her complaint. After all, "the basic rule is that
mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."[52] This, the petitioner failed to do.
As correctly observed by the CA, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to establish that the
respondents' occupation of the subject property was actually effected through her tolerance or
permission. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to prove how and when the respondents entered
the subject lot, as well as how and when the permission to occupy was purportedly given. In fact,
she was conspicuously silent about the details on how the permission to enter was given, save for
her bare assertion that the respondents' occupied the premises as caretakers thereof. The absence
of such essential details is especially troubling considering that the respondents have been
occupying the subject property for more than 70 years, a fact which was not disputed by the
petitioner. In this regard, it is must be shown that the respondents first came into the property due
to the permission given by the petitioner or her predecessors.
It cannot be gainsaid that the fact of tolerance is of utmost importance in an action for unlawful
detainer. Without proof that the possession was legal at the outset, the logical conclusion would
be that the defendant's possession of the subject property will be deemed illegal from the very
beginning, for which, the action for unlawful detainer shall be dismissed.[53]
Remarkably, in Quijano v. Atty. Amante,[54] the Court ruled that in an action for unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff must show that the possession was initially lawful, and thereafter, establish
the basis of such lawful possession. Similarly, should the plaintiff claim that the respondent's
possession was by his/her tolerance, then such acts of tolerance must be proved. A bare
allegation of tolerance will not suffice. At least, the plaintiff must point to the overt acts
indicative of his/her or predecessor's permission to occupy the disputed property. Failing in this
regard, the occupant's possession could then be deemed to have been illegal from the beginning.
Consequently, the action for unlawful detainer will fail. Neither may the ejectment suit be treated
as one for forcible entry in the absence of averments that the entry in the property had been
effected through force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.[55]
Similarly, in Suarez v. Sps. Emboy,[56] the Court warned that "when the complaint fails to aver the
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria."[57]
The same ruling was rendered in the case of Dr. Carbonilla v. Abiera, et al.,[58] where the Court
laid the important dictum that the supposed acts of tolerance should have been present right from
the very start of the possession—from entry to the property. "Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy."[59] This
same ruling was echoed in Jose v. Alfuerto, et al.,[60] where the Court even emphasized its
consistent and strict holding that in an unlawful detainer case, "tolerance or permission must
have been present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful from the start,
an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed."[61]
Perforce, guided by all the foregoing cases, an action for unlawful detainer fails in the absence of
proof of tolerance, coupled with evidence of how the entry of the respondents was effected, or
how and when the dispossession started.[62] This rule is so stringent such that the Court
categorically declared in Go, Jr. v. CA[63] that tolerance cannot be presumed from the owner's
failure to eject the occupants from the land.[64] Rather, "tolerance always carries with it
'permission' and not merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not
tolerance."[65] On this score, the petitioner's tenacious claim that the fact of tolerance may be
surmised from her refusal for many years to file an action to evict the respondents is obviously
flawed.
Furthermore, it must be stressed that the fact that the petitioner possesses a Torrens Title does
not automatically give her unbridled authority to immediately wrest possession. It goes without
saying that even the owner of the property cannot wrest possession from its current possessor.
This was precisely the Court's ruling in Spouses Munoz v. CA,[66] viz.:
If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that possession thereof was
deprived from him for more than twelve years, he should present his claim before the Regional
Trial Court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria and not before the Municipal
Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the
owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in
possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for
ejectment.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised
in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria.[67] (Citations omitted and emphasis and underscoring Ours)
As a final note, an important caveat must be laid down. The Court's ruling should not in any way
be misconstrued as coddling the occupant of the property, at the expense of the lawful owner.
Rather, what this resolution seeks to impress is that even the legal owner of the property cannot
conveniently usurp possession against a possessor, through a summary action for ejectment,
without proving the essential requisites thereof. Accordingly, should the owner choose to file an
action for unlawful detainer, it is imperative for him/her to first and foremost prove that the
occupation was based on his/her permission or tolerance. Absent which, the owner would be in a
better position by pursuing other more appropriate legal remedies. As eloquently stated by
Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin in the case of Quijano,[68] "the issue of possession between
the parties will still remain. To finally resolve such issue, they should review their options and
decide on their proper recourses. In the meantime, it is wise for the Court to leave the door open
to them in that respect. For now, therefore, this recourse of the petitioner has to be dismissed."[69]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the Decision dated March 30, 2012, and Resolution dated October 30, 2012, rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 03115, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson),[*] Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
July 30, 2018
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sir/Madam:
Please take notice that on July 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on
July 30, 2018 at 1:52 p.m.
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C.
PERFECTO
Division Clerk of Court

By:
(SGD.) TERESITA
AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of
Court
[*]
Senior Associate Justice (Per Section 12, Republic Act No. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, As
Amended)
[1]
Name was spelled as "Tapuz" in the rollo cover.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 3-32.
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Ramon Paul L.
Hernando and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring; id. at 33-43.
[4]
Id. at 45-46.
[5]
Id. at 9.
[6]
Id. at 50.
[7]
Id. at 9.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id. at 10.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id. at 83-103.
[12]
Id. at 104-108.
[13]
Id. at 106.
[14]
Rendered by Presiding Judge Raul C. Barrios; id. at 52-62.
[15]
Id. at 58.
[16]
Id. at 59.
[17]
Id. at 58.
[18]
Id. at 61-62.
[19]
Rendered by Presiding Judge Ledelia P. Aragona-Biliran; id. at 48-51.
[20]
Id. at 49-50.
[21]
Id. at 51.
[22]
Id. at 33-42.
[23]
Id. at 39-41.
[24]
Id. at 42.
[25]
Id. at 45-46.
[26]
Id. at 3-32.
[27]
Id. at 23.
[28]
Id. at 16-17.
[29]
Id. at 17.
[30]
Id. at 19.
[31]
Id. at 22.
[32]
Id. at 21.
[33]
Id. at 27-28.
[34]
Id. at 169-170.
[35]
Id. at 170.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Id. at 197.
[38]
Id.
[39]
Id. at 176.
[40]
Id. at 198.
[41]
Id. at 196.
[42]
Tenazas, et al. v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport, et al., 731 Phil. 217, 228 (2014), citing "J"
Marketing Corporation v. Taran, 607 Phil. 414, 424-425 (2009).
[43]
Tongonan Holdings and Dev't. Corp. v. Atty. Escaño, Jr., 672 Phil. 747, 756 (2011), citing
Rep. of the Phils. v. Malabanan, et al., 646 Phil. 631, 637-638 (2010).
[44]
Quijano v. Atty. Amante, 745 Phil. 40, 51-52 (2014), citing Sps. Beltran v. Nieves, 648 Phil.
460, 466 (2010); Manila Electric Co. v. Heirs of Sps. Deloy, 710 Phil. 427, 443 (2013); Sps.
Pascual v. Sps. Coronel, 554 Phil. 351, 356 (2007).
[45]
Suarez v. Sps. Emboy, 729 Phil. 315, 329 (2014).
[46]
Id.
[47]
Id.
[48]
Id. at 329-330.
[49]
Id.
[50]
Id. at 330.
[51]
Rollo, pp. 112-113.
[52]
ECE Realty and Development Inc. v. Mandap, 742 Phil. 164, 171 (2014).
[53]
Quijano v. Atty. Amante, supra note 44, at 42.
[54]
745 Phil. 40 (2014).
[55]
Id. at 42.
[56]
729 Phil. 315 (2014).
[57]
Id. at 325.
[58]
639 Phil. 473 (2010).
[59]
Id. at 482.
[60]
699 Phil. 307 (2012).
[61]
Id. at 319.
[62]
Dr. Carbonilla v. Abiera, et al., supra note 58, at 482.
[63]
415 Phil. 172 (2001).
[64]
Id. at 181.
[65]
Dr. Carbonilla v. Abiera, et al., supra note 58, at 482.
[66]
288 Phil. 1001 ( 1992).
[67]
Id. at 1011-1012.
[68]
Supra note 54.
[69]
Id. at 53.
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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2016 > October 2016 Decisions > G.R. No.
211539, October 17, 2016 - THAMERLANE M. PEREZ, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR
PRISCILLA RASACEÑA, NAVARRO AND ADELFA LIM, Respondent.:
G.R. No. 211539, October 17, 2016 - THAMERLANE M. PEREZ, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR
PRISCILLA RASACEÑA, NAVARRO AND ADELFA LIM, Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 211539, October 17, 2016
THAMERLANE M. PEREZ, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR PRISCILLA RASACEÑA,

NAVARRO AND ADELFA LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's Resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Thamerlane
M. Perez assailing the Decision1 dated July 29, 2013 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124234. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated
September 30, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.
11-125644, which affirmed the April 13, 2011 Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Decision.4 chanrobleslaw
The factual and procedural antecedents follow.
The dispute centers on the right of possession of the subject property denominated as Lot 28,
Block No. 2 located at 800 Loyola' Street corner San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, with a
total area of 187.50 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 284213 registered under the name of LNC 3 Asset Management, Inc. (LNC).
On August 18, 2010, petitioner filed a Complaint5 for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 11 against respondents Dominador Rasacefia, Priscilla Navarro, and Adelfa Lim.
He alleged that he is the absolute owner of the property in controversy. He acquired the property
from LNC through a Deed of Conditional Sale dated January 13, 2010 and, subsequently,
through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 29, 2010. The previous owner, LNC, tolerated
respondents' occupancy of the subject property.
In a letter dated April 19, 2010, petitioner, through his counsel demanded respondents to vacate
the property, but the latter refused to heed. At the proceedings initiated by petitioner before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 521, Manila, the parties failed to settle amicably. Hence,
the complaint, praying that respondents be ordered to vacate the premises and restore the
possession of the property to the petitioner; to pay a reasonable rent in the amount of P30,000.00
for the use and occupation of the same; and, to pay P100,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00
as attorney's fees and costs.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 respondents alleged that they leased the property from Agus
Development Corporation (Agus). They contended that: the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents; the case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata; there is no lessor-
lessee relationship between the parties; petitioner has no cause of action against respondents; and
the condition precedent for the filing of the complaint was not complied with as there was no
demand to vacate.
In a Decision dated April 13, 2011, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner, with the following
dispositive portion:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered m favor of [petitioner] and against the

[respondents]. The court orders the [respondents]: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. To immediately vacate and peacefully surrender the possession of the

occupied subject premises located at 800 Loyola corner San Diego Streets,
Sampaloc, Manila;
2. To pay the [petitioner] [P]5,000.00 as reasonable monthly compensation

for the use and occupancy of the premises beginning April 2010 and every
month thereafter until [respondents] shall have finally and actually vacated
the subject premises;
3. To pay the amount of [P]10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
4. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thereafter, respondents elevated the case before the RTC of Manila. On September 30, 2011, the
RTC affirmed in toto the Decision of the MeTC.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC. Petitioner failed to prove that his predecessor-in-interest tolerated
respondents' possession of the property. He did not offer any evidence attesting that LNC
tolerated the occupation. His complaint was silent as to the factual circumstances surrounding the
alleged tolerance, or averment of an overt act indicative of LNC's permission. The CA
considered the Deed of Absolute Sale from which petitioner anchors his right of possession
highly dubious and questionable because: the same was not registered with the proper Registry
of Deeds; no affidavit of the lawyer who notarized the same was submitted; and there was no
proof of authority of the persons who signed in the contract for LNC. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2011
Decision and the February 24, 2012 Omnibus Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 11-125644 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
187245-CV for unlawful detainer filed by Thamerlane M. Perez against Dominador Rasaceña,
Priscilla Navarro and Adelfa Lim before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 11 of Manila is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 4, 2014, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.9 chanrobleslaw
Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO
ALLEGE AND PROVE THAT RESPONDENTS['] POSSESSION WAS BY
MERE TOLERANCE OF HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE OF THE PETITIONER IS HIGHLY DUBIOUS AND
QUESTIONABLE CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME WAS NOT
REGISTERED WITH THE PROPER REGISTRY OF DEEDS; NO AFFIDAVIT
BY THE LAWYER WHO NOTARIZED THE SAME WAS SUBMITTED AND
NO PROOF WAS SHOWN THAT THE PERSONS WHO SIGNED FOR THE
REGISTERED OWNER, LNC ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., WERE
AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.10
To begin with, in summary ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the only
issue to be determined is who between the contending parties has better possession of the
contested property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts in Cities, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases and the
proceedings are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.11 The summary character of the
proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of
preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to
resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible
entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the
principal issue of possession.12 chanrobleslaw
We note that the arguments raised here would necessarily require a re-evaluation of the parties'
submissions and the CA's factual findings. Ordinarily, this course of action is proscribed in a
petition for review on certiorari, i.e., a Rule 45 petition resolves only questions of law. By way
of exception, however, the Court resolves factual issues when the findings of the MTCC and the
RTC differ from those of the CA, as in the case at bar.13 chanrobleslaw
Petitioner averred that he sufficiently alleged in his Complaint and established that respondents'
possession of the subject property is by mere tolerance of his predecessor-in-interest. That LNC
has allowed several years to pass without requiring respondents to vacate the premises nor filed
an ejectment case against them supports the fact that LNC has acquiesced to respondents'
possession and use of the property.
It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states
the following:
(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about
the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
its enjoyment; and cralawlawlibrary
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.14
A review of petitioner's complaint shows that: (a) by tolerance of the previous owner, LNC,
respondents were allowed to occupy the property on the promise to vacate upon demand; (b) in a
letter dated April 19, 2010, petitioner demanded the respondents to vacate the property; (c) the
respondents refused to vacate; (d) petitioner filed the complaint on August 18, 2010 or within
one year from the formal demand to vacate was made. Clearly, the Complaint established a case
for unlawful detainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdiction over it.
Case law introduced the concept of possession by tolerance in ejectment cases as follows upon
failure of the tenant to pay the stipulated rents, the landlord might consider the contract broken
and demand immediate possession of the rented property, thus, converting a legal possession into
illegal possession. However, the landlord might choose to give the tenant credit for the payment
of the rents and allow him to continue indefinitely in the possession of the property, such that
during that period, the tenant would not be in illegal possession of the property and the landlord
could not maintain an action of desahucio until after the latter had taken steps to convert the
legal possession into illegal possession. 15 chanrobleslaw
As held in Canaynay v. Sarmiento: 16 chanrobleslaw
x x x There is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a defaulting tenant to remain in the rented
property one month, one year, several years, or even decades. That consent, no matter how long
it may last, makes lawful tenant's possession. Only when that consent is withdrawn and the
owner demands tenant to leave the property is the owner's right of possession asserted and the
tenant's refusal or failure to move out makes his possession unlawful, because it is violative of
the owner's preferential right of possession. 17
We further elucidated the concept of possession by mere tolerance in Calubayan, et al. v.

Pascual,18 thus:
x x x In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the
premises nor filing action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendant's possession
and use of the premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against them. x x x.
xxxx
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the various notifications for defendant to see the
plaintiffs could be construed as demands upon the defendant to vacate, the length of time that
defendant detained the premises is to be reckoned with from the date of the last demand.
Plaintiffs' failure to file an action in court shortly after defendant had ignored their
previous notices is to be considered as a waiver on their part to eject the defendant in the
meantime.
x x x.19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally
lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the
possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established.
Acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's
tolerance or permission for him to occupy the disputed property.20 chanrobleslaw
To establish the tolerance on the part of petitioner's predecessor, petitioner presented a letter 21
dated October 15, 2002 wherein Agus apprised one Isidra Millanes, who was a lessee on a
month-to-month basis, the transfer of ownership of Lot No. 28, Block No. 2 at 800 Loyola Street
corner San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank); and a letter dated March 25, 2004, wherein Metrobank, through its counsel,
demanded the spouses Ricardo and Precilla22 Navarro and all persons claiming title or rights
under him to vacate the premises and pay rental in arrears.23 chanrobleslaw
Respondents, as lessees of Agus and then Metrobank, were the legal possessors of the subject
property by virtue of a contract of lease. Metrobank's failure to file an action in court shortly
after respondents failed to heed to its demand to vacate in 2004 was a waiver on its part to eject
respondents in the meantime. It would appear that Metrobank permitted or tolerated respondents'
possession of the property even before LNC acquired the property and eventually sold the same
to petitioner. It can be surmised that LNC maintained the status quo. Otherwise, petitioner would
not have found respondents on the premises. Hence, petitioner was able to establish that
respondents' possession was by tolerance of his predecessors. As such, they are necessarily
bound by an implied promise that they will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.24 chanrobleslaw
With the issue on possession by tolerance settled, We now scrutinize the issue of who is entitled
to physical possession of the property or possession de facto.
To reiterate, the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled
to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. Where
the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order
to determine who has the right to possess the property.25 cralawredchanroblesl aw
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his claim of ownership and right to possess the property on
the strength of a notarized Deed of Conditional Sale and a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
between. him and LNC.
The CA opined that the Deed of Absolute Sale invoked by petitioner is highly dubious and
questionable considering that the same was not registered with the proper Registry of Deeds, no
affidavit by the lawyer who notarized the same was submitted, and no proof was shown that the
persons who signed for LNC were authorized to do so.
We disagree. There is no rule which requires a party, who relies on a notarized deed of sale for
establishing his ownership, to present further evidence of such deed's genuineness lest the
presumption of its due execution be for naught.26 Regarded as evidence of the facts therein
expressed in a clear, unequivocal manner, public documents enjoy a presumption of regularity
which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity. The burden of proof to overcome said presumptions lies with the party
contesting the notarial document.27 chanrobleslaw
We note that the respondents presented a Certification dated November 15, 2011 that the Notary
Public who signed and affixed his notarial seal on the deed has not yet submitted his notarial
report for 2010 intending to prove that the deed was not a public document.28 However, the same
was only alleged and offered before the CA. Basic consideration of due process impels the rule
that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.29 It is erroneous for the CA to base its ruling that the deed is dubious on the
certification that was not presented before the trial courts. As such, respondents failed to present
clear and convincing evidence as to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized
deed, from which petitioner anchored his claim of ownership.
As to respondents, it appears that they initially admitted that they were lessees of Agus. They
merely denied petitioner's ownership and contested the notarized deed of sale through bare
allegations. According to respondents, petitioner has no right to demand on April 19, 2010 for
them to vacate since the alleged undated deed of absolute sale was notarized on July 29, 2010.
Thus, there was no demand to vacate the premises. On appeal before the RTC, the respondents,
to bolster their claim of better right of possession, alleged that the premises which they occupied
are covered by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Law. They insist
that they are qualified and legitimate beneficiaries of the property. They have been paying rental
deposits since August 1, 1984 as proved by a certification dated September 14, 2010.30 chanrobleslaw
In their Comment on the instant petition, respondents reiterate that the MeTC and the RTC have
no jurisdiction over herein subject property as there is a pending expropriation case filed by the
City Government of Manila before the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, in connection with its
distribution to qualified beneficiaries like the respondents.31
chanrobleslaw
From the foregoing, this Court rules in favor of the petitioner. We agree with the MeTC, as
affirmed by the RTC, that petitioner has proven that he is better entitled to the material
possession of the property as against the unsubstantiated claims of respondents.
Respondents admitted in their Answer that they were lessees of Agus, predecessor of petitioner.
As such, they recognized the ownership of the lot by the petitioner, which includes the right of
possession. As discussed, respondents failed to rebut the deed of sale from which petitioner
anchored his claim of ownership and right of possession of the property. Also, they belatedly
alleged and presented evidence to substantiate their claim of better right of possession.
Anent respondents' argument that petitioner had no right to evict them on April 19, 2010 since he
became the owner only on July 29, 2010, this Court is not persuaded. Although denominated as
conditional, a deed of sale is absolute in nature in the absence of any stipulation reserving title to
the seller until full payment of the purchase price. In such case, ownership of the thing sold
passes to the buyer upon actual or constructive delivery. In a contract of sale, the title to the
property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. On the other hand, in a contract
to sell, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee
until full payment of the purchase price.32chanrobleslaw
A perusal of the contract readily reveals that there was nothing in the Deed of Conditional Sale33
which expressly provides for LNC's retention of title or ownership of the property until full
payment of the purchase price or any provision which would impose payment of the price as a
condition for the contract's entering into force. The condition imposed was only on the
performance of the obligations of the parties. As such, there was already a perfected contract,
and the ownership of the property already passed to petitioner as the buyer upon the execution of
the deed of conditional sale on January 13, 2010. Thus, petitioner was deemed to have been
unlawfully deprived of the lawful possession of the property upon respondents' failure to heed
his demand to vacate on April 19, 2010.
Respondents insisted that petitioner has no right to eject them since the subject property is
covered by P.D. No. 1517, and that they are qualified beneficiaries under the same.
It is settled in the case of Spouses Friltes v. Spouses Yambao34 that the purpose of P.D. No. 1517
is to protect the rights of legitimate tenants who have resided for 10 years or more on specific
parcels of land situated in declared Urban Land Reform Zones or Urban Zones, and who have
built their homes thereon. These legitimate tenants have the right not to be dispossessed and
to have the right of first refusal to purchase the property under reasonable terms and
conditions to be determined by the appropriate government agency. Thus, a legitimate tenant's
right of first refusal to purchase the leased property under P.D. No. 1517 depends on whether the
disputed property in Metropolitan Manila is situated in an area specifically declared to be both
an Area for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone.35 chanrobleslaw
These circumstances do not obtain in the present case as it was not alleged nor proven that
respondents built their dwelling on the land. They merely presented certification that they were
paying rentals since 1984. Assuming the aforementioned circumstances are present, the
respondents still cannot qualify under P.D. No. 1517 in the absence of any showing that the
subject land had been declared an area for priority development and urban land reform zone. The
said documents, letters and memorandum which purportedly establish that the respondents'
occupied property is covered by P.D. No. 1517 pertain to the implementation of Ordinance No.
8022 concerning the expropriation of parcels of land, which specifically mentioned Barangay
536, Zone 53.36 However, the said documents did not prove that the area of Barangay 521 where
the property (TCT No. 284213) was situated was declared as Area for Priority Development and
Urban Land Reform Zone. A copy of the said Ordinance was not even presented. Lastly, P.D.
No. 1517 will still not apply as the issue raised in the case at bar was respondents' refusal to
vacate the subject property and not their right of first refusal.
As to the issue of the pending expropriation case filed by the City Government of Manila raised
for the first time in the RTC by the respondents, the same is proscribed as all issues raised for the
first time in the reviewing court are proscribed.37 Assuming arguendo that We entertain the issue,
We rule that the pending expropriation will not affect the resolution of this petition. First,
respondents can raise their issue in the appropriate legal proceeding. Second, respondents' pieces
of evidence, which include a certification38 from the Urban Settlement Office, that a pending
expropriation case was filed relative to the implementation of Ordinance No. 8022, were silent as
to the scope of the said Ordinance, or that the subject property was indeed included therein.
It must be stressed that the ruling in the instant case is limited only to the determination as to
who between the parties has a better right to possession. It will not bar any of the parties from
filing an action with the proper court to resolve conclusively the issue of ownership.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Thamerlane M. Perez,
assailing the Decision dated July 29, 2013 and the Resolution dated March 4, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124234, is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated April 13,
2011 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 187245-CV is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
OCTOBER 11, 2017
G.R. No. 217296
SPOUSES ERWIN C. SANTIAGO and MARINELA A. SANTIAGO; SPOUSES

GAUDENCIO A. MANIMTIM, JR. and EDITHA P. MANIMTIM; SPOUSES RAMIRO
C. ALBARAN and ELVA C. ALBARAN; and CESAR F. ODAN, Petitioners
vs.
NORTHBAY KNITTING, INC., Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 26, 2014, as well as its Resolution2 dated February 25,
2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 132962, reversing the Decision3 of the Malabon Regional Trial Court
(RTC) dated May 29, 2013 in Civil Case No. ACV 12-008-MN.
The procedural and factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. (NKI) filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas City against petitioners spouses Ramiro and Elva
Albaran (the Spouses Albaran) who were doing business under the name REA General Marine
Services (REA), spouses Gaudencio and Editha Manimtim (the Spouses Manimtim) who were
doing business under the name Junedith Brokerage Corporation (JBC), spouses Erwin and
Marinela Santiago (the Spouses Santiago) who were doing business under the name Quick Care
Cargo Handler (QCCH), and Cesar Odan who was doing business under the name Transment
Freight Forwarder (TFF).
NKI alleged that it owns the subject property, a parcel of land in Phase I, North Side of the
Dagat-Dagatan Project in Navotas covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38092.
All petitioners were simply allowed to occupy said property by NKI and they were not paying
any rent. On March 5, 2009, NKI sent demand letters to petitioners asking them to vacate the
property within five (5) days from receipt and to pay rent in the event that they refuse to vacate
within the grace period given. However, despite receipt of said letters, petitioners refused to
vacate or pay the necessary rent. Thus, on April 14, 2009, NKI filed an ejectment complaint
against petitioners.
For their part, petitioners averred that NKI merely exists on paper as its certificate of registration
had already been revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for failure to
operate. NKI only became the registered owner of the subject prope1iy on June 16, 2008, while
petitioners came into possession of said property through their predecessor-in-interest,
Hermeginildo Odan, and have been continuously in possession since 1970. Odan had leased the
prope1iy from the family of the late Francisco Felipe Gonzales. Later, he subleased the property
to petitioners. The gove1nment likewise expropriated the subject property and declared it as an
Area for Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zone under Proclamation No. 3 3 84
dated April 13, 1983. Being tenants and actual occupants of the place, petitioners could not be
evicted. Then a Conditional Contract to Sell was entered into between NKI and National
Housing Authority (NHA). NKI violated the terms of said contract, causing the automatic
cancellation of the same. Sometime in 2008, the NHA sold the property to NKI without giving
petitioners, as the actual occupants, the right of first refusal granted under the law. Thus,
petitioners filed a case questioning said sale which was docketed as Civil Case No. 06-11-MN.
Petitioners contended that this case on the issue of their right of first refusal is a prejudicial
question that must be resolved first before the MeTC can take cognizance of the ejectment case.
On June 11, 2012, the Navotas Me TC rendered a Decision in favor of NKI, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

Northbay Knitting, Inc. and against defendants as follows:
1. ORDERING defendants-spouses Ramiro Albaran & Elva Alba.ran, spouses Gaudencio

Manimtim & Edith Manimtim, Junedith Brokerage Corporation, spouses Erwin Santiago &
Marinela Santiago, and Cesar Odan, and all persons claiming rights under them to remove the
improvements they introduced on the property located in Phase 1, No1ih Side of the Dagat-
Dagatan Project in Navotas, Metro Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-
38092 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City in the name of the plaintiff Northbay
Knitting, Inc.;
2. ORDERING defendants-spouses Ramiro Albaran & Elva Albaran, spouses Gaudencio

Manimtim & Edith Manimtim, Junedith Brokerage Corporation, spouses Erwin Santiago &
Marinela Santiago, and Cesar Odan, and all persons claiming rights under them to
PEACEFULLY VACATE AND VOLUNTARILY SURRENDER to plaintiff Northbay
Knitting, Inc. the possession of the said lot situated in Phase 1, North Side of the Dagat-Dagatan
Project in Navotas, Metro Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38092
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City in the name of the plaintiff Northbay Knitting,
Inc.;
3. ORDERING each defendant named-above to each pay plaintiff the amount of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00) per month for the use and occupation of the above-
described prope11y computed from May 4, 2009 until possession of said property is surrendered
and turned-over to plaintiff; and
4. ORDERING defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the amount of Php20,000.00, as
and by way of attorney's fees. The Counterclaim of defendants-spouses Albaran, Santiago, and
Odan is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 29, 2013, however, the Malabon RTC set aside the MeTC Decision for lack of
jurisdiction, since NKI failed to show a case of Unlawful Detainer, to wit:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Sec. 8 par. 2, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, this Com1 hereby
assumes jurisdiction over this case.
In the meantime, let this case be set for preliminary conference on July 24, 2013 at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning.
SO ORDERED.5
Upon appeal, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 29, 2013 and Order dated October 29, 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 170, Malabon City in Civil Case No. ACV 12-008-MN are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 11, 2012 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 54, Navotas City is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, this petition.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined
by the material allegations of the complaint. It cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act
or omission of the parties, neither can it be cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express
consent.7 In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the
court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.8
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
1) possession of property by the defendant was initially by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment of the same; and
4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.9
Here, as the CA aptly found, NKI's complaint sufficiently shows all the allegations required to
support a case for unlawful detainer, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the MeTC over the case. NKI
stated that it is the absolute owner of the subject property, as evidenced by TCT No. M-38092,
and supported by Tax Declaration No. C-002-08822-C and real property tax receipt for the tax
due in 2008. Petitioners, who are the actual occupants of said property, never paid rent but
continued to possess the property upon NKI's mere tolerance. Despite receipt of NKI's demand
letters to vacate, petitioners refused and continued to occupy the property.
The statements in the complaint that petitioners' possession of the property in question was by
mere tolerance of NKI clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves
the person's withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is
entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession under the
contract, either expressed or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful
detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned
unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession
was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in the
instant case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of
tolerance must be proved.10
Here, petitioners claim that NKI only became the registered owner of the subject property on
June 16, 2008. However, from that time when the title to the disputed property was registered in
NKI's name on June 16, 2008 until the time when it sent the demand letters to vacate on March
5, 2009, petitioners' possession had certainly been one upon mere tolerance of the owner. NKI's
right to possess the property had then become absolute and undeniable. And when NKI
demanded that they leave the premises and petitioners refused to do so, their possession had
already become unlawful. As the registered owner, NKI had a right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of its ownership.11
Further, petitioners argue that there is a pending action questioning the validity of the sale of the
disputed prope1iy to NKI, consequently affecting the validity of its title to said property. Such
argument is clearly a collateral attack on NKI's title, which is not allowed in an unlawful detainer
case. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified, or
cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.12 A Torrens Certificate of Title
cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be
decided is possession de facto rather than possession de Jure, a collateral attack by petitioners on
NKI's title is proscribed. The present case only covers the issue of who has the better right of
possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to
the validity of NKI's title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted separately to directly attack
its validity, an issue that cannot be definitively resolved in the extant unlawful detainer case.13
It has been held time and again that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the premises, independent of any claim of ownership by any of
the party litigants. Possession refers to possession de facto, and not possession de Jure. It does
not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. Where the parties to an ejectment
case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between
the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to that of possession, as 'n this case, adjudication of the ownership issue is not
final and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.14
An ejectment suit is likewise summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.1avvphi1 In forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
lower courts and the CA, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve
the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Such decision,
however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts
found in said case between the same parties but upon a separate cause of action involving
possession.15
Therefore, the Comi finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed rulings of the CA.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 26, 2014 as well as its Resolution dated
February 25, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 132962.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANDRES B. REYES JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

Jurisprudence - Ejectment Cases

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Jurisprudence - Ejectment Cases

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797 Phil. 369

The factual and procedural antecedents follow.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered m favor of [petitioner] and against the

1. To immediately vacate and peacefully surrender the possession of the

2. To pay the [petitioner] [P]5,000.00 as reasonable monthly compensation

4. To pay the costs of the suit.

Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

As held in Canaynay v. Sarmiento: [16]

We further elucidated the concept of possession by mere tolerance in Calubayan, et al. v.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Very truly yours,

Supreme Court E-Library

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Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal against the MCTC decision.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

The decretal portion of the assailed CA decision reads:

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

The owner of real property cannot wrest

Carpio (Chairperson),[*] Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

July 30, 2018

Very truly yours,

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

G.R. No. 211539, October 17, 2016

THAMERLANE M. PEREZ, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR PRISCILLA RASACEÑA,

The factual and procedural antecedents follow.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered m favor of [petitioner] and against the

1. To immediately vacate and peacefully surrender the possession of the

2. To pay the [petitioner] [P]5,000.00 as reasonable monthly compensation

3. To pay the amount of [P]10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;

4. To pay the costs of the suit.

Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

As held in Canaynay v. Sarmiento: 16 chanrobleslaw

We further elucidated the concept of possession by mere tolerance in Calubayan, et al. v.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

OCTOBER 11, 2017

G.R. No. 217296

SPOUSES ERWIN C. SANTIAGO and MARINELA A. SANTIAGO; SPOUSES

The procedural and factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

1. ORDERING defendants-spouses Ramiro Albaran & Elva Alba.ran, spouses Gaudencio

2. ORDERING defendants-spouses Ramiro Albaran & Elva Albaran, spouses Gaudencio

Upon appeal, the CA ruled:

Hence, this petition.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

ANDRES B. REYES JR.

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