Case Digest:

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FACTS:

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RULING:

Case Digest:

TITLE: G.R. No. L-38383 May 27, 1981 WILLELMO C. FORTUN, Petitioner,

vs. RUFINO O. LABANG, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pagadian City.
FACTS:
Petitioner Judge was accused by a member of the bar and a former employee in a letter
complaint of a possible irregularity in his claim for gasoline allowance. Considered by them
to hold him liable administratively. On the morning of February 18, 1974, just as petitioner
was about to ascend the rostrum to start the first session in his Court, a subpoena was served
upon him in a jampacked courtroom, filled with practitioners and spectators who were not
there for any case but to witness the reaction of petitioner to the service of said subpoena, in
further disregard of the spirit behind Section 6 of Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, on the
confidentiality of proceedings against judges.
Petitioner Judge contested the legality of the issuance of said subpoena and asked for the
dismissal of the complaint, but he was unsuccessful. Hence, this petition before this Tribunal.
ISSUES: Whether the said Fiscal has the capacity to perform his duty.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted restraining respondent City
Fiscal or anyone acting in his place from enforcing the subpoena. The writ of certiorari is
likewise granted annulling the order of February 22, 1974, issued by respondent City Fiscal
denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The complaint against petitioner is
dismissed.
TITLE: G.R. No. L-14639 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO vs. JUSTO LUKBAN
FACTS: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, to exterminate vice, ordered to sort
out women of ill repute in different district, which had been permitted for several years in the
city of Manila. The women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
In one midnight, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann, and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, went to the houses and hustled
some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been
asked if they wished to be brought to that region and had neither asked directly nor indirectly
given their consent to the deportation.
The vessels reached their destination in Davao where the women were landed and receipted
for as laborers.
The friends of the victim filed a case for issuance of habeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether the writ [of habeas corpus] should be granted.
RULING: The court awarded the writ, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of
the province of Davao, and Feliciano Ynigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court
the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty.

TITLE: G.R. No. L-34150 Tolentino vs Comelec

FACTS: The case is a petition prevent the Commission on Elections "from undertaking to
hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed amendment to reduce the
voting age to eighteen years and shall be passed for approval by the people and the
succeeding implementing resolutions. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into
being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity
as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution namely. The delegates to the said Convention were all
elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof,
Republic Act 6132.
ISSUES: Whether the Constitutional Convention of 1971 has the power to order the holding
of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s.
RULING: The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite. The plebiscite being called for the purpose of
submitting the same for approval of the people on November 8, 1971, is not authorized by
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the
respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
lt says that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly, or a convention called for the
purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution". The same provision also as
provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or
plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same
constituent assembly of Congress or convention. The petition herein is granted. Organic
Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and
resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on
November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith
(RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec,
Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are
hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately
executory. No costs.

TITLE: G.R. No. 174136 PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs NASIPIT

INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC
FACTS: In November 2000, PPA, through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) accepted bids for a 10-year contract to operate as the sole cargo handler at the port of
Nasipit, Agusan del Norte (Nasipit Port). The PBAC issued Resolution No. 005-2000
recommending that the 10-year cargo-handling contract be awarded to NIASSI as the
winning bidder. The contract, however, was never executed. Instead, PPA issued several
hold-over permits to enable NIASSI to legally operate its cargo handling services at the
Nasipit port.
However, barely two months after the last extension of the HOA, PPA, through its Assistant
General Manager for Operations, issued a letter dated December 6, 2004 revoking the
extension due that PPA received numerous complaints regarding the poor quality of its
services due to the use of inadequately maintained equipment. And PPA would take over the
cargo-handling services at the Nasipit Port.
NIASSI has been operating as the cargo handler since the reinstatement of the preliminary
mandatory injunction. It is estimated that NIASSI has been operating for 12 years, 3 months
and 15 days.
For its part, PPA argued, among others, that NIASSI was not entitled to the issuance of the
injunctive writ because it had no legal right to continue providing cargo-handling services at
Nasipit Port, considering that PPA has no existing cargo-handling contract with NIASSI.PPA
concludes that it can no longer be compelled to formally execute a contract with NIASSI
upon finality of the Amended Decision, since the term of the perfected contract already
expired on January 3, 2011, 10 years after PPA received notice of NIASSI’s conformity to
the
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the cargo handling contract was executed properly.
2) Whether the ten-year period has already prescribed despite the mandatory injunction.

RULING: 1) The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. The factual findings of the CA in respect
of the perfected cargo-handling contract in the injunction proceedings became
unquestionable upon finality of this Court’s decision affirming the same. the cargo-handling
contract was a valid and binding agreement, and it was thus bound by the associated rights
and obligations.
2) The Supreme Court ruled that the term of the perfected contract has already expired.
PPA claims that its 10-year cargo-handling contract with NIASSI is already expired, after the
lapse of 10 years from the date when said contract was perfected. In turn, PPA concludes
that it can no longer be directed to formally execute another contract with NIASSI, since
such a directive would unduly lengthen the term of the cargo-handling contract contrary to
the intention of the parties. While the Court agrees with PPA’s submission that the contract
has already expired, the Court clarifies that such expiration is not because of the mere lapse
of 10 years computed from the date when the same was executed. The IO-year term of the
perfected contract was considered interrupted during the periods when PPA assumed
management and control over NIASSI’s cargo-handling operations. Clearly, the 10-year term
of the perfected contract had already expired, leaving the R TC with nothing to enforce.