[G.R. No. 96296. June 18, 1992.]
(Section 17, Rule 3, Revised
RAFAEL S. DIZON, in his capacity as Administrator of
the Estate of the Deceased JOSE P. FERNANDEZ,
REDENTOR MELO, ELIODORO C. CRUZ, PIER 8
ARRASTRE & STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC.,
COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, PASIG STEVEDORING
COMPANY, INC., and WESTERN PACIFIC
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. PROTACIO C. STO. TOMAS, Judge, RTC,
Branch 14, Ligao, Albay, and JOSE
BALDE, Respondents.
Rafael S. Dizon, for Petitioners.
Delfin De Vera Law Office for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EFFECTS OF DEFENDANT’S
DEATH IN A CIVIL CASE. — The effects of the death of a
defendant in a civil suit are dependent upon the nature of the
action: whether (a) the action is a personal one for "recovery
of money, debt or interest thereon," or (b) is not for said
purpose, i.e., it is a real action, or one for recovery of
personal property "or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal." The effects of the defendant’s death are
dependent, as well, on the time of his demise.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHERE ACTION IS FOR RECOVERY OF
MONEY AND DEFENDANT DIES BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT. —
The law says that" (w)hen the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court), it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in
the manner especially provided in these rules." The "especial"
manner of the prosecution of said money claims against the
decedent is set forth in Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in
connection with the judicial proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — "The reason for the
dismissal of the ordinary action," as a noted commentator
stresses, "is that upon the death of the defendant a testate or
intestate proceeding shall be instituted in the proper court
wherein all his creditors must appear and file their claims
which shall be paid proportionately out of the property left by
the deceased. It is, therefore, to avoid useless duplicity of
procedure that the ordinary action must be wiped out from
the ordinary courts."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHERE ACTION IS FOR RECOVERY OF
MONEY AND DEFENDANT DIES AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT. — If
the defendant dies after final judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, the action (for money, debt or interest thereon) is not
dismissed, and an appeal may be taken by or against the
administrator; but if that judgment against the deceased
becomes final and executory, it shall be enforced, not by
execution under Rule 39, but in accordance with Section 5 of
Rule 86, i.e., by presenting the same as a claim against the
estate.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN OTHER CASES. — If, on the other
hand, the claim against the defendant is other than for
"money, debt or interest thereon" — i.e., it is a real action, or
one for recovery of personal property "or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real of personal," — and the defendant
dies, the claim against him is not thereby extinguished, and
the action will not be dismissed but continue against the
decedent’s legal representative.
Rules of Court)
FACTS: This action was instituted in 1975 by the private
respondent Jose Balde principally for the recovery of
damages resulting from the allegedly illegal termination of his
employment from the so-called "Fernandez Companies."
The complaint filed in the lower court named as defendants
the six (6) petitioner corporations herein, as well as Jose P.
Fernandez "in his own personal capacity and/or as Chairman
of the Board, President, or Director" of said firms. The
complaint alleged that Balde was "summarily ousted and
dismissed" from his job as Chief Accountant and Credit &
Collection Manager.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, Balde’s presentation of his evidence-in-chief was
concluded upon the admission by the Court of his exhibits
over the defendants’ objections.
Some two weeks afterwards, defendant Jose P. Fernandez
died. Notice thereof was given to the Court by his counsel.
As a consequence, the death of Fernandez brought up the
question of the legal consequences of that demise, and the
action that the Trial Court should properly take in view
thereof.
The Trial Court did not dismiss the action as against the
deceased defendant, Fernandez.
The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the petition of the
defendants (or petitioners in this case).
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, by
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the PETITIONERS have
appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Rules of
Court mandate the dismissal of the case and not substitution
of the deceased defendant.
ISSUE: WON the Trial Court correctly declined to dismiss the
suit as against the deceased Fernandez and to insist on
continuing with the action as to Fernandez by ordering his
substitution by his administrator. [NO]
RULING: The effects of the death of a defendant in a
civil suit are dependent upon the nature of the action:
whether (a) the action is a personal one for "recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon," or (b) is not for said
purpose, i.e., it is a real action, or one for recovery of
personal property "or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal." The effects of the defendant’s death are
dependent, as well, on the time of his demise.
The law says that" (w)hen the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court), it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these
rules."
The "especial" manner of the prosecution of said money
claims against the decedent is set forth in Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, in connection with the judicial proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. "The
reason for the dismissal of the ordinary action," as a noted
commentator stresses, "is that upon the death of the
defendant a testate or intestate proceeding shall be instituted
in the proper court wherein all his creditors must appear and
file their claims which shall be paid proportionately out of the
property left by the deceased. It is, therefore, to avoid
useless duplicity of procedure that the ordinary action must
be wiped out from the ordinary courts."

If the defendant dies after final judgment of the

Regional Trial Court, the action (for money, debt or interest
thereon) is not dismissed, and an appeal may be taken by or
against the administrator; but if that judgment against the
deceased becomes final and executory, it shall be enforced,
not by execution under Rule 39, but in accordance with
Section 5 of Rule 86, i.e., by presenting the same as a claim
against the estate.

If, on the other hand, the claim against the defendant

is other than for "money, debt or interest thereon" —
i.e., it is a real action, or one for recovery of personal
property "or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal," supra 18 — and the defendant dies, the claim
against him is not thereby extinguished, and the action will
not be dismissed but continue against the decedent’s legal
representative.

HENCE, the point raised by petitioners is well taken. As

already stated, the law is quite explicit and leaves the Trial
Court with no choice: "When the action is for recovery, of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court), it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these
rules." It was therefore error for the Trial Court to decline to
dismiss the suit as against the deceased Fernandez and to
insist on continuing with the action as to Fernandez by
ordering his substitution by his administrator.
G.R. No. L-49247 March 13, 1979
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON.
WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Samar, Branch V (Calbayog City); BASILIO
ROSALES, TRINIDAD D. ENRIQUEZ, JOSE RONO, CESAR
DEAN, MARIA S. QUESADA, AURORA SOLIMAN, JAIME
ROCO and HERMINIGILDO ROSALES, Respondents.
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Samar granted the
application of private respondents Resales, et al. for the
registration of thirteen lots located in Calbayog City, Samar.
"service on the Solicitor General shall' be the basis" "for the
purpose of finality of the decision "
In this case, it is obvious that, strictly speaking, the
city fiscal did not directly represent the Government.
He was merely a surrogate of the Solicitor General
whose office, "as the law office of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines", is the entity that is
empowered to "represent the Government in all land
registration and related proceedings" (Sec. i[e],
Presidential Decree No. 478).

A copy of that decision was received in the Solicitor General's The trial court in disallowing the Government's appeal relied
Office on May 25, 1978. On June 23, 1978 or twenty-nine on the ruling that the service of the decision in a land
days after service of the said decision, the Solicitor General registration case on the fiscal is necessarily a service on the
filed a motion for reconsideration. A copy of the order denying Solicitor General (Republic vs. Reyes, L-35545, June 18,
that motion was received in the Solicitor General's Office on 1976, 71 SCRA 426, 436-437).
August 18, 1978. On that same date, he filed a notice of
appeal and a motion for an extension of thirty days from
August 19 (last day of the thirty-day reglementary period) That ruling is not applicable to this case because in
within which to file the record on appeal. The motion for the Reyes case the fiscal as representative of the Solicitor
extension was not acted upon. General, was authorized not only to attend hearings but also
to file pleadings for the Government. In the instant case, the
The record on appeal was filed on September 15, 1978 or city fiscal's authority was confined to attending the hearings.
within the period sought in the motion of extension. The The Office of the Solicitor General was the one that filed the
LOWER COURT disapproved the record on appeal and did pleadings and motions in the lower court.
not give due course to the Government's appeal because the
record on appeal was allegedly filed out of time. The lower
court reasoned out that the thirty-day period should be
computed, not from May 25, 1978, when the Solicitor General
was served with a copy of the decision, but from May 11,
1978, when the city fiscal of Calbayog City, who represented
the Solicitor General at the hearings, was served with that
decision.

Disagreeing with that order, the Solicitor General in behalf of

the Republic of the Philippines, filed this petition for review to
compel the lower court to give due course to the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the thirty-day period should be reckoned

from the service of the decision upon the fiscal OR from the
time it was served upon the Solicitor General [Latter]

RULING: The SC held that the thirty-day period should

be counted from the date when the Solicitor General
received a copy of the decision because the service of
the decision upon the city fiscal did not operate as a
service upon the Solicitor General.

It should be clarified that, although the Solicitor General

requested the city fiscal to represent him in the trial court,
he, nevertheless, made his own separate appearance as
counsel for the State. In that "notice of appearance", he
expressly requested that he should be served in Manila with
"all notices of hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions and
other processes" and that such service is distinct from the
service of notices and other papers on the city fiscal.

The Solicitor General also indicated in his "notice of

appearance" that he "retains supervision and control of
the representation in this case and has to approve
withdrawal of the case, non-appeal or other actions
which appear to compromise the interests of the
Government" and that "only notices of orders,
resolutions and decisions served on him will bind" the
Government.

The Solicitor General in requesting the city fiscal to represent

him at the hearings called the attention of that official to
Circular No. 41 of the Secretary of Justice dated November
28, 1973- wherein provincial and city fiscals were advised
that, in cases where they represent the Solicitor General