ARTICLE 23
Even when an act or event causing damage to another’s
property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant,
the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he
was benefited.
 Duty to Indemnify Because of Benefit Received  
Unless there is a duty to indemnify, unjust
enrichment will occur.
EXAMPLE:  
Without A’s knowledge, a flood drives his cattle to the
cultivated highland of B. A’s cattle are saved, but B’s crops are
destroyed. True, A was not at fault, but he was benefited. It is but
right and equitable that he should indemnify B.  the person confessing. Courts should be slow in accepting
ARTICLE 24
In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection
 Reason for the Courts’ Protection of the Underdog
The law takes great interest in the welfare of the
weak and the handicapped. Thus, we have “parens patriae”
Literally, “parens patria” means “father or parent of
his country.” In the U.S. (as in the Philippines), the phrase
refers to the sovereign power of the state in safeguarding
the rights of person under disability, such as the insane
and the incompetent. (In re: Turner, 94 Kan. 115). Thus,
were the law always to be applied strictly, there would be
danger that injustice might arise (summun jus, summa
injuria). (Reyes and Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, p. 43,
citing, Cicero, De Offi ciis).
The State as parens patriae is under the obligation to
minimize the risk to those who because of their minority,
are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
(People v. Baylon, L-35785, May 29, 1974)
Meaning of “Vigilant for His Protection”
The phrase in general means that in case of doubt, the doubt
must be resolved in favor of the underdog.
Inadmissibility of Confessions Obtained Thru Coercion
A confession obtained thru coercion, whether physical,
mental, or emotional is inadmissible. What is essential for a
confession’s validity is that it proceeds from the free will of
such confessions unless corroborated by other testimony.
(People v. Ramon Roa, L-35284, Jan. 17, 1975). 
ARTICLE 25
Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or
display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be
stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or
private charitable institution.
 Reason for Curtailing Thoughtless Extravagance
Thoughtless extravagance or expenses for pleasure
during emergencies or periods of public want may incite the
passions or unwittingly enkindle the fires of unrest of those
who cannot afford to spend.
 Who Can Bring Action via Article 25
Only a charitable institution (whether government or private)
may bring the action. The Mayor of a city, should he desire
 to stop an alleged display of extravagance by a social
organization, cannot summarily order the stopping all by
himself. He has to ask for a court order. A Mayor indeed
cannot just take the law into his own hands, no matter how
noble or sincere his motive may be
ARTICLE 26
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:
1. Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; 
2. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another; 
3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
4. Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition
 Duty to Respect Dignity and Privacy
This Article enhances human dignity and personality.
Social equality is not sought but due regard for decency and
propriety.
 Remedies (See Arts. 29 and 2219, Civil Code).
A civil action may be instituted even if no crime is
involved, and moral damages may be obtained.
While they may not be criminal offenses, a person can
seek to be provided remedies.
o Action for damages
o Action for prevention
o Other reliefs (restraining orders, injunctions, etc.)
 Scope
o Prying into the privacy of another’s residence —
includes by implication respect for another’s name,
picture, or personality except insofar as is needed
for publication of information and pictures of
legitimate news value. (Prosser, Torts, p. 1050).
o Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another — includes alienation of the
affections of the husband or the wife. (Prosser,
Torts, p. 916). (Thus, a girl who makes love to a
married man, even if there be no carnal relations,
disturbs his family life, and damages may therefore
be asked of her.) Intriguing against another’s honor
(gossiping) is also included.
o Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends — includes gossiping, and reliance on
hearsay.
o Vexing or humiliating — includes criticism of one’s
health or features without justifiable legal cause.
(138 A.L.R. 25). Religious freedom does not
authorize anyone to heap obloquy and disrepute
upon another by reason of the latter’s religion.
(Commission Report, p. 33).
CASTRO v. PEOPLE 559 S 676
FACTS:
Albert Tan filed a case against the petitioner, Jerome Castro
(assistant headmaster of Reedley International School or RIS), for
grave oral defamation.

Tan filed a complaint in DepEd for violation of the Manual of
Regulation of Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19
of the Civil Code against RIS, the school where Tan’s son had
sanctions which include not letting his son attend his graduation rite.
Even so, the son was still able to graduate after DepEd ordered RIS
to readmit his son. Another party, Bernice Ching, a fellow parent at
RIS talked to Tan and in their conversation, she was told by Tan that
he is going to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacity. Ching
then telephoned Castro and told him about Tan’s plan. And before
they hung up, Castro said, “Okay, you too, take care and be careful
talking to [Tan], that's dangerous,” Ching then telephoned Tan and
informed him about what Castro said over the phone. Insulted, he
filed this case against Castro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Castro is guilty of grave oral defamation.
 
RULINGS:
NO. The court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeal’s
resolution which was charging Castro with slight oral defamation.
Petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26
of the Civil Code which states that:
“Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy, and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief… (3)Intriguing to cause another to be
alienated from his friends;”
However, double jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him.
The Court of Appeals cannot indict him with the same charge on the
same case that was already dismissed in the RTC.
There was an inaccuracy in the criminal procedures that had
happened. OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, it only raised the
errors of judgment. Further, the Court of Appels made a mistake in
taking cognizance of its petition and in reviewing the factual findings
of the RTC, which made the Supreme Court reinstate the RTC
decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy
ARTICLE 27
Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
 Refusal or Neglect in the Performance of Official Duty
o The article refers to a public servant or employee.
The purpose of Art. 27 is to end the pabagsak or
bribery system, where the public official for
some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the
performance of his duty until he gets some kind
of “pabagsak. (bribe)” (See Bocobo, Study of
Proposed Civil Code Changes, 16 Lawyers Journal,
p. 97)
o Generally, bribes come in three forms
 Pabagsak - gift given so illlegal thing may be
done
 Pampadulas - gift given to expedite things
 Pampasalamat - gift after illegal thing is
done

 Malfeasance, Misfeasance, and Nonfeasance
o Malfeasance – doing an act prohibited by law or
doing an act ought not to be done
o Misfeasance – the improper or irregular
performance of an act
o Nonfeasance – the non performance, failure or
refusal to do an act which one is required to do
without just cause
 Meaning of “Official Duty”
APPLIES TO MINISTERIAL DUTIES (Official
duties) NOT TO DISCRETIONARY DUTIES
o Discretionary Duty – if the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed
oMinisterial Duty  – one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done.
 EXAMPLES:
o A goes to a government office where B, an
administrative clerk, instead of attending to A (upon
A’s request) just reads the newspaper. If A suffers
material or moral loss, B will be liable. Also, if B
refuses to perform his duty unless given a bribe,
damages may be asked of him in addition to the
proper criminal and administrative liabilities.
o A Chief of Police who, instead of giving legal
assistance to the victim of an assault, intimidates
and harasses said victim, his father, and his
witnesses is liable for damages under Art. 27. This is
so even if other remedies (such as an administrative
charge against the chief of police and the filing of a
criminal complaint with the office of the city attorney
for such assault) are also available to the victim.
(Amaro, et al. v. Sumangit, L-14986, July 31, 1962).
o Similarly, a town mayor (and other officials) who
consistently absents himself from town council
sessions, and refuses to act upon the minutes of
sessions conducted by the councilors present, and
to sign the payrolls for the
CASE:
LEDESMA v. CA and DELMO 160 S 449
Q: Why did the court hold Ledesma liable, when there was
unjust refusal on Ledesma to confer the honors on Delmo?
A: Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought
about by Ledesma’s neglect of duty and callousness. Hence, the
award of moral damages is proper.
Exemplary damages are also in order. The rationale behind
exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide
an example or correction for the public good 
 
FACTS: Exemplary damages are also in order. The rationale behind
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide
by students of West Visayas College with the late Violeta Delmo as an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan
treasurer. Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some American World Airways).
of the students of the school. Jose Ledesma, the school President, Therefore, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
claims that said act of extending loans was against school rules and
regulations. He then sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she
was being dropped from the club, and demeriting her of any award or
citation from the school. Delmo appealed this decision to the Office
of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. The Bureau ruled in
favor of Delmo and held that she should not be deprived any
award, citation, or honor from the said school, if entitled.
However, Ledesma did not furnish Delmo a copy of such CAMPUGAN v, TOLENTINO, JR. 752 S 254
decision. 
On the day of the graduation, as it was impossible to include
Delmo’s name in the program as one of the honor students, Q: Why is the Register of deeds not made liable to art. 27?
Ledesma let her graduate as a plain student instead of being A:  Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-
awarded as Magna Cum Laude. request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid
was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine
documents presented for registration was limited only to what
ISSUE: appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the
Whether or not the school president is liable for damages letter-request and the RTC order, they found the same to be
under Article 27 of the New Civil Code sufficient in law and to be in conformity with existing requirements, it
became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without
unnecessary delay.
RULING:
YES. Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was
brought about by Ledesma’s neglect of duty and callousness. Hence,
the award of moral damages is proper. 
As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance FACTS: The complainants are the surviving children of the late
Transport System, Inc): there is no argument that moral damages spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres, as such, they inherited upon
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, the deaths of their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under TCT
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission.
On August 24, 2006, they discovered that the aforementioned land
had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon
and Josefina Ricafort. Accordingly, they immediately caused the
annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during
the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to end their
dispute, whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and
the proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties,
and the complaint and the counterclaim would be withdrawn
respectively by herein complainants and the Ricaforts, respectively.
Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty Victorio Jr.,
being the complainants’ counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint dated February 26, 2008, which the RTC granted in its
order dated May 16, 2008.
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the
RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer locate or
contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and
visits to his office. Unable to receive any response or assistance from
Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite having paid him for his professional
services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their
case.
They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim
and their notice of lis pendens without a court order specifically
allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and
conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and
from the taking advantage of their positions as officials in the
Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar,
and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new
annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent attorneys’ conduct render
them unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.
RULING: No, none of the attorneys’ conduct rendered them
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.
The Court found no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by
Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the
cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546.
Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-
request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid
was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine
documents presented for registration was limited only to what
appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the
letter-request and the RTC order, they found the same to be
sufficient in law and to be in conformity with existing requirements, it
became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without
unnecessary delay.
Outside of the complainants’ bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr.
and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to
cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the
annotations; they presented no evidence to support their allegation of
conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own active
participation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now
turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had themselves
entered into.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty.
Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty.
Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr.
assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in
receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis,
without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal
fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively show
any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their
interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was expressly denounced in this Chapter because same tends to
not liable for abandonment. Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for undermine free enterprise. While competition is necessary in
the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to the a free enterprise, it must not be unfair.” (Memorandum of the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise Code Commission, L.J., Aug. 31, 1953).
expressly stipulated between them at any time during the
engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty.
Victorio, Jr.’s legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his  Scope
representation of them in the LRA. o Agricultural enterprises
o Commercial enterprises
o Industrial enterprises
o Labor

ARTICLE 28
DEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS

Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial

enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damages.
 Reason for Preventing Unfair Competition
The above provision is necessary in a system of free
enterprise. Democracy becomes a veritable mockery if any
person or group of persons by any unjust or high-handed
method may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in
business or to earn a living.’’ (Report, Code Commission, p.
31).
“This Article is intended to lay down a general
principle outlawing unfair competition, both among
enterprises and among laborers. Unfair competition must be
ARTICLE 29
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
ARTICLE 30

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained
of.
Connection between Civil and Criminal
GENERAL RULE: Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 100) a
person criminally liable is also civilly liable (civil liability ex delicto).
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other; the
criminal aspect affects the social order; the civil, private rights. One is
for the punishment or correction of the offender, while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. 
(Report, Code Commission, p. 45)
Thus, even if the accused is acquitted because of
prescription of the crime, he is released only from criminal
responsibility, not civil liability; otherwise, the victim would be
prejudiced.  evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render
(Sombilla and Positos v. Hodges and Mogar, L-4660, May 30, 1952).
EXCEPTION: 
 The fact from which the civil action may arise did not exist
 The accused did not commit the crime
 No crime existed
Criminal liability is harder to prove than civil liability because
the former demands proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the
other, mere preponderance of evidence. Now then if criminal
conviction is not obtained because of reasonable doubt there is still a
chance that the civil liability can be held to exist because of
preponderance of evidence
Whether an exoneration from the criminal action should
affect the corresponding civil action depends on the varying kinds of
acquittal.
When to file for Civil Liability by reason of Felony
Definition: Dependent Civil Action- The right of the offended party to
damages would depend on the result of the criminal proceedings.
(Art 29 applies to this)
GENERAL RULE: The civil action arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal proceedings
When acquitted or dismissed via demurrer, what the trial court
should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer
to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for
continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce
judgment on the civil aspect of the case (Daluraya v Oliva)
EXCEPTIONS:
 When the offended party immediately files the civil action for
damages. When a criminal case (for instance, by PNP)  is
filed hereafter, the civil action filed ahead of the criminal
proceedings, has to be suspended to await the result of the
criminal case. This is because the civil action is dependent
on the result of the criminal case. (Article 30)
  When the offended party no longer desires to pursue civil
action, or that in effect he waives his right to institute a civil
action.
 When the offended party reserves the right to institute a
separate civil action. Such Civil Action cannot be filed during
the pendency of the criminal case. One has to await for the
result of the criminal proceedings before a civil action can
proceed. (see ARTICLE 30)
Although the degrees of proof may be different (Criminal
Case - Guilt beyond reasonable doubt; Civil Case - mere
preponderance of evidence), the success of the civil action
still depends on the success of the criminal case.
o Hypothetical: If the court dismisses the case on the
ground that the accused did not commit the crime,
the fact from which a civil action may arise did not
exist, or the accused is not the author of the crime,
then the civil action will be dismissed.
There will be no basis for prayer for damages sought
for in the civil case.
  NOTE: Civil Action must be filed before Prosecution presents
their evidence.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCEPTIONS:
 One may not exercise his right to waive or reserve his right
to institute a civil action when the civil action arises from the
criminal case of violating BP 22 (Anti-Bouncing Checks
Law).
Example: Civil Action After Acquittal In a Criminal Case (Art 29)
A was accused of theft, but he was acquitted because his
guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. B, the offended
party, can institute civil action for damages for the same act and this
time, mere preponderance of evidence is sufficient.
NOTE: An acquittal on the ground that the guilt of the defendant “has
not been satisfactorily established” is equivalent to one on
reasonable doubt, and does not preclude or prevent a civil suit under
Art. 29. Article 29 also does not speak of Individual Civil Action.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. (Dayap v Sendiong, as cited
in Dy v People)
Example: Civil Liability Arising from an Unprosecuted Criminal
Offense (Art 30)
A accused B of stealing his (A’s) watch, and so he (A)
brought a civil action against B to get the watch and damages. If the
fiscal institutes criminal proceedings against B the civil case is
suspended in the meantime (Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court), this
case not being one of those for which there can be an independent
civil action. But if the fiscal does not, then the civil case continues,
and here, a mere preponderance of evidence would be sufficient to
enable A to recover
Types of Acquittal (Manatan v Court of Appeals, as cited in DY v
People)
1. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict civil liability ex delicto is out
of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of
2. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act
or omission."
Effect of Extinction of Criminal Liability on Civil Liability
 Paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that the death of an accused pending his
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex
delicto, thus:
o Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment
 In People v. Bayotas, the Court construed the above
provision and pronounced these guidelines:
o 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore."
o 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission:
 a) Law
 b) Contracts
 c) Quasi-contracts
 d) xxx
  e) Quasi-delicts
o 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained
in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefore may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
o 4. Finally, the private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription. (Emphases supplied.)
Preponderance of Evidence versus Proof Beyond Reasonable
Doubt
Preponderance of Evidence. This means that the weight,
credit and value of the aggregate evidence of one is superior to the
other.
The burden of proof is met if there is greater than a 50%
chance that, based on all the reasonable evidence shown, plaintiff’s
claims are true and defendant did in fact do the wrong that caused
the damage.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. That degree of proof,
which, excluding the possibility of error, produces moral certainty.  If
the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
If after all the evidence has been put forth the judge or jury
has no doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, or if their only doubts are
unreasonable, then the prosecutor has met the burden and proved
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant
should be pronounced guilty. 
On the other hand, if there is a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime, then the defendant should be
pronounced innocent.
CASES:
People vs Bayotas G.R. No.: 10200
Summary: No Civil Liability After Criminal Liability is Extinguished
FACTS:
Appellant Rogelio Bayotas was charged and convicted with
Rape 6/19/1991, while the pending for the appeal of his conviction,
he died on 2/4/1992 due to cardiac arrest. According to Art. 89 of the
RPC, criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the
convict, as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before the final
judgement.  which the civil liability existed or not"
The Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
the accused, only extinguished his criminal liability and not his civil
liability.  failed to prove he was the author of the crime.)
ISSUE:
w/n the death of the accused in a pending appeal for his
conviction extinguish him from his civil liability
RULING:   While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical
YES. The SC held that Bayota’s extinguishes his criminal
and civil liability based on the Court’s ruling that (1) Death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. (2) The claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. (3)  if the civil liability survives, only by filing a separate civil
action maybe used as an action for recovery. (4) The private
offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
DALURAYA v. OLIVIA 744 S 193
(Summary: Acquittal was not based on "proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt" but rather on "whether the act or omission from
Daluraya was not held liable for damages because the prosecution
FACT: 
Daluraya was charged in an Information for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death of
Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the afternoon of
January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a
Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing
EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over.
attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein
respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported
driver of the vehicle.
The MeTC Ruling
In an Order dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya's demurrer and
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It found that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in material
details and that they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya
committed the crime imputed upon him.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the MeTC's ruling, declaring that "the act from
which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist."

The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and
reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the
amounts of p152,547.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.[25] In so ruling, the
CA held that the MeTC's Order showed that Daluraya's acquittal was
based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil
liability
ISSUE:
WoN Daluraya may be held liable for damages via civil
liability ex delicto.
HOLDING:
A punctilious examination of the MeTC's Order, which the
RTC sustained, will show that Daluraya's acquittal was based on
the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was
not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him.
Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that
the accused precisely committed the crime charged against him."
Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC's
Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified
that "the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was
the driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva" and
that "there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that the
accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva."
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the
findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya's
acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would
necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for
the reception of Daluraya's evidence on the civil aspect. Records
disclose that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that "the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in
view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he
was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently,
his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature
of such acquittal.
PEOPLE v. DIONALDO 770 S 350
(Summary: Accused-appellants kidnapped one Edwin Navarro. The
accused tried to extort P15M from the victim’s brother. A co-
conspirator of the accused turned on them and helped to arrest
them. When they were arrested, Edwin was found dead. Autopsy
reports reveal he was killed with a gunshot to the head. 
Accused-Appellants appealed for their innocence. The court found
them guilty. The court also found error in the courts a quo in failing to
rule for damages to be indemnified to the victim (in this case the
estate of the victim). Court ordered for the accused to indemnify 
Moral, and Exemplary Damages, with interest.)
FACTS:
 Accused-appellants (Armando, Renata, Mariano, and
Rodolfo) as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information which
reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and
intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor
vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN
NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand of P15,000,000.00 was made
as a condition of the victim's release and on the occasion thereof,
the death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in Crim. Case No. C-68329,
convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto
the RTC's conviction of accused-appellants, finding that the
prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or
in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of
the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is
committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained
is a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer.[21] It likewise sustained the finding that the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, as
sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the victim.
Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the commission
of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the
same purpose or common design, and they were united in its
execution.
ISSUE:
 WoN the accused-appellants are guilty of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention
 WoN the courts a quo erred in not ruling for civil liabilities.
HOLDING:
 YES. Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of
witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
weight, and it is conclusive and binding unless shown to be
tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the
case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of
the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the
appellate court.
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight
 and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention.
witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and It cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victim's
consistent. Through these testimonies, it was clearly family suffered mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety
established that accused-appellants, who were all private over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As
individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of his such, and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, moral
liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of damages in the amount of P100,000.00 must perforce be
extorting ransom. Thus, seeing no semblance of awarded to the family of the victim.
arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of the court a
quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb its Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this
factual findings on this score. case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid
qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others
from committing the same atrocious acts. In accordance
 YES. The Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to with prevailing jurisprudence, therefore, the Court awards
award civil indemnity as well as damages to the family of the exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the
kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon, the Court explained family of the kidnap victim.
that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on
accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not being shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing
on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the jurisprudence.
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of
the crime. In the present case, considering that both the
The appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of
qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby
victim during captivity were duly alleged in the
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the accused appellant
information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in
herein are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of
the amount of P100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each
the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole,
jurisprudence
and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin
Navarro the following amounts: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral
(2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) ₱100,000.00 as
damages is warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of
exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
the Civil Code, moral damages include physical
per annum ·from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while
Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral DY v. PEOPLE 800 S 39
(Summary: Gloria Dy was entrusted by MCCI, represented by
William Mandy to facilitate the payment of checks amounting to
P21,706,281.00 to ICBC. As it turns out, there was no payment
made. Thereafter, Mandy filed a case against Dy for Estafa.
Consequently, Dy was acquitted. Courts a quo found Dy to be liable
for civil damages, ordering the return of aforesaid value, as the
wanting of such action would result to unjust enrichment.
This Court, however, disagreed. The civil liability arises from a
contract, and not from the act or omission alleged in the case.
Therefore, the appropriate action would be to file a separate civil
action.)
FACTS:
 Gloria Dy was the former General Manager of MCCI. She
assisted in the business involving several properties, one of
which was the construction of warehouses over Numancia
Property that MCCI leased from PNB.
 She proposed to William Mandy the purchase of a property
owned by Pantranco and obtained a loan from International
China Bank of Commerce (ICBC) of P20,000,000 evidenced
with a promissory note. As security, MCCI also executed a
chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the Numancia
Property. Mandy entrusted petitioner with the obligation to
manage the payment of the loan.
 In Feb 1999, MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the
mortgaged property due to its default in paying the loan. In
order to prevent the foreclosure, Mandy instructed petitioner
to facilitate the payment of the loan. MCCI, through Mandy,
issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12 AsiaTrust Bank checks
in varying amounts and in different dates covering the period
from May 18, 1999 to April 4, 2000 with a total amount of
P21,706,281.00.
 Mandy delivered the checks to Dy. Mandy claims that he
delivered the checks with the instruction that petitioner use
the checks to pay the loan. While Dy testified that she
encashed the checks and returned the money to Mandy.
ICBC foreclosed the mortgaged property as MCCI continued
to default. Mandy claims that it was only at this point
discovered that not a check was paid.
 Mandy filed a complaint-affidavit against Dy for estafa. The
RTC Manila acquitted Dy saying that she received the
checks but the prosecution failed to establish that she was
under any obligation to deliver them to ICBC in payment of
MCCI's loan. The trial court made this finding on the strength
of Mandy's admission that he gave the checks to petitioner
with the agreement that she would encash them. Dy would
then pay ICBC using her own checks. The trial court also
said that Mandy and petitioner entered into a contract of
loan. Thus, it held that the prosecution failed to establish an
important element of the crime of estafa — misappropriation
or conversion. However, while the RTC Manila acquitted
petitioner, it ordered her to pay the amount of the checks.
 Dy appealed to the CA but it found the petition without merit
stating that acquittal doesn’t necessarily absolve her civil
liability. CA said that when an accused is acquitted on the
basis of reasonable doubt, courts may still find him or her
civilly liable if the evidence so warrant. The evidence show
that Dy received the checks as a loan from MCCI and
preventing to recover would be unjust enrichment. The CA
also denied her MR.
ISSUE:
 Whether Dy has civil liability in the criminal case of estafa
when she was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all
elements of the crime.
HOLDING: NO. 
While there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not
suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the
act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven,
albeit without sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any criminal
penalty, civil liability exists.
BUT, The liability of the defendant for the return of the amount so
received arises from a civil contract, not from a criminal act, and may
not be enforced in the criminal case.
Therefore there is no civil liability ex delicto. The situation envisioned
in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is civil liability ex contractu
where the civil liability arises from an entirely different source of
obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal case, and consequently must be filed
separately.
The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil
obligation arising from a contract of loan in the same criminal case
where she was acquitted on the ground that there was no crime. Any
contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in a
separate civil action involving the contract of loan.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the CA dated February 25, 2009 is REVERSED.
This is however, without prejudice to any civil action which may be
filed to claim civil liability arising from the contract.
PEOPLE v. CALOMIA 845 S 364
(Summary: Accused was charged and convicted for two counts of
qualified rape. Subsequently, accused died during the pendency of
his appeal. The issue thereafter is whether or not civil liability is
extinguished by virtue of the extinction of his criminal liability
because of his death.
Court ruled that civil liability is extinguished.
The death of an accused pending the appeal of his conviction
extinguishes the criminal action, as there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused; and the civil action instituted therein for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is likewise ipso facto extinguished,
as it is grounded on the criminal action. )
FACTS:  
Accused-appellant Ruben Calomia was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, with two counts of
qualified rape of his minor daughter, AAA which he allegedly
committed sometime in August 2007 and April 2008.
After trial on the merits, the RTC promulgated its Decision
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both counts of
qualified rape. Accused-appellant filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals. In its Decision, the appellate court upheld accused-
appellant's conviction, but modified the award of damages to AAA.
 During its pendency, the Court was informed that the said
appellant has died while in the confinement of Bohol District Jail due
to Strangulation, Self-Inflicted, Hanging and declared dead by the
medical officer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of an accused pending his appeal
extinguishes all his liability.
HOLDING: YES
Paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that the death of an accused pending his appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex delicto, thus:
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, must therefore be set
aside as the same had already been rendered ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to SET ASIDE the Decision
dated August 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-
HC No. 02040 and to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 131 7 and 1318
before the Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, by reason
of the death of the sole accused therein, Ruben Calomia, on
September 29, 2015.

 Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:a
o 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.

The death of an accused pending the appeal of his conviction

extinguishes the criminal action, as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; and the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
likewise ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the
criminal action.
In the instant case, accused-appellant's death occurred prior to the
finality of the judgment of conviction rendered against him. In fact,
accused-appellant died way back on September 29, 2015, during the INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals. Unfortunately,
the appellate court was not timely informed of accused-appellant's
death prior to the promulgation of its Decision in CA-G.R. CEB-CR- An independent civil action is one that is brought distinctly
HC No. 02040 on August 26, 2016. and separately from a criminal case allowed for considerations of
Irrefragably, accused-appellant's death extinguished his criminal public policy, because the proof needed for civil cases is LESS than
liability and his civil liabilities directly arising from and based solely on that required for criminal cases; but with the injunction in general that
the crime/s he committed. Accused-appellant's conviction by the success in financially recovering in one case should prevent a
recovery of damages in the other. (Paras)

It should be noted that the bringing of the independent civil
action is PERMISSIVE, not compulsory. Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2177
give instances of independent civil actions. (See Rule 111, Revised
Rules of Court; See also comments under Art. 33).
ARTICLE 31
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
ARTICLE 32
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is
taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to
petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any
form;
 (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against
one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make
such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not
the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter
be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a
judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
Liabilities that may arise from Act or Commission causing
Damage to Another
The  civil   liability   is  not  extinguished  where   acquittal  
is  based  on reasonable doubt (Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350
SCRA 387).
"An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,
(1) civil liability ex deli[c]to, under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and
(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those
(a) not arising from an act or omission complained of
felony, e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law
under Article 32 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Article 32 and 34, and culpa aqiiilkma under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, or
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file
an independent and distinct criminal action (Article 33, Civil
Code).
Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the
offender (separately and simultaneously) subject, however, to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under
both causes (Cando, Jr. v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978, November 12,
2002). However, a separate civil action based on subsidiary liability
cannot be instituted during the pendency of the criminal case
(Remedial Law, Herrera).
CASE:
KANE V ROGGENKAMP, GR NO. 214326
(Summary: Kane was charged with RA 9262 but was subsequently
acquitted. Roggenkamp filed a separate civil action for damages.
Issue is whether or not the filing is proper.
The Court ruled in the affirmative)
FACTS:
On March 30, 2006, an Information for violation of Republic
Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act
of 2004 was filed against Alastair John, with Patricia as the private
complainant. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-0413,
was then raffled to Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court of
Paranaque City.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Paranaque
City acquitted Alastair John on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
Paranaque trial court was of the opinion that Alastair John's account
of the events—that he accidentally dropped Patricia on the floor
while he was carrying her— was "in accord with human
experience[,]” while that of Patricia's was not. It further said that "if
[Patricia] was really a victim of violence or abuse, she should have
told the same to her son [Ashley Richard], especially because the
latter, according to her, is a lawyer." 
Thereafter, Patricia filed a Complaint for Damages based on
Article 33 of the Civil Code before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, praying for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. Patricia argued that the right of action
provided in Article 33 in cases of physical injuries is entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action earlier commenced against
Alastair John.
Further, she added that the civil actions for damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, called independent
civil actions, "are not deemed instituted with the criminal action and
may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation." Considering that Alastair John was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt, not because he wasn't the author of the
act complained of, Patricia argued that he may still be held liable
under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
WoN Patricia may file a separate civil action considering
Kane was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
HOLDING:
YES. It is not hard to see that respondent properly availed
herself of a separate action for damages under Article 33 after the
dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner. The criminal action
filed against petitioner was one for physical injuries in the sense
contemplated in Article 33, that is, bodily injury.
 Reservation of the right to separately file a civil action for
damages under Article 33 need not even be made. The civil action
under Article 33 may be pursued before the filing of the criminal
case,60 during the pendency of the criminal case,61 or even after
the criminal case is resolved.62 The only limitation is that an
offended party cannot "recover [damages] twice for the same act or
omission" of the defendant. Rule 111, Section 3 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
 RULE 111: Prosecution of Civil Action
o SECTION 3. When Civil Action May Proceed
Independently. — In the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
FINAL RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals' March 25, 2014 Decision and September 13, 2014
Resolution in  CA-G.R. CV No.  96341   are hereby AFFIRMED.   
The
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, is hereby
DIRECTED to reinstate Civil Case No. MC08-3871, continue with the
proceedings, and to resolve the same with dispatch.
ARTICLE 33
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Filing of Separate Civil Actions
As discussed in Article 29-30, one may file separate civil actions
given conditions (filing ahead of time, waiving, reserving the right to
file) even when there is civil action deemed impliedly institute in the
criminal proceeding, Article 33 provides that the law grants to the
offended party the rights to institute a separate civil action for
damages AT ANY TIME and REGARDLESS OF THE RESULT OF
THE CRIMINAL CASE. It will proceed independently of the criminal
case and will only require preponderance of evidence. This is
applicable to cases involving Defamation, Fraud, and Physical
Injuries.
EXAMPLE: Even if a driver is acquitted in a criminal case where
offended party intervened thru a private prosecutor, a civil case may
still be allowed. What is prohibited is a double recovery, not a double
attempt of filing of the action. (Virata v. Ochoa L-46179, Jan. 31,
1978)
Independent Civil Action for Defamation, Fraud, and Physical
Injuries
Art. 33 Speaks of:
  Defamation (or libel or slander or intrigue against
honor)
The independent civil action of damages arising from physical
 Fraud (or estafa or swindling)
injuries under Art. 33 may be brought by the offended party even if
 Physical injuries (can include even murder,
he had not reserved the right to file the same in the criminal case for
homicide, parricide, etc., whether consummated,
the same injuries. (Ortaliz v. Echarri, L-9331, July 31, 1957).
frustrated, or attempted.)

NOTE: All three words (defamation, fraud, physical injury) are taken
to mean by their generic significations thus covering more than just
what would have been covered had they been interpreted under
legal definitions as in the RPC.
Exceptions: Crimes referred to as “criminal negligence” or
“offenses of criminal negligence” under Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal  Code such as crimes formerly known as
“homicide thru reckless imprudence” or “physical injuries thru
reckless  imprudence” do not fall under the purview of Art. 33
of the Civil Code. (Laura Corpus, et al. v. Felardo Paje, et
al.,  L-26737, July 31, 1969)
EXAMPLE: A separate civil action for damages
based on injuries allegedly arising from reckless
driving should be dismissed if the driver-accused
had been acquitted in the criminal action on the
ground that he was not negligent, the entire mishap
being a “pure accident.” Art. 33 does not refer to
unintentional acts or those without malice. [NOTE:
Art. 2177 provides for an independent civil action for
negligence.]. (Marcia v. Court of Appeals GR 34529,
Jan. 27, 1983)\
Independent Nature of An Independent Civil Action
As a matter of fact, two different courts may at the same time try the
same accident, one from the criminal standpoint, the other from the
standpoint of Art. 33. The result of the criminal case, whether
acquittal or conviction, would be in such a case, entirely irrelevant to
the civil action. (Dionisio and Almovador v. Alvendia, L-10567, Nov.
26, 1957)
Effect of Appearance or Intervention of Offended Party in a
Criminal Proceeding thru a Prosecutor
[I]t may truly be said that the only exception to the rule that Art. 33
gives a completely independent civil action is when the offended
party not only fails to reserve the right to file a separate civil action
but intervenes actually in the criminal case by appearing through a
private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering indemnity for
damages therein, in which case a judgment of acquittal BARS a
subsequent civil action. (Azucena v. Potenciano, et al., L-14028,
June 30, 1962).
However, if in the criminal proceedings, the offended party DID NOT
ENTER any appearance, or INTERVENE in any other manner, an
independent civil action can prosper under Art. 33, if no civil liability
was adjudged in the criminal case. This is so even if there was no
reservation made. (Pachoco v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25,
1960).’’

ARTICLE 34
When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or
fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life
or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor.
The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any
criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice
to support such action.
Independent Civil Action for the Liability of City or Municipal
Police Force
 Primary liability is assessed against the member of the police
force who refuses or fails to render aid or protection.
 Subsidiary liability is imposed on the city or municipality
concerned in case of insolvency.
NOTE: By virtue of this Article, the city or municipal government
concerned can be sued for its subsidiary liability. Incidentally, this
Article does not grant to the government the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the policemen. (Paras)
ARTICLE 35
 When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense,
charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action
is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the
peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute
criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's
motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify
the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information
should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall
be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
NOTE: WHEN ONE CAN’T INSTITUTE INDEPENDENT CIVAC
(NOT COVERED IN CIVIL CODE), ONE MAY FILE CIVIL ACTION
AGAINST OFFENDER GIVEN CONDITIONS
When the Complaint may bring Civil Action Even when no right
to institute Independent Civil Action is granted in this Code or
any special law
 MTC (justice of peace) finds no reasonable grounds to
believe a crime has been committed
 The prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal
proceedings
NOTE: Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of
evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.

When a Criminal Proceeding is instituted after Filing of Civil
Action under Art. 35
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information
should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall
be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
ARTICLE 36
Prejudicial questions, which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code.
Definition of Prejudicial Question
A prejudicial question is one which must be decided first
before a criminal action may be instituted or may proceed because a
decision therein is vital to the judgment in the criminal case.
[O]ne which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (People v.
Adelo Aragon L-5930, Feb. 17, 1954)
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
"the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. (Tuanda v Sandiganbayan)
Elements of a Prejudicial Question
1. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case
before the Court
2. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.
3. The Civil Action was filed ahead of the Criminal Proceeding
Requisites of a Prejudicial Question
1. The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based
2. In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
actions, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined
3. The jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal
(People v Consing Jr., 395 SCRA 366, 2003)
NOTE: There is no prejudicial question if the civil and criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. (People
v Consing Jr., supra)
Who may raise the Issue on Prejudicial Question
It would seem from the ruling of the Supreme Court in
People v. Villamor, et al. (L-13530, Feb. 28, 1962) that it is the
defendant in a criminal case (and NOT the prosecution) who can
raise the issue of prejudicial questions.
Thus, if the prosecution presents evidence against the
defendant and the latter in his own defense presents certain
documents the execution and validity of which are still being
threshed out in an appealed civil case, the prosecution CANNOT
ask for a suspension of the trial on the ground that a prejudicial
question is involved. This is unfair to the defendant who should have
the right to have the criminal case terminated as soon as possible
(right to a speedy trial). In fact, the prosecution, if it really believes
that a prejudicial question is involved should have refrained from
instituting the criminal case prematurely
CASE:
TUANDA v. SANDIGANBAYAN 249 S 342
Q: Why did the court say that all elements of Prejudicial
Questions are present?
ISSUE: Whether or not the legality or validity of private respondents'
designation as sectoral representatives which is pending resolution
in CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying suspension
of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
HOLDING: 
The Court finds that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No.
36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension
of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case
against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
unmistakably present in this case.
 There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the
civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936)
are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was
premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad
faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per
diems as sectoral representatives
 while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve
whether or not the designations of private respondents as
sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will certainly
determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with the criminal
action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in
bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay private respondents'
salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal, however, was
anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations were made
in violation of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus,
were null and void.
Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's
decision declaring null and void private respondents'
designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply
with the provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against petitioners would no
longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on.
Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and partiality there being
in the first place no obligation on their part to pay private
respondents' claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right
to demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the
Court of Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will
ultimately determine whether or not there is basis to proceed with the
criminal case.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed (see
Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital to the
eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the
prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in
said criminal case.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined from proceeding with the
arraignment and trial of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16936
pending final resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 36769.
BELTRAN v. PEOPLE 334 S 106
Q: Why did the court say that there is no prejudicial question?
FACTS:
Civil Action: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E.
Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion
Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four
children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.
Criminal Case: In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the
conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting.4 Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found
probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration
of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting
decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage
and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court
might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit
petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on
ground of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: WoN a prejudicial question exists in the case at bar.

HOLDING:
NO. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case.

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the

herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be

acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense.
(He can be tried for concubinage regardless of the status of their PHILIPPINE AGUILA SATELLITE, INC. (PASI) v. LICHAUCO 496
marriage)  S 588

Q: Prejudicial Question present. But was it proper for the

investigating officer?

YAP v. CABALES 588 S 426

Q: Prejudicial Question present. But was it proper for the

investigating officer? NO. Why.
 DREAMWORK v. JANIOLA 591 S 426

Q: Prejudicial Question present. But was it proper for the

investigating officer? NO. Why.

PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL 630 S 436

CONSING, JR. V. PEOPLE 701 S 132

Q: Prejudicial Question present. But was it proper for the

investigating officer? NO. Why.

CATERPILLAR, INC. v. SAMSON (GR# 164352 ONLY) 808 S 309

EXCLUDE GR# 205972
Q: Prejudicial Question present. But was it proper for the
investigating officer? NO. Why.