Rares – Petru Zaharia – Lefter

European Studies Paper

Research Question: To what extent can it be considered that Russia and Ukraine are currently
in a war?

INTRODUCTION

Not long into its short official history, Ukraine is, again, in a situation of crisis. A
country caught between two great spheres of influence, essentially the border between the
European Union and Russia, Ukraine has been stuck in a crisis, with its people trying to find
and protect their very identity against pressures from the threats on its Eastern border. Loss of
territory to Russia, mass demonstrations, armed violence, controlled mass-media and
diplomatic inefficiency are just a few of the challenges that the Ukrainian people have faced. 1
Starting from the Euromaidan, the mass protests against the Ukrainian government halting the
process for preparing to sign the European Union Association Agreement, the situation
escalated with political and military efforts by Russia to stop Ukraine from gaining further
access to the European sphere. 2 The conflict is multi-faceted and its nature is debatable, with
opinions ranging from those who claim that Russia has had no influence in the Ukrainian
Crisis, classifying it as an internal matter, to those who attribute all the violent and turbulent
events of the past 5 years to Russian military action. This clash of opinions has led me to my
research question: “To what extent can it be considered that Russia and Ukraine currently in a
war?”. It is of course important to define what one understands by the world ‘war’, in this
case meaning a military, violent conflict between two countries, for geopolitical reasons. The
general state of turmoil and confusion looming on the topic leaves a great uncertainty: an
uncertainty for the people of Ukraine, with regards to their identity, safety and future and an
uncertainty for the international community with regards to the intentions and actions of one
of the greatest powers in the world, Russia. Whether or not the Ukrainian crisis is all but an
unofficial war initiated by Russia or a Ukrainian civil war is crucial in determining the actions
that the international community should take further and how to help the Ukrainians reach
their goals and retain their right for self-determination and geopolitical integrity. It is also not

1 Nadia Diuk. "EUROMAIDAN: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution." World Affairs 176, no. 6 (2014):
9-16
2John Besemeres. "Putin’s Last Territorial Demand." In A Difficult Neighbourhood: Essays on Russia

and East-Central Europe since World War II, 332. Australia: ANU Press, 2016.

1
simply a theoretical question anymore – the crisis has left numerous casualties and has put
many men, women and children into situations where their freedom has been inhibited. In the
following paper, I will follow an argumentative structure, to show that the Ukrainian crisis
can be considered, to a great extent, a war initiated by Russian forces. The academic basis of
the paper consists of chapters of books, academic curated journals and web articles. John
Besemeres’ in depth analysis of the current state of affairs in “A Difficult Neighbourhood:
Essays on Russia and East-Central Europe since World War II” along with articles by
academics such as John Kramer or Carl Gershman in the renowned journal “World Affairs”
will present and analyze the status quo from different angles. In my argument, I will first
analyze the context in which the crisis started, including the interests and the international
affairs of both countries. Then, I will continue by discussing the main events of the crisis to
date in depth, more specifically the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbass and the Azov
Sea conflict, addressing both the Russian and the Ukrainian interpretations of the events and
their effects. Finally, I will proceed to evaluate the events and their consequences, as well as
their current state and I will suggest possible solutions, while discussing the importance of the
unfolding of the events, its further implications and risks.

CONTEXT

Russia

During Putin’s era, Russia seems to have moved towards an attempt to regain its
influence in Eastern Europe, trying to establish a Eurasian Union, in a wish to revive a sphere
of influence as great as the one of the Soviets. Starting with the Russo-Georgian war in 2008,
Putin has made it clear that Russia was not to keep a pacifistic self-centered policy, but rather
pursue international geo-political interests that some academics have even framed as a
resurrection of imperialism. 3 In the media, Putin made his belligerent intentions clear, by
framing the government in Kiev, along with other pro-Western governments, as “fascist” and
“neo-Nazi”. What many tend to downplay is the importance of having influence over Ukraine
for the Kremlin – Ukraine represents one of the biggest exporters of military products to
Russia, as well as a much-desired source of young manpower, which Russia is at a shortage
of, at the moment, and without which the prospect of a Eurasian Union may seem

3Zofia Studzińska. "How Russia, Step by Step, Wants to Regain an Imperial Role in the Global and
European Security System." Connections 14, no. 4 (2015): 21-23.; F. Stephen Larrabee, Peter A.
Wilson, and John Gordon. "The Geopolitical Roots and Dynamics of the Ukrainian Crisis." In The
Ukrainian Crisis and European Security: Implications for the United States and U.S. Army, 5. RAND
Corporation, 2015.

2
unachievable. Not to mention, if Ukraine were to join NATO or the EU, Putin’s view for the
future would be entirely overturned. 4

Ukraine

The Ukrainians have proved, on numerous occasions, that their goal is to approach the
EU and to “Westernize”, ever since the beginning of the new millennium. From the Orange
Revolution in 2004, to the Euromaidan 10 years later, Ukrainians have shown that they will
not tolerate any more imposed influence by Kremlin and that they do not have any reluctance
to protest against any political leader, if that means progressing towards the EU. The
Ukrainian masses have also manifested a move towards Western democracy by their tireless
peaceful protests. The method is one that has been the norm in Europe for quite some time
and has characterized most of the Color Revolutions; mass manifestations, organized by
NGO’s and directed by the media. Nadia Diuk reported that “the Euromaidan was forging the
beginnings of a new civic and political nation” 5 and what seemed an overwhelming majority
of the Ukrainian people started believing that their country could change, uniting political
entities and people alike for a common goal, building a structure for a modern democratic
state and toppling an oligarchic system, inspired and kept under the heel of the Russian
sistema. 6

THE CRISIS

The Annexation of Crimea

The very term “annexation” is a disputed one in the question of Crimea. In 2014, after
the president Yanukovych was ousted in the Euromaidan, for refusing to further the
preparations for signing the European Union Association Agreement between the EU and
Ukraine, Moscow sent soldiers wearing unmarked uniforms into Crimea, to take over
strategic Ukrainian defense locations. Using these troops, they organized and supervised an
illegal plebiscite through the people of Crimea agreed to join Russia. While Kremlin naturally
approved of the plebiscite and recognized the newly gained territory, they denied having ever
had a great influence in acquiring it, presenting it as a simple means to fulfil the wish of the

4 Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, The Ukrainian Crisis, 4-5

5 Diuk, EUROMAIDAN, 15
6 Ibid, 9-16; Daniel P. Ritter, "A Spirit of Maidan?: Contentious Escalation in Ukraine." In Global

Diffusion of Protest: Riding the Protest Wave in the Neoliberal Crisis, edited by Della Porta Donatella,
204. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017.

3
Russians in Crimea and to protect them. The international community, however, largely does
not recognize the plebiscite. 7

If one is inclined to believe the Russian perspective, one may speak of no such thing
as an annexation. After all, Moscow did rely on a majoritarian Russian population in Crimea,
which loosely favored the merge. However, for the EU and NATO, the fact that the
“plebiscite” was carried out by Russian military personnel after covert attacks on Ukrainian
positions cannot go unnoticed; the UN does not recognize the annexation, while Western
governments have started imposing economical punishments on Russia, including multiple
embargos and boycotts on Russian products. While this means that the Russian economy has
suffered, there is no question as to the fact that there were some parties that gained from this
political move. 8 For one, Russian popular support of the annexation of Crimea, along with the
popularity of Vladimir Putin, the current president, has grown exponentially; it appears that
the Russian view this as a victory and a great gain for their country, suggesting that even they
may know that the annexation was an intentional operation. This, coupled with Putin’s media
tactics of framing the Russian move as a protectorate of true orthodoxy and a warm welcome
to formerly oppressed Russians has ensured, at least momentarily, a favorable opinion of his
electorate. 9 What followed, however, shed more light on the Kremlin’s intentions and
implication into Ukraine.

The War in Donbass

The “little green men” (nickname given by the Ukrainians to the unmarked Russian
troops entering Ukraine) made an appearance again, later in 2014, in the Eastern province of
Ukraine known as Donbass. In the two main cities of the region, Donetsk and Luhansk, they
sided with local Russian nationalists to seize buildings of public administration. The
perpetrators later declared the independence of the two cities (Donetsk People’s Republic and
Luhansk People’s Republic) and are currently fighting government forces in Ukraine with
what seems a vast number of unmarked weapons, tanks and machinery. Russia denies having
any role in the heavy arming of the separatists, all the while openly supporting them in the
media, under the pretense of protecting the Russians on Ukrainian soil. 10 The West,

7 Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, The Ukrainian Crisis, 6; Besemeres, A Difficult Neighbourhood, 329-

334
8 Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, The Ukrainian Crisis, 7; David J. Kramer, "THE UKRAINE INVASION:

One Year Later." World Affairs 177, no. 6 (2015): 9-16

9 Besemeres, A Difficult Neighbourhood, 297-302
10 Ibid, 331-332

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meanwhile, understands that Russia is funding and supporting the separatists; after all, there
would be no other way for a rather isolated region of outlaws in civil war with their
government to receive such great equipment and manpower; without such support, the
separatists would not have been able to obtain and defend their strategic positions in
Donbass 11. What is more, John Besemeres argues that Ukrainians are majoritarian in Donbass
and, even though many of them favor a close political relationship with Russia, they do not
wish for independence or to be annexed by the latter, leaving them essentially no motive to
start an offensive against the government. According to him, it is much more likely that
Russian troops and nationalists started the insurgence. 12 Since the incident, two agreements
(Minsk and Minsk II) have been signed, accepting a cease-fire in Donbass, but they have done
little more than show an unwillingness of the West to intervene militarily in the conflict, for
fear of not triggering a full-fledged war against Russia. 13

A question that may arise in this case is: Why would the Kremlin want to fund a
separatist movement in Ukraine and what would they have to gain? It is clearly
distinguishable that, unlike in the case of Crimea, Russia would gain no territory out of this
ordeal. However, driving Ukraine into what appears to be a civil war gives them a status
which prevents them from joining the European Union, which is an important goal for Putin,
if he wishes to keep his influence on Ukraine. 14

The Azov Sea Conflict

The latest event in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the incident in
the sea of Azov. On the 25th of November 2018, Russian ships have blocked the entrance of
Ukrainian ship seeking to pass through the Kerch Strait into the Sea of Azov, ramming a
Ukrainian tugboat, opening fire on them and subsequently capturing them and their personnel.
While the Russians claim that the area that the Ukrainians were trying to access belongs,
territorially, to Russia (since their recent, if unrecognized, annexation of Crimea), the
Ukrainians rely on two other documents of international law to prove that their presence in the
Azov Sea was entirely justified. 15 Firstly, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of

11 Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, The Ukrainian Crisis, 8-9

12 Besemeres, A Difficult Neighbourhood, 331-332
13 Kramer, The Ukraine Invasion, 14
14 Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, The Ukrainian Crisis, 4-5
15 Danilo Bilyk. 2018. “What You Need to Know about the Conflict in the Sea of Azov | DW |

26.11.2018.” DW.COM. Deutsche Welle. November 26, 2018

5
the Sea regulates free Sea Traffic in the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov. 16 Secondly, Ukraine
and Russia have a bilateral agreement, signed in 2004, stating that both countries have free
access to the Azov Sea. 17 Given the fact that these events occurred in the very recent past, the
academic community has not yet clearly expressed itself with regards to the latest evolution of
the conflict. However, given the laws already in place, one could be inclined to view this
incident as another attempt of Kremlin to enforce their domination in the Azov Sea, as well as
in Crimea, and to seize complete control of Ukrainian ports in the area.

EVALUATION

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has many different manifestations and many
consequences as well. For the people of Ukraine, it has brought a lot of struggles and it has
called for constant fight and resistance. For Russia, the political mobilization has yielded
territorial dominance and assertion in the international stage. However, it may be argued that,
due to the sanctions applied by the United Nations, in the economic field, Russia are now in a
crisis of their own, being in one of their biggest economic troughs in the past 2 decades. 18 The
Western powers, namely the US and the EU have shown that they can help curb Russia’s
propensity to act aggressively on the international stage, but they cannot effectively stop
Russia’s persistent imperialist tendencies, without actually risking setting off what may as
well be the Third World War. 19

CONCLUSION

In summary, the perspectives and events presented in this paper can help answer the
initial research question: “To what extent can it be considered that Russia and Ukraine are
currently in a war?” Analysing the events of the last 4 years, together with the perspectives of
both the academic and the international community, one may draw the conclusion that
Russia’s attempts to hide or disguise their military and political violent actions against
Ukraine have not gone unnoticed. It can be argued that Russia’s aggressions put the two
countries into what could be accepted, to a great extent, as “war”. The fact that it is not
officially recognised as such does not change the fact that the soldiers from the both camps, as

16 United Nations. n.d. “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” www.un.org. Accessed

January 23, 2019

17 Leonid Kuchma, and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. 2004. “Договір Між Україною Та Російською

Федерацією Про Співробітництво у Використанні Азовського Моря і Керченської Протоки.”

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. April 20, 2004
18 Kramer, The Ukraine Invasion, 10-14
19 Studzińska, Russia, Imperial Role

6
well as Ukrainian civilians have been and are hurt and even killed in the ongoing conflicts.
However, the fact that this war is not entirely declared and fought on an open front does give
hope; there is still a possibility that it might be solved diplomatically and, most importantly,
that it does not break out and spread to other countries.

After all, the most important aspect of the status quo is not the way that it currently
presents itself, but rather where it will lead to. A multitude of new questions arise, such as:
How will this conflict be solved? Will Putin ever stop in his expansionist intentions? How can
the casualties of this conflict be reduced? With regards to the future, Carl Gershman proposes
a sombre, yet realistic view. He argues that the only way to move towards is if Russia,
alongside Ukraine, will join the European community. He also agrees that, given the current
conditions, this outcome is rather improbable, but it might be possible if Ukraine manages to
bear through its crisis first and join the EU. Until then, the United Nations will be faced with
the challenge of handling any further aggressions and of supporting Ukraine in their fight for
democracy, so that it may, eventually stand in the way of Russian autocracy and become a
model for the peaceful democracies of the future. 20

20Carl Gershman. "A FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY: Why Ukraine Matters." World Affairs 177, no. 6
(2015): 47-56

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