ing & Convention Di University of the Philippines Law TED ANSWERS tothe 2018 BAR EXAMINATIONS IN REMEDIAL LAW SUGGE Danielle, a Filipino citizen and permanent residert of Milan, Italy, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, where she owns a re: rouse, a complaint for ejectment against Dan, a resident of Barangay Dalia, Davao City, Danielle's property, which is located in Digos City, Davao del Sur, 3as an assessed value of PhP 25,000. Appended to the complaint was Danielle's certification on non-forum shopping executed in Davao City duly notarized by Atty, Dane Danoza. a nocary public, (a) Was there a need to refer the case to the Lupong Tagapamayapa for prior barangay conciliation before the ‘court can take cognizance of the case? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWERS: (2) No. Since Danielle is not an actual resident of Barangay Dalino, saALDACan Ri is not a pre-condition to the fling of this ease in court (Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 157830, 17 November 2005). (b) Was the action properly instituted before the RTC of Davao City? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWERS: (b) No. Batas Pambansa Big. 129 vests the Municipal Trial Court ‘with the exclusive jurisdiction over unlawful detainer cases, hence, the cegatdless of the gssessed yahie of the property; action was wrongfully instituted with the RTC.{e) Should the complaint be verified or is the certification sufficient? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWERS: (o) Yes: Considering that the ation is for unlawful detainer, the Section 3(B) re will apply. Rule les on Summary Proces of the Rules on Summary Procedure requires that all pleadings submitted (0 the court be verified; hence, a mere certification on _agn-forum shopping, the complaint being an initiatory pleading is insufficient. € u Dendenees ine. and David, both stockholders owning collectively 25% of Danwinkle Inc., filed an action before the RTC of Makati to compel its Board of Directors (BOD) to hole the annual stockholders” meeting (ASM) on June 21, 2017, a8 required by Darwinkle Inc.'s By-Laws, with prayer for preliminary Inandatory injunction to use, as record date, April 30, 2017. The complaint alleged, among others, that the refusal to call the ASM on June 21, 2017 was rooted in the plan of the BOD to allow Databank, Inc. (which would have owned 30% of Darwinkle Inc. after July 15, 2017) to participate in the ASM to effectively dilute the complainants’ shareholdings and ease them out of the BOD. Dendenees ine. and David paid the amount of PhP 7,565 as filing fees bbasec on the assessment of the Clerk of Court. The Board of Directors filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They averred that the filing fees snould have been based on the actual value of the shares of Dendenees Inc. and David, which were collectively worth PhP 450 million. If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion to dismiss? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case. The court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Here, Dendenees Inc. and David merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court. If ineorrect, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing how much they must pay within the prescriptive period (Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nationale de Paris. (G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005).ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: No. Since the case is an intra-corporate suit, BOD’s motion to dismiss on the ground of deficient filing fees must be denied for being a prohibited pleading. Under Rule 1, Section 8 of the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-8C), motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading. m1 On February 3, 2018, Danny Delucio, Sheriff of the RTC of Makati, served the Order granting the ex-parte application for preliminary attachment of Dinggoy against Dodong. The Order, together with the writ, was duly received by Dodong. On March 1, 2018, the Sheriff served upon Dodong the complaint and summons in connection with the same case. The counsel of Dodong filed a motion to dissolve the writ. (a) Can the preliminary attachment issued by the Court in favor of Dinggoy be dissolved? What ground/s can Dodong’s counsel invoke? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWERS: ia) Yes, the preliminary attachment issued by the court in favor of Dinggoy can be dissolved, because the enforcement thereof was improper. In Torres, et al. v. Satsatin, (G.R. No. 166759, 25 November 2009), the Supreme Court ruled that once the implementation of a writ of preli ary attachment commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant, consequently. any order issuing i m the Court will not bind the defendant. It is, thus, indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against liim and the issuance of a writ of preliminary atrachment and the grounds therefore that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, theapplication for attachment, the applicants affidavit and bond. and the order must be served upon him. In this case, since copies of the complaint and summons of preliminary attachment was served were served after the w upon Dodong, the writ therefore, was improvidently issued; the writ of preliminary attachment may be dissolved. ‘ (ATIVE ASNW! (a) Yes, the party whose property has been ordered attached may file 8 motion to quash the order by filing a motion in court in which the action is pending before or after the levy (Rule 57, See. 13). ‘Other grounds: i, Writ was improvidently issued 2. A.counter-bond has been posted by the defendant 3. The attachment bond is insufficent {b) If Dedong posts a counter bond, is he deemed to have waived any of his claims for damages arising from the issuance of the Order and writ of attachment? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b) No, the posting of a counter-bond does not amount to a waiver of his claim for damages arising from the issuance of the Order and the writ of attachment. The counter-bond and a claim for damages pertain to two (2) different aspects in the issuance and implementation of a writ of preliminary attachment. A counter-bond posted by the person against whom the writ of preliminary attachment was issued, does not answer for damages on account of the lifting of the attachment, but for the Payment of the amount due under the judgment that may be recovered by an attaching creditor. The counter-bond stands “in place of the properties so released” (Dizon v. Valdes, G.R. No. L-23920, 25 April 1568).On the other hand, a claim for damages by the person age governed by Rule 57, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, which st whom the writ of preliminary attachment was issued is states that “an appli ation for damages on account of improper, 1 or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the tr executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof, Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on tite main ease xx x”. Consid g that the Rules of Court provided different purposes for the filing of a counter-bond and the filing of claim for damages, Dodong’s posting of a counter-bond cannot be deemed a waiver of his claim for damages. Ww Dick Dixson had sons with different women — (i) Dexter with longtime partner Delia and (ii) Dongdong and Dingdong with his housemaid Divina. When Dick fell ill in 2014, he entrusted all his property titles and shares of stock ia various companies tc Delia who, in cum, handed them to Dexter for safekeeping. After the death of Dick, Dexter induced Dongdong and Dingdong an agreement and waiver of their right to Dick’s estate in consideration of PhP 43 million, As Dexter reneged on bis promise to pay, Dongdong and Dingdong filed wich the RTC of Manila a complaint for annulment of the agreement and waiver. The summons and complaint were received by Dalia, the housemaid of Dexter, on the day it was first served. Hence, Dexter filed a notion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. RTC Manila granted the motion to dismiss. Dongdong and Dingdong thereafter filed a new complaint against Dexter for annulment cf the agreement and waiver. Before Dexter could file his answer, Dongdong and Dingdong filed a moticn to withdraw their complaint praying that i: be dismissed without prejudice. Ar Order was issued granting the motion to withdraw without prejudice on the basis that the summons had not yet been served on Dexter. Dexter filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of cismissal, He argued that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under tae “two-dismissal rule” of Rule 17, Section | of the Rules of Court, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case,Will the two-dismissal rule apply making the second dismissal with prejudice? (5%) TED ANSWI No, the two-dismissal rule will not apply, because the first dismissal was af the instance of the defendant. i “The requirements for the application of the (vo-dismissal rule under Rule 17, Section 4 of the Rules of Court are: (a) [t]here was a previous case chat Jas dismissed by 2 competent court; (b) (bjoth cases were based on or include the same claim: (¢) [bJoth notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and (@) fwthen the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former (Ching, ef al. v. Cheng, et al., G.R. No. 175507, 8 October 2014). In this case, the third requisite is absent because the first dismissal vas apon the motion to dismiss filed by Dexter; hence, the two-dismissal ule will not apply. v Dorton Inc. (Dorton) sued Debra Commodities Inc. (Debra), Daniel, and Debbie in the RTC of Manila for recovery of sum of money. The complaint alleged that, on October 14, 2017, Debra obtained a loan from Dorton in the amount of PhP i6 million’ with interest of 9% per armum. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note (PN) payable on demand signed by Daniel and Debbie, the principal stockholders of Debra, who also executed a Surety Agreement binding themselves as sureties. Copies of both the PN and the Surety Agreement were attached to the complaint. Dorton further alleged that it made a jnal aemané on March 1, 2018 for Debra and the sureties to pay, but the demand ‘was not heeded. Debra. Daniel, and Debbie filed their answer. and raised the affirmative defense that, while the PN and the Sarety Agreement appeared to exist. Daniel and Debbie were uncertain whether the signatures on the documents were theits. ‘The PN and the Surety Agreement were pre-marked during pre-trial, identified aut not authenticated during trial, and formally offered. Can the RTC of Manila consider the PN and the Surety Agreement in vendering its decision? (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, me RTC of Ma la. may consider the PN and the surety agreement in rendering its decision. ‘The PN and the surety agreement are actionable documents, defined ‘ under Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court as a written instrument upon whicti an action is founded upon Rule 8, Section 8, mo vover, provides that yhen ant action is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached vo tie corresponding due execution of the ding, the genuineness instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. In this case, Debra, Daniel, and Debbie are parties to the PN and the surety agreement. Since the PN and surety agreement are attached to the complaint, Debra, Daniel, and Debbie are deemed to have admitted the genuineness and due execution thereof for their failure to: (a) deny the genuineness and due execution of these documents under oath; and (b) to set for what they claim to be facts. ‘The court, therefore, may consider the PN and the surety agreement in rendering its decision. VI Daribell Inc. (Daribell) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against spouses Dake and Donna Demiapilis for unpaid purchases of construction naierials in the sum of PhP 250,000. In their answer, spouses Demapilis admi:ted the purchases from Daribell, but alleged that they could not remember he exact amount since no copies of the documents were attached to the compiaint. They nevertheless claimed that they made previous payments in the amounts of PhP 110,00 and PhP 20,000 and that they were willing to pay the salance of their indebtedness after account verification. In a written nanifestation, spouses Demapilis stated that, in order to buy peace, they were willing to pay the sum of PhP 250,000, but without interests and costs. Subsequently, Daribell filed a Motion for partial summary judgment. Thereafter, Saribell filed an amended complaint, alleging that the total purchases of construction materials were PhP 28(,000 and only PhP 20.000 had been paid Daribell also served upon the spouses Demapilis a request for admission, asking. them co admit the genuineness of the statement of accounts, clelivery receipts and invoices, as well as the value of the principal obligation gad the amount paid as stated in the amended complaint,Daribell thereafter amended the complaint anew. The amendment modified the period covered and confirmed the partial payment of PhP110,000 but alleged that this payment was applied to the spouses’ other existing obligations. Daribell however reiterated that the principal amount remains ‘unchanged. Si 2) Is the request for admussion deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the second amended complaint? (2.5%) ‘ED ANSWEE nded complaint merely supersedes the first to Rule 10, 1a) No. The seco smended complaint and nothing more, pursu Section 8 or the Rules of Cou jon hus, the Request for Adi is nor deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the Second Amended Complaint (Spouses Villuga v. Kelly Hardware 8 July 2012). and Construction Supply, Inc., G.R. No. 17657 1b) Can the amendment of the complaint be allowed if it substantially alters the cause of action? (2.5%) STED WERS: (b) Such amendment couid still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings (Valenzuela vy. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131175, August 28, 2001). The amended complaint may be allowed if it will not prejudice the rights of the parties. {c) Can the facts subject of an unanswered request for admission be the basis of a summary judgment? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWERS: ic) Yes. Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn-out litigations, and useless delays. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties (Spouses Villuga v, Kelly Hardware and Construction Supply, Inc. G.R. No. 176570, 18 July 2012). gIn this ease, the facts subject of an unanswered request for admission are deemed admissions by the adverse’ party (Rule 26, Section 2, Rules of Court). Applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in Spouses Villuga y. Kelly Hardware and Construction Supply. Inc., (GR. No. 176570, 18 July 2012), these jacts may be the basis of a summary judgment. vil Dory Enterprises Inc. (Dory) leased to Digna Corporation (Digna) a sarcei of land located in Diliman, Quezon City. During the term of the lease, Digna was informed by DBS Banking Corporation (DBS) that it had acquired the leased property from the former owner Dory and required Digna to pay the entais directly to it. Digna promptly informed Dory of DBS’ claim of swnership. In response, Dory insisted on its right to collect rent on the leased sroperry Due to conflicting claims of Dory and DBS over the rental payments, Digns filed « complaint for interpleader in the RTC of Manila. Digna also prayed ‘nat % be allowed to consign in court the succeeding monthly rentals, and that Dory and DBS be required tc litigate their conflicting claims. It later appeared hat sts action for nullification of a dacion en pago was filed by Dory against DBS in the RTC of Quezon City. In said case, Dory raised the issue on which of hhe two corporations had better right to the rental payments. Dory argued that, to avoic conflicting decisions, the interpieader case must be dismissed. Does the action for nullification of the dacion en pago bar the filing of the imerpleader case? (2.5%: Yes. The interpleader case should be dismissed in view of the action for nullification of the dacion en pago. Under Rule 2, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for dismissal af the others. In the situation above, the interpleader case filed by Digna seeks to resolve who between Dory and DBS has the right to receive the rental payments, Similarly, Dory’s action for nullification of the dacion en pago will determine who between Dory and DBS has the right to collect rental payments from Digna, Considering that the two cases involve the same cause of action, the interpleader case should be dismissed. 9ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: & ‘Yes, ihe interpleader case must be dismissed. Interpleader, in this case, should have been eaised as a compulsory counterclaim. Failure to the same amounts {0 4 waiver of the counterclaim (Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. ». Won and Tan, GR. L-23851, March 26, 1976). vu Spouses Dondon and Donna Dumdum owned a residential lot in Dapitan City. Doy Dogan bought said lot and took possession thereof with the promise \© pay the purchase price of PhP 2 million within a period of six (6) months, After receiving only PhP 500,000, spouses Dumdum executed the Deed of Absolute Saic and transferred the title to Doy Dogan. The balance was not paid tall, Spouses Dumdum, through counsel, sent a demand letter to Doy Dogan. for him to pay the balance of PhP 1.5 million plus interest of PhP150,000. Doy Dogan responded in a letter by saying that “while the remaining balance is admitted, the interest charged is excessive.” There being no payment, Spouses Dumdum filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against Doy Dogan nthe RTC of Dapitan City, n his Answer, Dey Dogan raised, by way of affirmative defense, that the gurehase price had been fully paid and for this reason the complaint should have deen dismissed. Spouses Dumdum then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was granted by the RTC of Dapitan City. ‘The Court awarded PhP1.5 nillion actual damages representing the balance of the purchase price, 2hP200,006 as moral damages, PhP 200,000 as exemplary damages, PHF 20,000 as interest. PhP 50.000 as attorney's fees, and PhP 5,000 as cost of. suit ‘as it proper for the RTC of Dapitan City to grant the motion for ent on the pleadings? (2.5%) dg 3UGGESTED ANSWER: No. It was improper for the F-TC of Dapitan City to grant the motion (or judgment of the pleadings. Rule 34 of the Rules of Court states that a judgment on the pleadings 's proper where an answer failed to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, In this case, Doy Dogan alleged that he paid the purchase price in full, contrary to Spouses Dumdum’s allegation that Doy Dogan did not pay the balance of Phpl.s Million. He tendered an issue in his answer as to whether or not he has anoutstanding anpaid balance with Spouses Dumdum. Tie answer claims that the purchase price has been fully paid; hence, a judgment on the pleadings was improper. 1x In 2013, Dempsey purchased from Déria a parcel of land located in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, The latter executed a Deed of Absolute Sale and sanded to Dempsey the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 777 covering the property. Since he was working in Manila and still had to raise funds to cover ‘axes, registration and transfer costs, Dempsey kept the TCT in his possession without having transfened it 10 his name, A few yeats thereafter, when he already had the funds to pay for the transfer costs, Dempsey went to the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete and discovered that, after the sale, Daria had filed a setition for reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 777 which hhe RTC granted. Thus, unknown to Dempsey, Da TCT in her name. ia was able to secure a new What 1s Dempsey’s remedy to have the reconstituted tile in the name of Daris: nullified” (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWE] Dempsey may file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court had consistently held that when the owner’s duplicate certificate of tle has nov been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is voi because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction, As a rule, reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate. In this regard, the remedy to mullify in order granting reconstitution {s a petition for annulment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court (Easnworld Motor Industries Corporation y. Skunac Corporation, G.R. Vo, 163994, 16 December 2005}. | In this case, RTC Dumaguete had no jurisfiction to order the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 777, considering thar the owner's dupli te copy thereof had not been lost, but is merely in for Deipsey’s possession, The order granting Daria’s peti reconstitution is therefore void; accordingly, Dempsey may file a Pet¢ for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 to nullify the reconstituted title in Daria’s name. x In a buy-bust operation, 30 kilos of shabu were seized from Dave and Daryll, They were arrested and placed on inquest before Prosecutor Danilo Dosn who ardered their continued detention. Thereafter, the information for the sale and distribution of shabu was filed in court. When arraigned, Dave and Darvil pleaded not guilty to the charge. During pre-trial, counsel for both of the accused raised, for the first time, the illegality of the arrest. The case proceeded to triai, After trial, the court scheduled the promulgation of judgment with notice to both the accused and their counsel, Atty. Dimayuga. During the promulgation, only Dave and Atty. Dimayuga were present. Both the accused were convicted of the crime charged. (@) Was the challenge to the validity of the arrest timely raised? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWERS: (2) No, the challenge to the validity of the arrest was not timely raised. As a rule, an accused may question the validity of his arrest through a motion to quash before he enters his or her plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived, and an accused is estopped from questioning the legality of his or her arrest Weridiano ». People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370, 7 June 2087). ‘b) What is the remedy available to Daryll, if any, to be able to file an appeal? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWERS: {b) In this case, Dave and Daryll questioned the legality of their arresc only during pre-trial, after they were arraigned; hence, tive challenge to the validity of the arrest was not timely raised. To be able to file an appeal, Daryll'should: (a) surrender, and (b) file a motion for leave of court to file an appeal, stating therein the reasons for his absence during the promulgation, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment.As a rule, the accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment, such as the filing of: (a) a motion for new trial or reconsideration; or (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Rules of Court, however, allow the accused to is standing in court to avail of these remedies by: (a) his of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating therein the reasons for his absence within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment (Villena v, People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184091, 31 January 2011). XI In 2007. Court of Appeals Justice (CA Justice} Dread Dong (J. Dong) was appointed to the Supreme Court (Court) as Associate Justice. Immediately after ‘ne appointment was announced, several groups questioned bis qualification to he position on the ground that he was not a natural bom Filipino citizen. In the fame year, the Court issued an Order enjoining him from accepting the ippointment or assuming the position and discharging the functions of his office until he is able to successfully complete all the necessary steps to show that he is «+ natural born citizen of the Philippines. He however, continued to exercise his junctions as CA Justice Since the qualification of'a natural born citizen applies as well to CA usticez, Atty. Dacio, a practicing lawyer, asked the Office of the Solicitor Seneral (OSG), through a verified request, to initiate a quo warramto proceeding against J. Dong in the latter’s capacity as incumbent CA Justice. The OSG refused to initiate the action on the ground that the issue of J. Dong’s citizenship ‘was still being litigated in another case. When the CSG refised to initiate « quo warranto proceeding, Atty. Dacio tiled s petition for certiorari ageinst the OSG. and cerdorari and prohibition against J. Dong. The petition for certiorari against tie OSG alleged that the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion when it defewed the filing of a quo warrento proceeding against 3. Dong, while the petition for certiorari and prohibition agains: J. Dong asked the Court 10 order himn'to cease and desist from further exercising his powers, duties and responsibilities as CA Justice. In both instances, Atty. Dacio relied on the fact that at the time of J. Dong’s appointment 15 Ca Justice, J. Dong’s birth certificate indicated that he was a Chinese citizen und his bar records showed that he was a naturalized Filipino citizen. a(8) May the OSG be compelled, in an action for certiovari, o initiate a (quo warranro proceeding against J. Dong? (2.5%) GESTED ANSWERS: (a) No. the OSG has the discretion in determining the presence of a) she requisices for a Quo Warranto proceeding. Besides, there is already a pending ease for the purpose of determining citizenship. For 1 Quo Warranto proceeding to be successful the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office (Ferdinand Topacio v. Associate Justice Gregory Ong and she Office of the Solicitor General, G.R. No. 179895, 18 December 2008). Does Any. Dacio have the iegal personality to initiate the action for rtiorari and prohibition against J. Dong? (2. No. He is not clothed with legal interest, Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of tie Rules of Courr state that only an aggrieved party may ‘lle petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the appropriate court. An ‘aggrieved party” is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise ta the original action for certiorari under Rule 65 (Siguic | Reyna Montecilio and Ongsiako Law Offices v. Chionlo-Sia, GR. No. 181186, 3 February 2016). the mn this ease sine there is no “original proceeding” before 4. Dong where Atty. Dacio is a party. Atty. Dacio cannot be considered an “aggrieved party” for. purposes of Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Dacio therefore, fhas no legal personality to file the same.xn Dodo was knocked unconscious in a fist fight with Dindo. He was rushed ‘0 the emergency room of the Medical City where he was examined and treated ay Dr. Datu, As he was being examined, a plastic sachet appearing 10 contain shabu fell from Dodo's jacket which was on a chair beside him. Dodo was thus arrested by the same policemen who assisted him to the hospital. At Dodo's rial, the public prosecutor called Dr. Datu to the witness stand, When the public orosecutor asked Dr. Datu as to what he saw in the émergency room, Dodo's counsel objected, claiming doctor-patient privilege rule, How would you rule on the objection? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The objection should be overruled. The doctor-; lege under Kale 130, Section 24 of the Rules of Court is Timited to “any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in ig stich patient in a professional capacity, which information was -y to enabie him to act in that eapacity, and which would blacken the repucation 04 the patient” (See aiso: Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91174, 15 September 1992). In this ease. Dr. Datu is being called to testify on what he saw in the emergency room, which does not pertain any information which he acquired in attending to Dodo in a professional capacity. Simply, Dr. Datu was being asked to testify as an ordinary witness, and not as Dodo's physician; hence, doctor-patient privilege under Rue 130, Section 24 of the xm i | Rute: of Court does not apply. Denny is on trial for homicid:, The alll calls Danilo, a police who interviewed the victim, Drew, shortly ‘the shooting. Danilo's eestimony is being offered by the prosecution for pur ses of proving that (i) Drew: is now deac; (ii) while in the emergency robin! Drew was posting his snedicai condition on Facebook and was “liking” {he -posts of his Facebook friends: (iii) Drew asked the nurse for water but wes ‘refused because he was dleecing, which subsequently angered Drew; and (iy) that before dying, Drew signed a statement in which he identified Denny as the shooter. Is the proposed testimony of Danilo admissible? (2.5%);GESTED ANSWE! Yes. The subject matter of Danilo's statements could be admitted as independently relevant statement. They are intended to merely establish either the truth or falsity of Drew's statements. ALTERNATIVE ANSWE 4 Danilo’s testimony as to the fact of Drew's death is admissible, ledge of Drew's death. Rule 130, because he has personal kno Section 36 of the Rules of Court star “Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules” In this case, Danilo has personal knowledge of Drew's death, because he was present when the latter died in the emergency room; thus, Dar lo’s testimony which pertains to Drew's death is admissible. Danilo's testimony as to the fact that Drew was using his Facebook at the time he was in the emergency is inadmissible cee elses eae Cour states: “Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law pf these rules”. Jn this case, the fact that Danilo saw Drew using his Facebook is irrelevaut in proviig, the issue of Denny's purported commission of the erime of homicide. rew was mad after the ‘Danilo’s testimony as to the fact th arse refused (0 give him water inthe emergency room is inadmissible, because itis irrelevant and immaterial under Rule 128, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. in this case, Drew's 6reaction upon being refused water by the nurse is irrelevant to 1¢ of homicide. prove Denny's purported commission of the c iv) Danilo’s testimony is admissible to prove the fact that Drew signed a document which identified Denny as the shooter because he has personal knowledge of the same. Rule 130, Section 36 states: “Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only (0 those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own percepti except as otherwise provided in these rules”. Danilo personally saw Drew’ sign the document which purportedly identified Denny as the shooter; thus, his testimony regarding the faci that Drew signed said document is admissible. XIV Dave is on tial for sexual assantt of Delly, a law student who sidelines as 2 cal. center agent. Dave offers the testimony of Danny, who says that Dave is «nown in the community as a decent and discerning person. The prosecution oresenis a rebuttal witness, Dovie. who testifies that, if Dave was reputed to be a zoo person. that reputation was a misperception because Dave had been previously convicted of homicide. Is Dovie's testimony admissible as to the sharacter of Dave? (2.5%) * SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Dovie’s testimony on Dave's previous conviction for homicide as evidence of his bad character does not refer to moral trait involved in the offense charged which is sexual assault (Section 51 (a)(2). Rule 130 of the Ruies of Court). XV Atty. Dalmacio, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, ied for a search warrant before the Executive Judge of RTC Manila. Healleges in his application that a certain alias Django was keeping about 10 kilos of shabu in & wooden cabinet located at Dillian’s Store in Pasco de Sta. Rosa, Laguna. ‘The Executive Judge of Manila personaliy examined Aty. Dalmacio and his wimesses and thereafter issued the search watrant particularly describing hhe piace to be searched and the items to be seized (a) Can the search warrant issued by the Executive Manila be enforced in Laguna? (2.5%) judge of ANSWERS: la) Yes, the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge of ‘Manila may be enforced Laguna, Administrative No. 99-20-09 of the Supreme Court states all applications for search warrant personally endorsed by the head of the PI pine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), The Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts, In the case at bar, the application for the issuance of search warrant was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) before the Executive Judge of Manila; hence, the search warrant may be enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of Mani (b) Can the legal concept of *veniue is jurisdictional” be validly raised in applications for search warrants? (2.5%) { SUGGESTED ANSWERS: iV} ee ie | | | No, the legal concept of venue being jurisdictional is not applicable. () The Supreme Court in mock ¥. Court of Appeals, (GR. No. 104879. 6 May 1994), states that an application for a search warrant is 9 special criminal process, rather than a