The Moluccan Archipelago and Eastern Indonesia in the

Second Half of the 16th Century in the Light of

Portuguese and Spanish Accountsl
Manuel Lobato
Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical,
Lisbon

From about 1580, Portugal and Spain began to coordinate their overseas policies
under King Philip II. Portuguese settlements in Tidore and Ambon (Central Maluku)
began to be supported by Spanish authorities in Manila against attacks from the Sultan
of Ternate. Between 1581 and 1606, the Portuguese and the Spanish were compelled to
fight the Ternatian “empire” from the Philippines, in the north, to the Lesser Sunda
Islands, in the south. The Iberian condominium over the Spice Islands ended by 1607,
when the Dutch, settled in the region, engaged with Ternate in the clove trade on
friendly terms.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the Portuguese and Spanish
involvement in the Moluccan archipelago, focusing on the political history of the
Ternate Sultanate in the second half of the 16th century, based on accounts written by
Iberian crown representatives. Fortunately, many of these European accounts about the
Moluccan archipelago are available. Permanent wars and a large number of Christian
missions attracted the attention of many contemporary writers. Among them, one can
find letters from governors, the voluminous Jesuit correspondence and a few narratives
from 16th and 17th century chroniclers, such as the Portuguese Diogo do Couto, Friar
Paulo da Trindade and Father Francisco de Sousa, on the one hand, and the Spanish
Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola, Dr. António de Morga, Diego Aduarte and Gaspar
de San Agustin. Some accounts conceming military expeditions sent from Manila and
Melaka — respectively the Spanish and Portuguese capitals in Southeast Asia —
against the Dutch and the eastern Indonesian kingdoms, are also available.

The decline of the Portuguese influence in Maluku

The Portuguese had settled in the island of Ternate by 1522, the year in which
they built a fortress there. Two decades after its foundation, their domination over
Maluku was considerable. From the very beginning they tried to create a sort of
protectorate over the Ternate Sultanate, which they considered to be a very faithful ally.
Meanwhile, rivalry between the Portuguese and the Castilians festered until a
diplomatic solution was found in 1529, when the Treaty of Saragossa was signed. Even
then, the Portuguese continued to dispute control over the Spice Islands with the
Spaniards. The Spaniards were allied to the Tidore Sultanate, a traditional rival of
Ternate. In 1542, Rui Lopez Villalobos, chief of a Spanish expedition, founded a few
Castilian settlements in Jailolo, Morotai and Tidore islands. However, the Portuguese
took advantage of the Castilian failure to make their way back to America on this
occasion, and of their lack of access to Indian textiles for the trade in cloves in Maluku.2
Once the Spaniards withdrew from the region, the Ternate Sultanate tried to
counter the Portuguese hegemony. This attitude, when added to some internal disputes
among the Portuguese, created a highly ambiguous relationship between Asians and
Europeans in the region.
The period dealt with in this paper begins around the late 1530s, the second part
of the interrupted reign of Sultan Hairun. In the early period, the Portuguese had
successfully reinforced their protectorate in Ternate. They thought they could control
events through the device of a puppet ruler, as they had done formerly with other kings.
They assured the new Sultan an uncontested power over his subjects, as well as a
comfortable hegemony for the Ternate Sultanate over the other Maluku kingdoms.
Hairun played their game, taking advantage of the situation as opportunities came his
way. During the Castilian offensive in the 1540s, Sultan Hairun did not commit himself
in the conflict, nor did he fight the local allies of the Spaniards, who, theoretically, were
also his enemies.3 Tematians showed a great ability to moderate the Portuguese
hegemony. After the definitive rupture between Ternatian and Portuguese authorities, in
1570, a similar policy was followed by Tidore's rulers to secure the balance of power.
To consolidate Hairun on the throne, António Galvao, the Portuguese governor,
promoted a marriage between Hairun and a daughter of the Sultan of Tidore. Initially,
Hairun seemed to be receptive to the proselytising proposals of the Portuguese. He
divorced his Christian wife according to the Jesuit design to separate Christians from
Muslims. Hairun also promised that his son would receive baptism on the condition that
he should be enthroned by the Portuguese as the king of all Christian people of
Maluku.4 In this way, the Sultan tried to circumvent the Portuguese strategy of the
1540s and 1550s, which consisted in the creation of two blocs in Maluku: one
composed of all the Christian communities, the other made up of Muslims. This new
Christian state would have its centre at Moro, a fertile region that included Morotai
island and Morotia in northern Halmahera island. In this particular region, animist and
Christian people, converted by Francis Xavier, outnumbered the Muslims. In this way,
the Portuguese tried to ensure that they had a solid basis for the control of Maluku, since
Moro was the main supplier of foodstuffs to the other regions which specialized in
clove production. On the other hand, Hairun made a great effort to preserve his
influence in Moro.5 He appointed Christian members of his own family to rule Christian
zones in Moro, but at the same time, he made war on them in order to extinguish
Christian influence.6
In the 17th century, Father Francisco de Sousa disputed the profile of Hairun
drawn by Gabriel Rebelo, a Portuguese settler at Maluku and a friend of the Sultan.7
Sousa criticised the two-faced policy of Hairun: the Sultan invoked his lack of authority
over his subjects who were carrying out anti-Portuguese activities, but, he argued, the
king himself was its major instigator.8 Thus, the situation evolved from a limited
influence of Hairun over the course of events to a complete manipulation by him of the
Portuguese alliance. As a consequence, the Sultan increased his power and
independence in the whole Maluku area. The Portuguese, or at least some of them, had
realised the waste of their efforts in dismissing kings and promoting new ones, because
local elites could always choose among a large number of candidates for king. Where
the Temate Sultanate was concerned, constitutional dispositions acted as a tool used by
Ternatian elites to prevent their king from becoming a puppet in the hands of the
Portuguese authorities. Although the Portuguese failed to manipulate the succession
system, the anti-Portuguese faction succeeded in this task after 1570.
However, it was not until the 1550s that the increasing power of the Sultan
became a threat to the Portuguese.9 The Sultanate no longer cooperated with Christian
proselytism. The era of Muslim tolerance was over as Ternate strengthened its links
with Japara, the Javanese kingdom allied to Aceh. Thenceforth, Portuguese decline in
Maluku also became apparent.
By 1557, the king of Bacan accepted baptism. Like Jailolo, Tidore and Ternate,
Bacan belonged to the group of four legendary “pillar” kingdoms of Maluku. Jailolo
disappeared as an independent kingdom in 1550, when the Castilians and their allies
were defeated.10 Thereafter, Hairun reinforced his position against the Christian faith by
sending a few military expeditions to attack Christian villages in Moro and Bacan.
Sultan Hairun and the Javanese community settled at Ambon also inspired a Muslim
rebellion against the local Christian people. In reaction, the Portuguese governor
arrested Hairun, but some Portuguese casados from Temate set him free to avoid a
general revolt in all the Maluku islands. From now on, Hairun proved to be a skilful
strategist. He did not permit his influence to be weakened by Christian expansion. At
the same time, he made an effort to please the Portuguese authorities, above all the
viceroy at Goa, for fear of major military interference from Goa or Melaka. In 1562, in
a solemn but largely symbolic act, he granted his kingdom to the Portuguese crown. In
1563, he preempted a Jesuit mission in northern Sulawesi and the Syao islands, by
forcing local rulers, still animists, to embrace Islam, avoiding in this way the expansion
of Portuguese influence into the western and northwestern regions. He showed the same
determination concerning the eastward regions. “The king of the Papua people, Emperor
of Banggai”, sent his son and heir as ambassador to Temate to choose between Islam
and Christianity. The ambassadors chose the Christian faith but Hairun, the most
prestigious ruler of the region, changed their minds by promising to marry a daughter of
the Papuan king.11
The Goa authorities, taking cognisance of the growing religious conflict in
Maluku, decided to reinforce their military presence. The Portuguese plan included the
promotion of Christian communities in both number and strength to secure Portuguese
rule in the islands.12 The lower classes' reluctance to change their ancestral beliefs for
the Muslim faith encouraged early missionaries and gave them excessive hope. In fact,
initiatives of Christian proselytism often provoked Hairun's reaction. As a consequence,
the animist communities of the most distant islands were forced to choose between the
Christian and Islamic faiths. Some rulers and chieftaincies of the eastern Archipelago
accepted the Christian religion to flatter the Portuguese and obtain advantages from
them, but the kings depended on traditional and Islamic conceptions to legitimise and
keep effective power.13

Expeditions to Maluku (1563-1569)

The Muslim revolt inspired by Ternate and the Javanese, in the later 1550s,
encouraged a Portuguese project to establish clear suzerainty over Maluku. In 1562, the
viceroy D. Francisco Coutinho ordered António Pais to build a new fort at Rocanive, on
Ambon island. The Portuguese authorities also wished to prevent the Javanese trade in
spices. This plan failed due to the obstruction of Hairun. António Pais’s expedition to
Ambon, in 1563-64, could not force southern Maluku to submit. Pais tried to obtain
support from some independent chieftaincies, but Hairun pre-empted him by making
some raids on Ambon, and attacking Christian people and local communities who were
supporting the Portuguese. The latter, at the command of Henrique de Sá, governor of
Ternate, withdrew from Ambon.14
Once news of this defeat was known in Goa, the new viceroy D. Antao de
Noronha ordered a stronger expedition. The fleet led by Gonçalo Pereira Marramaque
left Goa around April 1566. Marramaque was charged with a large number of tasks in
the Malay-Indonesian seas.15 He was ordered to relieve Melaka from a possible siege by
Aceh; resolve conflicts between the Portuguese governors of Ternate and Sultan Hairun;
and force the surrender of Ambon, where, besides the Javanese traffic in cloves, the
Muslim authorities encouraged by the Ternatian representatives continued a sanguinary
repression of Christian communities.16 However, from the beginning, the plan did not
succeed. Aceh did not besiege Melaka that year. The fleet, sailing along the northern
coast of Borneo, had to come to terms with the recent Spanish settlement in the
Philippines. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi had fortified himself in Cebu, with the
Portuguese being impotent to expel the Spaniards. So, Marramaque had to quit the
Philippines, arriving at Maluku in 1567.
Meanwhile, Portuguese settlers from Ternate had begun to fight the Castilian
presence in the Philippines, disturbing trade in Bohol and other islands. Marramaque's
expedition was the most powerful fleet that had been sent by the Portuguese to Maluku
in many years. It was made up of three galleons, two galleys, six foists and some five
hundred soldiers, reinforced by the usual galleon of trade (galeão da carreira).
However, the expedition was depleted in terms of personnel and vessels as a result of
battles with the Castilians in Cebu. As we have noted, Marramaque intended to force
the East-Central Archipelago to submit. A fort was to be built in Ambon, the strategic
port of call in the sea route followed by galleons to and from Maluku. Marramaque
carried out a few military campaigns against the Javanese and their allies at Ambon and
other neighbouring islands in south-central Maluku. The Javanese left Ambon after a
fleet sent from Japara to the rescue of Hitu, the Muslim headquarters at Ambon, was
defeated. The ambitious project, which included, besides the new fort, the provisioning
of a fleet to secure the coasts of Maluku, failed after a few years.17

The murder of the Sultan and the fall of Ternate fort

The Portuguese community in Maluku was concentrated at Ternate. It was

composed of some 40 to 50 settlers (vizinhos) living in a separate compound next to the
fort.18 They were not a harmonious community united in the same political and
economic aims. Most of them were not on good terms with the natives. However, a few
of them, rich and influential people, were linked by kinship ties to local elites. In fact,
by the late 1560s, a group of powerful casados acted as counsellors of Sultan Hairun,
while most of the Portuguese settlers were persecuted by the Muslim authorities
throughout the islands.19 To the first group belonged, for instance, Paulo de Lima,
probably a half-caste “headman” married to a Christianised niece of the Sultan of
Tidore. Because of this marriage, Paulo de Lima became landlord of a few villages in
Motiel island and a relative of Hairun.20 These rich casados were second-generation
settlers of European origin. The first generation had been settled by governor Antonio
Galvao in early times. They played a decisive role in supporting Hairun. In other words,
the usual alliances, through marriage, between regional elites and Maluku rulers, was
enlarged to include the Portuguese community. To the first generation of casados
belonged Henrique de Lima and Manuel da Silva, to whom M. A. Lima Cruz adds
Gonçalo Fernandes Bravo and Baltazar Veloso, both married Hairun's sisters, and
António Ribeiro and Lopo Ribaldo, also linked by kinship ties to the Sultan of
Ternate.21
By 1575, the Portuguese withdrew from Temate, after a long conflict with the
local Sultanate. Contemporary writers condemned the governor Diogo Lopes de
Mesquita for his tactlessness, because he ordered the murder of Sultan Hairun in 1570,
despite his being a “trusted ally” of the Portuguese. But, in fact, the Sultan was far from
being a faithful vassal of the Portuguese crown, and followed an ambiguous policy vis-
a-vis the Portuguese. This attitude become more marked in his latter years. Mutual
relations worsened after Hairun increased his persecution of Christian communities in
Moro. This region includes, as we have said, Morotai, in northwestern Halmahera, the
Morotia island, located northwards, and a few small islands, of which the most
important was Rau. Christian communities in these islands included some eighty
thousand souls and twenty-nine villages. Moro was the main exporter of rice and sago.
The fertility of its soil, especially in Morotai, is the result of its being a plain, while
most of the other neighbouring islands were mountainous. For several centuries, Moro
had been coveted by all the kings of Maluku. Its possession conferred the right and the
power to demand foodstuffs and to impose tributes. Continuous disputes and wars led
natives to seek the protection of missionaries and the Portuguese, who could also gain
access to provisions in Moro. In early times, the Jesuit mission in Moro and local
Christian people were persecuted by the Sultan of Jailolo, ruler of Central Halmahera,
immediately south of Moro. Defeated by the Portuguese in 1550-51, Jailolo responded
by attacking Moro in 1558 with the support of Hairun. From 1562 to 1566 there were
some signs of appeasement, so that missionary work could go forward. But in 1566 the
Sultan of Ternate ordered unprecedented violent persecutions, which became quite
regular from 1569. Something similar had already been practised in Ambon. Perhaps
the Sultan sought, by these means, to balance the influence achieved by Gonçalo Pereira
Marramaque in south-central Maluku.22
The strategy of Hairun against the Portuguese was finally understood by
Marramaque. After some hesitation, he decided to arrest the Sultan and thus recover the
influence that the Portuguese had lost. Some casados, relatives of the Sultan, tipped him
off, so that he could easily elude Marramaque's design.23 In 1570, Hairun was also
informed about another plan for his murder, presented by the governor of Ternate,
Diogo Lopes de Mesquita. This secret affair was leaked out from the council by some of
the most prominent Portuguese residents. In that meeting, Francisco de Sousa attributes
to the governor a speech, pronounced before his compatriots, summarising all Hairun's
treacheries.24 Despite complicities and kinship ties between the Portuguese community
and the Sultan, he was killed by order of the governor. Because of Hairun's murder, the
Sultanate of Ternate, earlier the chief “vassal” and “ally” of the Portuguese, became
their most powerful enemy.25 Local authorities fought the Portuguese for five years,
finally expelling them from the island. The late P. R. Abdurachman has argued that the
jihad or holy war against the Portuguese was declared just after the death of Hairun.26
However, a different version is given by Argensola. According to him it was not until
1572 that a confederation of all kings and sengaji of Maluku was built up against the
Portuguese, the leadership of which none of Hairun's sons had the courage to take over,
but which was accepted by Baab Ullah, the new Sultan of Ternate.27 On the other hand,
the Portuguese and missionary sources refer to a rebellion all over the Eastern
Archipelago, putting an end to the internecine disputes. A similar event had occurred in
1557, when the Portuguese governor arrested Hairun.28 Some cultural and ideological
explanations have been found to justify these social and political reactions. Firstly, the
kings of Ternate and Tidore claimed to be of divine origin.29 Secondly, Ternate island
was a part — the chief one, because it was said to be the centre — of a much wider
sacred area, extending beyond Maluku itself. The Portuguese insisted on the
geopolitical division of the region, ignoring mythical ties between kingdoms. They only
knew the intricate kinship links among royal families that offered them an inconsistent
political pattern.30 Regicide perpetrated by foreigners was a violation of the idea, deeply
rooted in tradition, that the Sultan of Ternate was the king of kings of Maluku and that
his person was sacred and inviolable.
On the other hand, Spanish writers, namely Gaspar de San Agustín, clearly note
that the killing of Hairun was invoked by the Ternatians as a pretext to turn things
against the Portuguese. Inside the royal family itself, there was a faction inclined to a
stronger resistance against the Portuguese. The Sultan’s murder was very convenient to
this political faction which gained power and encroached on the legitimate royal
lineage. This fact partially influenced the subsequent Portuguese policy.31
From that time on, the old faction which had lost its power moved into
“opposition”, clustered around the legitimate lineage. This group agreed to make some
concessions to the Portuguese, including, after 1575, to give them back the fortress, in
exchange for support to recover the crown. This domestic opposition in Ternate also
conspired with Tidorian authorities. According to Couto, the Sultan of Ternate, Baab
Ullah, ordered the killing of the presumptive heir who was also his own brother. The
governor of Maluku, Duarte Pereira, now resident at Tidore, found this the propitious
moment to recover Ternate, hatching a scheme with Kachil Tulo, “Regent of the
Kingdom”, and brother of the Sultan. Pereira appealed to the right of succession of
Kachil Tulo, taking advantage of the general indignation in Maluku caused by the
prince's murder ordered by the Sultan.32 Argensola presents a different version.
According to him, after the death of Hairun, the new governor, Nuno Pereira de
Lacerda, offered the throne of Ternate to Kachil Guarate, the eldest son of Hairun.33
Meanwhile, after the Marramaque expedition had withdrawn from Maluku,
Asians achieved naval supremacy over the seas of the Eastern Archipelago. In Ternate,
the Portuguese depended on the acquiescence of the Sultan to gain access to foodstuffs
from Moro. The Sultan, for his part, often disrupted the supply lines.34 The fortress had
not fallen earlier because the king of Tidore, breaking his alliance with Ternate,
discreetly supplied the Portuguese encircled behind the walls.35 During the siege, both
sides kept alive negotiations for peace. Finally, when the garrison was surrendered,
Sultan Baab Ullah kept the fortress in the name of the king of Portugal, an
unprecedented and surprising event.36 Reinforcement troops sent from Goa arrived too
late and were of insufficient strength to recover it.37
Goa abandoned Maluku to its fate, just as governors neglected the defence of a
“conquest” that was also a place for exiled and convicted people.38 on the other hand,
at the same time, Portuguese possessions in India suffered several attacks — sieges of
Goa, Chaul and Chaliyam — that inhibited adequate aid from the viceroys.39 A fleet
composed of four vessels left Goa in 1574, but arrived at Ternate just after the fortress
surrendered.40 Altogether, three rescue expeditions were sent to Maluku in a seven-year
period, without any positive results.41 Though the Portuguese showed some interest in
recovering their influence in Maluku,42 one may conclude that the Portuguese showed
relatively little inclination towards conquest, giving priority to commerce over military
enterprises. This was in contrast to the Spaniards: “The first thing the Castilians do
when they conquer [a land] is to kill prominent people and to convert to the Christian
faith the other people, unlike us [for] the first thing we pursue is the clove trade and
[only] secondly Christianity.”43 For the Jesuit priests, after the fall of the Ternate
fortress, Maluku lost its value as a mission area. So they turned their eyes more and
more to Japan.44
In 1574, just before the fall of Ternate, the Portuguese also experienced some
troubles in the Banda islands. Their loss of prestige gave the Bandanese courage enough
to escape their influence and attack them.45 In Maluku the Portuguese had a royal
factory and a fortress, but their presence in Banda presented a different pattern. Here,
the Portuguese presence was reduced to a seasonal visit by the Crown's agents and
private traders, though there were some resident traders at Neira island. A similar
pattern could also be found in the Solor islands in the early days.46 In the mid-1570s two
political blocs emerged in the Archipelago: the first one led by Ternate, the other one
combining Tidore and Banda. However, though some members of the royal family of
Tidore were convinced they should help Banda to fight the Portuguese, the Sultan had a
different opinion. Because Tidore’s policy was an ambiguous one, Banda moved
eventually to Ternate's side, especially after the Portuguese built a fort at Tidore with
the Sultan's permission. Thenceforth, the Portuguese presence in Banda depended on the
surrender of Ternate: “If this Maluku surrenders, so will Banda.”47
After 1575, Ternate's authorities multiplied fortifications on their own island, as
well in their overseas possessions. The Sultanate received supplies, including artillery,
from Johor, which was also allied to Banda.48 This means that the difficulties
experienced by the Portuguese in Maluku were not isolated from the conflicts they had
in the western Malay world. In some sense, such problems at Ternate were an extension
of the war between the Portuguese and rival Sultanates. These events brought to light
the existence of an anti-Portuguese coalition linking Muslim power throughout the
Indian Ocean. Acch was the connection to the Western Indian Ocean, while Johor was
the link of a Muslim chain to Java and the Eastern Archipelago.49
Expelled from Temate, the Portuguese found themselves in a very weak
position, despite their new bases at Ambon and Tidore. The foundation of a fort at
Tidore was due to the fears of the local Sultan regarding Ternate’s hegemony. The
Sultan of Tidore personally rendered tribute to the Portuguese governor of Ambon,
reviving an old lost practice. Until then, neither party went back on the alliances and
mutual attitudes that had been in place for some ten years or even more.50 Besides this
ambiguous alliance with Tidore, the coalition led by Temate left to the Portuguese a few
villages of little significance. The Sultan of Ternate, Baab Ullah, intended to banish the
Portuguese presence without harming the commercial links. Thus he continued to
secure supplies of cloves for ships coming from India and Melaka. This policy on the
part of Temate remained unchanged until the Dutch arrival at Maluku at the end of the
century.51

The Portuguese in Ambon:

War and Islamization and Christianity

From 1501, Temate claimed political suzerainty over Ambon. According to

local sources, the Pati of Hitu made a defensive agreement with Sultan Zainal Abidin
from Ternate. Hitu was a town or, to be exact, a confederation of some thirty Muslim
villages, and the strongest political formation on the northern coast of Ambon.52 P.
Abdurachman, who extracted this information from a late Hituan chronicle named
Nadah, thinks the agreement served Ternate's claims for political paramountcy over
Buru, Ceram, Ambon, Lease and Banda islands. The Hitu authorities adopted the
Islamic faith in the late 15th or early 16th century, but most common people remained
attached to animism till the next century.53
By 1525, a Portuguese settlement was created at Hitu. As in Maluku, the
governor Ant6nio Galvao also introduced Christianity in Ambon about 1538. To protect
Christian people and to prevent the clove trade to Java, the govemor Jordao de Freitas
built, around 1544, a stockade at Ative, then the most important Christian centre. From
1557, the Muslim authorities from Ambon, supported by Hairun and Japara, fought the
Christian influence. In the early 1560s, several rebellions arose against Christian
communities and Jesuit missionaries,
followed by persecutions.54 This period set off an increasingly fierce offensive
in Hitu. According to missionary figures, Christian communities in the Ambon, Lease,
Ceram and Buru islands, amounted to some seventy thousand souls by 1565. The
persecutions of which they had been victims were a reason for Goa to send the
Marramaque expedition, as we have seen. He was ordered to built a new fort at Ambon,
but the Portuguese settlers did not wait for him and they were forced to withdraw from
the island as soon as 1565.55 This particular year saw the rise of a new geopolitical
framework in the region: the Portuguese left Ambon, abandoning local Christians to
their fate; in the southeastern extremity of the Archipelago, the Portuguese settlement
on Solor island was ravaged by a Javanese fleet initially directed against Portuguese
positions in Ambon; and finally a change in the structure of alliances of Hitu occurred.
This micro-state set up close relations with Gresik, in Java. However, Japara, passing
through an obscure phase, continued to support Hitu until a new king ascended the
throne in Java.56 Marramaque forced Hitu — where he built a new stockade — as well
as other populous centres in neighbouring islands to submit. Sancho de Vasconcelos,
the Portuguese commander of the fort, moved it from Hitu, on the northern coast, to
Gelala, on the southern shore, and, afterwards, to Batumerah. In 1576 it was rebuilt in
stone and lime at the place where Ambon town today stands, deep inside the bay formed
by the Hitu and Leitimur peninsulas.57
When the Portuguese, expelled from Ternate, returned to their old settlement in
Ambon island, they found a large and influential Javanese community there, whose
members were mostly, from Japara and Tuban. The Javanese contributed in good
measure to Hituan resistance against the Portuguese conquerors. These efforts were
based on an anti-Portuguese agreement for the defence of Hitu, allying Japara and,
probably, Tuban. It had been celebrated in the early 1570s after the Javanese, expelled
from Ambon by the Marramaque expedition, moved into Saparua. This island was ruled
by a Ternatian governor who was also a close relative of Sultan Baab Ullah. Junks from
Java usually came there for cloves. Despite their limited forces, Portuguese continued to
patrol the seas and to attack small Javanese ships in the Spice Islands.58
The Portuguese had been settled in Ambon for a long time. In fact, some of them
married women from Ative, a native group inhabiting the neighbourhood of the port
where the galleons wintered, awaiting the monsoon, on their way to Maluku or back to
India.59 The Portuguese survived at Ambon, after 1575, taking advantage of the internal
conflict between Ulilima — the union of five Muslim villages—and the Ulisiwa, the
union of nine villages whose members were animist people, resistant to Islam and
favourably inclined to the Portuguese. The Siwa also were considered to be a “foreign”
people according to mythical and sacred geography.60 The conflict at Ambon, due to the
increasing religious proselytism, took the appearance of a war between Christian and
Muslim people. The advent of new political forces and new religions exacerbated the
ritual nature of regional antagonisms, which embodied opposed forces, each one allied
to a foreign people who were also political-religious representatives. So, the Siwa from
Leitimur peninsula, on the southern shore of Ambon, were allied to the Christians —
first to the Portuguese, and later on, to the Dutch. On the other hand, the Lima, from
northern Hitu peninsula, adopted Islam and sought an alliance with Ternate.61 Defeated
by the Portuguese, the Hituan people took refuge in the mountainous hinterland of the
island, earlier a deserted area.62
Before 1580 the Portuguese had directed their attacks at targets in Ambon and
its neighbouring islands, all areas rich in cloves. At the same time, Christian
communities from distant islands, such as northeastern Sulawesi, Syao, Moro or Bacan,
were waiting for Portuguese help to revolt against Tematian rule.63 In the 1580s,
Ternatian military operations in the Ambon archipelago were conducted by Rubuhongi,
a member of the royal family of Ternate. This prestigious warrior besieged Ambon on at
least one occasion in that decade. Later on, the same situation occurred twice, in 1593
and 1598. The last attack counted on the support of a Javanese fleet.64 The Sultan of
Ternate, informed of the weakness of the Portuguese settlement on Ambon, tried to
make use of a cunning strategy. He sought out an alliance with the Saparua island
authorities and, at the same time, he made a peaceful and commercial agreement with
the Portuguese from Ambon fort in prejudice of the Javanese settled at Saparua.65 In the
very late 16th century, Hitu was no longer the main trading centre in southern Maluku.
Its role was transferred to the Hoamal lor Veranula) peninsula in southern Ceram, in
which Luhu, Kambelo and Lisidi ports were sheltered from Portuguese raids.66
The Jesuit priests at Maluku soon realised the need for military efforts to stop
Islamization and to give some chance to their missionary project. Often, they felt the
obligation to finance military structures and to pay salaries to soldiers and even to
governors, as happened with Nuno Pereira de Lacerda.67 New converts were recruited
among opponents to Ternatian expansionism. Argensola states that many communities
accepted the Christian faith to escape Ternatian suzerainty. Religious motives played
little or no role in their decisions.68 When the arrival of a strong fleet was expected,
many opponents of Ternate moved to the Portuguese side. The king of Syao, an old
enemy of Temate, became Christian and preserved his autonomy through military
means. But the Christian king of Bacan was forced to embrace Islam. The single
exception to this trend occurred in Buru island, where two Christian factions, fighting
each other, were supported one by the Portuguese and the other by Temate. In fact, the
adoption of a new faith was not enough to do away with old and deep-rooted political
rivalries.69
Extra-cultural reasons also influenced the rejection of the Christian faith. Often,
Christianity interfered with the internal structure of insular communities, provoking
authority crises or conflicts. We can observe this at Maluku, Ambon and Solor. Local
rulers, becoming Christians, fell under the jurisdiction of Portuguese or ecclesiastical
authorities. Their Asian subjects, previously judged according to traditional procedures,
often were punished by European authorities. Thus, the prerogatives of native
authorities tended to disappear.70
Retraction in local Christian adherence was due, above all, to the Portuguese
loss of political influence. This fact led to the defection of a large number of their
followers.71 Until 1575, important Christian communities were to be found at Ternate,
Bacan, Jailolo and Moro. But in Maluku, as everywhere in Southeast Asia, power and
wealth consisted in controlling people, not land. Thus, the depopulation of Christian
areas, not their conquest, was a Ternatian strategy. Massacres and dispersion of
Christian communities became very common at Bacan. According to missionary
accounts, about 1588, after three decades of continuous war and persecution, the
population of Bacan was reduced to twenty percent of what it had been.72 In Ternate,
people converted to the Christian faith were fugitive slaves of the sultan, freed by the
Jesuits. They were forbidden to follow the Portuguese when they left the island, in
1575, and were taken back into slavery as oarsmen in the war fleet.73 However, a great
number of them could run away to Tidore and, later on, to Ambon where they formed
an important community. The Portuguese, in their turn, made few slaves in the Maluku
wars. They preferred to attract slaves from the enemy, thus avoiding raids, the usual
method in the Eastern Archipelago. This policy failed when the Portuguese, losing their
influence, were no longer in a position to sustain and give protection to a great number
of dependent people.
As the Portuguese and, with them, Christianity declined, Temate increased
Islamization through a coordinated policy. The sons of the most important rulers,
especially if they were Christians or rebels, were compelled to learn Arabic and study to
become ulama.74 By forcing young men of royal blood to quit their lands, the Sultan
made them hostages and used religious faith as an imperialistic ideology to reinforce his
power and to consolidate people from different origins. In the early 17th century, there
were more than forty Christian communities spread throughout the Ambon archipelago,
inhabiting, for defensive reasons, gunnong or fortified hillocks.75

The Spanish period

The Portuguese inability to gain control over Maluku led them to fear a Spanish
offensive in the archipelago. A plan to conquer Maluku was put into effect by the latter,
using as their pretext its abandonment by the Portuguese.76 Later on, the Spaniards
believed that Iberian influence in Maluku was lost because their presence in Philippines
was not consolidated in the early period.77 Just before the Dutch arrival at Maluku, they
wrote, the Portuguese had fallen in absolute discredit among Asian people.78
In 1578, before the Union of Crowns, the Spaniards, helped by the people of
Luzon, dominated Brunei—a Sultanate politically and economically influential in the
Maluku area—and Mindanao, an Islamized political formation allied to Temate. The
Spaniards were well positioned to take over Portuguese commercial interests at Maluku,
after 1580. However, Spain had no access to Indian cloth, needed for trade, nor to Asian
markets where cloves were in demand. But during the northern monsoon, the distance
between the Philippines and Maluku could be sailed in 15-20 days. Due to Spanish
interference in Maluku it became possible to guarantee Iberian influence till the end of
the century: in ten years, the Portuguese settlement in Tidore saw the number of casados
increase to some sixty families under the protection of a Spanish garrison.79 According
to San Agustín, King Philip II decided to conquer Maluku during his journey to
Portugal for his coronation. At Lisbon he received an embassy from Ternate. Sultan
Baab Ullah realised that the Iberian union was a threat to him due to reinforcements
from the Philippines, and hence sent Kachil Naik as ambassador to Lisbon. Naik took
the Bomeo route, sojourning there and at the Bintan (Johor) and Aceh Sultanates, trying
to bring their rulers to orchestrate an action against the Spaniards and the Portuguese.80
Official contacts between the Philippines and the Portuguese authorities at
Maluku began in 1581. It was a very difficult moment for the Portuguese. By 1582, no
galleon from India had arrived in the last three years. They felt totally powerless to
“stop the war against the King of Ternate, together with that of Tidore, because they
cannot sustain it any more''.81 Argensola states that the Philippines brought financial
losses to the Spanish crown, because of the continuous silver flow into Chinese hands.
This was a reason why the Crown seriously considered the possibility of abandoning it
and concentrating its efforts on the conquest and maintenance of the Maluku
archipelago. However, private interests already consolidated in the Philippines — which
dealt with trade as well with native encomiendas — insisted on its preservation. This
policy, aiming at shipping a great volume of valuable Asian goods to Europe through
the Philippines, was prejudicial to the Portuguese East-West searoute.82 Meanwhile, in
1580, Francis Drake, the famous English corsair, visited Maluku and Banda, gaining
friendship and protection from the Sultan of Ternate.83 According to Spanish sources,
initially Drake was not welcomed because he purchased a certain amount of cloves
without the Sultan’s permission. However the Englishman appeased him by offers and
promises of military support against the Portuguese.84 Thus, after the intra-Iberian
struggle for Maluku in the first half of the 16th century, the larger European rivalry
reached the political and commercial scene of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago.
 The decline of Portuguese influence in Maluku is often attributed to the arduous
and lengthy Melaka-Maluku searoute. However, by 1526, Jorge de Meneses discovered
a shorter way along the northern coast of Borneo. Sailing from Melaka, it was possible
to reach Maluku after two months of navigation. Only Portuguese sailors made use of
the northern Borneo route in the 16th century. They did it in a single direction, from
Melaka to Maluku. On their way back, they needed to call at Ambon and Java. Thus,
Maluku could be rapidly reached from Melaka, although the political will to do so was
not strong enough. Like Malay and Gujarati merchants, the Portuguese did not use the
Borneo route in general. Instead, they gave preference to the Java searoute due to the
very profitable trade of the Javanese ports of call.85 On the other hand, the private
interests of some Crown representatives were among the motives behind the lack of
support given by the Melaka authorities to the Portuguese settlements in the Eastern
Archipelago. Just as Goa provided soldiers, ships and supplies to Melaka, Maluku, in
turn, had to be supported from Melaka. To that end, royal orders were often sent from
Lisbon. However, as the royal monopoly in cloves came to an end, Javanese traders
brought increasing amounts of Indonesian spices to Melaka. Therefore, Melaka s
governors often neglected human, material and financial supplies to the Tidore and
Ambon fortresses, since most of the spices brought to Melaka by Asian merchants came
into the governor's hands at very cheap prices anyway.86
Since the Philippines lay not far from Maluku, contacts between these
archipelagos were suddenly increased.87 Just after the Iberian crowns' unification, the
Spanish committed themselves to the retrieval of Ternate and to the establishment of a
joint Hispanic dominion over Maluku. They never completely succeeded. Reasons for
this must be found in the skilful policy of Ternate, and in the impossibility of locally
supporting large fleets during the lengthy time required for military operations. The
islands had suffered the effects of continuous wars, which had led to the abandonment
of a large number of villages. Some native rulers lost their own wealth and became
resourceless. In a situation of general scarcity, logistical support to the war fleets was
reduced to assistance brought from the Philippines. From 1582 to 1585, the Spanish sent
three expeditions to recover the fortress of Ternate.88 on the other hand, Maluku and
the Philippines remained two separate administrative areas to avoid commerce in cloves
to Europe through Manila and America. Thus, navigation between the two never
became a regular feature, contributing to the failure of the Spanish efforts to gain
paramountcy over Maluku in the 1580s. Military expeditions did not promote
colonisation or real administrative structures. As no solid trace remained after each
expedition, their role was self-defeating, leading to discredit for the Spanish and the
Portuguese. Passing over their own responsibility in the matter, later Portuguese texts
insist that firearms supplied by the Dutch to the Asians rulers, namely to the Sultan of
Ternate and his allies, were mainly responsible. In contrast, Spanish sources blame the
Portuguese for flooding Maluku with all kinds of firearms. This particular fact sheds
some light on the attitude of Ternate and Tidore to the Portuguese during these decades.
Such arms provided the Asian rulers the means to spread influence and consolidate
power, as well as the means and a motive to resist the Portuguese and the Spanish
offensives.89
Among the causes for the Iberian military failure, one can also point to
dissensions among the Portuguese,90 as well as the rivalry between them and the
Spaniards for the hegemony over the Spice Islands.91 By 1583, the inclusion of Maluku
in the jurisdiction of the Philippines was being advocated. This was the answer to the
threat created by an unprecedentedly strong alliance, including Temate and Tidore, plus
several Javanese cities, against the Portuguese fort in Maluku. The Javanese contributed
the major war effort. The Iberian attack on Ternate, in 1585-86, was successfully
repelled by three thousand Javanese soldiers, most of them supplied with guns. The
Portuguese tried to solve the conflict—centered, in their minds, on the retrieval of
Temate fort—by diplomatic means. An embassy sent from Lisbon was, however, a
complete failure. The war intensified and the Portuguese remained dependent on the
assistance coming from the Philippines. As a result of unsuccessful campaigns, the
Spanish reputation emerged seriously damaged.92 Temate enlarged its power and area
of influence, threatening even the Philippines, where the Spanish presence was not yet
consolidated.93
In the wake of the Spanish interference, the conflict opposing the Portuguese
and the Muslim people of Maluku tended to spread out to the Philippines. From the
1580s, as the Spanish enlarged their sphere of influence in the Philippines, the seas of
this archipelago began to be infested by Javanese and Japanese piracy.94 on the eve of
the entry of the Northern European nations, a general conflict, even if a latent one,
existed all over Southeast Asia, opposing the Portuguese and the Spaniards to Islam. By
1590, the whole of South and Central Maluku, including Ceram and Buru, joined the
war against the Portuguese. This spread the conflict southwards. The Banda islands
were chosen to lead the Muslim confederation and to coordinate the holy war. This
Asian choice, not a very obvious one, was possibly due to the missionary and
Portuguese presence at Solor and, generally, in the Lesser Sunda Islands. Probably the
Bandanese leadership of the Islamic confederation was due to the need to attract new
forces to the common cause. The grant of nominal leadership to a small and
decentralised potentate would appease disputes for pre-eminence inside the alliance.
The decision to opt for this form of weak leadership reflects the geopolitical realities in
the Eastern Archipelago, with Saparua island being the strongest supporter of Ternatian
power in Central and Southern Maluku. The union around the rising Islamic ideal was
not enough to solve differences among the Sultanates. On the other hand, Banda lay in a
peripheral area where the Portuguese had little influence.95
About 1592, the Muslim confederation had brought together a large fleet to
carry on the holy war. From 1591, the Sultan Said Berkat of Ternate and his allies were
decided on the expulsion of the Portuguese from the positions they held. At the same
time, with the arrival of a new governor in Ambon, António Pereira Pinto, the local
casados increased in number and strength.96 Spanish assistance in Maluku reassured
Portuguese authorities in Goa, while Ambon did not cause great concem to Lisbon or
Goa.97 In 1593, the Spanish failed in the last 16th century attempt to conquer Ternate,
when the Chinese oarsmen from a powerful fleet revolted against the governor of the
Philippines and killed him.98 Thus, Ambon became a major source of trouble for the
Portuguese in Southeast Asia, after Aceh, while the Tidore settlement was abandoned to
the sphere of influence of the Philippines.99 In 1596, a great fleet from Ternate, on its
way to help several kingdoms that had revolted against Spanish rule, was defeated by
Juan de Ronquillo in the seas of the Philippines. In 1597 Ambon was besieged by a
powerful “Javanese and Moorish” fleet.100

Dutch interference and the new balance of power

The already weak position of the Portuguese in the Eastern Archipelago

worsened with the arrival of the Dutch. They were determined to expel the Portuguese
and the Spaniards from the Spice Islands and to sign monopolistic agreements with
local rulers. The Dutch soon acquired a very accurate political and commercial
perspective on the Indonesian Archipelago. By 1599, Wijbrand van Warwijk and Jacob
van Heemskerck had signed treaties with the native rulers of Ambon and Banda, later
on confirmed by the Sultan Said Berkat of Ternate. The Muslims of Maluku and the
Javanese joined the Dutch to attack Ambon fortress. Ternate was ready to exchange its
Portuguese trade-partnership for one with the Dutch, in exchange for help against the
Portuguese from Ambon. But van Warwijk and van Heemskerck decided not to face the
Portuguese and their allies from Tidore, despite the insistence of Said Berkat and his
allies. The commercial agreements of the Dutch with Temate and the Eastern Javanese
cities placed in jeopardy the acquisition of cloves by the Portuguese.101 The Dutch built
factories at Banda and Ternate.102 Next year van Neck and Steven van der Hagen
unsuccessfully attacked Tidore and Ambon forts.103 The Dutch brought to their Asian
allies a great advance in access to firearms and the Javanese increased their activities in
Central Maluku.104
At Ambon, where no Spanish military presence existed, the Portuguese found
themselves in a desperate situation. The Goa authorities gave priority to the rescue of
Ambon by sending three galleons there in 1600. However they did not appeal to the
Spaniards for fear of losing jurisdiction over Maluku.105 In 1602, another fleet
commanded by the general André Furtado de Mendonça, failing to conquer the
Javanese port of Banten, sailed for Ambon. Mendonça forced all the Muslim potentates
in the area that recognised Ternatian paramountcy to submit. Several populous and
important trading centres were ravaged, including Hitu, where the Dutch held a fortified
factory. Mendonca also attacked Veranula in westem Ceram, where an English factory
lay.106 The authorities from Veranula sent an embassy to Banten asking for Dutch help,
promising to give them exclusive rights in the clove trade.107 Hiemao, on the northern
shores of Saparua, remained the single Muslim centre free from Portuguese raids.108
After Central Maluku temporarily submitted, the general Furtado de Mendonca
was petitioned by Sultan Mole Madjimoe of Tidore and the local Portuguese settlers to
defend the island against the Dutch and retrieve the old Portuguese fortress in Ternate.
Sultan Mole had become king in 1599 with the help of the governor Rui Gonçalves de
Sequeira. After the arrival of the Dutch, who were friendly with Ternate, Tidore
approached the Portuguese and the Spanish.109 In spite of the Ambon settlers being
more interested in a campaign against Banda where the Dutch had a major influence,
Mendonca decided to attack their positions in northern Maluku.110 In 1603, his forces,
together with an expedition from the Philippines, were not enough to defeat Temate.
The Portuguese attributed this failure to the lack of reinforcements from Melaka. The
Spanish sources emphasised the incompetence of the Portuguese general and his
officers, the lack of military discipline and experience of their soldiers, and the leakage
of information through the casados of Tidore to the Sultan of Temate. In 1603,
Mendonca's decision to leave for Melaka was followed by the usual syndrome of
military expeditions in Maluku. As Ternatian strength was reinvigorated, Sultan Said
Berkat became lord of Maluku and all Portuguese and missionary dreams were brought
back to earth.111
In 1605, both Ambon and Tidore forts fell into the hands of the Dutch. The
Sultan of Tidore was forced to accept a Dutch factory in his capital and to sign a Treaty
of Protection with them, as a result of which they came to dominate the trade in cloves.
Next year, the Spaniards, under the command of the govemor of Philippines, Pedro de
Acuna, came back and regained all their lost positions, as well as the fortress and island
of Temate. Sultan Said and his presumptive heir fled. Persecuted by the Sultan of
Tidore, Said presented himself before the governor Pedro de Acuna who took him to the
Philippines.112 As a result of these events, the Iberian presence at Maluku came entirely
into the military and administrative sphere of the Philippines. A Spanish govemor was
appointed at Maluku—the first one being Juan de Esquivel—under the command of the
govemor of the Philippines. During the next decade, the Spanish resisted the Dutch
military supremacy with the aid of many of the local rulers and inhabitants.113

Conclusion

It is not easy to follow the twists and turns in the political trajectories of the
Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore on the basis of European sources alone. The changes
in the states of the region that appear from a first reading of these sources reflect the
particular vision that Europeans in the epoch had of these courts and rulers. For their
part, the foundation myths of the inhabitants of the archipelago, which speak of their
discovery and the establishment of the primordial hero in these islands, appear to have
influenced the manner in which the Moluccans viewed the arrival of these foreigners.
They were for the most part hardly seen as intruders. On the contrary, relations between
the rulers of Maluku and the Portuguese and Castilians soon came to acquire a
supernatural dimension: the very strength of the European presence was seen as a
catalyst, pre-destined to favour the expansionist tendencies of the people of the
archipelago. This formulation helps us understand the conduct of the Ternatians and
Tidorians in the epoch, since they sought to profit from the Iberian presence in order to
extract from it the greatest possible commercial and political gains for themselves.
Even if the Portuguese were convinced that they were the principal obstacle to
Tematian expansionism, in fact the Portuguese presence, rather than damping the
emerging power of the Sultanate, forced Ternate to seek links with other Islamic states
to the west, to build a solid military basis for its power, and to view in a rather different
manner its relations with its neighbours, since Temate took upon itself the role of the
principal defender of an Islam threatened by Christianity in the region. By successfully
resisting the Portuguese and Spaniards, Ternate attracted to its orbit a large number of
principalities which were spread far beyond the rather limited ambit of the Moluccan
archipelago.
The most significant feature, as elsewhere in the whole of the Indonesian
archipelago, is that the areas dominated by Ternate and Tidore were discontinuous and
hardly well-defined in geographical terms; rather, they appear to be interpenetrating
networks of possessions, creating a strategic web which on the one hand generated
constant conflicts and military instability, but on the other created a geo-strategic
context that was far more stable than might be supposed. During the period of
Portuguese hegemony in the Moluccas, both Ternate and Tidore expanded their insular
possessions, but the former kingdom did so in greater measure than the latter, and in
part managed to do so by expanding into regions over which Tidore had earlier
established its ascendancy.
The Castilian presence in the region after 1580 in fact permitted, under the cloak
of a radicalisation in the terms of the conflict between Ternate and the Portuguese, the
fine-tuning of the centralising machinery of the Sultanate, which came to impose its
stamp little by little over the whole eastern archipelago. During the latter half of the
sixteenth century, the Sultan of Ternate came to be less and less dependent on the
traditional links of kinship, and managed to acquire sufficient personal power and
authority to be able to define and implement fairly independent and personalised
policies. The turning point here appears to have been the assassination in 1570 of
Hairun. Under his son and successor, Baab Ullah, these tendencies culminated in a form
of strong personal dominance asserted by the Sultan.
 As for the Portuguese, it may be inferred from the entire discussion above, that
save for the clove trade that was conducted on the route that ran from the Moluccas to
Melaka, and thence to Goa, they were unable to exploit regional conflicts to their own
advantage, even if this was the stated policy as defined by the Portuguese Crown.114
NOTES

l. I am grateful to Professor Sanjay Subrahmanyam for helping in the revision of this text for publication.
2. V. M. Godinho, Os Descobnmentos e a Economia Mundial, 4 Vols. Editorial Presenca, 2a ed., Lisboa, 1982, ed., pp. 142-44.
3. M. Augusta Lima Cruz, “O assassinio do rei de Maluco. Reabertura de um processo”, Artur Teodoro de Matos and Luis Filipe F. Reis Thomaz
(eds.), As relações entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente. Actas do VI Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa
(Macau, 22 a 26 de Outubro de l991), Macau-Lisboa, 1993, p. 518
4. Id., ib., pp. 515, 518 and p. 522.
5. John Villiers, “Las Yslas de Esperar en Dios: The Jesuit Mission in Moro 1546-1571”, Modern Asian Studies, 22, 3 (1988}, p. 600.
6. Francisco de Sousa, Oriente Conquistado a Jesus Cristo, M. Lopes de Almeida (ed.), Lello & Irmao, Porto, 1978, p. 1101.
7. Cf. M. A. Lima Cruz, “O assassinio do rei de Maluco”, pp. 514-16.
8. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1050.
9. Hubert Jacobs, S.J., “The Portuguese town of Ambon, 1567-1605”, II Seminário Internacional de História Indo-portuguesa, IICT, Lisboa, 1985, p.
604.
10. Leonardo Y. Andaya, “Los primeros contactos de los españoles con el mundo de las Molucas en las Islas de las Especies”, Revista Española del
Pacifico, II, 2 (1992), p. 82.
11. Sousa, Onente Conquistado, pp. 1043, 1059, 1115 e 420-21.
12. M. A. Lima Cruz, “O assassinio do rei de Maluco”, pp. 526-27.
13. Iohn Villiers, “The Cash-crop Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries”, J. Kathirithamby-Wells
8v John Villiers (eds.}, The Southeast Asian Port and Polity. Rise and Demise, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1990, p. 96.
14. Francisco de Sousa casts suspicion on Henrique de Sá, who may have been bnbed by Sultan Hairun (Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1045-57).
15. Marramaque's departure from Goa is dated by Francisco de Sousa to 1567 contradicting 1566 as stated by Diogo do Couto (id., ibid., p. 1058).
16. It was not known in India that, meanwhile, the Portuguese had withdrawn from Ambon (Artur Basilio de Sa, (ed.), Documentação para a História
das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente - Insulíndia, II, Lisboa, 1955, p. 435 44, henceforth DHMPPO).
17. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1066; DHMPPO-Insulíndia, IV, p. 174; Gaspar de San Agustín, O.S.A., Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas (1565-
1615), Manuel Merino, O.S.A. (ed.), C.S.I.C., Madrid. 1975, Liv. I, Cap. XXI, pp. 156-57; DHMPPO-lnsulindia, IV, pp. 457 e 472. On Gonçalo
Pereira Marramaque, see M. A. Lima Cruz, “A viagem de Gonçalo Pereira Marramaque do Minho às Molucas ou os itinerários da fidalguia portuguesa
no Oriente”, Stvdia, 49 (1989), pp. 333-36.
18. Hubert Jacobs, S.J., Documenta Malucencia, II, Roma, 1980, p. 79, henceforth DM.
19. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, IV, p. 185.
20. Id., pp. 548-49; San Agustin, Liv. III, Cap. IV, p. 596. The Lima family was the most influential Portuguese family in Maluku. Their members were
half-caste people married to women of royal blood. This did not inhibit the crown from recognising their aristocratic rank and appointing them to
command fortresses and ships. Probably, they were the only Portuguese married into the nobility and permanently resident in those islands. Paulo de
Lima probably was the son of Henrique de Lima, also a relative of the Sultan of Ternate (Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, Conquista de las Islas
Malucas, Madrid, 1609, pp. 167-69).
21. M. A. Lima Cruz, “O assassinio do rei de Maluco”, pp. 515, 518 and 522.
22. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1072 and ss.; L. Y. Andaya, “Los primeros contactos de los españoles”, p. 82; J. Villiers, “Las Yslas de Esperar en
Dios”, pp. 594-604.
23. M. A. Lima Cruz, “A viagem de Gonçalo Pereira Marramaque”, p. 335; idem, “O assassínio do rei de Maluco”, p. 517. The author emphasizes the
Portuguese inability to deal with this problem. See Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1065.
24. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1075-79; Argensola, Conquista, p. 73.
25. H. Jacobs, S.J., “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 604.
26. Paramita R. Abdurachman, “Atakiwan Casados and Tupassi, Portuguese Settlements and Christian Communities in Solor and Flores (1536-1630)”,
Masyarakat Indonesia, X, 1 (1983), p. 98.
27. Conquista, pp. 78-80.
28. Hairun was charged with involvement in Muslim activities at Ambon against local Christian communities, in close co-ordination with Japara. He
was also charged with promoting clove smuggling from that island to Japara. See M. A. Lima Cruz, “O assassínio do rei de Maluco”, pp. 525-26.
29. Argensola, Conquista, p. 2.
30. L. Andaya, “Cultural State Formation in Eastern Indonesia”, Paper submitted to the International Conference on Southeast Asia in 15th-18th
Centunes, Lisbon, 4 7 Dec.1989, pp. 10-16.
31. San Agustin, Liv. II, Cap. XXV, pp. 527-28; Sousa, Onente Conquistado, p. 1114.
32. San Agustín, Liv. III, Cap. IV, pp. 598-99; Diogo do Couto, Da Ásia, Lisboa, 1788, Dec. X, Pte. 2a, Liv. VIII, Cap. IV, pp. 289-91; Liv. IX, Cap.
XIII, pp. 511-15.
33. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 78-80.
34. P. R. Abdurachman, “Niachile Pokaraga A Sad Story of a Moluccan Queen”, Modern Asian Studies, 22, 3 (1988), pp. 586-87.
35. The King of Tidore was afraid of a Portuguese reaction against his alliance with the Sultan of Temate. For this reason he sent
small vessels to the shores of Borneo looking for Portuguese ships coming from India (Argensola, Conquista, p. 89).
36. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1091-92.
37. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, IV, pp. 215 e 252; F.P. Mendes da Luz (ed.), Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas, que a Coroa de Portugal
tem n as pastes da india. e das capitanias, e mais cargos, que nelas ha, e da importancia delles, ed. facsimilada do Ms. da
Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid (cod. 3217}, published in Stvdia, 6 (1960), fl.67.
38. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, IV, pp. 313 e 382.
39. M. A. Lima Cruz, “A viagem de Gonçalo Pereira Marramaque”, p. 335.
40. Argensola, Conquista, p. 83.
41. DHMPPO-Insulindia, rv, p 473. Such limited reinforcements led Spanish sources to say that the Ternate fortress did not receive
any help from India during the six year siege (DM, II, p. 223).
42. In 1586, five galleons were used in military and trade operations in the Maluku area (J.H. Cunha Rivara (ed.), Archivo
Portuguez-Oriental, 2a ed., Nova-Goa, 1851-1877, III, pt. I, pp. 156-57, henceforth APO).
43. DM, II, pp. 32-33.
44. Letter from Father Duarte de Sande, Goa, 1579-11-07, ANTT, Armario Jesuítico, n.º 28, fl.ll9.
45. DHMPPO-lnsulIndia, IV, p. 254.
46. V. M. Godinho, Os Descobnmentos e a Economia Mundial, III, p. 146.
47. DM, II, p. 40; DHMPPO-lnsulfndia, IV, pp. 255-56.
48. Argensola, Conquista, p. 96; DHMPPO-lnsulindia, IV, p. 260; A. da Silva Rego (ed.), Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa,
I, Lisboa, 1960, p. 15.
49. According to H. Jacobs, Ternate was mainly visited by Javanese from Japara, Tuban, Sidayu and Gresik, for trade and military
support (DM, II, p. 36, n. l0). The role of Aceh in commerce with the westwards Islamic network, as well as the role of Johor
eastwards, have been emphasized by Kenneth R. Hall, “The Opening of the Malay World to European Trade in the Sixteenth
Century”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, LVIII, 2 (Dec. 1985), p. 89.
50. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1101.
51. DM, II, p. 438; DHMPPO-lnsulindia, IV, p. 236; Couto, Dec. X, Pte. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VII, pp. 55-56.
52. Concerning Hitu, in the context of the power structures in Eastern Indonesia, see H. Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”,
p. 604, and also John Villiers, “The Cash-crop Economy and State Fomnation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth
Centuries”, J. Kathirithamby-Wells & John Villiers (eds.), The Scutheast Asian Port and Polity. Rise and Demise, Singapore
University Press, Singapore, 1990, p. 92.
53. Paramita R. Abdurachman, “Niachile Pokaraga. A Sad Story of a Moluccan Queen”, Modern Asian Studies, 22, 3 (1988), p. 575
54. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630,
The Hague, 1962, p. 160; H. Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 612; Luis Filipe Thomaz, “Maluco e Malaca”, A.
Teixeira da Mota (ed.), A viagem de Fernão de Magalhães e a Questão das Molucas. Actas do II Colóquio Luso-espanhol de
Historia Ultramarina, Lisbon, 1975, p. 38; M. A. Lima Cruz, “O assassínio do rei de Maluco”, p. 525; id., “A viagem de Gonçalo
Pereira”, p. 333.
55. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, p. 140. See M. A. Lima Cruz, “O assassinio do rei de Maluco”, pp. 526-27.
56. P. R. Abdurachman, “Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi”, p. 98. Infommation from an Hituan, Malay language chronicle, the
Hikayat Tanah Hitu. The Portuguese sources say nothing about the role of Gresik in their departure from Ambon in 1565.
57. M. A. Lima Cruz, “A viagem de Goncalo Pereira”, p. 334; H. Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 604.
58. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, IV, pp. 192-99, 229, 262, 368 and 458.
59. Id., ibid., pp. 196; H. Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 604.
60. The two groups may be distinguished on account of the alimentary taboo on pork that the Ulilima strictly observed (DHMPPO-
lnsulindia, p. 195J.
61. H. Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 604; P. R. Abdurachman, “Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi”, p.l07.
62. DHMPPO-lnsulíndia, pp. 200-03.
63. Id., ibid., p. 247; DM, II, pp. 39-40. In 1582, a secret agent sent by the governor of the Philippines “found at Temate many
crypto Christian people and many other nations that, when the time will come, would not refuse to fight side by side with the
Castilians” (San Agustín, Liv. II, Cap. XXXVIII, p. 548}.
64. H. Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 611.
65. DHMPPO-Insulindia, IV, p 327.
66. H. Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 604.
67. DM, II, pp. 1-3.
68 Conquista, p. 72.
69. San Agustin, Liv. II, Cap. XXXVIII, p 548; DM, II, pp 39 40, 55-56 and p. 79; Mendes da Luz, Livro, fl.70; DM, II, p.l 14.
70. P. R., “Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi”, p. l08; Manuel Lobato, “Os Portugueses em Timor”, Coral, 1 (Dec.1991i, pp. 8-14.
71. Mendes da Luz, Livro, fl.73v.
72. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, V, p. 103.
73. Wars involving different ethnic groups, rival lineages, such as Christian and Muslim people, were the main source for slavery in
Maluku and, generally, in Southeast Asia (A.Reid, “The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries”,
[ournal of Southeast Asian Studies, XI, 2 (Sept.1980), Sing. Univ. Press, p. 248).
74. DM, II, p. 102.
75. Fernão Guerreiro, Relação anual das coisas que fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus nas suas missões [. . .] nos anos de
1600 a 1609, I, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade, 1930, pp. 273-74.
76. San Agustín, Liv. II, Cap. XXXIII, pp. 509-10 and pp. 520-21; DM, II, pp. 32-33.
77. DM, II, p. 223. Obviously it was mainly due to the lack of institutional collaboration between the Iberian kingdoms which, even
after their unification, continued to be the case.
78. DM, II, p. 363; Guerreiro, Relação anual, I, p. 269.
79. DHMPPO-Insulindia, V, p. 116; DM, II, pp. 32-33 and p. 269; San Agustín, Liv. II, Cap. XXXIII, pp 509-11, Cap. XXXIV, pp
520-21 and Cap. XXXV, pp. 527-28.
80. San Agustin presents an incorrect chronology. (id., ibid., pp. 527-28). On the Ternatian embassy to Lisbon see Argensola,
Conquista, pp. 140-46.
81. Couto, Dec. X, Pte. 1ª, Liv. III, Cap. VI, pp. 307 e 312; San Agustin, Liv. II, Cap. XXXV, p. 528; DHMPPO-Insulindia, IV, p.
113.
82. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 84-86.
83. DM, II, p. 93.
84. San Agustin, Liv. In Cap. XXXIIl, p. 508. Similar in Argensola, Conquista, p. 107.
85. See Roderich Ptak, “The Northern Trade Route to the Spice Islands: South China Sea-Sulu Zone-North Moluccas, (14th to early
16th century”, Archipel, 43 (1992J, pp. 27-55, passim.
86. “The Bishop of Melaka to the king”, Melaka, 1588-12-31, A. G. Simancas, Sec. Prov., c6d.1551, fl.275v, quoted by Artur
Teodoro de Matos, O Estado da Índia nos anos de 1581-1588. Estrutura administrative e económica. Alguns elementos para o seu
estudo, Universidade dos Açores, Ponta Delgada, 1982, p. 39.
87. DHMPPO-lnsulíndia, V, p. 108.
88. DM, II, pp. 123, 165, n. 32 and p. 179. The Spanish expedition led by Juan de Morón or Morones arrived at Tidore around
March 1585. It was the third expedition sent from the Philippines to Maluku in four years: the first one in 1582 was commanded by
Juan de Ronquillo, a second one by Pedro Sarmiento in 1584. See San Agustin, Liv. II Cap. XXXVIII, Liv. III, Cap. II and Cap. IV;
Couto, Dec. X, Pte. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VI and Cap. VII, p. 49 and Caps.VIII and IX. For the 1580s Boxer refers to only two Spanish
expeditions, both with a Portuguese contribution (“Portuguese and Spanish projects for the Conquest of Southeast Asia”, Journal of
Asian History, III (1969), p. 126).
89. Argensola, Conquista, p. 10.
90. Couto, Dec. X, Pte. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VII, pp. 46-49, Liv. VIII, Cap. IV, pp. 285-86.
91. DM, II, pp. 170 and 393; APO, III, lª pt., pp. 156 57.
92. DM, n, pp 134, 207 and 393; APO, III, III pt., pp. 34, 80 and p. 278; DHMPPO-lnsulindia, V, p. 27; San Agustin, Liv. III, Cap.
IV, p. 597.
93. DM, II, pp. 190-91 and 222-24. A conspiracy by the people of Brunei and Luzon to take Manila by force was discovered in 1587
(San Agustin, Liv. III, Cap. IV, p. 601).
94. Id., ibid.; Jacques de Coutre, Andanzas Asiáticas, Eddy Stols, B.Teensman and J.Werberckmoes (eds.), Madrid, 1991, p. 146.
95. DM, II, p. 306.
96. DM, II, pp. 331, 359 and p. 369.
97. Cª régia a Pero Lopes de Sousa, Lisboa, 1590-03-06, AHU, Cons. Ultr., cod.281, fl.86.
98. According to Prof. Boxer, the figure of a thousand Spanish soldiers, under the governor's command, is not reliable (“Portuguese
and Spanish projects”, p. 134).
99. Regimento do vice-rei Conde da Vidigueira, Lisboa, 1596-01-05, AHU, Cons. Ultr., cod.281, fl.366.
100. DM, II, pp. 389, 445-46 and 456; Coutre, Andanzas Asiaticas, p. 149; APO, III, 14 pt., p. 481, 2a pt., p. 580; Antonio de
Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, J. S. Cummins (ed 1, Hakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 93-94.
101. DM, II, pp. 470, 490 and p. 505.
102 William Foster, “Introduction”, The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas. 1604-1606, Hakluyt Society, 1943, Klaus
Reprint, Millwood, New York, 1990, p. XXIV; DM, II, pp. 470 and p. 474.
103. Id., ibid., p. XXIV; DM, II, pp. 495-96. See also H.Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 611.
104. DM, II, pp. 520-21.
105. Francisco Pyrard de Laval, Viagem (1601-11), transl. and annot. by Cunha Rivara, II, Liv. Civilização, Porto, 1944, p.l58;
Carta de Tomé de Sousa Coutinho ao vice-rei, Goa, 1600-04-07, ANTT, MMCGraça, Cx.6, t. II E, p. 349; Cª de Luís da Gama.
Secretario do Estado, ao vice-rei, Goa, 1600-04-07, ANTT, MMCGraça, Cx. 6, t. II E, p. 273; Couto, Dec. XII, Pte. ultima. Liv. V,
Cap. VIII, p. 512.
106. Hoamoal is another name for this peninsula. See Hubert Jacobs, S.J., “Un reglement de comptes entre Portugais et Javanais
dans les mers de l'lndonesie en 1580”, Archipel, 18 (1979), p. 170.
107. The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton..., p. 20.
108. C. R. Boxer & Frazao de Vasconcelos, André Furtado de Mendonça, Lisboa, 1955 (reimp. 1989), pp. 40 45.
109. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 155-58. Argensola seems to use information about Maluku not available in the Portuguese and
missionary reports.
110. Boxer, André Furtado, p. 47.
111 H. Jacobs, “The Portuguese town of Ambon”, p. 611. Magalhaes Godinho clearly notes the failure of André Furtado at Ambon
and Ceram. See Os Descobnmentos e a Economia Mundial, III, p. 162. The Spanish sources also suggest it. The Portuguese sources,
without an evident reason, repeatedly glorify the achievement of Furtado de Mendonça. Boxer, André Furtado, pp. 46-54;
Argensola, Conquista, pp. 288-307.
112. Morga, Sucesos, p. 233; Fernão Guerreiro, Relação anual, II, pp. 131 32 e 306-11.
113. V.M. Godinho, Os Descobnmentos e a Economia Mundial, III, p. 163; Antonio de Morga, Sucesos, p. 239; “A discourse of the
present state of the Moluccos, anexed to the for-mer Journall Voyage of George Spielbergen, extracted out of Apollonius Schot of
Middleborough' [1617l, Purchas His Pilgrimes, II, p. 227.
114. After completing this essay, I had an opportunity to read the work of Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku. Eastern
Indonesia in the Early Modern Period, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1993, which may be consulted for another approach
to the history of this period.