American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 100 (May 2010): 51–56
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.2.51
The Great Recession: Lessons from Microeconomic Data
By Atif Mian and Amir Sufi*
Crises and sharp economic downturns, while
undesirable, provide economists with a unique
opportunity to test and hone economic theory.
Indeed, some of the most influential advance-
ments in economic thought, including Milton
Friedman’s monetarist tradition, John Maynard
Keynes’ fiscal theory, and Irving Fisher’s debt-
deflation hypothesis, emerged from analysis of
the Great Depression.
The current economic malaise, which we
refer to as “The Great Recession,” provides
another watershed moment to reevaluate our
core economic beliefs. However, in contrast to
our peers in previous crises, we are fortunate to
have access to large-scale microeconomic data-
sets and advancements in computational capac-
ity. These advantages allow for a more rigorous
analysis of the current recession and therefore
a more informed understanding of its origins,
propagation, and consequences.
Our purpose is to highlight how a micro-level
analysis of the Great Recession provides us with
important clues to understand the origins of the
crisis, the link between credit and asset prices,
the feedback effect from asset prices to the real
economy, and the role of household leverage in
explaining the downturn. We hope that our dis-
cussion also serves as an example of the useful-
ness of incorporating microeconomic data and
techniques in answering traditional macroeco-
nomic questions.
I.  What Were the Origins of the Credit Cycle:
Credit Demand or Credit Supply?
Financial crises are almost always preceded by
a sharp rise in leverage or debt-based ­financing.
There are two competing ­explanations for this
* Mian: University of California, Berkeley and NBER,
545 Student Services Building, Berkeley, CA 94720 (e-mail:
atif@haas.berkeley.edu); Sufi: University of Chicago Booth
School of Business and NBER, 5807 South Woodlawn
Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: amir.sufi@chicago-
booth.edu). We thank the Initiative on Global Markets and
the National Science Foundation for financial support, and
Philip Strahan for comments.
51
observation. The first explanation borrows from
the real business cycle tradition and associates
credit expansion with positive productivity or
technology shocks. Under this paradigm, the
subsequent crisis represents an “unlucky” event
when realized shocks are not as positive as
anticipated. If such a view were correct, there
is no role for public policy: credit booms result
from productivity-driven shifts in the demand
for credit and should therefore be left alone.
The influence of this paradigm on policymakers
during the credit expansion from 2002 to 2006
is evident from Alan Greenspan’s references to
“productivity improvements” as a rationale for
the higher debt burdens.1
However, an alternative explanation for credit
booms is based on shifts in the supply of credit.
Such shifts may be driven by a series of factors,
but financial innovation (such as securitization) is
often a core component. Charles P. Kindleberger,
in his masterful account of financial crises origi-
nally published in 1978, asserts that “in many
cases the expansion of credit resulted from the
development of substitutes for what previously
had been the traditional monies.”   2
From a policy perspective, it is important to
understand whether a rise in leverage is driven by
demand-side productivity shocks or supply-side
financial factors. A supply-driven rise in lever-
age may not be innocuous. For example, if lever-
age growth is driven by risk-shifting supply-side
incentives such as regulatory arbitrage or expec-
tations of government bailouts, then there may be
a role for intervention to realign incentives.
How does one separate supply from demand
in understanding the origins of the expansion
of household leverage from 2002 to 2006? In
Mian and Sufi (2009a), we argue that the use
of microeconomic data in the form of zip code
level data on household borrowing can isolate
channels much more effectively than traditional
1
For example, see Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan’s testimony to the US Congress on June 9, 2005.
2
See chapter 4 of Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert
Aliber (2005).
52 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
aggregate datasets. We show that contrary to the
predictions of a productivity-based credit expan-
sion hypothesis, zip codes that see the largest
increase in home purchase mortgage origina-
tions from 2002 to 2005 experienced relative
declines in income.
In fact, the evidence is even more extreme. We
isolate the sample to zip codes that experienced
negative income growth in nominal terms from
2002 to 2005, and compare these zip codes to
others in the same county with positive income
growth. From 2002 to 2005, the negative income
growth zip codes witnessed a growth in mort-
gage originations that was almost twice as large
as in the positive income growth zip codes! More
broadly, we show that the correlation between
mortgage growth and income growth is negative
from 2002 to 2005 while the correlation is positive
in all other periods since 1990. A productivity-
driven credit demand hypothesis for the mortgage
credit boom is soundly rejected in the data.
On the other hand, a supply-based explanation
for mortgage credit expansion, where subprime
credit is financed through the rapidly developing
securitization market, is robustly supported in
the data. The fraction of home purchase mort-
gages that were securitized by non-government-
sponsored enterprise (GSE) institutions rose
from 3 percent to almost 20 percent from 2002
to 2005, before collapsing completely by 2008.3
We show that non-GSE securitization primarily
targeted zip codes that had a large share of sub-
prime borrowers. In these zip codes, mortgage
denial rates dropped dramatically and debt-to-
income ratios skyrocketed.
Not surprisingly, the mortgage default crisis
started and remains most pronounced in high
subprime share zip codes, which correspond to
the top quartile based on the fraction of borrow-
ers in the zip code with a credit score less than
660 as of 2000.4 The top left panel of Figure 1
shows the dramatic relative expansion and
­collapse of mortgage lending to subprime zip
codes, and the top middle panel shows a ­similar
3
These facts come from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
data. Mortgages sold by the originator to non-bank finan-
cial institutions and for the purpose of private securitization
are included. See Mian and Sufi (2009a) for more details.
4
All of the data used in Figure 1 are explained in detail
in Mian and Sufi (2009a). The quartile splits are weighted
by population so that the bottom and top quartiles contain
the same number of households.
MAY 2010
expansion and collapse in securitization for
these zip codes. The top right panel plots mort-
gage default rates in subprime zip codes, which
reached almost 20 percent by 2008.
II.  Does the Supply of Credit Influence 
Asset Prices?
The traditional approach in asset pricing prices
assets by discounting future cash flows. The
availability of credit plays no role in the deter-
mination of asset prices. However, this view is
increasingly challenged as being too narrow. For
example, John Geanakoplos has initiated a prom-
ising line of inquiry on the premise that “varia-
tions in leverage cause fluctuations in asset prices”
(Geanakoplos 2009). In other words, financial
innovation or general shifts in the supply of credit
can have a direct impact on asset prices, creating
a potentially important feedback mechanism (see
also Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale 2000).
Is there evidence that the growth in real estate
prices during the recent boom was partly driven
by shifts in credit supply? Mian and Sufi (2009a)
exploit local variation in credit growth and
housing supply elasticity to address this ques-
tion. The bottom left panel of Figure 1 shows
that house price growth was significantly stron-
ger in subprime zip codes relative to prime zip
codes until 2006, before collapsing completely
by the end of 2008. Since credit growth was also
significantly stronger in subprime zip codes dur-
ing 2002 to 2005, the graph is suggestive of a
credit-induced house price boom.
However, how do we know that the causality
does not run in the opposite direction? Perhaps the
higher credit growth in subprime neighborhoods
was itself driven by the expectation of higher
house prices in these neighborhoods. To test
for such reverse causality concerns, we split the
sample by housing supply elasticity. In particular,
we focus only on cities where housing supply is
extremely elastic—that is, where new housing can
be constructed quickly at relatively low marginal
cost. Theoretically, house price appreciation in
these cities should not exceed nominal inflation in
construction costs because land is effectively free.
We show that this was indeed true during the
subprime lending frenzy. Moreover, in these
elastic housing supply Metropolitan Statistical
Areas, there was no differential house price
growth in subprime neighborhoods despite
these neighborhoods’ strong credit growth
VOL. 100 NO. 2 The Great Recession: Lessons from Microeconomic Data 53

Mortgage growth since 2000 Fraction sold for non-GSE securitizaton Mortgage default rates
1 0.25 0.2

0.2
0.15
0.5
0.15
0.1
0.1
0
0.05
0.05

– 0.5 0 0

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year Year Year

Subprime Prime Subprime Prime Subprime Prime

House price growth since 2000 Auto sales growth Fraction with FHA insurance
0.8 0.25
0.2
Growth since 2005Q4

0.2
0.6 0
0.15
0.4 – 0.2
0.1
– 0.4
0.2
0.05
– 0.6
0 0
2004q4 2005q4 2006q4 2007q4 2008q4
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year Year
High leverage growth counties

Subprime Prime Low leverage growth counties Subprime Prime

 

Figure 1. Household Credit Cycle and the Macroeconomy

Notes: Subprime and prime categories correspond to the top and bottom quartiles based on the fraction of borrowers in the
zip code with a credit score less than 660 as of 2000. Quartiles are population weighted so that both subprime and prime zip
codes contain the same number of individuals. For the bottom middle panel, we use county-level data on auto sales. High
(low) leverage growth counties are counties in the top (bottom) decile of the distribution of the change in the debt-to-income
ratio from 2002 to 2006.

relative to prime neighborhoods. If subprime This point is especially important for policy-
credit growth were driven by expectations of makers and regulators. After arguing that house
higher house price appreciation in subprime price growth during the housing boom “largely
neighborhoods, we should not have seen higher reflect[s] strong economic fundamentals,” Ben
subprime credit growth in elastic cities that Bernanke now recognizes that “the availability
experienced no house price appreciation. The of these alternative mortgage products proved
housing supply elasticity comparison suggests to be quite important and, as many have recog-
that the direction of causality is more likely nized, is likely a key explanation of the hous-
to flow from credit expansion to higher house ing bubble.”6 One of the key lessons from our
prices.5 Indeed, Mian and Sufi (2009a) show research is that the use of microeconomic data
that the within-county zip code level correlation can lead to real time analysis to tease out the
between house prices and income growth was underlying causes of macroeconomic pat-
negative from 2002 to 2005, while it was posi- terns. The negative correlation between income
tive in all other time periods. It appears far more growth and house price growth at the zip code
likely that a single cause—a shift in supply of level could have been detected as early as 2005
credit—was responsible for the boom in lever- using microeconomic data.
age and house prices.

6
See January 3, 2010 speech at the American Economic
Association Meeting on “Monetary Policy and the Housing
5
In elastic cities, higher credit extension should level to Bubble” and October 20, 2005 Congressional Testimony on
more quantity of housing. This is also true in data. “The Economic Outlook.”
54 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
III.  Do House Prices Have an Accelerator
Effect?
The growth in mortgage credit and house
prices obviously impacts the real economy
through the construction sector. However, such
real effects could be relatively small unless there
is an “accelerator” or feedback effect from the
rise in asset prices to the real economy. Several
macro models based on collateral and financial
frictions postulate such feedback effects (e.g.,
Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler 1989; Nobuhiro
Kiyotaki and John Moore 1997).
Historically, accelerator effects are largely
perceived to work through the effect of collateral
value on firm investment. However, we believe
that in years preceding the Great Recession, the
major accelerator effect was driven by the impact
of rising home equity on household spending.
It is generally difficult to isolate the impact of
higher house prices on household expenditure.
The usual worry is that unobserved common
shocks, such as permanent income shocks, may
co-determine house price, household consump-
tion, and borrowing dynamics.
We show in Mian and Sufi (2009b) that micro-
economic data helps to overcome this worry. Our
analysis uses an instrumental variables approach
and a large panel of individual-level data on
household borrowing to isolate the causal effect of
house price growth on household borrowing and
consumption. We find that existing homeowners
borrowed 25 to 30 cents against the rising value
of their home equity from 2002 to 2006. A sig-
nificant fraction of the overall rise in household
debt can therefore be attributed to home equity-
based borrowing. Moreover, the borrowings were
not used to purchase new properties or to pay
down expensive credit card balances, implying
that they were likely used for real outlays such as
home improvement and consumption.
We also examine heterogeneity across differ-
ent groups and find that the home equity-based
borrowing channel is much stronger among
households with low credit scores and high credit
card utilization rates. Homeowners that appear
credit constrained are the most aggressive in
their home equity extraction response to house
price growth. Older households respond less
aggressively to unexpected house price growth,
contradicting most standard life cycle theories of
consumer behavior. The magnitude of borrowing
against home equity growth suggests that it had
MAY 2010
a first order effect on the economy. House price-
driven home equity extraction accounts for $1.5
trillion of the increase in household debt, or 2.8
percent of GDP per year from 2002 to 2006.
While our findings are consistent with col-
lateral-based accelerator models, they also
point to some shortcomings requiring further
­exploration. For example, collateral effects and
financial frictions are typically associated with
the production sector as opposed to the house-
hold sector. Our findings suggest that household
borrowing for consumption may be far more
sensitive to collateral values than firm invest-
ment. Similarly, the high sensitivity of house-
hold borrowing and defaults to collateral value
raises the question of whether nonstandard
preferences, such as the hyperbolic discounting
model of David Laibson (1997), more accurately
capture consumer behavior.
IV.  The Household Leverage-Driven Recession
An expansion in the supply of credit coupled
with the feedback effect of borrowing against
rising house values by existing homeowners
created an unprecedented growth in US house-
hold leverage between 2002 and 2006. We show
in Mian and Sufi (2010) that the cross-sectional
variation in leverage growth across US counties
is an early and powerful predictor of the severity
of the recession of 2007 to 2009.
The predictive effect of household leverage
on macroeconomic outcomes is large enough
that it can explain the entire rise in mortgage
defaults, the fall in house prices, and the fall in
durable consumption measured by auto sales.
We use county-level information on auto sales
and building permits to show that durable con-
sumption declined earlier and more sharply
in counties that experienced a large increase
in household leverage before the recession. In
the most highly leveraged counties, auto sales
and new residential building began declining
as early as 2006, a full year before the begin-
ning of the recession. In fact, counties with low
household leverage completely escaped the drop
in durable consumption until the fourth quarter
of 2008 (see bottom-middle panel in Figure 1).7
7
This figure is based on county level data, where we
split the US counties based on the change in the household
debt-to-income ratio in the county from 2002 to 2006. See
Mian and Sufi (2010) for more details.
VOL. 100 NO. 2 The Great Recession: Lessons from Microeconomic Data
Household leverage could have affected
durable consumption and residential investment
through two channels. First, highly leveraged
households may have refused to purchase goods
that required additional debt burdens given
higher probabilities of default. Second, frictions
in credit markets may have lead to a decline in
the supply of credit, making it difficult for con-
sumers to purchase durable goods. In support of
this latter channel, we find that credit card lend-
ers sharply curtailed credit availability from the
fourth quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of
2009, and that this differentially affected coun-
ties that relied more on credit card borrowing.
Our results support an earlier strand of litera-
ture that highlights the importance of household
leverage in driving and amplifying recessions
(e.g., Irving Fisher 1933 and Frederic Mishkin
1978 on the Great Depression). Mervyn King
(1994) and Reuven Glick and Kevin Lansing
(2009) also find a very strong relation between
the increase in household leverage and the
severity of the subsequent recession across
developed countries. Similarly, Edward Leamer
(2009) points out that eight of the last ten reces-
sions were preceded by substantial problems in
housing and consumer durables. Yet household
finance does not play a major role in most mod-
els of macroeconomic fluctuations.
V.  In Search of Fundamental Causes
Our central argument is that an outward shift
in the supply of credit from 2002 to 2006 was a
primary driver of the macroeconomic cycle of
2002 to 2009. An obvious question then is: what
drove this outward shift? There are many poten-
tial answers to this question, but we choose
to highlight two. The first is the international
financial literature on global savings imbalances
(Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff 2009).
Indeed, in terms of aggregate flows, the accu-
mulated current account deficit almost perfectly
matches the rise in household leverage that we
argue was at the root of the economic downturn.
Second, subsidies for mortgage credit in the
form of government homeownership initiatives,
implicit government guarantees and expected
bailouts is likely to have played an important
role in artificially lowering the cost of credit.
In research with Francesco Trebbi, we find that
campaign contributions from the mortgage
industry increased significantly in favor of US
55
r­ epresentatives from high subprime congressio-
nal districts starting in 2000. These campaign
contributions were in turn increasingly informa-
tive in predicting congressional voting behavior
(Mian, Sufi and Trebbi 2009b). Moreover, in the
aftermath of the crisis, representatives with high
constituent defaults and high campaign contri-
butions from the financial industry were sig-
nificantly more likely to vote in favor of various
bailout initiatives (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi 2009a).
These results highlight the dangers that
political capture by special interest and populist
forces pose. If the prevailing political structure
cannot credibly commit to imposing losses on
market participants engaged in risky behavior,
leverage-driven crises are likely to be a recur-
rent feature of our economy. The bottom right
panel of Figure 1 shows why this issue is espe-
cially pressing: in 2008, the Federal Housing
Finance Administration aggressively stepped
into the housing market by insuring mortgages
in collapsing subprime neighborhoods.
VI.  Conclusion: The Role of Microeconomic
Analysis in Macroeconomic Policy
The widespread availability of microeco-
nomic data has greatly enhanced our ability
to understand the fundamental driving forces
behind macroeconomic fluctuations and credit
cycles. Our research has employed micro-
economic data in order to understand the link
between household finance and the real econ-
omy. However, a similar case can be made
for other channels of interest, such as the link
between bank liquidity and the real economy.8
The broader point to emphasize is that micro-
level data is now widely available for key variables
of interest such as bank loans, house prices, con-
sumer borrowing, spending, and defaults. These
data are updated at quarterly frequency or higher,
making them highly useful for policy work. We
hope that the above illustration of our work using
microeconomic data leads to a greater use of such
data both in academic and policy circles.
8
See Khwaja and Mian (2008) for an illustration.
Similarly, Jimenez et al. (2010) use credit registry data in
Spain to isolate the credit channel consequences of the rise
in securitization in Spain.
56 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
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