The Post-Colonial Studies Reader
Second edition
Fated by
Bill Ashcroft,
Gareth Griffiths and
Helen Tiffin
£9 Routledge
R fie,Ty 1d, Pads, Coral
ws known ot heese ia
Bill Ashe
Bill Ashe
PART O
Issues z
Bill Ashe:
1 Geor
2 Abdu
4 Gaya
5 Homi(Foucault and Deleuze 19
Chapter 4
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK
CAN THE SUBALTERN SPEAK?
(Abbreviated by the author)
an the §
baltern Speak?” in Gayatri C
1 Cambridge, Wlass.: Harva
worty Spivak
y Pr
A WOMAN WHO TRIED TO BE DECISIVE in sserom, Sh
but women did not, do not, “hear” her. Thus she can be defined as a ‘subaltern”
2 person cial mobil
king subaltern is the left sine
-e which relate to each other as r networks
¢ also a practice; the
0 quick and
within state formation andthe ly
are related but fereducibly discontinuous,
resented a8 a proof reflects
who speaks and acts... is alway
[or] party or... union’ can represent “those
1977: 206). Are those who act andl struggle mute, a
“¢ problems are bi
between the ‘same’ w nd c
entation and re-presentation. The critique of id
formations and systems of political economy ean now
ical practice of the ‘transformation of consciousness.
F self knowing, politically canny subalterns st
Iectuals represent themselves as transparent. If such a critique and
en up, the shifting
omy, on the one han
nn representation within the political
4 svithin Fy of the Subject, on the other, must not be
iterated. Let us consider the play of ‘represent’ in the first sense) and
‘recpresent’ in the second sense) in a famous passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire ofCAN THE SUBALTERN SPEAK? 29
Bonaparte, where Marx touches on ‘class’ as a descriptive and transformative concept. This is
ass be
e argument ftom the work th from our two
Id feminism from the me
Marx's contention here is that the descriptive definition of a class can be a differential
live under economic conditions of existence that cut off theit mode of lie, their interest, and
philosophers andl political third
their forn
[faindlich
tion from those of the other classes and place them in inimical confrontation
they form a class’ (Marx 1973: 239). There is no such thing as a
existence, which might be
‘opetated by, the differential
ind economic, and the
1” at work here. In fact, the collectivity of famil
considered the arena of “instinct,” is discontinuous with, th
isolation of classes. In this context, the formation of a
feconomic agency o interes is impersonal because itis systemic and heter
tor interest is tied to the Hegelian critique of the individual subject, for it marks th
fempty place in that process without a subject which is history and political economy. Tl
the capitalist is defined as “the conscious bearer {Traiges]of the limitless movement of capit
Mare king to create an undivided
desire and interest coincide, Class consciousness does not operate toward that goal. Both in
7: 254). My point is that M
the economic area (capitalist) and in the political (world historical agent), Marx is obliged to
construct model We
of adivided and dislocated subject whose parts are
with each other. A celebrated passig
ike the description of capital as the Faustian monster
brings this home vividly (Marx 1977: 302)
The following passage, continuing the quotation from The Fightecnth Brumaire, is also
working on the structutal principle of a dispersed and dislocated class subject: the (absent
collective) consciousness of the stall peasant proprictor class finds its “bearer” in a ‘reps
sentative’ who appears to work in another's interest, ‘Representative’ here does not derive
from n°; this sharpens the contrast Foucault and Deleuze slide over, the contrast, say
has received political and ideological exacerbation in the European tradition at least since the
poet and the sophist, the actor and the orator, have both been seen as harmful. In the guise
we thus encounter a much older debate
= to the
second, Again,
fof a post-Marxist description of the scene of po
len belon
between representation or rhet
first constellation, vsrteren — wil
stronger suggestions of substitution ~ t
they are related, but running them together, especially in order to say that beyond both is
where oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for chemselvs, leads to an essentialist, utopian
politics that can, when transferred to single-issue gender rather than class
he, which ruthlessly constructs a general will in the
UN Plans of Action so that she
leyond this concatenation, transparent as thetoric in the service of “truth
I subject (as Woman), speaking,
rader in development is best for her. It is in the shadow of this
support to the financialization of the
eedit-baited rural woman oven as it “formats” her theo
can be ‘developed.
IF out to be, is the much-invoked oppr
acting, and knowing that
unfortunate marionette that the history of the unheeded subaltern must unfo
Here is Marx's passage, using “rertrren’ where the English uses ‘represent,’ discussing a
2 substitution as a representation), The small peasant proprietors
can ces; they must be represented, Their representative must
appear simultaneously as their master, 9s an authority over them, as unrestricted
them from the other classes and sends them rain30 GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK
and sunshine from above. The political influence fin the place of the lass interest
since there is no unified class subject] of the small peasant proprietors therefore finds
an; Derrida trans
n] subordinating society to
here] in the executive force [Fxckurveg
lates Gemale as violence in another context in Force of
Nat only does stich a model of social incoherence — necessary gaps between the source
of ‘influence’ {in this case the small peasant proprietors), the ‘representative” (Louis Napoleon),
and the historical-political phenomenon (executive contra
dlislocated machine of history moves because ‘the identity of the interes’ of these proprietors
fails to produce a feeling of community, national links, oF a political organization." The event
af representation as Vertctang (in the constellation of rhetoric-as-persuasion) behaves like a
Ds g (or chetoricas-trope), taking its place in the gap between the formation of a
(descriptive) class and the nonformation of a (transformative) class: ‘In so far as millions of
families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life... he
rm a clas. In so far as... the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of com
munity... they do not form « class.’ The complicity of rerteten and darstllen, theit identity
incifference as the place of practice — since this complicity is precisely what Marxists must
°x Marx does in The Eighteenth Brumaire can only be appreciated if they are not
conflated by a sleight of word
1 would be merely tendentious to argue that this textualizes Marx too much, making
him inaccessible to the common ‘man," sho,
2 victim af common sense, is so deeply place
in a heritage of positivism that Marx's irreducible emphasis on the work of the negative, on
p :
the necessity lor defetishizing the concrete, is persistently wrested From him by the strongest
adversary, ‘the historical tradition’ in the air." The uncommon “tnan," the
ntemporary phil
‘osopher of practice, and the uncommon woman, the metropolitan enthusiast
resitance, sometimes exhibit the same positivism,
have dwelt so long on this passage in Marx because it spells out the inner dynamics of
Vertewung, or representation in the political context, Representation in the economic context
ihe the philosophical concept of representation as s
which relates to the divided subject in an indirect way. The most obvious passage is well
known: ‘In the exchange relationship [Austauschverhalens] of commodities their exchange-value
appeared to us totaly independent of their use value, But if we subtract their use-value from
the product of labour, we obtain their value, as it was just determined [bextimaz], The common
clement which represents itself [sich dance] in the exchange relation, oF the exchange value
of the commotity, is thus its value’ (Marx 1977; 254
According to Marx, under capitalism, value, as produced in necessary and surplus labor
is computed as the representation/sign of objectfied labor (which is rigorously
istinguished
human activity}. Conversely, in the absence of a the
of exploitation as the extraction
xluction), appropriation, and realization of (surplus) value os representation of labor power
ination {the mechanics of power as such).
tof Marxist,’ Deleuze suggests, ‘was to determine the problem [that power is morc
diffuse than the structure of exploitation and state formation] essentially in terms of interests
(power is held by a ruling class defined by its interests)" (Foucault and Deleuze 1977: 214).
O
alist summary of Marx's project, just as one cannot ignore
that, in parts of the Ani-Dedipus, Deleuze and Guattari build their case on a brilliant if ‘poeticCAN THE SUBALTERN SPEAK? 31
grasp of Marx's theory of the money form, Yet we mi
following way: the relationship between
the microl
gical texture of power.” Sub-individaal micrologies cannot grasp the “empirical
y ~ of
field. To move toward such an accounting one must move toward theories of ideok
ject formations that micrologieally and often erratically operate the interests that
the micro
caled in macrologies. Such theories cannot afford to overloo
f
They must note how the staging of the world in representation — its scone of writing, its
Dante
— dissimulates the choice of and need for “her
paternal proxies, agents of
My view is that radical practice should attend to this double session of representations
rather than reintroduce the individual subject through totalizing concepts of power and
esi
(One clearly available example of ideological epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated
far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project
is also the asymmetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity
It is well known that Foucault locates one
se of epistemic violence, a complete overhll «
the episteme, in the redefinition of madness at the cnd of the European eighteenth centur
(see Foucault 1965: 251, 262, 268). But what if that particular redefinition was only a part
of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the o
nies? What ifthe two projects of
pistemic overhaul ~ European madness and colonial normality — worked as dislocated and
unacknowledged parts of a vast two-handed engine?
He
then, is a schematic suenmary of the epi
Hinds
may gain added significanc
At the end of th enth century, Hindu Law, in so far as it can be
ribed as a
unitary syste rated in terms of four texts that ‘staged a four-part episteme defin
the subject’s use of memory: sruti (the heard), sanviti (the remembered), eat (the calcula),
and ryavahara (the performance), The origins of what had been heard and what was remem:
ered were not necessarily continuous or identical. Every inv
The second two texts — the
ared and the performed — were seen as dialectically continuous,
al theorists and prac
itionees were not it any given case certain if this structure described the body of law or four
ways of settling a dispute. The legitimation, through a binary vision, of the polymorphous
tructure of legal performance, ‘internally’ noncoherent and open at both ends, isthe narrative
of codification I offer as an example of epistemic violence
Consider the often-quoted programmatic lines from Macaulay's infamous “Minute on
Indian Education’ (1835);
We must at present do our best to form a chse who may be interpreters between
and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour,
but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect, To that class we may
leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with
terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by
‘ees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the
reat mass of the population
(Macaulay 1835: 359)32 GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY 5
aK
sect of
oF Sanskeit
nerated by authoritative scholars
The education of colonial subjects complements their production in law. One
establishing a version ofthe British system was the development of an uneasy separati
disciplinary formation in Sanskrit studies and the native, now alternative, traditiot
“high culture.” Within the former, the cultural explanations g
matched the epistemic violence of the legal project
sb
baltern, as complicated by the imperialist project, is confronted by
The place of th
the ‘Subaltern Stues'
Ranajit Guba, the founder of the collective, gives a definition of the peo
roup. They must ask; Can the subaltern speak:
colonial social
identity-in-differential. He proposes a dynamic stratification grid describ
production at large. Even the third group on the list, the bulfer group, as it were, between
sructutal dominant i
bus,
levels’ representing the elite; and
the people and the great mac IF defined as a place of
in-betweenness. The classification falls into; ‘dominant foreigh and ‘dorninsant indigen
‘ous groups at the all-India and at the regional and I
ups and elements included in [the terms “people” and "subaltern classes"| repre
rn the toual Indian population and all those whom we h
sentfing] the demograph
lesribed as th
For the (gender-unspecified) ‘true’ subaltern group, whose identity isis difference, there
is no unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and speak itsell; the intellectual’s solu
tion is not to abstain from representation. The problem is that the subject's itinerary has not
been left traced so as to olfer an object of seduction to the representing intellectual. In the
slightly dated language of the Indian group, the question becomes: How can we touch
the consciousness of the people, even as we investigate their politics? With shat voiew
consciousness can the subaltern speak:
Within the effaced its
doubly effaced.’ The question is not of female participation in insurgency, oF the ground rules
of the sexual division of labor, for both of which there is “evidence.” It is, rather, that, both
as object of colonialist historiography and as subject of in
tion of gender keops the male dominant. If, in the contest of colonial production, the subaltern
has no history and cannot speak, the subaltem as female is even more deeply in shadow
‘The +
double silen
IT ask myself: how is it possible 10 want to die by fire to mourn a hus
regulative psychobiography of w
9 will be useful in tracking this
nd ritually, 1
am asking the question of the (gendered) subaltern woman as subject, not, as my friend
Jonathan Culler somewhat tendentiously suggests, trying to ‘produce difference by differin
or to “appeal... to a sexual entity defined as esscatial and privilegling) experience
rated with that identity’ (Culler 1982: 48). Culler is here a part of that mainstream
project of Western feminism which both continues and displaces the battle over the right to
individualism between women and men in situations of upward class mobility. One suspects
ally repre
that the debate between U.S, feminism and European “theory” (as theory is gen
sented by women from the United States or Britain) occupies a significant corner of that
Sarah Kofin:
scapegoat may be read as 2 reaction formation to an initial and continuing de
sted that the decp ambiguity of Freud's use of women as a
hysteric a voice, to transform her into the subject of hysteria (Kofman 1985
gical formation that shaped that desire into “the daughter's seduction’ is part
imperialist ideolo
of the same formation that constructs the monolithic third-workd woman.” No contemporary
by that formation. Part of our ‘ualearning’ project
silences, if necessary ~ intoCAN THE SUBALTERN SPEAK? 33
the object of investigation. Thus, when confronted with the questions, Can the subaktern
speak? Can the subaltern (as woman) speak?, our efforts to give the subaltern a voice in history
run by Freud’s discourse, It is in acknowledgement of
to a problem that I put together the sentence ‘White
wn women from brown men,’ a sentence that rns like a red thread
men are saving br
through today’s ‘gender and development.” My impulse is not unlike the one to be encoun
tored
174
see Mohanty 1991: §1-8
Freud predicates a
one hitklen in the amnesia of the infant, the other lc
past, assuming by implication a preoriginary space where hun
1 Freud's investigation of the sentence ‘A child is being beaten’ (Freud 1961 vol. 1
ruets “Third World Woman’
04). For a list of ways in which Western criticism co
hatory of repression that produces the final sentence. It is a histor
with a double or 1 in our archaic
in and animal were
2 home
‘ifferentiated (Freud 1961: 188). We are driven yy of this Freudian
strategy on the Marxist narrative to explain the ide
ical economy and outline a history of repression that produces a sentence like the
sketched: white
nial subject
rmaneuverings behi
mnorary whiteness to the
n prechely this sue, This history also basa double origins one hidden ta
ed
a and the Dharmasasir. An undif
the British abolition of widow sacrifice in 1829,° the other lod
in the classical and Vedic past of “Hindu” India, the Ry-
nary space can only to0 easily be predicated for this other
history
The sentence 1 have constructed is one among many displacements describing the
relationship between brown and white men (sometimes brown and white women worked
in).* W takes its place am ‘of pious guile that
me sentences of ‘hyperbolic admiration’
Derrida speaks of in connection with the ‘hieroglyphist prejudice.” The relationship between
the imperialist subject an
The Hin
This is widow sacrifice. (The conventional transcription of the Sa
ct of imperialism is at least ambigu
ds the pyre of the dead husband and immolstes herself upon it
krit word for the widow
would be sati. The early colonial British transcribed it suite.) The rite was not practiced
universally and was not caste- or classfixed, The abolition of this rite by the British has been
gencrally understood as a case of 'White men saving brown women from brown men.” Whit
women ~ from the nineteenth-century British Mi
produced an alternative understanding
nary Registers to Mary Daly ~ have not
Against this is the Indian nativist statement, a parod
ig advanced
The two sentences go a long way to legitimize each other. The archivized example
of the nostalgia for lost origins: “The women wanted to dle,” still b
the testimony of the women's voice consciousn
allow for the mobilization of such help.
As one goes down the grot hese women, the sacrificed
widows, in the police reports included in the records of the East India Company, one eannc
put together a ‘soive." The ma
‘one can sense isthe immense heterogeneity breaking through
even such a skeletal and
tribes). Faced with the dialectically interlock
sentences that are constructible as ‘White
own men’ and ‘The women wanted to die,’ the metro:
politan feminist migrant (removed from the actual theater of decolonization) asks the question
of simple semiosis ~ What does this signify? — and begins to plot a history
1
thas woman's b
fe written elsewhere of a constricted counternatrative of woman's consciousness,
1, thus the desire, thus
tiesire. This slippage ean be seen ie the fracture inscribed in the very word sath the feminine
r transcends any gendler-specific notion of masculinity and moves up not onk34 GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK
1¢ verb ‘to be" and as
such means not only but the True, the Good, the Right. inthe sacred texts it is essence
lniversal spirit, Even as a prefix it indicates appropriate, felicitous, fit. It is noble enough
to have entered the most privileged disco
Being (Heid
AF modern Western philosophy: Heidegger's
1961: 58). Sati, the feminine of this w
od wife
Figures like the
ndidess Athena --‘Tather’s daughters self professedly uncontaminated by
the womb’ — are useful for establishing women’s ideological self-