The Ethical Consequences of the Doctrine of Immortality

Author(s): W. Lutoslawski
Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Apr., 1895), pp. 309-324
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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 Ethical Consequencesof the Doctrine of Immortality. 309

THE ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOC-

TRINE OF IMMORTALITY.
THE personal aims of man, as well as the comparative
strengthof differentmotivesof his actions,must necessarily
vary, according to his conception of life as limited to the
bodily existence on earth,or as continued afterthe decay of
the body.
If I am sure to continue my existence afterdeath,and if I
have some clear ideas as to the conditionsof that continued
existence,then every act of my life has in my eyes influence
not only on this life,but also on the futurelife,and the pre-
sumed consequences of an action on the state afterdeath may
influencemy decisions more than the effectsexpected in this
earthlylife. The mere addition of certain consequences be-
yond those universallyadmittedto take place on earthwould
necessarilylessen the influenceof earthlymotives. The man
who believes in immortalitymay have all the motivesknown
to the unbeliever,but he has also a certainnumberof motives
unknownto the man who does not care about the futurelife.
The additional motives may be contradictoryamong them-
selves, or contradictoryto the earthly motives,but at all
events they must divert to some extent the attentionthat
would otherwise be paid exclusively to earthlymotives; so
we must admit,as a general truth,that the belief in immor-
tality,enlarging,as it does, the horizon of our motives,must
lessen the importanceof the earthlymotivesof action. This
alone would give a great ethical importanceto the opinions
that men hold about immortality, and this importanceis aug-
mented by the fact that our fearof death is one of the most
powerfulearthly motives of action. Many of our most im-
portantpracticaldecisions are made witha view to preventing
our death or the death of those dear to us. Now, the beliefin
immortalitydoes not necessarilyimplythat death is not fear-
ful, but historicallysuch a belief has been accompanied by
an absence of fearof death, and the believers in immortality
31O InternationalY7ournalof Ethics.

have generallyassertedthat death has no terrorforthem. It

is easy to see, fromsome extremeinstances,how indifference
to death mightmodifythe conditionsof life. If we look, for
instance,at the greateststruggleof our age, the war between
labor and capital,we see the working-menbeginninga strike
because they wish to obtain higherwages and such comforts
of lifeas can be affordedby the higherrate. So long as this
is theiraim,everystrikeis conditionedby the material means
at the disposal of the strikers,because a strike that would
lead to the wholesale starvationof the strikerswould miss its
original aim of obtaining for them better conditionsof life.
But let us suppose, in some societyvery different fromour
own, the only reason for a strike to be the opinion of the
strikersthat they do not get a fairshare of the resultsof their
labor, and that they ought to get more,no matterwhat use
they would make of the increase of their wages, and no
matterwhether better conditionsof life are desired by them
or not. Such strikers,were they indifferent to death and
certainof theircontinuousexistence,would preferstarvation
to the unjust distributionof the productsof theirlabor,hating
injustice more than they loved earthlylife. To preventthe
physical sufferingcaused by starvation,they mightresort to
suicide rather than be compelled to work for unfairwages.
In this case a part of them would die, and the remainder
would have the greater chance of obtaining whatever they
demanded,supposing,of course,theirdemands leftsomething
in the way of profitsto capital.
This paradoxical instance,though not likely to occur actu-
ally, shows how far a certain view of death might react on
our conduct. The improbabilityof such an occurrence in
real life does not weaken our argument,but merely shows
that the real working-mengenerally have not the opinion
here supposed,or that the people holding such an opinion are
not usually working-men. But in the lifeof working-men,as
well as of otherpeople, it occurs frequentlythat the mere fear
of death acts as a very strong motive, and brings them to
decisions which they are well aware are not satisfactoryfrom
the stand-pointof morality. The preservationof one's life-
 Ethical Consequencesof the Doctrine of Immortality. 3 II

and more so of the life of one's wife and children-is fre-

quently an argumentin favorof some action which otherwise
is looked upon as not quite moral.
Although the doctrineof immortalityis thus naturallycal-
culated to have a twofoldinfluenceon man's conduct,firstby
adding new motivesto the motivestaken fromearthlyexperi-
ence, and thenalteringall the motives connectedwith death,
it mustbe admittedthat thisinfluenceis notverymuch noticed
in the actual lifeof religious people who professto believe in
immortality.We see here a problemthatrequirespsychologi-
cal and ethical explanation. We know that though the belief
in immortalityis generallyasserted among Christiannations,
the motives,taken fromthe conceptionof a futurelife,appear
very exceptionally in our every-dayexperience,and he who
might advance such motivesin a public discussion would ex-
pose himselfto the riskof ridicule. This is to a certainextent
explained by the observationthatthe existenceand influenceof
motives,taken fromthe considerationof a futurelife,are often
concealed by motives taken from earthly experience. The
firstteachersof immortality soon foundout that it is not easy
to bringthis beliefinto close connectionwith man's every-day
decisions,and theyhave oftenindicatedearthlymotivesstrong
enough to keep men in the required line of conduct. For
instance,if a believerin immortalityis restrainedfrom doing
wrong by the considerationthat the moral consequences of
an unpunished wrong action extend far beyond earthlylife,
he can urge upon weak believers that even in this lifeevery
bad action may come, sooner or later,to the knowledge of
living men,and arouse contempt and indignation,and cause
some kind of punishment. In almost every case we can re-
duce a considerationbased on belief in immortalityto the
formof an argument touching upon the possibilitiesof this
life,because the social interestsof this life require fromus
nearlythe same line of conduct as our personal interestin the
futurelife.
This parallelismof moral means in this and the futurelife
does not signifythat the considerationof all the motivestaken
fromour earthlyexperiencecould enable us to find a line of
312 InternationalYournal of Ethics.

conduct equally convenientfor this and the futurelife. He

who considers the eventualitiesof a futurelifedoes not, as a
rule, ignore the experienceof this life,and thereforehe can
satisfythe exigencies of both epochs of his existence. But if
one looks only at his experience in this life,he is liable to
misunderstandthe relative importanceof motives, because
certainof the earthlymotives gain very much in strengthby
the suppositionof a continuedexistenceafterdeath.
The general religiousacceptance of this suppositionought
thereforeto result in a higher standardof conduct than we
see in practical life. The contrast between the professed
opinions about a futurelife and the practical conduct ruled
chieflyby earthlymotives requires furtherexplanation. We
see that in every-daylifemotives taken fromthe idea of im-
mortalityare practically excluded. The great majority of
men act as if there were no other life than this; they do
not thinkabout the consequences in a futurelifeof theirac-
tions here. To understandthis contrastwe must look at the
logical value of the popular belief in immortality. It is a be-
lief originally based on authority,and not on any kind of
logical reasoning. To a large number of Christianpeople
the doctrineof immortalityis as void of sense as the fourth
dimension of space. They are accustomed to think of the
existenceof man onlyas conditionedby the stateof the body;
theyidentify theirpersonswiththeirbodies; all theirthoughts
are constantlyoccupied with these bodily conditions,and with
such actions and effectsas can be observed by means of the
senses; theycannotimagineany existencein otherconditions;
and so they never think about it, and it can never have any
influenceover theiractions. These are the indifferent
majority,
who, though theyprofessto belong to some church,and act
apparentlyaccording to the rules of this church, do it only
by custom and tradition,and have no personal interestin the
religious teachingof immortality. They do not seem to be
unbelievers,because they never deny or discuss the official
teachings of the church, not caring,indeed,to occupy their
mindswithsuch abstractideas. They frequently, forthe sake
of what they regard as public opinion,seek to promote the
 Ethical Consequencesof the Doctrine of Immortality. 313

prosperityof the church,and occasionally show some indig-

nation against atheists,or frankunbelievers,because they see
in them enemies of the church. They associate the church
as an institutionwith some of the most importantmaterial
institutions,withoutwhich they could not enjoy the material
advantages which theyesteem above everythingin life. It is
a somewhat strange psychological phenomenon that these
" unconscious unbelievers,"as they could be named, being
probably the largest class in every contemporaneous com-
munity,are entirely unaware of the fact that they do not
belong to the church to which they professto belong. They
never thinkabout religion,but they maintain that everybody
ought to do as others do, and ought to avoid conflictand
conformto the customs of society by observing the external
forms. Each one thinks his own indifferencean excep-
tion,and he credits the majority,which is formedof beings
like himself,with influenceover his own customs, manners,
and religious observances. It is as if a companyof smokers,
being in a place where nobody is smoking, abstain from
smoking because each thinks that the others would object
to it. For a similarreason the unconscious unbelieversact as
if they fullybelieved in the doctrinesof the church,and fail
to observe that the majority,to which they look for rules of
external conduct, is composed of such men as themselves,
who care fornothingabout a futurelife,or any other religious
doctrine. It is clear thatamong such unconscious unbelievers
we could not find examples of the effectof the doctrineof
immortalityon conduct in this life.
But there are reasons why,even among believers,it is not
easy to ascertain the whole ethical influenceof the doctrine
of immortality. By believers I mean those persons who not
onlyprofessto belong to some church,but who are also inter-
ested in religiousteachingsand believe earnestlyin a futurelife.
Their thoughts are frequentlyoccupied with this doctrine,
and they ask about theirfuturestate more questions than can
usually be answered by any church. Their belief has the
characterof a general hope of something better in a future
life,to be obtained by those deservingit in this life. So the
314 International-7ournalof Ethics.

idea of a futurelifehas a general influenceover theirconduct,

in so faras it is supposed thata betterconduct preparesbetter
futureconditions. Such a general idea is hardly commen-
surable with the detailed motives of every particularaction,
and so long as detailed motives are all taken fromearthly
experience,the clearnessand distinctnessof these well-known
motivesovershadowthevague generalidea oftheconsequences
of our actions afterdeath. The ordinaryreligious believers
are unable to say in what particularway any immoral action
is likely to produce any particular unpleasant consequence
afterdeath. This explains why persons who reallybelieve in
the immortality of the soul frequentlyfail to take the conse-
quences of this belief into consideration,when called upon to
decide upon some particular action which seems to them to
referonly to earthlylife,and to implyno consequences beyond
that. Moreover, the religious belief in immortality, as it is
usually professed,does not affectthe general fearof death,
because, according to the prevailing ideas on this subject,the
state after death depends essentiallyupon the moral state at
the momentof death,and no Christian can be sure that he
will not die in a state of mortal sin. Only an exceptional
person, free from every' sin, could rely, according to the
general belief,upon the futurebeing better than the present
life. As such absolutely virtuouspersons are very few,death
remains,forthe great majority,always a fearfulevent,and the
fearof death frequentlypreventsthem fromacting according
to theirconvictions. Still, in a fewof the best representatives
of religious belief we can observe the full influenceof the
doctrine of immortalityupon conduct. These are chiefly
the passionate religious teachers and moral agents,who never
think about themselves,and live only to improve the lifeof
others. They are never afraid to die, and have generallya
stronger conviction of men's immortalitythan the average
believer.
If we considerall believers,the trueand the apparent,we see
that the doctrine of immortalitydoes not influencehuman
action to such an extentas, from its logical consequences, it
would seem right to expect. To findthe full illustrationof
 Ethical Consequencesof the Doctrine of Immortality. 315

the relation between this doctrine and human conduct, we

mustdirectour attentionto such persons as are able, not only
to draw the consequences fromeveryhypothesis,but also to
give to theiropinionsa more permanentfoundationthan belief
in religious or other authority. Such persons,true philoso-
phers,are fewerin number than the leaders and believers in
religion,but their opinion as to immortalityis no longer a
mere general belief; it is a well-founded knowledgee*and
answersmanyquestionsthatremainedunansweredby religion.
The assertionof a perfectknowledgeon this subject may seem
over-bold,as thereare still to-day,as therewere several thou-
sand years ago, certain philosopherswho deny the possibility
of such a knowledge,or of a scientificproof of immortality.
But since Platot the numberof those professinga knowledge
of the soul's immortalityhas been so great,that it is no lon-
ger extravagantto assert such a knowledge. Nevertheless,in
these difficultquestions,words and terms have been so fre-
quently abused, that it is absolutely necessary to point out
what kind of knowledge and what kind of immortalityare
here supposed, and how a philosophercan and must proceed
frombeliefto knowledge in regardto the question of his own
continuousexistence.
The only scientificbasis fora theoryof human personality

* See mypaper," On the DifferencebetweenKnowledge and Belief as to the

Immortality of theSoul," in vol. xxii.,No. 4, of theJournal of SpeculativePhil-
osoyphy,Dec., 1893.
t Plato's opinion about immortality has been very much debated among
philosophers. Among the most recenthistoriansof philosophy,Zeller chiefly
representsthe view that Plato taughtimmortality, while Teichmullerstrongly
protestsagainstit,and attemptsto provethatPlato,as an idealist,could notadmit
personal immortality.The truthis, thatit is not indispensableto suppose that
Plato always had the same opinion upon this subject; and, if we distinguish
between earlyand later dialogues,we easilyrecognizethat Plato, in his later
works,alteredthe views he expressedearlier. Since Lewis Campbell laid, in
his Introduction to theSophistesand Politicus(i867) thefirst durablefoundations
to thechronology of thePlatonic dialogues,subsequentresearcheshave confirmed
theviewthatSophistes,Politicus,Philebus,Timaeus,Leges, are the last dialogues
of Plato,writtenin his old age; and preciselyin these workswe find an em-
phatic assertionof the immortality of the rationalsoul, but withouta full con-
ceptionof thehumanpersonality.
3 i6 International-7ournalof Ethics.

is given by the metaphysicalstudy of existence in general.

Every school of philosophybegan earlyto distinguishbetween
apparentand real existence,and all agreed in thisrespect,that
every apparent existence is explained and caused by a real
existence, that there is no appearance without some reality,
though the realitymay be very different fromthe appearance.
The firsttruthof any metaphysicsis that theremustbe some
reality,some true existence, behind all appearances. This
truth,in its simplicity,remains still a very importantstep in
philosophy,and leads us out of scepticism. It is a necessary
truth,on a par with the mathematicalaxioms, because we are
unable to conceive thatnothingexists. So long as we admit
any appearance,the notion of appearance has a meaningonly
as contrastedwith reality. Some philosophers have thought
they could reject the assertion of a realityas producing the
appearances and make themappear onlyto the perceiver,with-
out outwardbasis. But in this case the realityproducingthe
appearance would be the perceiverhimself,so that the most
extreme idealismcould not denythe existenceof some reality,
without falling into the contradiction of making appear-
ances realities. So the firstpremiseof our argument," There
is some true existence," stands beyond a doubt.
Now the idea of trueexistence in oppositionto the apparent
world impliesthe permanenceof such true existence,because
any existence that could cease to exist would seem to have
been an appearance. This consequence is admitted equally
by the materialistsand the idealists,and is expressed in vari-
ous ways: as the indestructibility of matter,by those who
look at matteras something trulyexisting; as conservation
of force,by those who think of force as truly existing; as
eternalexistence of ideas, of God, or of the universe,by ideal-
ists and pantheists. Whoever admits anythingas trulyexist-
ing, admits its eternal,permanentexistence. Deeper thinkers
state this truthin anotherway: theysay that time itselfbeing
an appearance,a formof perception,the realitymust be out
of time, and cannot have beginning or end in time. But
such an expressiondoes not change the meaningof our gen-
erally-receivedtruth,that the trulyexisting thing or being
 Ethical Consequencesof the Doctrineof Immortality. 3 I 7

cannot cease to exist. The truth,supported by the whole

history of philosophy, is only a detailed expression of the
firsttruththat thereis somethingtrulyexisting. An appear-
ance is, justly speaking,an appearance because it ceases to
exist, and only when it ceases to exist does it prove itselfan
appearance. The cessationof existence,at least in our imagi-
nation,is the peculiar mark of apparentexistence as opposed
to real existence. So we may take forgranted,as a basis of
furtherreasoning,that the true existence,or the trulyexisting
thing or being, cannot cease to exist.
Now, having this representationof true existence,we have
to findthe concrete object correspondingto this definition.
While our notionof true existence is an a priori concept,not
based on experience,our knowledgeof the object correspond-
ing to this notion can be gained only by experience and
observation. In this way the most obvious objects of our
experience are material bodies observed by the senses. It
was a very natural conclusion of the older philosophers,that
matteris the only true existence,and that every appearance
is caused by the action of matter. But in two different ways
philosophyand science were led out of this firstand natural
hypothesis. On one side, the study of matterled gradually
to the decompositionof this matterinto atoms,which are in
no way perceived by the senses, and which seem to have
smaller claims fortrue existence than the gross matterwhich
they compose. It may be very difficult to explain to a farmer
that his cows and sheep are productsof his own active imagi-
nation, acted upon by something essentially differentfrom
cows and sheep; but it is becoming more and more easy to
bring a learned naturalistto the conclusion that the atoms
withwhich he deals,and which explain to him all the changes
occurringin the appearance of cows and sheep as well as in
the appearance of stars and clouds, are only concepts of the
human mind. This conclusion is to-day really admitted,
under the influenceof philosophy, by most investigatorsin
natural science, and there are now few who imagine their
materialatoms to be as solid and objectiveas the smith does
his iron. Anotherway led to the same idealizationof matter;
318 Internationaljournal of Ethics.

as, on one side, physics and chemistrydecomposed matterinto

atoms and molecules, so, on the otherside, physiologyeasily
foundout that our sense-impressionsdo not depend entirely
upon our senses, and that the full activityof the eye or ear
does not imply seeing or hearing. Gradually the cause of
our sense-perceptions was carriedwithinfromwithout. Colors
were firstsupposed to be in outward objects,then in the light
coming fromthese objects,then in the eye thatperceives this
light,then in the nerve acted upon by the eye, then in some
part of the brain acted upon by the nerve,and a very small
step remainsto enable us to understandthat the brain itself
is unable to perceive colors, and that everysense-perception
is an activityof mind,while everyphysical or physiological
causation of sense-perceptionis essentially different fromit.
In this way physics,chemistry,physiology,have contributed
gradually to deprivematterof its firstposition,and to prove
that it is only an appearance. In more recent times psy-
chology has brought us farther, because it has shown by ex-
periencethat sense-perceptionis possible without any action
of the senses. I know therestill are some psychologistswho
deny telepathy,but I know also, fromtheirown confessions,
that theyhave not studied the factson which the moderncon-
cept of telepathyand mental suggestion is based. In fact,it
is impossible to make a thorough study of the literatureof
this subject,and to perseverein simple experiments* in tele-
pathy,without admittingthought transferenceto be just as
well observed and certaina fact,as, forinstance,lightpolariza-
tion,withthe difference onlythat the conditionsof lightpolar-

* I mean thoughttransference of single numbersand letters. I have often-

and always with success,so thatI dared to
times triedthese test-experiments,
introducethemin mylectureson psychologyat the Universityof Kazan without
any more hesitationthan a chemistwould have in showing his audience the
productionof hydrogenby the actionof sulphuricacid on zinc.
It mustbe bornein mind,however,thatpsychologicalexperiments have other
conditionsthan chemical experiments, and that a result showing,for instance,
threehundredcases of thoughttransference in one thousandexperiments is fully
since the mathematicalprobabilityof guessing any one numberout
satisfactory,
of ten is onlyone hundredin a thousandtrials. See Ochorowicz," Suggestion
Mentale."
 Ethical Consequencesof the Doctrine of Immortality. 3I9

ization are much betterknown than the conditionsof thought

transference. The recent scientificstudy of telepathy has
shown that we can perceive outward appearances exactly in
the same way without our senses as with them. This is a
deadly blow to all materialisticmetaphysics,and leads every
philosopherto see true existence outside of the world of ma-
terial appearances.
In the historyof human thought several objects have been
named as correspondingwith the idea of real existence,but
if we differentiatebetween knowledge and belief as to these
things,we are obliged to admit,with Descartes, that thereis
nothing beyond us that we can know better than ourselves.
If I am the best known thingto myself,and if I am perfectly
certainof my own existence,that is,ifI am conscious of being
myselfthe cause of my actions, I cannot but admit that I am
a true being,and, if I am a true being, I can never cease to
exist. Frequentlythis simple and clear conclusion has been
obscured by the representationof the human person as com-
posed of soul and body. But the body is not a part of my-
self; it is only something belonging to me and ruled by me,
though quite as foreignto my own substance as any otherex-
ternal object. I am conscious of existence as a simple being
and have no parts. I can easily attainthe same control over
otherthingsas over mybody. If I play a musical instrument,
this instrumentis quite as much under my control as can be
any part of my body-it could be looked at, indeed, as a part
of my body. The same can be said of any other instrument
fullymasteredby man; it becomes graduallymore and morea
part of his body. On the otherhand, we do not always have
more control over the body than over other things,and fre-
quently we have the impressionthat the body shows just the
same resistanceto our effortsas any other part of the outer
world. If we considerthis,we come to understand that one
is only what is commonlycalled a soul, that is, one's self. It
is not quite rightto say that I have a soul as I have a body.
In reality,I am a soul reigning over a body, and therefore
any one, by asking what or where his soul is, proves only
that he does not understandwhat is meantby soul. His soul
320 Internationaljournal of Ethics.

is not somethingwithin-it is simplyhimself-and so long as

he speaks of himselfin the firstperson he has not the right
to say that he does not know anything about his soul. I
would ask him what he means by utteringthe word I, and
tell him, that this " I" is his soul, or that he is himselfa soul.
This definition of a soul as identicalwiththe experimentalidea
of " I" leads us to a more definiteand clear explanation of
the meaningof our continuous existence. It is no more the
abstractidea of the permanenceof a soul; it is the perfectly
clear representation of myselfas existingindependentlyof my
body, and after the death of the body. Everything that I
have been used to look at as myselfparticipatesin this im-
mortality,which is the only true immortalityof souls. That
means that I shall remain myself,with everyfaculty,knowl-
edge, feeling, acquired by myself in this life. Sometimes
there may be at firstan uncertaintywhethersome activityof
my mind is not dependent on parts of my body: as, for in-
stance,many physiologistshave thoughtthat memory,imagi-
nation,and thought itselfare necessarilyconnectedwith the
existence of a brain. But if I ask only my own conscious-
ness, I have no doubt or hesitation as to whether memoryis
a facultyof myselfor not. It is most certainlysomething
necessarilyconnected with myself,and I could not have an
idea of continuousexistence without memory. Then I must
retainmemoryafterdeath,as well as everyfacultythat I am
conscious of as belonging to myself The relation between
brain and memory,if there is any, is very much more diffi-
cult to understandand to explain than the simple psychologi-
cal relationof my memoryto myself. Everythingthat I feel
to be my personality,all my thoughts,my feelings,have to
remainwith me, and can be altered after death only in the
same gradual way as in this life.
This is the strongconclusion fromthe knowledgeof myself
as a trulyexisting being, and of real existence as permanent.
This conclusion is quite as sound and logically as strongas
any other knowledge,but it is not equally obtainable by all
living men,for the same reasons that many other scientific
truths,well proven,are accessible only to a few. The knowl-
 Ethical Consequencesof the Doctrineof Immortality. 32I

edge of immortalityis perhaps more difficultto obtain than

the knowledge of the highest mathematics. Just as many
persons are unable to realize certain mathematicalideas, so
we see a great many educated persons unable to realize that
they are-that they are true beings, or, at least that they
know nothing that is more truly existent than themselves.
This weakness of self-consciousness,hesitatingto recognize
itself as truly existing, is by no means a peculiarityof un-
trainedminds; it can claim for itselfthe highest authorities
in the historyof philosophy. All the pantheisticand ideal-
istic philosophers have recognized something else as more
truly existing than themselves,and themselves only as an
appearance of this something truly existing,and they have
usually given to the one truly existing thing the name of
God. We find, even to-day, especially in England and
America, many highly estimable thinkers of this class.
Nevertheless,the consciousnessof the trueexistenceof human
personalityhas grown in moderntimes,not only in pure phi-
losophy, but also in legislation, politics, and religion. It
would be an interestinghistorical investigationto show this
developmentof human self-consciousnessfromthe " Discours
de la Methode" of Descartes to the " Mikrokosmos"of Lotze,
but I intend here merelyto show what influencethis knowl-
edge of our own real existence,or of our immortality, has on
conduct. Having acquired suizh a knowledge,and looking
at it as not less certain than any other part of scientific
knowledge,I may regard calmly not only the death of my-
self,but also the death of my nearestfriends,because I know
that they continue to exist,probably under better conditions
than at present. This hope of betterconditionsis well founded
on the experiencethat most of the presentevils are caused by
theimperfections and wantsof our body. The greatestcrimes
are done forthe sake of materialadvantages. If now material
independence or wealth frequentlyappears as a conditionof
intellectualand moral activity,this will change at the moment
of death,because we then become independentof our bodies.
Looking at death as a kind of progress,we cannot be afraid
to die, and we look at this life chieflyas at a fieldof exercise
VOL. V.--No. 3 22
322 InternationalY7ournalof Ethics.

for our intellectual and moral faculties. The differencesof

rank and fortunedisappear or change in our eyes, because
we understandthat these differences have only a relative im-
portance in the short time of our life on earth,and that at
any momentthey may be modifiedby means of death. The
poorest man,if he is a philosopher,may,afterdeath,be more
independentthan the richestmillionaire. This difference be-
tween the apparent and the real rank of men has been de-
scribed by Plato in a masterlymanner in many of his dia-
logues (eg., Gorgias, Republic), and it is always present to
the eye of the philosopherwho knows that neither he nor
other men cease to exist. It has a considerable influence
over the attitude towards the powerful and the rich. He
looks at them as at other men,and will do nothing to flatter
them,nor will he keep silentif he sees that they abuse their
power or theirriches. The knowledge of immortalityleaves
us no otherfearthan the fearof our own injustice,and if we
are always certain that death cannot bereave us of our intel-
lectual and moral wealth,we do not mind the danger of death
in the war with oppression,injustice,and crime. It gives us
a victoriousself-consciousness,and we do notlose our courage
if we see a momentaryand apparent triumphof evil. If we
know that we have eternitybefore us, we have no necessity
to be in a hurry,and to run, regardless of others, for the
attainmentof our personal aims in this life. We learn to
understandthat it is better to do a littlework to perfection,
than to do apparentlymuch,but nothing soundly. The sor-
rows as well as the joys of this life appear less, and we take
a deeper interestin the sorrows and joys of others,helping
them not merelyfortemporalends but so as to promotetheir
moral and intellectualprogress.
Those who do not recognize their own eternal existence
may object that if we think always about our futurelifewe
lose gradually everyinterestin this life. But forthe philoso-
pher thereis no such contrastbetweenthis lifeand the future
life. The one is the continuationof the other,and he expects
to remain the same person in both parts of his existence. A
carefulstudy of the relations between himselfand his body
 Ethical Consequencesof the Doctrine of Immortality. 323

shows that the popular belief exaggerates the importanceof

the body in this life,and that most of the activityascribed to
the body belongs to the mind. If my mind is able, forin-
stance, to see and hear everythingwithout the use of the
senses, then the loss of the sense organs may,afterall, not
be so unfortunate.The only great change occurring at the
moment of death will be the interruptionof our influence
on our friendswho remain here. Numerous witnessesdeny
this interruption,and claim to have communicationsfromthe
dead, but so long as they are unable to give clear indications
as to the conditionsunder which such communicationsmight
be obtained by everybody,their claims remain trustworthy
only to themselves. Still, itis importantto observe that there
is no scientificreason whateverto denythe possibilityof such
communications. That something does not occur in every-
body's experience is by no means a sufficientreason for de-
claring it to be impossible. If we are certainof our own and
otherpersons continuousand conscious existence afterdeath,
we cannot deny the possibilityof communicationwith them,
though we are not obliged to admit the realityof such com-
municationif we have not satisfactoryevidence as to its oc-
currence. The question of the possibilityof our communi-
cation with the dead, if it could get a satisfactorysolution,
would, of course, show an increased influenceof the doctrine
of immortalityon men's conduct,especially because it would
give to the majoritya more accessible proof of immortality
than the above-named metaphysical proof. But it is not
necessaryto establish continuousrelations between dead and
living to show the full influenceof theoretical knowledge
about immortalityon the practical conduct of men. This
theoretical knowledge is much strongerthan any evidence
gathered from spiritualisticseances, because it does not re-
quire darkness as a conditionof its production. A detailed
considerationof the influenceof such a knowledge on con-
duct would show us that,while the motives taken from or-
dinary experience do not always agree with the motives
created by the knowledge of immortality, these latteralways
show a remarkable coincidencewith the line of conduct that
324 InternationalYournal of Ethics.

bringsto us the best enjoymentin this lifeas well as the best

trainingfor the life to come. Every action that prepares
humanityfora better state in the futuresecures, at the same
time,a betterlifeforthe present. The moral law of this and
the futurelife is the same law of love taughtby the highest
knowledge in the universe.
W. LUTOSLAWSKI.
DROZDOWO, RUSSIA.

PHILOSOPHICAL SIN.

FEW questions have more greatlyexercised the minds of

moralists than the accurate definitionand adjustmentof the
responsibilityfor sin. A wrongfulact may be so committed
that its sinfulnessmay not justly be imputedto the actor,or
may be fairlyentitledto mitigationthroughinfinitegradations.
Ignorance,forinstance,is admittedas an extenuation: he who
has not the knowledge of good and evil is not to be held
guiltyforthe infractionof a preceptof which he has not or
cannot have had cognizance,and theologians'have exhausted
their ingenuityin definingthe various degrees of ignorance,
with their correspondingresponsibilities,fromthe invincible
or inculpable ignorance which wholly excludes the idea of
intentional sin, to the crass or culpable ignorance which
increases guilt throughwilfulavoidance of enlightenment.
Among the speculationsof this nature,which have largely
attracted the attention of writers on what is called moral
theology,is the degree of advertence and consent in the act
of sinningrequisiteto cause imputationof the sin. Naturally
these questions have been the subject of keener disputation
among Catholic authors than among Protestantsor free-
thinkers,for in Catholicism they have a most important
practicalbearing upon the daily decisions in the confessional,
wherethe priestshould be preparedto pass judgmenton every
act of the penitent,not only in its objective relations,but in
the accompanying subjective conditionswhich may serve as