Assignmentweek2 Digest

Case Digest Assignment Week 2
Submitted by : Pat Monte
Endencia and Jugo v. David

G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953)
FACTS:
1. RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be

considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared
not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law.
2. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive
compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 590 unconstitutional.
RULING: No.
Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease
in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office”, by the Legislature. Through the separation
of powers, such a task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are
exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to
secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.
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PEOPLE VS, JABINAL

GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)
FACTS:
1. Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition.
2. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of

the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the
requisite license or permit.
3. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he

had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm
in question.
4. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-
mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with
authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People
vs. Macarandang (1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis
of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the
complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that
“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet”
— the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to
his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
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therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished

for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
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Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

and BF Homes Inc.,
G.R. No. 74851, 09 December 1999
FACTS:
1. RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes’ inventory of creditors and

liabilities, on October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to
extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF
Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction-sale and the SEC ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of a
bond. Presumably unaware of the filing of the bond on the very day of the
auction sale, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction sale in which
RCBC was the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. But because of
the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC of
the certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties.
2. On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an
action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him
to execute in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties.
3. On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF

Homes.
4. Consequently, the trial court granted RCBC’s “motion for judgment on

the pleading” ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner
the Certificate of Auction Sale.
5. On appeal, the SC affirmed CA’s decision (setting aside RTC’s decision

dismissing the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of
new land titles until the resolution of the SEC case) ruling that
“whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and
suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such
preference but stand on equal footing with other creditors.” Hence, this
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes

has taken effect.
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RULING:
The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations
stand on equal footing with all other creditors gains relevance and materiality
only upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver,
board or body.
Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately

clear that suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is
counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management committee
or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition for
rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be more logical and wise but
unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist
on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to encroach upon
legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law --- plainly judicial
legislation.
Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is

appointed pursuant to PD 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed
corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly; Suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective the
status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor. What it
merely provides is that all actions for claims against the corporation, partnership
or association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver a chance to
rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so. In
the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims against the
distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors
shall enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors subject only to the provisions
of the Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of Credit.
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Garcia vs. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No.
170735, 17 December 2007
FACTS:
1. The Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia et al. were the directors of Impact

Corporation. The said corporation was engaged in the business of
manufacturing aluminum tube containers.
2. Impact Corporation started to face and encountering financial problems.

The corporation filed in Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) a
Petition for the Suspension of the Payments.
3. The company directed to pay all entitled workers unpaid wages, unpaid
13thmonth pay and to remit the Social Security System (SSS) loan
amortization and premiums that was deducted from the wages of the
workers.
4. The union of Impact Corporation filed a Notice of Strike with the Ministry
of Labor which was followed by declaration of strike.
5. The Ministry of Labor made a same order. SSS filed a case before the SSC
for the collection ofthe unremitted premiums contributions.
6. Plaintiff/Petitioner’s Arguments:•she was a mere director without

managerial functions, and she ceased to be such in1982•she cannot be
made personally liable for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation
since her liability extended only up to the extent of her unpaid
subscription, of which shehad none since her subscription was already
fully paid.•She is only liable of the penalties and not the liability of the
employer. Defendant/Respondent’s Arguments:•The petitioner mistakenly
concluded the SS Law Sec. 28 (F)
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, as the only surviving director of Impact

Corporation, can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations of
Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions
and penalties. Provision subject of statutory construction: Section 28(f) If
the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association,
partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head,
directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for
the offense. II. Section 28(f) Section 28(f) is applicable only to penalties and
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not to the liability of theemployer for the unremitted premium

contributions.
RULING:
Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, as sole surviving director of Impact

Corporation is hereby ORDERED to pay for the collected and unremitted
SSS premiums and penalties of Impact Corporation. The case is
REMANDED to the SSS for computation of the exact amount and collection
thereof.
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Tung Chin Hui vs. Rodriguez,

G.R. No. 137571, 21 September 2000
FACTS:
1. After obtaining a visa at the Philippine Embassy in Singapore, petitioner,
a "Taiwanese citizen,"[3] arrived in this country on November 5, 1998.
2. On November 15, 1998, he was arrested by several policemen, who

subsequently turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID). Thereafter, on November 25, 1998, the BID Board of
Commissioners, after finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport
earlier canceled by Taiwanese authorities, ordered his summary
deportation.
3. On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition
for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. After
respondents filed a Return of Writ controverting his claim, the trial court
issued a Decision dated January 7, 1999, granting his Petition and
ordering his release from custody.
4. On January 11, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated January 29, 1999.
5. Respondents then filed a "[N]otice of [A]ppeal from the judgment of the

Honorable Court in the above-stated case, dated January 29, 1999, a copy
of which was received by the Bureau on February 11, 1999 and was
received by the undersigned counsel on February 15, 1999 x x x."[4] Dated
February 15, 1999, it was received by the RTC on February 16, 1999 at
9:45 a.m.
6. Petitioner filed an "Opposition," claiming that the Notice had been filed
beyond the 48-hour reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas
corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court. Although
respondents alleged that they had received the said Order on February 15,
1999, petitioner contended that they had in fact received it on February
11, 1999, "as evidenced by the receipt of the service thereof and by the
Sheriff's Return."[5]
7. In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioner's

contention and granted due course to the Notice of Appeal.
8. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing this time that
the Notice should be rejected because it had referred not to the RTC
Decision but to the January 29, 1999 Order denying reconsideration. In
its assailed March 2, 1999 Order, the trial court denied his Motion.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] now
15 days from notice of judgment as contended by [the] lower court.
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the Notice of Appeal was late because respondents
filed it only on February 16, 1999, five days after they had received the Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration on February 11, 1999.[9] He argues that
the reglementary period for filing an appeal is 48 hours, as prescribed in Section
18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
"SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. - An appeal in

habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of court or
the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals
therefrom."
The argument is devoid of merit, because the foregoing provision was

omitted from and thereby repealed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which
completely replaced Rules 1 to 71. The well-settled rule of statutory construction
is that provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the revision thereof
covering the same subject are deemed repealed and discarded.[10] The omission
shows the intention of the rule-making body, the Supreme Court in this
case,[11] "to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not reproduced in
the revised statute or code."[12]
Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case
is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions[13] and is governed by Section 3,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides:
"SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken

within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
"The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall be allowed."
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary
period.
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Sps. Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 97973, 27 January 1992
FACTS:
1. In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review

on the decision made by herein respondent Court of Appeals – sustaining
the right of private respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of land sold to
petitioners.
2. It started when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired

through free patent, however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed
it into commercial complex. Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP foreclosed
the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem such property
within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners Benzonan.
3. Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and granted

the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint against CA,
alledging, among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re. the
five-year period in foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge
v. Angeles and instead relied on the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate
Appellate Court which was applied retroactively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the
foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles
and instead applied retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC.
RULING: Yes.
At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was
still the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case
at bar. However, the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in
1988 thereby rendering a decision in favor of the private respondent. But the
Supreme Court sustained the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that
though they are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the
Court also stressed that: “while our decisions form part of the law of the land,
they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that “laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided””. Moreover, the Court
emphasized that “when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively xxx.” Therefore,
respondents cannot rely on the Belisario ruling because it should be applied
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prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in its decision regarding this case.
Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set aside.
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Pesca vs. Pesca,

G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four
children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
“psychological incapacity” to perform his marital obligations starting 1988.
His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual
drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until
1:00 o’clock in the morning.
2. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent

would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a
loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children.
The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
3. Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of
her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways.
Two months later, she returned home to give him a chance to change. But,
to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected.
4. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for

about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black
and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
5. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
The trial court declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on the
basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
6. Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
which in turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage
of respondent and petitioner still subsists.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court.
(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in
nature.
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RULING:
(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was
absolutely no evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in
the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim –
“legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when
a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law,
was given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina,
additional procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying
cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was
added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of
law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature.
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People v. Garcia
G.R. No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950)
Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 41
FACTS:
1. The lower court, ignoring the Appellant’s minority, sentenced him to an

indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47
which amended Art. 80 of the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below
which the Appellant has to “be committed to the custody or care of a public
or private, benevolent or charitable institution,” instead of being convicted
and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy.
2. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also
amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which provides that when the
offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, “the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the
commission of
the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, par.
2 of
the RPC.
RULING: Yes.
The court founf no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it

now stands and Art. 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between
granting Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance
and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a
reformatory institution. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and
reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that
conflicting interest in the same statute are never to be supposed
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People vs. Limaco,

G.R. No. L-3090, 09 January 1951.
FACTS:
1. Liberato Envelino, his wife and a son left their house. away. In the house
were left his three daughters — Inacia, Severa, and Sofia, all surnamed
Envelino and a niece Martina Amores. According to the eldest daughter,
Inacia, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant Ricardo Limaco came
to the house and found the four girls in the kitchen. He asked her sister
Severa to sell him a pig which he wanted to butcher.
2. Severa told him that he better wait for her parents because she would not
dare sell the animal in their absence and without their consent. Visibly
disappointed and resenting her refusal to sell, he addressed Severa thus:
"If you do not want to, it is better that you will be hacked because you are
selfish." Almost simultaneously, he drew his bolo, and attacked Severa
with it, inflicting on her seven wounds, two of which were mortal; Sofia
and Martina rushed to Severa and embraced her, but Ricardo in his fury
also boloed them, inflicting on each four wounds, two of which were
mortal.
3. The three girls died on the spot. In the meantime, Inacia who witnessed
the horrible slaughter drew back in terror, and fearing that her turn would
come next, jumped down from the kitchen through an opening in the wall
and hid herself in the bushes. After an hour and thinking that the accused
had left, she ventured into the house and found the dead bodies.
4. Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. However, appellant's counsel

abandoned this defense of alibi in his brief. Neither does he deny that the
appellant is the author of the killing. He merely asks that the sentence be
suspended and that his client be committed to the Psychopathic Hospital
for mental observation.
5. The trial court found the accused guilty of murder and imposed only one
penalty for the three murders.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of only one penalty for the three murders was
proper.
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RULING: NO
The trial court imposed only one penalty for the three murders. In this, the
trial court erred. There should be a penalty for each of the three separate crimes
caused by separate acts or blows committed and inflicted by the appellant.
The trial judge severely condemns the act committed by the appellant,
calling it hideous and gruesome, committed, in the opinion of the court, either
by an insane or by a bloodthirsty criminal, and regards the defendant as plain
blood thirsty, unfit to live in normal and peaceful society, and goes on to say that
if said defendant had three lives, he could legally be deprived of each and every
one of them, and that the trial court could send him to the electric chair without
any compunction of conscience. But strange to say, the trial judge states, and
we quote:
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City of Baguio vs. Marcos,

G.R. No. L-26100, 28 February 1969.
Facts:
In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the
reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was
RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared
public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case
on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous
possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors
were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On the contrary, F.
Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening
on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period
provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and
3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.
Issue:
Whether or not the reopening of the petition was filed outside the 40-year
period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953
RULING: Yes.
The Supreme Court granted the reopening of cadastral proceedings.
The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court
under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have
been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within
the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads
as “..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims,
have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial
proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of this
act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should
be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be
followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12,
1912, the petition would be invalid.
The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately

be omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.
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Ebarle vs. Sucaldito,

G.R. No. L-33628, 29 December 1987
Facts:
1. Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a

candidate for re-election in 1971 local elections.
2. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed complaints with the city
fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and
Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. The petitioner filed petitions for prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they
were dismissed.
4. He petitioned to the Supreme Court and alleged that the City Fiscal and
Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of EO 264, which
outlined the procedure how complainants charging the government
officials and employees with the commission of irregularities should be
guided.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and

not to criminal complaints
Ruling: No.
The title of the EO 264 is of “Commission of Irregularities”. It speaks of

commission of irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended
to make it applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific
terms like “accused,” “convicted,” and the like.
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People of the Philippines v. Purisima

G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
FACTS:
1. Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective

Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9.
2. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9.
3. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying
outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or in the occasion of, connected with or related
to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder.
4. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are
essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities.
RULING:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative

measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining
what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and
spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or
“whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
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Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People

G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first
securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the
Insurance Commissioner.
2. Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because she
only assisted her husband, and that she did not receive any
compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation

of Sec. 189.
RULING:
Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent.

Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts, a kept
subservient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and
independently. The term “agent” used in par. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2
of the same section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 to
the agent in par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of
Sec. 189. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all
its provisions wherever possible. Every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.
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Florentino v. PNB
G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956
FACTS:
1. Florentino et al are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of

P6,800 plus interest, incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on
January 2, 1954. The said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties.
2. Petitioner Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721

dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic
Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953.
3. On December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the
respondent bank with their backpay certificate but PNB refused to accept
petitioner’s offer to pay the said indebtedness with the latter’s backpay
certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Philippine National Bank be compelled to accept the backpay

certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of
the Philippines, to pay an indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank
RULING:
Section 2 of RA 304 reads as “…obligations subsisting at the time of the

approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to
the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the
corporations owned or control by the Government, or to any citizen of the
Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.” SC held
that the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, “any citizen
of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines.” It should be noted that there is a comma before the words “or
to any citizen, etc.,” which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. Hence,
“who may be willing to accept the same for settlement” applies only to the last
antecedent.
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not persuasive, and the

courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give the
statute the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or
incorrect punctuation marks and inserting others where necessary.
21 | P a g e
Unabia vs. City Mayor,

G.R. No. L-8759, 25 May 1956.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer,
Cebu City, at P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed
him from the
service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter
by Pedro Gonzales.
2. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division, including personnel,
was transferred from the City Health Department to the Offce of the City
Engineer on April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be reinstated but his petition
was not heeded by the Respondents.
On the basis of the abo&e facts, the Court of first instance of Cebu held
that Petitioner is a person in the Philippine Civil service, pertaining to the
unclassified service (section 670, Revised (Administrative Code as
amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of section 694
of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art 6-- of the
Constitution.
3. It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words “Civil Service” in
section 1 and 4 of Article XII of the Constitution and the use of small letters
for the same words, “civil service”, in section 670, of Revised
Administrative Code, indicates that only those pertaining to the classified
service are protected in the above mentioned sections of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not use of capital in the words “Civil Service” in the Constitution
and the use of small letters for the “civil service” in the Revised Administrative
Code indicates that the protection only pertains to the classified service.
RULING:
We see no validity in this argument. Capital “C” and “S” in the words “Civil
Service” were used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are
used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no
difference between the use of capitals in the former an of small letters in the
latter. Where is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from
the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. both are
expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service:
22 | P a g e
Hence, the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons
in the unclassified service are designated because the nature of their work and
qualifications are not subject to the classification, which is not true of those
appointed to the classified service. This cannot be valid reason for denying
privileges to the former that are granted to the latter.
23 | P a g e
Kare v. Platon
G.R. No. 35902. October 28, 1931
Facts:
1. The petitioner filed a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of

Albay contesting the election of one of the respondents, Francisco Perfecto.
2. The respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay entered an

order on which required the petitioner to give two kinds of bond in order
that proper proceedings might be taken on his motion of protest.
3. These two kinds of bond were personal bond for P3,000 and a cash bond
of P2,000 to be deposited with the provincial treasurer of Albay within the
time specified in the order.
4. These sums were later changed so that the cash bond was for P1,500 and
the personal bond for P3,500.
Issue:
Whether or not the court has the right to choose in which form the petitioner
would give his payment, through bond or through cash deposit
Ruling:
Court required a personal bond. Cash deposit on discretion of the petitioner
Section 482 of the Election Law states that “Before the court shall
entertain any such contest or counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party
filing the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed
by the court with two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all
expenses and costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in
court in lieu of such bond.” The Supreme Court held that while the respondent
judge holds that the court may require either a bond or a cash deposit, the
petitioner maintains that it is to him alone the choice is given to file a personal
bond or to make a cash deposit in lieu thereof. The Supreme Court ruled that
the court may only require a personal bond, and that the contestant may make
a cash deposit in lieu thereof.
The rule accepted by most of the authorities is that if the chapter or

section heading has been inserted merely for convenience or reference, and not
as integral part of the statute, it should not be allowed to control
interpretation.
24 | P a g e
Manila Race Horse Trainers Association, Inc. vs. De La Fuente,

G.R. No. L-2947, 11 January 1951.
Facts:
1. Manila Race Horses Trainers Association, Inc., a non-stock corporation,

alleged that they are owners of boarding stables for race horses and that
their rights as such are affected by Ordinance No. 3065 of the City of
Manila. They pleaded that said ordinance be declared invalid as it is
violative under the Constitution.
2. On appeal, it is upheld that the ordinance is a tax on race horses as

distinct from boarding stables.
3. Under Ordinance No. 3065, the tax is assessed not on the owners of the
horses but on the owners of the stables, as counsel admitted in their
brief. It is ordinary that the number of horses is used in the assessment
purely as a method of fixing an equitable and practical distribution of the
burden imposed by the measure.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance is constitutional and valid as has been enacted
in accordance with the powers of the Municipal Board granted by the Charter
of the City of Manila.
Ruling:
The Court did not believe that the Ordinance made arbitrary
classification. There is equality and uniformity in taxation if all articles or kinds
of property of the same class are taxed at the same rate. Thus, it was held that,
the fact that some places of amusement are not taxed while others are taxed, is
not argument at all against the equality and uniformity of tax imposition." In
applying this to the case, there would be discrimination if some boarding
stables of the same class used for the same number of horses were not taxed or
were made to pay less or more than others.
25 | P a g e
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987)
FACTS:
1. Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land

registered in the name of their deceased parents.
2. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such
agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the lot,
representing the portions bought.
3. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-
concrete house.
4. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area
sold.
5. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not
having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a valid notice.

2. Whether or not Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly.
RULING:
Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the
sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs
were unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete
structure. While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice
of sale; the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice, despite
their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet
begun. The intent of was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified
of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-
day period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of
the sales although no notice in writing was given to them.
26 | P a g e
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997)
FACTS:
1. An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral
damages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to
China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the
fees.
2. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central
Bank, which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment or any other process of any court. Respondent
Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood firm
on the policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA

6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner.
RULING:
Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage
the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic
crisis, where foreign investments were minimal. As, some time has already
passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat
recovered from the financial drought.
Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be
acquitted at the expense of the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be
followed, justice would be undermined, stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case
of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
27 | P a g e
People of the Philippines v. Purisima

G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
FACTS:
1. Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective
Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9.
2. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one
essential elements of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the
residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
3. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are
essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities.
RULING:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative

measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining
what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and
spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or
whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
28 | P a g e
ESMERALDO M. GATCHALIAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

GR Nos. L-32560-61, 22 October 1970
FACTS:
1. Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the

Philippines, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR 707 which states
that “dianions of billboards to the Commission by foreigners or companies
or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are
not covered by Secton 56 of the Revised Election Code.”
2. Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the

Philippines, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR 707 which states
that “donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners or
companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by
foreigners are not covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election Code.”
3. The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioner’s

motion, declaring "that contributions by foreigners to the COMELEC
Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of COMELEC
billboards are not made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a
particular district and that the allocation of space for its candidate
disallowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result of the
election.
4. He then filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said order of the
COMELEC is null and void as contrary to law or having been issued
inexcess of the powers of the Commission on Elections or in grave abuse
of its discretion, and praying for a writ of preliminary as well as permanent
injunction. No restraining order was issued as COMELEC did
not implement the said resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “any elections,” “foreigner,” and “any candidate;”
“aid,” “take part,” and “influence,” as contemplated In Section 56 of the
Revised Election Code, had other meanings.
RULING:
The term “any elections” applies to election of delegates

Constitutional Convention. “Foreigner,” on the other hand, refers to both
natural and juridical persons or associations or organized groups, as
29 | P a g e
provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election Code,

broadening the application of the term, and not limiting the prohibition to
natural persons only. “Any candidate” likewise comprehends ‘some
candidates’ or ‘all candidates.’ The terms “aid,” “to take part,” and
“influence,” were also construed in their general sense with “aid” referring
to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen or to act in cooperation with;
"to take part" means to participate or to engage in; and "influence" means
to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point,
or to exert or have an effect on the nature or behavior of, or affect the
action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to affect; to have
an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act upon
physically, especially in some gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or
maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to e ect or sway by
modifications, feelings or conduct. There is nothing in the Revised Election
Code which impliedly or expressly prescribes a different meaning to the
aforementioned terms. Hence, they should be understood in their general
sense. There was likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the
meaning of the words were to be restricted or limited.
Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in

their general meaning, unless it is expressed that they have acquired
a special and restricted meaning.
Hence, in this case, “generalia verba sunt general iter intelligenda”

applies.
30 | P a g e
Celestial Nickel vs Macroasia

G.R. No. 169080, December 19, 2007
FACTS:
1. In 1973, Respondent Macroasia entered into a Mining Lease Contract for
a term of 25 years with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Herein petitioner then filed a petition to cancel said contract as well as
other mining claims of respondent on numerous grounds.
2. The Panel of Arbitrators (POA) granted the petition and gave Celestial the
preferential right to Macroasia’s mining areas.
3. On appeal with the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), it affirmed the ruling
but transferred the rights to Blue Ridge Mineral Corporation.
4. In a motion for reconsideration, Macroasia questioned the jurisdiction of

POA in cancelling the mining lease contracts stating that the power is
exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary. Subsequently, MAB withdrew
its prior decision upholding respondent’s contention.
5. Petitioner and Blue Ridge separately appealed. CA upheld the exclusive

authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral
agreements. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining
contracts and privileges.
RULING: Yes.
It is only the Secretary of the DENR, not the POA, who has jurisdiction to
cancel mining contracts and privileges. Such power emanates from his
administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral
resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987. It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises,
and regulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the country.
It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain,
which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power
to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include mineral
resources. Derived from this is the power to approve mineral agreements and
necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.
31 | P a g e
Arenas vs. City of San Carlos

G.R. No. L-34024 (April 5, 1978)
FACTS:
1. RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an
annual salary of P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of
P1000.00, P350 of which was from the national government and the
remaining P650 comes from the city government.
2. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but the
Respondent City refused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from
P12,000 to P18,000.
RULING:
Looking at the Senate deliberations, the intention in enacting the RA was

that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city
mayor. Moreover, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception. In case there is repugnancy between the proviso and the main
provision, the latter provision, whether a proviso or not, is given preference
because it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislation, but more so
because provisos are negatively written and gives off a more mandatory tone.
32 | P a g e
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusements Board,

G.R. No. L-12727, 29 February 1960.
FACTS:
1. The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved
for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement
of their right.
2. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA

983, that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or
groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB).
3. RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without

specifying the days on which they are to be run, the GAB reduced the
number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.
RULING: No.
From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is
permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entities are not
entitled to the use of such days. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the
legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day
are untenable. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the
entire House of Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioner’s claim that to allow
the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also
untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO.
33 | P a g e
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. ABAJA

G.R. No. 42134, 21 October 1936
FACTS:
1. On June 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of Lands filed in the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negrosa petition praying that the titles
with respect to a tract of land containing about 23,443,355 square meters,
divided into lots and situated in the municipality of Hog, Occidental
Negros, be settled and adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act.
2. After due hearing, the lower court, in a decision dated August 15, 1925,
declared lot No. 712, comprising about 1,322 square meters, public land
because no one appeared to claim it. On January 25, 1934, amotion was
filed in the same court by the herein appellants, Roman de Arruza and
Mario Luzuriaga, through their attorney, praying that the aforesaid
decision of the lower court be set aside in so far aslot No. 712 was
concerned, that a new trial be granted and that they be allowed to present
their claim under the provisions of Act No. 4043.
3. On February 2, 1934, the provincial fiscal of Occidental Negros, on behalf

of the government, filed an opposition to the appellants' motion contending
that the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros had no jurisdiction
to reopen the case with respect to lot No. 712 because the motion was not
filed within the time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043. On April 20,
1934, the judge of the said court denied the motion of the appellants.
4. The appellants assign three errors alleged to have been committed by the
court below all of which raise but one legal question, namely, whether the
ten-year period mentioned in Act No. 4043 should be counted from the
date the decision was rendered or from the date judicial proceedings were
instituted in a cadastral case.
ISSUE:
Can the appellants avail of the Act No.
34 | P a g e
RULING: No. Because the because the cadastral proceedings in question were
instituted on June 12, 1919, ormore than fifteen years before the approval of
that Act. The decision of the lower court was affirmed.
In determining the intention of the lawmaker, we are permitted to look to

prior laws on the samesubject and to investigate the antecedents or
the legislative history of the statute involved:
Act No. 4043 was not the only Act passed by the Philippine
Legislature to enable persons whose lands had been declared public lands
by virtue of the operation of the cadastral system to recover said lands
after complying with certain prescribed conditions.
In 1923, the Legislature enacted Act No. 3059 (declared in force by

Executive Proclamation No. 57, dated September 25, 1923); in 1930, it approved
Act No. 3672(declared in force by Executive Proclamation No. 299, dated
February 28, 1930), and more recently in 1934, it passed Act No, 4195 (declared
in force by Executive Proclamation No. 767, dated February 7, 1935). A cursory
scrutiny of these four Acts will show that while the titles of Acts Nos. 4043 and
4195 refer to "parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered etc.", those of the earlier Acts Nos. 3059 and 3672
fail to make any such allusion.
35 | P a g e
BRIGIDA BUENASEDA VS. Sec. JUAN FLAVIER

G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993
FACTS:
1. The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S.
Buenaseda et.al.
2. The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative

complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the
private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
3. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the

aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated
that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend
suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming
the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official
or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such
powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials
and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman,
pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said
officials and employees.
HELD: YES.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to

recommend the suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it
referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words associated with
the word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative
cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur asociis,
the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
36 | P a g e
Republic v. MERALCO
G.R. No. 141314
FACTS:
1. MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its
rate schedules to reflect an average increase in its distribution charge.
2. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that should

the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser
increase, all excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall
either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor.
3. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, thus
ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the
CA set aside the ERB decision. MRs were denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO

is valid.
RULING: YES.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon

the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and
regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property
is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be
juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote
the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by
discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is
subject to public regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public
against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality
of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State
the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a
reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must
be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property
performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services
rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the
investor and the consumer interests.
37 | P a g e
PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. RELOVA

GR No. L-52819 October 2, 1980
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for review on certiorari where the Philippine Global

Communications Inc. seeks to set aside decision dated April 27, 1982
declaring petitioner without authority to establish, maintain and operate,
apart from its single principal station in Makati, any other branch or
station within the Philippines.
2. On May 10, 1976 petitioner filed application with the Board of

Communications an application for authority to establish a branch station
in Cebu City for the purpose of rendering international telecommunication
services from Cebu to any point outside Philippines.
3. This was opposed by the private respondents. On March 24, 1977, BOC
issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-13 Designating Metropolitan Manila
area as the sole gateway, point of entrance into and exit from) for
communications in the Philippines and defining what constitutes domestic
record operations.
4. It was on Jan. 16, 1979 that BOC granted petitioner provisional authority
to establish a station in Cebu City subject to condition that as soon as
domestic carriers shall have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cease
its operation and interface with domestic carriers.
5. On May 24, 1979, BOC granted petitioner the final authority to establish
a branch/station in Cebu City subject to prior approval, anywhere in the
Philippines.
6. Private respondents filed petition for declaratory judgment on the proper

construction of petitioner’s franchise, RA 4617. Petitioners sought
dismissal of petition. Motion was denied.
7. Petitioner assailed the order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Court

held that the suit for declaratory relief fell within the competence of the
Judiciary and did not require prior action by the administrative agency
concerned under the concept of primary jurisdiction.
8. Parties then agreed to submit the case for decision on the bases of their
respective pleadings and memoranda. Court rendered judgment on April
38 | P a g e
27, 1982 declaring petitioner without authority to establish, maintain and

operate any other branch or station within the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is authorized under its legislative franchise, RA

4617, to establish stations or substations in places or points outside
Metropolitan Manila.
RULING:
It is stressed that the principle of contemporaneous construction of a

statute by the executive officers of the government, BOC in his case, whose duty
is to execute it, is entitled to great respect. Therefore, the Bureau of
Communications made final the provisional authority granted to applicant or
Phil Global Communications, Inc. to establish branch stations in ay point within
the country for the purpose of receiving and transmitting messages to countries
outside the Philippines where it is authorized to render international
communications services in accordance with its legislative franchise, RA 4617
and Memorandum Circular No. 77-13.
39 | P a g e

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Case Digest Assignment Week 2

Submitted by : Pat Monte

Endencia and Jugo v. David

1. RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be

PEOPLE VS, JABINAL

2. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of

3. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he

therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

1. RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes’ inventory of creditors and

3. On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF

4. Consequently, the trial court granted RCBC’s “motion for judgment on

5. On appeal, the SC affirmed CA’s decision (setting aside RTC’s decision

Whether or not the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes

Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately

Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is

1. The Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia et al. were the directors of Impact

2. Impact Corporation started to face and encountering financial problems.

6. Plaintiff/Petitioner’s Arguments:•she was a mere director without

Whether or not petitioner, as the only surviving director of Impact

not to the liability of theemployer for the unremitted premium

Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, as sole surviving director of Impact

Tung Chin Hui vs. Rodriguez,

2. On November 15, 1998, he was arrested by several policemen, who

4. On January 11, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

5. Respondents then filed a "[N]otice of [A]ppeal from the judgment of the

7. In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioner's

"SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. - An appeal in

The argument is devoid of merit, because the foregoing provision was

"SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken

Sps. Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals,

1. In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review

2. It started when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired

3. Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and granted

Pesca vs. Pesca,

2. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent

4. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for

1. The lower court, ignoring the Appellant’s minority, sentenced him to an

The court founf no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it

People vs. Limaco,

4. Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. However, appellant's counsel

City of Baguio vs. Marcos,

The Supreme Court granted the reopening of cadastral proceedings.

The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately

Ebarle vs. Sucaldito,

1. Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a

Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and

The title of the EO 264 is of “Commission of Irregularities”. It speaks of

People of the Philippines v. Purisima

1. Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective

The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative

Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People

Whether or not the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation

Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent.

1. Florentino et al are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of

2. Petitioner Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721

Whether or not, Philippine National Bank be compelled to accept the backpay

Section 2 of RA 304 reads as “…obligations subsisting at the time of the

An argument based upon punctuation alone is not persuasive, and the

Unabia vs. City Mayor,

1. The petitioner filed a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of

2. The respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay entered an

Court required a personal bond. Cash deposit on discretion of the petitioner