League of Cities 2011

EN BANC

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 176951
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU;
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO,
CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x-----------------------------x

ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,

- versus -

MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC,
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI,
PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL;
and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN,
PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

by LCP National President Present:
ILOILO represented by PUNO, C.J.,
MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, QUISUMBING,
CITY OF CALBAYOG YNARES-SANTIAGO,
represented by MAYOR CARPIO,
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his CORONA,
personal capacity as taxpayer, CARPIO MORALES,
Petitioners, AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; BRION, JJ.
MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN
DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY
OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF
EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY,
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
CITY OF CADIZ, and Promulgated:
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention. November 18, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition[1] with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of
Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas[2] assailing the constitutionality of the subject
Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the
Cityhood Laws.

The Facts

During the 11th Congress,[3] Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on
bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,[4] Congress enacted into law
[5]
Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June
2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality
into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the
mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.[6]

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress[7] adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,[8] which sought to exempt
from theP100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress,[9] the House of Representatives re-adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it
to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve
the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood
bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting
all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws[10]) on various dates from
March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.[11]

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause.[12] Petitioners also
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce
the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.[13]

The Issues

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to
the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA
9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality
into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any
statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved
bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the
13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Preliminary Matters

Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws
administered by the COMELEC,[14] like the Cityhood Laws, which direct
the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood
Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing
because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with
the “primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues
affecting city government administration and securing, through proper and
legal means, solutions thereto.”[15] Petitioners-in-intervention,[16] which are
existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment
will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor
Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a
taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of
public funds, like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political
units than what the law allows.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the
11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it
has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million
pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:

(i)
a contiguous
territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,
as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to
less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land
area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had
cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law
before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood
bills during the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100
million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
acted upon during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in
the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and
December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in
Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as
follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. — The City of x x x
shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under
Republic Act No. 9009.

This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the
income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills
lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the
effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or
during the 11thCongress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006
the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent
municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.
[17]
This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the
Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.[18] The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code
all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion
of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any
other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern
exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the
city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to
insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the
same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to
increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the
creation of a city.This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that
moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality
desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to
respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in
Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all
enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption
clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus
patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local
Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable
distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution provides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by
law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them. (Emphasis supplied)

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes
to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria
being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city
with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area,
population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria,
prescribed by law, are material in determining the “just share” of local
government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow
the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they
prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in
violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids — like deliberations of
Congress — if the language of the law is plain, clear and
unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal
language of the law, within the law’s four corners.[19] If the language of the
law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according
to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction like the legislative history of the law.[20]

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local

Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased
income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood
bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption
whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income
requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

The 11th Congress’ Intent was not Written into the Local Government
Code

True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent
municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the
matter during the 11thCongress. However, Congress did not write this
intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such
exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of
respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009
as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality
into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in
the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or
exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot
create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or
exemption found in the Local Government Code.

Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except
by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good
and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the “formation,
organization, or regulation” of private corporations in a general
law applicable to all without discrimination.[21] Congress cannot create a
private corporation through a special law or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.[22] The unapproved cityhood bills
filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations
conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became
worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and
deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the
13th or subsequent Congresses.

The members and officers of each Congress are different. All
unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon
adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken
up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood
bills in 2006 during the 13thCongress, the bills had to start from square one
again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first
time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules
of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate
upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by
the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first
time. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on
Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall
consist of the following:
a.
Unfinished Business. This is
business being considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is
disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session
shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as
if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a
Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed
terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved
cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and
13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009
certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as
extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income
requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for
possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the
exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the
ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local
Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, “Exemption
from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from
the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No.
9009.” This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from
those that are not exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100
million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the
equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact
that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the
11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid
classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption
from the P100 million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on
substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law,[23] not limited to existing
conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court
has ruled:

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
permits a valid classification under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of
the same class.[24]

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with

pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not
have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality
from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of
income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that
did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification
criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not
rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-
viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not
informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a
condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income
requirement. Had they been informed, many municipalities would have
caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if
they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities,
cannot now convert into cities if their income is less thanP100 million.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA
9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v.
Ten Eyck,[25] where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in
business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to
newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court
held:

We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a
regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may except
from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to
which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians
and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession
subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in
practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws
forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting
existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such
laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an
activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public,
but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those
engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all
those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do
not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public
health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage
monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law,
in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have
no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the
discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable
and denies the appellant the equal protection of the
law. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives
the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the
filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress – as against
all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of
RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly
situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the
Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and
declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,
9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES(LCP) G.R.
represented No. 176951
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY Present:
P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by
MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. PUNO,* C.J
TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, .,
Petitioners, CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO
MORALES,

VELASCO,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JR.,
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, NACHURA
PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF ,*
BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU;MUNICIPALITY OF LEONARDO
CATBALOGAN,PROVINCE OF WESTERN -DE
SAMAR;MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, CASTRO,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;MUNICIPALITY BRION,
OF BORONGAN,PROVINCE OF EASTERN PERALTA,
SAMAR; andMUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON, BERSAMI
Respondents. N,
DEL CASTI
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF LLO,*
IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY ABAD, and
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF VILLARA
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL MA, JR., JJ.
SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OFGINGOOG, CITY OF
CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN
CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF
CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,
x-------------------------------------------x

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL
SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,

- versus -

MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;MUNICIPALITY
OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS
NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI,PROVINCE OF
DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF
GUIHULNGAN,PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO,
CITY OF IRIGA, G.R. No.
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF 177499
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL
SANTOS,
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY
OFCALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,
x-------------------------------------------x

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL
SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,

- versus
-

MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU;
and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY
OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY,
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF
CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,

G.R.
No. 178056

Promulgated
:

December
21, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR. J.:

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, [1] for what is within the
spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. [2] Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
[3]
Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.[4]

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act
of Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have
at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes.[5] This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of
government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three
great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each
other’s acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its
official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against
the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of
earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or
concept is infringed.[6] Consequently, before a law duly challenged is
nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a
manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.[7]

BACKGROUND

The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League
of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treñas[8] assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,[9] each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws,
hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.

By Decision[10] dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5
vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for
being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and
the equal protection clause.
Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for
reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual
premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established,
which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.[11] By
Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for
reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent
LGUs prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable
Court reconsider its “Resolution” dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it
denies for “lack of merit” respondents’ “Motion for Reconsideration”
dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu thereof, considering that new and
meritorious arguments are raised by respondents’ “Motion for
Reconsideration” dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned
“Motion for Reconsideration” dated December 9, 2008 and dismiss the
“Petitions For Prohibition” in the instant case.

Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed
of the motion as follows:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied
since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31
March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18
November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the
Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by
counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings
shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. x x x

On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the
Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that
Respondents’ “Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31,
2009” and “Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached ‘Second
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’
Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon.”

Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14,
2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made
on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common
cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the
April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the
observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected “before the Court
could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period
counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution.”[12]
Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will
now rule on this incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic
premises:
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision,
as Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial
issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises upon
which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for
reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the
motion on the sole ground that “the basic issues have already been passed
upon” reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying
Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues
raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April
28, 2009 was precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the
issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motion––which mainly
argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law
unconstitutional–– remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases
involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en
banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June
2, 2009 Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth
in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the
petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration
where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of
a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution
dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated
ground––that the “basic issues have already been passed”–– suffice to hurdle
the voting requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of the cityhood laws in question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31,
2009, which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that “the basic
issues had already been passed upon” betrayed an evenly divided Court on
the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008
had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of
the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and
the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood
laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in
the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or
not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of
the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be deliberated anew
until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the
laws in question is, on the merits, secured.

It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the
“majority of the Members” contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which requires that:

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc,
x x x shall be decided with theconcurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. (Emphasis added.)

Webster defines “majority” as “a number greater than half of a
total.”[13] In plain language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v.
Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate
opinion, expressed the view that “a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a
majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential
value.”[14]
As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched,
exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving the
constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such
determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for
reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice
Ricardo J. Francisco: “x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional
requirement on the concurrence of the ‘majority’ was initially reached in the

x x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by
way of a motion for reconsideration.”[15]
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote
situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09-
SC, respectively, providing that:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. – Where the court
en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation
no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be
dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall
stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall
be denied.

A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC – x x x A motion for reconsideration of a
decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be
granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the
case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion.

If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is
deemed denied.

But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the
Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction
with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases “shall be decided with
the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon.” To

repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills
is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution––a 6-6 deadlock.

On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008
Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate[16] entry of judgment
notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for
reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood
laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying
decision. Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and
against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the
Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would
be served thereby.[17] In the performance of their duties, courts should not be
shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules
of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical
application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed
with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.
[18]
Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a
particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice
so require.[19]
While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a
purely business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v.
Sandiganbayan[20] is most apropos:

To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of
Appeals and other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere
instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to
be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly
defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the
Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules, inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already declared to
be final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now.

The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs’ motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14,
2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the
November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second
motion for reconsideration.

This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case.

The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief

During the 11th Congress,[21] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed
before the House of Representatives.[22] Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three
(33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted
upon.

Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill
(S. Bill) No. 2157[23] to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The
proposed amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify
for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average annual income to
PhP 100 million locally generated income.

In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to
take effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991 now provides that “[a] municipality x x x may be converted
into a component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual
income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices.”

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the
th
12 Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No.
29[24] which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income
requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions
into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No.
29.

Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw
the House of Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H.
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.

The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint
resolution. During the Senate session held on November 6, 2006, Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in
net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement
imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested
the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way
for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the
Senate for proper action.[25]

Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures
was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100
million income requirement.

As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the
individual cityhood bills, all of which eventually lapsed into law on various
dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days
from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters
approve of the conversion.

As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws
unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well
as for violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities
will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of
the LGC of 1991.[26]

Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later
seek leave and be allowed to intervene.
Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the
cityhood laws in question, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention
collectively pray that an order issue enjoining the COMELEC from
conducting plebiscites in the affected areas. An alternative prayer would
urge the Court to restrain the poll body from proclaiming the plebiscite
results.

On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the
petitions and the petitions-in-intervention. On March 11, 2008, it heard the
parties in oral arguments.

The Issues

In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether
or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and
(2) the equal protection clause.

In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the twin posers in the affirmative
and accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as
they do from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion
prescribed by the LGC of 1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed
with the petitioners that the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous
language, requires that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be
embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.

After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider.

Petitioners’ threshold posture, characterized by a strained
interpretation of the Constitution, if accorded cogency, would veritably
curtail and cripple Congress’ valid exercise of its authority to create political
subdivisions.
By constitutional design[27] and as a matter of long-established
principle, the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially
legislative in character.[28] But even without any constitutional grant,
Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the
boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly
recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.[29] The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X,
Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality,
or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for
the creation of political subdivisions “in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code,” subject to the approval of the
voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable
indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners
would parlay the thesis that these indicators or criteria must be written only
in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are
referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the
cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income standard
spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.

Petitioners’ posture does not persuade.

The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional
provision. Save for the use of the term “barrio” in lieu of “barangay,”
“may be” instead of “shall,” the change of the phrase “unit or units” to
“political unit” and the addition of the modifier “directly” to the word
“affected,” the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI,
Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:

Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears notice, however, that the “code” similarly referred to in the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is
consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create
political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating
political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring
a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their
creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs
the clause “in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code” is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other,
which can impose the criteria. The eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law, specifically on the subject
provision, explains:

Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard
to the power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the
boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the
executive may share in this power was obscured by Cardona v.
Municipality of Binangonan.[30] Pelaez v. Auditor
General subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the
Supreme Court said that “the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature.”[31] Pelaez,
however, conceded that “the power to fix such common boundary,
in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature-
involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities.”[32] Pelaez was silent
about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations.
But since division in effect createsa new municipality, and both
dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may
fairly be inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature.

Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a
legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes further than the doctrine
in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces,
cities, municipalities x x x subject to “criteria established in the
local government code,” thereby declaring these actions
properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries “subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.”[33] x x x (Emphasis added.)

It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987
Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific
statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991.[34] Be it noted that
at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only
in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they
would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC,
as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3[35] of the Constitution.

Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress
can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need
not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal
repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity.
Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law,
adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as
efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA
9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million
to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is
no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically
exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier
mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased
the already codified indicators.

Petitioners’ theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in
the LGC and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we
pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying
the new and increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice
of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not
question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an
argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.

As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws,
validly decreased the income criterion vis-à-vis the respondent LGUs, but
without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed
shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised
to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to
the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the
following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. – The City of x x
x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009.

In any event, petitioners’ constitutional objection would still be
untenable even if we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of
their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city
shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set
forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is
invalid. We shall explain.

Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject
of contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less,
intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from
the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws,
which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final
analysis, to the “criteria established in the Local Government Code,”
pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed
to discuss this exemption angle.[36]

Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X
of the 1987 Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991
under the heading “Requisites for Creation.” The section sets the minimum
income qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an
average regular annual income “of at least ten million pesos for the last
three consecutive years” as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-
city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by the
LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that “[a] municipality or cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos(P20,000,000.00) for
at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x.” RA
9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income
requirement to PhP 100 million, thus:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality
or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million
Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:

xxxx

(c) The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis[37] or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless
and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. [38] To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of
the law is the law itself,[39] resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the
law controls its letter.[40]

It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the
logical inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering
legislative intent.[41]

The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of
the LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentel’s
sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of particular significance is his
statement regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20 million
to PhP 100 million in the income requirement for municipalities wanting to
be converted into cities, viz:

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted
this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments
that we have introduced to precisely amend the [LGC]. However,
it is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to
be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the [LGC] was
approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has
increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for
conversion x x x. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive
that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no
municipalities.

It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing
among other things, that the financial requirement, which, under
the [LGC], is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to
enable a municipality to have the right to be converted into a city,
and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated
funds.

Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated
upon, of the pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying
municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-
income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally
noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then
Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping
short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill
No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills,
thus:

THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some
clarificatory point. x x x

THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of
the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a
number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the
present standard.

We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming
that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard
as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for
consideration?

SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair
to make this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that are
pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities.

THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language
crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of the
Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will
apply to those bills which are already approved by the House under
the old version of the [LGC] and are now pending in the
Senate? The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which
will limit the application to those which are not yet in the
Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not
think it is necessary to put that provision because what we are
saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides,
if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would
have any retroactive effect.

THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills
which are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr.
President.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates
are the following complementary legislative intentions: (1) the then pending
cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income
requirement of PhP 100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA
9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are
concerned.

Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis
for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-
cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not
only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the
cityhood laws from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress
has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood
laws.

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor
in interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start
out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that
best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
policy and objects of the legislature.[43] In fact, any interpretation that runs
counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.[44] Torres v.
Limjap could not have been more precise:

The intent of a Statute is the Law. – If a statute is valid, it is
to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the
lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the
primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to
that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is
the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the
statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads
away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative
enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out
and follow the true intent of the legislature x x x. [45] (Emphasis
supplied.)
As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption
of constitutionality.[46] Consequently, to him who would assert the
unconstitutionality of a statute belongs the burden of proving
otherwise. Laws will only be declared invalid if a conflict with the
Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt.[47] Unfortunately for petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden.

It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the
covering joint resolution were undertaken in the 11th and/or the
12th Congress. Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more
particularly those on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009
certain municipalities, are without significance and would not qualify as
extrinsic aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the
13th Congress, Congress not being a continuing body.

The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the
cityhood bills––which were already being deliberated upon even perhaps
before the conception of RA 9009––were again being considered during the
13th Congress after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses. And
specific reference to the cityhood bills was also made during the
deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of the day, it is really immaterial if
Congress is not a continuing legislative body. What is important is that the
debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in
the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA
9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted,
if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.[48] And of course the
earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16
municipalities in question would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link
to the historical chain of the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on
the bills are spread in the Congressional journals, which cannot be
conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric without meaning whatsoever, on the
simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing body
and that unfinished business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the
end of the term of Congress.

This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood
laws on equal protection grounds.

To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to
respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the
standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art.
III of the Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall “be
denied the equal protection of the laws.”

Petitioners’ challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal
protection clause proscribes undue favor as well as hostile discrimination.
Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.

The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic
concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a
separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more
specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from
government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due
process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.[49] This constitutional protection extends to all persons,
natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as
the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar
as their property is concerned.[50]

In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot
plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no
deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood
laws. The LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be
substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the
respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP
member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their
property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the
municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the
cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this
point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status
as a political unit, but not its property as such.

As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal
protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or
privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal
protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting
upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that
inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify, [51] necessarily
implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class.[52] The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by
the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal
protection clause.

As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16)
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Indeed,
respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million
income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in
RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be
cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood
bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference.
And years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondents
LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under
the LGC of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for
their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As aptly observed by
then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech sponsoring H.
Joint Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw
themselves confronted with the “changing of the rules in the middle of the
game.” Some excerpts of Senator Lim’s sponsorship speech:

x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57)
municipalities applied for city status, confident that each has met
the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC],
particularly the income threshold of P20 million. Of the 57 that
filed, thirty-two (32) were enacted into law; x x x while the rest –
twenty-four (24) in all – failed to pass through Congress. Shortly
before the long recess of Congress in February 2001, to give way
to the May elections x x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually
became [RA] 9009, was passed into law, effectively raising the
income requirement for creation of cities to a whooping P100
million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24 cityhood bills
then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the law on
June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded were swift and
overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act
on the measures.

Some of these intervening events were x x x
the impeachment of President Estrada x x x and the May 2001
elections.

The imposition of a much higher income requirement for
the creation of a city x x x was unfair; like any sport – changing
the rules in the middle of the game.

Undaunted, they came back during the [12th] Congress x x
x. They filed House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking exemption
from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. For the second
time, [however], time ran out from them.

For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are
now under consideration, this year, at the closing days of the [13 th]
Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and
justice. x x x

I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they
should be given a legal remedy by which they could be allowed to
prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status
using the criteria set forth under the [LGC] prior to its amendment
by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint Resolution No. 1 reached
the Senate x x x I immediately set the public hearing x x x. On
July 25, 2006, I filed Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On
September 6, I delivered the sponsorship x x x.

x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the
period of individual amendments. This was when the then acting
majority leader, x x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel
and the proponents of House Joint Resolution No. 1 have agreed
to the proposal of the Minority Leader for the House to first
approve the individual Cityhood Bills of the qualified
municipalities, along with the provision exempting each of them
from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. x x x This led to
the certification issued by the proponents short-listing fourteen
(14) municipalities deemed to be qualified for city-status.

Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the
proponents lost no time in working for the approval by the House
of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each
containing a provision of exemption from the higher income
requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year,
December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the Cityhood
Bills of twelve out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your
Committee immediately conducted the public hearing x x x.

The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x
x x.

In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will
have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1
because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher
income requirement of RA 9009. The proponents are invoking
the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness.

Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for
conversion into a component city based on the old
requirements set forth under Section 450 of the [LGC], prior
to its amendment by RA 9009, namely: x x x[53] (Emphasis
supplied.)

In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lim’s
speech, which respondent LGUs found themselves in were unsettling. They
were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009. Because
of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA
9009 supervened. Now, then, to impose on them the much higher income
requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be
indeed “unfair,” to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the imperatives of
fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they
would be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for
city status, using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its
amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of respondent
LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative
classification.

To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining,
cannot question the wisdom of the congressional classification, if
reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification.[54] By the
same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the
remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative.
The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection
clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis.

The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The
exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million
income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the
passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the
exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice
would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then
the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the
original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of those became
laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the
challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the
impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal
investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the
aborted impeachment.

While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a
privileged class without justification, inherent in the equality clause is the
exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing
existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense
an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the
respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and
eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent
municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other municipalities whose cityhood
bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and
the 33 other municipalities, which had already been elevated to city status,
were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991
during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other
former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is,
thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million
requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny
respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to
the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated,
is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal
protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are
creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the
same clause. The irony is not lost to the Court.

Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in
application only to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions
obtain. To be more precise, the legislative intent underlying the enactment
of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million criterion
would hold sway, as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed
before the effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies
for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of the LGC
of 1991.

Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the
cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on
the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere
declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive
effect of RA 9009.

Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform
exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood
bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450
of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20
million. It is hard to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out
there belonging in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent
LGUs. Municipalities that cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16
cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have to comply with the
PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009.

A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the
approval of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites
held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to
have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of
officials and employees. Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The
operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the
constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it
hereby abandons and sets aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject
of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in
support of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:

(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA
9009 to apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in
question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be
exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by
RA 9009;

(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100
million income requirement;

(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved
bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The
hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be
used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were
filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the
13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as
extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law
results in absurdity or injustice.

(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact
that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009
that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for
cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income
level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed
constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive
constitutionality of the laws in question.

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 2, 2009, their “Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28,
2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to
Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated
November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further
Proceedings,” dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED.
The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions
areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21,
2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention
are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389,
9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434,
9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 February 15, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP
National President Jerry P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor
Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of
Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del
Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality
of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents.
x – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -x
G.R. No. 177499
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of
Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of
Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of
Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and
Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents.
x – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -x
G.R. No. 178056
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of
Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of
El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and
Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:
1. Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August 24, 2010 dated
and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al.;
and
2. Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated
August 24, 2010"].
Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set
“Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010″ for
Hearing. This motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.
A brief background—
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and
Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,1 each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5
vote,2 granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional
for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote, 3 denied
the first motion for reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-
6,4 which denied the second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited
pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009
Resolution in this wise—
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: “No
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same
party shall be entertained.” Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15
days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for
reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the
second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for
reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion
for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a
prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn
the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied
the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.5
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote
of 6-4,6 declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-
6,7 resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the
Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City,
Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City, reinstating
the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its
position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking
note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for
Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable
action by this Court on the basis of the following cogent points:
1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Article X, Section 10 provides—
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24,
2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.—
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. –a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred
Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on
2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis
supplied)
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for
the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices.
Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities
into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of
these bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among
these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were converted into component cities
through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the
sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No. 2157, to wit—
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in
the whole set of proposed amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend
the Local Government Code. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the
Local Government was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has
increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion to the
same status. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before long this
nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that
the financial requirement, which, under the Local Government Code, is fixed at
P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to
be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally
generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr. President, is, the municipalities aspiring to become
cities say that they qualify in terms of financial requirements by incorporating the
Internal Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to their regularly generated
revenue. Under that requirement, it looks clear to me that practically all
municipalities in this country would qualify to become cities.
It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that we are seeking the approval of this
Chamber to amend, particularly Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, the
requisite for the average annual income of a municipality to be converted into a
city or cluster of barangays which seek to be converted into a city, raising that
revenue requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the last two consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices.8
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the
pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by
the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified under
the P20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The
interpellation of Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing,
thus—
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate
which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into cities and which
qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a
law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to those bills
which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill, on
the assumption that it is approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the
Senate conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that
view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill
becomes a law tomorrow, that it will apply to those bills which are already
approved by the House under the old version of the Local Government Code and
are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not know if we can craft a
language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate.
Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to
put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the
interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think
that the bill would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already
pending in the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.9
Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and
higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the
LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the
letter and the intent of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which
the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the
pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as
amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the
Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual
Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent
municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate
President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the
wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher
income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these
municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component
cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers
of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of
agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In
this regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent
municipality, viz—
Batac, Ilocos Norte – It is the biggest municipality of the 2nd District of Ilocos
Norte, 2nd largest and most progressive town in the province of Ilocos Norte and
the natural convergence point for the neighboring towns to transact their
commercial ventures and other daily activities. A growing metropolis, Batac is
equipped with amenities of modern living like banking institutions, satellite cable
systems, telecommunications systems. Adequate roads, markets, hospitals, public
transport systems, sports, and entertainment facilities. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 5941, introduced by Rep. Imee R. Marcos.]
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental – It is located at the center of the Cagayan-Iligan
Industrial Corridor and home to a number of industrial companies and
corporations. Investment and financial affluence of El Salvador is aptly credited to
its industrious and preserving people. Thus, it has become the growing investment
choice even besting nearby cities and municipalities. It is home to Asia Brewery as
distribution port of their product in Mindanao. The Gokongwei Group of
Companies is also doing business in the area. So, the conversion is primarily
envisioned to spur economic and financial prosperity to this coastal place in
North-Western Misamis Oriental. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 6003,
introduced by Rep. Augusto H. Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte – It is the largest of the eleven (11) municipalities
in the province of Agusan del Norte. It plays strategic importance to the
administrative and socio-economic life and development of Agusan del Norte. It is
the foremost in terms of trade, commerce, and industry. Hence, the municipality
was declared as the new seat and capital of the provincial government of Agusan
del Norte pursuant to Republic Act No. 8811 enacted into law on August 16, 2000.
Its conversion will certainly promote, invigorate, and reinforce the economic
potential of the province in establishing itself as an agro-industrial center in the
Caraga region and accelerate the development of the area. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 3094, introduced by Rep. Ma. Angelica Rosedell M. Amante.]
Borongan, Eastern Samar – It is the capital town of Eastern Samar and the
development of Eastern Samar will depend to a certain degree of its urbanization.
It will serve as a catalyst for the modernization and progress of adjacent towns
considering the frequent interactions between the populace. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 2640, introduced by Rep. Marcelino C. Libanan.]
Lamitan, Basilan – Before Basilan City was converted into a separate province,
Lamitan was the most progressive part of the city. It has been for centuries the
center of commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the Yakan people of Basilan.
The source of its income is agro-industrial and others notably copra, rubber, coffee
and host of income generating ventures. As the most progressive town in Basilan,
Lamitan continues to be the center of commerce catering to the municipalities of
Tuburan, Tipo-Tipo and Sumisip. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5786,
introduced by Rep. Gerry A. Salapuddin.]
Catbalogan, Samar – It has always been the socio-economic-political capital of the
Island of Samar even during the Spanish era. It is the seat of government of the
two congressional districts of Samar. Ideally located at the crossroad between
Northern and Eastern Samar, Catbalogan also hosts trade and commerce activates
among the more prosperous cities of the Visayas like Tacloban City, Cebu City
and the cities of Bicol region. The numerous banks and telecommunication
facilities showcases the healthy economic environment of the municipality. The
preeminent and sustainable economic situation of Catbalogan has further boosted
the call of residents for a more vigorous involvement of governance of the
municipal government that is inherent in a city government. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 2088, introduced by Rep. Catalino V. Figueroa.]
Bogo, Cebu – Bogo is very qualified for a city in terms of income, population and
area among others. It has been elevated to the Hall of Fame being a five-time
winner nationwide in the clean and green program. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 3042, introduced by Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur – This over 350 year old capital town the province has
long sought its conversion into a city that will pave the way not only for its own
growth and advancement but also help in the development of its neighboring
municipalities and the province as a whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its role as
the province’s trade, financial and government center. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 5940, introduced by Rep. Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.]
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur – It is a first class municipality and the biggest in terms
of population in the entire province. It has the most progressive and thickly
populated area among the 14 municipalities that comprise the province. Thus, it
has become the center for trade and commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a more
developed infrastructure and facilities than other municipalities in the province.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1899, introduced by Rep. Rodolfo
"Ompong" G. Plaza.]
Carcar, Cebu – Through the years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to urban and
now boast of its manufacturing industry, agricultural farming, fishing and prawn
industry and its thousands of large and small commercial establishments
contributing to the bulk of economic activities in the municipality. Based on
consultation with multi-sectoral groups, political and non-government agencies,
residents and common folk in Carcar, they expressed their desire for the
conversion of the municipality into a component city. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 3990, introduced by Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental – Its population is second highest in the province,
next only to the provincial capital and higher than Canlaon City and Bais City.
Agriculture contributes heavily to its economy. There are very good prospects in
agricultural production brought about by its favorable climate. It has also the
Tanon Strait that provides a good fishing ground for its numerous fishermen. Its
potential to grow commercially is certain. Its strategic location brought about by
its existing linkage networks and the major transportation corridors traversing the
municipality has established Guihulngan as the center of commerce and trade in
this part of Negros Oriental with the first congressional district as its immediate
area of influence. Moreover, it has beautiful tourist spots that are being availed of
by local and foreign tourists. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628,
introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras.]
Tayabas, Quezon – It flourished and expanded into an important politico-cultural
center in [the] Tagalog region. For 131 years (1179-1910), it served as the
cabecera of the province which originally carried the cabecera’s own name,
Tayabas. The locality is rich in culture, heritage and trade. It was at the outset one
of the more active centers of coordination and delivery of basic, regular and
diverse goods and services within the first district of Quezon Province.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3348, introduced by Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga – It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and trade, but
also the cultural center of the rich customs and traditions of the different
municipalities in the province. For the past several years, the income of Tabuk has
been steadily increasing, which is an indication that its economy is likewise
progressively growing. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3068, introduced by
Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]
Available information on Baybay, Leyte; Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu
shows their economic viability, thus:
Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay [Leyte] is composed of 92
barangays, 23 of which are in the poblacion. The remaining 69 are rural
barangays. Baybay City is classified as a first class city. It is situated on the
western coast of the province of Leyte. It has a Type 4 climate, which is generally
wet. Its topography is generally mountainous in the eastern portion as it slopes
down west towards the shore line. Generally an agricultural city, the common
means of livelihood are farming and fishing. Some are engaged in hunting and in
forestall activities. The most common crops grown are rice, corn, root crops, fruits,
and vegetables. Industries operating include the Specialty Products Manufacturing,
Inc. and the Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can also be found in the
city such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics, dress-making, fiber craft, food
preservation, mat weaving, metal craft, fine Philippine furniture manufacturing
and other related activities. Baybay has great potential as a tourist destination,
especially for tennis players. It is not only rich in biodiversity and history, but it
also houses the campus of the Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte State
University/Visayas State College of Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural
College/Baybay National Agricultural School/Baybay Agricultural High School
and the Jungle Valley Park.) Likewise, it has river systems fit for river cruising,
numerous caves for spelunking, forests, beaches, and marine treasures. This
richness, coupled with the friendly Baybayanos, will be an element of a successful
tourism program. Considering the role of tourism in development, Baybay City
intends to harness its tourism potential. (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay
City> visited September 19, 2008)
Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the eastern part of the island of Mindanao. It is
one hundred sixty-five (165) kilometers away from Davao City, a one and a half-
hour drive from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from Davao City through the
Madaum diversion road, which is shorter than taking the Davao-Tagum highway.
Travels by air and sea are possible, with the existence of an airport and seaport.
Mati boasts of being the coconut capital of Mindanao if not the whole country. A
large portion of its fertile land is planted to coconuts, and a significant number of
its population is largely dependent on it. Other agricultural crops such as mango,
banana, corn, coffee and cacao are also being cultivated, as well as the famous
Menzi pomelo and Valencia oranges. Mati has a long stretch of shoreline and one
can find beaches of pure, powder-like white sand. A number of resorts have been
developed and are now open to serve both local and international tourists. Some of
these resorts are situated along the coast of Pujada Bay and the Pacific Ocean.
Along the western coast of the bay lies Mt. Hamiguitan, the home of the pygmy
forest, where bonsai plants and trees grow, some of which are believed to be a
hundred years old or more. On its peak is a lake, called “Tinagong Dagat,” or
hidden sea, so covered by dense vegetation a climber has to hike trails for hours to
reach it. The mountain is also host to rare species of flora and fauna, thus
becoming a wildlife sanctuary for these life forms. (<http://mati.wetpain.com/?
t=anon> accessed on September 19, 2008.)
Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber
President of the Davao Oriental Eastern Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
emphasized the big potential of the mining industry in the province of Davao
Oriental. As such, he strongly recommends Mati as the mining hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?
m=12&sec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.htm&no.=9&date, accessed on September
19, 2008)
Naga [Cebu]: Historical Background—In the early times, the place now known as
Naga was full of huge trees locally called as “Narra.” The first settlers referred to
this place as Narra, derived from the huge trees, which later simply became Naga.
Considered as one of the oldest settlements in the Province of Cebu, Naga became
a municipality on June 12, 1829. The municipality has gone through a series of
classifications as its economic development has undergone changes and growth.
The tranquil farming and fishing villages of the natives were agitated as the
Spaniards came and discovered coal in the uplands. Coal was the first export of the
municipality, as the Spaniards mined and sent it to Spain. The mining industry
triggered the industrial development of Naga. As the years progressed,
manufacturing and other industries followed, making Naga one of the
industrialized municipalities in the Province of Cebu.
Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)
Ann. Income (as of Dec. 31, 2006) Php112,219,718.35 Agricultural, Industrial,
Agro-Industrial, Mining Product
(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?option=com.content&view=article
id=53:naga-facts-and-figures&catid=51:naga-facts-and-figures&Itemid=75>
visited September 19, 2008)
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative
power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws,
and to alter and repeal them.10 The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the
people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in
the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is
broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers
for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to
matters of general concern or common interest.11
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No.
9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress
enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided
for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local
government units—income, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to
modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities
into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount
of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However,
Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a
belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher
calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which
is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these
municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the
Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found
therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,
therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the
November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained
and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses,
are not found in the LGC.
2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution
impress that the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause enshrined in
the Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated
because the Cityhood Laws infringed on the “just share” that petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention shall receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be
automatically released to them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid
classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.12
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities
with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not
have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another
for the purpose of the income requirement. This contention misses the point.
It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate
President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No
9009 was merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted
into cities” and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of
cities and without municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of
the P100 million average annual income requirement for the creation of
component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence or
empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The
imposition of a very high income requirement ofP100 million, increased from P20
million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become
component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the
situation created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed component cities at
a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under Section 452 of the LGC, to
wit—
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. – (a) Cities with a minimum population of
two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer,
shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component
cities of the province in which they are geographically located. (Emphasis
supplied)
The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an
arbitrary amount, cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount “sufficient,
based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities
and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population,”
per Section 713 of the LGC. It was imposed merely because it is difficult to comply
with. While it could be argued that P100 million, being more than P20 million,
could, of course, provide the essential government facilities, services, and special
functions vis-à-vis the population of a municipality wanting to become a
component city, it cannot be said that the minimum amount of P20 million would
be insufficient. This is evident from the existing cities whose income, up to now,
do not comply with the P100 million income requirement, some of which have
lower than the P20 million average annual income. Consider the list14 below—
AVERAGE ANNUAL
CITY
INCOME
1. Marawi City 5,291,522.10
2. Palayan City 6,714,651.77
3. Sipalay City 9,713,120.00
4. Canlaon City 13,552,493.79
5. Himamaylan City 15,808,530.00
6. Isabela City 16,811,246.79
7. Munoz City 19,693,358.61
8. Dapitan City 20,529,181.08
9. Tangub City 20,943,810.04
10. Bayawan City 22,943,810.04
11. Island Garden City of Samal 23,034,731.83
12. Tanjay City 23,723,612.44
13. Tabaco City 24,152,853.71
14. Oroquieta City 24,279,966.51
15. Ligao City 28,326,745.86
16. Sorsogon City 30,403,324.59
17. Maasin City 30,572,113.65
18. Escalante City 32,113,970.00
19. Iriga City 32,757,871.44
20. Gapan City 34,254,986.47
21. Candon City 36,327,705.86
22. Gingoog City 37,327,705.86
23. Masbate City 39,454,508.28
24. Passi City 40,314,620.00
25. Calbayog City 40,943,128.73
26. Calapan City 41,870,239.21
27. Cadiz City 43,827,060.00
28. Alaminos City 44,352,501.00
29. Bais City 44, 646,826.48
30. San Carlos City 46,306,129.13
31. Silay City 47,351,730.00
32. Bislig City 47,360,716.24
33. Tacurong City 49,026,281.56
34. Talisay City (Negros Occidental) 52,609,790.00
35. Kabankalan City 53,560,580.00
36. Malaybalay City 54,423,408.55
37. La Carlota City 54,760,290.00
38. Vigan City 56,831,797.19
39. Balanga City 61,556,700.49
40. Sagay City 64,266,350.00
41. Cavite City 64,566,079.05
42. Koronadal City 66,231,717.19
43. Cotabato City 66,302,114.52
44. Toledo City 70,157,331.12
45. San Jose City 70,309,233.43
46. Danao City 72,621,955.30
47. Bago City 74,305,000.00
48. Valencia City 74,557,298.92
49. Victorias City 75,757,298.92
50. Cauayan City 82,949,135.46
51. Santiago City 83,816,025.89
52. Roxas City 85,397,830.00
53. Dipolog City 85,503,262.85
54. Trece Martires City 87,413,786.64
55. Talisay City (Cebu) 87,964,972.97
56. Ozamis city 89,054,056.12
57. Surigao City 89,960,971.33
58. Panabo City 91,425,301.39
59. Digos City 92,647,699.13
The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as component cities of their
respective provinces emphasizes the arbitrariness of the amount of P100 million as
the new income requirement for the conversion of municipalities into component
cities. This arbitrariness can also be clearly gleaned from the respective distinctive
traits and level of economic development of the individual respondent
municipalities as above submitted.
Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to
respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger picture. The
existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities
covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A.
No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a),
thus—
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine
and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.
Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress,
by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic
growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the
LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress
and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to
become a component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition
continues to exist.
Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their “just
share” in the IRA. To be sure, petitioners are entitled to a “just share,” not a
specific amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when, after the
implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, not
decreased. Consider the table15 below—
CY 2006 IRA CY 2008 IRA
CITY (Before Implementation of (Actual Release After Implementation of
Sixteen [16] Cityhood Laws) Sixteen [16] Cityhood Laws)
Bais 219,338,056.00 242,193,156.00
Batangas 334,371,984.00 388,871,770.00
Bayawan 353,150,158.00 388,840,062.00
Cadiz 329,491,285.00 361,019,211.00
Calapan 227,772,199.00 252,587,779.00
Calbayog 438,603,378.00 485,653,769.00
Cauayan 250,477,157.00 277,120,828.00
Gen. Santos 518,388,557.00 631,864,977.00
Gingoog 314,425,637.00 347,207,725.00
Himamaylan 248,154,381.00 277,532,458.00
Iloilo 358,394,268.00 412,506,278.00
Iriga 183,132,036.00 203,072,932.00
Legaspi 235,314,016.00 266,537,785.00
Ligao 215,608,112.00 239,696,441.00
Oroquieta 191,803,213.00 211,449,720.00
Pagadian 292,788,255.00 327,401,672.00
San Carlos 239,524,249.00 260,515,711.00
San Fernando 182,320,356.00 204,140,940.00
Santiago 508,326,072.00 563,679,572.00
Silay 216,372,314.00 241,363,845.00
Surigao 233,968,119.00 260,708,071.00
Tacurong 179,795,271.00 197,880,665.00
Tagaytay 130,159,136.00 152,445,295.00
Tarlac 348,186,756.00 405,611,581.00
Tangub 162,248,610.00 180,640,621.00
Urdaneta 187,721,031.00 207,129,386.00
Victorias 176,367,959.00 194,162,687.00
Zamboanga 918,013,016.00 1,009,972,704.00
What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective IRA
shares was based on a computation of what they would receive if respondent
municipalities were not to become component cities at all. Of course, that would
mean a bigger amount to which they have staked their claim. After considering
these, it all boils down to money and how much more they would receive if
respondent municipalities remain as municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed
IRA from the national government for cities.
Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. 9009, should prove enlightening:
SENATOR SOTTO. Mr. President, we just want to be enlightened again on the
previous qualification and the present one being proposed. Before there were
three…
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There are three requisites for a municipality to become a
city. Let us start with the finance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh us? I used to be
the chairman of the Committee on Local Government, but the new job that was
given to me by the Senate has erased completely my memory as far as the Local
Government Code is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are three
requirements. One is financial.
SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to P100 million
of locally generated funds.
SENATOR SOTTO. In other words, the P20 million before includes the IRA.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.
SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. The internal revenue share should never have been
included. That was not the intention when we first crafted the Local Government
Code. The financial capacity was supposed to be demonstrated by the municipality
wishing to become a city by its own effort, meaning to say, it should not rely on
the internal revenue share that comes from the government. Unfortunately, I think
what happened in past conversions of municipalities into cities was, the
Department of Budget and Management, along with the Department of Finance,
had included the internal revenue share as a part of the municipality,
demonstration that they are now financially capable and can measure up to the
requirement of the Local Government Code of having a revenue of at least P20
million.
SENATOR SOTTO. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President, has spread that into
the Record because otherwise, if he did not mention the Department of Finance
and the Department of Budget and Management, then I would have been blamed
for the misinterpretation. But anyway, the gentleman is correct. That was the
interpretation given to us during the hearings.
So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 million from locally generated
income as far as population is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As far as population is concerned, there will be no
change, Mr. President. Still 150,000.
SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As to the land area, there is no change; it is still 100
square kilometers.
SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was “either/or”?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is correct. As long as it has one of the three
requirements, basically, as long as it meets the financial requirement, then it may
meet the territorial requirement or the population requirement.
SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains “or”?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.
SENATOR SOTTO. AND?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other words…
SENATOR SOTTO. Does the gentleman not think there will no longer be any
municipality that will qualify, Mr. President?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There may still be municipalities which can qualify, but
it will take a little time. They will have to produce more babies. I do not know—
expand their territories, whatever, by reclamation or otherwise. But the whole
proposal is geared towards making it difficult for municipalities to convert into
cities.
On the other hand, I would like to advert to the fact that in the amendments that
we are proposing for the entire Local Government Code, we are also raising the
internal revenue share of the municipalities.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. So that, more or less, hindi naman sila dehado in this
particular instance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr. President, I
throw my full support behind the measure.
Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Emphasis
supplied)16
From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood
Laws becomes obvious, especially considering that 33 municipalities were
converted into component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A.
No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16
municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by
the abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging
the “privilege” that they have already given to those newly-converted component
cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the
same footing or “class” as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely
recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces.
Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be able to pursue and the
expenditures that they would not be able to meet, but totally ignored the
respondent municipalities’ obligations arising from the contracts they have already
entered into, the employees that they have already hired, and the projects that they
have already initiated and completed as component cities. Petitioners have
completely overlooked the need of respondent municipalities to become effective
vehicles intending to accelerate economic growth in the countryside. It is like the
elder siblings wanting to kill the newly-borns so that their inheritance would not
be diminished.
Apropos is the following parable:
There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his vineyard.
After reaching an agreement with them for the usual daily wage, he sent them out
to his vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw other men standing
around the marketplace without work, so he said to them, “You too go along to my
vineyard and I will pay you whatever is fair.” They went. He came out again
around noon and mid-afternoon and did the same. Finally, going out in late
afternoon he found still others standing around. To these he said, “Why have you
been standing here idle all day?” “No one has hired us,” they told him. He said,
“You go to the vineyard too.” When evening came, the owner of the vineyard said
to his foreman, “Call the workmen and give them their pay, but begin with the last
group and end with the first.” When those hired late in the afternoon came up they
received a full day’s pay, and when the first group appeared they thought they
would get more, yet they received the same daily wage. Thereupon they
complained to the owner, “This last group did only an hour’s work, but you have
paid them on the same basis as us who have worked a full day in the scorching
heat.” “My friend,” he said to one in reply, “I do you no injustice. You agreed on
the usual wage, did you not? Take your pay and go home. I intend to give this man
who was hired last the same pay as you. I am free to do as I please with my
money, am I not? Or are you envious because I am generous?”17
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only
sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their respective
capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by
the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert
into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the
LGC, i.e., to make the local government units “enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals,” which is the very mandate of the Constitution.
Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense
of the transcendental interest of justice and equity. While it is true that litigation
must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this
Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions
and doubt, as the following pronouncement of this Court instructs:
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the
legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been
considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably
give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and
application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great
deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible
caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless
its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in
pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution
to be in contravention of the Constitution x x x, the case must be so clear to be free
from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be
irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and
the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in
favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be
contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the
doubt in favor of its validity.18
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August
24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of
Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws—Republic Acts Nos. 9389,
9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435,
9436, and 9491—are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Notes:
1
Republic Acts 9389 [Baybay City, Leyte], 9390 [Bogo City, Cebu], 9391
[Catbalogan City, Samar], 9392 [Tandag City, Surigao del Sur], 9393 [Lamitan
City, Basilan], 9394 [Borongan City, Samar], 9398 [Tayabas City, Quezon], 9404
[Tabuk City, Kalinga], 9405 [Bayugan City, Agusan del Sur], 9407 [Batac City,
Ilocos Norte], 9408 [Mati City, Davao Oriental], 9409 [Guihulngan City, Negros
Oriental], 9434 [Cabadbaran City, Agusan del Norte], 9435 [El Salvador City,
Misamis Oriental], 9436 [Carcar City, Cebu], and 9491 [Naga City, Cebu].
2
Penned by J. Carpio, with JJ. Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Velasco, Jr., and Brion, concurring; dissenting, J. Reyes, joined by JJ. Corona,
Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Leonardo-De Castro; C.J. Puno, and JJ. Nachura and
Tinga took no part; J. Ynares-Santiago was on leave.
3
Justice Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Ynares-
Santiago, Corona, Chico-Nazario, and Leonardo-De Castro. Chief Justice Puno
and Justice Nachura took no part.
4
Justice Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Ynares-
Santiago, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Leonardo-De Castro, and Bersamin. Chief
Justice Puno and Justice Nachura took no part. Justice Quisumbing was on leave.
5
Citations omitted.
6
Penned by J. Velasco, Jr., with JJ. Corona, Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin,
Abad, and Villarama concurring; dissenting, J. Carpio, joined by JJ. Carpio-
Morales, Brion, and Peralta; C.J. Puno and JJ. Nachura and Del Castillo took no
part.
7
Penned by J. Carpio, with JJ. Carpio-Morales, Brion, Peralta, Villarama,
Mendoza, and Sereno, concurring; dissenting,, J. Velasco, Jr., joined by C.J.
Corona, and JJ. Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, and Perez; JJ. Nachura and
Del Castillo took no part.
8
II Record, Senate, 13th Congress, p. 164 (October 5, 2000); rollo (G.R. No.
176951), Vol. 5, p. 3765.
9
Id. at 167-168; id. at 3768-3769.
10
Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180046, April
2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428, 450, citing Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General,
National Economic Development Authority, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006,
487 SCRA 623.
11
Id., citing Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
12
De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 70, 79 (2000); Tiu v.
Court of Tax Appeals, 361 Phil. 229, 242 (1999).
13
SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be
based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
(a) Income. — It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for
all essential government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government
unit concerned;
(b) Population .— It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within
the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area .— It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bound with technical descriptions; and sufficient
to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of
Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). (Emphasis supplied.)
14
The figures reflect the actual income of the cities for 2006. If R.A. No. 9009 is
to be applied such that the figures are expressed in 2000 constant prices, the
income of the cities will even be lower. (Certification from the Bureau of Local
Government Finance dated December 5, 2008; rollo [G.R. No. 176951], Vol. 5,
pp. 3731-3734.)
15
Based on the letter dated December 9, 2008 of the Department of Budget and
Management; rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, pp. 3978-3986.
16
Committee Amendments re S. No. 2157, Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 24,
October 5, 2000, pp. 165-166; id. at 3766-3767.
17
Mat. 20: 1-15.
18
Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 584 (1915).
—————————————————————————————————
———————-
CONCURRING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
The Court has received flak on this case for supposed “flip-flopping.” But its
shifting views are understandable because of the nearly even soundness of the
opposing advocacies of the two groups of cities over the validity of the sixteen
cityhood laws.1 It also does not help that the membership of the Court has been
altered by retirements and replacements at various stages from when it first
decided to annul the laws, to when it reconsidered and upheld their validity, and to
when it reverted to the original position and declared the laws involved
unconstitutional. This to me is a healthy sign of democracy at work, the members
being blind to the need to conform.
In its Resolution of August 24, 2010, the Court reversed its December 21,
2009 Decision and denied the quest for cityhood of sixteen municipalities on the
ground that the laws creating them violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution2 and the equal protection clause.3 By that resolution, the majority also
held that the Court erred in setting aside its November 18, 2008 decision since this
latter had attained finality after the Court’s denial of the second motion for
reconsideration of the respondent cities, albeit the 6-6 deadlock vote and the
corresponding entry of judgment.
The Issues Presented
The motion for reconsideration of respondent cities presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the sixteen cityhood laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution;
2. Whether or not such laws violate the equal protection clause; and
3. Whether or not the Court could still modify its decision dated November 18,
2008.
Discussions
One. In ruling that the sixteen cityhood laws violated Section 10 of Article X, the
majority in the Court held that the creation of local government units must
conform to the criterion prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.4 Since those laws, which were passed after the enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) 9009,5 covered municipalities that did not comply with the amended
income requirement set by the Local Government Code, their conversion into
cities were constitutionally infirm. The majority held that R.A. 9009 did not
provide exemptions from its application. Although the provisions in the sixteen
cityhood laws established exemptions from such requirement for the subject
municipalities, the same can not be considered without violating Section 10,
Article X, taking into account the legislature’s primary intent in passing R.A.
9009.6
I take exception on how the majority of the Court selectively chose to focus on the
sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino Pimentel to come up with a “primary
intent” theory for R.A. 9009. Surely, the intent of R.A. 9009 can not be based
solely on that speech. The Court should not ignore the legislative history of R.A.
9009, including the pertinent exchanges during the interpellation of Senator
Pimentel and Senate President Franklin Drilon, thus:
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate
which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into cities and which
qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a
law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to those bills
which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill x x x
approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate for conversion from
municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that
view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill
becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are already approved by
the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now pending in the Senate?
The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the
application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the
Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to
put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the
interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think
that the bill would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already
pending in the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected Mr. President.7 (Emphasis
supplied)
Two things are clear from the above exchanges. First, the legislature intended to
exempt from the amended income requirement of R.A. 9009 the municipalities
that had pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. As a matter of fact, such
legislative intent was carried over to the 12th and the 13th Congress when the
House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolutions8 that sought the exemption of
twenty-four municipalities, including the sixteen, from the application of R.A.
9009. The continuing intent of Congress culminated in the inclusion of the
exemption clause in the cityhood bills and their subsequent passage.
Second, it is also clear from the above exchanges between Senators Pimentel and
Drilon that Congress did not anymore insert an exemption clause from the income
requirement of R.A. 9009 since such exchanges, when read by the Court, would
already reveal the lawmakers’ intent regarding such matter.
Besides, the exemption clause found in each of the cityhood laws serves as an
affirmation of Congress’ intent to exempt them from the increased income
requirement of R.A. 9009. These new cities have not altogether been exempted
from the operation of the Local Government Code covering income requirement.
They have been expressly made subject to the lower income requirement of the old
code. There remains, therefore, substantial compliance with the provision of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which provides that no city may be
created “except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code.”
The above interpretation accommodates the “primary” intention of Congress in
preventing the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and
the other intention of Congress to exempt the municipalities which have pending
cityhood bills before the enactment of R.A. 9009.
This is not to say that the views of the majority in the Court are absolutely illogical
or wrong. They are admittedly plausible. But, given the unstable footing of such
views as evidenced by its shifting positions on the issue, the Court should have
adopted an attitude of becoming humility, upholding the constitutionality of the
acts of a co-equal branch of government regarding a matter that properly fell
within its powers.
Two. The equal protection clause of the Constitution seeks to protect persons from
being deprived of life, liberty, or property by the uneven application of statutes. In
invoking this protection, it is incumbent on petitioner League of Cities to show,
not only that the exemption granted to the sixteen cities amounted to arbitrary
classification but, that the League or their members have been deprived of life,
liberty or property, by reason of the exemption. The League of Cities has failed to
discharge this burden.
The Court explained in Ichong v. Hernandez9the limits of the equal protection
clause, thus:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists (sic)
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not. (Emphasis supplied)
Far from baselessly favoring the sixteen municipalities, Congress gave them
exemptions from the application of R.A. 9009 based on its sense of justice and
fairness. Senator Alfredo Lim explained this in his sponsorship speech on House
Joint Resolution No. 1, thus:
x x x The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a
city virtually delivered a lethal blow to the aspirations of the 24 municipalities to
attain economic growth and progress. To them, it was unfair; like any sport—
changing the rules in the middle of the game.
xxxx
I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a legal
remedy by which they could be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary
qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the Local
Government Code prior to its amendment by R.A. 9009.
xxxx
In essence, the Cityhood bills now under consideration will have the same effect
as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks
exemption from the higher income requirement of R.A. 9009. The proponents are
invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness. x x x10 (Emphasis
supplied)
What makes the injustice quite bitter is the fact that the sixteen cities did not
merely have pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. They also met at
that time the income criteria set under Section 450 of the then Local Government
Code. The Court owes to these cities the considerations that justice and fair play
demands. It can not be denied that substantial distinction sets them apart from the
other cities.
Further, petitioner League of Cities failed to show that the creation of the sixteen
new cities discriminated against other cities. As the respondent cities point out, the
majority of the present cities in our midst do not meet the P100 million minimum
income requirement of the Local Government Code.11 It boggles the mind how
these deficient cities can complain of denial of equal protection of the law.
Besides, assuming an improper classification in the case of the sixteen cities,
petitioner League of Cities can not invoke the equal protection clause since it has
failed to show that it will suffer deprivation of life, liberty, or property by reason
of such classification.
Actually, the existing cities would not cease to exist nor would their liberties
suffer by reason of the enactment of the sixteen cityhood laws. That their Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) will be diminished does not amount to deprivation of
property since the IRA is not their property until it has been automatically
released.12 Mere expectancy in the receipt of IRA can not be regarded as the
“property” envisioned in the Bill of Rights.
Three. The majority maintain that the Court did not properly set aside its original
decision dated November 18, 2008, which earlier invalidated the Cityhood laws
since, procedurally, the Court had previously declared such decision already
final.13 But a question had been raised regarding the propriety of such declaration
of finality, given a pending question respecting the consequence of a 6-6 vote on
the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. At any rate, the Court has under
extraordinary circumstances14 reconsidered its ruling despite an entry of judgment.
It will not allow the technical rules to hinder it from rendering just and equitable
relief.15
The issues presented in this case do not only involve rights and obligations of
some parties but the constitutionality of the exercise by Congress of its power to
make laws. There is no reason to uphold the November 18, 2008 decision since the
petitioner League of Cities has failed to overcome the strong presumption in favor
of the cityhood laws’ constitutionality.
I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
cities, REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Resolution of the Court dated August
24, 2010, REINSTATE the Decision of the Court dated December 21, 2009,
and DISMISS the Consolidated petitions of the League of Cities.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

League of Cities 2011

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EN BANC

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with

By Decision[10] dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5

the equal protection clause.

Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for

reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual

which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.[11] By

A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent

LGUs prayed as follows:

Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed

of the motion as follows:

On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the

Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that

Respondents’ “Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31,

Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’

Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon.”

2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made

on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common

counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution.”[12]

Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the petitioners and

petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will

as Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial

raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision;

(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April

issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motion––which mainly

argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law

unconstitutional–– remains unresolved; and

involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en

banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who

petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration

dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated

the voting requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality

of the cityhood laws in question?

laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in

laws in question is, on the merits, secured.

“majority of the Members” contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the

Constitution, which requires that:

Webster defines “majority” as “a number greater than half of a

total.”[13] In plain language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v.

Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate

majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential

As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched,

exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving the

constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such

determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for

Ricardo J. Francisco: “x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional

requirement on the concurrence of the ‘majority’ was initially reached in the

way of a motion for reconsideration.”[15]

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote

SC, respectively, providing that:

Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction

deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon.” To

is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution––a 6-6 deadlock.

purely business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v.

Sandiganbayan[20] is most apropos:

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration

2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration

Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated

November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further

Proceedings,” dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for