ARTICLES OF THE DAY

June 16, 2021

MAITREYA BHAKAL, RUSSIA TODAY ....................................................................................................................... 2

SCOTT RITTER, RUSSIA TODAY ............................................................................................................................... 5

ZAHID HUSSAIN, DAWN ......................................................................................................................................... 8

RAFIA ZAKARIA, DAWN........................................................................................................................................ 10

ALI VAEZ, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ................................................................................................................................ 12

JENNIFER HILLMAN, CFR ...................................................................................................................................... 15

HAMNA TARIQ, SOUTH ASIAN VOICES ................................................................................................................. 17

TALAT MASOOD, EXPRESS TRIBUNE .................................................................................................................... 21


Why Beijing loves portraying India as a mere pawn in America’s
Cold War with China
Maitreya Bhakal, Russia Today
B
eijing is keen to depict
India as a White House
lackey in the US’
ongoing anti-China campaign.
By accusing America of
instigating disputes between
the two, it denies India any
agency and lets China portray
itself as blameless.
Love is in the air
Love seems to be in the air in
Indo-US relations. The two
nations now seem to be closer
than ever before – has no shortage of, with China,
geopolitically as well as
militarily. Ever since the West
started to consider India a
‘rising power’ in the early
2000s, the political elite and
media there have loved being
praised by the Americans.
For the US, India serves the key
purpose of hedging against
China. Yet, its usefulness to the
American agenda is often
weighed down by its own
liabilities – over-promising and
under-performing, in
everything ranging from
manufacturing to innovation.
The US sees India as little more
than a market for weapons and
consumer goods and a key ally
in its geopolitical crusade
against China, showing it off as
a trophy wife at every
opportunity.
Yet, India remains reluctant,
not willing to fully commit yet.
This is in large part due to its
inertia and legacy of being a
traditionally non-aligned
nation, because much of India’s
current political elite is
unashamedly pro-West.
Outside the glare of the media,
diplomacy has proceeded at
pace. The much vaunted ‘2+2
Ministerial Dialogue’ between
India and the US took place in
New Delhi in October last year.
The two nations signed the
Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement for
Geo-Spatial cooperation
(BECA) – the last foundational
agreement of the 2+2 dialogue.
This was the latest in a series of
agreements signed over the past
few years: The General
Security of Military
Information Agreement
(GSOMIA) signed in 2002
(with its extension the
Industrial Security Annex
(ISA) agreed in 2019), the
Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement
(LEMOA) signed in 2016, and
the Communications
Compatibility and Security
Agreement (COMCASA) in
2018.
2
The alphabet soup is indicative
of a broader strategic context:
the Indian and US militaries are
now closer than ever before.
For India, the advantages go
beyond China. The agreements
will enable information sharing
between the US and India on an
unprecedented scale, including
satellite imagery and geo-
spatial data in border areas.
This will help with surveillance
and reconnaissance on its
disputed borders, which India
Pakistan, and Nepal. (Its
decades-old dispute with
Bangladesh only got resolved
in 2015, 41 years after
negotiations began).
The enemy of my enemy?
China is miffed by all this. The
way Beijing sees it, India is just
another US stooge, co-opted by
the Americans in their anti-
China campaign. The US is
using India against China as a
mere mercenary to prevent its
rise – and India is simply too
stupid to realize it. “New Delhi
should avoid being roped into a
geopolitical trap,” roared
Chinese tabloid Global Times
in a hawkish article. “India
should not be instigated by the
US,” it brayed in another.

Since the ongoing India-China
border standoff began in early
2020, China’s state media have
been consistently pushing this
narrative. While one would
have expected the jingoistic
Global Times to peddle this
line, even the more restrained
publications are also pushing it.
There seems to be a concerted
effort to portray India as a mere
US agent against China, or at
least warning India against
becoming one.
This is hardly surprising.
Depicting your enemy as being
directed by a third party against
you is a common geopolitical
trope. It’s similar to how India
often accuses Nepal of being
used by China.
The way China sees it, if there
is a dispute between it and
India, it is either India’s fault or
the result of American
provocation. China, obviously,
can never be to blame.
Two factors help explain this
trope’s attraction. The first is
that it diverts attention away
from your own share of the
guilt. Secondly, it helps take
away agency from your enemy
and portrays it as acting on
behalf of someone else.
Infrastructure for me, but not
for thee
Beijing has repeatedly
indicated, via its think tanks
and state media and recently via
official statements, that
infrastructure building and
military deployment are the
“root cause” of the current
tensions. Yet, China has itself
built numerous roads and
military installations on its side
of the border. After spending
decades saturating its border
defenses with useful roads and
infrastructure, China now seeks
to deny India the opportunity to
do the same on its side. No
wonder it has been pushing
India for a mutual freeze on
border infrastructure
development for years, a
proposal that India has sensibly
rejected.
China also refuses to officially
exchange maps and demarcate
the Line of Actual Control or
the LAC in Ladakh (the site of
the current standoff). The mere
act of LAC demarcation – in
essence a temporary border like
the LOC (Line Of Control) that
India shares with Pakistan –
would not prejudice either
country’s territorial claims.
After all, both India and
Pakistan claim territories
beyond their side of the LOC.
Demarcating a temporary
border will ensure that China
would not be able to bring up
old claims, such as the Galwan
valley, which India says it
hadn’t mentioned in bilateral
discussions since the 1950s. It
will mean that patrols don’t
cross over each other, and each
side sticks to its side of the line
(the current murderous standoff
was caused by the clashing of
the two sides’ patrols). In other
words, it will ensure that
standoffs like the current one do
not take place at all.
China has offered no concrete
explanation for the refusal. But
Indian analysts speculate that
Beijing wants to keep the
3
dispute alive so that it can keep
‘nibbling’ territory (something
China also accuses India of
doing). According to former
Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay
Gokhale, the only rational
explanation is that “the nibbling
is the other way around. It is the
Chinese who are nibbling away,
it is we who say ‘Let’s stop this
by clarifying the LAC,’ and the
Chinese don’t want that to
happen, because they want to
keep on nibbling away.”
Another likely reason for
China’s portrayal of India as a
pawn revolves around taking
away agency from India and
avoiding its legitimate
grievances. Depicting India as a
US pawn allows Beijing to
portray its activities not as
reactions to China’s actions, but
simply as part of a wider plot
against it. India can then be
painted as an irrational actor
going against its own interests –
solely at the behest of the US.
Consequently, China itself can
then be depicted as blameless in
the entire affair.
This also has the added
advantage of exaggerating
one’s own importance: that
India is simply arrow fodder for
the US in the 21stcentury Great
Game between the two powers.
This denial of agency to India is
unwittingly encouraged by
Western and Indian pundits too.
The standard rhetoric has been
that ‘Beijing’s belligerence has
driven India into Washington’s
arms’, as if India decides
strategic alliances overnight
based on an incident at the
border. Both Chinese and

Indian pundits interpret India’s
actions – or lack thereof – for
their own agenda.
None of this means that the US
is a saint. It is a war-mongering,
savage regime, having killed
millions upon millions of
innocent victims globally since
World War II in every corner of
the planet – the most
aggressive, trigger-happy,
barbaric military state in the
world today. It also doesn’t
mean that India’s own share of
the blame in letting the border
dispute fester for over 75 years
should be ignored.
Yet, perspective matters. By
thinking that Indo-US relations
are solely tied to India-China
relations, China exaggerates
and over-estimates its own
importance. Indo-US ties were
already on an upward trajectory
before the Galwan valley clash.
It's not that the Indian
government suddenly woke up
on the night of the clash and
decided to jump into US arms.
Its tilt toward the US will
ensure that China keeps looking
over its shoulder. There’s a
difference, though, between
signing military agreements
with the US for one’s own
national interest and taking its
side on everything. At a
strategic level, India’s interests
would be best served by playing
the two powers against each
4
other and taking advantage of
their rivalry for its own gain,
rather than openly picking one
side and shutting off all options
with the other.
The arc of Indo-US relations
bends toward closer ties, but
it’s unlikely to end in an anti-
China military alliance. There’s
little possibility that India will
become a full-fledged treaty
ally with US bases on its soil, or
transform into a permanent US
aircraft carrier like Japan or
Australia. For now, that will
have to remain America's
dream – and China's nightmare.
All the more reason for India to
keep both guessing.

Biden wants NATO to project the strength it doesn’t have
Scott Ritter, Russia Today
J oe Biden travelled to
Brussels riding the wave of
his “America is back”
mantra. Far from rebuilding the
US-NATO relationship, he
used NATO as a prop to help
set the stage for his upcoming
meeting with Vladimir Putin.
The United States is facing a
perfect storm of crises of its
own making. On the domestic
front, the American democratic
institution is collapsing under
the weight of centuries of
unresolved societal inequities
that threaten to divide the
country into two irreconcilable
factions. In the Pacific, decades
of geopolitical neglect
fundamentally ceded the
strategic advantage to a surging
China, allowing the momentum
of that country’s economic and
military expansion to challenge
and, in some areas, surpass
what had previously been a
region of uncontested
American influence and
control. In Europe, the post-
9/11 focus on the Middle East
and South Asia left a once
dominant American military
posture in ruins, and with it the
influence 300,000 troops once
forward-deployed on European
soil used to bring. Lacking an
American military spine, the
NATO alliance withered into
virtual irrelevance, unable to
meaningfully project power or
mount a credible defensive
deterrence.
This storm is still raging, and
despite all the rhetoric and
flexing being done by the
administration of President Joe
Biden, will continue to do so,
unabated, for the foreseeable
future. One of the root causes of
this storm is the disconnect
between policy and action on
the part of the US over the
course of the past 30-odd years.
In 1991, the US had the world’s
most powerful economy
backed by the world’s most
powerful military, sustained by
the world’s most vibrant
democracy. The deterioration
of these three pillars of US
credibility and strength was
gradual yet steady, unnoticed
by most outside (and internal)
observers who opted to dig no
deeper than the gilded façade
offered up by the American
establishment, rather than
examine the deteriorating
framework that held the
American behemoth together.
Military power inherited and
squandered
Joe Biden is a veteran
American politician who was
part of the establishment which
squandered the inheritance of
wealth, prestige and power
America had accumulated in
the aftermath of the Second
World War. He is the living
embodiment of American
political hubris, where words
speak louder than results. As
5
the senior Democrat in the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, he helped oversee
the post-Cold War physical
expansion of NATO void of
any existential reason for doing
so. In this way he helped create
the bloated edifice that exists
today, 30 nations united in
everything except a viable
military alliance. He also
helped frame the current
poisonous situation with
Russia, denigrating post-Soviet
Russia by supporting and
sustaining the political career of
Russian President Boris
Yeltsin, and then expressing
resentment when Vladimir
Putin took over in the wake of
Yeltsin’s physical, mental and
moral collapse and refused to
continue the Yeltsin policy of
lying prostrate before the US
and Europe.
The rise of Putin coincided with
America’s strategic shift from a
Euro-centric power focus to
pursuing regional
transformation fantasies in the
Middle East and South Asia,
seeking to use the US military
as a vehicle for nation building
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and
elsewhere. This 20-year
experiment has failed, leaving
the US fiscally and morally
bankrupt, and its military in
Europe a mere shadow of its
former self in terms of
capability and reach – where in
1990 we could deploy four

divisions to Europe in 10 days,
today it takes us four months to
deploy one brigade. The
administration of George W.
Bush initiated this process
(with a substantial assist from
the Clinton administration), and
the Obama-Biden
administration sustained it.
While tactless and inept in his
execution, Donald Trump was
realistic regarding the situation
he had inherited, seeking to
repair relations with Russia
while approaching the issue of
NATO with a more realistic
perspective born of fiscal and
geopolitical reality. This
approach incurred the wrath of
the American establishment,
resulting in a single term
presidency and the ascension of
Joe Biden to his status as
American commander in chief.
Biden has shown no real
appreciation for the state of
affairs he has inherited,
formulating a foreign policy
premised on the mantra of
“America is back” without
having an appreciation of what
“back” means. His rhetoric and
posturing suggest that he
believes the dominance and
prestige America enjoyed in
1991 can be replicated today
simply by willing it to be so.
This is irresponsible fantasy,
something even Biden seems to
realize in the aftermath of his
“Putin is a killer” comments to
the US media. The reality check
that followed Biden’s impolitic
chest thumping, manifested in
the withdrawal of Russia’s
ambassador and the snap
mobilization of 100,000
Russian troops on Russia’s
border with Ukraine, drove
home the reality that the US and
its NATO allies were not in any
position to confront Russia
militarily. Moreover, more
sober assessments coming out
of both Europe and the US held
that the rise of an expansionist
China represented a greater
threat to the geopolitical
positioning of the transatlantic
partnership than Russia.
Projecting weakness
The problem confronting Biden
was that the issue of NATO
expansion had left the alliance
held hostage by both the anti-
Russian posturing of its
relatively new Polish and Baltic
members and notions of a
potential NATO membership
on the part of post-Maidan
Ukraine. One of the goals of the
recently completed NATO
summit was to create a
framework of action which
would provide political cover
for both issues, while allowing
for enough latitude to
realistically apportion the
political and economic
resources necessary to pivot to
China. This is the heart of the
NATO joint statement – a
commitment to a new military
posture which seeks to rebuild
NATO’s crumbling military
component while expanding
the reach of NATO’s Article 5
defensive umbrella to include
space, cyber and so-called
“hybrid” activities.
The notion of NATO building a
30-battalion combat force
capable of full mobilization in
30 days is an indication of a
reality that NATO knows it
6
cannot, and will not, be fighting
a ground war in Europe against
a Russian foe. The 30-battalion
figure is a goal, not a reality,
one that will be impacted by
fiscal realities driven by the
domestic imperatives of 30
separate nations, some more
committed to the concept than
others. And the 30-day
mobilization figure is likewise
purely political, given that
Russian can mobilize many
times that number in half the
time, and that most scenarios
involving Russia-NATO
combat have the Russians
prevailing in a period of one
week or less. The 30-battlaion
concept is a political fig leaf
designed to demonstrate
resolve without really having to
do so.
The same can be said about
expanding the scope of
NATO’s Article 5 commitment
to self-defense. The old formula
had NATO automatically
coming to the defense of a
member state if it were attacked
by a hostile power. The purpose
of this clause was to confront
any potential threat – namely
the Soviet Union and, later, its
Warsaw Pact allies – with the
reality that any attack against
one NATO member would be
treated as an attack against all.
The deterrence value of this
posture was significantly
enhanced by the presence of a
combined NATO air-sea-
ground force possessing unified
command, communications,
logistics and operational
structures, so that any attack
would be met immediately with
the full weight of NATO’s
 7

military capability – there was the perception of a Russian Russia, or repair relations with
no “30-day” period of threat where none exists. Putin. There will be no détente.
mobilization involved. Instead, the goal is to prevent
No détente expected – only
the continued worsening of
By expanding Article 5 more posturing
relations between the two
protection guarantees into the
From the perspective of Joe nations, to create a sense of
fields of space, cyber and
Biden, the NATO Summit was stability and predictability that
“hybrid”, NATO is projecting
not so much about fixing the will maintain the present chill
the sad state of its current
myriad of problems facing in relations without continuing
deterrence posture. The feeling
NATO, but rather creating the to a deep freeze or, worse, a hot
in Brussels is that Russia could
impression that NATO was war. To accomplish this, certain
degrade NATO
united in the face of Russian perceptions must be
communications and
aggression. The perception of maintained, most important of
interoperability capabilities by
strength, from the perspective which is that NATO is ready,
shutting down satellites in
of the Biden administration, is willing, and able to stand up to
space, degrade and disrupt
more important than reality, any military threat posed by
critical infrastructure using
because the long-term focus of Russia. This is the real purpose
cyber-attacks, and exploit
NATO cannot be on Russia if it behind the NATO Summit – to
internal political and ethnic
ever hopes to muster the construct a fiction capable of
unrest through so-called
political and economic bolstering Biden’s posturing
“hybrid” fifth columnists. The
resources necessary to confront during his meeting with Putin.
fact that these concerns are self-
China. Joe Biden simply needs The fact that Russia is fully
created, formed by either
to take this perception of aware of this reality only
mirror-imaging NATO intent
NATO unity and strength with underscores the theatrics of the
onto Russian capability or, in
him to Geneva, where he will entire affair. That, more than
the case of the “hybrid”
use it as a prop in the political anything, defines the current
concerns, manufacturing a
theater that will transpire when situation between the US and
doctrine where no such doctrine
he sits down with Russian Russia – theater posing as
exists, is beside the point.
President Vladimir Putin on reality, to cover for weakness in
Perception creates its own
June 16. order to project strength, all in
reality, and currently NATO is
an effort to avoid a conflict no
in the grips of a panic driven by In Geneva, Joe Biden will not
one wants.
try to reset relations with

Countering ‘Islamophobia’
AST week’s incident in
L
Ontario, Canada, in
which four members of
a Muslim family were crushed
to death in a premeditated
attack has once again raised
concerns over the rising
incidence of ‘Islamophobia’. It
was perhaps the most gruesome
murder of innocent people
motivated by anti-Muslim
hatred in Canada.
There has been a significant rise
in such crimes with the
ascendancy of ultra-right forces
in many Western societies. The
incidence of attacks on
Muslims and their places of
worship has become more
frequent. It may not be the first
time Muslims have been
targeted in Canada but it was
certainly the most heinous
attack.
It was an act of terrorism driven
by Islamophobia, declared
Justin Trudeau, the Canadian
prime minister. The 20-year-
old suspect who mowed down
the Afzal family had reportedly
been motivated by the anti-
Muslim campaign run by racist
and white supremacist groups
which have become
increasingly active over the
past few years. The tragedy has
shaken Canada, which is one of
the most culturally and racially
inclusive countries in the world.
The cabinet includes Muslim
ministers.
8
Zahid Hussain, Dawn
terrorism’ are used in right-
hat is described as
‘Islamophobia’ has, in fact, wing propaganda literature.
existed for a very long time in Surely in some cases the state’s
many Western countries. But policy of cultural
anti-Muslim movements have discrimination has also
seen a marked rise after 9/11 contributed to anti-Muslim
and have been further sentiments.
strengthened over the past few
It’s not just in the West; anti-
years with the surge of right-
Muslim politics have also
wing racist ideology. The anti-
gained momentum in other
immigrant campaign has
parts. For instance, India is one
intensified anti-Muslim
of the few countries where the
sentiments. The rise of
government itself is directly
Trumpism in the US and the
involved in an anti-Muslim
emergence of populist
campaign. It is not just
nationalist regimes have also
discriminatory policies but also
given impetus to hate-based
the violence perpetrated by the
politics.
ruling party that seeks to
‘Islamophobia’ is generally marginalise the Muslim
defined as “an outlook or population.
worldview involving an
The rise of violent anti-Muslim
unfounded dread and dislike of
movements and the hate
Muslims, which results in
campaign run by racist groups
practices of exclusion and
on social media have certainly
discrimination”. But it has
been a serious challenge for
taken a more violent turn in
democracy around the world.
recent years with terrorist
But such hate campaigns and
attacks targeting the Muslim
actions by extremist groups
community and mosques.
must not be equated with
There are political as well as
religious and civilisational
economic reasons for the rise of
wars. Individual terrorist
the anti-immigrant movement
actions must not be allowed to
particularly in Europe that often
strengthen extremist ideology
takes an anti-Muslim turn.
on the other side.
Some violent actions by
It should also be recognised that
Muslim individuals influenced
the strongest resistance to this
by extremist ideology too have
violent ideology based on anti-
been used by racist and ultra-
Muslim prejudice has come
right groups to whip up anti-
from within Western
Muslim sentiments as seen in
democracies themselves. The
France. Terms, like ‘Islamic
strong public and government

reaction against the 2019
Christchurch mosque killings
carried out by a supporter of a
white supremacist group is a
case in point. New Zealand’s
Prime Minister Jacinda
Ardern’s handling of the
horrific shootings won her
widespread appreciation by the
Muslim community. It was a
terrorist attack and didn’t
involve any religiously
motivated group.
Similarly, the Ontario killing
has united in grief the widest
section of Canadian society
across religious and racial
divides. Justin Trudeau’s
passionate speech condemning
the incident as an act of
terrorism and his government’s
pledge to take the toughest
action against the hate
campaign has certainly
reassured the vast Muslim
community in the country.
Of course, there is a need for a
coordinated and concerted
effort to counter the anti-
Muslim campaign, but it should
also be linked to the struggle
against all other violent
religious ideologies. Sadly,
killing in the name of faith is far
more prevalent in our country.
Prime Minister Imran Khan has
called for an international effort
to counter growing
‘Islamophobia’ and has also
raised the issue at various
international forums including
at the UN General Assembly. In
a recent interview to a Canadian
TV channel, he lamented the
lack of response to the move for
an internationally coordinated
effort to combat
‘Islamophobia’.
Of course, one cannot agree
more with the prime minister
that hate literature and anti-
Muslim websites should be
banned but his call would
receive a greater response if he
too made some efforts to curb
the continuing rise of extremist
faith-based ideology in the
country. A policy of
appeasement has given greater
space to the groups openly
preaching violence in the name
of faith.
While the prime ministers of
Canada and New Zealand stood
with the Muslim community in
their time of grief and took
decisive actions against the
perpetrators of the crime, our
leaders are found missing when
such tragedies occur in the
country. How can we forget the
9
time when the prime minister
refused to meet the mourners of
the victims of a Hazara
massacre in Quetta declaring he
would not be ‘blackmailed’?
He finally went there to meet
some members of the victims’
family after the funeral had
taken place. Such a callous
attitude in the face of tragedy
could hardly give him the kind
of moral high ground needed to
lead an international campaign
against ‘Islamophobia’.
Hundreds of Hazaras have been
killed over the last few years in
this country in the name of
faith.
The international community
constantly censures Pakistan
for victimisation of religious
minorities. The growing misuse
of blasphemy laws targeting
both Muslims and non-
Muslims are also cited as a
manifestation of the extremist
ideology gaining ground in the
country. The PTI government’s
overdose of religiosity has
imparted a sense of impunity to
extremist religious groups. Will
the international community
heed the prime minister’s
appeal given this situation at
home?

T
HE world knows India
through its movies. For
more than a century,
most of South Asia has been
humming Bollywood tunes,
mimicking Bollywood actors
and awaiting the next
blockbuster with rapt
anticipation.
The reach of Bollywood
stretches beyond the
subcontinent; diehard (and
rude) American fans gang up
and troll people who do not
agree with their choice of the
best Bollywood film of all time,
and Egyptians, Nigerians and
millions of others around the
world have similarly gyrated to
its dance numbers. Obviously,
they have also gotten to know,
at least to the extent possible
through the screen, the country
that exports such rousing
entertainment to so many.
This may all change very soon.
In the weeks and months to
come, operatives of Prime
Minister Modi’s Bharatiya
Janata Party are increasingly
throttling India’s multibillion-
dollar film industry that makes
more movies a year than even
Hollywood in the United
States. Specifically, there are
two things that the BJP does not
quite appreciate about the
movies these days. First is the
fact that the triumvirate of the
Khans — Shahrukh, Aamir and
Salman — have ruled the roost,
Modi’s movies
Rafia Zakaria, Dawn
wielding enormous power over
what movies get made, who
makes it big and what themes
are emergent in India’s film
industry.
Over the years, since the
inception of Prime Minister
Modi’s government in 2014,
and with much greater zeal
since his re-election in 2019,
the BJP has gone head to head
against Bollywood. Movies
which tell the stories of Muslim
conquest and Mughal rule (such
as Jodhaa Akbar) are not easy
to do, and ones such as
Padmavaat have garnered
tremendous controversy.
Bollywood movie producers
have learned the hard way that
the easiest way to get a movie
past meddling BJP censors is to
please the BJP. As a
consequence, low-budget films
regurgitate improbable dramas
in which India dominates over
Pakistan; the patriotic and
heroic are, all of them, Hindu
and fanatically so.
In recent days, as the Modi
government has confronted the
latest deadly and crushing surge
of the coronavirus pandemic,
the demand to have helpful
instruments of propaganda has
surged. Like Goebbels, the
Nazi administrator who
presaged the use of
moviemaking as part of an
ideological agenda, Modi
bhakts seem to have reached
10
similar, if belated, conclusions.
The television and print media
in India has already been beaten
into submission such that the
slang term for it is ‘Godi’ (lap)
media’, referring to how cosy
Indian journalists have become
with Modi’s Hindu supremacist
agenda.
Now Bollywood megastars and
mega producers must be
transformed into ‘Godiwood’.
It would be led by someone
other than the Khans and their
ilk and would produce endless
hours of formulaic movies
whose entire purpose would be
to extol the virtues of Prime
Minister Modi and his
government and re-familiarise
a once-secular Indian audience
with arcane myths and tales that
could be connected to the
Vedas or the BJP agenda. It is
likely that Kangana Ranaut,
who has expressed a desire to
go to the border and attack
Pakistan, and Priyanka Chopra,
who has hugged and giggled
with Modi at one of 20
wedding-related events, could
star in the ones that were left.
It would be funny if it were not
true. When protests broke out
over India’s new citizenship
laws, the Khans for all their
power were afraid to speak out
despite the fact that the new law
primarily snatches citizenship
from India’s Muslims.
Whatever little they could say

was useless in sating the bhakts;
needless to say, the citizenship
law passed.
Modi needs to produce a
distraction for his long-
suffering and Covid-19
traumatised Indian population.
For weeks, so many have had to
endure more tragedy and loss of
life than most people see in a
lifetime; worse still, from the
BJP perspective, all Indians
who had happily drunk the
Modi miracle potion have had a
bitter dose of reality. The
country still has millions of
poor, the health infrastructure is
non-existent, there is corruption
at every level; these are just
some of the truths they may
have become reacquainted
with.
An entertainment machinery is
required to distract such a
stricken population; the answer,
Godiwood. With celebrities
frightened away by intrusive
audits, threats of arrests,
censorship, etc., Godiwood
could produce the same song
and dance spectacles but with a
pointed goal: the glorification
of the Hindu supremacist state
that the prime minister has
almost created.
Fascists always seek to control
cultural production in a country
in order to realise the complete
and centralised control of
power that permits them to
dominate everything. If one
watches the Godi media, it is
difficult not to wonder how so
many in the Indian population
can swallow such obviously
concocted praise songs being
presented as the day’s news.
The time between newscasts is
taken up by bizarre and
seemingly endless ‘debates’, in
which nearly everyone screams
at each other in their efforts to
show just how much in Modi’s
godi they are.
Godiwood will be very similar,
one assumes; there will more of
a focus on religious themes, the
ills of ‘Hinduphobia’ (which,
by definition, could not exist in
a Hindu-majority country
11
where Hindus control
everything), the depredations of
Pakistan, the ignominy of all
Muslim rulers of the past. If
Bollywood was light and
entertaining, funny and
seductive, Godiwood, designed
to please its audience of one,
promises to be tedious and
banal. You can force creative
people to do what you want
them to do, you cannot force
them to love it.
Ironically, then, while the
independent Bollywood was a
fantastic and ubiquitous
emblem of India’s cultural
depth and relevance, Godiwood
will likely be exactly (and
boringly) just the opposite. If
the former stood for a
democratic and endlessly
fascinating country, the latter is
but a hideous and apologetic
husk of a project presented to a
duped population and those
who best do their master’s
bidding.

Iran’s Rigged Election
Ali Vaez, Foreign Affairs
S
ince the Iranian
presidential election of
1997, when the reformist
candidate Mohammad Khatami
won a surprise victory,
elections in the Islamic
Republic have remained
relatively competitive. That
seems set to change, however.
In the upcoming presidential
election, slated for June 18,
Iran’s current chief justice,
Ebrahim Raisi, is all but certain
to cruise to victory and become
Iran’s eighth president. His win
will largely result from
preelection engineering on the
part of the Guardian Council, a
12-member body of jurists and
clerics that is closely aligned
with Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei and that vets
candidates for office. Of the
592 candidates who threw their
hats, turbans, and headscarfs
into this month’s race, the
Guardian Council approved
only seven men, of whom Raisi
is the most prominent.
The Guardian Council’s
decision to disqualify many
established political
heavyweights shocked
Tehran’s political elite. The
council rejected the candidacy
of Ali Larijani, who served the
longest term of any Speaker of
the parliament, currently
advises the supreme leader, and
led the negotiations that
produced Iran’s recent strategic
partnership deal with China.
Also barred from running were
Vice President Eshagh
Jahangiri, who has been a
heartbeat away from the
presidency for the past eight
years, and the two-term past
president Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad.
Criticism of the council’s
decision laid bare the Iranian
political elite’s hypocrisy.
Larijani’s brother, Sadeq, a
member of the Guardian
Council, lambasted the
“indefensible” disqualifications
and derided the “security
apparatus” for meddling in the
vetting process. Hassan
Khomeini, the grandson of the
Islamic Republic’s founder,
condemned the council’s
undermining of the system’s
republican institutions as
“counterrevolutionary” and
advised the approved
candidates to drop out of the
race. Ahmadinejad joined
millions of Iranians who say
they are planning to boycott the
elections.
Khamenei initially defended
the Guardian Council’s
choices. Although he later
claimed that some injustices
were committed during the
vetting process, he stopped
short of demanding a reversal.
That is likely because the
supreme leader may be
considering structural changes:
namely, converting the
12
country’s presidential system
into a parliamentary one or
replacing the role of supreme
leader with a multiperson
council. A parliamentary
system would limit the conflicts
between the offices of the
supreme leader and the
president under Iran’s existing
system, and abolishing the
position of supreme leader
would help his son maintain
backroom influence after
Khamenei’s death. Having a
pliant president such as Raisi by
his side would mean that
Khamenei would face little
internal resistance to what
would amount to an
unprecedented transformation
of the Iranian political system.
AN UNLEVELED PLAYING
FIELD
When the council published its
final list of approved candidates
on May 25, Iranians flooded
social media with clips from
The Dictator, a movie in which
Sacha Baron Cohen plays a
Middle Eastern tyrant. In one
scene, the dictator participates
in a race, which he begins by
firing his pistol into the air—
and then shooting the other
runners. To Iranian observers, it
served as an allusion to Raisi,
who is notorious for his
involvement as a prosecutor in
the execution of thousands of
political prisoners in the late
1980s.

None of Raisi’s vetted rivals
pose a serious threat. One, the
hard-line former national
security adviser and chief
nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili,
supported Raisi in the 2017
presidential election. Polls
suggest that the gap between
him and Raisi is
insurmountable. The same
applies to another perennial
contender, Mohsen Rezaei, the
former commander in chief of
the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps. In his previous
three failed bids, Rezaei never
gained more than four million
votes (compared with Raisi’s
nearly 16 million in 2017,
which was in turn dwarfed by
the 23.5 million votes for the
winning candidate, Hassan
Rouhani). Two other hard-line
opponents, Amir-Hossein
Ghazizadeh and Alireza
Zakani, are current members of
parliament with little national
recognition. But they present no
challenge since Zakani
withdrew on June 16, and
Ghazizadeh is likely to do the
same before voting day. The fig
leaf reformist candidate,
Mohsen Mehralizadeh, former
governor of the province of
Isfahan, was not backed even
by reformist coalitions and also
dropped out on June 16, further
narrowing the field.
The only person who could
potentially mobilize some
popular support is Abdolnaser
Hemmati, the technocratic
former head of Iran’s central
bank. Many centrists and
reformists are starting to
consider him the least bad
option owing to his relatively
progressive platform and to his
wife’s active participation in
his campaign, which signals a
relatively progressive approach
to gender issues by the
standards of Iran’s highly
patriarchal polity.
Nevertheless, he is unlikely to
dislodge Raisi as the front-
runner.
END OF THE REPUBLIC?
The government of the Islamic
Republic has often pointed to
high rates of voter turnout to
buttress its claims
legitimacy, even if the
electorate always has to choose
from a limited spectrum of
preselected candidates. In
reality, however, turnout rates
have varied widely. And in
recent years, the Guardian
Council’s increasingly
aggressive disqualification
practices and the hard-liners’
dogged obstruction
meaningful reforms have
culminated in widespread
political apathy. Recent surveys
anticipate a historically low
turnout of around 40 percent.
The ongoing COVID-19
pandemic is likely to further
reduce participation.
This causes very little alarm for
Iran’s hard-line faction, which
is not primarily concerned with
shoring up the government’s
popular legitimacy through
competitive elections. Instead,
Khamenei has decided to
further shrink the circle of
insiders and anoint
subservient ally to the
presidency to complete the
hard-liners’ control over all
levers of power at a critical
13
moment. Most observers
believe rigging the election in
favor of Raisi is a ploy to groom
him to become the supreme
leader himself, in the same way
that Khamenei succeeded
Iran’s first supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
in 1989, after serving as
president. According to this
view, if Raisi became supreme
leader, his lack of revolutionary
and religious credentials would
force him to rely on
Khamenei’s office—a shadow
to government of sorts in which
Khamenei’s son Mojtaba is a
key player.
Others argue the opposite: that
the supreme leader sees Raisi as
a threat and that by elevating
him to the presidency,
Khamenei is setting him up to
fail. After all, the thinking goes,
as head of the judiciary, Raisi
faces a narrow set of challenges
of
and is accountable only to
Khamenei, but as president, he
would confront numerous
socioeconomic crises amid a
standoff with the West over
Iran’s nuclear and regional
policies. With Raisi’s
credibility eroded by the
burdens of the presidency,
Khamenei could elevate his
preferred heir apparent.
Neither hypothesis is
particularly convincing. Once
in office as supreme leader,
Raisi would not necessarily
remain dependent on
Khamenei’s office or family
a
and could sideline them in
much the same way Khamenei
himself sidelined the Khomeini
and Rafsanjani families that
had helped boost him to the

pinnacle of political power. It is
hard to believe that Khamenei,
his family, and his supporters
would overlook Machiavelli’s
warning: “He who is the cause
of another becoming powerful
is ruined.”
The second hypothesis is even
less likely. There is, after all, a
decent chance that the nuclear
deal Iran struck with the United
States and other major powers
might be restored by the time
Raisi comes into office. In that
case, he would begin his
presidency by reaping the
deal’s economic dividends and
taking credit for the country’s
recovery from COVID-19 as
well, given the prospects of
greater vaccine availability by
then. If Khamenei is trying to
set up a rival to fail, he’s picked
an odd time to do it.
A more likely explanation for
why Khamenei and the
Guardian Council put their
fingers on the scale so
decisively to assist Raisi is that
they have reason to believe he
would not oppose major
structural changes that would
put the system on a more stable
footing while ensuring the
survival of Khamenei’s family
and his vision for the
revolution. Specifically, the
supreme leader may aim to
convert Iran’s presidential
system to a parliamentary one
or to replace the supreme
leader’s role with a council that
would take over once he passes
on. He hinted at the former a
decade ago, when he publicly
announced that “if one day,
possibly in the distant future, it
is felt that a parliamentary
system is more suited for
electing those responsible for
the executive branch, then there
would be no problems in
making changes to the system.”
A parliamentary system would
reduce the friction between the
offices of the supreme leader
and the president that currently
exists in Iran’s bifurcated
political structure and would
make it easier for an amenable
parliament to remove and
replace the chief executive.
And thus one of the system’s
key representative
institutions—its executive—
could no longer challenge its
theocratic unelected ones,
14
strengthening the control of the
supreme leader.
Abolishing a single-man
supreme leadership,
meanwhile, would diminish the
risk that after Khamenei leaves
office, his successor would
marginalize his family. The
absence of a sole dominant
ruler would also allow
Khamenei’s son Mojtaba to
retain a great deal of behind-
the-scenes influence even after
his father had passed away.
Having sidelined Khomeini’s
family and imprisoned
Rafsanjani’s children himself,
Khamenei is right to fear a
similar fate for his son, who
could ensure that Khamenei’s
legacy is protected and his
strategic agenda outlives him.
Such significant changes might
not be Ayatollah Khamenei’s
ultimate objective. He might
just want his new (and probably
last) president to be less
troublesome than the previous
four, who often caused him
headaches. But if he is seeking
transformational change, a
compliant president would
certainly help.

The Time Is Now for a Trade Deal With Taiwan
U .S. Secretary of State
Antony Blinken made
headlines last week
when he signaled during
congressional testimony that
the United States would be
resuming its suspended trade
dialogue with Taiwan. U.S.
Trade Representative Katherine
Tai followed up by meeting
virtually with her Taiwanese
counterpart last Thursday,
where they agreed to convene
the Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA)
Council “in the coming weeks.”
This is a welcome and overdue
development, but it is still not
enough. Instead, the time is ripe
for the United States to begin
negotiations with Taiwan on a
comprehensive bilateral trade
agreement.
Taiwan is the United States’
ninth-largest trading partner
and its seventh-largest
destination for agricultural
exports, with total trade in
goods valued at $90 billion in
2020. Trade with Taiwan
supports over two hundred
thousand U.S. jobs. Taiwan
also occupies a central position
in global technology supply
chains, in particular
semiconductors. The United
States trades more with Taiwan
than it does with India, France,
or Italy. Beyond trade, Taiwan
is an important partner on
regional and global issues,
working with the United States
Jennifer Hillman, CFR
on everything from climate
change to global health,
anticorruption,
empowerment,
women’s
sustainable
development, and
counterterrorism.
The United States and Taiwan
signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA)
in 1994, which provides a
forum for officials from the
Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR)
to meet with their Taiwanese
counterparts to discuss and
hopefully resolve irritants to
bilateral trade and investment.
Since 2007, the trade
relationship has not been able to
get past Taiwan’s barriers to
U.S. agricultural exports. The
main stumbling block has been
Taiwan’s ban on imports of
U.S. pork and beef because they
often contain ractopamine, an
additive (currently also banned
in the European Union and
China) that promotes leanness.
To signal its displeasure with
Taiwan’s stance, USTR
suspended TIFA talks,
resuming them from 2013 to
2016 (after Taiwan allowed
some beef imports containing
ractopamine), before the Trump
administration suspended them
again in 2017.
Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-
wen, a trade negotiator by
training, recognized the
primary hurdle as well as the
15
importance of improving trade
ties with the United States.
After handily winning
reelection, in August 2020
President Tsai announced that
she would remove the ban, to
significant domestic political
backlash. This policy change is
now subject to a nonbinding
referendum that will be held in
August. The Trump
administration, despite all its
talk about the importance of
U.S.-Taiwan relations, did not
initiate trade talks, reportedly
because it was concerned that
doing so would prompt China
to walk away from the phase
one trade deal.
USTR has identified remaining
issues that could be addressed
during negotiations, namely
Taiwan’s barriers on
agricultural products, in
particular rice, genetically
modified foods, ground beef,
and animal byproducts. USTR
likely also would push Taiwan
to lower tariffs on distilled
spirits, large motorcycles, and
soda ash, and create a more
level playing field in the
pharmaceutical and medical
device sectors. There is also
scope for Taiwan to more
effectively combat copyright
infringement, especially with
respect to online piracy, and to
provide greater access to its
cloud computing market.
Progress on these issues should
be attainable.

Despite a general lack of
appetite for new free-trade
agreements, there appears to be
a large degree of congressional
support for a deal with Taiwan.
In the fall of 2020, a bipartisan
group of fifty senators signed a
letter calling on then-U.S.
Trade Representative Robert
Lighthizer to begin working
toward a comprehensive trade
agreement with Taiwan. This
followed a similar bipartisan
letter signed by 161 members of
the House in 2019 and the
passage in 2020 of the Taiwan
International Protection and
Enhancement Initiative
(TAIPEI) Act by unanimous
consent, which called on USTR
to further strengthen bilateral
trade and economic relations
with Taiwan.
This strong bipartisan support
reflects an appreciation of
Taiwan’s constructive role on
regional and global issues and
recognition that Taiwan’s
continued security is critical to
regional stability in the Asia-
Pacific. As China’s military
strength and confidence
increase, the United States
needs to find additional ways to
continue to deter Chinese
adventurism. In addition to the
economic merits of a trade deal,
this development would also
send a strong signal to China on
the importance the United
States places in its relationship
with Taiwan and increase
Taiwan’s confidence, allowing
Taipei to approach the
mainland from a position of
strength.
China’s strategy for Taiwan is
to employ a range of tools in an
16
attempt to cause Taiwan’s ability to join in trade
twenty-four million people to liberalization, Taiwan’s
conclude that their only viable economy will fall behind,
future is to join China. In the which would add to China’s
economic realm, it has cut leverage over the island. A
tourism to Taiwan, banned U.S.-Taiwan trade deal,
imports of Taiwanese however, could provide
pineapples, and most political cover for other
importantly sought to countries to begin negotiations
marginalize Taiwan in of their own with Taipei.
international trade. Although
While resuming TIFA talks is a
Taiwan is a member of the
positive step, this dialogue
World Trade Organization
alone is unlikely to generate
(WTO) and the Asia-Pacific
enough momentum toward a
Economic Cooperation (APEC)
trade agreement. The time is
forum, it is not a member of the
ripe to be more ambitious.
two largest regional trade
President Tsai has three years
groupings, the Comprehensive
left in her second term, and
and Progressive Agreement for
because she does not have to
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-
stand for reelection she is in a
TPP) that includes Canada,
position to spend political
Japan, Mexico, and eight other
capital to finalize a trade deal
countries and the Regional
with the United States. Her
Comprehensive Economic
successor, regardless of
Partnership (RCEP) that
political party, will be unlikely
includes China, Japan, South
to make the necessary
Korea, Australia, New Zealand
concessions during a first term.
and the Association of
President Tsai, who has focused
Southeast Asian Nations
on diversifying Taiwan’s
(ASEAN) countries. Taiwan is
economy away from China
excluded largely because
(with mixed success), would
members fear Chinese
view a trade agreement with the
retaliation. Taiwan only has
United States as an important
two free trade agreements with
part of her legacy, and can be
countries that do not maintain
expected to negotiate in good
diplomatic relations with the
faith.
island – deals with Singapore
and New Zealand – and China A U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement
has pressured other countries would increase the island’s
not to conclude trade economic and national security
agreements with Taiwan. This while further opening an
despite the fact that China important market for U.S.
signed an Economic exports. It would signal support
Cooperation Framework for an important partner and
Agreement (ECFA) with underscore the U.S. interest in
Taiwan in 2010, which cross-strait stability. The time is
significantly reduced tariffs and right for an ambitious U.S.-
trade barriers. There is a well- Taiwan trade agenda.
founded fear that without the
 Realizing the U.S.-Pakistan Geoeconomic Pivot
Hamna Tariq, South Asian Voices
I n his recent visit to the
United States, Pakistan’s
Foreign Minister Shah
Mahmood Qureshi met with
Pakistani-American
entrepreneurs in New York to
encourage foreign investment
in Pakistan. Over the past few
months, numerous high-level
officials in Pakistan’s
government, including
National Security Advisor
Moeed Yusuf and Chief of
Army Staff General Qamar
Javed Bajwa, have pushed for a
recalibration of U.S.-Pakistan
relations away from
geostrategy and geopolitics—
the influence of geographic
dynamics on international
power dynamics—and towards
geoeconomics—the influence
of global economic trends on
foreign relations. The Pakistani
state envisioned its
geoeconomic turn in the
context of decreasing domestic
terrorism and the U.S. intention
to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Restructuring U.S.-Pakistan
relations along economic lines
could help improve Pakistan’s
reputation as a terrorism-ridden
security state and enhance
prospects of domestic and
regional peace and stability.
While Pakistan pushes for an
economics-driven foreign
policy at the diplomatic level, it
can only realize this vision after
undertaking significant
domestic economic reforms
and rebranding itself as an open
international market.
Politically Motivated vs. Profit-
Motivated Investment
Before diving into how
Pakistan could improve its
government can, however,
reconsider its narrative of
Pakistan’s security conditions
and CPEC investments and
nudge private investors towards
investment climate for
Pakistani projects through
international investors, it is
groups such as the U.S.-
essential to differentiate
Pakistan Business Council. Yet
between investments from
the onus remains on Pakistan to
China—especially through the
improve its investment climate
China-Pakistan Economic
and impress profit-motivated
Corridor (CPEC)—and
investors in the United States.
investments from the United
This would require Pakistan
States. First and foremost,
immediately address domestic
CPEC was a government-to-
barriers, including bureaucratic
government agreement to
inefficiencies, restrictive laws,
develop infrastructure, roads,
and inconsistency in economic
and energy in Pakistan. State-
policies.
led Chinese investments are not
driven exclusively by economic The Uncertain Economy
motivations. Political and
Pakistan’s post-pandemic
security relations have at least
economy has shown signs of
as strong an influence.
recovery, largely due to the
Specifically, in order to bolster
conditions imposed by the
its long-term strategic goals,
International Monetary Fund
China is often willing to accept
(IMF) program. Pakistan’s
near-term unfavorable
foreign reserves have nearly
investments for long-term
doubled from USD $7.2 billion
influence.
in May 2018 to USD $16
U.S. investments are typically billion in May 2021. The State
economically (profit) Bank of Pakistan has estimated
motivated, and U.S. companies the GDP growth rate to rise to
independently choose to invest 3.94 percent for fiscal year
in attractive economies. (FY) 21, and the government of
Exceptions to this rule are Pakistan set the GDP growth
USAID initiatives that have rate target to 4.8 percent for
contributed significantly to FY22.
economic development but
Although Pakistan’s 28 spot
have been widely criticized for
jump in the World Bank’s
internal mismanagement and
Doing Business 2020 report—
lack of sustainability required
from 136 to 108—is
for long-term projects. The U.S.
commendable, the country lags
government cannot itself
behind regional neighbors
directly facilitate private sector
India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.
investments. The U.S.
Foreign direct investment

(FDI) inflows have also
dropped by approximately 35
percent in the first three
quarters of FY 2021. Given the
global pandemic, these
statistics cannot be entirely
attributed to the Pakistani
government’s policies.
However, spurts of growth
followed by economic crises
remains a troubling pattern for
the country’s economy.
Pakistan’s economic strategy
must focus on investments that
are sustainable and upheld with
consistent economic policies.
First, Pakistan needs to address
inconsistencies in its economic
approaches from one
government to another and
avoid internal shifts and
frequent reshuffling of
cabinets. Over the course of
Imran Khan’s three-year
tenure, four different officials
have held the position of
finance minister: Asad Umar,
Abdul Hafeez Sheikh, Hammad
Azhar, and now Shaukat
Tareen. Frequent finance
minister overturn illustrates
how the government’s
economic agenda has failed,
hurting investor confidence.
Rapidly fluctuating and
unpredictable policies slash
investor confidence, making
individuals hesitant to invest
large amounts capital and
maintain investments for more
than a couple of years. Such
internal inconsistency and
bureaucratic red tape promote
rent-seeking behavior — the highest losses in South
investing for a short period of
time to gain maximum profit
without creating long-term
benefits and wealth for the
18
economy—which further The complicated regulatory
inhibits growth and ambition. system in Pakistan further
deters foreign investment.
Investors have also identified
Foreign businesses must
that inconsistent tax regulations
address often inconsistent laws
from provincial and federal
and policies from both
authorities and frequent delays
provincial and federal
due to incompetent
regulatory authorities. A
bureaucratic institutions have
judicial system that expects
made it difficult for them to
foreign investors to file in
gauge the profitability of
regular courts, instead of fast-
investments. For example,
track courts for expedited
Special Economic Zones—
conflict resolution, also
areas intended for rapid
complicates matters. The Reko
economic growth through
Diq Arbitration Case is a model
foreign investment by offering
example of inconsistent
tax and business incentives—
regulatory policy. In 1993 BHP
made investors exempted from
Minerals signed an agreement
all income taxes for ten years.
with the Balochistan
However, the Pakistani
government to mine copper and
government began charging a
gold in the Reko Diq mine of
minimum of 1.5 percent
Balochistan. In 2006, this
turnover tax—an indirect tax on
company was replaced by an
the estimated value of a good—
Australian joint venture called
in lieu of income tax. The
the Tethyan Copper Company
Pakistan Business Council has
(TCC), which would acquire
described these taxes as
the terms of prior agreements.
“extremely high and
Although the Balochistan High
unrealistic.” It is also difficult
Court validated the agreement
to expect investors to establish
in 2007, the Supreme Court of
manufacturing plants when 26
Pakistan declared the
percent of Pakistan does not
agreement void in 2013, and a
have access to grid electricity
long-drawn and expensive legal
and load-shedding remains
battle for Pakistan ensued.
commonplace. Electricity
Similarly, when Walter Power
shortage is at the core of
International Limited (WPI),
Pakistan’s investment
based in Oklahoma City, sent
dilemma, as is illustrated by the
power generation equipment to
damaging delays to the Renault
Pakistan in 2009 to help
Motors car manufacturing plant
alleviate the country’s power
in Karachi. Although China’s
shortages, the Supreme Court
investments have helped with
intervened and nullified the
some power grid issues,
contract due to widespread
Pakistan’s power sector makes
corruption. Even after the
National Accountability
Asia, and the cost of power is
Bureau in Pakistan settled the
also more expensive than
dispute with WPI, the
regional countries.
government of Pakistan refused
to re-export the equipment back

to the United States. The Reko
Diq and WPI cases illustrate the
deep-rooted tensions involved
in Pakistan’s judicial dealings
with foreign investors. Such
public court interventions in
private investment matters
cannot guarantee security and
policy certainty for a 20- or 25-
year long-term investment.
The Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) is another major
barrier to Pakistan’s
geoeconomic pivot ambitions.
Although Pakistan’s internal
security situation has improved
considerably, its place on the
FATF gray list, signaling the
threat of money-laundering and
terror-financing, represents an
additional layer of risk for
international investors.
Although the reputational risks
of the gray list aren’t nearly as
serious as those of the black list,
increased risk perception from
the gray-listing threatens to
keep investors out of the
country. Deloitte’s exit from
Pakistan in November 2020
made Pakistan the only country
amongst the top ten most
populated countries in the
world that does not have all Big
Four accounting firms—
Deloitte, Ernst and Young
(EY), Pricewaterhouse Coopers
(PwC), and KPMG). This
signaled the diminishing of
Pakistan’s international
reputation and increases doubt
about the credibility of
Pakistan’s investment climate.
Whether Deloitte’s exit was
related to Pakistan’s alleged
terror-financing or not, it
illustrates how the security risk
remains high for international
investors.
Setting up a Stronger
Investment Environment
Pakistan has the ability and
capacity to realize its
geoeconomic objectives
through sustainable domestic
reform. This could include
setting up fast-track courts to
arbitrate international
investment cases, establishing a
central regulatory authority,
harmonizing tax codes, and
fighting terror-financing and
money-laundering. The
government should invest in
research and development to
create an innovative and
stimulating investment climate
through increasing involvement
of the diaspora in investment-
related policy-making
decisions, encouraging
creativity beyond the confines
of religious laws, and reducing
licensing fees amongst other
economic measures to attract
payment-transfer facilities,
such as PayPal, support direct
business-to-business contact.
With help from its diaspora
community, Pakistan can also
recalibrate its marketing
strategy to capture the
imagination of international
investors. Now that Chinese
investors are setting up
manufacturing facilities for the
production of a variety of
products, including beer and
garments, the next step is to
build momentum and attract
non-Chinese investors.
The onus of realizing this
geoeconomic shift does not
only fall exclusively on the
19
Pakistani government.
Although the former Pakistan
Muslim League-N (PML-N)
government explicitly
prioritized Chinese
investments, the current
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
(PTI) government has
consistently sought to develop
trade relations with the United
States and China and
emphasized that relations with
China are not a “zero-sum
game.” However, the U.S.
government’s China-hesitant
rhetoric has, to an extent,
heightened caution amongst
U.S. investors from exploring
the Pakistani market. U.S.
diplomat and former U.S.
Ambassador to Jordan Alice
Wells’ strong criticism of
CPEC in 2019 marked a shift in
U.S. policy towards implicitly
including Pakistan as a field for
its larger economic great power
competition with China. Even
recently, U.S. government
officials have criticized the
China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) for its lack of
transparency and debt-trap
diplomacy features. The U.S.
business community, nudged
by the U.S. government, is
likely to view CPEC with
suspicion. Yet it is in its own
interest to tap the potential of
fast-developing CPEC-built
Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) and road infrastructure
in the resource-rich country
with a young workforce and
burgeoning middle class.
Islamabad, in return, should be
more transparent with the
Pakistani public about the terms
of CPEC loans and widen
CPEC-related consultations to
 20

involve all stakeholders. bureaucratic practices will be digital economy, suggest a

Stepping away from
exaggerated “China camp”
rhetoric could significantly
help reform U.S.-Pakistan
relations.
Entrenched obstacles including
the long-standing problem of
“elite capture” and rigid
tough to reform. Pakistan also
faces geopolitical constraints as
it competes with faster-growing
economies Vietnam and India
for U.S. investment. Yet recent
economic policies, including
efforts to temporarily abolish
withholding tax over usage of
credit cards to promote the
positive trend in Pakistan’s
investment future. Similar
efforts to cut bureaucratic red
tape and build economic
reliability will enable Pakistan
to shift from being a U.S.
security partner to an economic
investment opportunity.

The US-China conflict and where it would lead to
Talat Masood, Express Tribune
T
he intensification of
rivalry between United
States and China has far-
reaching global repercussions.
It has been described as a new
Cold War and is a reflection of
how the new US administration
has taken upon itself as the
world’s number one challenge
or threat to its global
supremacy. It is mobilising all
its resources and bringing
together its European and Asia
Pacific allies to put up a joint
front to thwart its rise. There is
a sense of unease and
nervousness and a compelling
urgency in Washington to
counter China lest its rise may
gain momentum and become
unstoppable. Indeed, the US
assumption is partly true that
China has the making and
resolve of a future superpower.
If in the coming decades
Beijing maintains the steady
course it will challenge US
supremacy despite repeated
assurances that it has no
intention of doing so.
But the way Washington’s
reaction borders on paranoia.
Perhaps the reason being that
the US has remained
unchallenged militarily or
economically ever since the
collapse of the Soviet Union in
December 26, 1991.
The US, in order to undermine
China’s economy and rising
military capabilities, has
imposed multiple sanctions and
blacklisted its very successful
companies that were trading
with the US on the basis that
these were indulging in
malpractices and stealing
technology. By denying them
any access it expects to retard
China’s technology and
manufacturing capabilities. The
US administration under
former president Donald
Trump had blacklisted 31
Chinese companies and
declared several Chinese firms
off-limits to American
investors. These include
telecom, construction and
technology firms including
China Mobile. The list has been
further expanded to nearly 60
by the present US
administration.
China has been compelled to
take reciprocal steps and
banned several US companies.
Thus the world economic order
that we witnessed over the last
few decades is undergoing a
major change and turbulence.
How the global markets and
giant multinationals and IT
companies will adjust to these
changes and how it will affect
smaller economies and
countries like Pakistan is of
serious concern.
Clearly, it will require delicate
balancing of strategic relations
with China while cooperating
with the US in matters of
21
mutual interest. This will not be
easy but Pakistan’s Foreign
Office and military have the
experience and ability to
manage in complex
environments.
This is an age where major
nations realise that military
dominance has to be
accompanied by economic
power. President Joe Biden’s
primary focus and strategy is to
weaken China economically by
raising trade barriers, accusing
it of malpractices and taking
multiple measures to put brakes
in China’s economic rise.
The US allegation, generally
shared by other European
partners and Japan, is that
Chinese companies do not
adhere to agreed international
norms and practices in doing
business. This may be true in a
few cases but this is not
peculiar to China and many
Western and other nations have
been accused of similar charges
when they tried to dominate the
world market.
As China’s economic
capability increases and
tensions between the US and
China rise, it is likely that
Beijing that has been satisfied
with a modest nuclear
capability of anywhere between
250 to 350 weapons may decide
to upgrade and increase two or
three times its nuclear arsenal
by the next decade. Obviously,
 22

this is miniscule in comparison At present, in America the deceptive when it claims its rise
with the US and Russian assumption that it will always will be peaceful, changes the
nuclear arsenals, but would remain number one is being entire paradigm which the
reflect a more aggressive trend, challenged. It is an interesting world was taking for granted.
giving a message that it will not debate and serves as a wake-up
be intimidated. call to take China’s rise
seriously at multiple levels. In
Moreover, according to experts
any case, history is full of
China has made rapid progress
examples when nations at the
in build-up of its medium-range
pinnacle have been replaced by
missiles, with multiple
others. The other pertinent
warheads that are now more
question is that just as the US
accurate and lethal. China is
does not want China to engage
also building and modernising
in unfair practices to gain
its sea based and bomber
economic ascendancy so
nuclear forces, but these would
should Washington not pursue
take time. Obviously, all these
policies to thwart China’s rise
developments would present
through unfair political,
organisational as well as
economic and strategic means.
technological challenges and
Mobilising and putting a
take time to fully mature.
common front to protect the
It was expected that as China’s world economic order and
military power increased it practices is perfectly in order
would have been drawn in these but building a wall to prevent
discussions at a certain stage to the rise of China’s economic
ensure strategic stability. power is another.
Apparently, China has been
When Trump threw aside all
reluctant to be a part of any
treaties and conventions and
global strategic consensus
pursued an increasingly
considering that its nuclear
unilateralist path, that gave the
arsenal is very small (about 5%)
US some immediate
in comparison with the two
advantages. But was that
nuclear major powers. It does
ethically right and not a breach
not want to get constrained by
of sorts? This may not be
associating with them at this
analogous to the present
stage. And the US considers its
China’s actions but illustrates
missile defence shield will take
that there are different
care of China’s threat as well
standards of viewing issues.
Unfortunately, former
The fallout of the current
president Trump was very
economic, trade and strategic
dismissive about arms control
confrontation between
and international treaties. Arms
Washington and China will
control received a setback when
have serious consequences for
the US withdrew from the
the world. It will hurt the global
arms-reduction negotiations
economy adversely and
with Russia during Trump’s
political tensions will increase.
administration.
The US, by spreading the
narrative that China is being