U.S. Intelligence On Europe Background Article

It Did Not Begin With Snowden
The Declassified History of American Intelligence Operations in Europe:

1945-2001
Matthew M. Aid, October 2014
Background article for Brill’s Research Collection U.S. Intelligence on Europe, 1945-1995. The online collection is
available at http://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/us-intelligence-on-europe.
pg. 1 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

Contents
Introduction
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S 70-YEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN AND TURKEY
• U.S. Intelligence Activities in West Germany and West Berlin

• The U.S. Intelligence Presence in Great Britain
• The Turkish Intelligence Facilities
U.S. ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE COLD WAR
• East Germany
• Czechoslovakia
• Hungary
• Poland
• Romania
• Bulgaria
• Albania
SPYING ON AMERICA’S EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES
• France
• Great Britain
• West Germany
• Norway
• Spain
• Italy
• Greece
• Turkey / Cyprus
• Spying on the Picayune of Europe
• Spying on the Western European Communist Parties
• Economic Intelligence Gathering in Europe
• Monitoring European Anti-Nuclear Groups in the 1980s
INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON EUROPE
• Terrorism in Europe
• Coverage of European Socio-Economic Issues

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The great thing about the study of history is that it is a dynamic process. Unlike the sciences, engineering and
mathematics, there are no hard and fast rules to the study of history because it is forever changing as new
information come to light. This is especially in true in the realm of intelligence history, one of the youngest but
fastest growing areas of serious academic endeavor, where literally every day researchers around the world are
unearthing formerly classified documentary materials on dusty shelves in archives and libraries that are changing,
in some cases dramatically, our understanding of how and why certain world events happened the way they did.
The result is that many of the books and articles written over the past seventy years about intelligence matters
by journalists and popular non-fiction writers, which were based largely on interviews with confidential sources
of varying levels of knowledge and sometimes dubious reliability, are now being challenged by intelligence
scholars and researchers, who have the benefit of access to many of the formerly classified primary source
documents that their journalistic brethren did not.
The vital importance of serious intelligence scholarship has become abundantly clear by the revelations in the
American and European media over the past two years based on leaked material provided by former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden about the activities in Europe of America’s electronic eavesdropping organization,
the National Security Agency (NSA) and its British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ).
In the U.S., the media revelations have led to demands for strengthening the oversight controls on NSA and
limiting the electronic surveillance activities that the agency is legally authorized to perform. But given the
current propensity of the American political and legislative systems towards inaction and perpetual partisan
squabbling, it remains to be seen if any of these calls for NSA ‘reform’ will ever be enacted into law.
In Europe, the revelations about NSA and GCHQ’s electronic eavesdropping activities in the European press
have brought into clear relief the broad outlines of the electronic surveillance activities currently being conducted
by these two agencies on the continent. Not only have the revelations generated considerable public anger, but
they have also had a decidedly negative impact on the U.S. government’s relations with some (but not all) of its
European allies, especially the German government because of 2013 stories indicating that NSA and GCHQ
monitored the cell phone calls of German chancellor Angela Merkel.
Many current serving and retired American and European intelligence officials that I have spoken to over the
past two years are both angry and more than somewhat perplexed about the reaction in Western Europe to the
reports in the press about U.S. intelligence activities, many of which they adamantly believe to be distorted,
inaccurate, or lacking in historical context and political perspective.
There is more than a little truth in what these past and present intelligence officials say, but regardless of
whether you agree with their views or not, the simple fact of the matter is that the Snowden leaks have, perhaps
forever, changed the way Europeans view the U.S. intelligence community and its activities. The irony is that
seventy years after the first American spies took root in Europe, the American intelligence presence in Europe
has now become a source of both public controversy and high-level concern within a number of Western
European governments.

CHAPTER 2
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S 70-YEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE
As the documents in this collection show, the multitude of civilian and military intelligence agencies comprising
the U.S. intelligence community took root in Europe even before Nazi Germany’s surrender in May 1945, and have
never left the continent in the intervening seventy years despite the significant changes that have taken place in
the global security environment. As a former senior CIA official aptly put it, “The world may change, leaders come
and go, governments rise and fall, but spying is forever.”1
There were many reasons why the U.S. intelligence community devoted so much time and resources to
systematically build up such a massive, multi-layered espionage infrastructure in Western Europe during the Cold
War.
• First, in 1948 the CIA was tasked with doing whatever it took to prevent any Western Europe countries from
coming under the control of Moscow. One of the top tasks assigned to the CIA’s covert action arms, the Office
of Policy Coordination (OPC) after its creation in 1948 was to prevent by any means necessary Western
European communist parties from taking over their host governments at the ballot box, or even from
participating in the governance of their host countries in a coalition environment.2
• Second, and perhaps most importantly, after the end of World War II Western Europe immediately became
the U.S. intelligence community’s most important platform for gaining access to its top intelligence targets: the
USSR and its Eastern European allies.
It must be remembered that gaining access to even the most mundane information about the Soviet Union,
such as train schedules and telephone books, was very hard to come by in the early Cold War years, and the U.S.
intelligence community’s personnel in Europe were ill-equipped to overcome these obstacles.
After the end of World War II, the U.S. intelligence community did not have much of a presence in Western
Europe. The U.S. military services had perhaps 900 intelligence officers and supporting staff in Europe in 1946,
half of whom were radio intercept personnel based in West Germany belong to the U.S. Army’s cryptologic
organization, the Army Security Agency (ASA). Most of the remaining personnel were counterintelligence officers
belonging to the U.S. Army’s Counterintelligence Corps (CIC).3
As of mid-1946, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), the predecessor to today’s CIA, had a little more than 300
men and women stationed in Western Europe organized into semi-overt detachments under U.S. Army cover in
West Germany, Austria and Italy, as well as covert stations hidden inside the American embassies in Stockholm,
Oslo, Copenhagen, Brussels, London, Paris, Madrid, Lisbon, Berne, Prague, Bucharest, and Athens.4 The largest of
the European stations was the 170-man SSU Mission in Germany, whose headquarters was located in Heidelberg.
The SSU German Mission included a five-man liaison detachment in Frankfurt, a 25-man intelligence unit in West
Berlin (the predecessor of what would become known as the Berlin Operations Base), and a seven-man station in
Prague, Czechoslovakia.5
Credible sources of hard intelligence about what was going on behind the Iron Curtain were very few and far
between after World War II. This was the era when the U.S. intelligence community’s ability to break high-level
Soviet codes and ciphers was practically nil. Virtually all of the agents that the CIA dropped into the Soviet Union
between 1949 and 1954 were either killed or captured. Reconnaissance overflights of the USSR and Eastern Europe
were not permitted by the White House in the early post-war years. The first flight of the CIA’s U-2 spy plane over
the USSR did not take place until July 1956, and the first operational American KH-4 CORONA spy satellite was
not put into orbit until August 1960.
Desperate for any intelligence information about the Soviet Union and its allies, the CIA and the U.S. military
intelligence organizations based in Europe engaged in some ill-conceived operations in the early post-World War
II era. American intelligence officers in Germany and elsewhere, who were under enormous pressure from

Washington to produce intelligence, frequently fell prey to dozens of predatory and unscrupulous peddlers of
intelligence information throughout Western Europe who ran so-called “paper mills” which cranked out
fabricated or misleading information about what was going on behind the Iron Curtain that the young and
inexperience American intelligence operatives were all too willing to buy at the grotesquely inflated prices being
charged.6 The vulnerability of the US intelligence community to these intelligence fabricators and paper mill
operators in Western Europe is told in vivid color by a number of declassified documents contained in this
collection. Many of the most rapacious intelligence fabricators were clustered in Paris, France and Brussels,
Belgium, where many prominent members of the White Russian community financed their lavish lifestyles by
selling fake intelligence information to the highest bidders, which in many cases was the cash-rich CIA and other
equally well funded branches of the U.S. intelligence community.7
Some of the sources that the CIA and U.S. military intelligence tried to use behind the Iron Curtain were of
dubious intelligence value. For example, nearly all of the Russian and Eastern European emigre groups based in
West Germany who were being used by the CIA and MI6 as sources for agent recruits were later found to be
completely penetrated by Soviet intelligence, allowing the KGB and Eastern European security services to quash
almost all of the clandestine missions these organizations jointly conducted with the CIA behind the Iron Curtain.
Once the CIA realized in1952 how deeply the emigre groups had been penetrated, the agency was forced to move
all of the sites around the German city of Munich that had been used since 1949 to train agents designated to be
infiltrated into the Soviet Union to the U.S.8
Declassified documents show that in 1946 the Vienna Station of the CIA’s predecessor organization, the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU), was spying on the activities of the Jewish Agency in Austria as part of an operation
called Project SYMPHONY. The CIA wanted to infiltrate the Vienna headquarters of the Jewish Agency’s
intelligence organization, which was engaged after World War II in smuggling Jewish refugees out of the USSR
and Eastern Europe and into Palestine, in order to collect intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain as well as
determine if the Soviet intelligence services were hiding agents amongst the tens of thousands of Jewish refugees
bound for Palestine. The operation quickly died when irreconcilable differences arose when Jewish Agency
officials object to the incessant demands of the American intelligence officers for sensitive information that went
far beyond what the Jewish Agency officials were willing to provide.9
Despite what you might have read in the newspapers since the first Edward Snowden-inspired newspaper
article appeared in June 2013, the U.S. intelligence community has had some sort of intelligence liaison and/or
information-sharing relationship with virtually every Western European intelligence and security service since
the end of World War II, regardless of the size and relative import of the service. With only limited resources and
capabilities, during the first decade of the Cold War (1945-1955) the U.S. intelligence community had to heavily
depend on the intelligence information it got from friendly European intelligence and security services for much
of what it knew about the military capabilities and political aspirations of the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European allies. For example:
• From 1946 onwards, the nascent West German intelligence service, known as the Gehlen Org (in 1955 it was
renamed as the Bundesnachrichtendienst) was the leading source for intelligence information on political and
military developments in East Germany, not the CIA.10
• The only source for hard intelligence on Soviet naval activities in the Barents Sea and on the Kola Peninsula
after the end of World War II was the SIGINT reporting received from the Norwegian intelligence service.11 A
Spitfire reconnaissance aircraft and a Catalina amphibious patrol plane belonging to the Royal Norwegian Air
Force conducted a number of secret overflights of Spitsbergen Island (Svalbard) in the North Sea beginning in
1948, photographing Soviet mining installations while at the same time looking for secret Soviet military
installations. 12
• The Swedish intelligence and SIGINT services proved to be vitally important sources for hard-to-come-by
information on Soviet military activities in the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) and on Soviet naval
activities in the Baltic Sea. A tacit arrangement was arrived at in 1946 whereby the Swedes passed to the U.S.

intelligence community any data they developed on Soviet military activities in the Baltic region, including
from SIGINT monitoring of Soviet fleet activities in the Baltic and HUMINT received from the agents the
Swedish intelligence service was then infiltrating into the Baltic States. 13 In November 1947, the USAF signed
a secret agreement to give the Swedish air force K-22 aerial cameras with 24- and 40-inch lenses, film, paper,
and other equipment. In return, the Swedes gave the USAF military attaché in Stockholm two prints and one
contact film copy of every photograph taken on the covert overflight missions of the USSR, Poland and Finland
conducted by the Swedish air force over the next three years. 14
• Another important source early in the Cold War for data on Soviet naval and naval air activities in the Baltic
Sea region were the Danish SIGINT stations on the island of Bornholm, and observation reports from specially-
trained merchant seamen posted aboard Danish merchant vessels that plied the waters between Denmark and
Soviet ports along the Baltic Sea coast. 15
• In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the CIA and its predecessor organizations extensively used anticommunist
sources inside the Vatican to gather intelligence on what was going on behind the Iron Curtain, particularly in
Poland, Hungary and the Ukraine, as well as for information about the internal situation in Italy. One of the
CIA’s top sources inside the Vatican in the late 1940s was the head of the Foreign Section of the Vatican’s
Secretariat of State, Cardinal Domenico Tardini, who was also one of the top aides to Pope Pius XXII. 16
From these very humble beginnings can be traced the genesis of what became during the Cold era a massive
American intelligence presence in Europe. As the Cold War progressed, the size of the U.S. intelligence presence
in Europe and the extent of its operational activities grew by leaps and bounds. At the height of the U.S.
intelligence community’s power and influence in the late 1960s, former U.S. intelligence officials estimate that
there were between 25,000 and 30,000 American military and civilian intelligence personnel and support staff
operating in Europe, including more than 4,000 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officers, analysts and
support staff stationed in virtually embassy in Europe (the exceptions being Luxembourg, the Vatican, San
Marino, Andorra, Monaco and Liechtenstein), and approximately 15,000 military and civilian signals intelligence
(SIGINT) intercept operators, analysts and intelligence reporters working for the National Security Agency (NSA).
17
In the late 1960s the CIA was also covertly financing dozens of underground stay-behind agent networks in
thirteen Western European countries, including supposedly neutral Sweden. As described more fully below, these
‘sleeper’ networks of stay-behind agents had been hastily organized and equipped by the CIA and the British
foreign intelligence service, MI6, throughout Western Europe after the 1948 Berlin Crisis, who would, if war with
the USSR ever broke out, conduct behind-the-lines intelligence gathering and sabotage missions like the French
Maquis and Dutch resistance forces did during World War II. By the late 1960s these stay-behind networks,
comprised of almost 5,000 men, ranged in size from very small networks in Denmark (codenamed TINHORN),
Belgium (NICLIPPER) and Luxembourg (OKRIDGE), each comprised of no more than a couple hundred men; to
large networks in Norway (SARGASSO), Italy (DEWBAR/GLADIO), Greece (THUNDERBIRD) and Turkey
(EXWOOD), which in some cases comprised more than 1,000 men under arms, most of whom were Special
Operations Forces (SOF) troops trained in guerrilla warfare. 18
The importance of the U.S. intelligence presence in Europe declined precipitously during the late 1960s and
the first half of the 1970s because of the war in Southeast Asia, which literally ate up about one-third of America’s
intelligence collection and analytic resources. The number of intelligence personnel stationed in Europe declined
dramatically, as did the operational tempo of their intelligence collection activities. But starting in 1975 the U.S.
intelligence community began to slowly reinforce its presence and intensify its activities in Western Europe as
the perception grew in Washington that the Soviet military threat to Europe was rising. The CIA and U.S. military
intensified their human intelligence (HUMINT) efforts behind the Iron Curtain. New SIGINT intercept stations
were built across Europe; a new generation of reconnaissance aircraft equipped with the latest sensor technology
suddenly appeared in the skies over Europe; and dozens of just-developed ground-based high-tech surveillance
radars and other intelligence sensors were quietly deployed to the region to monitor developments inside the

USSR and Eastern Europe. And the CIA and NSA reinvigorated their longstanding intelligence sharing and liaison
relationships with their European counterparts, which had been frozen in stasis since the America’s entry into
the Vietnam War in the early 1960s. 19
Following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the U.S. intelligence community dramatically pared down
the size of its presence in Europe and scaled back the amount of its support for its European intelligence partners.
The number of personnel assigned to the CIA’s stations and bases in Western Europe fell by more than 50 percent,
and NSA closed down all but a few of its SIGINT intercept stations in Europe between 1989 and 1999 and returned
over 10,000 personnel to the U.S.
But the size and import of the U.S. intelligence presence in Europe rebounded dramatically after the 9/11
terrorist attacks in 2001. Today, the number of American intelligence personnel based in Europe is far less than
what was the case in the late 1960s. Sources estimate that there are today between 7,000 and 9,000 American
military and civilian intelligence personnel based in Europe. 20
According to sources, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), General James Clapper, had planned to
substantially reduce the size of the U.S. intelligence presence in Europe following the completion of the U.S. troop
withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was expected to be completed by the end of 2014. But sources report that
the dramatic growth of the ISIS insurgencies in Syria and Iraq, as well as Russia’s military intervention in the war
in the Eastern Ukraine in the summer of 2014, has forced the U.S. intelligence community to change its plans,
which now call for reinforcing the size and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence assets operating in Europe, sadly
proving correct President Harry Truman’s apocryphal statement that “What you plan for never happens.”

CHAPTER 3
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN AND TURKEY
In light of the plethora of revelations in the European press over the past two years stemming from materials
leaked to the media by Edward Snowden, it may come as a surprise to many Europeans that for the past seventy
years the CIA has maintained stations and bases inside virtually every U.S. embassy and consulate in Europe.
According to intelligence insiders, only the smallest European countries, such as Andorra, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Monaco and the Vatican, have no CIA station on their soil. Officially, these CIA stations and bases
serve as the nexus for the U.S. intelligence community’s routine intelligence sharing and liaison relationships
with the intelligence and security services of the host nation, and as such, they are accorded a status comparable
to the State Department’s diplomats.
Most Western European countries, as a matter of official government policy, refused to permit the U.S.
government to operate intelligence collection facilities on their soil outside of the declared CIA stations, such as
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, all four of the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Austria. Within the U.S.
intelligence community, some senior officers referred to these countries as the “refuseniks.” While officially the
governments of these countries maintained neutrality policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its allies, the
intelligence and security services of all these countries collaborated to varying degrees with the U.S. intelligence
community. 21
Take for example the case of Switzerland. Despite its government’s strict policy of neutrality, the Swiss
intelligence and security services have maintained a cordial relationship with the U.S. intelligence community
since the end of World War II. The CIA and its antecedents have maintained close relations with the Swiss
intelligence service as well as the intelligence component of the Swiss Federal Police since World War II. 22 And
according to a single document found at the U.S. National Archives in Washington, D.C., U.S. Air Force
intelligence and the Swiss government were discussing the possibility of assigning USAF pilots to selected
Swissair commercial flights into the Moscow and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The project, however, never got
off the ground and was cancelled in June 1952 for reasons not yet known. 23
Another case is the U.S. intelligence community’s relations with the Vatican. Although the CIA has apparently
never maintained a station inside the U.S. legation to the Vatican, the CIA’s Rome station has always maintained
close contact with senior Vatican officials and the Vatican’s secretive intelligence service, which is subordinate to
the Vatican’s Secretariat of State. Catholic church officials outside the Vatican were occasionally used by the CIA
to collect intelligence as well as scout for sources for the agency within the various anticommunist emigre
organizations based in Germany, Italy and elsewhere. For example, Father Lieber, one of the top Catholic church
officials in West Germany, introduced CIA officers to senior leaders of several Ukrainian emigre organizations
based in Munich. 24 The CIA’s Austrian station was also using Catholic church officials based in Vienna, many of
whom were staunch anticommunists, to collect intelligence on political, military and economic matters during
their travels in Eastern Europe and the Ukraine. 25 The relationship between the CIA and the Vatican continued
well into the 1980s, with the Vatican providing the CIA with its views and assessments on the persecution of
Catholic Church officials in Eastern Europe, the growing power of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in Italy,
developments in Italian politics, and the growing power and influence of the Catholic Church in Poland in the
early 1980s. 26
A small number of Western European governments secretly allowed the U.S. intelligence community to
establish SIGINT listening posts and other intelligence facilities on their soil, usually with the provisos that they
not be used to spy on the host country and that their presence be kept secret. For example, in 1957 Francisco
Franco’s Spanish regime allowed the U.S. Air Force to establish a small nuclear weapons test detection station at
Sonseca, and the early 1960s the U.S. Navy was given permission to build a large SIGINT intercept station on the
grounds of the Rota naval base in southern Spain. 27 In 1953, Italy allowed the U.S. Air Force to construct a large

listening post at San Vito dei Normanni in southern Italy, which became operational in 1960. 28 And in 1953 Greece
allowed the USAF to construct a listening post at Iraklion on the island of Crete, which was declared operational
in 1954. 29
But three Western European countries allowed the U.S. intelligence community extremely broad latitude in
terms of establishing a wide range of intelligence bases and smaller support facilities on their soil. These countries
were West Germany, Great Britain and Turkey. Much of what the U.S. intelligence community knew about what
was going on behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War largely came from U.S. clandestine intelligence
operatives and electronic eavesdroppers based in these three countries. As the documents in this collection
reveal, these three nations were vital to the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts because their governments were
willing, usually in return for huge sums of money, weapons and other gratuities, to host a wide array of American
intelligence collection facilities aimed at the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. Without the plethora
of SIGINT listening posts, radar surveillance stations, and CIA bases and training facilities in these countries, the
U.S. intelligence community’s task of monitoring political and military developments taking place inside the
USSR and Eastern Europe would have been nigh on impossible.
1 U.S. Intelligence Activities in West Germany and West Berlin

The CIA's West German operations are well documented in this collection, with more than a hundred documents
detailing the explosive growth of the agency’s clandestine intelligence gathering and covert action activities in
West Germany and West Berlin between 1945 and 1960, followed by the slow but steady decline of the CIA’s
operational presence in Germany after the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, which effectively cut the
agency’s case officers from most of their sources in East Germany.
Perpetually short of money and trained personnel, the years after the end of World War II were not a
particularly happy period for the CIA and U.S. military intelligence in Germany both in terms of the quantity and
quality of the intelligence being produced. The early clandestine intelligence operations of the CIA’s predecessor
organization, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), in West Germany and West Berlin between 1945 and 1950 were
very limited in both scope and amount of intelligence produced because of the German Station’s severely
circumscribed financial and personnel resources. 30 So not surprisingly, there were frequent complaints from the
agency’s military and civilian consumers about the poor quality of the intelligence they were getting from
Germany about what was going behind the Iron Curtain in East Germany and beyond. 31
Then as now, the CIA’s growth in Germany was dictated by world events. The first surge in the growth of the
U.S. intelligence presence in Germany can be directly traced to the 1948 Berlin Crisis, which caught the CIA and
the U.S. military intelligence establishment completely of-guard. The Berlin Crisis also frightened the U.S.
government, which was suddenly reminded that the approximately 300,000 Soviet troops then deployed in East
Germany could relatively easily defeat the understrength U.S. and NATO forces stationed in West Germany.
Moreover, the U.S. intelligence community, which had at the time no high-level sources behind the Iron Curtain,
would not be able to provide any timely or meaningful warning of Soviet intentions to invade West Germany. 32
Pushed hard by the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department to do something to rectify this
situation, the CIA and U.S. military intelligence began taking steps to help defend West Germany and the rest of
Western Europe in case of Soviet attack.
The CIA clandestine intelligence arm, the Office of Special Operations (OSO), immediately began organizing
stay-behind networks of agents in the U.S. occupation zones in Germany and Austria, whose wartime mission
would be to remain in place after the expected Soviet military invasion and report by radio on enemy troop
movements and activities. Between 1948 and 1955 the CIA organized over a dozen stay-behind networks in West
Germany (KIBITZ) and West Berlin (PASTIME), consisting of several hundred German radio operators, agents,
cut-outs and informants, many of whom had been soldiers in the Wehrmacht or Waffen SS during World War II.
The CIA buried dozens of caches containing weapons, ammunition, and radio gear throughout West Germany
and West Berlin to be used by these agents in wartime. 33

There was also a smaller CIA stay-behind agent network in the American occupation zone of Austria,
codenamed GRCROOND/HTREPAIR, whose principal mission was to build and operate a covert escape and
evasion network inside Austria to help shot down American airmen escape from the Soviets in case of war. During
the early 1950s, the CIA cached several hundred tons of weapons, ammunition, radio equipment and other
military supplies in the mountains around the city of Salzburg, which were to be used by CIA-trained guerrilla
teams if Austria was occupied by the Russians. These CIA arms caches were still buried in the Austrian Alps after
Austria regained its independence in 1955. In 1948, the CIA also secretly recruited a “sleeper network” of former
German Army radio operators living in and around Vienna, who would remain in the city if it were captured by
the Russians and radio reports of Soviet troop movements and activities to a CIA radio station in England. 34
At the same time, the newly formed Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the CIA’s covert action arm, began
organizing paramilitary guerrilla warfare and sabotage networks in West Germany comprised of German World
War II combat veterans that would launch behind-the-lines attacks on Soviet troop units and military
installations once war began. These partisan groups and U.S. Army engineers would also be responsible for
blowing up vital transportation installations so as to retard a Soviet military advance across West Germany, such
as rail lines and bridges. 35
The second major surge in the size of the U.S. intelligence forces in Europe came two years later after the North
Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, when Washington was swept by panic that Korea was the prelude
to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. 36 Fearing that a Soviet invasion was imminent, President Truman even
ordered nuclear weapons and Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers hastily deployed to Great Britain. 37
In the months after the Korean War began, the size of the CIA’s German Station exploded, and it continued to
grow at a meteoric pace for the rest of the decade. By 1959, the German Station, whose covername was
Department of the Army Detachment (DAD), was the CIA’s largest overseas unit, comprising somewhere
between 1,400 to 1,700 operational and support personnel. 38 The headquarters of the CIA German Station, which
occupied several floors of the I.G. Farben Building in downtown Frankfurt, controlled a dozen Operations Bases
spread throughout West Germany and West Berlin, the largest of which was the 200-man Berlin Operations Base
(BOB), whose covername was the U.S. Army Field Systems Office. BOB operated from a three-story building on
the Foehrenweg in the Dahlem district of Berlin that formerly had been the headquarters of the German Luftwaffe
during World War II. 39 As of 1960 the CIA’s German Station also ran almost one hundred other smaller
installations, including at huge defector interrogation center outside Frankfurt at Camp King, dozens of covert
observation posts, radio intercept and electronic eavesdropping sites, technical laboratories, liaison offices,
training camps, supply and weapons depots, propaganda broadcasting stations, communications facilities, and
safe houses spread across West Germany and West Berlin.
Berlin richly deserves its reputation as the world’s spy capital. At the height of the Cold War, Berlin was the
fulcrum of the American espionage effort against the USSR and its Eastern European allies. As of 1959, there were
more than a thousand American spies based in West Berlin, half of whom were radio intercept personnel working
for the NSA. There were also more than five hundred British, French and West German intelligence officers and
technicians operating from their zones in West Berlin doing exactly the same thing as their American
counterparts. 40 The Soviets were so angry about the presence of so many U.S. and other Western spies in West
Berlin that they threatened to break off negotiations with Washington over a peaceful resolution to the never-
ending conflict over Berlin’s future. In the end, the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 effectively killed off
many, but not all, of the U.S. intelligence community’s sources in Berlin. 41 Even after the Berlin Wall was erected,
the U.S. and allied spying effort went on without interruption. The NSA SIGINT intercept effort in West Berlin
was expanded and modernized. The phone and cable tapping operations in West Berlin, as well as the mail
opening programs taking place at the Berlin Post Office were supposed to cease after West Germany gained its
independence in 1955, but the documents contained in this collection indicate that these operations continued
unabated until the reunification of East and West Germany in the late 1980s, probably without the knowledge or
consent of the West German government. 42
By far, the largest number of American intelligence personnel operating in Germany over the past seventy

years were military and civilian SIGINT personnel working for the National Security Agency (NSA). This collection
contains several dozen documents concerning the buildup of NSA intercept stations in West Germany and West
Berlin beginning literally with days of Nazi Germany’s surrender in May 1945 and continued right up until the day
that the Soviet Union was formally dissolved. 43 To give you some idea how explosive the growth was, on the day
North Korea invaded South Korea (June 25, 1950) the U.S. Army and Air Force had only four radio intercept units
stationed in West Germany manned by approximately six hundred men. Five years later in 1955, there were more
than eight thousand U.S. military ‘SIGINTers’ manning fifteen strategic and tactical radio intercept sites in West
Germany. 44 And by July 1960, the three military services were operating eleven large listening posts, four border
intercept detachments, an airborne SIGINT intercept detachment, various command staffs, SIGINT processing
centers, and support units spread throughout West Germany and West Berlin that were manned by nearly ten
thousand military personnel. 45
There are also a large number of documents in this collection concerning the U.S. Army’s secret telephone and
cable tapping operations inside West Germany and West Berlin, and related secret mail opening programs
conducted in conjunction with the German Post Office (Bundespost) in the early 1950s which collected
intelligence on members of the German Communist Party (KPD) and other West German citizens or companies
targeted for various reasons by U.S. Army intelligence. But these programs also yield some valuable intelligence
information on what was taking place behind the Iron Curtain. For example, the U.S. Army’s 7880th Military
Intelligence Detachment in West Berlin was surreptitiously opening all letters and packages going to and from
the Soviet Union and all Eastern European countries that passed through the Berlin Central Post Office. Through
this program, Army intelligence analysts were able to identify the names and locations of many of the German
scientists and engineers working on the Soviet nuclear and ballistic missile programs at secret installations deep
inside the USSR; details of the illicit trade in embargoed high-tech items and strategic commodities between West
German companies and Eastern Europe; and nearly the complete order of battle of the Polish army. 46 But most
of the information contained in these intercepted letters was more mundane. A declassified document described
the operation as “a lucrative source of information which provided personalized views of life behind the Iron
Curtain, covering such topics as morale, political restrictions, shortages of food and medical supplies, housing,
cost of specific items of food and clothing, weather, crop conditions, government quotas levied upon individuals,
and locations and activities of military and quasi-military units.” 47 The British military was conducting the exact
same series of telephone and cable tapping operations throughout their zone in West Germany known as
Operation LISTER. 48
Large contingents of CIA and U.S. Army interrogators were stationed at nearly all of the refugee camps (called
Displaced Persons centers) throughout West Germany and West Berlin, every day trawling the lists of newly
arrived refugees and defectors who might possess information of intelligence value to the U.S. The CIA set up a
large interrogation center at Camp King outside Frankfurt to debrief particularly Soviet and East European
defectors and refugees, such as German scientists and engineers who had worked on the Soviet nuclear and
ballistic missile programs since the end of World War II. The importance of the thousands of refugees who fled
across the border to West Germany and West Berlin cannot be underestimated. Documents in this collection
reveal that by 1959-1960, the Marienfelde refugee center in West Berlin was perhaps the most important source
of intelligence information for the CIA and the U.S. Army about what was going on behind the Iron Curtain. 49
Between late 1948 and the reunification of Germany in October 1990, U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft
based at Rhein-Main Air Base outside Frankfurt and Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft flying from bases in Britain
conducted thousands of photographic and electronic intelligence reconnaissance flights along the border
between East and West Germany. 50 By far, the most sensitive of these reconnaissance missions were conducted
over East Germany by transport aircraft carrying hidden aerial cameras and ELINT intercept equipment, which
flew almost daily through the three air corridors linking West Germany with West Berlin photographing all of the
Soviet military airfields located within 100-miles of the air corridors. The British Royal Air Force and the French
Air Force were also performing the exact same missions, although not at the same level as the USAF. 51 In Berlin
itself, British Army and U.S. Army light aircraft and helicopters were also performing risky photographic missions

while flying ‘training’ missions over East Berlin and surrounding areas. 52
Both the U.S. and British military intelligence agencies placed a series of technical intelligence sensors aboard
the weekly trains that carried troops and supplies from West Germany to the Allied garrisons in West Berlin. For
example, the British converted a toilet compartment on the special military train that made the nightly run from
West Germany to West Berlin into a painfully small mobile listening post. A single British radio intercept operator
locked himself in the privy for the duration of the overnight trip to Berlin, all the while listening for Soviet signals
while the train passed slowly through East Germany. In the 1960s the British hid a number of sophisticated
camera systems inside the train’s baggage compartment to photograph anything of possible intelligence interest
that the train passed on its way to Berlin. 53
The CIA conducted a wide array of ‘black’ psychological warfare operations aimed at the USSR and its East
European allies from bases in West Germany and West Berlin. The most important of these classified programs
were the propaganda broadcasts of two radio stations based in West Germany – Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL), which the CIA funded and managed from 1948 until the CIA’s role in these stations was
terminated in the 1970s. 54 There were a number of other CIA-sponsored psychological warfare operations being
run from Germany. From 1948 until 1968, the CIA launched thousands of balloons containing anti-Soviet
propaganda from West Germany in the hope that they would stir up unrest and discontent inside the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. They did not produce many positive results. 55
2 The U.S. Intelligence Presence in Great Britain

Over the past seventy years, no country has been more important to the successes of the U.S. intelligence effort
than Great Britain. Oftentimes referred to as “the unsinkable aircraft carrier” by U.S. military and intelligence
officials, since Germany’s surrender in 1945 Britain has hosted a dizzying array of U.S. intelligence facilities. At the
height of the Cold War, NSA operated three SIGINT listening posts in Britain at RAF Chicksands, RAF Edzell and
Menwith Hill, of which only Menwith Hill is still actively engaged in electronic surveillance activities. During the
Cold War, Britain allowed the U.S. intelligence community to fly manned reconnaissance missions and launch
unmanned reconnaissance balloons against the USSR and Eastern Europe. Britain also hosted a wide array of
American technical intelligence sensors, such a massive over-the-horizon surveillance radar at Orfordness, the
U.S. Navy’s SOSUS submarine tracking station at Brawdy in Wales, large CIA and NSA stations that occupied two
entire floors of the U.S. embassy in Grosvenor Square in downtown London, as well as a secret network of CIA
training, logistics and communications facilities spread throughout the United Kingdom, most of them operating
under U.S. Air Force cover. For example, the huge U.S. Army supply base at Burtonwood had a specially segregated
area where the CIA stored weapons and other equipment for its spies and paramilitary forces operating
throughout Europe. 56 And the CIA’s principal communications stations servicing its stations, bases and
paramilitary forces across the European continent were located at RAF Croughton and Barford-Saint John. The
combined station, which was designated the Special Electronics Testing Facility, was declared operational in 1952
but is still active today. 57
The CIA’s intimate relationship with the British foreign intelligence service, the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS), which is also referred to in the declassified documents either by its old moniker MI6 or ‘Broadway’ for the
former location of its headquarters building in downtown London. The documents in this collection describe the
establishment of the interlocking liaison relationship between the CIA’s antecedents and MI6 after the end of
World War II, the types of intelligence information being exchanged between the two services (including the fact
that both agencies withheld surprisingly large amounts of information from each other). The documents also
reveal that there existed, especially in the late 1940s and the 1950s, a competitive relationship between the CIA
and MI6, which led occasionally to acrimonious policy fights over the conduct of clandestine intelligence and
covert action programs (such as Albania), scrums over access to sources, disagreements over the CIA’s
relationship with General Reinhard Gehlen and his West German intelligence service, and the deliberate
withholding of information from one another, especially by the CIA. There were even instances of CIA

counterintelligence officers spying on the activities of their British counterparts. 58
Some writers, including a number of CIA historians, have suggested that the U.S. intelligence relationship with
Great Britain carried on without interruption as it had during World War II. These documents show that this is a
myth. In fact, starting in the spring of 1946 U.S. intelligence officials based in Europe were ordered to restrict their
information exchange with the British to “only what they need to know.” According to an April 1946 memo, the
SSU station in Paris was told that the new norm in Anglo-American intelligence relations was “With the end of
the war we no longer have any enemies, but at the same time we have no friends.” 59
The documents contained in this collection reveal that starting in 1949, the CIA began marking particularly
sensitive documents “U.S. Officials Only” in order to keep them from being shared with the British, especially
those documents relating to unilateral CIA operations in Albania, high-grade intelligence from the CIA-
sponsored Gehlen Org intelligence service in West Germany, and nuclear weapons-related intelligence
information that the agency did not want MI6 to know about. 60 Beginning in 1954, significant parts of the CIA’s
finished high-grade intelligence analysis and reporting produced by the CIA on European topics was marked
NOFORN (no dissemination to foreigners) specifically to prevent the British from gaining access to these
materials. By the mid- to late-1960s almost all of this material was marked NOFORN, in large part because of
significant policy differences between the U.S. and British governments on European security and foreign policy
matters. 61
In part, the reason for withholding information from the British government and intelligence services was due
to the discovery in the 1950s and 1960s that Soviet intelligence had recruited a number of very high-level agents
inside the British government and even MI6. For instance, the amount of damage done to U.S. national security
by three British spies working for Soviet intelligence – Donald MacLean, Guy Burgess, and H.A.R. “Kim” Philby –
is described in a number of documents contained in this collection. It was Donald MacLean who first informed
the U.S. government in 1948 that Great Britain was developing its own nuclear weapon, so it can logically be
concluded that everything that MacLean learned while in Washington about both the U.S. and British nuclear
weapons programs went straight to Moscow. From the perspective of U.S. intelligence, the damage caused by Kim
Philby’s spying was even worse. It was Philby who was present at a number of key meetings in London between
1945 and 1949 where the joint Anglo-American intelligence effort against the Soviet Union was born. It is also
clear from the documents that Philby had some level of knowledge about the joint Anglo-American covert
operation to subvert the communist Albanian regime that began in 1949, although it would appear that Philby’s
level of access to the details of the operation was not as great as some authors who have written about the Philby
case in the past have assumed. 62
The documents contained in this collection show that as time went by, a highly competitive relationship
developed between the CIA and MI6, marked oftentimes by a refusal to share operational information with one
another, and even instances of outright spying on one another’s activities. The documents also reveal deep
divisions between the CIA and MI6 over the conduct of clandestine intelligence gathering and covert action
operations. The differences between the two services are quite apparent in the documents concerning the joint
CIA-MI6 covert action operation in Albania from 1949 to 1954 (Operations VALUABLE/BGFIEND. At first the
relationship between the two services was close and cordial. But over time, increasingly divisive political
differences led both agencies increasingly to go their own ways. As time went by, CIA officials increasingly took
to belittling the efforts of their British counterparts. The CIA officials piled derision on their British colleagues for
being unduly cautious, risk adverse, not aggressive enough, or “nutless” because they were perceived as being
beholden to their political masters in the British Foreign Office.
Virtually every facet of the nearly eighty-year relationship between NSA and the British SIGINT agency,
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), is detailed in over seventy documents that have never
been published before, including the postwar Anglo-American codebreaking successes against Soviet
cryptographic systems after the end of World War II, and new details about the decline of the Anglo-American
SIGINT relationship during the 1980s because of personality differences between the heads of NSA and GCHQ. 63
The collection also provides new details concerning the deployment of American SIGINT intercept units to Great

Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, including the initial efforts to build what is now NSA’s largest listening post in the
world at RAF Menwith Hill in northern England. 64
Given the presumption that the Soviet military would overrun most of West Germany in the first week if World
War III ever broke out, the U.S. and British intelligence communities concluded a series of secret agreements
whereby American intelligence units based in Germany would be evacuated to Great Britain once the conflict
broke out. For example, the CIA had an arrangement with MI6 which allowed for the evacuation of most of the
agency’s huge German station to Britain if war ever occurred. 65 NSA and GCHQ had a similar arrangement
whereby all U.S. SIGINT units based in Germany would be evacuated to the town of Beaumanor in northeast
England if war with the Soviet Union ever broke out. 66
Beginning in 1966, the U.S. began negotiating with the British to build huge long-range over-the-horizon (OTH)
surveillance radars in Britain and on the island of Cyprus to monitor Soviet ballistic missile tests and space
launches. The Cyprus OTH radar, located on the grounds of the British-controlled Sovereign Base Area at
Episkopi, was given the codename SENTINEL SHOE, then changed to COBRA SHOE; while the larger OTH radar
system at Orfordness in England was initially designated SENTINEL FAN, then changed to COBRA MIST. 67
The CIA secretly constructed a listening post designated APPLESAUCE outside the village of Yerolakkos on
Cyprus in 1949-1950. The CIA apparently did not disclose to the British government, which ruled Cyprus at the
time, what they were doing, pretending that the Yerolakkos site was a State Department communications facility.
68
But the British would not permit the U.S. to build an overt SIGINT listening post on Cyprus. Despite strenuous
efforts by the State Department over the span of four years, the British government steadfastly refused to permit
NSA to deploy a USAF SIGINT intercept unit to Cyprus in the early 1950s. 69 In 1964, NSA was so concerned about
the possibility of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus that contingency plans were hastily drawn up to evacuate the
Yerolakkos station. 70
In 1948, the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy signed an agreement to coordinate their electronics intelligence (ELINT)
collection effort against the USSR. Shortly there after, the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Air Force entered into a
comparable information-sharing effort. By the early 1950s, the British and U.S. military services were coordinating
their respective ELINT collection flights by specially-equipped “ferret” aircraft that were then taking place in the
Barents, Baltic and Black Seas. 71
Immediately after the end of World War II, dozens of U.S. Air Force and the British Royal Air Force photo
interpreters jointly analyzed a huge trove of aerial reconnaissance photos of the Soviet Union captured from the
Germans. There was also a parallel program being conducted in Germany and Britain, where U.S. Army and
British military analysts pored through hundreds of thousands of pages of captured German documents looking
for information about the organization and capabilities of the Soviet military. 72 This joint intelligence program
ballooned in 1948 when the USAF and RAF jointly began preparing target folders of Soviet cities and industrial
facilities designated to be hit by nuclear bombardment in case World War III ever broke out. 73
As time went by, the service intelligence components of the U.S. and British militaries became increasingly
integrated. A sizeable number of U.S. Navy intelligence analysts were posted to the Royal Navy’s Admiralty
Operational Intelligence Center in London beginning in 1948. 74 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Air Force and Royal
Air Force began exchanging intelligence officers who specialized in the Soviet Union. 75
The CIA and American intelligence officers created a joint interrogation to question the few high-ranking
Soviet or Eastern Europeans who managed to flee to the West. The first of these defectors was Lt. Colonel Grigori
Aleksandrovich Tokaev, a Soviet Air Force officer stationed in East Germany, who defected to the British in Berlin
after having worked on aspects of the Soviet missile program since the end of World War II. Tokaev, codenamed
EXCISE, was jointly interrogated in London by British and American intelligence officers. These interrogations
yielded the first hard information about the nascent Soviet ballistic missile research and development program.
76
This collection also contains a series of top secret memos and cables concerning negotiations between the CIA
and Britain’s MI6 to allow the CIA to build a secret radio base outside Oxford, England so that the agency could
communicate with its agents operating behind the Iron Curtain. The man inside MI6 who helped get the project

started in 1949 was none other than the KGB’s top spy in British intelligence, H.A.R. “Kim” Philby. 77
In the 1970s, the British government gave the U.S. Navy permission to build an acoustic intelligence
(ACOUSTINT) surveillance station at Brawdy near the town of Haverfordwest in Wales, which when completed
in April 1974 was used to monitor the movements of Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic. 78
Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in the area of nuclear weapons test detection has always been close,
and remains so today. As part of a 1964 agreement, the U.S. and British began jointly constructing a global array
of modern nuclear test detection stations to monitor both atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons tests.
This network of stations still exists to this day, although most of the stations are now unmanned and controlled
by remote control. 79 The British government has also made available to the U.S. intelligence community to
construction secret nuclear test detection stations around the world. For example, in 1964 the British government
signed a secret agreement called Project CLEAR SKY giving the U.S. Air Force’s secretive nuclear test detection
organization, the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), permission to install an array of sensors on
Ascension Island in the South Atlantic to detect atmospheric nuclear explosions. Later, the British allowed
AFTAC to install an array of underwater hydroacoustic sensors off Ascension which are still being used today to
detect acoustic waves generated by underground nuclear explosions. 80 In 1966 Great Britain allowed AFTAC to
build a station on the island of Fiji that was used to monitor the first French atmospheric nuclear weapons tests
at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. At about the same time, the U.S. and Britain were allowed to build similar
stations in Australia to monitor French nuclear testing activities at Muruoa. 81 This joint program to monitor the
French nuclear testing program was expanded in 1968 to include specially-equipped American and British
nuclear test detection aircraft, who flew from bases in Argentina, Chile and Peru coordinated reconnaissance
missions called Project COLD SKIN over the South Pacific in order to collect radioactive debris from French
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. 82
3 The Turkish Intelligence Facilities

Prior to Turkey formally being formally admitted to NATO in February 1952, all U.S. - Turkish intelligence relations
had to be conducted covertly at the insistence of the Turkish General Staff, which wanted to cooperate with the
U.S. intelligence community while at the same time keeping this information from the civilians in the Turkish
government, whom the Turkish military did not trust. As a result, between 1949 and 1952 the intelligence
components of the U.S. military covertly deployed a number of SIGINT collection units to Turkey using a variety
of subterfuges and cover stories, all with the tacit approval of the Turkish military.
The following is a summary of these early covert U.S. intelligence activities in Turkey conducted between 1949
and 1952:
• After more than a year of secret negotiations with the Turkish military, on November 1949 the Chief of Staff of
the Turkish Air Force approved the first USAF ferret flight (Project BLACKJACK) over Turkish territory. The
agreed cover story for these missions was that they were aerial mapping flights. 83
• The first U.S. intelligence unit sent to Turkey was a U.S. Army nuclear test detection unit, which arrived in
Ankara in December 1950 as part of secret program called Project THANKSGIVING. The unit established a
clandestine acoustics intelligence (ACOUSTINT) intercept facility called Station HATRACK (or Station ‘H’)
outside the Turkish capital of Ankara. 84
• In the spring of 1951, the first U.S. Army electronics intelligence (ELINT) intercept unit, the 9488 th Technical
Service Unit, was deployed to Turkey. Headquarters and main body of the unit set up camp two kilometers
north of the city of Sinop (Site 6); a second element at Samsun; and a communications center was established
in Ankara. 85
• In April 1951, a U.S. Air Force nuclear test detection unit, Team 301 (TUSLOG Detachment 18), was activated
south of Ankara near the village of Belbasi. The Belbasi station, the first seismic intelligence facility in the U.S.
Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS), was sited so as to detect Soviet nuclear weapons tests taking place
at Semipalatinsk in Soviet Central Asia. 86

• On October 20, 1951, the first increment of U.S. Air Force radio intercept personnel designated Project PENN
arrived in Turkey and established a covert radio intercept site inside the compound of the U.S. military-run
Turkish United States Logistics Group (TUSLOG) on the outskirts of Ankara. 87
• In November 1951, the U.S. Navy requested permission to begin establishing a covert ELINT collection site on
the shores of the Dardanelles at Anadolu Kavak (aka Anadolu Kavigi) near the city of Istanbul. 88 On April 17,
1952, the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations approved a deal reached with the Turkish General Staff (TGS),
whereby Naval Communication Unit 32C (NAVCOMMU 32-C) was created at Anadolu Kavak, Turkey in return
for Turkish personnel being trained at the unit in ELINT intercept. 89
• In July 1952, the U.S. Navy approached the Turkish General Staff with a proposal wherein U.S. Navy ELINT
personnel would be allowed to sail on Turkish submarine patrols in the Black Sea. But the project never got off
the ground because the Turkish Navy ceased conducting submarine patrols in the Black Sea. 90
• On August 19, 1952, the U.S. Navy advised the JCS that the U.S. Navy intended to commence flying ELINT
collection flights over the Black Sea, and the Joint American Military Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) mission in
Ankara was requested to obtain the authorization of the Turkish General Staff for overflight rights for these
missions. 91 The Navy’s request was approved on April 10, 1953 by the Turkish Council of Ministers, with the
proviso that the flights were not conducted over restricted areas and that the planes did not go close to the
Soviet border. 92
These early U.S. intelligence activities were just the tip of the iceberg. In the years after Turkey joined NATO,
the number of CIA, NSA and other U.S. intelligence personnel and facilities rose dramatically. This collection
contains dozens of documents concerning the lengthy and oftentimes arduous efforts by the U.S. military and the
State Department between 1952 and 1954 to get the Turkish government’s permission to allow the secret
deployment to Turkey of National Security Agency listening posts; followed by the construction of a long-range
surveillance radar complex at Pirinclik in 1954, which was urgently needed in order to monitor Soviet ballistic
missile tests then taking place at Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam. 93 These negotiations ultimately resulted in a top
secret 1957 agreement whereby the Turkish government gave the U.S. blanket permission to establish and operate
a number of SIGINT listening posts in their country. 94
By 1960, Turkey had become perhaps the most important real estate available to the U.S. intelligence
community. 95 In addition to the large CIA and NSA stations in Ankara and a large CIA base inside the U.S.
consulate in Istanbul, there were 16 military-run intelligence collection units based in Turkey, including six large
SIGINT intercept stations, the critically important AN/FPS-17 long-range missile surveillance radar complex at
Pirinclik in eastern Turkey, five seismic and acoustic intelligence detachments that were used to monitor Soviet
nuclear weapons tests and missile launches, and detachments of CIA U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and USAF RB-
47 and U.S. Navy EC-121M SIGINT aircraft which operated from Incirlik air base. 96
But the declassified documents in this collection also confirm that then, as is the case today, Turkey was an
extremely difficult ally to work with.
From a political standpoint, Turkey became increasingly volatile and unstable as time went by. In 1960, 1971
and 1980, the Turkish military overthrew the elected Turkish civilian government, placing the safety and security
of the American intelligence facilities and storage depots containing hundreds of nuclear warheads in Turkey in
considerable jeopardy. 97 When Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus in 1964 and 1967, the Defense Department
was forced to take steps to secretly beef up the security of the ten nuclear weapons storage sites in Turkey so as
to prevent the Turkish military from seizing the weapons. 98
In the 1960s the Turkish government began taking advantage of the huge American military and intelligence
presence in their country to extract not inconsiderable financial and military aid concessions from the U.S., as
well as exert political pressure on the U.S. government on issues of particular concern to Ankara.
• In April 1961, without warning the Turkish military banned all U.S. and British reconnaissance aircraft from
overflying their country to conduct intelligence missions against Soviet targets from orbital positions over the
Black Sea. It turned out that flight cessation was because the Turks wanted a new agreement authorizing

American SIGINT listening posts to operate on Turkish territory as well as equipment to equip five Turkish
tactical SIGINT units. An agreement was signed in February 1962 that gave the Turks basically everything that
they wanted. 99
• In 1964 the Turkish government and military began systematically delaying their responses to U.S. requests for
land to expand some of their SIGINT stations and permission to deploy a large over-the-horizon intelligence
collection radar to Turkey in order to register their disapproval of Washington’s policies on Cyprus. 100
• Then on December 14, 1965, a USAF RB-57F BIG RIB TELINT intercept aircraft based at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey
was lost while flying a reconnaissance mission over the Black Sea. When the Soviets protested, the Turkish
government immediately banned the U.S. military from conducting any further reconnaissance flights over
the Black Sea from Incirlik. All efforts to get the Turkish government reverse its decision were to no avail,
forcing the U.S. Navy and Air Force to close down all of their aerial reconnaissance units at Incirlik and transfer
them elsewhere. 101
This was the final straw as far as the White House was concerned. A September 1966 secret report
commissioned by the State Department recommended substantial cuts in the size of the U.S. military and
intelligence basing infrastructure in Turkey. Despite U.S. intelligence community protests that the Turkish
intelligence facilities were irreplaceable, the Lyndon Johnson White House ordered a reduction in the number
and size of U.S. intelligence facilities in Turkey. In 1967 the U.S. Air Force withdrew its plan to put a large over-
the-horizon (OTH) surveillance radar in Turkey, and in 1968 a U.S. Army-run listening post south of Ankara at
Cerkezhuyuk (Manzarali Station) was closed and turned over to the Turkish military. 102 Pursuant to a May 20,
1969 directive from Henry Kissinger, the Nixon administration accelerated the drawdown in the size of U.S.
intelligence facilities. In 1970, two U.S. Air Force-run SIGINT listening posts on the Black Sea coast at Samsun and
Trabzon were closed and turned over to the Turkish military, and a nuclear test detection station at Karamursel
was deactivated. 103
The rising tide of urban terrorism inside Turkey during the 1970s and 1980s was a matter of deep concern of
the U.S. government and intelligence community, especially because it directly affected the security of the dozens
of American military bases and nuclear weapons storage facilities in the country. This was made worse when an
insurgency by Turkey’s Kurdish minority broke out in the early 1980s in eastern Turkey near the borders with
Syria and Iraq. 104 The terrorist threat to the U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites and intelligence facilities was real.
On March 26, 1972, three British GCHQ civilians were kidnaped by TPLA terrorists from their quarters in Ünye,
Turkey. The men worked at a half-completed GCHQ SIGINT facility located at Carsamba. All three of the GCHQ
employees were killed four days later (March 30, 1972) during a firefight between the kidnappers and Turkish
security forces at the village of Kizildere. 105
In April 1973 the Turkish military accused the U.S. of reneging on a 1962 agreement to provide the Turkish army
with SIGINT and electronic warfare equipment, implicitly threatening to terminate the secret 1957 agreement
which allowed the National Security Agency to operate a half dozen SIGINT listening posts on Turkish soil. At the
urging of the State Department, the Pentagon scrambled to find some spare equipment to send to Turkey. But
Pentagon and NSA officials were apparently highly reluctant to give the Turks advanced U.S.-made SIGINT
equipment, and the Turkish demands languished for a year while the bureaucracy debated what to do. Finally, in
May 1974 the State Department and Pentagon convinced the Turks to accept a shipment of older, hand-me-down
electronic warfare equipment in lieu of the more modern equipment originally promised in 1962. 106
Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 led Congress, spurred on by intense Greek government political
lobbying on Capitol Hill, to impose an arms embargo on Turkey in July 1975. The Turks retaliated on July 25, 1975
by ordering the immediate closure of all U.S. intelligence facilities in Turkey and restricted access to the ten U.S.
nuclear weapons storage sites in Turkey. The arms embargo seriously, but not irreparably, damaged the U.S.
intelligence community’s coverage of Soviet missile testing and space launch activities, much of which had been
conducted from intelligence facilities in Turkey. The arms embargo remained in place for three long years, despite
repeated behind-closed-doors efforts by the Ford administration to get Congress to lift the ban. Finally, on

September 26,1978 Congress relented and lifted the ban on arms sales to Turkey. Within days of this decision, the
Turkish government allowed the U.S. to reopen their intelligence collection facilities throughout Turkey. 107
Almost all of the U.S. intelligence collection facilities in Turkey were closed down in the early 1990s after the
end of the Cold War. The last American intelligence facility in Turkey, the U.S. Air Force-run seismic nuclear test
detection station at Belbasi south of Ankara, was turned over to the Turkish government in 2000. Despite the
change in ownership, the Belbasi station is still operating today, using American-provided equipment to detect
nuclear weapons tests around the world and feeding whatever data it collects to the USAF intelligence
organization which runs the U.S. intelligence community’s global nuclear test detection network, the Air Force
Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). 108

CHAPTER 4
U.S. ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE COLD

WAR
1 East Germany
The first CIA and U.S. military HUMINT collection operations against the Soviet military forces based in East
Germany were characterized by the sorts of miscues and mistakes characteristic of all young and inexperienced
intelligence organizations. The HUMINT gathering operations mounted by the CIA in East Germany in the
postwar years produced very little of substance in the way of hard intelligence information. The CIA's Berlin
Operations Base (BOB) spent the period from 1945 to 1949 trying to build up its sources and produce intelligence,
but was hard pressed to compete with the much larger and far more experienced officers of the KGB station based
outside East Berlin in Karlshorst. 109
In the fall of 1946, counterintelligence officers from the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB), the
predecessor organization to what became the KGB, rolled up virtually all of the American agent networks inside
East Germany, leading to calls for the removal of the CIA’s chief of base in Berlin. 110 By March 1947, virtually all of
the CIA’s agent networks inside East Germany were gone. The loss of its agent networks in East Germany had the
unfortunate side effect of forcing the U.S. intelligence community to become increasingly dependent on the
nascent West German intelligence organization, the Gehlen Org. 111
And as if things were not bad enough already, the CIA's operations in Berlin were further hampered by a lack
of cooperation from the much larger U.S. Army intelligence gathering effort in West Berlin, which refused to
coordinate its efforts with the CIA. 112 The result was that by the time of the 1948 Berlin Airlift crisis, apparently
the only ‘hard’ intelligence that the CIA base in Berlin was producing was derived from local newspaper reports.
113
The North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, spurred the CIA into action. Between 1950 and
1952, hundreds of new case officers were hastily recruited right out of America’s universities, given a training
course in the rudiments of espionage, then sent to Germany and other Cold War hot spots around the world to
pump new vigor into the U.S. intelligence effort against the Soviet Union and its allies.
Despite much of the CIA’s historiography, many of these operations did not fare very well. Facing enormous
pressure from the U.S. military, which feared that a Soviet invasion of Western Europe was soon to come, dozens
of new clandestine intelligence collection and covert action programs, many of them ill-conceived and poorly
planned, were hastily launched by the CIA inside East Germany while at the same time the agency made hasty
preparations to evacuate its entire German station to England if “the balloon went up” and the Soviets invaded
West Germany. 114
While on the surface the explosive growth of the agency’s activities in Germany looked impressive, below the
surface the declassified documents in this collection reveal that the CIA in Germany experienced all sorts of
problems during the 1950s, especially in its relationships with the plethora of American military intelligence
agencies operating independent of the CIA in West Germany and West Berlin.
Another important reason for these failures was that many of the operations in East Germany suffered from
duplication of effort by the dozens of clandestine agencies operating in the theater, with one U.S. intelligence
agency tripping over another in their efforts to produce intelligence. A former U.S. Navy intelligence officer who
served in West Berlin in the 1950s recalled that “the Americans outdid themselves in the number of collectors
(and organizations), overt and clandestine. They also frequently made complete fools of themselves – in the eyes
of the French, British, Germans and probably the Soviets – with competing intelligence networks operating in
the Soviet Zone. We were the wealthy amateurs, and I regret to say that we had not gotten completely squared
away by the time of the Vietnam War.” 115

As had been the case since the end of World War II, there was no meaningful or substantive coordination of
effort among the more than twenty American civilian and military intelligence agencies and organizations
operating in Germany (including two competing CIA stations), and cooperation by the CIA with the various U.S.
military intelligence units in Europe was practically non-existent. 116 The CIA and the U.S. military agencies
operating in West Germany and West Berlin tried to fix the problem by patching together a series of agreements
to coordinate their efforts, but neither side appears to have abided by the agreements, producing even more
duplication of effort than before and contributing to a new string of intelligence failures. 117
There were also serious problems with the British intelligence service MI6 and the innumerable British military
intelligence organizations operating in West Germany and West Berlin, who openly competed with their
American counterparts for resources and agent assets. 118 For example, CIA officers complained that MI6 officers
were trawling the refugee camps in West Germany and recruiting agents from amongst the various
anticommunist emigre groups that had sprung up since the end of World War II, including Ukrainians, Balts,
Belorussians and members of various religious and ethnic groups from the Soviet Caucasus. Many of these emigre
groups were known or suspected of having collaborated with Nazi Germany during the war. 119
As a result, the CIA suffered a string of very public and extremely humiliating intelligence failures in both East
and West Germany during the 1950s, none of which are mentioned at all in the CIA’s publicly-released histories
of Cold War intelligence operations. The declassified documents confirm that a surprisingly large number of CIA
HUMINT and covert action operations inside East Germany during the 1950s either collapsed of their own volition
through mismanagement, or were destroyed or neutralized from the inside by the larger and more experienced
Soviet and East German security services.
Take for example the CIA’s experience with an extreme right-wing anticommunist youth organization based
in Frankfurt, West Germany called the Bund Deutscher Jugend (BDJ). Beginning in 1949, the CIA’s covert action
arm, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), began secretly subsidizing the BDJ as part of an operation
designated LCPROWL. Initially the OPC used the BDJ to spread anticommunist propaganda in both East and
West Germany. But in August 1950, two months after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the CIA hastily
created a separate secret paramilitary organization, or apparat, within the BDJ whose members were trained and
equipped to attack Russian forces and sabotage critical infrastructure facilities if the Soviets ever invaded West
Germany. The problem was that many of the BDJ apparat’s members were extremists with decidedly repugnant
views on racial policies and democratic values, including a significant number of Waffen SS and Hitler Youth
World War II veterans. The leader of BDJ was Paul Egon Lueth, a former black marketeer and narcotics trafficker
whose credibility the CIA only began to question years after the operation began. In other words, the BDJ was
doomed to failure. The whole operation collapsed in September-December 1952 after a disgruntled member of
the apparat went to the German police and disclosed what the BDJ was up to. The entire senior leadership of the
BDJ apparat was arrested by the German police and put on trial, provoking a storm of public outrage about what
the CIA was up to in Germany. The LCPROWL operation was such an ignominious failure that the CIA case officer
in Germany who had run the BDJ operation was summarily fired, and all of the senior managers at CIA
headquarters in Washington who were supposed to have supervised the operation were issued letters of
reprimand. 120
Then there was the CIA’s equally troubled relationship with a West Berlin-based anticommunist organization
called the League of Free Jurists (Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen, or UFJ), which was headed by an
mercurial lawyer and political activist named Horst Erdmann. In December 1949, the CIA’s covert action arm, the
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), began covertly using the Free Jurists to disseminate CIA-produced
pamphlets and leaflets inside East Germany that contained derogatory information about the Soviet occupation
forces and the East German government. The CIA called this operation Project TPEMBER. But in August 1951,
under immense pressure from the Pentagon to immediately establish agent and paramilitary networks inside
East Germany, the CIA began hastily recruiting inside the Free Jurists a separate paramilitary apparat, which was
given a separate operational name of Project CADRASTIC, then CADROWN in March 1953. Although everything
about the apparat was supposed to be kept top secret from the overt side of the Free Jurists organization, the

unit’s security was so poor that within a matter of months virtually everyone at the Free Jurists headquarters in
West Berlin knew what was going on in the apparat’s suite of office. The CIA and the head of the Free Jurists
apparat, Admiral Konrad Patzig (replaced by Heinrich Julius Otto Rauch in January 1952), began recruiting a
network of agents, called V-Man, throughout East Germany. By March 1953, the apparat consisted of 81 cadre
groups throughout the Soviet Zone of Germany consisting of 555 V-Man agents. 121
But it turned out that the Soviet and East German intelligence services knew virtually everything about what
the UFJ apparat was doing inside East Germany. Like so many other CIA espionage programs during the Cold
War, the Soviet and East German intelligence services penetrated the UFJ’s senior leadership and staff at a very
early stage of the operation, allowing the communists to watch every move that the organization’s operatives
made in East Germany. Beginning in July 1953, the East German security service began arresting the members of
the Free Jurists apparat in East Germany, starting with all 17 of the apparat’s radio operators in East Germany. In
September 1953, the East German government began broadcasting on a weekly basis the names of all the UFJ
apparat members they had arrested, as well as the true names of all the organization’s top commanders in West
Berlin. By the end of 1953, the Free Jurists apparat had been completely decimated by the East German security
service, forcing the CIA to dismiss almost all of the apparat’s German staff because they were all well known to
the Soviet and East German security services. The operation lurched along for two more years, producing nothing
except for lots of bad publicity and embarrassments for the CIA, before the agency’s bureaucracy finally threw in
the towel and terminated its relationship with the Free Jurists in December 1955. 122
And finally, there was the CIA’s secret ten-year relationship with a West Berlin-based anticommunist group
called the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, or KgU) (Project
DTLINEN). This operation began in May 1949, when the OPC secretly began providing the KgU with small
financial subsidies, which the organization used to publish the accounts of political prisoners released from
Soviet concentration camps in East Germany as a means of embarrassing the Soviets and their East German
cohorts. 123
But over time, the KgU and its leaders lost their innocence and allowed themselves to be slowly subsumed into
the CIA’s larger clandestine intelligence gathering and covert action efforts against the East German regime. In
February 1953, CIA case officers arrived in West Berlin to train KgU members in their new mission of operating a
covert paramilitary stay-behind resistance network inside East Germany. But as was the case with the League of
Free Jurists, the Soviet and East German intelligence services had recruited agents deep inside the KgU and knew
pretty much everything that the organization was doing for the CIA. Beginning in late 1953, the East German
security service began systematically rounding up all the members of the DTLINEN paramilitary apparat in East
Germany and putting them on trial. Many of the KgU apparat’s members were sentenced to death and guillotined.
The East German state-controlled media broadcast their confessions, and printed every salacious detail about
the organization and its leaders, including the fact that some senior members of the KgU were giving the CIA
fabricated intelligence information in order to justify the large sums of money they were getting from their agency
handlers. 124
Despite the CIA’s disastrous relationships with the BDJ, UFJ and KgU, the agency stubbornly continued to
covertly fund a wide array of anticommunist organizations based in West Germany well into the 1970s. At the
time West Germany gained its independence in 1955, the CIA was secretly funding over a dozen West German
businesses and political entities, including a German publishing house that produced anti-Soviet tracts that were
smuggled into East Germany (Colloquium Verlag ), a publisher in West Berlin called Werbebüro Kramer, which
until 1956 printed, and distributed falsified editions of official East German publications; an anticommunist
magazine (Die Tarantel), a Berlin-based refugee organization called the League of Political Refugees from East
Germany (Verband Politischer Ostfluechtlinge), and the West Berlin-based overt intelligence units of the West
German SPD and CDU political parties called the SPD Ostbüro and the CDU Ostbüro, which gathered political and
economic data for the CIA on what was going on inside East Germany. 125
The CIA also financed the psychological warfare efforts of a number of anticommunist Russian emigre groups
based in West Germany, such as the Natsionalny Trudovoi Soyuz, or NTS (National Labor Union), a Russian emigre

organization based in Frankfurt which the CIA used during the 1950s and 1960s to spread anti-Soviet propaganda
amongst the Soviet troops stationed in East Germany and Austria. The CIA also used the Berlin-based Russian
emigre group called the Central Association of Political Emigres from the USSR (TsOPE) to conduct defection
inducement and covert propaganda leaflet distribution operations directed at Soviet troops stationed in East
Germany under a program called Project AEVIRGIL/AECARRERA. 126
2 Czechoslovakia
Immediately after the end of World War II, the Prague station of the predecessor organization to the CIA, the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU), established a number of high-level agent networks inside Czechoslovakia that
produced some remarkably high quality intelligence information. 127
But after the February 25, 1948 Soviet-backed bloodless coup d’etat which overthrew the democratically-
elected government of Jan Masyryk, the communist-controlled Czech security services set about systematically
arresting all of the CIA’s agent networks. To make matters worse, the new communist Czech government threw
the CIA station chief, Charles Katek, and most of his senior staff out of the country. It would seem that the CIA’s
HUMINT effort in Czechoslovakia never really recovered from the expulsions and arrests of their top agents. The
following year, 1949, the Czech security services rolled-up of all U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps’ agent
networks in Czechoslovakia. 128
The CIA had one or more high-level agents inside the Czech and/or Polish militaries in the late 1960s who were
providing top secret documents and other classified materials about high-level military planning and Warsaw
Pact military coordination efforts. 129
3 Hungary
The CIA was unable to operate any agent networks in Hungary for virtually the entire Cold War era. Hampered
by disorganization and lack of resources, the CIA never was able to establish a fully functional station inside the
U.S. embassy in Budapest after the end of World War II. 130 Declassified CIA documents show that virtually all
agency operatives who attempted to infiltrate into Hungary from neighboring Austria in the years after the end
of World War II were quickly caught, and the few desultory attempts by the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination
(OPC) to destabilize the communist regime in Budapest all came to naught. 131
By 1956, the CIA’s HUMINT effort in Hungary was in such bad shape that there was only a single agency officer
stationed at the U.S. embassy in Budapest, who spent all his time stamping passports in order to keep his cover
as a consular officer intact and virtually no time gathering intelligence. This meant that the CIA was getting no
intelligence information from HUMINT sources inside Hungary prior to the October 1956 Hungarian
Revolution.132
4 Poland
Until Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski offered his services to the CIA in August 1972, the agency’s efforts to mount
clandestine intelligence collection and covert action operations inside Poland had been a catalogue of failures.
Beginning in 1948, the CIA and the British foreign intelligence service, MI6, began covertly providing technical
and financial support to a Polish anticommunist resistance organization called the Association of Freedom and
Independence (Zrzeszenie “Wolno?? i Niezawis?o??”) or WiN. 133
Unbeknownst to the CIA and MI6, WiN was an artifice that was completely controlled from top to bottom by
the Polish security service, which maintained the fiction that WiN was secretly operating inside Poland in order
to lure U.S. and British agents into a trap. 134 The trap worked to perfection. In December 1952, the Polish security
service swept in and arrested the last remaining remnants of the Polish WiN Polish resistance organization that
they did not already control. The CIA and MI6's humiliation was made complete when the Polish government
gleefully published the news of the arrest of all the CIA and MI6 agents parachuted into Poland in preceding years,

as well as the arrest of the entire WiN high command that were not already working for the Polish security
service.135
This collection also contains a number of recently declassified documents detailing the kinds of high-grade
intelligence information being provided to the CIA in the 1972-1981 timeframe by the agency’s top spy behind the
Iron Curtain, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, who served on the Polish general staff. 136
5 Romania
OPC Project QKBROIL, which began in May 1951, was an OPC covert action operation whose goal was to
destabilize the Romanian government through a combination of psychological warfare and paramilitary
operations. The project was approved by the head of the OPC, Frank Wisner, on August 28, 1951.137
QKBROIL had the objective of encouraging the Romanian people to resist communism; to undermine the
political, economic, and military stability and cohesiveness of the Romanian government; to establish a
clandestine underground in Romania; to hamper Soviet/satellite military operations; and to serve as the nucleus
for a wartime guerrilla warfare organization that would attack Soviet troops and installations if World War III
ever broke out. All these tasks were supposed to be conducted under the rubric of a Romanian National
Committee, which the OPC was supposed to organize to act as cover for its covert action operations inside the
country.138
But the declassified documents show that Project QKBROIL was a fiasco from beginning to end. Between 1951
and 1953, the CIA parachuted five agent teams consisting of 17 men into Romania. With the exception of one lone
agent who somehow made his way back to France, all the agents were captured and executed in October 1953.
Two years of attempts by the CIA to form a political organization consisting of representatives from the two main
Romanian emigre political groups as cover for its covert action operations inside the country came to naught, in
part because the former Romanian monarch, King Michael, sabotaged all the efforts by the CIA to unify the two
groups. Attempts by the CIA in late 1951 and early 1952 to recruit more agents who were willing to parachute into
Romania to form a resistance army inside their former homeland proved to be "most unsatisfactory" because,
according to a CIA report, "Most of the Rumanian emigres have succeeded in establishing themselves fairly well
[in exile] and, except for members of the Iron Guard, who are politically undesirable, practically none of them
are interested in engaging in any hazardous activity, preferring to wait for the day when they can reenter behind
the American armed forces.".250
Between August 1951 and the end of the operation in July 1954, the project produced virtually no intelligence
information, failed to recruit a viable clandestine resistance organization inside Romania, and as far as can be
determined, caused no damage whatsoever to the stability of the communist regime in Bucharest or the
Romanian economy. The CIA finally threw in the towel in July 1954 and admitted defeat. Those parts of the project
that they could salvaged were renamed Project SHELLFIRE, but nothing came of these efforts as well.251
6 Bulgaria
In April 1950, the CIA’s covert action unit, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), commenced an operation to
destabilize the pro-Moscow Bulgarian government designated Project QKSTAIR/BGCONVOY because the
Bulgarians were covertly support the communist guerrillas in neighboring Greece. 139 The operation, which was
supposed to complement OPC’s parallel covert operation to overthrow the Enver Hoxha regime in Albania
(Project BGFIEND), sought to destabilize the communist regime in Sofia through a combination of psychological
warfare and the parachuting of dozens of agents recruited from Displaced Person camps across Western Europe
into Bulgaria in order to establish a nationwide anticommunist resistance organization similar to the French
Maquis. 140
Like the OPC operation next door in Romania, Project QKBROIL, QKSTAIR failed in all its objectives almost
from inception. The CIA at the time had virtually no intelligence sources in the country because the Bulgarian
security service kept the U.S. embassy staff in Sofia under virtual house arrest. Then on February 20, 1950, the U.S.

broke diplomatic relations with Bulgaria after Sofia refused to withdraw a diplomatic note which accused the U.S.
ambassador to Bulgaria of subversive activities and his being declared persona non grata. This meant that all the
planning for the operation was done without the benefit of any hard intelligence data about the state of affairs
inside the country. 141 The committee of anticommunist politicians that the CIA established as cover for the
operation was so rent by internal infighting and security leaks that one of the top members of the committee,
Dmitri A. Dimitrov, had to be imprisoned by the CIA at a hospital in Panama so as to prevent him from publicly
exposing the operation. 142 And perhaps most importantly, the Turkish government adamantly refused to allow
the CIA to establish bases in their country to train and infiltrate the agency’s operatives into Bulgaria. 143
So not surprisingly, all the agents the CIA parachuted into Bulgaria or infiltrated into the country from Greece
beginning in December 1950 were quickly killed or captured and sent back as double agents. 144 The CIA should
have recognized that something was wrong with the operation when the Bulgarian government began in
September 1951 holding splashy public espionage trials for all of the CIA agents it had captured, many of whom
were sentenced to death and executed. The Bulgarians named all the agents, the identities of theirs, the CIA bases
in Germany where they had been trained, and other operational details which should have led the operation to
either be suspended or terminated. But like all hidebound bureaucracies, the CIA refused to admit that anything
was amiss and pressed forward with the operation with greater intensity. 145 In the fall of 1951 the CIA convinced
the French and Dutch intelligence services to help them train new agent teams which were to be parachuted into
Bulgaria. As far as can be determined, these agents met the same fate inside Bulgaria when they were parachuted
into the country in the spring of 1952. 146
The abject failure of QKSTAIR/BGCONVOY can be traced to the poor operational security surrounding the
operation. Declassified Bulgarian documents reveal that the Bulgarian counterintelligence services had
thoroughly penetrated both the U.S. and British intelligence operations targeted against Bulgaria, apparently
thanks to the horrendous operational security practices of the CIA’s Bulgarian recruits. The documents show that
Bulgarian intelligence agents had infiltrated the Anglo-American intelligence operations in Greece, Turkey,
Yugoslavia and West Germany, and were providing Sofia with high-grade intelligence material on the number of
agents the Americans and British were training, where they were being trained, and what their targets were inside
Bulgaria. By December 1953 the Bulgarian counterintelligence operations had completely compromised the
security of the Anglo-American penetration operations into Bulgaria, with American and British agents being
arrested as soon as they crossed the border into Bulgaria. 147
7 Albania
This collection contains several hundred pages of newly declassified documents concerning the CIA’s failed effort
to overthrow the communist Albanian regime of Enver Hoxha, which was conducted in conjunction with the
British foreign intelligence service, MI6. Like the agency’s failed covert action operations in Romania and
Bulgaria, the CIA’s Albanian operation, known as Project BGFIEND (MI6 referred to their side of the Albanian
operation as VALUABLE), was a unmitigated failure. Over one hundred CIA agents were infiltrated into Albania
between 1949 and 1954, very few of whom returned from their missions. And according to the declassified
documents in this collection, the CIA-MI6 operation ultimately only served to strengthen the Hoxa regime in
Tirana, which was exactly the opposite result of what the planners in Washington and London had hoped for
back in 1948 when the operation was conceived.
BGFIEND was a case study in bureaucratic mismanagement by OPC’s top officers in Washington, and sheer
ineptitude by the inexperienced case officers running the operation in the field during the early stages of the
operation. The documents in this collection reveal that OPC’s top leaders, including its chief, Frank Wisner, who
were desperate to prove to the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, and the British, that they were now a
‘major player’ in Washington, rushed precipitously into launching the operation even though they did not have
the personnel, equipment, facilities or expertise needed to conduct a covert action operation as large and as
complicated as BGFIEND. 148 And worse still, OPC ignored all the intelligence reporting and even a national

intelligence estimate, which stated that there was no existing resistance movement inside Albania, and that the
regime of Enver Hoxha was not vulnerable to destabilization by outside forces because of the omnipresence of
the state’s police, internal security forces, and nationwide network of informers. 149 The OPC planners instead
‘cherry picked’ the available intelligence information and declared, on little or no basis in fact, that Albania was
“ripe for revolution.” This formed the justification for the five-year effort to overthrow the Hoxha regime in
Albania that followed. 150
From an operational standpoint, what ensued over the next five years (1949-1954) was a series of catastrophic
failures that got only worse over time. The documents in this collection reveal that the field management of
Project BGFIEND was nothing short of inept. OPC was in such a hurry to launch the operation that the OPC field
officers running the project in Italy and Greece made repeated fundamental tradecraft and operational security
mistakes, which doomed the operation to failure even before it began. During the first two years of the operation
(1949-1950), the OPC division chief responsible for managing the Albania operation, former State Department
official James McCargar, and the OPC field commander of BGFIEND, New York business entrepreneur Michael
Burke, neither of whom had any prior experience running an intelligence operation, pressed forward with the
operation even when all the indicators suggested that the operation was failing at all levels. Even after over a
dozen agent teams were lost in Albania, OPC blindly kept going, believing that they had to press forward if the
organization was to prove its worth to policymakers in Washington and London and get it the money it needed
to expand its operations to other parts of the world
The political front organization comprised of exiled Albanian political leaders that the OPC cobbled together
as cover for the operation, the National Committee for Free Albania, proved to be a disastrous undertaking from
beginning to end, and a very expensive one at that. Rent with dissension, factionalism, intrigue and double-
crossing, the Committee more closely resembled a daytime soap opera than a serious political organization. The
declassified documents reveal that the committee’s leaders, most of whom were drawn from the right-wing Balli
Kombater political party, behaved as if they were players in an amateur theatrical production. They squabbled
incessantly, misspent the money they were given by the CIA, and engaged in personal behavior so egregious that
it alarmed the CIA officers who controlled them because it threatened the security of the operation. For example,
the committee members were so leaky that even the OPC officials running the operation admitted that they could
not be trusted with any of the details of the BGFIEND operation. And perhaps most importantly, the Committee
deliberately excluded the most stable and cohesive Albanian emigre group, the BKI, which was based in Italy. 151
Operational security surrounding the operation was so poor that over a dozen documents in this collection
reveal that virtually every intelligence service operating in the Mediterranean, including the French, Italian and
Greek intelligence services, was privy to the most intimate details of Project BGFIEND’s planning and activities
even before the first CIA-sponsored agent teams were infiltrated into Albania in 1950. Moreover, even after the
OPC planners were informed that the Albanian intelligence service had penetrated the operation and were
operating a high-level agent within the Albanian National Committee, the OPC officials ignored this warning sign
and continued on with the operation. 152
By 1951, operational losses in agents inside Albania had become so severe that even the OPC officers running
BGFIEND could not ignore the warning signs. A March 1951 intelligence assessment found that the Hoxha regime
in Tirana had not been damaged at all by Operation BGFIEND, and that Albanian security forces had instead
intensified their efforts to destroy the last vestiges of resistance to the regime inside the country. The CIA’s
analysts also concluded that the anemic efforts of the CIA-sponsored resistance groups inside Albania was
nowhere near enough to destabilize or overthrow the Hoxha regime in Tirana. 153 The OPC’s response was to
ignore the intelligence reporting and expand their recruitment of agents and beef up the tempo of covert
operations inside Albania, arguing that the situation on the ground was far better than what the analysts in
Washington thought it was. As it turned out, the analysts got it right154
The bottom fell out of Project BGFIEND on October 10, 1951, when Radio Tirana announced the upcoming trial
of 14 captured spies, including four CIA agents dropped into Albania in 1950 and 1951. To make matters worse,
over the next three weeks Radio Tirana broadcast extended excepts from the ‘confessions’ of the captured spies,

detailing who their leaders were, where they had been trained in Germany, and other operational details about
the CIA’s role in the operation. The damage to the operational security of BGFIEND stemming from these
revelations was extraordinary and deeply embarrassing to the CIA officers running the project. The OPC tried to
coverup the disaster by ordering that the translated transcripts of the Radio Tirana broadcasts not be
disseminated outside of the OPC, but this foolish order was quickly superceded when the content of the
broadcasts were picked up by U.S. and European wire services. 155 CIA director General Walter Bedell Smith was
livid, with a memorandum reported that the General “questioned seriously the value of our Albanian Operations.
He noted what he considered to be the large amount of money and effort which CIA is pouring into this program.
He could not understand what we are accomplishing or, more important, what we are trying to accomplish.” 156
Technically, BGFIEND should be suspended, or perhaps even terminated at this point in time. The British
intelligence service, which had divorced itself from the CIA operation in late 1949, repeatedly warned the CIA
that BGFIEND was failing. But the warnings from the British were ignored, with some CIA officials telling anyone
who would listen in Washington that the British had become timorous and weak kneed. 157 In June 1952, the CIA’s
clandestine intelligence arm, the Office of Special Operations (OSO), submitted a blistering critique of the OPC’s
management of Project BGFIEND, but this report also went unheeded. So a few months later the OSO pulled itself
out of the operation without so much as a by-your-leave. 158
Supported by the State Department, the OPC ran right through ignored all of these warning signs and
continued the operation despite steadily increasing losses of agents and equipment. For three more years this
pattern continued. The Albanians would put on trial a new batch of captured CIA spies, and publish and
broadcast further details of the operation. The CIA would order up a new review of the operation. The OPC would
conduct the review of its own failing operation, and not surprisingly each review found nothing wrong and
recommended the continuation of the operation. In March 1953, the CIA admitted defeat, telling the State
Department that the goal of overthrowing the Hoxha regime in Albania was no longer attainable and that
previous reports of widespread discontent inside Albania with the communist government had been “greatly
exaggerated.” And still the operation was allowed to continue unabated. By 1954, the CIA was finding it
increasingly difficult to justify the cost of continuing the operation, especially since the agency’s recruiters could
no longer find Albanians willing to parachute into their home country where their survival rate was next to nil.
With virtually nothing to show for it, the CIA unceremoniously pulled the plug on BGFIEND (now renamed
OBOPUS) at the end of 1955 after six years of fruitless effort and tens of millions of dollars expended. 159

CHAPTER 5
SPYING ON AMERICA’S EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES
It may be small consolation for German chancellor Angela Merkel, but as the documents in this collection
demonstrate, the U.S. has been spying on the communications of Western Europe’s governments and leaders for
almost seventy years.
The U.S. intelligence community began spying on its Western European friends and allies midway through the
Second World War, and has never stopped since Germany’s surrender in May 1945. Even before the end of World
War II the U.S. Army secretly activated small clandestine listening posts inside the U.S. embassies in Paris,
Stockholm, Madrid and Ankara so as to monitor the internal government communications of these four friendly
or neutral European countries as part of an ultra-sensitive SIGINT program called Project 78. These listening posts
are, for the most part, still active and form a small part of what is now today referred to within the U.S. intelligence
community as the Special Collection Service (SCS), a 4,000-man covert SIGINT intercept organization that
operates listening posts inside more than seventy U.S. embassies and consulates around the world. 160
Virtually no country in Europe was immune from the U.S. intelligence community’s scrutiny, except perhaps
for the tiny nations of Luxembourg, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Liechtenstein. Everybody else seems to
have been considered fair game. For instance, the declassified documents contained in this collection show that
the diplomatic, military and economic communications of a sizeable number of Western European countries
have been targeted by America’s electronic eavesdropping organization, the National Security Agency (NSA),
since the end of World II, including Albania, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 161
Here is a brief summary of the documentary evidence for U.S. spying on its friends and allies in Western
Europe.
1 France
By far and away, the single largest and most important Western European target of the U.S. intelligence
community even before the end of World War II has been France. Eavesdropping on French diplomatic and
military communications traffic began even before the U.S. entered the Second World War in December 1941, and
continued unabated throughout the war, in large part because of serious policy differences between the U.S.
government and the leader of the Free French government-in-exile, Charles De Gaulle. 162
After the end of World War II in late 1945, the U.S. agreed not to spy on the French government or conduct
unilateral intelligence collection operations inside France without the consent of the French government, these
agreements were apparently broken at an early stage by the predecessor to the CIA, the Strategic Services Unit
(SSU). As early as August 1945, the SSU’s counterintelligence organization was spying on the activities of the
French foreign intelligence service in Western Europe and the Middle East. And as time went by, the SSU’s
successor, the CIA, quietly intensified its intelligence coverage of French espionage activities around the world,
including inside the U.S. 163
There were numerous reasons why the U.S. intelligence community was more than slightly distrustful of the
French intelligence and security services. There were numerous reports of varying reliability that the French
foreign intelligence service, SDECE, had been penetrated by the French communist party. 164 French security was
nothing short of horrific, with American surveys of French communications security practices finding that it was
relatively easy to penetrate even the most secure French cipher systems. 165 The French foreign intelligence
service, SDECE (now known as the DGSE) throughout the Cold War actively intercepted U.S. diplomatic, military
and then later commercial communications traffic. As of 1946, a team of French and Finnish cryptanalysts were
trying to break the American diplomatic codes and ciphers then in use. The U.S. initially found out what the

SDECE was doing thanks to a small number of Finnish cryptologists working for the French in a chateau outside
Paris, who informed the predecessor organization to what is today the CIA of what the French intelligence service
was doing. 166
By late 1946, the SSU had built up a sizeable stable of agents and cooperating sources high up inside the French
military and intelligence services, and was also surreptitiously running networks of Basque and Polish
anticommunist intelligence from Paris without the knowledge or consent of the French intelligence services. And
because of fears about the growing power of the French Communist Party, in late 1946 the SSU was covertly
helping its friends inside the French intelligence service (SDECE) recruit and equip an underground
anticommunist resistance network across France in case the communists ever took control of the French
government. 167
At the same time, America’s codebreakers were making remarkable progress breaking French diplomatic
codes and ciphers. At the time of Japan’s surrender in August 1945, 18 different French diplomatic cipher systems
had been broken and their traffic was being read by the American codebreakers. The end of World War II in 1945
prompted the U.S. codebreakers and their partners in Britain and Canada to redouble their effort against French
diplomatic communications. The declassified documents contained in this collection show that immediately
after Japan’s surrender, decrypted French diplomatic traffic instantly became the most productive and important
source of information available to the U.S. intelligence community about what was going on around the world,
particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This was due, in no small part, to the fact that while the
American and British cryptanalysts had not yet managed to solve any Soviet high-grade machine cipher systems,
the French cipher systems were so weak and French communications security practices so poor that they proved
to be easily solvable. 168
It is easiest to explain why the U.S. was spying on French communications traffic after the end of World War
II by examining the intelligence product that resulted from these operations, This collection contains over a
dozen Top Secret Codeword reports from the early post-World War II years based on decrypted French
diplomatic communications, as well as a number of exemplars of raw decrypted French diplomatic messages,
many of which reveal French diplomatic activities that were not in consonance with U.S. foreign policy objectives
at the time, such as France’s push to regain control over its foreign colonies and French espionage activities in
the U.S. 169
For instance, as of May 1961, the U.S. was apparently reading the highly-sensitive diplomatic traffic of both the
French government as well as the rebel Provisional Algerian Government, which was in the process of negotiating
France’s withdrawal from Algerian during secret talks then being held at Evian outside Paris. 170 And after French
president Charles De Gaulle pulled France out of NATO in 1966, former NSA cryptologists admit that both NSA
and its SIGINT partner in Great Britain, GCHQ, intensified their coverage of French military and diplomatic radio
traffic and expanded the scope of their cryptanalytic attack on French cryptographic systems. 171 SIGINT
monitoring of French diplomatic traffic helped the U.S. government track French foreign policy activities around
the world, which sometimes were not in consonance with U.S. government policies at the time, such as France’s
independent role on both sides of the fence at the height of the Vietnam War. 172 The U.S. was also able to monitor
the progress of the French nuclear weapons testing program at the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls in the South
Pacific thanks to SIGINT. 173
The CIA’s success inside France may have been more significant than NSA’s ability to break French codes.
During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the CIA experienced considerable success recruiting agents inside the French
government and military, as were the Soviet intelligence services, the KGB and GRU. The declassified documents
in this collection reveal that the U.S. intelligence community operated a number of paid agents or sympathetic
cooperating confidential sources inside the French government and military, some apparently at the highest
levels of the French government. These sensitive sources provided from about 1957 onwards information about
French nuclear weapons policy; French government thinking about allowing the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons
on French soil; information on the French nuclear weapons research and development program, including
insight into construction delays and technical problems being experienced at the French gaseous diffusion plant

at Pierrelatte; and details of the French nuclear weapons testing program in Algeria and the South Pacific,
including advance warning of dates of the nuclear tests and data on the size of the explosive yields of these
devices; and information about French arms sales to Israel. 174
This collection contains seven documents which reveal that beginning in at least 1964, the CIA tasked the U.S.
intelligence agency which operates America’s network of spy satellites in orbit around the Earth, the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), to take high-resolution photographs from space of the French nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile testing sites. Between 1964 and 1958, CIA KEYHOLE reconnaissance satellites monitored
developments taking place at the French nuclear weapons test sites at Mururoa in the South Pacific and In-Ekker
in Algeria, and the French ballistic missile test ranges at Landes in southwestern France and Colomb-Bechar in
Algeria. In 1967, spy satellite coverage of France was expanded to include the St. Christol missile complex in
southern France, which was where France’s first squadrons of intermediate-range ballistic missiles were based in
hardened silos. 175
2 Great Britain
A 1952 State Department document reveals that the CIA had a source close to senior members of the British
Labour Party, who was feeding the CIA with what the document described as “gossipy” tidbits about senior Labour
Party leaders, such as Aneurin Bevan, the former Minister of Health in the cabinet of Clement Attlee from 1945 to
1951, who as of 1952 was the leader of the left-wing of the Labour Party. These reports were so secret that only two
CIA officials were cleared to read then - the head of the CIA’s Clandestine Service Allen W. Dulles and Frank
Wisner, the director of the agency’s covert action arm, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The source in the
UK, whose identity and nationality were not revealed in the document, was being run by Wisner’s OPC. 176
3 West Germany
In the early to mid-1950s the CIA had at least one high-level intelligence source within the German government
who reported on German chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s top policy advisors as well as German government policy
discussions regarding relations with France. 177 And one declassified 1985 report reveals that NSA was intercepting
West German police communications at the time. 178
Beginning in the late 1940s, the CIA began quietly monitoring the activities of the West German foreign
intelligence service, the Gehlen Org, which after German independence in 1955 was renamed the
Bundesnachrictendienst (BND), and the German domestic security service (BfV). According to retired CIA
intelligence officials, this surveillance by agency counterintelligence officers was passive in nature, depending on
day-to-day interface with German government and intelligence officials for most of what was collected rather
than from intelligence obtained from agents covertly recruited inside the German intelligence agencies
themselves. 179
There were reasons for the CIA counterintelligence officials to be concerned about the integrity and security
of the German government and intelligence services. Dr. Otto John, the head of the West German
counterintelligence service, the BfV, mysteriously disappeared on July 20, 1954, then just as strangely reappeared
in West Germany a year and a half later on December 12, 1955 claiming that he had been kidnaped by the Russians.
No one believed John’s fanciful story because many of the CIA’s sources run jointly with John’s internal security
service, the BfV, stopped reporting after his disappearance. John was convicted of treason and sentenced to four
years in a German prison. The suspicion among American and German counterintelligence officials was that John
may have told the Russians, amongst other things, everything that he knew about what the West was learning
about the Soviet Union from SIGINT. 180
But the worst damage to the CIA’s HUMINT operations in Germany was done by the head of the BND's Soviet
Counterintelligence Department, Heinz Paul Johann Felfe, who it turned out was a Soviet spy. Two declassified
CIA damage assessment reports contained in this collection reveal for the first time that during his ten year career
in the BND from November 1951 until his arrest on November 6, 1961, Felfe betrayed more than 95 BND agents

and gave the KGB approximately 15,000 pages of classified BND documents. Directly or indirectly, Felfe directly
manipulated dozens of operations on behalf of the KGB so as to insure their failure, including virtually all BND
counterintelligence operations between 1951 and 1961. Felfe compromised the identities of more than 100 CIA
officers in Germany, as well as virtually the entire roster of BND managers, staff, field operatives, and agents in
both West and East Germany, including virtually every BND tactical agent source then operating in East Germany
(many of whom suddenly went silent after Felfe’s arrest). 181
4 Norway
For reasons that are not yet known, in 1967 the U.S. embassy in Oslo and its CIA station were tasked with urgently
collecting information and preparing a report on Norway’s nuclear energy research and development activities,
including joint research activities being conducted with the Netherlands on nuclear reactor development. 182
5 Spain
The ability of America’s codebreakers to read the diplomatic communications of the Spanish ambassador in
Washington, D.C., yielded some interesting and extremely sensitive high-level data in the late 1940s and early
1950s about links between the regime of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco and a number of right-wing American
politicians in the years after the end of World War II. 183
6 Italy
The CIA had at least one high-level source within the Italian foreign ministry in the early 1950s, who provided the
agency with details of Italian government policy decisions regarding Yugoslavia and Albania. 184
7 Greece
American and British codebreakers thoroughly penetrated the cipher systems being used by the Greek
communist guerrilla forces during the Greek civil war which lasted from 1946 to 1949. It remains to be seen how
important these decrypts were helping the Greek government defeat the Soviet-backed communist insurgency
in 1949. 185 SIGINT coverage of Greek diplomatic communications provided U.S. policymakers with some level of
insight into the behavior of the Greek government both before and after the April 1967 Greek military coup
d’etat.186
8 Turkey/Cyprus
A number of U.S. and British HUMINT sources inside the Turkish military and the Turkish national intelligence
organization provided detailed information about Turkish preparations to invade Cyprus in 1967, and the first
detailed advance warning that the Turkish army intended to occupy the northern half of the island in August
1974. 187
NSA’s ability to read the diplomatic communications of the Greek, Turkish and Cypriot governments helped
the Lyndon Johnson administration achieve diplomatic resolutions to crises in Cyprus in 1964 and 1967. 188 As late
as the 1980s, SIGINT from NSA was still providing helpful intelligence material about troubled state of affairs on
Cyprus. 189
9 Spying on the Picayune of Europe

At the direction of the White House, the U.S. intelligence community began monitoring political developments
in Iceland in 1954 during a period when U.S.-Icelandic relations deteriorated dramatically and the continued
presence of U.S. troops at Keflavik air base was threatened by the Icelandic government’s threats to terminate a
1951 defense agreement with the U.S. 190 At about the same time, the CIA and the U.S. military began recruiting

agents for a clandestine stay-behind resistance organization from amongst the members of the Icelandic police
force, the Icelandic coast guard, and a conservative anticommunist political organization called the Heimdallur.
191
But most of the highest level of attention that Iceland has ever received from the U.S. intelligence community
came in the 1970s during the so-called “Cod Wars” dispute between Iceland, Norway and Great Britain over fishing
rights in the waters off the coast of Iceland. 192
Even tiny Malta was targeted by the U.S. intelligence community after it achieved its independence from Great
Britain on September 21, 1964. The reason is that the country’s first leader, Dom Mintoff, established close ties
with both the USSR and Libya in the late 1960s, which immediately elevated the U.S. intelligence community’s
interest in what was going on in Malta. 193 And the closer Malta became to the USSR and Libya, especially after
the last British troops left the island nation in March 1979, the more resources the U.S. intelligence community
placed on trying to ferret out Dom Mintoff’s intentions. 194
10 Spying on the Western European Communist Parties

Viewed today in retrospect, it is more than somewhat ironic that the CIA spent so much time and devoted so
many resources to spying on the activities of virtually every communist party in Western Europe, especially those
in France and Italy, especially since these parties over the past seventy odd years have become mainstream
political forces in European politics.
But it is worth remembering that in the late 1940s, there was genuine fear in high-level Washington
government circles that some of these communist parties, especially those in France and Italy, could take control
of their governments through a combination of subversive activities, principally through the use of strikes, and at
the ballot box because of their enormous popularity with the voting public. These fears were stoked by the
oftentimes alarmist reporting coming from the CIA about the subversive threat posed by Western European
communist parties, especially those in France and Italy. 195 The documents reveal that senior State Department
officials were deeply involved in pushing the CIA to aggressively engage in an expansive array of extremely
sensitive covert action operations which were designed to subvert communist parties or communist-dominated
labor unions throughout Western Europe. 196
In response to this perceived threat, the CIA’s covert action arm, the Office of Police Coordination (OPC), used
every tactic, fair and unfair, to try to degrade the political power and influence of the European communist
parties.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the CIA’s clandestine intelligence organization, the Office of Special
Operations (OSO) and the OPC were both actively engaged in infiltrating agents into the communist parties and
communist-controlled labor unions of France, Italy, West Germany, Norway and Denmark, to name but a few.
Other documents in this collection reveal that U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) was also deeply
engaged in spying on the activities of the German Communist Party (KPD) in West Germany, including running
agents inside the KPD; while another Army intelligence unit tapped the phones and intercepted the cable traffic
of all senior KPD officials and also opened their mail. Not surprisingly, MI6 and the British Army’s intelligence
and counterintelligence officers were doing exactly the same thing in the British occupation zone of West
Germany. 197
But for the most part, the CIA depended on information provided by the European intelligence and security
services for much of what it knew about the activities of the Western European communist parties. There were
also numerous examples of non-communist European political parties and private anticommunist groups
collecting intelligence on communist party activities for the CIA, such as:
• On November 28, 1951, the CIA station in Copenhagen, Denmark, reported that “With the concurrence of
Danish Intelligence, OSO/Copenhagen has established direct contact with a former resistance leader who now
heads an independent intelligence network which collects information on Communist activities in 18 Danish
towns. This data, previously passed via Danish Intelligence, will now be furnished directly.” 198
• On December 20, 1951, the CIA station in Helsinki, Finland reported that “The chief of the intelligence section

of the Finnish Social Democratic Party has asked OSO/Helsinki to furnish recording devices to assist counter-
intelligence coverage of Communist activities in Finland.” 199
• On December 26, 1951, the CIA’s clandestine intelligence arm, the Office of Special Operations (OSO), reported
that “OSO officers in Washington have been discussing closer cooperation and exchange of information on
Communist activities in Norway with Haakon Lie, Secretary of the Norwegian Labor Party. Mr. Lie hesitates to
expand his cooperation with OSO, but has agreed to furnish monthly reports on the Norwegian Communist
Party, on which he is considered an authority.” 200
The OPC, through cutouts, was also secretly pumping millions of dollars into most non-communist political
parties in certain key Western European countries, many anticommunist political, social and legal advocacy
groups, and virtually all labor unions in Western Europe that were not already controlled or dominated by the
communist party, such as the huge and politically influential German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) in West
Germany. For example, one document in this collect reveals that in the 1940s and 1950s Irving Brown, the Paris-
based European representative of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the predecessor to today’s AFL-CIO
labor federation, served as the cutout through which CIA secretly subsidized the activities of various European
labor unions, especially the non-communist French, German and Italian trade federations. 201
11 Economic Intelligence Gathering in Europe

Despite what you may have read in the newspapers since the first article based on leaked materials from Edward
Snowden appeared in June 2013, the U.S. intelligence community has extensively engaged in economic
intelligence collection and analysis since World War I, and perhaps even earlier. For example, during World War
II, economic intelligence was used to great affect by the U.S. government as an economic sanctions tool in order
to prevent strategic commodities, such as tin, rubber and petroleum products, from reaching Nazi Germany and
Imperial Japan.
After the end of World War II, U.S. economic intelligence gathering in Europe continued, albeit at a very low
order of effort given that the Soviet Union and its allies were eating up the vast majority of America’s intelligence
collection resources. Given the fact that the Western European economies were the largest and most stable in the
world after the U.S., not surprisingly this is where much of the U.S. intelligence community’s focus was when it
came to economic intelligence gathering. For example, the U.S. Army’s SIGINT organization was monitoring all
commercial message traffic moving between the various major global economic centers, such as Paris, London,
Lisbon, Rome, Athens, and Oslo, amongst other capitals. The CIA and U.S. military intelligence also began
covertly covering the smuggling of banned goods and machinery from West Germany to East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. 202
During the 1950s the focus of U.S. economic intelligence collectors and analysts was the domestic and
international economic activities of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, and to a lesser degree
the commercial activities of Moscow’s Eastern European allies. For example, NSA SIGINT intercepts were used
to determine how much petroleum and kerosine the USSR and Eastern European countries were shipping to the
People’s Republic of China; track the use of Greek and Panamanian-flagged ships to transport Soviet and Eastern
European-made weaponry to Moscow’s client states around the world; as well as monitor the sale of Czech heavy
weapons to various Middle Eastern countries, especially Egypt and Syria, in the 1950s. In the 1950s, the CIA and
U.S. military intelligence were closely monitoring the smuggling operations being run from the Belgian port of
Antwerp and the Dutch port of Rotterdam that illicitly shipped banned commodities, such as diamonds, tin,
rubber and banned chemical products, to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 203
But it was not until the 1960s that the U.S. intelligence community began focusing more resources on
monitoring economic developments taking place in Europe. For example, starting in the mid-1960s the U.S.
intelligence community began closely following the exploration and development of the North Sea oil and natural
gas fields by Britain and Norway. 204 In the years that followed, the U.S. intelligence community closely monitored
British trade with North Vietnam during the Vietnam War205 and the continuing illicit smuggling of strategic

materials and high-technology items from Western Europe to the USSR and Eastern Europe. 206
Only in the late-1960s did the U.S. intelligence community really begin to appreciate the value of the
commercial SIGINT coming from NSA. During the British Sterling Crisis of 1967, CIA economic intelligence
analysts depended on NSA commercial intercepts to track large block transfers or sales of British pounds or
American dollars around the world. Then between 1967 and 1969, NSA commercial intercepts were used to
covertly monitor the sale of South African gold to a number of countries, particularly France, as the South African
government attempted to manipulate upwards the world price of gold. 207
But this was not deemed to be enough by the White House. In 1971, the Nixon administration directed the U.S.
intelligence community to devote even more resources to gathering and analyzing economic intelligence,
including developments in Western Europe that might have an impact on the U.S. economy. 208
HUMINT and SIGINT proved to be valuable source of economic intelligence which detailed the severe
economic hardship being caused across Europe by the Arab oil embargo in 1973-1974. SIGINT intercepts also
provided Washington with details of some of the secret arrangements various European countries (especially
France, West Germany and Italy) and Japan were making with Arab oil producers to ensure that their countries
continued to receive oil and natural gas shipments from the Persian Gulf. 209
The Arab oil embargo spurred the CIA and the other American intelligence agencies to redouble their efforts
in the area of economic intelligence gathering. 210 Suddenly the CIA began issuing a plethora of all-source
intelligence reporting about economic developments taking place around the world, especially in Western
Europe and Japan because that was where the majority of the world’s wealth lay. 211 One example was the CIA
produced a series of studies of Norway’s dramatic economic growth in th4e mid-1970s from the huge revenues
being derived from oil and natural gas drilling in the North Sea. 212
But the CIA’s economic intelligence mission really took off in the 1980s during the Reagan administration, a
period where economic issues, such as trade deficits, oil prices, and trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe,
became major determinants in U.S.-European relations. 213 By the mid-1980s, economic intelligence had become
so important that the CIA was being asked to prepared detailed summaries of European economic developments
and problem areas prior to each G8 summit meeting between U.S. and European leaders. 214 The CIA also stepped
up its intelligence coverage of smuggling by certain Western European companies in Germany, Austria, Italy and
Switzerland of an array of high-tech hardware and banned technologies, such as machinery used to manufacture
chemical and nuclear weapons, to the Soviet Union and certain Middle Eastern countries. 215
12 Monitoring European Anti-Nuclear Groups in the 1980s

In 1979 President Jimmy Carter announced that the U.S. intended to deploy to Western Europe nuclear-armed
Pershing II ballistic missiles and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) to counter the buildup of Soviet SS-
20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the western USSR. The Pershing II missiles were to be deployed to West
Germany, while a larger number of GLCM missiles were destined for a specially designated air bases in Great
Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.
Even before the decision to deploy these weapons to Europe was formally announced by the Carter White
House, new anti-nuclear groups and older, better established organizations like the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament (CND) in Great Britain, began coalescing across Europe in opposition to the planned arrival of these
weapons. And as the opposition to these weapons began to grow across Europe, so too did the number of CIA
reports on these anti-nuclear protests and the impact they were having on key European governments. 216
The tenor and tone of the CIA’s reporting on the opposition to the deployment of these new nuclear delivery
systems to Europe changed dramatically in 1981 after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as the president of the U.S. In
1983, just as the first Pershing II and GLCM missiles were about to be deployed to Europe, the CIA began
producing a series of classified reports about the growing anti-nuclear protest movement in Western Europe,
including dire suggestions that European terrorist groups like the Baader-Meinhof Gang (Red Army Faction) in
Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy might use these protests as cover for launching terrorist attacks on U.S.

nuclear facilities. 217 Prompted by requests from the Reagan administration, other CIA reports during this
timeframe focused on the covert role that the Soviet Union was playing in promoting and supporting the
European anti-nuclear campaigns. 218 Subsequent reporting during the 1986-1987 timeframe focused on the
question of whether the Belgian, Dutch and Italian governments would decide to permit the U.S. to deploy GLCM
missiles on their soil, which they all eventually did. 219

CHAPTER 6
INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON EUROPE
Despite what you may have read in the newspapers over the past two years, over a dozen current and former U.S.
intelligence officials have categorically stated in interviews that intelligence has historically played a minuscule
role in the formulation of U.S. government foreign policy towards Western Europe. This may have changed over
the past decade, but informed sources in Washington tend to doubt that much has changed since the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. 220
The documents contained in this collection confirm a long-held belief that CIA’s National Intelligence
Estimates were, and remain, an imperfect tool for assessing global, regional or national developments, with the
declassified documents show that the estimative process failed as often as they hit the mark on significant
European developments. For example, the CIA produced no National Intelligence Estimates before the April 1967
military coup d’etat in Greece, the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus,
the 1974 military coup d’etat in Portugal, or the 1980-1981 Polish crisis.
During the Cold War era from 1945 to 1990, CIA intelligence estimates on Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern
Europe (excepting Albania and Yugoslavia) were very few and far between. With only a few exceptions, the CIA
analysts merged the Eastern European nations into Soviet intelligence estimates in the mistaken belief that the
Warsaw Pact countries were essentially drones of the Soviet Union who marched in lockstep with the Kremlin
and did what the Soviets wanted. Is was not until the 1980-1981 Polish crisis that information provided by the
CIA’s spy inside the Polish general staff, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, revealed that the Eastern European countries
operated with a far greater degree of autonomy than Washington previously believed.
Those CIA estimates on Eastern Europe that were produced during the fourty year period between 1950 and
1990 emphasized the negative, focusing to a large degree on any indications whatsoever of internal dissent,
political instability, economic problems and socio-economic problems within the Eastern European countries.
Any positive developments in the Eastern European countries got only brief mention in these estimates because
these facts were not what the agency’s consumers in Washington wanted to hear. So over time, the CIA produced
fewer and fewer estimates on Eastern Europe as interest in Washington waned on the subject during the 1960s
and 1970s. On during the Reagan administration in the early 1980s was there a sudden resurgence in interest in
what was going on in Eastern Europe, especially in Romania, which was led by the rebellious bete noir, Nicolae
Ceausescu. 221 During the 1950s and 1960s, the CIA’s intelligence analysts also devoted an inordinate amount of
time and space to searching in vain for any indicia of popular resistance movements or guerrilla-type activities
taking place behind the Iron Curtain. As the estimates reluctantly admitted, there was not much resistance to the
communist regimes in Eastern Europe to be found anywhere. 222
In those instances where the CIA intelligence estimates contained conclusions that displeased consumers in
the U.S. government and elsewhere in the CIA, there was a natural tendency on the part of the consumers to give
short shrift or even ignore the CIA’s assessments. For example, estimates of the situation in Albania from 1949 to
1954 all indicated little likelihood of success for an internal uprising against the Hoxha regime in Tirana. And yet,
the OPC/CIA and the State Department ignored the estimates and plunged ahead with their abortive efforts to
overthrow or subvert the Hoxha regime, pointing out the limited utility of these documents. They are only as
good as the people who use them. 223
During the same 1950-1990 timeframe, the CIA produced even fewer intelligence estimates on Western Europe,
and most of these estimates were so general in nature, lacking in specificity and bereft of insight from SIGINT and
clandestine sources that one might have been better served reading a good newspaper in order to obtain a
detailed understanding of the problems facing the countries of Western Europe. Take for example the banal and
mostly uninformative estimates produced by the CIA during the 1950s and 1960s on the short-term political and
economic prospects for West Germany, 224 France, 225 Italy, 226 . Only in the mid-1970s did these CIA intelligence

estimates become more serious and rigorous in their approach to estimating short- and long-term developments
in Europe.
The best of the CIA intelligence estimates dealt with more technical subjects, such as the dangers of nuclear
weapons proliferation in Europe and the latest developments in the French nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
programs. 227 And the CIA’s analysts must be credited with producing thoughtful and insightful intelligence
estimates on Yugoslavia during the 1980s and early 190s which focused on the growing nationalist and sectarian
tensions that eventually ripped the country apart in the early 1990s and led to a bloody five year civil war that
killed tens of thousands of people. 228
The CIA’s day-to-day intelligence reporting on events in Europe was also deficient in a number of important
areas. First, during the Cold War era most of the intelligence information on Western European politics came
from State Department reporting and open sources rather than from secret sources, a fact confirmed by the
documents contained in this collection. Second, between 1950 and 1990 the U.S. intelligence community
produced far fewer intelligence reports and estimates about developments in Europe than for virtually any other
major intelligence targets around the world. Why? It is not because the US intelligence community viewed Europe
as unimportant to US national security. Rather, the reason is that with the exception of a few wars and minor
conflicts, Europe has remained relatively peaceful and politically, economically and socially stable since the end
of World War II.
The exceptions to this rule were the Greek Civil War from 1946 to 1949, the1948 Berlin Blockade, the 1956
Hungarian Revolution, the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the 1967 military coup d’etat in Greece, the
1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the rise of the Solidarity trade union
and the resulting Polish Crisis of 1980-1981, and the brutal five year-long war in the former Yugoslavia that lasted
from 1991 to 1995. All of these crises are covered in some detail in this document collection
Another important finding is that the U.S. intelligence community historically has devoted very few
intelligence collection resources to spying on Western Europe, which runs contrary to much of what has been
written in the U.S. and European press over the past two years based on materials leaked by former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden. Declassified documents confirm that even Latin America and Africa have
historically gotten more manpower and money for intelligence collection and analysis than Western Europe. As
of 1975 the U.S. intelligence community’s target coverage was divvied up as follows: the USSR and Eastern Europe:
65%, Asia: 25%, the Middle East: 7%, Latin America: 2%; and the rest of the world (including Western Europe):
1%.229
For example, the declassified documents show that signals intelligence (SIGINT), satellite reconnaissance and
other high-tech intelligence sources played a very small role in helping the US intelligence community follow
events in Western Europe. Not surprisingly, during the Cold War era the vast majority of these resources were
devoted to monitoring the activities of America’s principal protagonists, the USSR, the People’s Republic of China,
North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. And the amount of ‘hard’ intelligence information that it has gotten from
these efforts has typically fallen far short of comparable efforts conducted elsewhere around the world.
And the amount of hard intelligence information garnered from the U.S. intelligence community’s collection
operations in Western Europe has historically been very small despite the sometimes high quality of the
information derived from high-level sources within European governments.
1 Terrorism in Europe
A review of the materials in this collection reveals that the CIA’s intelligence collection and reporting on terrorism
in general prior to the mid-1970s was anemic, and hard analysis of the growing threat posed by terrorism was
almost non-existent, which is indicative of the low priority given this problem by the U.S. intelligence community.
Most of the perfunctory reporting published in CIA daily intelligence summaries during this period appears to
have come from the State Department diplomatic cables or unclassified wire service reports rather than from the
agency’s clandestine intelligence sources or from electronic eavesdropping materials collected at NSA, and the

CIA’s analytic commentary accompanying the daily reporting could best be described as shallow.
For instance, most of the CIA reporting on terrorist attacks conducted by the Greek Cypriot group EOKA
against British forces on Cyprus during the 1955-1958 timeframe appear to have been taken directly from State
Department reporting from the American consulate in Nicosia, with most of the reporting lacking analytic depth
and context. 230 The same was true of the CIA’s intelligence coverage of the 1961-1962 wave of terrorist violence
directed at French government and military installations in France and Algeria by the right-wing group known as
the Secret Army Organization (OAS), which vehemently opposed French president Charles De Gaulle’s plan to
give Algeria her independence. The best that can be said about the CIA’s coverage of the OAS terrorist threat was
that it was sketchy and incomplete. One cannot help wondering if one would have been better served by reading
a quality newspaper or magazine if one wanted to know about the growth of right-wing terrorism in France during
this period. 231
It was not until the early 1970s during the Nixon administration that there were signs of a marked improvement
in both the quantity and quality of the CIA’s coverage of terrorism in Europe. The CIA began giving extensive
coverage to the growth of left-wing and right-wing urban terrorism and an increasingly violent Kurdish
insurgency in eastern Turkey. The CIA also gave fair coverage to the oftentimes bloody steps taken by the Turkish
military to stamp these internal threats out, which got very little coverage in the Western press at the time. But
by 1980, the level of terrorist violence in Turkey was threatening to spiral out of control, marked for the first time
by the assassinations of Turkish political figures and the kidnaping of high-profile figures in Ankara and Istanbul.
232
As if the Turkish internal security situation was not complicated enough, in the early 1980s an Armenian
terrorist group based largely in France called the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
began bombing Turkish embassies and consulate across Europe. 233
In 1972, the CIA finally began providing coverage in its intelligence publications to the growing number of
terrorist attacks being conducted in West Germany by the Baader-Meinhof Gang (sometimes referred to by the
CIA as the Red Army Faction), but only because the terrorists had begun targeting U.S. military installations in
West Germany. 234
The CIA also began producing “think pieces” on terrorist attacks on Yugoslavian government embassies and
consulates and splashy airliner hijackings by right-wing Croatian emigre Ustasha terrorists. 235
Some of the most interesting CIA intelligence reporting on European terrorism in the late 1970s and early 1980s
focused on the growing number of attacks inside Spain being committed by the Basque terrorist groups ETA and
GRAPO, which analysts at the CIA honestly believed posed a significant threat to the stability of the
democratically-elected Spanish government, which was headed at the time by Adolfo Suarez. By 1981, the CIA’s
analysts believed that the level of ETA and GRAPO terrorist attacks and efforts by Catalan separatists to gain
autonomy for their region would lead the Spanish military to overthrow the civilian government in order to
restore order. 236
In 1981, the CIA began covering the activities of the Italian terrorist group Red Brigades following the kidnaping
of an American general, James Dozier, from his home in Verona. In the ensuing years, the CIA began criticizing
what the agency’s analysts believed to be a timorous response to the growing Red Brigades terrorist threat by the
Italian government. 237
Some of the more interesting CIA counterterrorist intelligence reporting in the 1980s centered on the perceived
weak response to the growing levels of terrorist violence across Europe by certain European governments,
especially the French government, which the CIA widely believes tacitly permitted Basque ETA and Armenian
ASALA terrorists to operate openly on French soil. 238 The Italian government also came in for a fair amount of
criticism from the CIA for failing to aggressively go after terrorists operating from, or transiting through their
country. 239 Another country that CIA counterterrorist specialists were concerned about in 1984 was Turkey,
where levels of terrorist violence and attacks by Kurdish separatists continued to increase despite massive efforts
by the Turkish military and security forces to stamp out these threats. 240
But interestingly, the CIA produced virtually no intelligence coverage of the bloody conflict between the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government in Northern Ireland during the 1960s, 1970s

and 1980s except for one or two reports on the flow of money from pro-IRA groups in the U.S., which the IRA used
to purchase weapons, and a single report about the alleged provision of weapons and training to IRA terrorists by
the Soviets and their allies. 241
2 Coverage of European Socio-Economic Issues

Only in the mid-1970s did the CIA’s analysts begin closely examining the host of political and related socio-
economic issues that were changing Western Europe, starting immigration. Beginning in 1975, the CIA began
producing a series of classified reports about the rising number of immigrants, most of them from Turkey, North
Africa and the Middle East, who were coming to Europe to find work. When these immigrant groups took root
and did not return to their home countries, they created a number of thorny socio-economic problems that today
have become major political issues and significant sources of tension in certain European countries. 242 The CIA
examined the growth of the Jean-Marie Le Pen’s ultra-nationalist National Front political party in France in the
1970s and 1980s, whose meteoric rise to prominence in French politics was due, in large part, to the Le Pen’s
skillful manipulation of the immigration issue to further the prospects of his political party at the ballot box. 243
Beginning in the early 1980s, the CIA examined in some detail the rise of ethnic nationalism and sectarian
minorities in Yugoslavia, such as the increasingly serious problems associated with the rising aspirations of the
Muslim minority population of Kosovo Province. What makes these intelligence reports and estimates so
significant is that they accurately predicted that the growth of ethnic and sectarian divisions inside Yugoslavia
would presage unrest and even violence in the near future. This is exactly what happened after the Yugoslav
federation collapsed in 1990, when nationalist and sectarian violence tore Yugoslavia apart and helped cause a
bloody five year civil war that changed the map of Europe forever. 244
Other fascinating reports prepared by the CIA on European socio-economic issues included the influence of
the German media on West German politics; 245 the rising tide of German nationalism in West Germany; 246 the
declining political and economic power of labor union and trade federations across Western Europe; 247 the
danger to the British economy caused by the drastically falling value of the British Pound in 1985; 248 and the
growing political power of the Catholic Church in communist Eastern Europe years before the end of the Cold
War, especially in Poland. 249
1. Interview with James H. Critchfield.
2. Department of State, Memorandum, Unaccounted Funds to Assist Non-Communist Forces in Europe, September 6,
1947, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, January 12, 1948, Secret
[view]
CIA, Report, France: Communist Mass Action Expected in Spring, February 7, 1948, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of US Counteraction, February 9,
1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means, March 5, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Liaison With State Department, March 19, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, The Problem, April 30, 1948, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Operation LARGO, October 12, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Soviet Planning of the French Coal Strike, November 22, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Remarks by CGT Leaders Concerning the Coming Revolution in France, December 22, 1948, Secret [view]

3. MS, Bruce W. Bidwell, Colonel, USA (Ret.), History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General
Staff, Part 6, p. I-24, III-1 - III-2, ,June 1, 1962, Call No. 2-3.7, AA.N, U.S. Army Center for Military History (CMH),
Washington, D.C., U.S. Army FOIA.
4. Regarding SSU/OSO stations in 1946, see Memorandum, Magruder to Irwin, Assets of SSU for Peacetime Intelligence
Procurement, January 15, 1946, at http://www.state.gov/; Warner, The CIA Under Harry Truman, pp. 21, 23; William R.
Corson, Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, Widows (NY: Crown Publishers, 1989), p. 401n1.
5. SSU Missions and Stations in Europe, Near East and Africa, April 22, 1946, RG-226, Entry 210, Box 344, File: Missions &
Stations, NA, CP.
6. A particularly poignant first-hand description of how intelligence fabricators worked is in Arnold M. Silver,
“Questions, Questions, Questions: Memories of Oberursel,” Intelligence and National Security, April 1993, pp. 202-209.
7. U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Evaluation of “Heinz-Moline”, February 7, 1950, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Paper Mills and Fabrication, February 1952, Top Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Article, Paper Mills and Fabrication, Winter 1958, Secret [view]
8. CIA, Memorandum, Phasing Out of MAT, January 24, 1952, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Points for Consideration in AEROSOL Dispatch (Fran and Muni), February 5, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, untitled, May 21, 1952, Secret [view]
9. SSU, Report, Symphony Project: Original Project Report, April 17, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, NKGB Recruiting of Jewish Agents for Palestine, April 29, 1946, Top Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Clandestine Jewish Traffic to Palestine, May 2, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Project SYMPHONY: Direct Overt Contact With Political Department, Jewish Agency, May 2, 1946,
Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Symphony Project, October 3, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, “Report on Jewish Escape Routes” Furnished by G-2 USFA, October 9, 1946, Secret [view]
CIA, Article, Project SYMPHONY: US Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah in Post-war Austria, 2007, Secret. [view]
10. See for example SSU, Memorandum, Operation KEYSTONE, September 9, 1946, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Operation RUSTY - Use of the Eastern Branch of the Former German Intelligence Service,
October 1, 1946, Top Secret [view]
CIG, Memorandum, Operation RUSTY, December 5, 1946, Top Secret [view]
CIG, Memorandum, Operation Rusty, June 3, 1947, Top Secret Control [view]
CIA, Cable, Chief, Foreign Branch M to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, February 9, 1949, Top Secret Control [view]
CIA, Dispatch, Letter to General Hall, February 10, 1949, Secret; CIA, Memorandum, Dr. Schneider’s Reply to Recent
Policy Guidance Letters, October 12, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Intelligence Estimate, May 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Review of CIA Management of OFFSPRING [Gehlen Org] During the Fiscal Year 1950, July 21, 1950,
Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Brief on ZIPPER for Mr. Dulles, February 15, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Briefing for deleted, July 31, 1951, Secret Control. [view]
11. U.S. Navy, Report, Norway/USSR: Norwegian-Finnish Border [view]

Spitsbergen, June 12, 1946, Secret; SSU, Cable, Oslo to War Department - Strategic Services Unit, August 7, 1946, Top
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Soviet Radar Stations in the Arctic Region, January 15, 1948, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Norway/Soviet Activities in South Norway, February 4, 1948, Secret [view]

U.S. Army, Cable, USMILATTACHE AMEMBASSY Oslo Norway to Dept of the Army, September 14, 1948, Top Secret
[view]
JCS, Memorandum, Information Requested of the Norwegian Government Reference Soviet Activity on Spitzbergen,
March 12, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CH MAAG NORWAY to HQ USAF, September 12, 1952, Top Secret. [view]
12. U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Daily Activity Report, September 7, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Photo Reconnaissance, October 5, 1948, Top Secret.
13. SSU, Memorandum, Houck to Magruder, January 8, 1946, Secret [view]

SSU, Memorandum, Liaison With Other Intelligence Services, February 20, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Cable, Copenhagen to War Department - Strategic Services Unit, March 17, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Liaison With Foreign Intelligence Services (Scandinavia), April 15, 1946, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Navy: Fleet Dispositions, October 29, 1946, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Aviation: Dispositions, October 31, 1946, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Navy: Fleet Disposition, December 20, 1946, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Commerce & Shipping: Russian Baltic Merchant Fleet, January 13, 1947, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Navy: Fleet Disposition, May 21, 1947, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Swedish Radio Interception, June 3, 1947, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Swedish Efforts to Detect Russian Search Radar Stations, June 3, 1947, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Intelligence from Swedish Source, July 10, 1947, Top Secret [view]
14. U.S. Air Force, Cable, USMILATTACHE AMEMBASSY Stockholm Sweden to MILID, September 15, 1947, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, USMILATTACHE AMEMBASSY Stockholm Sweden to MILID, September 22, 1947, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Interview With Captain Thoren, Royal Swedish Navy, October 14, 1947, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Loan of Aerial Cameras, November 20, 1947, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, USMILATTACHE AMLEGATION Stockholm Sweden to AFACB, December 4, 1947, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, USMILATTACHE AMEMBASSY Stockholm Sweden to MILID, February 2, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Release of Equipment, February 16, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Transmittal of Special P.I. Report, October 5, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Letter, Brannon to Brown, August 31, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, AIRATTACHE Helsinki Finland to C/S Washington, September 28, 1949, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Thompson to Matthews, October 10, 1949, Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Thompson to Matthews, October 13, 1949, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Matthews to Thompson, October 19, 1949, Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Matthews to Thompson, October 27, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Request for Detailed Photo Interpretation Report, November 23, 1949, Top Secret. An
excellent Swedish history of these secret overflights can be found at Lennart Andersson and Leif Hellströ [view];m.
lain Bortom Horisonten (Stockholm: Freddy Stenboms förlag, 2002).
15. U.S. Army Cable, Military Attache Copenhagen to War Department, March 13, 1946, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia - Navy - Fleet Movements and Advanced Bases; Air Bases; Mined Areas, March 15, 1946, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Navy: Operating Forces, April 10, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Reports From Germany, August 16, 1946, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Navy: Movement of Russian Naval Vessels, July 29, 1947 [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Russia: Russian Naval Units in the Baltic, December 23, 1947, Secret [view]

Department of State, Cable, Copenhagen to Secretary of State, December 23, 1947, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, USMILATTACHE AMEMBASSY Copenhagen Denmark to Director of Intelligence Dept of the Army,
October 6, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Report, Daily Selected Intelligence Reports and Briefs, Directorate of Intelligence, September 22, 1950, Top
Secret [view]
16. SSU, Memorandum, Relations Between Bern Mission and Rome Office, January 22, 1946, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Rome to Secretary of State, November 11, 1947, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Rome to Secretary of State, November 20, 1947, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Rome to Secretary of State, December 9, 1947, Secret [view]
CIA, Cable, Munich to Special Operations, January 10, 1949, Secret. [view]
17. Confidential interviews.
18. CIA, Memorandum, Project WUDEPOT - Current and Future Status, March 8, 1965, Secret. [view]
19. UK Royal Air Force, Report, Record of Vice-Chief to Vice-Chief Discussions in Washington on 18th April 1972, April 21, 1972,
Top Secret [view]
Department of Defense, Letter, Clements to Rush, April 17, 1973, Secret [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Cable, SUSLO CHELT to NSACSS, March 28, 1977, Top Secret/COMINT Channels
[view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon Above Corps, January 20, 1982,
Secret [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Letter, Faurer to Casey, March 26, 1982, Secret/Handle Via COMINT Channels Only
[view]
CIA, Cable, C/E/OPS to deleted, June 8, 1983, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Talking Points for Discussion with General Wickham, October 31, 1983, [view]
Top Secret; CIA, Memorandum, Visit of Rudolf Werner (ALIAS KEMPE), Chief of Department One (Human Collection)
and Ebrulf Zuber (ALIAS ACKERMANN), Chief of the Intelligence Operations Staff of the West German Federal
Intelligence Service (BND), August 23, 1984, Secret [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Diary Entry, GCHQ, June 7, 1985, no classification markings [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Diary Entry, Notes & Observations on London and Bergen Mtgs, June 11, 1985, no
classification markings [view]
21. Interviews with Cleveland W. Cram, David E. Murphy and Harry Rositzke.
22. SSU, Memorandum, Current Status and Activities of the Swiss Mission, SI, February 28, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Liaison with Swiss Intelligence Services, April 16, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Swiss Intelligence, April 18, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Liaison with Foreign Intelligence Services, April 18, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Cooperation Between Swiss Federal Police and G-2, USFET, June 3, 1946, Top Secret Control [view]
CIA, Report, Director’s Log, November 8, 1951, Top Secret. [view]
23. U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Assignment of Pilots to SWISSAIR, July 9, 1952, Top Secret. [view]
24. SSU, Letter, Lewis to Helms, September 18, 1946, Secret. [view]

25. SSU, Memorandum, Vatican Contacts, June 4, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Letter, Lewis to Helms, September 18, 1946, Secret. [view]
26. CIA, Report, Weekly Review, July 5, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Italy, March 5, 1958, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Staff Notes: Western Europe, Canada, International Organizations, November 24, 1975, Top Secret Umbra
[view]
CIA, Report, Catholicism in Eastern Europe, March 4, 1986, [view]
Secret/NOFORN.
27. Mary Welch, “AFTAC Celebrates 50 Years of Long-Range Detection,” AFTAC Monitor, October 1997, p. 13; Department
of State, Cable, Madrid to Secretary of State, May 13, 1965, Secret [view]
28. U.S. Army, Memorandum, US Army Intercept Station Italy, March 16, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, FS Italy, April 22, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Rome to Dept of State, July 7, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, US CINCEUR Rep Amemb Rome to US CINCEUR, July 15, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Military Rights Requirements of the USAF Security Service, September 18, 1953, Top
Secret [view]
29. Department of State, Letter, Nash to Secretary of State, March 16, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Communications Facilities for the 57th Radio Sq Mobile, June 19, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Athens to Secretary of State, February 2, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Athens to Secretary of State, April 15, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Athens to Secretary of State, July 27, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Notes on Iraklion, February 28, 1956, Top Secret. [view]
30. OSS, Report, Monthly Report of the Steering Division, SI/Germany, August 2, 1945, Top Secret [view]
OSS, Report, Monthly Report of the Steering Division, October 4, 1945, Secret [view]
Strategic Services Unit (SSU), Report, SSU Activities: October 1945, January 25, 1946, Top Secret Control [view]
State Department, Cable, Berlin to Secretary of State, November 29, 1945, Secret [view]
SSU, Report, Summary of SSU Activities During November, 1945, undated, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, SI Personnel and Operations in American Zone, Germany and Denmark; Present Status and
Proposals for Near-Term Future, December 6, 1945, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Report on German Mission, December 8, 1945, Top Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, SI Germany, January 31, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Summary of Personnel Situation in SSU Missions and Stations, March 6, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Progress Report, March 1946, April 15, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Servicing of OMGUS by the SSU Detachment in Berlin, April 26, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Monthly Activity Report - April 1946 - Central Europe-Scandinavia Section, SI, May 10, 1946, Secret
[view]
SSU, Memorandum, Monthly Activity Report - May 1946 - Central Europe-Scandinavia Section, SI, June 14, 1946, Secret
[view]
SSU, Letter, Lewis to Quinn, June 17, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Monthly Activities Report for June 1946 - FBM, July 18, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, General Report of Intelligence Branch Activities, September 13, 1946, Top Secret [view]
SSU, Letter, Lewis to Helms, September 18, 1946, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Intelligence Disseminations of War Department Detachment, October 24, 1946, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Army, Cable, COMGENUSAFE Wiesbaden Germany to Dept of the Army, July 16, 1948, Top Secret [view]

31. U.S. Army, Memorandum, Intelligence Reporting from EUCOM, April 23, 1947, Secret [view];
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Intelligence Reporting from EUCOM, April 25, 1947, Secret. [view]
32. U.S. Army, Letter, Chamberlin to Walsh, April 7, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, April 8, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Hillenkoetter to President, June 28, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, August 19, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Consequences of a Breakdown in Four-Power Negotiations on Germany, September 28, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, October 20, 1948, Secret;
Defense Department, Memorandum, The March “Crisis”, December 23, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Article, March Crisis 1948, Act I, Fall 1966, Secret [view]
CIA, Article, March Crisis 1948, Act II, Spring 1967, Secret. [view]
33. CIA, Memorandum, ICEBERG, November 4, 1948, Secret [view]

CIA, Memorandum, Developmental Project - KIBITZ, March 15, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Progress Report - KIBITZ, March 17, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Review of Bamberg Operations, March 30, 1949, Secret Control [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Communications Operations KIBITZ/VULTURE, August 1, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Letter, deleted to Helms, September 2, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, KIBITZ Project - 1 July through 31 December 1950, May 31, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, KIBITZ Progress Report, June 2, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, KIBITZ Project, October 20, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Outline of Stay-Behind Operation, November 10, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, KIBITZ and VULTURE Progress Report, November 22, 1950, Top Secret [view]
34. CIA, Memorandum, Progress Report, QKDEMON-JBEDICT, May 27, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Director’s Log, October 18, 1951, Top Secret; CIA, Memorandum, Proposed Project HTREPAIR, March 26, 1952,
Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Program for Preparation for Wartime Operational Activity in Austria, October 5, 1953, Top Secret
[view]
CIA, Report, GRCROOND Project Status Report for Month of May 1954, June 1954, Secret [view]
CIA, Dispatch, GRCROOND: Inventory of SOB Arms Caches, April 27, 1959, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Project WUDEPOT: Current and Future Status, March 8, 1965, Secret. [view]
35. U.S. Army, Memorandum, Map Showing Effect of Railway Ground Demolitions on Soviet Advances Through Western
Europe, November 14, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Current Status of the Provisional Planning Study, February 14, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, P&O Briefing, “The Scope, Mission and Organization of Operations Behind Enemy Lines, and
Their Integration with Overall Planning and Operations”, March 1, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Presentation, Presentation by Brig. Gen. C.V.R. Schuyler at the Army Commanders Conference on 7 June 1950,
June 7, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Index Card, Strategic Demolition Plan, June 20, 1950, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, LCPROWL - Proposed Activation of Guerrilla Warfare and Sabotage Training in Germany, August
28, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Presentation of the McDowell Plan to Mr. Wisner, November 14, 1950, Top Secret [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Guerrilla Warfare Organization for Germany, February 19, 1951, Top Secret. [view]

36. JCS, Cable, Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCAL et al., June 30, 1950, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, The Military Situation in the Soviet Zone of Germany, July 3, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Op-322-F1C Briefing Items, July 3, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Eastern European Theater, July 5, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, CINCAFE Wiesbaden Germany to CS USAF, July 5, 1950, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Soviet Air Force Status Report, July 6, 1950, Top Secret Control [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, Commander in Chief, Air Forces in Europe to CSAF, July 24, 1950, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Germany (Russian Zone): 24th Air Army, July 24, 1950, Secret Control. [view]
37. U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Memorandum for the Record, July 11, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, JCS to CINCFE et al., July 15, 1950, Top Secret [view]
38. Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 65;
Klaus Eichner and Andreas Dobbert, Headquarters Germany (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1997), p. 73; interviews with James
H. Critchfield and David E. Murphy.
39. Eichner and Dobbert, Headquarters Germany, p. 77.
40. White House, Memorandum, Memorandum of Conference With the President, June 25, 1959, June 25, 1959, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Comments on GIS West Berlin, June 25, 1959, Secret [view]
U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), Memorandum, Transmittal of Army Paper, July 10, 1959, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Geneva to Secretary of State, July 18, 1959, Secret [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Berlin Intelligence Activities, July 7, 1960, Secret [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Berlin Overt Intelligence Activities, July 15, 1960, Secret [view]
41. Department of State, Report, Western Activities in Berlin Considered “Hostile” or “Subversive” by the Soviets, June 1959,
Secret [view]
Department of State, Report, Statements by Soviet, DDR and Other Satellite Personalities and Publications on Western
Use of West Berlin for Subversive Activities, June 1959, Secret [view]
42. Department of State, Memorandum, Implementation of the Memoranda of Agreement on Intelligence and Security,
August 4, 1955, Secret - Limit Distribution [view]
British Ministry of Defense, Memorandum, “DRAGON” Intercepts, July 21, 1955, Secret and Guard [view]
British Ministry of Defense, Memorandum, “DRAGON” Intercepts, August 2, 1955, Secret and Guard [view]
National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, Army Special Operations Field Office in Berlin, March 30, 1977,
Secret/Sensitive [view]
43. U.S. Army, Cable, HQ DEPT OF ARMY to EUCOM, November 28, 1947, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, State Department Assumption of Responsibility in Occupied Europe, February 4, 1948, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCEUR to Seventh Army, June 2, 1951, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Establishment of a Naval Security Group Detachment in Western Europe, January 9, 1952,
Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Ground Intercept of Non-Communications Signals, March 11, 1952, Top Secret [view]
Armed Forces Security Agency, Memorandum, Berlin Site Survey Information, March 18, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, USFA Utilization of EUCOM-Abandoned Space in Southeastern Bavaria, April 3, 1952, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Transfer of Post Operating Functions of Herzo Base, April 10, 1952, Secret [view]

U.S. Army, Memorandum, Ground-Based Electronic Countermeasures Search Activities, October 22, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Emergency Relocation of ASAE Units, March 6, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Emergency Evacuation of Intelligence Units to UK, March 17, 1953, Top Secret [view]
JCS, Cable, JCS to US CINCEUR, June 23, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Request for Operational Site, September 9, 1954, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Letter, Armstrong to Dowling, November 28, 1955, Top Secret [view]
White House, Memorandum, Intelligence Activities in Berlin, August 4, 1961, Top Secret. [view]
44. U.S. Army, Letter, Bolling to Taylor, September 25, 1950, Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Armstrong to Dowling, November 28, 1955, Top Secret. [view]
45. JCS 2010/117, NSA Requirements for Bases in Germany, Japan and Korea, July 9, 1956, Top Secret; White House,
Memorandum, Memorandum of Conference With the President, June 25, 1959, June 25, 1959, Secret [view]
White House, Memorandum, Intelligence Activities in Berlin, August 4, 1961, Top Secret. [view]
46. U.S. Army, Memorandum, State Department Assumption of Responsibility in Occupied Europe, February 4, 1948, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Communications Intelligence Service, January 24, 1949, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCEUR Heidelberg Germany to Dept of the Army, September 9, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Cable Facilities, September 14, 1949, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCEUR to Chief of Staff U.S. Army, October 10, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Evaluation of Civil Censorship Intercepts, December 5, 1949, Confidential [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCEUR Heidelberg Germany to CSUSA Washington, December 6, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Chief of Staff US Army to CINCEUR, December 13, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Report, A (Top Secret) Limited Distribution Supplement to the Daily Staff Digest, March 14, 1951, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, Marshall to Chief, Reports & Analysis, January 2, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Interception of Russian Mail, March 3, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, McClure to Bolling, May 13, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, NLO Hamburg Requirements, June 23 1952, Confidential [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, Baldry to Laurendine, August 8, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Analysis of Intercepts, 7746 CIS, November 17, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Transmittal of Communications Intercepts, November 17, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Censorship of Polish Mail, November 18, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Dr. Otto John and CISD Surveillance, August 3, 1954, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Frankenpost Publishes News Item on CIS Hof Installation, September 10, 1954, Confidential
[view]
47. U.S. Army, Report, History of the Army Security Agency and Subordinate Units: Fiscal Year 1955, 1957, Top Secret Eider.
48. U.S. Army, Memorandum, British Operation “LISTER”, November 24, 1948, Top Secret. [view]
49. U.S. Army, Memorandum, The Collection of Technical Information on the USSR in the U.S. Zone of Germany, October 28,
1947, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, Erskine to Irwin, June 29, 1949, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, Partridge to Irwin, October 18, 1949, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, RE: Our Conversation on 9/19, September 20, 1950, Top Secret [view]
NSC, Report, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Policy on Soviet and
Satellite Defectors, April 3, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Director’s Log, October 12, 1951, Top Secret [view]

U.S. Army, Memorandum, Information Requested by the Secretary of the Army, December 8, 1951, Top Secret [view]
British Foreign Office, Letter, Watson to Schwinn, December 18, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Analysis of Personnel and Policy Problems Affecting EUCOM Intelligence Efforts, December
29, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, US CINCEUR to COFS USA, January 26, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Priority Selection of German Specialists for Exploitation, January 27, 1953, Secret [view]
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Report, Meeting of Inter-Departmental Working Group for Psychological
Warfare Held in Frankfurt on 24 March 1954, March 24, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), Memorandum, Progress Report on NSC 174: United States Policy Toward the
Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, July 7, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Dawson Report on Refugees, April 16, 1959, Confidential [view]
White House, Memorandum, Memorandum of Conference With the President, June 25, 1959, June 25, 1959, Secret [view]
U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), Memorandum, Transmittal of Army Paper, July 10, 1959, Secret [view]
Department of State, Report, Intelligence Note: Population Movement Between East and West Germany, November 20,
1959, Confidential [view]
White House, Memorandum, Intelligence Activities in Berlin, August 4, 1961, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Letter, deleted to deleted, September 14, 1961, Secret [view]
50. U.S. Air Force, Cable, COMGENUSAFE to CO 36 Fighter Wing et al., October 29, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, COMGEN USAFE to CS USAF, August 12, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Photographic Coverage of Germany With K-30 100-Inch Camera, March 12, 1951, Top
Secret [view]; U.S. Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to CINCUSAFE Wiesbaden Germany, October 16, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to CINCUSAFE Wiesbaden Germany, February 11, 1952, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Staff Visit to Europe on Long Focal Length Camera for AAFCE, February 27, 1953, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Memorandum for Record, November 4, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, CINCUSAFE to COFS USAF WASH DC, March 18, 1954, Top Secret [view]
51. U.S. Air Force, Cable, COMGENUSAFE Wiesbaden Germany to COMGENSAC Offutt AFB, September 13, 1949, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Photographic Coverage of Germany With K-30 100 Inch Camera, April 18, 1950, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to COMGENSAC Offutt AFB, July 20, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Photographic Coverage of Germany With K-30, 100-Inch Camera, July 25, 1950, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, CINCUSAFE Wiesbaden Germany to COFS USAF WASH DC, March 21, 1952, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Installation of 240 Inch Camera in Cargo Aircraft for CINCUSAFE, March 24, 1952, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Department of Army to Secretary of State, May 13, 1954 [view]
Department of State, Cable, USMISSION Berlin to Secretary of State, June 9, 1966, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Airgram, Resumption of French Reconnaissance Flights in Berlin, July 15, 1966, Confidential [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, CINCUSAFE to AIG 560, May 10, 1968, Secret/NOFORN [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCUSAREUR to DIA et al., June 11, 1968, Secret/NOFORN [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCUSAREUR to DIA et al., August 20, 1968, Secret/NOFORN [view]
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Memorandum, Meeting With Mr. Katz of the RAND Corporationin , June 28,
U.S. Army, Memorandum, US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon Above Corps, January 20, 1982,
Secret [view]

52. UK Defence Committee, Minutes, Brief for Minister of Defence: Special Intelligence Operations, December 19, 1961, Top
Secret [view]
Department of Defense, Memorandum, Helicopter Flights Over East Berlin, January 16, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of Defense, Memorandum, Helicopter Flights Over East Berlin, April 5, 1965, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, U.S. Helicopter Flight Over East Berlin, April 6, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, US Helicopter Flights Over East Berlin: ACTION MEMORANDUM, July 7, 1965,
Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule for January 1968, January 2, 1968, Top Secret [view]
53. UK Ministry of Defence, Memorandum, Intelligence Photography from the Berlin Military Train, January 18, 1965,
Secret [view]
Geoffrey Elliott and Harold Shukman, Secret Classrooms (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 2002), p. 176.
54. CIA, Memorandum of Conversation, no subject, August 26, 1948, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Radio Free Europe, November 22, 1950, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Memorandum for Record, June 8, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, QKACTIVE, February 27, 1953, Secret [view]
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Report, Meeting of Inter-Departmental Working Group for Psychological
Warfare Held in Frankfurt on 24 March 1954, March 24, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Jones to Stoessel, October 18, 1954, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Radio Free Europe Radio Broadcasts to Hungary, December 4, 1956, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Radio Free Europe, February 19, 1957, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Radio Free Europe (RFE) and the Hungarian Revolution, April 5, 1962, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Reaffirmation of Existing Policy on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, September 8, 1966,
Secret/Eyes Only [view]
CIA, Report, Coordination and Policy Approval of Covert Operations, February 23, 1967, Secret/Sensitive [view]
Radio Study Group, Memorandum, Report of Radio Study Group on the Future of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio
Liberty (RL), September 8, 1967, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Report of Radio Study Group (RSG) on the Future of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty
(RL), September 12, 1967, Secret/Eyes Only [view]
303 Committee, Memorandum, The Future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, A Summary, September 25, 1967,
CIA, Memorandum, Reactions to Closing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, October 26, 1967, Secret; CIA,
Memorandum, “Schultze Paper”, November 10, 1967, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Scheduled 303 Committee Meeting on Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), December
National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, untitled, December 16, 1967, Secret/Eyes Only [view]
CIA, Memorandum, 303 Committee Decision on Surge-Funding and Continuation of Radio Liberty, Inc. and Free Europe,
Inc., December 21, 1967, Secret [view]
303 Committee, Report, Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 15 December 1967, December 22, 1967, Secret
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, Status of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Under the New Administration, November 13, 1968,
Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), January 27, 1969, Secret/Eyes Only [view]
National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, Disposition of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, February 20, 1969,
CIA, Report, Briefing Book on Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. (RADLIBCOM), 1970 [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Memorandum for the President, May 11, 1971, Secret [view]
40 Committee, Report, Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 22 June 1971, June 22, 1971, Secret/Eyes Only [view]
CIA, Memorandum, SE Division’s Covert Action Program, November 14, 1977, Secret [view]

55. CIA, Memorandum, The Problem, April 30, 1948, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Director’s Log, September 18, 1951, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Jones to Stoessel, October 18, 1954, Top Secret [view]
56. U.S. Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to COMGENTHIRDAIRDIV Ruislip England, July 4, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to COMGENTHIRDAIRDIV Ruislip England, July 7, 1950, Top Secret [view]
57. U.S. Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to CG THIRD AF South Ruislip England, June 14, 1952, Top Secret [view]
58. U.S. Navy, Memorandum, MI-6, Liaison With, February 26, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, British Intelligence, May 20, 1945, Top Secret [view]
OSS, Report, Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British Intelligence
System, July 1945, Top Secret [view]
OSS, Memorandum, Memorandum of 20 September on Broadway Matters, October 17, 1945, Top Secret [view]
OSS, Memorandum, Distribution of Broadway Intelligence, October 17, 1945, Top Secret, NARA [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Special Reports From British Intelligence, November 16, 1945, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, II, Broadway Organization, etc., December 4, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, ONI Liaison With MI-6, Section V, Status of, December 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, MI-6, Exchange of Intelligence With, December 19, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, United States Intelligence Relationship With British Until Permanent Policy Is Established,
December 19, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Future Intelligence Relationship With British, December 19, 1945, Top Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, British Intelligence Reports, April 22, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Contact With the British - Reply Your Memo of 9 April, May 1, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Liaison With British, August 15, 1946, Top Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Visit With Members of British Secret Intelligence, August 16, 1946, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Liaison With British Intelligence, September 19, 1946, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, British Secret Intelligence Service, Liaison With Broadway, September 20, 1946, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Special Intelligence, Liaison Activities, January 16, 1947, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Preliminary Foreign Office Reaction to Certain Aspects of Recent OPC-SIS Conversations, June 13,
CIA, Memorandum, Reasons for Conducting OPC Albanian Operation on Joint Basis with British, July 11, 1949, Top Secret
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, British Counterpart of BGFIEND, July 26, 1949, Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Memorandum for Record, November 17, 1949, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, OPC Liaison With Other Intelligence Services, March 7, 1950, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Liaison With the British in Washington on Projects FIEND and VALUABLE, August 28, 1951, Secret
[view]
CIA, Report, Minutes of FIEND/VALUABLE Conference: Rome, 22-24 October 1951, October 24, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Transmittal of Excerpts of Minutes of FIEND/VALUABLE Meeting, London, 12-13 March 1952, March
FBI, Report, Summary Brief: Donald Duart MacLean, Guy Francis De Moncy Burgess and Harold Adrian Russell Philby,
59. SSU, Memorandum, Contact With the British - Reply Your Memo of 9 April, May 1, 1946, Secret, NARA. [view]
60. See for example CIA, Report, Personal and Financial Status of Ex-King Zog, September 30, 1949, Secret/US Officials
Only [view]

CIA, Report, Nationalist Resistance in Albania; Present Internal Situation, January 31, 1950, Secret U.S. Eyes Only [view]
CIA, Report, Free Albanian Activities, May 17, 1950, Secret/U.S. Eyes Only [view]
CIA, Report, Activity of the Resistance Movement in Albania, November 21, 1950, Secret U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Airfields in Albania, November 24, 1950, Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Soviet Air Activities, November 28, 1950, Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Brno Airfield, December 13, 1950, Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Resistance Activities in Albania; Departure of Albanians for Yugoslavia, December 20, 1950, Secret Control
- U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Germany (Russian Zone): Reorganization of HVA, December 23, 1950, Top Secret Control - U.S. Officials
Only [view]
CIA, Report, Alleged Soviet Intentions, March 5, 1951, Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Possible Indications of Preparation for War, March 24, 1951, Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Resistance Activities in Albania; Albanian Refugee Activities in Yugoslavia, October 9, 1951, Secret Control -
U.S. Eyes Only [view]
CIA, Report, Clandestine Anti-Communist Radio Transmitter, October 31, 1951, Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only
[view]
CIA, Report, Paper Mills and Fabrication, February 1952, Top Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Summary of Major Atomic Energy Activities in Western Europe, February 15, 1952, Secret/U.S. Officials
Only [view]
CIA, Report, Brandenburg-Briest Airfield, June 18, 1952, Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Rumania: Aircraft Identification and Antiaircraft Defense Command, August 7, 1952, Top Secret Control -
US. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Report, Albanian Refugee Organization in Yugoslavia, May 29, 1953, Secret Control - U.S. Officials Only [view]
CIA, Memorandum, ZIPPER’s CE Organization and Operations, March 30, 1955, Secret - U.S. Officials Only [view]
61. See for example Department of State, Memorandum, Report on State of Adenauer’s Health, June 11, 1956, Secret
NOFORN [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Position of the French Army in Algeria, January 1957, Secret NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, untitled, March 25, 1957, Secret NOFORN [view]
U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), Report, The Berlin Situation, March 17, 1959, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, The Cyprus Problem, March 31, 1960, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Reported Discussion of French Plan for Dual Control of Nuclear Warheads Based on French Soil,
May 12, 1960, Secret/NOFORN/Continued Control [view]
Department of State, Report, Problems and Prospects of the Fifth Republic, December 6, 1960, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Berlin Handbook, December 27, 1961, Secret/NOFORN [view]
62. U.S. Navy, Letter, Ladd to Smedburg, December 13, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, ONI Liaison With MI-6, Section V, Status of, December 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Visit With Members of British Secret Intelligence, August 16, 1946, Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, British Secret Intelligence Service, Liaison With Broadway, September 20, 1946, Top Secret
[view]
Department of State, Memorandum, State to Officer in Charge of the American Mission in London, May 20, 1948, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Memorandum for Record, November 17, 1949, Top Secret; Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), Letter, Pike to McMahaon, June 11, 1951, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, MacLean - Burgess, June 12, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Liaison With the British in Washington on Projects FIEND and VALUABLE, August 28, 1951, Secret
[view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Memorandum for the Secretary, July 19, 1955, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, untitled, September 13, 1955, Top Secret; Department of State, Memorandum,
Guy Burgess, Donald MacLean and the Department of State, November 4, 1955, Limited Official Use [view]

Department of State, Memorandum, Donald MacLean, December 2, 1955, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Exchange With the British - Burgess and MacLean, December 12, 1955, Secret
[view]
FBI, Report, Summary Brief: Donald Duart MacLean, Guy FrancisDe Moncy Burgess and Harold Adrian Russell Philby,
63. U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Disclosure of Free French Results to British, May 14, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Release of Free French Material to British, May 15, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Signal Intelligence Activities, June 5, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Relations With G.C.C.S., September 27, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Items of Interest from U.S. Naval Liaison Officer GCCS’s Newsletters, October 18, 1945, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Army/Navy, Minutes, Joint Meeting of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board and Army-Navy
Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, October 29, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Outline of British-U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement, November 1, 1945, Top Secret
Ultra [view]
U.S. Army/Navy, Minutes, Joint Meeting of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board and Army-Navy
Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, February 15, 1946, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, U.S. - British Agreement, February 19, 1946, Top Secret Ultra [view]
Agreement, British - U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement, March 5, 1946, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, British Communications Intelligence, April 1946, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Navy, Letter, Wenger to Travis, April 26, 1946, Unclassified; U.S. Communications Intelligence Board,
Memorandum, Establishment of an United States Combined Intelligence Liaison Center in Great Britain, May 3, 1946,
Top Secret [view]
Canada Department of External Relations, Letter, Glazebrook to Hastings, July 10, 1946, Top Secret Cream [view]
. Navy, Memorandum, British Secret Intelligence Service, Liaison With Broadway, September 20, 1946, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, Clarke to Bartlett, September 2, 1947, Secret [view]
U.S. Communications Intelligence Board, Report, Appendix J: Interpretation of Certain Provisions of the U.S.-British
Communication Intelligence Agreement, December 4, 1947, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, British Proposal for Liaison on “Noise Investigation&rdquo, [view]
March 12, 1948, Top Secret; Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), Memorandum, Exchange of Information With
GCHQ Representatives in Field of Research and Development of Cryptanalytic Equipment, March 15, 1950, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB), Memorandum, Army Security Agency Europe Liaison With Certain
British Authorities, December 21, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Memorandum for Record, May 14, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Communications Intelligence Board, Report, Appendix Q: Organization of U.S.-British Communication Intelligence
Collaboration in War, February 12, 1952, Top Secret Eider [view]
Armed Forces Security Agency, Letter, Manson to Wenger, February 12, 1952, no classification markings [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Attached Telegram From Eric Jones, February 22, 1952, Top Secret [view]
Armed Forces Security Agency, Letter, Wenger to Clow, March 9, 1952, no classification markings [view]
U.S. Communications Intelligence Board, Memorandum, Establishment of SUSLO Unit, London, March 12, 1952, Top
Secret [view]
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Report, Change in British Arrangements for Interception and Analysis of Foreign Non-
Communications Radio Transmissions, November 5, 1952, Top Secret [view]
British Chiefs of Staff Committee, Report, Measures to Improve Intelligence, November 6, 1952, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, COMINT Service to SHAPE and its Subordinate Commands, January 2, 1953, Top Secret
[view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Memorandum, Third Meeting of Executive Committee, February 2, 1953, Top Secret
[view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Memorandum, U.K./U.S. BRUSA Planning Conference 1953: Minutes of the First

Meeting of the Executive Committee, March 2, 1953, Top Secret [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Report, Report of Committee on Informal Discussions of the Establishment of a U.S.
Screening Group at GCHQ, March 14, 1953, Top Secret Canoe [view]
National Security Agency, Letter, Wenger to Loehnis, April 22, 1953, Unclassified [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Trans-Oceanic Cables, June 15, 1954, Top Secret [view]
JCS, Memorandum, U.S. Liaison Officers for GCHQ on Matters Concerning Non-Communications Electronic (Radio)
Emissions, July 30, 1954, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, AF Representation in SUSLO, July 19, 1955, Secret [view]
Department of Defense, Memorandum, The Proposed Leibler/Robertson Discussions with the Director, GCHQ Scheduled
for 25 January 1956, January 11, 1956, Top Secret [view]
British Cabinet Office, Report, Extract from Review of Service Intelligence, December 16, 1960, Secret [view]
British Ministry of Defence, Memorandum, The Templer Report, February 3, 1961, Top Secret [view]
UK Foreign Office, Letter, Stephenson to Trend, June 29, 1962, Secret [view]
UK Royal Air Force, Report, Record of Vice-Chief to Vice-Chief Discussions in Washington on 18th April 1972, April 21, 1972,
Top Secret [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Cable, SUSLO CHELT to NSACSS, March 28, 1977, Top Secret/COMINT Channels
[view]
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Memorandum, Unknown Subject(s): Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified
Information in “The New York Times,” October 24, 1982, Media Leaks, April 15, 1983, Secret [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Diary Entry, GCHQ, June 7, 1985, no classification markings [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Diary Entry, Notes & Observations on London and Bergen Mtgs, June 11, 1985, no
classification markings [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Article, Beyond BOURBON - 1948: The Fourth Year of Allied Collaborative COMINT
Effort Against the Soviet Union, Spring 1995, Top Secret Umbra [view]
64. U.S. Air Force, Report, No. 1 (Top Secret) Limited Distribution Supplement to the Daily Staff Digest, May 6, 1952, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Establishment of an Army Security Agency Installation in the U.K., May 4, 1953, Top Secret
[view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, November 10, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCUSAREUR to CO 32nd AAA Brigade, November 20, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, US CINCEUR to COFS USA, December 29, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to London, April 25, 1972, Secret [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Memorandum, Discontinuing Protection of NSA Presence at Menwith Hill Station -
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, February 14, 1997, Confidential [view]
65. CIA, Memorandum, Evacuation Plan, July 10, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Evacuation Planning, January 29, 1951, Secret. [view]
66. U.S. Army, Memorandum, Emergency Relocation of ASAE Units, March 6, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Emergency Evacuation of Intelligence Units to UK, March 17, 1953, Top Secret. [view]
67. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Possible Radar Installation on Cyprus, October 19, 1966, Secret -
LIMDIS [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Amembassy Nicosia, January 13, 1967, Secret [view]
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Memorandum, OTH Radar in Turkey, April 21, 1967, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, April 24, 1967, Secret [view]
Department of State, Airgram, OTH Agreements, June 13, 1967, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Nicosia et al., August 12, 1967, Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, CSAF to RADC, November 24, 1967, Secret [view]

Department of State, Airgram, Ordfordness Over the Horizon (OTH) Radar Facility, March 16, 1968, Secret [view]
Department of State, Airgram, COBRA MIST Calibration, April 8, 1971, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Ankara, July 27, 1971, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, December 9, 1971, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, December 13, 1971, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to London, December 16, 1971, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to London, September 18, 1972, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, May 18, 1973, Secret/EXDIS [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, June 14, 1973, Limited Official Use [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, June 18, 1973, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, June 22, 1973, Secret [view]
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Report, AN/FPS-95 Research and Development Program (Final Technical report,
Naval Research Laboratory, Long-Path One-Way Propagation Effects), March 1974, Secret. [view]
68. U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Evacuation of APPLESAUCE Personnel in Emergency, January 16, 1952, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Armstrong to Dulles, November 4, 1953, Top Secret [view]
69. U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Memorandum for Record, December 22, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Site for Deployment of 14th Radio Squadron, Mobile, September 15, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Site for Deployment of 14th Radio Squadron, Mobile, October 1, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, USAF Requirements Versus NATO Requirements, October 8, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to CINCUSAFE Wiesbaden Germany, October 19, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to CINCUSAFE Wiesbaden Germany, March 31, 1952, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, USAF Security Service Base Requirements, June 16, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, CINCUSAFE and COFS USAF, November 28, 1953, Top Secret [view]
70. National Security Agency (NSA), Cable, DIRNSA to CINCUSSTRICOM, February 12, 1964, Secret [view]
71. U.S. Navy, Memorandum, British Proposal for Liaison on “Noise Investigation,” March 12, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Cable, CNO to CINCNAVEASTLANTMED, March 30, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Collaboration With the British on Electronics Intelligence, May 3, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Electronics Intercept Program in the European Theater, May 21, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Letter, Richardson to Shepard, July 30, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Exchange of Information, November 14, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Exchange of Information, December 11, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Memorandum for Record, May 14, 1951, Top Secret [view]
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Report, Change in British Arrangements for Interception and Analysis of Foreign Non-
Communications Radio Transmissions, November 5, 1952, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Cable, CINCNELM to CNO, August 3, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Royal Navy, Cable, ADMTY London to HQ Coastal Command, August 3, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Cable, CINCNELM to CNO, August 4, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Royal Air Force, Report, Operation “Reason”, August 4, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Royal Air Force, Letter, Secretary of State for Air to Prime Minister, August 8, 1953, Top Secret [view]
JCS, Cable, JCS to JAMMAT TURKEY, November 25, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Royal Air Force, Memorandum, Airborne Sigint Requirements, March 4, 1954, Top Secret [view]
72. U.S. Army, Report, Meeting of Lieutenant Davidoff With Lieutenant Northrup, G-2 Liaison Officer at RAF Central
Interpretation Unit, Medmenham, England, September 25, 1945, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, HQ USFET Frankfurt Germany to War Department, November 1, 1946, Top Secret [view]

73. U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Strategic Target System - Europe, August 9, 1948, Top Secret [view]
74. U.S. Navy, Memorandum, CINCNELM Operational Intelligence Section and Admiralty Operational Intelligence Center;
Integration of, June 8, 1948, Top Secret [view]
75. British Joint Services Mission, Memorandum, Exchange of Technical Intelligence Officers, September 2, 1948, Secret
[view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, USAF Officers Assigned to Air Ministry, October 8, 1948, Secret [view]
76. U.S. Army, Cable, USMILATTACHE AMEMBASSY London England to CSUSAF, July 19, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, HQ USAF to MA England to CSUSAF, July 22, 1948, Top Secret [view], See also Paul Maddrell, Spying
on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany 1945-61 (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 70-77; Paul
Maddrell, “British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration During the Occupation of Germany,” Intelligence
and National Security, Summer 2000, pp. 76-78; Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 68. A detailed biography of Tokaev can be found in “Pamyatnik pri
zhizhni - osetinu ... v amerikanskom shtate New Meksiko,” May 21, 2001, located at
http://www.kavkazweb.net/report/tokati/.
77. U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Memorandum for Record, November 17, 1949, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Establishment of United Kingdom Base Radio Station, May 26, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, CIA-UK Base Radio Facility, June 22, 1950, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Director’s Log, October 16, 1951, Top Secret. [view]
78. Department of State, Memorandum, Circular 175: Request for Authority to Negotiate and Conclude a Secret
Government-Level Agreement Supplemented If Necessary by a Secret Service-to-Service Agreement for a SOSUS Station in
the United Kingdom, February 5, 1971, Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Murray to Stoddart, April 15, 1971, Secret/LIMDIS [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to London, June 18, 1971, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, November 17, 1971, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, November 22, 1971, Secret [view]
79. Department of State, Circular, Project Clear Sky, February 6, 1964, Secret [view]
Department of State, Airgram, Deleted [Project Clear Sky], August 28, 1964, Secret [view]
Department of Defense, Letter, Wolff to Freshman, October 12, 1964, Secret [view]
Department of State, Airgram, Deleted [Project Clear Sky]: Informal U.K. Draft Agreement, November 2, 1964, Secret
[view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Tananarive, June 25, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Amembassy London, June 18, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Amembassy London, June 20, 1966, Secret [view];
80. Department of State, Airgram, Agreed Arrangements for AEDS Facilities on Ascension Island, December 17, 1964, Secret
[view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Ascension Island Hydroacoustic Data System, September 2003, Unclassified [view]
81. Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, July 26, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to London and Canberra, August 24, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Department of State to Amconsul Suva, May 26, 1967, Secret [view]

Department of State, Cable, Department of State to Amconsul Suva, May 26, 1967, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Suva to Secretary of State, January 16, 1970, Secret. [view]
82. Department of State, Memorandum, Project CLEAR SKY/COLD SKIN, June 27, 1968, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Buenos Aires to Secretary of State, July 11, 1968, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Buenos Aires, August 7, 1968, Secret [view]
83. U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Conference Regarding Over-Flight of Turkey for the Purpose of Conducting Electronic
Reconnaissance Missions Covering the Turkish Black Sea Coastal Area, August 11, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Conference Regarding Over-Flight of Turkey for the Purpose of Conducting Electronic
Reconnaissance Missions, August 19, 1948, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, no subject, June 30, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Cable, TUSAFG Ankara Turkey to CSAF Washington, November 30, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Calibration of Turkish Radar Sites, March 20, 1950, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Calibration Flights of Turkish Radar Sites and Electronic Reconnaissance in the Black Sea
Area, April 7, 1950, Top Secret. [view]
84. U.S. Army, Memorandum, Training of Personnel for Operation THANKSGIVING, December 12, 1950, Secret [view]
85. U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, INSCOM and its Heritage, 1985, Unclassified, p. 116.
86. Mary Welch, “AFTAC Celebrates 50 Years of Long-Range Detection,” AFTAC Monitor, October 1997, p. 12.
87. USAFSS History Office, A Special Historical Study of the Closure of Trabzon and Samsun, March 1, 1971, Top Secret, p. 2,
AIA FOIA.
88. U.S. Army, Index Card, Special Electronic Search Project (SESP) in Vicinity of Istanbul, Turkey; Proposed Activation of,
November 7, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Chief JAMMAT Ankara Turkey to DEPTAR WASH DC, November 29, 1951, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Chief JAMMAT Ankara Turkey to DEPTAR WASH DC, December 1, 1951, Top Secret [view]
89. U.S. Navy, Cable, CINCNELM to US CINCEUR, November 8, 1954, Top Secret. [view]
90. U.S. Navy, Cable, CINCNELM to US CINCEUR, November 8, 1954, Top Secret. [view]
91. U.S. Army, Index Card, Use of Turkish Airfields By U.S. Navy Special Electronic Search Project (SESP) Aircraft, August 19,
1952, Top Secret. [view]
92. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum, Airborne Special Electronic Search Operations, April 10, 1953, Top Secret. [view]
93. For example, see the following Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Military Operating Rights and
Facilities in Turkey, August 5, 1952, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Turkish Base Negotiations, September 11, 1952, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Military Operating Requirements, November 25, 1952, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Acheson to Lovett, January 7, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Amembassy Ankara, January 16, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Base Rights Negotiations With Turkey, May 21, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, USAF Security Service Base Requirements, June 16, 1953, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Military Rights Requirements of USAF Security Service, August 18, 1953, Top Secret [view]

U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Military Rights Requirements of the USAF Security Service, September 18, 1953, Top
Secret [view]
Department of Defense, Letter, Erskine to Armstrong, October 26, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Question of Informing Admiral Mountbatten and British Concerning Base
Negotiations With Turkey, February 9, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Murphy to Secretary of Defense, February 19, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Warren to Bedell [Smith], April 12, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Question of Informing the British and Admiral Mountbatten Regarding Our
Impending Base Agreement With Turkey, April 27, 1954, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Turkish Base Agreement, July 13, 1954, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Memorandum, Funds for Projects KNICKNACK (S) and CASEKNIFE, November 8, 1955, Secret. [view]
94. White House, Report, Staff Notes No. 116, May 20, 1957, Secret. [view]
95. National Security Council (NSC), Report, U.S. Policy Toward Turkey, October 5, 1960, Top Secret. [view]
96. Army-Navy Electronic Evaluation Group, Report, Summary Report No. 3: 15 July 1953 - 15 October 1953, November 15,
Department of State, Despatch, Classified List of U.S. Military Units in Turkey, August 18, 1959, Secret [view]
97. CIA, NSC Briefing, Background Notes on Turkey, January 21, 1958, Top Secret [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Turkey, May 30, 1960, Secret [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Turkey, June 29, 1960, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, EUCOM Intelligence Report, February 26, 1962, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, The February Military Revolt in Turkey, April 9, 1962, Secret/NOFORN [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., November 27, 1967, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Turkey: Winter of Discontent, January 7, 1971, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Turkey: A Regime in Trouble, June 4, 1971, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Bulletin, July 27, 1974, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified] [view]
Department of State, Cable. nkara to Secretary of State, July 19,1979, Secret [view]
National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, Noon Notes, September 12, 1980, Top Secret/Sensitive [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, September 26, 1980, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Turkey: Forging a New Order, March 1981, Secret/NOFORN. [view]
98. Department of Defense, Memorandum, Deleted, March 3, 1964, Top Secret/Restricted Data [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Agenda for Meeting of Cyprus Working Group, November 20, 1967, Secret/LIMDIS
[view]
U.S. Army, Cable, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., November 22, 1967, Secret [view]
99. Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, April 20, 1961, Top Secret [view]
UK Ministry of Defense, Report, Radio Proving Flights: Report on Meeting With the Chief of the Turkish General Staff,
April 28, 1961, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, May 2, 1961, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Hare to Miner, August 23, 1961, Secret. [view]
100. Department of State, Letter, Dale to Helseth, May 11, 1964, Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Helseth to Dale, May 24, 1964, Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Thompson to Vance, August 11, 1964, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Proposed Letter to Mr. Vance Regarding Conduct of Military Facilities Negotiations
to Avoid Complication of Cyprus Problem - ACTION MEMORANDUM, August 12, 1964, Secret [view]

Department of State, Letter, Bracken to Hare, January 7, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Ankara, January 11, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, January 25, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Ankara, February 11, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, March 1, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Report, Significant Events March 11-28, 1965, March 26, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Ankara, June 1, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, June 10, 1965, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, June 14, 1965, Secret [view];
101. CIA, Memorandum, Morning Meeting of 29 December 1965, December 29, 1965, Secret - Internal Use Only [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, January 7, 1966, Secret [view];
Department of State, Report, Item for the President’s Weekly Review: Turkey, January 12, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Ankara, January 25, 1966, Secret - LIMDIS [view]
102. Department of State, Memorandum, Letter to Admiral Raborn on U.S. Facilities in Turkey, June 22, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Bil-lateral Discussions - Turkey: NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting Summer 1966:
Talking Points, July 15, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Report, The US Presence in Turkey: A Preliminary Survey, September 23, 1966, Secret/NOFORN
[view]
Department of State, Letter, Howison to Bronez, December 8, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Amembassy Ankara, January 13, 1967, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Amembassy Ankara, February 13, 1967, Secret [view]
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Memorandum, OTH Radar in Turkey, April 21, 1967, Top Secret [view];
103. National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, Reduction of US Presence in Turkey, May 20, 1969, Secret [view]
National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, Program Analysis of Turkey, September 23, 1969, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, May 1, 1970, Secret [view]
U.S. Air Force, Report, A Special Historical Study of the Closure of Trabzon and Samsun, March 1, 1971, Top Secret.
[view]
104. CIA, Memorandum, Turkey: A Regime in Trouble, June 4, 1971, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Turkey Under Martial Law, December 27, 1978, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, April 23, 1979, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, January 31, 1980, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, July 25, 1980, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, November 25, 1980, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Turkey: The Current Situation, May 1, 1984, [view]
Secret/NOFORN; CIA, Report, Turkey: The Threat of Resurgent Terrorism, September 1984, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Bulgaria: Coping With the Papal Assassination Scandal, December 1984, [view]
Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified]; CIA, Report, The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey, August 26, 1985,
Secret/NOFORN [view]

105. Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: Harper Press,
2010), pp. 312-319.
106. Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, April 3, 1973, Secret/LIMDIS [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Ankara, April 19, 1973, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, May 18, 1973, Secret/EXDIS [view]
Department of State, Letter, Risk to Schlesinger, July 16, 1973, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Electronic Warfare Commitment to Turkey, July 26, 1973, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, USMISSION NATO to Secretary of State, September 20, 1973, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, February 14, 1974, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, March 28, 1974, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Your Meeting With Turan Gunes, Monday, April 15 - 5:30 pm, April 13, 1974, Secret
[view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, May 24, 1974, Secret [view]
107. CIA, Memorandum, The Intelligence Stake in Turkey and the Eagleton Resolution, November 20, 1974, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, February 19, 1975, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Interagency Memorandum: Turkey After the US Arms Cutoff, February 20, 1975, Secret [view]
White House, Memorandum, Background Information and Talking Points on Restoration of Military Assistance to
Turkey, July 9, 1975, Top Secret/Sensitive [view]
National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, U.S. Security Policy Toward Turkey, July 16, 1975, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to USDEL Secretary, July 29, 1975, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Bulletin, July 30, 1975, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified] [view]
Congress of the United States, Letter, Seiberling to Colleagues, July 31, 1975, Unclassified [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, August 1, 1975, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Cable, Secretary of State to Ankara, February 4, 1976, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Ankara to Secretary of State, August 12, 1977, Secret. [view]
108. Department of State, Agreement, Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of Turkey Concerning the
Closure of Belbasi Installation and the Activation of a New Seismic Research Station, February 8, 2000, Unclassified.
[view]
109. SSU, Memorandum, Progress Report, February 1946, March 13, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Progress Report, March 1946, April 15, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Servicing of OMGUS by the SSU Detachment in Berlin, April 26, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Monthly Activity Report - April 1946 - Central Europe-Scandinavia Section, SI, May 10, 1946, Secret
[view]
SSU, Letter, Lewis to Quinn, June 17, 1946, Secret [view]. For a general description of the CIA Berlin Base’s operations
during the early postwar years, see David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 3-23.
110. SSU, Memorandum, General Report of Intelligence Branch Activities, September 13, 1946, Top Secret [view]
111. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin , pp. 15-17, 424.
112. U.S. Army, Memorandum, Gaps in the Collection of Positive Intelligence in Germany, October 29, 1947, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Gaps in the Collection of Positive Intelligence in Germany, November 6, 1947, Secret [view]
113. U.S. Army, Letter, Chamberlin to Walsh, April 7, 1948, Secret. [view]

114. JCS, Cable, Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCAL et al., June 30, 1950, Top Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Korean Crisis, June 30, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, LCPROWL - Proposed Activation of Guerrilla Warfare and Sabotage Training in Germany, August
CIA, Memorandum, Project Outline: Project QKDROOP, August 28, 1950, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Discussions With Mr. Angleton and deleted Regarding NTS, September 14, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Staybehind Operations in Germany, October 9, 1951, Secret [view]. For CIA evacuation plans, see CIA,
Memorandum, Evacuation Plan, July 10, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Evacuation Planning, January 29, 1951, Secret. [view]
115. Bob Dowd, "Memories of Berlin, 1950-51," Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly, Summer 1991, p. 11.
116. Department of State, Memorandum, Howe to P.A. [Park Armstrong], Germany, February 8, 1951, Top Secret.
117. U.S. Army, Letter, McClure to Bolling, February 18, 1952, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, McClure to Bolling, May 13, 1952, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, East German Intelligence Procurement, May 28, 1952, Secret. [view]
118. SSU, Cable, AMZON Germany to War Department - Strategic Services Unit, November 5, 1945, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Report on French Counter-Intelligence Service, Germany; Report on British Intelligence Service,
Germany, January 3, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Meeting With Brigadier Robin Brooke and Brigadier General Sibert, G-2, USFET, February 8, 1946,
Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, U.S. Army - Policy for Interchange of Intelligence With Allied Forces, February 15, 1946, Top Secret
[view]
SSU, Cable, Heidelberg to War Department - Strategic Services Unit, July 8, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Cable, Heidelberg to War Department - Strategic Services Unit, July 13, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Liaison With British, August 15, 1946, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Directive Concerning the Reorganization of British Headquarters, Intelligence Division, October 12,
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Exchange of Information, November 14, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Exchange of Information, December 11, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, McClure to Bolling, February 18, 1952, Secret [view];
119. CIA, Memorandum, The Problem of British Activities Among Ukrainians and Other National Minority Groups, May 16,
1951, Secret. [view]
120. CIA, Cable, Frankfurt to Policy Coordination, June 3, 1950, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Action Taken Against the “Technical Services Organization”, September 22, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Recent Developments Affecting the Security of the PP-Sponsored League of German Youth (BDJ)
(LCPROWL) and its Clandestine Paramilitary Apparat, October 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Ollenhauer Meeting, 23 October 1952, October 21, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, History of the The LCPROWL Project, October 22, 1952, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Chronology of Recent Developments Involving the LCPROWL Apparat, October 27, 1952, Secret
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, Conversation of Messrs. Reber and Joyce with Messrs. Dulles, Wisner and deleted, November 3, 1952,
Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Further Developments in the West German Police Investigation of the Paramilitary Adjunct of the
League of German Youth, November 6, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Chronological Record of the “Apparat” Case, November 7, 1952, Secret [view]

CIA, Letter, Truscott to Wisner, November 22, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Alleged Communist Connections of BDJ Apparat and Related Personnel, November 24, 1952, Secret
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, Termination of deleted, December 9, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Bund Deutscher Jugend Apparat, December 23, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, deleted Disciplinary Action, December 23, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Failure of Headquarters German Desk to Supervise and Guide Bund Deutscher Jugend Apparat,
December 23, 1952, Secret. [view]
121. CIA, Report, Director’s Log, December 17, 1951, Top Secret; CIA, Cable, Berlin to Operations, April 1, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Project TPEMBER, Amendment No, 3, April 10, 1952, Top Secret. [view]
122. CIA, Memorandum, Investigation of CADROWN, September 22, 1953, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Request for Termination of Project CADROWN, October 3, 1955, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, CADROWN, December 29, 1955, Secret. [view]
123. CIA, Memorandum, Outline Plan for Project No. 2B-14 Code Name: DTLINEN, August 16, 1949, Top Secret. [view]
124. CIA, Report, Director’s Log, September 25, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, “Fighting Group Against Inhumanity” - Current Psychological Attack Against East German
Communists, December 21, 1951, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, DTLINEN, February 26, 1953, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Recent Developments in the Operations of Project DTLINEN, April 1, 1955, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Project Outline: DTLINEN, October 22, 1956, Secret [view]. See also John O. Koehler, STASI: The Untold
Story of the East German Secret Police (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 130-141.
125. CIA, Memorandum, Commission for the Guidance and Review of Selected PP Activities in West Berlin, November 23,
126. CIA, Memorandum, AEVIRGIL Ballooning, etc., June 2, 1958, Secret [view];
127. U.S. Army, Cable, CG US Forces European Theater to War Department, August 24, 1945, Top Secret [view]
OSS, Cable, AMZON to Office of Strategic Services, August 26, 1945, Top Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Visit to Nurnberg and Prague, February 20, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Report, Surveillance of American and British Embassy Personnel by Czechoslovak Security Police (OBZ), April 1,
1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Monthly Activities Report for June 1946 - FBM, July 18, 1946, Secret [view]
128. U.S. Army, Report, Review of KNOTEK Case, August 12, 1948, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, CIC Espionage Activities in Czechoslovakia, March 22, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Letter, Keyes to Bradley, May 5, 1949, Top Secret. [view]
129. CIA, Memorandum, Meeting of the Chiefs of the Czechoslovak and Polish Army Chief Political Directorates, August 27,
1968, Top Secret/NOFORN/No Dissem/Controlled Dissem/Background Use Only [view]
130. SSU, Memorandum, Report on Mission in Hungary, July 25, 1946, Top Secret Control. [view]
131. Department of State, Cable, Budapest to Secretary of State, November 6, 1948, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Director’s Log, December 26, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Intelligence Value of the Maintenance of U.S. Missions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and

Rumania, February 23, 1952, Secret [view]
Department of State, Letter, Ravndal to Thurston, June 4, 1953, Top Secret [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Hungary, June 27, 1955, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, The Clandestine Service Historical Series: Hungary, Volume I, May 1972, Secret/CIA Internal Use Only
[view]
CIA, Report, The Clandestine Service Historical Series: Hungary, Volume II: External Operations 1946-1965, May 1972,
Secret/CIA Internal Use Only. [view]
132. CIA, Report, Clandestine Services History: The Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future: 23 October - 4
November 1956, January 1958, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, The Clandestine Service Historical Series: Hungary, Volume I, May 1972, Secret/CIA Internal Use Only
[view]
CIA, Report, The Clandestine Service Historical Series: Hungary, Volume II: External Operations 1946-1965, May 1972,
Secret/CIA Internal Use Only. [view]
133. SSU, Report, Poland: The Underground Movements in Poland, August 9, 1946, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Study of the Origins and Activities of the Underground Movement WIN, November 10, 1948, Confidential
[view]
CIA, Report, Director’s Log, December 3, 1951, Top Secret [view]
134. The best sources on the Polish security service’s WiN deception operation (Operacja Cezary) are all written in Polish:
Wojciech Frazik, “Operacja “Cezary” - ubecka analiza “gry” z WiN-em,” Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u, No. 15, 2001, pp. 183-
255; H. Piecuch, Akcje specjalne (Warsaw: 1996); R. Wnuk, “Dwie prowokacje - Pi?ta Komenda Zrzeszenia “WiN” i
Berg,” Zeszyty Historyczne, No. 141, 2002, pp. 71-112. For English-language sources, see Harry Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret
Operations, pp. 168-171. See also Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), p. 177.
135. Department of State, Cable, Warsaw to Secretary of State, December 27, 1952, Restricted [view]
Department of State, Cable, Warsaw to Secretary of State, December 31, 1952, Confidential. [view]
136. CIA, Memorandum, Soviet Concepts for Employment of Nuclear Weapons in a Conflict With NATO - Evidence From
Warsaw Pact Military Exercises, March 24, 1978, Top Secret/NOFORN [codewords not declassified] [view]
CIA, Memorandum, deleted Report, February 21, 1980, Top Secret [codewords not declassified] [view]
CIA, Memorandum, deleted Report, September 22, 1980, Top Secret [codewords not declassified] [view]
CIA, Memorandum, deleted Report, April 3, 1981, Top Secret [codewords not declassified] [view]
CIA, Article, The Vilification and Vindication of Colonel Kuklinski, Summer 2000, Unclassified. [view]
137. CIA, Memorandum, Project QKBROIL, July 1954, Secret Control.
138. CIA, Report, Aims of QKBROIL Operations - 1952, January 9, 1952, Secret. [view]
139. U.S. Army, Report, Greece: Communications Between Guerrillas and Satellites, September 29, 1948, Top Secret Glint
[view]
140. CIA, Report, Report of Operations for the Quarter Ended 30 June 1951, July 1, 1951, Top Secret. [view]
141. U.S. Army, Letter, Brady to Bolling, January 14, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Decrease in Intelligence on Bulgaria, September 5, 1953, Secret [view]

Department of State, Memorandum, US Position on Re-Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Bulgaria, February
142. CIA, Report, Director’s Log, September 6, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, QKSTAIR Monthly Project Status Report for Month of September 1951, October 1951, Top Secret [view]
143. CIA, Report, Meeting in Frankfurt on BGFIEND , May 2, 1951, Top Secret [view]
144. CIA, Memorandum, Conversation with State Department Representatives Concerning Albanian and Bulgarian
Operations, April 3, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, OSO/OPC Infiltration, Albania, 24 June 1951, June 26, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, EE-1: Report of Operations for the Quarter Ended 30 June 1951, July 1951, Top Secret Sensitive [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Meeting Held in Office of H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State, 2:30 p.m., 30 July 1951, July 31,
CIA, Report, EE-1 Daily Report, August 7, 1951, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, EE-1 Daily Report, August 29, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Conversation With deleted Re BGFIEND and Bulgarian Intelligence, September 18, 1951, Secret
[view]
CIA, Report, BGCONVOY Monthly Project Status Report for Month of January 1952, February 1952, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Daily Digest, February 1, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, BGCONVOY Monthly Project Status Report for Month of February 1952, March 1952, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, [EE-1] Daily Progress Report, June 17, 1952, Top Secret [view]
145. CIA, Director’s Log, September 5, 1951, Top Secret [view]

OPC, Monthly Project Status Report for Month of September 1951 - QKSTAIR, October 1951, Top Secret [view]=-;
Memorandum, Chief, EE-1 to Chief, EE, Monthly Report for EE-1 for September 1951, October 5, 1951, Top Secret [view]
146. CIA, Director’s Log, November 26, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Director’s Log, December 4, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Director’s Log, December 15, 1951, Top Secret [view]
147. The contents of these declassified Bulgarian documents will be contained in a forthcoming article by Dutch
intelligence historian Dr. Cees Wiebes.
148. Memorandum, F.G.W. [Wisner] to Offie, BGFIEND - Project Outline, June 22, 1949, Top Secret [view]
Memorandum, deleted to COP, Current Status of Project BG FIEND, With Particular Reference to OPC Organization,
August 16, 1949, Top Secret [view];
149. CIG, Report, Albanian Political Situation, August 1, 1947, Secret Control [view]
CIA, Report, Economic and Political Situation in Albania, November 8, 1948, Secret Control [view]
CIA, Report, Purge of Pro-Tito Elements in Albanian Communist Party, November 10, 1948, Secret Control [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Albanian Internal Situation, July 12, 1949, Top Secret Control [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hoxha Regime in Albania, September 12, 1949, Secret [view]
150. CIA, Memorandum, Albania: Possibility of Overthrowing Present Regime, May 27, 1949, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Outline Plan for Project No. EE-10 Code Name: BGFIEND, June 22, 1949, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Memorandum of Discussion With General Van Fleet Concerning Project FIEND, June 24, 1949, Top
Secret [view]

CIA, Report, Internal Situation in Albania; Nationalist Resistence, September 22, 1949, Secret Control [view]
CIA, Report, Current Situation in Albania, December 15, 1949, Secret [view]
151. CIA, Memorandum, Conversations With Albanian Leaders in the United States, October 4, 1949, Top Secret Control
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, Albanian Operation - Colonel William MacLean - B.K.I. Conference in Italy, November 15, 1949, Top
CIA, Memorandum, Albanian Operation - Activities and Personnel of the Committee for Free Albania, November 18,
1949, Top Secret Control [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Albanian Operation - Activities of Albanian Emigre Groups in Italy, November 18, 1949, Top Secret
Control [view]
152. CIA, Memorandum, Greek Knowledge of Albanian Operation, August 13, 1949, Top Secret Control [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Foreign Intelligence Services’ Knowledge of Albanian Operation, September 1949, Top Secret
Control [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Factors Affecting Continuation of Operations at Malta, October 21, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, deleted to SADO and PB-I, November 9, 1949, Secret [view]
Memorandum, Revaluation of Project BGFIEND, November 29, 1949, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Albanian Operation - Albanian IS Activities in Connection With the Committee for Free Albania,
December 21, 1949, Top Secret Control [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Albanian Operation - Contacts Between Nuci Kotta and the Albanian Legation in Rome, January 27,
153. CIA, Memorandum, The Current Situation in Albania, March 23, 1951, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Current Albanian Resistance Activities, July 24, 1951, Top Secret [view]
154. CIA, Memorandum, Re-Evaluation and Revision of OPC Plans Relating to Albania, March 28, 1951, Top Secret [view]
155. CIA Report, Daily Progress Report, October 10, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Director’s Log, October 11, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, untitled, October 24, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Daily Digest, October 25, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Cable, Policy Coordination to Frankfurt et al., October 26, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, EE-1 Daily Progress Report, October 26, 1951, Top Secret [view]
156. CIA, Memorandum, Assistant to Deputy Director (Plans) to Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Albanian
Operations, October 11, 1951, Top Secret.
157. CIA, Minutes FIEND/VALUABLE Conference, Rome, 22-24 October 1951, October 24, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, untitled, January 5, 1952, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Transmittal of Minutes - BGFIEND, March 18, 1952, Top Secret KNIXON [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Transmittal of Excerpts of Minutes of FIEND/VALUABLE Meeting, London, 12-13 March 1952, March
CIA, Memorandum, BGFIEND, October 21, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, British Attitude Toward Possible Albanian Operation, September 10, 1953, Secret [view]
CIA, Dispatch, Minutes of Recent OBOPUS/VALUABLE Meeting, November 2, 1953, Top Secret [view]
158. CIA, OSO Plans for Albania, undated but circa June 1952, Top Secret [view]

159. CIA, Memorandum, Deputy Assistant Director for Policy Coordination to Joyce, Destruction of OPC Agents by
Albanian Security Forces, November 8, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Project BGFIEND Review for the DCI, November 8, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Project BGFIEND Report, November 29, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Project 1952 OPC and OSO Operations in Albania, December 12, 1951, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum of Conversation, Briefing of Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews on Possible Clandestine
Action Against the Albanian Regime, March 19, 1953, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Stability of the Hoxha Regime in Albania, March 20, 1953, Top Secret [view]
Memorandum, Chief, EE to DD/P, Tirana Trials of CIA Agents, April 20, 1954, Top Secret [view]
160. U.S. Army, Cable, Washington to Paris, May 25, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Washington to Ankara, May 25, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Washington to Stockholm, May 25, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Washington to Madrid, June 1, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Ankara to War Department, June 16, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, War Department to Ankara, June 20, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, Stockholm to War Department, July 2, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, War Department to Stockholm, July 3, 1945, Top Secret [view]
161. U.S. Army, Minutes of the 11th Meeting of Army-Navy Cryptanalytic Research and Development Committee, May 16, 1945,
Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Semimonthly Branch Activity Report: 30 April - 15 May 1945, May 16, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Status of Work on Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French Language Systems, September 17, 1945, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Status of Work on Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French Language Systems, November 1, 1945, Top
Secret [view]
. Navy, Report, Status of Work on Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French Language Systems, December 3, 1945, Top
Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Navy, Report, Status of Work on Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French Language Systems, January 16, 1946, Top
Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Activity on Soviet Clandestine W/T Net, July 8, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Activity of Soviet Subversive Agent Links Controlled From Belgrade, August 18, 1948, Top Secret Glint
[view]
U.S. Army, Report, Albania: Arms Supply to Greek Guerrillas, October 19, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Czech Clandestine W/T Network, November 1, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Re-Organization of the Rumanian Special Service of Information (SSI), November 29, 1948, Top
Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Review of Clandestine W/T Activity in Europe; Satellite Clandestine Activity, December 21, 1948, Top
Secret Glint [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Soviet Orbit Procurement of Embargoed Materials via Antwerp and Rotterdam, January 30, 1951,
Top Secret Acorn [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Greek Vessels Chartered by Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries in 1958, and in 1959 Through 19 September,
October 19, 1959, Top Secret Daunt [view]
White House, Memorandum, Situation in Cyprus, July 16, 1974, Top Secret Umbra [view]
CIA, Report, Italy: Economic Relationship With the United States, July 1982, Top Secret Umbra/NOFORN [view]
162. U.S. Navy, Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, French-Russian Relations, April 11, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Disclosure of Free French Results to British, May 14, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Release of Free French Material to British, May 15, 1945, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, “MAGIC” Diplomatic Summary, May 24, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]

NSC, Memorandum, French Communication Security, June 13, 1951, Top Secret Acorn [view]
CIA, Report, Weekly Review, August 5, 1966, Top Secret Trine [view]
163. For the December 1945 “No Spying” SSU agreement with France, see SSU, Memorandum, Statement of Policies and
Principles Governing Organization and Activities of the SSU Mission in France During the Interim Period Before a
Permanent Organization Is Established, December 3, 1945, Top Secret. For examples of SSU/CIA spying on French
intelligence activities, see OSS, Report, X-2/OSS Counter-Espionage Summary, August 10, 1945, Top Secret Control
[view]
SSU, Report, Summary of SSU Activities During November, 1945, undated, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Our Cables #1240, 1254, and 1255, January 5, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, X-2 Paris Monthly CE Report for December 1945, January 28, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, X-2 Paris Monthly CE Summary, March 31, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Report, Monthly Activity Report: France and Lowlands: August 1946, September 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Report, Monthly Counter-Intelligence Summary: France and the Lowlands, 15 October - 15 November 1946,
November 15, 1946, Secret [view]
164. SSU, Report, Support of French Intelligence Services, July 29, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Cable, Paris to War Department - Strategic Services Unit, September 28, 1946, Top Secret Control [view]
FBI, Memorandum, Colonel Andre de Wavrin, With Alias Andre Passy; French Activities, October 15, 1946,Confidential
[view]
CIG, Memorandum, Vandenberg to President, November 26, 1946, Top Secret [view]
Confidential; CIG, Report, Attempted Penetration of SDECE, March 14, 1947, Secret [view]
165. NSC, Memorandum, French Communication Security, June 13, 1951, Top Secret Acorn [view]
Department of State, Airgram, Annual Report to National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDCP),
September 16, 1968, Secret. [view]
166. SSU, Memorandum, American Codes Held by STELLA POLARIS, May 8, 1946, Top Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Station Activities, Month of September 1946, October 1, 1946, Top Secret Control [view]
CIG, Memorandum, List of Russian Codes Opened or Captured by the Finnish, Now Handed Over to the French
Intelligence Service, December 17, 1946, Top Secret Control [view]
167. SSU, Memorandum, Paris Background Data, March 27, 1946, Top Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Polish I.S. Organization, Personalities and Activities, April 1, 1946, Secret Control [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Briefing Notes for Proposed CIG Visit to SSU Staff, Paris, May 7, 1946, Secret [view]
SSU, Memorandum, Background Data on Paris Sources, October 18, 1946, Top Secret [view]
CIG, Memorandum, Eddy to Joyce, November 6, 1946, Top Secret [view]
168. U.S. Army, Signal Security Agency, Report, Annual Report for the Fiscal Year (July 1944 to July 1945), August 31, 1945, Top
Secret Ultra [view]
Canada Department of External Relations, Letter, Glazebrook to Hastings, July 10, 1946, Top Secret Cream. [view]
169. U.S. Army, Decrypt, Washington to Paris (French), July 2, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Army, Decrypt, Oslo to Paris (French), September 27, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Army, Decrypt, Paris to Sofia (French), November 30, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Army, Report, “MAGIC” Diplomatic Summary, December 31, 1945, Top Secret Ultra [view]
U.S. Army, Report, “MAGIC” Diplomatic Summary, January 2, 1946, Top Secret Ultra [view]; U.S. Army, Report, France:
Personalities Mentioned in French SIS Traffic, May 31, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
National Security Agency (NSA), Decrypt, French Reaction to President Kennedy’s Death, November 27, 1963, Top
Secret Dinar [view]

170. CIA, Report, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, May 25, 1961, Top Secret Dinar, contained in Brill&rsquo [view];s
USSR Collection.
172. CIA, Memorandum, French Involvement in Vietnam, June 17, 1966, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] Sensitive
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, Comment on Couve de Murville’s Talk With Secretary Rusk, October 7, 1966, Top Secret [codeword
not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, New French President Faces Serious Domestic Problems, June 20, 1969, Top Secret [codeword not
declassified] [view];
173. CIA, Cable, CIA to White House Situation Room, June 26, 1974, Top Secret [codewords not declassified]. See also Chet
Flippo, &ldquo [view];Can the CIA Turn Students Into Spies?,” Rolling Stone, March 11, 1976, p. 30.
174. CIA, Memorandum, Reported Discussion of French Plan for Dual Control of Nuclear Warheads Based on French Soil,
May 12, 1960, Secret/NOFORN/Continued Control [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, French Nuclear Capability, September 12, 1960, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Paris to Secretary of State, October 5, 1961, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Paris to Secretary of State, February 10, 1962, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, EUCOM Intelligence Report, February 14, 1962, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, EUCOM Intelligence Report, March 23, 1962, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, March 30, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
Department of State, Airgram, French Nuclear Tests, January 4, 1963, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Airgram, French Plans for Nuclear Tests, January 26, 1963, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Airgram, French Underground Nuclear Tests, February 14, 1963, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Paris to Secretary of State, March 7, 1963, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Airgram, French Nuclear Tests, March 8, 1963, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Cable, Paris to Secretary of State, March 14, 1963, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Airgram, Comment on Pierrelatte Diffusion Plant, July 11, 1964, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Paris to Secretary of State, August 3, 1964, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Paris to Secretary of State, June 30, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, London to Secretary of State, October 14, 1966, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Paris to Secretary of State, January 15, 1968, Secret [view]
Department of State, Airgram, French Mirage Aircraft and Israel, February 7, 1968, Secret [view]
Department of State, Airgram, French Nuclear Tests in the Pacific, March 4, 1968, Secret [view]
175. CIA, Cable, NPIC to DIRNSA et al., October 2, 1964, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Cable, NPIC to DIRNSA et al., July 27, 1965, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, Photographic Interpretation Report: Mission 4026 19-24 March 1966, March 1966, Top Secret [codewords
CIA, Memorandum, Preliminary Readout Requirements for KH-4 Mission 1030, March 9, 1966, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Preliminary Readout Requirements for KH-4 Mission 1033, May 19, 1966, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Cable, NPIC to DIRNSA et al., June 2, 1967, Top Secret Ruff; National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),
Memorandum, Comparison of CORONA Performance Evaluation Reports, October 24,1968, Top Secret Ruff Trine
Corona. [view]
176. Department of State, Letter, Bohlen to Matthews, June 25, 1952, Secret. [view]

177. CIA, Report, Influential Personalities Around Chancellor Adenauer, June 16, 1954, Confidential Control [view]
CIA, Report, Adenauer’s Analysis of French Policy-Making, September 29, 1954, Secret Control [view]
178. National Security Agency (NSA), Cable, DIRNSA to NSA/SPECIAL et al., June 18, 1985, Top Secret Umbra/NOFORN
ORCON [view]
179. Interviews with James H. Critchfield and David E. Murphy.
180. CIA, Memorandum, Dr. Otto John and CISD Surveillance, August 3, 1954, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Otto John, August 12, 1954, Confidential [view]
CIA, Article, The Defection of Dr. John, Fall 1960, Secret [view]
181. CIA, Memorandum, Heinz FELFE Damage Assessment, February 7, 1963, Secret - Eyes Alone [view]
CIA, Report, KGB Exploitation of Heiz Felfe: Successful KGB Penetration of a Western Intelligence Service, April 13, 1977,
Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-1956, 2006, Secret. [view]
182. Department of State, Cable, Oslo to Secretary of State, January 11, 1967, Secret [view]
Department of State, Airgram, Norwegian Nuclear Energy Program, April 2, 1967, Secret [view]
183. NSC, Memorandum, Souers to Dennison, December 7, 1949, Top Secret Copse [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Memorandum for General Smith, October 12, 1951, Top Secret Suede [view]
184. CIA, Memorandum, Conferences of Top Italian Ambassadors and Other Leaders of Italian Foreign Office, March 23,
185. U.S. Army, Report, Greece: Move of GHQ of the Greek Democratic Army, March 4, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Greece: Guerrilla Counter-Intelligence and Security Activities, March 11, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Greece: Thessaly Hq of the Greek Democratic Army, April 3, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Greece: Agent Traffic on Greek Guerrilla Network, May 20, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Greece: Guerrilla Command Organization in Central and Southern Greece, May 24, 1948, Top Secret
Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Greece: Rebel Supply Depot Probably in Bulgaria, June 8, 1948, Top Secret Glint [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Greece: Communications Between Guerrillas and Satellites, September 29, 1948, Top Secret Glint
[view]
186. CIA, Report, The Greek Political Crisis, October 11, 1963, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Military Takeover in Greece (Situation Report Number 7 - 2000 EST), April 22, 1967, Top Secret
Codeword [view];
187. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Cable, USDAO Ankara to DIA WASH DC, November 24, 1967, Secret [view]
Department of State, Cable, Geneva to Secretary of State, August 9, 1974, Secret [view]
188. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Cable, DIA/CIIC to DINOZ, February 15, 1964, Top Secret Dinar [view]
CIA, Briefing, Cyprus, March 10, 1964, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Cyprus Situation, July 7, 1964, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Briefing, Cyprus, July 7, 1964, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Cyprus as of 1500, 9 August 1964, August 9, 1964, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view];

189. CIA, Report, Cyprus: Are the Turkish Cypriots Inching Toward Independence?, November 1983, Top Secret/NOFORN
[codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, Cyprus: A Changing Military Balance?, June 14, 1984, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, The Outlook for Turkish Cypriot Autonomy, March 1985, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified]
[view]
190. Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), Memorandum, Interim Report - Iceland, December 21, 1953, Secret [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Impasse With Iceland Over 1951 Defense Agreement, April 12, 1954, Top Secret [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Current Situation in Iceland, June 26, 1954, Secret [view]
191. U.S. Navy, Memorandum, Estimate of Indigenous Force Levels for Unconventional Warfare Planning, January 14, 1954,
Top Secret [view]
192. CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, March 9, 1973, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, August 31, 1973, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, September 4, 1973, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Bulletin, October 24, 1975, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Bulletin, February 5, 1976, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Political Assessment of Iceland, February 11, 1976, Confidential/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, August 27, 1979, Secret/NOFORN [view]
193. CIA, Report, Malta: A Nation in Transition, May 1979, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified] [view]
194. National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, Policy Toward Malta, July 17, 1971, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, New Directions in Maltese Foreign Policy, December 8, 1971, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Western Europe Review, October 4, 1978, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Malta Update, June 9, 1980, Top Secret/NOFORN [view]
National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, U.S. Policy Toward Malta, February 12, 1986, [view]
Secret/Sensitive; National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, U.S. Policy Toward Malta, November 25,
1987, [view]
Secret; CIA, Report, Planned Significant Increase in the Libyan Intelligence Presence in Malta in 1989, April 18, 1989,
Secret [view]
195. U.S. Army, Memorandum, Secretary of War to Acheson, May 3, 1946, Top Secret [view]
CIG, Report, Daily Summary, November 21, 1946, Top Secret [view]
CIG, Memorandum, Vandenberg to President, November 26, 1946, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, November 14, 1947, Secret
[view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Notes From Lt. Colonel C.F. Blunda, G-2, MTOUSA, December 12, 1947, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, December 17, 1947, Secret
[view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, January 12, 1948, Secret
[view]
CIA, Report, France: Communist Mass Action Expected in Spring, February 7, 1948, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, February 12, 1948, Secret
[view]
CIA, Report, Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means, March 5, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, March 10, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, May 12, 1948, Secret [view]

CIA, Memorandum, Possible Communist Inspired Disturbances in Paris at Time of the United Nations General Assembly,
September 16, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Soviet Planning of the French Coal Strike, November 22, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Remarks by CGT Leaders Concerning the Coming Revolution in France, December 22, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, French Labor Unrest in 1950 and Its Implications for the Attainment of US Objectives in Western Europe,
March 8, 1950, Secret [view]
196. Department of State, Memorandum, Unaccounted Funds to Assist Non-Communist Forces in Europe, September 6,
CIA, Memorandum, Liaison With State Department, March 19, 1948, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Operation LARGO, October 12, 1948, Secret, State Department FOIA [view]
197. U.S. Army, Memorandum, Communications Intelligence Service, January 24, 1949, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Cable, CINCEUR to Chief of Staff U.S. Army, October 10, 1949, Top Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Conflicting DAD Operations, September 18, 1950, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Memorandum, Transmittal of Communications Intercepts, November 17, 1952, Secret [view]
UK Joint Intelligence Committee Germany, Report, Security in the Federal Republic of Germany, May 14, 1973,
Secret/UK Eyes Only [view]
198. CIA, Director’s Log, November 28, 1951, Top Secret. [view]
199. CIA, Director’s Log, December 20, 1951, Top Secret.
200. CIA, Director’s Log, December 26, 1951, Top Secret. [view]
201. CIA, Director’s Log, September 4, 1951, Top Secret.
202. ASA Review, May-June 1947, p. 30, U.S. Army FOIA; CIA, Report, Illegal East-West Traffic in Germany, December 27,
203. CIA, Memorandum, Soviet Orbit Procurement of Embargoed Materials via Antwerp and Rotterdam, January 30, 1951,
Top Secret Acorn [view]
U.S. Army, Report, Daily Intelligence Briefing, March 4, 1952, Top Secret [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Orbit Petroleum for China, July 1, 1954, Top Secret Codeword; CIA, Memorandum, Greek Vessels
Chartered by Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries in 1958, and in 1959 Through 19 September, October 19, 1959, Top Secret
Codeword [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Support by S/TR for Current Intelligence, February 7, 1961, Secret.
204. CIA, Report, Britain, the Common Market, and the North Sea Gas Field, March 27, 1964, Secret/NOFORN [view]
205. Department of State, Memorandum, Approach to British on Hong Kong Ships in North Vietnam Trade, January 25, 1966,
Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Apparent Lack of British Awareness of Major Role Their Flag Plays in Free World
Shipping to North Vietnam, February 23, 1966, Secret/NOFORN [view]
206. CIA, Memorandum, Tantalum and Tantalum-Containing Products to European Satellites from West Europe, March 17,
1967, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Hungary Acquires Advanced Communications Technology from Sweden, September 1968, Secret
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, OMNIPOL, Prague Obtains US Machine Tool Through Sweden, January 22, 1969, Secret [view]

207. CIA, Report, Britain’s Economic Troubles and the Labor Government, August 4, 1967, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, French Actions in the Recent Gold Crisis, March 20, 1968, Secret/NOFORN [view]
Maurice C. Ernst, “Economic Intelligence in CIA,” in H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., Inside CIA's Private World (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 311-312.
208. President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), Memorandum, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board Meeting With the President, June 4, 1971, June 5, 1971, Top Secret [view];
209. CIA, Memorandum, Western European Response to the War in the Middle East, October 25, 1973, Secret/NOFORN
[view]
CIA, Report, The Current State of the Arab Oil Embargo, November 5, 1973, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, International Oil Developments, January 4, 1974, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, Weekly Review, January 4, 1974, Top Secret [codewords not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, International Oil Developments, January 11, 1974, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, International Oil Developments, March 8, 1974, Secret/NOFORN. [view]
210. White House, Memorandum of Conversation, February 8, 1974, Secret/Sensitive [view]
211. CIA, Report, Economic Intelligence Weekly, February 5, 1975, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Economic Intelligence Weekly, February 12, 1975, Secret/NOFORN [view]
212. CIA, Report, Weekly Review, March 8, 1974, Top Secret [codewords not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, Staff Notes: Western Europe, Canada, International Organizations, July 23, 1975, Top Secret [codeword not
declassified] [view]
213. CIA, Memorandum, Sweden: The Politics of Nuclear Energy, January 31, 1980, Confidential [view]
CIA, Report, France: Mitterand’s Nationalization Plans in Perspective, July 1982, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Italy: Economic Relationship With the United States, July 1982, Top Secret Umbra/NOFORN [view]
CIA, CIA, Report, Western Europe: Economic Links With the Soviet Union, May 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Western Europe: Implications of Energy Import Dependence, June 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Daily, July 31, 1984, Top Secret/NOFORN [codewords not declassified] [view]
Report, Western Europe: Vulnerabilities to a Persian Gulf Oil Cutoff, August 3, 1984, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword
CIA, Report, The Turkish Economy Under Ozal, March 29, 1985, Secret/NOFORN [view]
214. CIA, Briefing, [16-18 March Summit Preparatory Meeting in San Diego], March 15, 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Venice Summit: Country Positions, May 6, 1987, Secret/NOFORN [view]
215. CIA, Report, Austria: Technology Transfers to the Soviet Bloc, June 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Daily, July 31, 1984, Top Secret/NOFORN [codewords not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, The Gray Market in Nuclear Materials: A Growing Proliferation Danger, July 1984, Secret/NOFORN. [view]
216. CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, April 23, 1979, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Norway: A TNF Update, January 31, 1980, Confidential [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Denmark: The TNF Issue in Perspective, January 31, 1980, Confidential/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, The Netherlands and TNF: Agony Revisited, January 31, 1980, Confidential/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Italy: TNF - An Update on GLCM Siting Problems, February 15, 1980, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Belgium: The Martens III Cabinet: Foreign and Domestic Problems and the Outlook for TNF, June 9,

CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, January 27, 1981, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, September 25, 1981, Secret/NOFORN. [view]
217. CIA, Report, Daily Summary of Positions on INF, January 28, 1983, Confidential/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Daily Summary of Positions on INF - Classified Developments, February 8, 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, UK: Election Prospects - What If Thatcher Loses?, May 16, 1983, Confidential/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Western Europe: Radical Tactics Against INF Deployment, September 1983, [view]
Secret/NOFORN; CIA, Report, Western Europe: The Peace Movement After Initial INF Deployment, July 1984, [view]
Secret/NOFORN
218. CIA, Report, Soviet Leadership Views of the Pershing Threat, February 15, 1983, [view]
Secret/NOFORN; CIA, Report, INF Deployment: The Role of Intelligence Analysts in a Policy Success, March 1993,
Secret/NOFORN. [view]
219. CIA, Report, European Review, February 28, 1986, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, The Netherlands: Election Politics and Prospects for INF Deployment, March 10, 1986, Secret/NOFORN
[view]
CIA, Report, The Netherlands: The Center-Right Under Fire, May 14, 1986, Secret/NOFORN [view];
221. CIA, Estimate, NIE 12.4-54: Probable Developments in East Germany Through 1955, January 22, 1954, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12-54: Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956, August 24, 1954, Secret
[view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12.5-55: Current Situation and Probable Developments in Hungary, March 29, 1955, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12-56: Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through 1960, January 10, 1956, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12.4-54: Probable Developments in East Germany Through 1955, January 22, 1954, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12-54: Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956, August 24, 1954, Secret
[view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12.5-55: Current Situation and Probable Developments in Hungary, March 29, 1955, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12-56: Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through 1960, January 10, 1956, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, SNIE 12-4-61: Stability of East Germany in the Berlin Crisis, August 15, 1961, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 1.2-61: The Outlook in Eastern Europe, November 9, 1961, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12.4-62: The Outlook in East Germany, May 9, 1962, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12-65: Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact, August 26, 1965, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12-68: Eastern Europe and the USSR in the Aftermath of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia, November 7,
1968, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIAM 11/20-1-75: Soviet Policy Toward Selected Countries of Southern Europe, February 4, 1975, Secret
[view]
CIA, Estimate, SNIE 12.7-83: Romania: The Outlook for Ceausescu, December 22, 1983, Top Secret/NOFORN [codewords
CIA, Estimate, NIE 12-84: Pressures for Economic and Political Change in Eastern Europe: Implications for East and West,
March 12, 1984, [view]
Secret/NOFORN
222. JCS, Memorandum, Resistance Movements in Eastern Europe, March 16, 1951, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 10-55: Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, April 12, 1955, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 11-6-66: Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the USSR and Eastern Europe, January 27, 1966,
Secret [view]

223. CIA, Estimate, NIE-42: The Current Situation in Albania With Particular Reference to Greek, Yugoslav and Italian
Interests, November 20, 1951, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE-42/1: Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania, October 20, 1952, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, SE-34: Consequences of an Attempt to Overthrow the Present Regime in Albania, December 30, 1952, Top
Secret [view]
224. CIA, Estimate, NIE-57: Probable Political Developments in the West German Situation During 1952, February 12, 1952,
Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 23-60: The Outlook in West Germany, March 22, 1960, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 23-62: The Outlook for West Germany, July 25, 1962, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 23-65: Prospects for West German Foreign Policy, April 22, 1965, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 23-67: Bonn’s Policies Under the Kiesinger Government, March 30, 1967, Secret. [view]
225. CIA, Estimate, NIE-63: France’s Probable Future Role in the Western Security System, January 23, 1953, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, SNIE 71-58: France and North Africa, July 29, 1958, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, SNIE 22-2-61: France and the Algerian Problem, May 23, 1961, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 22-65: French Foreign Policy, June 2, 1965, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 22-83: Mitterand’s France: Near-Term Outlook, March 22, 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
226. CIA, Estimate, SE-54: The Political Outlook in Italy, December 28, 1953, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 24-62: Implication of the Center-Left Experiment in Italy, January 3, 1963, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 24-1-74: Prospects for and Consequences of Increased Communist Influence in Italian Politics, July 18,
1974, Secret/NOFORN. [view]
227. CIA, Estimate, Annex to NIE 100-2-58: Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and
Consequences, July 1, 1958, Secret/Restricted Data [view]
CIA, Estimate, SNIE 100-5-59: Implications for the Free World and the Communist Bloc of Growing Nuclear Capabilities,
February 3, 1959, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 4-3-61: Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other Than the US and
UK, September 21, 1961, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 4-63: Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems, June 28, 1963,
Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, SNIE 22-2-63: The French Nuclear Weapons Program, July 24, 1963, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 22-2-63: The French Nuclear Weapons Program, April 8, 1964, Secret
[view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 22-64: The French Advanced Weapons Program, November 18, 1964, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, Annex to NIE 22-64: The French Advanced Weapons Program, November 18, 1964, Top Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 22-68: French Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities, December 31, 1968, Secret. [view]
228. CIA, Estimate, SNIE 15-83: Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, January 31, 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 15-90: Yugoslavia Transformed, October 1990, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 29/15-92: A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?, April 1992, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia, May 1993, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 93-23/1: Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia, June 1993, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 93-23/11: Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia, Vol. II - Supporting Analysis, June 1993, Secret
[view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 93-26: Croatia: When Will Fighting Resume?, July 1993, Secret [view];
CIA, Estimate, Update Memorandum: NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia, October 1993, Secret [view];

CIA, Estimate, NIE 94-2: Serbia: A Troubled Year of Consolidation Ahead, January 1994, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, Special Estimate: Ending US Compliance With the Bosnian Arms Embargo: Military and Political
Implications, August 1994, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, Special Estimate SE 94-3: Strict Enforcement of the Exclusion Zones: Military and Political Implications,
September 20, 1994, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, Special Estimate SE 94-4: A Multilateral Lifting of the Arms Embargo on Bosnia: Political and Military
Implications, November 1994, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, Special Estimate SE 94-5: Prospects for UNPROFOR Withdrawal From Bosnia, December 1994, Secret.
[view]
229. U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final
Report, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, Book I, p. 348.
230. CIA, NSC Briefing, Mounting Violence on Cyprus, November 30, 1955, Secret [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Complicity of Makarios, March 10, 1956, Confidential [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Decreasing Cypriot Terrorist Activity, July 25, 1956, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, August 30, 1956, Top Secret/Continued Control [codeword not
declassified] [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Terrorism in Cyprus, November 21, 1956, Confidential [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Cyprus: Increasing Violence Threatens, February 5, 1957, Secret [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, Cyprus, August 20, 1958, Secret.
231. CIA, Estimate, SNIE 22-2-61: France and the Algerian Problem, May 23, 1961, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, November 3, 1961, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
U.S. Army, Report, EUCOM Intelligence Report, January 29, 1962, Secret [view]
. Army, Report, EUCOM Intelligence Report, March 6, 1962, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, March 26, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
U.S. Army, Report, EUCOM Intelligence Report, April 2, 1962, Secret [view]
U.S. Army, Report, EUCOM Intelligence Report, May 22, 1962, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, August 20, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]. [view]
232. CIA, Memorandum, Turkey: A Regime in Trouble, June 4, 1971, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Turkey Under Martial Law, December 27, 1978, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, April 23, 1979, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, July 25, 1980, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, November 25, 1980, Secret/NOFORN [view]
233. CIA, Report, The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat, January
1984, Secret/NOFORN [view]
234. CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, May 27, 1972, Secret/NOFORN [view]
UK Joint Intelligence Committee Germany, Report, Security in the Federal Republic of Germany, May 14, 1973,
Secret/UK Eyes Only [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Bulletin, March 1, 1975, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Daily Cable, May 12, 1976, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, National Intelligence Daily Cable, November 18, 1978, Top Secret/NOFORN [codeword not declassified]
[view]
CIA, Report, Western Europe Review, January 3, 1979, Secret/NOFORN [view]

CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, September 25, 1981, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Terrorism: The West German Response, October 1982, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Terrorism Review, August 26, 1985, Secret/NOFORN [view]
235. CIA, Memorandum, Croatian Emigre Activity, September 15, 1972, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism, September 21, 1976, [view]
Secret/NOFORN; CIA, Report, Weekly Summary, September 24, 1976, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Yugoslav Emigre Extremists, May 29, 1980, Top Secret/NOFORN [view]
236. CIA, Memorandum, Spanish Internal Stability, August 31, 1978, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Spain: Que Se Vayan! (Security Aspects of the Basque Problem), August 31, 1978, Secret/NOFORN
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, February 23, 1979, Secret [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Alert Memorandum: Basque Problems Threatening Dangerous Turn, June 19, 1979, Top Secret
[view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, June 25, 1979, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, May 22, 1981, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Spain: Basque Terrorism and Government Response, November 1984, Secret/NOFORN [view]
237. CIA, Report, Growing Terrorist Danger for Americans, December 23, 1981, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, General Dozier’s Kidnaping: An Update, December 31, 1981, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, February 19, 1982, Secret CIA, Report, Italian
Leftist Terrorism: Defeated But Not Destroyed, October 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Italian Counterterrorism: Policies and Capabilities, May 1984, Secret/NOFORN [view]
238. CIA, Report, Terrorism Review, March 1, 1984, [view]

Secret/NOFORN; National Security Council (NSC), Memorandum, NSC Meeting on President Mitterand’s Visit, March
239. CIA, Report, Italian Counterterrorism: Policies and Capabilities, May 1984, [view]
Secret/NOFORN
240. CIA, Report, Turkey: The Threat of Resurgent Terrorism, September 1984, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey, August 26, 1985, Secret/NOFORN [view]
241. CIA, Report, The President’s Daily Brief, August 19, 1969, Top Secret [codewords not declassified] [view]; Department
of State, Memorandum, Intelligence Note: Soviets Meddling With Northern Ireland, November 10, 1971,
Secret/NOFORN/NODIS [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, US Financial Support for the IRA, September 24, 1973, Secret/EXDIS [view]
CIA, Report, Growing Terrorist Danger for Americans, December 23, 1981, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Terrorist Exploitation of the International Legal System, March 1983, [view]
Secret/NOFORN
242. CIA, Report, Prospects for Foreign Workers in Western Europe, July 1975, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Foreigners in West Germany: Source of Growing Friction, February 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, France: The Immigrant Problem, November 1986, Secret/NOFORN. [view]
243. CIA, Report, France: The National Front’s Impact on the Political System, September 1985, Secret/NOFORN [view]

244. CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: The Kosovo Problem, May 1979, Confidential [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Yugoslav Emigre Extremists, May 29, 1980, Top Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: Revived Unrest in Kosovo, March 23, 1981, Secret [view]
CIA, Estimate, SNIE 15-83: Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, January 31, 1983, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism, September 1983, [view]
Secret/NOFORN; CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: Five Years After Tito, May 1985, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: A Growing Albanian Minority, August 9, 1985, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, European Review, August 28, 1985, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: Ethnic Tensions in Kosovo Province, June 3, 1987, Top Secret [codewords not declassified]
[view]
CIA, Report, Yugoslavia’s Kosovo Problem: A Blight on on Pan-Balkanization, October 16, 1987, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: Slovene Crisis Calming for Now, October 2, 1989, Top Secret [codewords not declassified]
[view]
CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: Civil Conflict Likely in Croatia, August 18, 1990, Top Secret [codewords not declassified] [view]
CIA, Report, Yugoslavia: End of the Federal Experiment, September 15, 1990, Top Secret [codewords not declassified]
[view]
CIA, Estimate, NIE 15-90: Yugoslavia Transformed, October 1990, Secret. [view]
245. CIA, Report, West Germany: The Role and Influence of the Media, April 1984, [view]
Secret/NOFORN
246. CIA, Report, The New West German Nationalism: Causes and Implications, July 1984, Secret/NOFORN [view]
247. CIA, Report, Western Europe: The Labor Unions of the Big Four in Flux, January 1985, Secret/NOFORN [view]
248. CIA, Report, Thatcher’s Troubles with the Falling Pound, February 15, 1985, Confidential/NOFORN [view]
249. CIA, Report, Catholicism in Eastern Europe, March 4, 1986,Secret/NOFORN. [view]
250. CIA, Memorandum, QKBROIL - A Brief Historical Resume, undated, Top Secret.
251. CIA, Memorandum, QKBROIL: PM Operations, March 2, 1954, Secret. [view]

U.S. Intelligence On Europe Background Article

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It Did Not Begin With Snowden

The Declassified History of American Intelligence Operations in Europe:

Matthew M. Aid, October 2014

pg. 1 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S 70-YEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE

U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN AND TURKEY

• U.S. Intelligence Activities in West Germany and West Berlin

U.S. ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE COLD WAR

SPYING ON AMERICA’S EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES

INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON EUROPE

pg. 2 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 3 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S 70-YEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE

pg. 4 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 5 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 6 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 7 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN AND TURKEY

pg. 8 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

1 U.S. Intelligence Activities in West Germany and West Berlin

pg. 9 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 10 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 11 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

2 The U.S. Intelligence Presence in Great Britain

pg. 12 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 13 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 14 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

3 The Turkish Intelligence Facilities

pg. 15 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 16 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 17 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 18 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

U.S. ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE COLD

pg. 19 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 20 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 21 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 22 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 23 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 24 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 25 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 26 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

SPYING ON AMERICA’S EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES

pg. 27 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 28 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 29 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

9 Spying on the Picayune of Europe

pg. 30 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

10 Spying on the Western European Communist Parties

pg. 31 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

11 Economic Intelligence Gathering in Europe

pg. 32 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

12 Monitoring European Anti-Nuclear Groups in the 1980s

pg. 33 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 34 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON EUROPE

pg. 35 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 36 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

pg. 37 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

2 Coverage of European Socio-Economic Issues

1. Interview with James H. Critchfield.

pg. 38 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article

11. U.S. Navy, Report, Norway/USSR: Norwegian-Finnish Border [view]

pg. 39 U.S. Intelligence on Europe – Background article