This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the appellant against the order issued by the Industrial Relations

Tribunal on May 6, 1939, which obliged her to reinstate in her previous jobs or in others substantially
equivalent to the 45 workers listed in the petition of the March 31, 1939 and the 10 workers headed by
A. Haber who were indefinitely excluded, within 10 days after receiving a copy of the order; to pay these
55 workers the wages they should have received from the date of their suspension or separation until
their reinstatement; and that pending resolution of the other issues that the parties have submitted, the
appellant refrains, under penalty of contempt, from dismissing or excluding, without prior permission of
the court, any worker or employee who was under his service at the time in that the dispute arose that
he is currently working in the mines or that he is reinstated in his work in accordance with the order;
and against the resolution of the same court of August 17, 1939 that denied the motion for
reconsideration of the appellant presented on May 26, 1939.

On December 12, 1938, the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., representing the workers and
employees of the Complainant who were members of said labor union, addressed a letter to the
Complainant requesting 21 claims on behalf of its members. The letter was received by the appellant's
office in Manila in an envelope stamped by the Baguio post office on the 30th of the same month. The
appellant's officials summoned their employees to a meeting on January 2, 1939, and in it they informed
all their workers that some of the demands had been accepted and had already been put into practice,
others would be considered and the rest would be be rejected for being unreasonable, and they were
advised not to resort to violence and to observe legal methods in settling their differences with the
appellants. On the night of the same day, the appellant's workers and employees went on strike and left
their jobs. The appellant immediately reported this strike to the Department of Labor and requested its
intervention in order to resolve it. The Secretary of Labor appointed Adolfo Umengan, Special
Investigator of the Department, and Eladio C. Leaño, Public Defender of the Montañosa Province, to
intervene and see how to solve the strike. These officials called a conference which was attended by
officials of the Complainant, a representative of the strikers, and Luis Lardizabal, Head of the Baguio
Federation of Labor, a labor organization affiliated to the National Labor Union, Inc. As a result of the
conference, the parties agreed to the following amicable arrangement:

AMICABLE SETTLEMENT

In order to have the present strike of the contractors and laborers of the respondent company who
staged a walkout on January 3, 1939, amicably settled, the parties hereby mutually agree to end the said
strike under the condition that all laborers will be readmitted upon the execution of this agreement;
provided, that all laborers whose services should be dispensed with due to lack of work in those tunnels
where they are no longer needed will be given not less than fifteen days employment from the date of
this settlement or resumption of work, and provided, further, that as soon as the stopes in 1360 and
1460 levels are opened and the services of men are needed, the company will give preference to
efficient laborers when reducing the personnel as above mentioned in those working places and may
transfer them to other division to replace inefficient men.

In witness hereof, the laborers represented by a committee composed of Messrs. Luis Lardizabal, Tomas
Dirige, Victoriano Madayag, Maximo Conaoi, Daniel Lambinicio, and Juan Cerilo and the Antamok
Goldfields Mining Co. as represented by its President, Mr. Andres Soriano, have hereunto placed their
signatures this 4th day of January, 1939.

The agreement was signed by the parties on January 4, 1939, but the workers did not appear until 9 a.m.
on the 6th of the same month. However, the appellant's management did not allow any worker to enter
the underground section known as "830 level" for the reason that the air had become stale due to the
strike and it was necessary to renew it with fresh air with the In order to avoid personal misfortunes.
This precaution was taken by the workers as a refusal of the appellant that they should work again, so
they went on strike again. The strikers were sympathetically joined by the workers working in the mine
called "680 division," which is another separate mine located 3 kilometers from the factory. Once again
the Department of Labor interned and through the mediation of Eladio C. Leaño the workers returned to
work on the night of January 6, 1939, when the mine work gradually resumed.

On January 9, 1939, the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute to the Industrial Relations Court in
accordance with Article 4 of Commonwealth Law No. 103 and said Court held the first hearing of the
matter on the 13th of the same month in the City of Baguio. At this hearing, the 21 claims of the
defendant National Labor Union, Inc. were discussed one by one, and the parties reached an agreement
on some of them, others were submitted to the decision of the Court and the rest were left pending for
be seen and resolved later.

On March 31, 1939, with most of the aforementioned claims still pending a decision, the defendant
National Labor Union, Inc., filed a motion alleging that Foreman A. Haber and 9 other workers for the
Complainant had been indefinitely suspended on the 29th of the same month; that these workers had
previously been transferred to outside jobs in order to provide the appellant with an excuse to later
separate them from service; that another group of about 30 workers were fired by the company for no
reason and without court authorization; and that the suspensions and separations that were thus made
were acts of revenge and discriminatory for the workers, for which reason it was requested that the
appellant's officials responsible for said acts be punished for contempt and that the appellant be forced
to replace the workers in their primitive jobs in the mines and to pay them their wages corresponding to
the period in which they were separated from service. The appellant answered the motion denying the
alleged facts and alleged that Haber and his 9 colleagues were suspended for their continuous laziness
during working hours and for having constantly refused to work, and that the 45 workers led by foreman
Victoriano Madayag were fired by having refused to name those responsible for the mistreatment of
foreman Juan Moldero on the morning of March 30, 1939. The motion was heard on April 3, 1939, and
the parties presented their witnesses at the hearing. The court appointed one of its special agents to
join the appellant's mines and carry out an investigation in order to supplement the facts that will be
proven during the hearing. After considering the evidence presented before him and the facts found by
the appointed commissioner, the court in its order of May 6, 1939 declared the following facts proven:
1. The discharges and indefinite suspensions alleged in the motion were made by the respondent
without first securing the consent of the Court in violation of the order of this Court of January 23, 1939.

2. The discharges and indefinite suspensions were made by the respondent without just cause.

In the same order, the Industrial Relations Court makes the following considerations that support the
conclusions reached:

In the order of January 23, 1939, the respondent was enjoined to refrain from discharging any laborer
involved in the dispute without just cause and without previous authority of the Court. It appears and no
denial of the fact is made by the respondent that the dismissal is one case and alleged suspension for an
indefinite time in the other, which has all the effects of a discharge, were made without seeking the
authority of the Court.

The charge that Haber and the group of nine laborers were indefinitely suspended of continuous loafing
and refusal to work was not established. The real motive behind the lay was the completion of their
work "outside." Under the circumstances, the provision of the order of March 21, to the effect that
these men should be returned to their work underground after the completion of their work "outside"
should have been observed. The respondent instead of complying with the order laid off the men.

The discharge of Victoriano Madayag and his forty-four companions as a result of the Moldero incident
also lacks justification. In the case of Madayag, although he was present with Haber when Moldero was
attacked, neither one is accused of the aggression. The two of them were conversing with Moldero with
the latter was stoned from behind without anybody apparently being able to point out the aggressor.
Less justification can be found for the discharge of the forty-four men as a result of the incident. The
investigation disclosed that at the time of the assault, they were at the Creek busy with their work. Both
the distance and the topographical situation of the place where the men were working, which is far and
well below the bank of the place of the incident, precluded their hearing of seeing clearly what
transpired above them in the place where Moldero was assaulted. An ocular inspection of the premises
made by the investigator confirmed this view. So far as is known, despite the investigations conducted
by the officials of the company and the policeman of the camp and by the constabulary authorities in
Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning has not been determined. The precipitate and
unwarranted dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to have been spurred by an over
anxious desire on the part of the company to get rid of these men.

As previously found, in the order of this Court of March 21, 1939, about 134 underground laborers of
the respondent were transferred and made to work 'outside of the mines' or surface work. The majority
of these men were muckers, miners, timbermen, trammers, and mine helpers and had to their favor
from 6 months to 5 years service in the mines of the company and not a few of them have done
underground work in several capacities and in different tunnels and divisions of the mine. Among them
are found leaders of the movement of the laborers for higher pay and better working conditions which
culminated in the strike called on January 3, 1939. These leaders have been prominent in the formation
of the union its activities and in connection with the strike. The temporary transfer of these men to
"outside" work was authorized by the Court in said order on the strength of the assurance of the
respondent that no more work suited for them inside the mines existed. It was directed, however, in the
aforesaid order that as soon as their outside was completed the laborers should be immediately
returned to their respective work inside the mines. Subsequent events and acts of the officials of the
respondent in charge of the mines have convinced the Court work existed and exists for the men inside
the tunnels and their transfers were made to provide an opportunity to the company to dispense with
their services as soon as the work is completed. The unwarranted discharges of Haber and nine others
and those of Victoriano Madayag and his forty-four companions amply demonstrated this conclusion.
Upon the company's own admission, as shown in its reports in the records and upon the findings of the
investigator of the Court, more than four hundred (400) workers of different classes among them,
muckers, miners, timbermen, trammers and capataces coming from different mines in the region have
been employed by the respondent as fresh laborers. Almost all, if not all, of these men are not members
of the petitioner, the National Laborer Union, Inc.

At the same time the work in different tunnels and division in the mines are allegedly being completed,
the old workers are being laid off. Although a small number of the men found transfer to other divisions
being operated, the majority are being left without work. Instead of laying hands on the old men laid off
and making them work in the tunnels needing hands and reinstating in the tunnel work those laborers
transferred to the 'outside' department, the respondent preferred to take in and hire other workers
coming from different places because evidently they are not members of the union.

There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that a good number of the position given of the men who
were employed after the strike numbering more than four hundred to date could have been offered to
the strikes who are now doing work "outside" and other who have been laid off on the allegation that
the underground work in which they were engaged had been completed. To believe that not a single
man or say a few among the latter could have met the requirements set by the technical men of the
company to perform the different classes of work for which the fresh men were engaged because they
lack the required efficiency, experience, physique. intelligence and skill of the four hundred fresh
laborers would be shutting the eyes of the court to realities. These men prior to the occurence of the
dispute, had worked for months and many for years in the mines of the respondent and it can not be
easily accepted that their experience gained in their particular lines in the very property of the
respondent would be inferior to that attained by the other workmen in other mines in the district for an
equal period of time. Their inefficiency as a whole group can not be successfully sustained now because
they were not transferred to surface work for this reason but because of the alleged lack of work or
completion of their work underground. Had any of them been inefficient in the past, it can not be
explained why the company laborer continued in the service as the records of the company abound with
instance of discharges made in the past of laborers who were found either inefficient or incompetent or
whose services were unsatisfactory.

The company asserts ignorance of the union affiliations of the men in the mine but the evidence stands
uncontradicted that before the strike was called a petition was presented by the men to the
management carrying the signatures of about eight hundred (800) worker demanding higher pay and
better working conditions. When the men struck, the operation of the mine was completely paralyzed
and there is a strong indication that a great majority of the workers joined openly the strike. It would
not have been difficult for the respondent, with the means at its command, to find for itself the
employees and laborers who remained loyal to the company and to consider those who struck as either
members of the union or its sympathizer.

The respondent's claim as to the motive for the suspension and discharges lacks substance and support
in the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. From all what appears, it is inferred that the
respondent desire to discourage membership in the union and to rout it if possible. The wholesale
discharges were the expression of such desire. The acts in the mind of the Court, are calculated to have
two effects. They will not only immediately affect the discharged laborers but would also discourage
other laborers from joining or remaining members of the union.

The allegation that it has always been policy to consider the laborer's connection with the company
terminated upon termination of the working place in which he is employed is not supported by the
facts. It has been shown that as a general rule when work in a place is completed, workers are
transferred to another working place in one level or to another level, although in some instances days
may elapse before all the men in a bunch can be absorbed in different levels.

It is alleged that mining operations in the property vary and involve several types, and that a miner, for
example, may be good in one type, but that it does not necessarily follow that he can do good work in
another type. And that the employment of men in particular jobs not suitable for them increased the
cost of production as a result of lower output. Consequently, the respondent vehemently insists in its
right of selecting the men that it should employ and that in the exercise of this right it should not be
restrained or interfered with by the Court. It contends that as to fitness of a laborer to do a particular
type of work the opinion of the management or its technical men should be respected. But all these
arguments are meaningless in the face of the finding of the Court that the underground laborers
transferred to the 'outside' work are not wanting in experience, efficiency and other conditions alleged
to be found among the fresh laborers. The special qualifications to do particular work can not rightly be
invoked in favor of the employment of new laborers most specially in those cases of common or
unskilled labor like muckers, trammers, helpers, etc.
Under normal circumstances, the exercise of judgment of the employer in selecting men he is to employ
should not be interfered with. But when such judgment is arbitrarily exercised to the prejudice of
members of a labor union whose rights should be safeguarded in consonance with the policies of the
law, the Court not only feels it justified but rightly its duty to interfere to afford protection to the
laborers affected.

The appellant presented a lengthy motion to reconsider the indicated order, a motion that was denied
by the resolution of August 17, 1939. The order of May 6, 1939 and the resolution of August 17 of the
same year are those that gave rise to to the appeal filed by the appellant.

The appellant maintains that Commonwealth Law No. 103, as amended by Laws Nos. 254 and 355, is
unconstitutional (1) because it violates the principle of separation of powers; (2) because by it the
National Assembly abdicated its legislative power, violating the doctrine on the delegation of powers; (3)
because the judicial powers that the law confers on the Industrial Relations Tribunal, considered
separately, are arbitrary and unreasonable and allow the deprivation of liberty and property without
due process of law; and (4) because assuming that the law is valid and constitutional in its entirety, the
portion, at least, of Article 20 that provides that the Industrial Relations Tribunal "shall adopt its
procedural regulations" must be declared null and void because it violates the Article 13 of Title VIII of
the Philippine Constitution that obliges the Industrial Relations Tribunal to observe the general rules of
procedure applicable to the courts of justice. The appellant alleges in this regard that since she has been
subjected to an arbitrary procedure different from that applied to other litigants in the Philippine courts,
she has been denied due process of law and the principle of equal protection before laws.

Commonwealth Law No. 103, which, as its title indicates, provides for the protection of the worker,
creating an Industrial Relations Court empowered to set a minimum wage for workers and the maximum
rent to be paid by tenants; To enforce compulsory arbitration between employers or owners and
employees or tenants, respectively, and prescribes penalties for the violation of its decrees, it has been
promulgated by the National Assembly by virtue of the precepts contained in Article 5, Title II; Article 6,
Title XIII; and Articles 1 and 2, Title VIII, of the Philippine Constitution that provide:

ART. 1. The Judicial Power shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in other lower courts established by
law.

ART. 2. The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribe and distribute the jurisdiction of
the various courts. . .
In compliance with the transcribed constitutional precepts, the National Assembly promulgated Law No.
103 of the Commonwealth that creates the Court of Industrial Relations, which is a special court with
judicial powers (Pambusco Employees Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., GR No. 46727; Ang
Tibay et al. Vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., GR No. 46496, concurring opinion of Judge Jose P.
Laurel). Article 1 of said law provides that the Industrial Relations Court shall exercise jurisdiction to
consider, investigate, decide and settle any question, matter, conflict or dispute that affects or arises
between employers and employees or workers, and between owners and tenants or sharecroppers, and
to regulate the relations between them, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the law.
Article 4 provides that the court will take cognizance, for the purposes of prevention, arbitration,
decision and adjustment, of any agrarian or industrial conflict that motivates or gives rise to a strike or
stoppage due to differences that arise in the matter of wages, participation or compensation, hours of
work or conditions of sharecropping or employment, between employers and employees or workers,
and between owners and tenants or sharecroppers, provided that the number of employees, workers,
tenants or sharecroppers affected exceeds thirty, and that the agrarian conflict or industrial is submitted
to the court by the Secretary of Labor, or by one or both interested parties, when the aforementioned
Secretary of Labor certifies as to its existence and the convenience of the intervention of the court in the
public interest. And article 20 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and resolution of any question
or conflict, and in the exercise of any of its duties and powers, the court shall act in accordance with
justice and equity and the substantial merits of the cause, without regard to technicalities and legal
formalities, and will not be subject to any technical rules of legal evidence, but will form a judgment in
the way it believes fair and equitable. Law No. 103 confers on the Industrial Relations Tribunal full
discretionary power to resolve and decide agricultural and industrial disputes in the manner that it
deems fair and equitable, regardless of technicalities and legal formalities, and the power thus granted
is judicial and not legislative. Therefore, it does not violate the principle of separation of powers, the
prohibition on the delegation of legislative powers, or equal protection before the law. As stated in the
Cincinnati case, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comm'rs, of Clinton County '1852), 1 Ohio St., 88, cited in the case of
Rubi et al. Against the Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Jur. Fil., 675, "There is a real difference between
delegating the power to enact laws, which necessarily implies discretion as to what they should be, and
conferring power or discretion to make them comply, a discretion that must be exercised in accordance
with the law. The first cannot be done in any way; against the second no objection can be raised. "