The Concept of Social Structure in Roy Bhaskar’s Critical

Realism
Tuukka Kaidesoja

Finnish version of the article was published in 2007 in Sosiologia 44 (2), 79-94.
The slightly revised English version first appeared as a part of my doctoral dissertation Studies on
Ontological and Methodological Foundations of Critical Realism in the Social Sciences (Jyväskylä
Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 376, University of Jyväskylä) in 2009.

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Introduction
The tradition of critical realism, which emerged in 1970’s Britain, has gained a relatively strong
foothold in recent social theory and methodology of the social sciences. Discussion on critical
realism has also been vitalized in Finland (Töttö 2004; Puuronen 2005; Kuusela & Niiranen 2006;
Kuorikoski & Ylikoski 2006). Critical realists typically hold that their doctrines are capable of
solving almost all problems in philosophy of science, methodology and social theory (for a
collection of basic texts on critical realism see Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson & Norrie 1998).
Although I reject this view as being grossly overstated, I regard critical realism as an interesting
theoretical and methodological tradition which has not only addressed many of the basic questions
of the social sciences but also provided original answers to them. One of these questions deals with
the perennial problem regarding the relationship between agency and social structures. Critical
realists maintain, like many other social theorists, that they have resolved this problem.
In this article I will analyze and evaluate the concept of social structure as expounded in the
early works of Roy Bhaskar, who is commonly considered as the founder of critical realism. This
concept forms a part of his conception of the relationship between agency and social structures.
Even though Bhaskar’s social ontology resembles Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory and views
of some other social theorists, Bhaskar’s concept of social structure seems to separate his critical
realism from the other social theories (Porpora 1989, Archer 1995, Tura 1999). Although his
position is not entirely consistent, I will argue that Bhaskar (1979, 1986, 1989) frequently conceives
social structures as collections of internally related social positions (e.g. the positions of capitalist
and worker) which possess such causal powers that are not only irreducible to the properties of the
individual agents1 who currently occupy these positions, but also causally efficacious in relation to
the actions of these agents. Furthermore, I seek to show that Bhaskar tends to conceive social
structures as abstract and non-actual and yet transcendentally real entities. Hence, according to my
interpretation, Bhaskar holds that social structures are separate from the social interaction of
individual agents and that they exist in the unperceivable transcendental realm of being. Despite
these features, he claims that social structures form possible objects for empirical social scientific
research, but, as will be argued, this claim is not valid. Bhaskar’s transformational model of social
activity, in turn, emphasizes that agents always reproduce and transform social structures via their
actions and that causal effects of the structures are always mediated through agents’ intentional
actions. For these reasons, Bhaskar contends that his views avoid the reification of social structures
into things that exist totally independently of agents.
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 The concept of social structure developed in Bhaskar’s early works has been very influential in
the tradition of critical realism (see Collier 1989, 1994; Sayer 1992, 2000; Archer 1995, 2000;
Lawson 1997). I will not, however, focus solely on Bhaskar’s early concept of social structure here,
since I shall also deal with Margaret Archer’s (1995) evaluation of and refinements to Bhaskar’s
early concept of social structure. Bhaskar (1993, 160; 1994, 95-96) has also largely accepted
Archer’s views in his more recent writings. I will nevertheless almost entirely ignore Bhaskar’s
(1993; 1994; 2002) later works on “dialectical critical realism” and “philosophy of meta-reality”
due to the fact that these writings have not been as influential in the discussion on social theory and
methodology as his early works. I will not deal with cultural structures apart from social structures
here, although I admit that cultural meanings form an elemental part of social reality. It is
nevertheless worth noting here that inter alia Archer (1988; 1995) has sought to theorize cultural
structures from the critical realist perspective. I will also omit detailed analysis of the concepts of
structural causality and social emergence, since I have already discussed these elsewhere (Kaidesoja
2007; see also Kuorikoski & Ylikoski 2006).

A priori arguments for social realism

Bhaskar holds that the assumptions regarding the existence of social structures and their causal
powers can be justified by examining the terms used to describe persons and their activities. He
writes that “the predicates designating properties special to persons all presuppose a social context
for their employment. A tribesman implies a tribe, the cashing of a cheque a banking system.”
(Bhaskar 1979, 35) For this reason, descriptions of persons and explanations of their actions,
according to Bhaskar, always employ such social predicates whose referents cannot be reduced to
the properties of individuals. He contends from this that neither methodological nor ontological
individualism can be correct. This argument, in turn, provides for critical realists reason to believe
that such causally efficacious social structures exist which are irreducible to the behavior of
interacting individuals and the social groups that they form. (ibid. 34-39.)
In his other argument for the existence of social structures Bhaskar focuses on the constraints
that social structures, according to our everyday experience, impose on the intentional actions of
agents. He argues, citing Durkheim, that a given language spoken in a given community both
enables and limits symbolic communication between the agents and that the current phase of
technological development poses constraints on the technical methods that can be successfully used
by an industrialist. From these observations Bhaskar infers that particular sequences of sounds and
movements of bodies would not exist unless causally efficacious social structures exist. Hence he
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assumes that he is able to prove, by employing “the causal criterion of reality”, that such social
structures, whose causal powers are ontologically irreducible to the properties and actions of
individuals, must exist. (ibid., 50; see also 1989, 81.)
Despite their persuasiveness these arguments are not valid, since they presuppose what they are
trying to prove (see also Tura 1999, 10-17). The tacit presupposition of the first argument is that
social predicates and the explanations in which they are employed refer to social structures which
possess causal powers that are ontologically distinct from the agents and their interactions. Due to
this presupposition, Bhaskar fails to refute the possibility that descriptions and explanations which
utilize social predicates can be translated into language which only uses predicates that refer to
agents and their causal interactions. Hence, in order to justify his view, Bhaskar needs to clarify
why these kinds of moderately individualistic translations of collective terms are impossible, and
why descriptions and explanations of social phenomena necessarily require reference to such
causally efficacious social structures which are separated from the interactions of individuals.
Bhaskar’s argument becomes even more problematic when it is acknowledged that many
sophisticated varieties of ontological individualism (e.g. Tuomela 1984; Coleman 1990) and
“intersubjectivism” (e.g. Searle 1995; Barnes 2000) exist which deny the existence of causally
efficacious social structures in Bhaskar’s sense.
Bhaskar’s other argument also presupposes that our experiences of enabling and constraining
features of social contexts should be explained by referring to the causal effects of such social
structures, which cannot be ontologically reduced to the properties and interactions of individual
agents. Bhaskar fails to provide good reasons why the abovementioned features of social contexts,
which are undeniable from the point of view of any particular individual, cannot be analyzed
individualistically (or reductively explained) by referring solely to actions of many interacting
individuals, ‒ including the unintended and unacknowledged consequences of their actions. It is
also far from clear as to how well Bhaskar’s examples, language and technology, fit with the
concept of social structure, which he develops elsewhere. Furthermore, Bhaskar’s way of using “the
causal criterion of reality” as the only criterion in ascertaining the existence of a certain
hypothetical entity – namely causally efficacious social structure – is dubious. Firstly, it leaves too
much room for postulation of different kinds of speculative entities as the producers of certain
effect, and, secondly, it does not alone provide any criteria for evaluating competing ontological
claims. This is especially problematic when considering Bhaskar’s (e.g. 1979, 57) concept of social
structure, since he holds that the only way of identifying these necessarily non-perceivable
structures is to examine their perceivable causal effects.

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 These two arguments are not by themselves sufficient, neither for refuting methodological and
ontological individualisms nor justifying the existence of such social structures which possess
autonomous causal powers. As Tomi Tura (1999, 10-17) has shown, despite their weakness, the
previous kinds of arguments are repeatedly used in critical realist literature. These kinds of
arguments are, in fact, also put forth in non-critical realist social theoretical literature (Pleasants
1999). Only a handful of critical realists have made serious attempts to rebut the views of such
current social researchers who advocate moderate versions of methodological or ontological
individualism/“intersubjectivism”.
It does not follow from the failure of these two arguments, which are based on Bhaskar’s a
priori -reasoning, that his conception of causally efficacious social structures is unsound. What has
been said so far does not include any justification of ontological individualism or intersubjectivism
either, since it only contains criticism of Bhaskar’s arguments. For these reasons, it is worthwhile to
examine more closely Bhaskar’s notion of social structure.

Social structures as internal relations between social positions

Bhaskar (1979, 32) writes, citing Marx, that “society does not consist of individuals [or, we might
add, groups], but expresses the sum of the relations within which individuals [and groups] stand”
(additions are Bhaskar’s). Furthermore, he specifies that social relations “must be conceptualized as
holding between social positions and practices (or better, positioned-practices), not between the
individuals who occupy/engage in them” (ibid. 52). Hence, according to Bhaskar’s view, social
positions and their relations have to be separated from individuals currently acting in them and their
social interactions. For this reason, the terms ‘people’ and ‘society’ “refer to radically different
kinds of thing” (ibid. 42). Moreover, Bhaskar (ibid. 54) conceives the relations between social
positions as internal and necessary in the sense that they constitute the essential features of either
one or both of the entities related. By drawing these and some other views presented by Bhaskar
(see ibid. 31-32, 36, 48-52; 1986, 123-124; 1989, 71) together, his position can be summarized as
follows: social structures, which together constitute society, are collections of internal relations
between social positions which are abstracted from the ongoing interaction between individual
agents. These kinds of social structures are relatively autonomous in relation to the interacting
agents who currently occupy the structurally constituted positions, and the causal powers of social
structures cannot be ontologically reduced to the social interactions of agents.
Bhaskar’s (1979, 36, 54) examples of internally related social positions include the positions of
capitalist and worker, MP and constituent, student and teacher, husband and wife. According to his
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view, internal relations between these social positions constitute the essential properties of the
positions related, which, in turn, determine causally the opportunities for action and social identities
of the individual agents who occupy these positions. For this reason, a person who occupies the
position of a capitalist cannot be a capitalist unless there is the existence of one or more worker(s)
as the object of his/her exploitation. Moreover, in order to sustain one’s position as a capitalist, one
not only has to act in a way that is both enabled and enforced by this position, but one also has to
obtain the social identity of a capitalist. A person who currently occupies the position of capitalist,
is nevertheless able to move to the position of worker, for example, by means of selling his/her
possession of the means of production to a capitalist and becoming employed by a capitalist – one
can also move in the opposite direction, even though this might prove difficult. Of course, capitalist
relations of production, which constitute the positions of capitalist and worker, are not necessarily
transformed, even though one or more person(s) is moving from one structural position to another.
The opportunities and social identities of the persons who change their positions are nevertheless
remarkably altered in the process. Furthermore, a person who occupies the position of capitalist
may also simultaneously occupy, for example, the positions of husband, father, and town councilor.
Hence, individual agents typically engage in many structurally constituted social positions
simultaneously and may also change their positions within a social structure. Social structures and
practices are, according to Bhaskar (ibid. 54-56), also commonly internally related, and, hence,
social reality forms a totality.
Social structures, according to the previous account, seem to be rather static and ahistorical
entities, which is incompatible with the fact that changeability and historicity are commonly thought
to be essential features of social reality. What I have so far stated here is not the whole truth of
Bhaskar’s thinking, since he clearly rejects the static and ahistorical interpretation of social reality.
He writes, for example, “society […] is an articulated ensemble of tendencies and powers which
[…] exist only as long as they (or at least some of them) are being exercised; are exercised in the
last instance via the intentional activity of men [sic.]; and are not necessarily space-time invariant”
(Bhaskar 1979, 49). Moreover, Bhaskar (e.g. ibid. 43-49; see also 1986, 122-129; 212-223) puts
forth his transformational model of social activity, which is inspired by Aristotle’s and Marx’s
works. According to this model, agents always either reproduce or transform pre-existing social
structures via their intentional activities. The new structures formed in this process function, in turn,
as a condition for agents’ future actions. From this perspective, social structures do not remain
spatiotemporally invariant, but are only relatively enduring and restricted to a limited geographical
region. Bhaskar (1979, 48; see also 1986, 109-112) writes accordingly that causally efficacious

5
“social structures exist only in virtue of the activities they govern” and, hence, he holds that his
view does not amount to the reification or the ahistoricization of social structures.
Since Bhaskar holds that activities in which social structures are reproduced and transformed are
intentional, or have a certain purpose, it follows that social structures are always dependent on the
concepts of agents which are used in the articulation of their reasons and purposes of action. From
the point of view of the transformational model, the reproduction of structures nevertheless occurs
typically via unintended and often also unacknowledged consequences of intentional actions. For
this reason, agents do not have to conceive their intentional actions in terms of the reproduction of
structures, since this model only requires that their activities are intentional under some description.
Indeed, as Bhaskar emphasizes, agents’ conceptions of the nature of their actions and current social
reality may be seriously partial and even distorted. It can be nevertheless argued that successful
transformation of structures requires both that agents in their collective activities consciously aim at
transforming the current structures and that they possess more or less adequate knowledge of the
nature of these structures. In Bhaskar’s critical realism, the emancipatory potential of social
scientific knowledge is tied precisely to the previous views. It is evident that collective actions that
aim at transforming current structures also produce, like all other forms of intentional action, both
intended and unintended consequences. Hence, the outcomes of the transformative activities only
seldom meet the agents’ expectations. (Bhaskar 1979, 43-49, 63-69; 1986, 122-129.)
The only detailed example of a social structure which can be found in Bhaskar’s (1979, 39, 52-
56, 65-69, 83-91; see also 1986; 1989; 1991) early works is Karl Marx’s (1974) analysis of the
capitalist mode of production. This analysis, according to Bhaskar’s interpretation, is outlined by
following the critical realist ontological, epistemological and methodological views. Hence,
relations of production in Marx’s theory are interpreted by Bhaskar as previously characterized
social structures which possess relatively autonomous causal powers and tendencies in relation to
the interacting agents who occupy the positions of capitalist and worker in this structure. From this
perspective, the internal relation between the positions of capitalist and worker causally determines
the opportunities, interests, functional roles, and (both cognitive and material) resources of those
agents who occupy these positions. The internal relation between these positions does not, however,
determine which opportunities agents seize and which causal powers they exercise in a given
situation, due to the fact that agents are capable of making relatively autonomous choices within
their positions by virtue of the intrinsic causal powers they possess, which constitute their capacity
for human agency.

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 Furthermore, agents engaged in the positions of capitalist and worker are able either to reproduce
or transform the capitalist relations of production and, accordingly, their own positions.
Reproduction of the capitalist relations of production happens largely via unintended consequences
of the agents’ intentional actions, since, for example, an agent who occupies the position of worker
does not usually consciously intend to reproduce the capitalist relations of production when
working for the capitalist, since his/her reason for doing wage labor is usually simply to earn a
living. In fact, Bhaskar (1979, 86-91) claims, following Marx, that agents’ conceptions of the real
nature of social reality in capitalism are systematically ideologically distorted and that this state of
affairs is a necessary condition for the endurance of capitalist relations of production. In order to
transform the capitalist relations of production, agents have to acquire at least partial knowledge of
the real nature of these relations. This is only possible through ideology critique. As can be inferred,
for example, from the history of the twentieth century, the new relations of production formed
through the collective actions of many agents seldom meet the aims of those agents.2

Archer’s Critique and Refinement

Margaret Archer (1995) argues, along with many other commentators on Bhaskar (e.g. Benton
1981; Pleasants 1999, 122-123; King 1999), that the previously characterized position is
inconsistent. According to Archer (1995, 135-161), Bhaskar presents the following two claims that
are not compatible with each other: on the one hand, he wants to ontologically separate causally
efficacious social structures from the interacting agents. On the other hand, he denies that social
structures can be ontologically separate from the agents, since he holds both that the social
structures are always dependent on the activities and conceptions of the current agents and that their
causal effects are always mediated via the intentional actions of these agents. Archer (1995, 141)
also accuses Bhaskar of not entirely avoiding the temptation to make “an over precipitous and quite
unnecessary leap from the truistic proposition ‘No people, no society’ to the highly questionable
assertion ‘this society; because of these people here present’”. In addition, Archer (ibid. 145-148)
contends that Bhaskar’s view on the ontological dependence of social structures from the concepts
of agents is open to many different interpretations; some of which are problematic and others not.
Archer (ibid. 143f.) suggests, as a solution to these problems, that in some cases the causal
powers of social structures might be dependent solely on the actions of former, possibly since
deceased, agents. Hence, she holds that, in contrast to Bhaskar’s view, society is never wholly
dependent on the actions and conceptions of current agents. Her examples of such social structures
whose causal powers are dependent only on the actions of earlier agents include a top-heavy
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demographic structure, people’s unfavorable relations to nature, and distributions of capital (ibid.
143-144). According to her view, these kinds of social structures, which have initially emerged by
virtue of the actions of human beings, are able to endure and continue to be causally efficacious,
even though they are not currently reproduced via the intentional actions of the current agents.
Archer also claims that these kinds of social structures are not ontologically dependent on the
conceptions of the current agents, although she admits that they are always dependent on the
conceptions of some agents, who may well belong to previous generations. In addition, Archer
maintains that agents’ conceptions of social structures may be distorted and contentious, which is
the point already emphasized by Bhaskar (1979, 174-177). Archer (1995, 143-149) nevertheless
holds that previous kinds of social structures require that human beings exist and that they are
always dependent on the activities and conceptions of earlier agents, and, hence, Archer holds that
her views avoid the reification of social structures.
A remarkable problem in Archer’s argument is that her first two examples of such social
structures, which are ontologically dependent only on the actions of earlier agents, do not seem to
be compatible with Bhaskar’s relationist interpretation of the concept of social structure, which is
explicitly advocated by Archer (1995, 165-194; 2000, 465-466). How might, for example, a
demographic structure which is conceived as a statistical age distribution in a given population
consist of internal relations between social positions? Relations between the social positions of
‘child’, ‘teen’, ‘adult’ and ‘old’ might be interpreted as a relational social structure in Bhaskar’s
sense, but these positions are constituted by cultural habits, norms, meanings and legalized rights
and duties, which are all reproduced and transformed by the current agents. Hence, this kind of
relational structure is impossible to derive from the statistical distribution of ages in a population.
Therefore, a demographic structure in Archer’s sense seems to be a population-level statistical
biological structure rather than a causally efficacious social structure in a critical realist sense (Tura
1999, 49-50; see also King 1999b).
Furthermore, rather than being produced by causal powers of relationally interpreted social
structures, it seems to me that many of the currently observable causal effects of the undesirable
relations between the historical actions of human beings and nature (e.g. global warming of climate)
are based on changes in the processes within “non-human nature” which have been influenced by
the historical actions of human agents and concrete social systems (e.g. intensification of the
greenhouse effect as a consequence of mass consumption of fossil fuels since the nineteenth
century). This is not to deny the fact that currently existing concrete social systems and their
structures may also either accelerate or slow down natural processes which are undesirable from the

8
point of view of human beings. From this perspective, it can be also argued that some changes in
the processes and structures of (non-human) nature, which have been initiated by historical actions
of human beings and their concrete social systems, do not necessarily require their recurrent
maintenance by current human agents. For example, it is possible that rapid global warming, which
has been accelerated by humanly induced intensification of the greenhouse effect, might continue
due to the various positive feedback loops in the climate system even if human beings cease using
fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gases, ‒ or even if the human species were, due to some
peculiar cosmic accident, to be suddenly wiped from the planet. Such natural processes are clearly
not social structures in the previously defined sense, even though social processes and concrete
social systems can have various impacts on them. It seems to me, therefore, that only Archer’s last
example, namely the distribution of capital between structured social positions, can qualify as a
social structure in the required sense.
In her answer to King’s (1999b) criticism, Archer (2000, 465) seems to withdraw her earlier
claims, since she now suggests that social structures are always dependent on simultaneous social
interactions and emphasizes that the causal effects of social structures are always mediated via
human activities. Her views therefore appear inconsistent in precisely the same way as those of
Bhaskar. Since Bhaskar (1993,160; 1994, 95-96) has accepted Archer’s previously considered
“refinements” of his views, I strive to take these into account in the following.

Abstract and Non-actual Nature of Social Structures

Although his views are not entirely consistent, Bhaskar tends to interpret the collections of
internally related social positions which are separated from individual agents and their concrete
social interactions as the bearers of the causal powers of social structures. Furthermore, he claims
that society, conceived as an ensemble of social structures, is “necessarily unperceivable” (Bhaskar
1979, 57) and yet “transcendentally real”, since its existence is presupposed by our experiences
(ibid. 68). Bhaskar therefore seems to locate abstract social structures in transcendental realm of
being which is separate from the actual phenomena (for a similar interpretation see Varela & Harré
1996).
The abstractness of Bhaskar’s notion of social structure can be highlighted by noting that the
terms used by him in reference to social structures are “abstract kind terms” which can be separated
both from singular terms and kind terms which refer to classes of concrete particulars. In other
words, abstract kind terms, such as ‘capitalist’ and ‘worker’, refer to internally related abstract
social positions which are considered as ontologically separate entities from the social interactions
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between concrete agents. From this perspective, the concept of the internal relation between the
positions of capitalist and worker can be interpreted as referring to the relationship between social
class positions, which are defined in terms of ownership of means of production (or capital/wage
labor relation). These kinds of “internally related” class positions cannot by themselves produce any
causal effects, since they are merely conceptual abstractions, not concrete particulars (cf. Harré
2001, 25-26). As I have elsewhere defended the view that causal powers can be attributed only to
particular concrete things or systems, I do not provide any further justification of this position here
(Kaidesoja 2007 see also Varela & Harré 1996).
It seems to me that precisely because of his abstract and non-actual notion of social structures,
Bhaskar (1979, 51) maintains that we need concepts which mediate agency and structures. He
suggests that causal effects of structures are mediated through a specific “position-practice system”
in which structural “slots” are filled by agents who either reproduce or transform pre-existing
structures via their social practices (ibid. 51). In other words, social structures constitute “places,
functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc.”(ibid. 51), which not only govern the actions of agents but
also enable them to participate in different kinds of social practices. The concepts that are used in
describing the position-practice system refer only to “the point of contact” between human agency
and structures, precisely because Bhaskar ontologically separates causally efficacious social
structures from concrete social interactions of agents. Furthermore, some structures might endure
without their active reproduction by current agents, and may both constrain and enable the actions
of the current agents in the form of distribution of capital and resources (Archer 1995, 151-152; cf.
Bhaskar 1979, 52-53).
This kind of “mediating position-practice system” is necessary for Bhaskar’s concept of social
structure, since without it abstract and non-actual social structures are at risk of losing contact with
concrete social reality. Bhaskar’s remarks on the relationship between abstract social structures and
concrete social practices remain, however, rather schematic and, in my view, he does not succeed in
giving a satisfactory account of this relationship. Archer (1995) deals with this relationship in more
detail, but, as previously indicated, due to their similar ontological presuppositions, her views
present similar problems to those of Bhaskar (for a critique of Archer’s views see King 1999b).
Before returning to these problems, I will first outline my own view on the nature of social kind
terms, which forms the basis of my following criticism of Bhaskar’s views.
Although I regard Bhaskar’s notion of social structure as problematic, I do not commit myself to
the conception, advocated for example by Rom Harré (2002,121), which denies the existence of
extra-discursive referents of social kind terms and holds that social structures exists only as

10
“discursive categories” used by agents. In contrast to this view, I hold that social kind terms can
refer to such concrete social kinds whose members possess certain essential properties. Part of these
properties might also contain an extra-discursive material dimension which does not depend on its
conceptualizations in the accounts of researchers and other agents. For example, causal powers of
material resources and artifacts, which we use in social practices, are not entirely ontologically
dependent on their conceptualizations by the participating agents. From this perspective, we might
say that the trouble with Bhaskar’s views is not the employment of social kind terms but rather his
abstract and non-actual interpretation of the referents of these terms, which separates them from
concrete social reality.
From the perspective just sketched, it can be pointed out that social class terms can be
interpreted as referring to relational properties of concrete agents and their concrete social relations.
For example, social class terms might refer either to individual agents’ possessions of means of
production, positions in the market or memberships in occupational groups. In addition, social class
terms might also be used in referring to the relations of domination that exists between the agents
belonging to such collections (i.e. classes), who differ with respect to some of the previously
mentioned relational properties. A given population of individual agents can be classified into
different social classes using such kinds of properties and relations as the classification criteria
(Bunge 1998, 69-70). It is important to emphasize that social classes that are formed along these
lines are not necessarily (collective) causal agents, since they may consist solely of collections of
individuals which have no interaction with each other whatsoever. It is nevertheless possible for
members of the working class in Marx’s sense of the term to establish via collective action a
socialist party, for example, that promotes their class-specific interests. Such a political party can be
interpreted as a concrete social system that possesses emergent causal powers that are not possessed
by its component individuals (Kaidesoja 2007). In other words, it is important to notice that the
working class and a socialist party are ontologically different kinds of entities: the former is a
collection of people which is formed based on certain theoretical criteria, and the latter is a concrete
social system which is composed of individuals who act in an organized manner and the artifacts
that are used by them.
I cannot see any valid justification for the claim that a social kind term cannot ever refer to
collections of social relations in concrete social systems that possess one or more essential property.
For example, the concept of wage labor can be interpreted as referring to essential social relations in
capitalist economies and enterprises. From this perspective, an essential property of all instances of
the social kind term ‘wage labor’ is, according to Marxist theory, that individual agents (i.e.

11
workers or wage laborers) sell their labor power to capitalist enterprises which are owned by one or
more individual agents (i.e. capitalists). In other words, by virtue of their possession of the means of
production, capitalists can control the use of the workers’ labor power in order to accumulate the
capital as long as they pay wages to workers. By following the previously outlined procedure, it is,
at least in principle, possible to concretize abstract kind terms which refer to kinds of social
relations and social positions, assuming that these terms actually refer to concrete social systems
and the social interactions that prevail within them.3
It nevertheless is not possible to say that the previous kinds of concrete social relations possess
such causal powers which cannot be ontologically reduced to the interactions between individual
agents and their artifacts in concrete social systems, even though it is still possible to say that the
“place” or “role” of the individual within a given concrete social system enables and constrains
his/her actions (Kaidesoja 2007, 82-83; see also Bunge 1996, 1998). The concept of social relation
concretized in this way is not compatible with Bhaskar’s analysis of the concept of social structure,
insofar as he interprets causally efficacious social structures in terms of internal relations between
abstract social positions which are located in the transcendental realm of being.
Bhaskar (1979, 57-59; 1986, 107-108; see also 1978) seeks to justify his view on the abstract
and non-actual nature of social structures by claiming that social reality forms “an open system”.
This means that social events are always produced by multiple social structures – and perhaps also
mechanisms belonging to other “strata of reality”, such as mental, physiological and biological –
which are contingently combined to produce the particular event in question. These structures and
mechanism may also modify and inhibit the workings of each other in such a way that the effects of
any particular structure or mechanism may be distorted or remain non-manifest at the level of actual
social phenomena. For this reason, Bhaskar (1979, 57-59) holds that no invariant empirical
regularities exist in social reality and contends that it is impossible to isolate social structures from
each other (and from the structures belonging to other strata) by using experimental or statistical
techniques. For these reasons, Bhaskar (ibid. 64-69) suggests that knowledge of social structures
should be acquired by employing “transcendental analysis”. This analysis begins by describing a
certain social phenomenon by utilizing the agents’ own conceptions of the phenomenon. A
description of the necessary conditions for the possible existence of the phenomenon (i.e.
descriptions of social structures) is then – by employing Kantian pure reason – inferred from this
description. As Andrew Collier (1994, 162-164) has indicated, Bhaskar’s (ibid. 165) schematic
model of the process of explanation in open systems presupposes the availability of “independently
validated” theoretical statements which refer to social structures and, consequently, does not say

12
anything about the genesis or empirical testing of the social scientific theories. Hence, in Bhaskar’s
account of the causal explanation of social phenomena, empirical regularities and predictions seem
to play no role, since causal explanations are not only formed via transcendental analysis but are
also necessarily theoretical descriptions that can be evaluated only in terms of their explanatory
power (Bhaskar 1979, 58, 162-165, 176; see also Collier 1994; Sayer 1992).
As, for example, Stephen Kemp and John Holwood (2003) and Pertti Töttö (2004) have pointed
out, Bhaskar and other critical realists such as Andrew Sayer (1992) exaggerate the openness of
social systems and belittle the role of empirical regularities in causal explanation of social
phenomena. These critics have argued that, contrary to the previously examined view, it is possible
to discover empirical regularities and statistical patterns of social life that are of importance in the
development and evaluation of causal explanations in the social sciences. They have also shown
that many interesting statistical patterns can be discovered only by means of analysis based on
statistical methods. It is important to notice that this view does not result in confusing statistical
correlations with causal relations, since the requirement for theoretical description of mechanism(s)
in causal explanations can be incorporated into this view (Töttö 2004). These authors have also
plausibly pointed out that empirical evaluation of social scientific theories is impossible unless
empirical regularities can be found in social reality (Kemp & Holmwood 2003; Töttö 2004, 232-
284). How, for example, could the explanatory powers of competing social scientific theories be
compared if no empirical regularities exist in social reality?
Critical realist Tony Lawson (1997) has admitted the methodological importance of partial and
spatio-temporally restricted empirical regularities – “demi-regularities” in his terms – in
constructing and evaluating the causal explanations of social phenomena. In my view, if the
methodological role of demi-regularities is emphasized, then Bhaskar’s abstract and non-actual
concept of social structure should be relinquished. Otherwise, it is hard to see in what way demi-
regularities might advance social scientists’ attempts to acquire knowledge of non-actual and
abstract social structures. Despite his interesting methodological views, Lawson (1997, 57-58; 160-
173) appears to follow Bhaskar’s doctrines too closely in his interpretation of the concept of social
structure. Hence, his position does not seem entirely consistent (cf. Hodgson 2004). I will not,
however, deal with Lawson’s views in any further detail here.
In some contexts, as has been already indicated, Bhaskar tends to interpret the concept of social
structure in more concrete terms. For example, in stating that social structures become more visible
to agents in periods of social crisis, he seem to suggest that essential features of internal relations
between social positions reveal themselves to the agents (Bhaskar 1979, 61). This view suggests

13
that social structures actualize and can be empirically identified in concrete interactions between
agents during periods of crisis, although they remain at other times buried behind numerous other
structures and mechanisms as well as other external and contingent social relations and interactions.
Furthermore, Bhaskar’s (1979, 52-53) way of dealing with the distributions of different kinds of
material and cognitive resources as conditions for action that are attached to the structured social
positions of agents, seems to presuppose that social structures are at least partially perceivable and
concrete. These views are nevertheless incompatible with his abstract and non-actual concept of
social structure, as examined above. Since Bhaskar bases his methodological views on his
transcendental interpretation of social structures, I will not deal with Bhaskar’s statements that are
incompatible with this concept in any further detail here.

Social Essentialism and Empirical Research

The concept of social structure developed by Bhaskar includes an essentialist assumption according
to which internal relations between social positions constitute the essential properties of these
positions. In other words, by virtue of its internal relations to the other social positions, the
instances of a given social position share a certain essence. The justification of this essentialist
assumption requires empirical research at least for two reasons: social reality is manifold, dynamic
and complex, and the essential features of social entities cannot usually be directly perceived. As I
will argue in the following, Bhaskar’s conception of the non-actual and abstract nature of social
structures tends to make empirical evaluation of his views on social structures impossible –
including the previous essentialist assumption. Before considering Bhaskar’s views, I try to show
how the previously sketched more concrete interpretation of Marx’s theory of the essential features
of capitalist relations of production might be evaluated empirically.
First of all, I would like to briefly consider the question: “Do capitalist relations of production, as
described in Marx’s (1974) theory of the capitalist mode of production, prevail in all modern
economies and enterprises which are commonly conceived to be capitalistic?” My intention is not to
present a conclusive and comprehensive answer to this question, nor do I aim to investigate Marx’s
views in detail. I aim instead to illustrate the previously outlined interpretation of the relationship
between Marx’s theory of capitalism and empirical research. One possible answer to the previous
question is that concrete economic systems form a continuum in which capitalism and communism
form opposite ends. For example, so-called “welfare state capitalisms” (see e.g. Kosonen 1998, 32-
38), like most other currently existing economic systems insofar as it is possible to distinguish them
from each other in the current state of economic globalization, can be located somewhere in
14
between the opposite ends of this continuum. In order to evaluate recent applications of Marx’s
theory, it is important to examine how well the current economic systems fit with Marx’s theory,
which, it might be argued, describes capitalism in its pure and unregulated form. In addition, it can
be argued that economic systems that represent “state capitalist socialism” (Shanz 1996, 184-187),
which prevailed in the late Soviet Union and its satellite states, are hard to analyze using Marx’s
theory, since these kinds of economies were not dealt with by him.
It can be argued that the relations between capitalists who own the means of production and
workers who sell their labor power to capitalists for wages are rather diverse in concrete enterprises
and other capitalist production units that function as parts of a concrete capitalist economy. For this
reason, their Marxian-essentialist interpretation should be justified via empirical research in each
individual case. Even though these relations are all wage labor relations in the minimal sense that
the workers sell their labor power to their employers in a way that differs from the earlier forms of
work (see e.g. Aho 1988), it is not self-evident that the relations of commodification, exploitation
and alienation, which are essential to the capitalist relations of production in Marx’s theory, can be
found in all (or most) enterprises and other units of production that function in capitalist economies.
It can be further argued that these kinds of relations were common in capitalist factories when Marx
wrote his Capital, and in many of the enterprises that are located in current “developing countries”
which lack decent work legislation and organized labor unions. It seems to me that in “highly
developed” industrial or post-industrial countries, such as Finland, it cannot be said that the
capitalists always exploit the maximum surplus-value from the workers in order to accumulate
capital, since this is not possible due to work legislation and the influence of labor unions on wages.
It also appears to me that current knowledge workers would hardly accept Marx’s characterization
of the processes of alienation from the products of their work, other people, and themselves,
whereas Marx’s characterization of alienation would apply well to workers on an assembly line,
whose labor process is organized according to Taylorist principles. Furthermore, Marx’s labor
theory of value can also be questioned, since labor does not seem to be the only source of value in
economic production in capitalist economies.
If we focus on the welfare capitalist countries, it can be argued that, despite their recent
weakening in many countries, social security systems sustain the unemployed and, for this reason, it
is not always necessary to sell ones labor power in order to subsist. Hence, the fate of unemployed
people in these countries is not as cruel as it was in Marx’s times. Furthermore, Marx’s prediction
regarding the absolute impoverishment of the life conditions of the workers is not realized in
welfare capitalist countries, in which the contradiction between capital and labor has often been

15
resolved in a relatively successful way. In addition, the growth of the middle class in the Western
countries poses a problem with regard to Marx’s largely dualistic theory of class due to the fact that
people are nowadays difficult to categorize solely on the basis of the concepts of proletariat and
bourgeoisie. Many capitalists are nowadays engaged in wage labor and many workers have jobs
that produce no direct surplus value for capitalists. As is well known, the traditional working class
has also diminished in recent decades in Finland and other Western countries due to the relative
increase in the number of adults who do not participate in working life (e.g. students, unemployed
and retired). For these reasons, the class struggle does not appear to be a force capable of pushing
historical development onwards.
According to the previous interpretation, Marx’s theory of capitalism and its later empirical
applications are open to empirical evaluation as outlined briefly above. Bhaskar (1979, 65), by
contrast, holds that Marx’s Capital follows a “transcendental procedure” which establishes, by
means of analyzing the necessary conditions of possibility of the phenomenal forms of capitalist
life, the specific categories that “must be employed in any concrete investigation [of capitalist
societies]”. It seem to follow from Bhaskar’s interpretation that the abstract categories developed by
Marx become immune to empirical critiques due to the fact that they, firstly, are necessarily
employed in concrete investigations of capitalist societies and, secondly, they refer to certain kinds
of non-actual entities located in the transcendental realm of being. By taking Bhaskar’s critical
realism as their guide, Marxists can stick to their theory even though the abstract concepts of this
theory cannot be plausibly concretized in their studies and even though the tendencies predicted by
their theory are not actualized in the form of empirical regularities, since it is always possible to
assert that some other mechanism(s) inhibited the actualization of these structures and tendencies in
the phenomenon under study. In a similar spirit, institutional economist Geoffrey Hodgson (2004)
has criticized Andrew Collier (1989, 66-67), who is both a critical realist and an openly Marxist
socialist, for his insistence on the validity of “the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall”,
even though the erroneousness of this law has been shown in many empirical investigations by
economists.
Bhaskar (1979, 58-64) nevertheless insists both that social sciences are empirical sciences and
that the theories that refer to social structures should be exposed to empirical tests. Since he
ontologically separates social structures from concrete social systems and holds that knowledge
acquisition in the social sciences should be based on some kind of transcendental analysis, Bhaskar
is not, as was already argued, able to show how theories about social structures could be developed
and empirically evaluated. He rather seems to confuse the transcendental argumentation, which is

16
based on a priori reasoning, and empirical inquiry in a way which leads to intractable problems (see
also Kaidesoja 2005).
In addition, Bhaskar’s interpretation of Marx is contentious. For example, Derek Sayer’s
interpretation of Marx’s doctrine of historical materialism differs from Bhaskar’s reading of Marx,
since Sayer holds that Marx’s abstract categories are based on careful empirical analysis of concrete
social reality and get their full meaning only when they are related to concrete social reality. Hence,
Marx, according to Sayer’s interpretation, consciously aimed at avoiding the reification of
conceptual abstractions into causally efficacious things, even though he certainly employed the
method of abstraction in his studies. Sayer (1987, 136) writes that “[…] Marx’s concepts of forces
and relations of production – of essential relations – do not then denote ‘items’ which are ‘more
basic than actions’ […]. The structure/action opposition is a false one. These ‘items’ are actions –
forms of human relationships – and the whole point of Marx’s critique is to unmask them as such.”
As was previously argued, Bhaskar and his followers, by contrast, tend to locate the social
structures studied by Marx in the transcendental realm of being which is separated from agents’
actions. Hence, Bhaskar’s reading of Marx is incompatible with Sayer’s.

Conclusion
In the foregoing, I have highlighted a number of problems in Bhaskar’s non-actual and abstract
interpretation of the concept of social structure. It seems to me that this problematic notion of social
structure has prevented critical realists from developing useful methods that can be employed in
bridging the divide between their highly abstract social theory and concrete social reality, which, it
can be argued, consists of interacting agents and concrete social systems. As Kemp and Holmwood
(2003) have argued, Bhaskar’s (and Andrew Sayer’s) descriptions of the methods that are needed in
investigating “open systems” already presuppose the existence of empirically validated knowledge
of social structures and, therefore, provide no clue as to how social scientific knowledge should be
empirically evaluated. For these reasons, a social scientist who grounds his/her studies in critical
realist methodology is at risk of unjustifiably promoting their chosen theories, such as Marx’s
theory of the capitalist mode of production, in constructing explanations of different kinds of social
phenomena (see also Hodgson 2004). These problems become even more pressing if it is noted that
Bhaskar (1979, 31-32) contends that his social ontology largely determines the methods that are
allowed to be used in empirical investigations.
I sought also to sketch an alternative interpretation of the concept of social structure which, in my
view, forms a better starting point for scientifically realist empirical social research than that of
17
Bhaskar. From this perspective, the concept of social structure refers to relations of social
interaction between agents who act as parts of concrete social systems or, in the case of more
complex social systems, to relations of interaction between their concrete social subsystems. I admit
that this view needs further specification and elaboration. For example, the relations between the
concrete social system concept and the concepts of institution, communication, social power,
agency, and bodily disposition should be clarified – a similar point also largely applies, however, to
Bhaskar’s concept of social structure. Despite these omissions, I believe that the previously outlined
perspective nevertheless successfully avoids the problems associated with the Bhaskarian concept
of social structure.

Notes
1
In this article, the term ‘agent’ refers to human individuals who are capable of participation in
intentional social action. I do not deal here with the issues concerning human agency any further
than is necessary for the understanding of Bhaskar’s notion of social structure.
2
Bhaskar (1979, 43-44) contends that social practices outside the realm of economic production
(e.g. science, politics, consumption, art) can also be interpreted as production processes in which
agents reproduce the enabling and constraining conditions for their future actions largely via the
unintended and acknowledged consequences of their intentional actions. Hence, Bhaskar writes that
“[t]he subject matter of sociology is […] precisely: relations of production [of various kinds]” (ibid.
56). In accordance with this Marxist view, Bhaskar seeks to interpret forms of social interaction
which differ from economic production also as work or production processes. In my view, this
approach can easily lead to the specific features of these non-economic forms of social interaction
being ignored. Bhaskar (ibid. 83-86) nevertheless rejects the thesis, occasionally credited to Marx
(e.g. Popper 1974), according to which the economic base of a society causally determines its
judicial, political and ideological superstructure (for criticism of this interpretation of Marx see
Sayer 1987). Bhaskar (1979, 61-62) also rejects the teleological view of history and the viability of
historical prophecies – both of these doctrines have also been credited to Marx (e.g. Popper 1974;
for criticism of this interpretation see Sayer 1987). In addition, Bhaskar (e.g. 1989, 1-10), alongside
some other critical realists (Collier 1989; 1994), openly advocates Marxist socialism. The
relationship between critical realism and Marxism is an interesting and complicated issue which is
not discussed here further (for discussions on this relationship see Hodgson 1999; Pleasants 1999,
117-119; Brown, Fleetwood & Roberts 2002).

18
3
This does not mean, however, that all relations and properties of concrete social systems have to
be directly perceivable. Some properties of these systems and the relations within them might well
lie beyond the reach of the perceptions made by the social scientists studying them. I nevertheless
find it highly problematic to claim that these systems are located totally beyond our perception. I do
not, therefore, wish to equate the concepts of ‘concrete’ and ‘perceivable’. Neither do I assume that
perceptions are completely independent of the concepts and theories possessed by the observer,
even though, in my view, the observer’s concepts and theories cannot be plausibly said to
completely determine his/her perceptions. I also reject the extensional semantics in which the
meanings of kind terms are exhausted by their extension. In other words, I contend that the
requirement for the concretization of social kind terms does not amount committing to the previous
views. Moreover, descriptions of concrete social systems and the relations within them might well
be idealized and utilize conceptual abstractions, but these kinds of descriptions are useful in social
scientific explanations only insofar as they at least approximately correspond to real social systems
and the relations within them.

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