Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

RESEARCH ARTICLE
Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic
Assessment
Pawan Kumar1

ABSTRACT
Keywords: Corruption, Accountability,
Citizen participation, Social audit.
The paper assesses the impact of anti-
Suggested Article Citation: Kumar, P. corruption measures adopted in India since
2019. “Anti-corruption Measures in independence and seeks to find out why,
India: A Democratic Assessment”. despite a robust anti-corruption framework,
Asian Journal of Public Affairs, 11(2). these measures have failed to tackle
corruption in the country. The paper argues
http://dx.doi.org/10.18003/ajpa.20191 that the extent and scale of corruption in the
country show that corruption is not an
ISSN 1793-5342 (print); ISSN 2382- individual problem, rather is systemic in
6134 (online), © The Authors 2019.
nature. With a comparative review of
Published by Lee Kuan Yew School of
different anti-corruption measures adopted in
Public Policy, National University of
Singapore different countries, the paper concludes that
because of its systemic nature, institutional
reforms, by itself, cannot be effective in fighting corruption in India. The paper also
emphasizes on drawing connections between corruption and democracy so that the
policy makers in India can acknowledge the link between growing levels of corruption
and the growing crisis of democracy. Therefore, it is argued that in order to tackle
corruption effectively it is important that corruption be understood in terms of
violation of democratic values, principles, and practices, which has also been
recognised by the global anti-corruption civil society organization Transparency
International. This calls for looking for measures that go beyond institutions and focus
on effective participation of the people, which has proved to be a more effective way
to ensure accountability and control corruption.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is one of the serious impediments for the realization of democratic

values as it damages the democratic process (Thompson 1993). It is also a major cause
of growing inequality and persistent poverty (Gupta et al 1998), reduced economic
growth (Mauro 1995; Burki and Perry 1998), and limited development (Kaufman et al
1999), as it affects the policy making process (Bai and Wei 2000) by harming
transparency and accountability in the system and causing unjustifiable
disempowerment of the common people (Warren 2004). Countries have, from time to
time, made attempts to get rid of this menace through different institutional measures.

1
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India.
(Email: pawankumardelhi@gmail.com)

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

However, even the latest Corruption Perception Index (CPI, 2018) of Transparency
International shows that none of the countries scores a perfect 1002 - implying that
corruption is seemingly an integral part of the practice of politics in all political systems,
albeit in different degrees.

The Global Corruption Barometer in its Asia Pacific report of 2017 came up
with the finding that corruption is making it impossible to attain sustainable and
equitable development of the region – in the sense that it has not only distorted the
democratic process but also promoted private interest, as the whole process of public
decision making is not focused on common good. Indeed, United Nations has
emphasized on reducing corruption and bribery in all its forms as part of the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be achieved by 2030. It recognized
that reducing corruption is important for achieving other SDGs – like ending poverty,
improving health care facilities, ensuring education for all, addressing climate change
and achieving gender equality – as corruption diverts public funds and creates
inefficiency in public delivery system. Transparency International reflecting on the
2018 CPI report, acknowledged that corruption is a major weakening force for
democracy since the continued inability of the countries to fight this menace is leading
to a crisis of democracy all over the world.

India, one of the largest democracies in the world, and a fast-growing

economy has been grappling with corruption at every stage of its development path.
Having experienced both petty and large scale corruption, a number of anti-corruption
measures have been taken from time to time. This paper performs a historical analysis
of the impact of various anti-corruption measures adopted in India, since
independence; and explores why these measures have not been able to achieve the
desired results. In order to understand this, the paper presents a comparative review
of the performance of different anti-corruption measures adopted in different parts of
the world so that the anti-corruption approach in India could be assessed on the basis
of international practices.

In doing so the paper also aims to explore whether the failure to eradicate
corruption is indicative of the failure of democracy in India, as corruption makes the
realisation of the goals of social justice impossible. On the basis of the findings of
various studies presented in this paper, it is argued that institutional reform by itself
cannot act as a panacea for tackling corruption. What is required is a bottom-up

2
That is, recording evidence/perception of no corruption in their countries. Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is the leading global indicator of public sector
corruption. The index provides annual assessment of relative degree of corruption by ranking countries
from all over the globe by aggregating the results from a number of different sources that provide
perceptions by business people and country experts about the level of corruption in the public sector.
The 2018 CPI is based on 13 surveys and expert assessments and measures of public sector corruption in
180 countries and territories, giving each a score from zero (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). The
detailed methodology can be accessed on Transparency International’s website
th
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018. (accessed 12 Jan. 2019)

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

approach, whereby the focus of policies should be on social mobilization. It is

emphasized that by strengthening the basis of democracy in terms of bringing
effective participation of the citizenry, corruption can be tackled more effectively in
the Indian context.

ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The CPI 2018 clearly points out that there has not been much improvement in
the worldwide corruption level, as most of the countries assessed have shown little or
no progress; and only 20 out of 180 countries have shown significant progress in the
past few years. This is despite the fact that most of the countries have well established
anti-corruption bodies (Corruption Perception Index 2018). As a result of this
widespread corruption, countries in the past have experimented with different
approaches and measures to tackle corruption, but the stories of success are few. This
section provides a brief review of anti-corruption measures adopted in different
countries to show why these measures were successful in some, while failed in other
countries. For this purpose the paper draws upon the anti-corruption measures used in
Hong Kong, Singapore and Philippines to demonstrate that similar approach may have
varied impacts in different contexts. While Hong Kong and Singapore show how
corruption can be tackled effectively through strong institutional and legal measures,
the case of Philippines shows that merely adopting a model may not be of much help –
Philippines adopted the ‘Hong Kong model’ to fight corruption, but that was not
successful. As an alternative to institutional approaches, the paper discuses some
other cases to show how effective participation of people can have a positive impact
on the corruption level. This is also indicative of a strong negative correlation between
democracy and corruption, in the sense that as a country would strengthen its
democratic features, the levels of corruption would go down. Thus, the purpose of this
section is to argue that setting up of anti-corruption institutions or copying a model
that was successful in a specific context cannot be a panacea., It is also important to
strengthen the democratic practices of a country so that the opportunities and
incentives of corruption can be minimised. It is emphasised that in a large and diverse
democracy like India, the role of people’s participation is crucial for tackling corruption.

The most prominent and effective anti-corruption measures were adopted in

Hong Kong and Singapore. The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of
Hong Kong was successful (in terms of the number of corruption cases reported after
the constitution of ICAC) in controlling corruption because of its independence in
functioning powers and sufficient financial resources (Manion 2004). They adopted a
three pronged strategy of enforcement, prevention, and education, thus striking at the
root of the problem. In Singapore, the anti-corruption reform process was successful
by strengthening the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) and by providing more
power to officers of Corruption Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (ibid.).

On the other hand, the case of Philippines demonstrates that merely coming
up with new institutions is not sufficient to tackle corruption. In 1986, a number of
laws and policies were enacted to tackle corruption. In 1987, constitutional bodies
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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

were created to maintain integrity and accountability in the system – like Ombudsman
(to protect graft and corruption) and Sandiganbayan (a special court for taking up the
cases of senior officials involved in corruption). However, in a study it was found that
the creation of these institutions had little or no impact on the status of corruption in
the Philippines, and the basic reason for the failure was weak enforcement (Millard et.
al 2007). This study was based on International IDEA (Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance) framework that is engaged in assessment of democracy all over
the world by taking the views of common people. The study concluded that the nature
of anti-corruption law in the Philippines was ‘dual’, in the sense that the higher rank
officials were rarely convicted or investigated, thus making the enforcement of the
laws almost impossible (ibid).

Reflecting on the impact of anti-corruption measures in developing countries,

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi argues that one of the major reasons for failure of anti-
corruption measures, in the developing countries, is their non-political nature, while
corruption has a systemic or political nature. In these countries, she argues, corruption
means ‘particularism’, where distribution of public goods happens on a non-
universalistic basis reflecting power distribution within the society. Thus, creating new
institutions in these societies would not prove to be effective (Pippidi 2006: 86-87). If
reform is brought about in one set of institutions, corruption would creep into another.
Hence, some theorists believe that bringing about changes in a piecemeal manner will
not work and what is required is a “big bang change” whereby the aim should be to
strike corruption at different levels simultaneously (Rothstein 2007).

Citing the example of Latin America, Susan Rose-Ackerman emphasises on

local citizen involvement for checking corruption (Ackerman 2004). In Latin America,
rural people were involved in the process of designing and monitoring of agricultural
development programs and in the government decision making process. In this way,
people were better informed about government policies and programs and how they
could hold public officials accountable. This helped in decreasing the level of
corruption (the assessment is made on the basis of data provided by World Bank and
Transparency International).

The study by Ritva Reinikka and Jacob Svenson reveals that there was
massive mis-utilization of funds in local primary schools in Uganda, and reforms
focussing on publicity and monitoring brought about positive results (Reinikka and
Svensson 2004). This study used a repeat expenditure tracking survey to study the
effects of improved access to public information as a tool to reduce diversion of funds
and corruption. In the mid-1990s, a public expenditure tracking survey in Uganda
revealed that schools received only 20 cents on average of every dollar allocated to
them by the central government. When the diversion of school funds by the local
officials was revealed, the central government started publishing newspaper accounts
of monthly transfers of these capitation grants to local governments (districts), which
reduced this mis-utilization of funds, as revealed by the survey later on in 2001. Thus,
in contrast to legal or institutional approach that focuses on top down approach to
tackle corruption, this study focused on users of public services to tackle the problem.
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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

The focus was, therefore, on empowering the people by providing them easy access to
information about the government programs meant to benefit them. “This empowers
citizens to demand certain standards, to monitor service quality, and to challenge
abuses by officials with whom they interact.” (ibid)

The positive effect of citizen involvement was also evident in one of the Indian
states of Karnataka. In a study it was found that decentralization reduced corruption
and improved the performance of government3 (Crook and Manor 2000). Though with
decentralization the number of officials increased, which also increased the ‘potential
bribe takers’, the State showed positive results because of greater transparency, a
vigilant press, an active two-party system, and effective voluntary organization (ibid:
12).

Looking at these varied approaches and strategies adopted in different

countries, and their mixed results, it is quite difficult to single out one single approach
or method that a particular country should adopt to tackle corruption. One important
conclusion that can be drawn from the above experiences is that merely setting up of
institutions is not enough to curb corruption. It has been proved that copying the
‘Hong Kong model’ in a large federal democracy or in countries where corruption is
endemic, may not give the desired results. Different studies have come up with
different reasons and explanations for the failure of anti-corruption measures, which
may be categorised within seven broad heads – political, economic, governance, legal,
organisational, performance of anti-corruption bodies, and relating to public
confidence (OECD 2008). Thus, any anti-corruption institution or measure is likely to
fail if it is functioning in an environment that: i) lacks genuine political will, ii) has
economic instability and endemic corruption, iii) is surrounded by inefficient
institutions and has general governance problem, iv) where rule of law is not properly
implemented, v) has inappropriate organisational structure not suitable in a particular
context, vi) where performance of anti-corruption bodies are assessed on a short term
basis, which is an inappropriate method of the assessment of anti-corruption bodies as
these assessments must be done on a long term basis, and vii) where there is lack of
people’s confidence in the institutions (ibid).

Delia Ferreira Rubio, Chair of Transparency International, has said that their
research clearly indicates of there being a link between democracy and corruption, in
the sense that democratic countries can fight corruption more effectively and have
lower levels of corruption as compared to non-democratic countries, or to countries
having weak democratic foundations. The CPI 2018 found that corruption undermines
democracy and fighting corruption, therefore, becomes crucial for having a healthy

3
This study was one of the many contributions to the World Bank’s 1999 Annual Review of
Development Effectiveness (ARDE) that looked at the state of development through the lens of
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) launched by World Bank in 1999. One of the basic
elements of CDF was its understanding that successful development requires partnership among
government, local communities, the private sector, civil society, and development agencies and that
policy reforms and institutional developments cannot be imposed on any context.

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

democracy. The data of CPI 2018 reveals that the average score of countries that are
fully democratic is 75, which is higher as compared to other political systems. That
means, they are relatively the less corrupt countries, and no country in this segment
has a score of less than 50. The report says that the ‘global crisis of democracy’ that is
emerging can be checked if following measures are taken at the earliest –
strengthening the system of checks and balances, proper implementation of anti-
corruption legislations, empowering citizens by improving political participation, and
effectively maintaining freedom of press (CPI 2018).

India, with a score of 40 in the CPI 2018, does not come under the “full
democracy” category, which testifies to the inverse relationship between corruption
and democracy. In their assessment of Indian democracy, Freedom House concluded
that though India has a robust electoral democracy, Indian politics and business is
entrenched with corruption, which has hampered its score on the democracy scale
(Freedom in the World 2018). These facts are clearly indicative of the growing crisis of
democracy in India which seems to be closely related to its performance in controlling
corruption.

The score of India in CPI shows that there has not been much improvement
in tackling corruption for the past few years, which also suggests that the anti-
corruption measures in the country have been largely ineffective. The Indian
experience of anti-corruption efforts fits with the argument coming out from the
review of global anti-corruption measures, viz. creating new anti-corruption
institutions or legal reforms may not be sufficient to tackle corruption. It is because
corruption is a systemic problem. It is important that policy making process in India
acknowledges Transparency International’s conclusions about the relationship
between the crisis of democracy and corruption. It is important that a reformed
understanding about the nature of corruption be developed by considering it not as an
‘individual’ but a ‘systemic’ problem. Then it can also focus on the fact that the
growing crisis of democracy is a result of the failure to control corruption. The
individual centric approach to tackle corruption is reflected in the different approaches
employed to tackle corruption in India, which has resulted in its minimum impact on
corruption level in the country. However, policies that have focused on social
mobilization aspect have shown better results. Before looking at different anti-
corruption measures taken in India, it is important to get an idea about the extent and
nature of corruption in the country which is well reflected by the number and scale of
scams that India has witnessed since independence. The big scams that have come to
light testifies the argument that corruption in India is not a result of the act of one or
few individuals, rather it is the result of the collusion between individuals from top to
bottom within the political system.

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

Box 1: Corruption Scams in India since 1947

The Jeep Scandal

The Jeep Scandal of 1948 was independent India’s first scam that involved the country’s first High
Commissioner to the UK, who bypassed protocol to sign a deal worth US $111,976 (80 lakhs Indian
Rupee, INR) with a foreign firm for the purchase of 200 army jeeps out of which only 155 reached
2
India . The case was, however, later closed, and he went on to become defence minister.
The Bofors Case
The Bofors scandal was a major political scandal during 1980s and 1990s which involved some of the
top politicians including the former Prime Minister of India. This scandal involved illegal kickbacks
paid in a US$1.4 billion deal between the Swedish arms manufacturer Bofors with the Government of
India for the sale of 410 field howitzer guns, and a supply contract almost twice that amount. It was
the biggest arms deal ever in Sweden, and money marked for development projects was diverted to
2
secure this contract at any cost .
The JMM Bribery Case
In 1995 the central government faced a no confidence motion and it was alleged that he bought the
support of some of the MPs of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), a regional political party, by paying
them a bribe of US $ 42,148 (INR 30 lakhs) each (Nariman 2005). Since under Article 105(2) of the
Constitution of India, a Member of Parliament cannot be made liable to any proceedings in any court
with respect to any vote given by him in Parliament, the Supreme Court dismissed all cases against
them.
The Fodder Scam
The fodder scam, that came to light in 1996, involved officials in the state animal husbandry
department of Bihar – withdrawing funds amounting to US $ 133,470,250 (INR 950 crore) from the
government treasury with fictitious bills of food, medicines etc. The investigation led to the
3
conviction of the then Chief Minister of Bihar .
The Mining Scam
This scam involved the former Chief Minister of Jharkhand who was accused of money laundering of
around US $ 561,980,000 (INR 4,000 crores) by taking bribes for illegal allotment of coal mining
4
contracts .
The 2G Spectrum Case
This scam was also called the telecommunication scam. The then telecom minister was accused of
allocating licences for 2G spectrum without following the prescribed rules. The Comptroller and
Auditor General (CAG) of India estimated the loss out of such illegal allocation to be around US
$ 24,727,120,000 (INR 1,76, 000 crores), thus turning out to be one of the biggest scams in the Indian
5
political history .
The Commonwealth Games Scam
The preparation of Commonwealth Games 2010 involved massive corruption with misuse of funds at
the hands of the chairman of a committee formed to organise the event. This scam involved a sum of
US $ 9,834,650,000 (INR 70,000 crores), which came to light after a report submitted by CAG and also
6
by the regular reports of the media highlighting the poor quality of the preparations .
_____________________________________
1
https://www.news18.com/news/india/a-brief-history-of-defence-scams-in-india; accessed on
January 20, 2019.
2
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/national-insecurity-bofors-agusta-westland-
defence-rafale-aircraft-5632780/ ; accessed on January 20, 2019
3
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/fodder-scam; accessed on January 20, 2019.
4
https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/madhu-koda-convicted-in-coal-scam; accessed on
January 20, 2019.
5
https://www.indiatoday.in/fyi/story/what-is-2g-scam-in-india-2g-scam-verdict; accessed on January
20, 2019.
6
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/miscellaneous/commonwealth-games-scam; accessed on
January 20, 2019.

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN INDIA

The Global Corruption Barometer in its Asia Pacific Report 2017 found that
around 69 per cent of people in India had paid bribe at least once to get their work
done by public officials, and out of this 73 per cent were poor people. This shows how
corruption is a common occurrence in the country and affects the poor the most
(Global Corruption Barometer 2017). The extent of corruption in India can also be
estimated by the scams that have been exposed in the past. Some of the major scams
are discussed below, which show that even the top-ranking public officials are not
immune from this disease (Box 1).

These are only a few cases to show the extent and pervasiveness of
corruption in India and its endemic nature. The huge amounts involved in these cases
clearly show how democratic procedures are frequently overlooked and state
resources are systematically misused for private gain. It can be argued that rule of
politics has undermined rule of law in independent India (Jain 2001: 109), and the all-
pervasive nature of corruption has led to the erosion of legitimacy of state institutions
(ibid).

The following section discusses various legal and institutional anti-corruption

measures adopted in India since independence and their impact on the status of
corruption in the country. The participatory approach, however, has proved to be
more effective in some parts of the country, which goes in line with Pippidi’s
understanding of corruption in developing countries, as discussed in Section 2 above.

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES

The history of anti-corruption legal discourse in India started with the

enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Criminal Law (Amendment)
Act, 1952 brought about some changes to corruption laws but it was only with the
amendments in 1964 that some significant changes could be seen. After more than
two decades came the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This Act tried to
incorporate the positives of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1952 and IPC (Indian Penal Code). Several significant developments
can be noted in this Act as compared to previous efforts, including a broader definition
of ‘Public Servant’ and introduction of a new concept of ‘public duty’. However,
despite an elaborate definition of “public servant”, the Act, instead of providing any
definition of corruption, defines it through different acts of “public servants”. Sections
7 to 15 of the Act provide the list of offences of bribery and other related offences and
their penalties. The definition provided in Section 2 does not explicitly mention MPs
(Members of Parliament) and MLAs (Members of Legislative Assembly), and hence it
leaves it open for discussion whether they can be included within the definition of
“public servant”.

The Second Administrative Reform Commission clearly spells out that such an
indirect definition of corrupt practices may not serve the purpose, as it is restrictive, in
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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

the sense that it does not cover a number of practices that are detrimental to public
interest but which may not be a violation of any criminal law like gross perversion of
the Constitution and democratic institutions (Fourth Report 2007, 61-62). The
Commission was thus of the opinion that these kinds of offences must be incorporated
in the Prevention of Corruption Act, and need to be firmly addressed to protect public
interest and the democratic system, because unless these offences are addressed we
cannot ensure the accountability of public servants.

Suitable amendments also need to be made in Article 105(2) of the

Constitution which provides immunity to the legislature. As recommended by the
National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), this Article
needs to be amended so that immunity enjoyed by the Members of the Parliament
(MP) do not extend to the corrupt acts, which may include accepting bribes or any
other valuables, and to speak and/or vote in the Parliament in a particular manner.

The Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005, has been one of the biggest and most
critical achievements of India in recent years in the fight against corruption. This Act
empowers citizens to request information from a public authority, which is then
required to furnish the requested information within thirty days. The Act also requires
that every public authority computerise their records so that there is wide
dissemination of public information and it can be easily accessed by all citizens. This
helps citizens to control public spending. Such legislations combined with active citizen
participation may thus provide much strength in the fight against corruption in India.

The nodal agencies dealing with corruption cases in India are Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC) and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). On the recommendation
of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption, popularly known as the Santhanam
Committee, CVC was set up in 1964. The CVC advises and guides the government
agencies in vigilance matters. It is the apex vigilance institution, considered to be free
of control from any executive authority. It exercises superintendence over the working
of the CBI, and also over the vigilance administration of various Ministries and other
organizations of the Union Government.

However, these agencies are charged with lack of autonomy and

ineffectiveness in high profile cases. Out of such criticisms, the demand for an
independent institution like the ‘Lok Pal’ emerged in the Indian political discourse
which was thought to go a long way in addressing political corruption. But before
getting into the debate on Lok Pal, it is important to discuss the working of another
constitutional body which has always played a crucial role in bringing to light various
malpractices in different government departments—the office of Comptroller and
Auditor General of India (CAG).

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG): The Supreme Auditing Authority

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) is the supreme auditing authority
in India. Of late, this body has effectively brought to light some serious violations in
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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

public spending of funds, which is important for ensuring accountability in government

functioning. The Parliament and the state legislatures mainly depend on the Indian
Audit Department for an account of how properly, efficiently and effectively the
budgeted amounts each year are spent for the intended purposes.

It is important to understand that the very purpose of CAG is to ensure that

funds are utilized properly and there is no wasteful or extravagant spending.
Corruption and political scandals have led to scarcity of funds for important policies
aimed at benefitting the common people. In this situation CAG has proved to be an
important instrument in ensuring accountability of the executives. In India, the
practice of allocating contracts on the basis of favouritism has been a common
practice (Amerjee 2012: 774). CAG’s intervention on many occasions has led to
exposure of such practices, thereby contributing to India’s ‘good governance goals’. In
the Coalgate and 2G Spectrum case, CAG’s report became the basis of the Supreme
Court’s judgment. The coal allocation scam, popularly known as Coalgate scam came
to light when CAG reported that the exchequer suffered a loss of US
$ 261,320,700,000 (INR 1.86 lakh crore) because of the government’s failure in
introducing competitive bidding in the allocation of coal mines between 2004 and
2009. CAG pointed out that though the government had the authority to go for
competitive bidding, it avoided to do so. It was because of CAG’s efforts that 14 coal
blocks were de-allocated, and many coal mines were given show-cause notices for
delaying the process of developing the coal blocks. In 2G Spectrum case too CAG’s
audit report played a crucial role. When CAG found that some ineligible companies
were given contracts of 2G Spectrum, the then telecom minister had to resign, as his
actions also led to undervaluing of the spectrum.

In the light of such instances of corruption that cause inefficiency in the

functioning of the government, and infliction of serious harm to the interests of people,
CAG has been one such body to which one can look up to. However, it has its own
limitations and challenges, which is evident from the fact that its reports and findings
are not much publicized. However, the experience of CAG’s functioning in the Indian
democracy shows that such audits do have an impact upon governance by ensuring
accountability, transparency, and responsiveness in the functioning of government,
which creates the ground for more such audits of Indian democracy.

The Debate on the Lok Pal

The Santhanam Committee in 1964 had recommended that constitution of a

permanent government body is important to deal with the problem of corruption. In
1966, the First Administrative Reforms Commission recommended the establishment
of a ‘Lok Pal’ bill at the central level and ‘Lok Ayuktas’ at the state level. The Lok Pal is
supposed to be a ‘watchdog’ over the integrity of Ministers and the Members of
Parliament, and it was intended to be similar to the institution of Ombudsman that
exists in the Scandinavian countries. A Lok Pal bill was introduced in the Parliament in
1968, and since then it was introduced several times but failed to be passed. However,
after a wide public protest under the leadership of Anna Hazare, an Indian social
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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

activist who spearheaded a number of social movements for rural development,

government transparency, and against corruption in the public sphere – the Lok Pal Bill
was passed by the Parliament and got the President’s assent on January 1, 2014 as the
Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013.

However, there is a need to examine whether the creation of a strong anti-

corruption agency can become an effective tool to fight corruption in India, in a
context where institutions to look after corruption cases are often charged with either
inefficiency or lack of autonomy or both. Various studies have come up with the
finding that a similar body, Lok Ayukta, constituted in some of the Indian states have
been ineffective in performing their task. Vinod Pavarala in a study of anti-corruption
efforts in the state of Andhra Pradesh, found that the Lok Ayukta constituted in the
state as the nodal body to fight corruption, suffered with “a high degree of
politicization, both instrumental and symbolic” (Pavarala 1996: 190). Though it could
initiate investigations against some ministers, they were only symbolic in nature.
Pavarala concluded that the effect of Lok Ayukta in controlling corruption in the state
of Andhra Pradesh was minimal (ibid: 188).

Therefore, any institutional design cannot work effectively and efficiently by

just bringing them into existence. It is important to understand that a successful fight
against corruption requires not just anti-corruption laws, but also political will
committed towards ending corruption in all its forms. Institutionalized or systemic
corruption cannot be effectively controlled through legal and policing measures alone.
The objectives of anti-corruption effort should be to develop an atmosphere of reform
that may be consolidated by law (Werner 1983: 151). Social audit has been one such
effort in the context of India that helped in changing the public attitude towards
corruption and made people believe that their participation could become an effective
check on such occurrences.

SOCIAL AUDIT AND CORRUPTION

Social audit is based on the idea that people’s participation can become an
effective tool to fight corruption. Such participation can be achieved when people are
aware about the nature and effects of corruption. Civil society groups in India have
played a prominent role in raising awareness among citizens about the evils of
corruption, which also helped in strengthening government-citizen relations.

One of the reasons of the success of the Independent Commission Against

Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong was that it focused on strengthening the ability of civil
society to address corruption. Through public education campaigns, it made efforts to
raise the consciousness of the people in Hong Kong. Apart from using innovative social
strategies, its focus was also to change the public attitude towards corruption. These
efforts comprised of press releases, public announcements, interviews, documentaries,
posters, leaflets, meetings and work with schools and universities to convey the ‘anti-
corruption message’ to the public.

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

In India, this kind of effort can be seen in the form of social audit, that works
on the principle that joint participation by civic community and government will
increase awareness among the people about their rights, and can help in reducing
corruption. “Social Audit is a tool with which government departments can plan,
manage and measure non-financial activities and monitor both internal and external
consequences of the department/organisation’s social and commercial operations. It is
an instrument of social accountability for an organisation. In other words, Social Audit
may be defined as an in-depth scrutiny and analysis of the working of any public utility
vis-à-vis its social relevance” (Kurian 2015). Social Audit Report published by Vision
Foundation explains social audit in the following words:
Social Audit is a process in which, details of the resource, both financial and
non-financial, used by public agencies for development initiatives are shared
with the people, often through a public platform. Social Audits allow people to
enforce accountability and transparency, providing the ultimate users an
opportunity to scrutinize development initiatives (Vision Foundation, 2005).

Social audit is a process through which the planning and implementation of a

scheme are monitored and evaluated by the people, working together with the
government. This helps in inducing accountability on those who implement the
programmes of the government. However, it is important to understand that in order
to enforce accountability some degree of hierarchy (or leadership) is required. Social
audit in India has not been able to ensure this, as the relationship between the
auditors (viz. people) and those who implement the programmes and policies (viz.
government officials) is weakly hierarchical, in the sense that the government officials
and other village leaders generally do not want to follow the directions from the
auditors and raise questions on the legitimacy of such audits (Shankar 2010). This
results in the non-fulfilment of the minimum criterion of imposing a standard on the
implementers, affecting the possibility of imposing sanctions against the corrupt
officials. These complexities highlight the conceptual and operational problems with
social audit in India.

The difficulties associated with social audit were revealed in a study

conducted on the Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. The study found
that 63 percent of the participant and non-participants in public meeting, and over half
the MGNREG4 (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee) participants
were absent from previous year’s public meeting in Rajasthan, and around 80 percent
of them said that they were not aware about the social audit. In Madhya Pradesh too,
the story was similar. It was found that only key persons in the village were aware
about social audit and attended the meetings (Shankar 2010: 11-12). The study
brought to light that even the minimum requirement of ensuring awareness among

4
MGNREG, initially NREG (National Rural Employment Guarantee), is a scheme run by the Government
of India to provide employment benefits to rural people. Those who register under this program get 100
days assured employment every financial year in the non-skilled work area.

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

people was often not being fulfilled, which was a major reason for the failure of such
an exercise.

Another drawback of the social audit in both the states of Madhya Pradesh
and Rajasthan was that the audit teams excluded NGOs and ignored the process of
social mobilization. “Those who participated in the meetings did not feel secure
enough to express their views freely since the officials conducting the meetings (eg.
Sarpanch5) were the ones who were also being audited” (ibid: 13). Also, “since the
auditors included government and elected officials who were also responsible for
implementing the NREG (National Rural Employment Guarantee, later renamed as
MGNREG), the process, particularly in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, was a self-
auditing exercise rather than an external one” (ibid: 14). Therefore, the assumption
that public audit ensures follow up actions from the officials proved to be incorrect.

The bureaucratic nature of the audit team, lack of awareness among the
people and minimum focus on social mobilization have been some of the main reasons
for the ineffectiveness of social audit in India. Thus, the practical problem with social
audit is that it is only concerned about the outputs of government policies and not
about the outcomes. In other words it is mainly concerned with the numbers that are
present on paper and not on the results, performance or actual achievements. For
example, in the audit of work allocated under MGNREG scheme (i.e. output), the
conclusions are drawn mainly from the government records, which may not reflect any
procedural fault in these allocations, ignoring the grass-root realities of whether these
schemes actually reach to the needy and benefit them (i.e. outcome). Though, social
audit is based on the principle that participation of people can ensure accountability
and transparency, it fails to suggest any ‘suitable mechanism’ to ensure such
participation. Thus, social audits in India have focused more on the audit part,
overlooking the social mobilization aspect (Shankar 2010: 24).

The Jan Sunwais (Public Hearings), conducted by the MKSS (Mazdoor Kisan
Shakti Sangathan or Association for the Empowerment of Labourers and Farmers)6 in
the state of Rajasthan show how the quality of decision making process can be
improved when the decision makers are aware that they can be held accountable for
their actions, and people stand as a community. In Jan Sunwais, all the records of the
development works in a particular area were collected and read out by the activists
and the people. People who testified against the documents were asked to record
their statements; and on the basis of the findings, police complaints were filed. In this
way these Jan Sunwais proved to be quite successful. Though it was very difficult to get
a villager to file an individual complain against any village leader, the Jan Sunwais

5
Sarpanch is an elected head of the village level constitutional body called Panchayat, a form of local
self-government in India. The duty of Sarpanch is to take care of the village infrastructure and civic
amenities.
6
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) is a people’s social movement and grass root organization. It
is one of the most influential civil rights movements in India. Its purpose is to strengthen participatory
democratic processes in India.

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

overcame this hurdle as the testimonials were collectively verified by the residents of
the village, and thus the onus was not on a single person. Another factor responsible
for its success was that these Jan Sunwais were attended by the powerful persons, like
retired judges, bureaucrats, ministers etc, making people believe that MKSS is a
powerful organization which can address their grievances effectively. These public
hearings led to the exposure of instances of corruption involving false muster rolls (a
complete list of allocations made under a particular scheme or a workers’ attendance
list.

In the case of MGNREG it reflects the attendance of the workers and provides
the complete list of the workers who got employment under this scheme), false bills
and vouchers, and false completion and utilisation certificates of projects under
different development works carried out in the village etc. These public hearings
forced the government in Rajasthan to introduce serious reforms, such as the creation
of a sabha (assembly) which had the power to conduct social audit of government
programmes, approve proposals for public works and certify proper execution of
works. The activists mobilized people in order to strengthen the weak hierarchical link
with the officials. However, these Jan Sunwais were not very successful in ensuring the
punishment of the corrupt. These could only act as an effective deterrent and that too
for a short period of time. Still, they had an impact on the policy making process, as its
efforts led to some important reforms in grass root governance. Therefore, for the
health of Indian democracy it is important that social audits become a common
practice and culture in the process of governance.

The assessment of different measures taken in India to address corruption,

reveal that the approach is actually ‘reactive’ instead of ‘proactive’. There are different
laws for corruption and provisions specifying legal punishments for different acts.
There are also institutions or bodies that are meant to deal with corruption cases.
These legal and institutional measures devised to tackle corruption in India focus
mainly on the punishment aspect. Whether it is Prevention of Corruption Act, or CVC
or the CBI, or Lok Pal and Lokayukta, all are based on more or less same individual-
centric understanding of corruption. Such kind of approach develops the feeling that
political corruption is accidental and can be tackled if those involved in corrupt acts are
removed from the office. Thus, the focus is more on punitive aspect making the
approach individual centric.

Persistence of corruption in India, which is reflected by the country’s low

ranking in CPI and related indices, despite various legal and institutional safeguards,
proves that corruption is not just an individual problem but is endemic and systemic in
nature. It is a reminder that anti-corruption policy and strategy must focus on
measures that go beyond creating institutions. It is important that the policy makers
take into account people’s views about the nature of political system and the way
politics and governance are actually practiced. The Worldwide Governance Indicators

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

(WGI)7 clearly show that governance performance, especially the control of corruption
in India, has always come out as “weak”8 (WGI 2018). This result indicates that the
institutional and legal reforms have not made much difference in the governance
performance of the country in dealing with corruption.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study discusses that the solution to the problem of corruption in India
requires a more systemic reform than what is already in place. It includes having a
broader definition of corruption; and developing a clear understanding that to tackle
corruption effectively it is important to have legal, political and social awareness about
its links with democracy. Corruption is a major hurdle in the path of economic and
social development, making democracy less efficient and useful in realising its
developmental goals at both the national and international level. In India, or in any
other democracy, corruption can be dealt with effectively only when the linkages
between corruption and democracy are acknowledged and corruption is considered an
important indicator of democracy. It is equally important that the working of the
present institutional arrangement is reviewed and those in ‘power’ are made more
accountable, so that discretionary self-motivated decisions could be minimized.
Procedures, laws, regulations that breed corruption need to be amended or eliminated.
Therefore, though the larger goal of such an exercise is to bring about policy changes,
the first step requires opening up a debate on larger scale and raising awareness about
various anti-corruption measures, their successes and failures, about the working of
Indian democracy and how it is intrinsically connected to corruption.

Democracy is about giving citizens the voice in policy making and politics. This
requires devising measures to empower citizens so that they are able to hold public
officials and leaders accountable in their actions concerning public service. Right to
Information and Social Audit have shown positive results because the focus has been
on ensuring accountability by empowering people (Fourth Report, Second
Administrative Reform Commission 2007). Since all these efforts have mainly come
from the civil society, an active engagement of civil society actors is crucial in bringing
about any positive change in the anti-corruption strategy in India. As seen in the past,
such efforts have shown to raise serious issues. Hearing the voice of the people would
strengthen the roots of democracy in the country, with an impact on the practice of
democracy and political will towards meaningful reform.

7
Governance related indices for around 200 countries, published annually since 1996.
8
The result has always been less than zero (the range is from -2.5 (indicating weak), to +2.5 (indicating
strong)

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Anti-corruption Measures in India: A Democratic Assessment Kumar, P.

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