EROS, EPITHUMIA, AND PHILIA IN PLATO

In Phronesis 13 (1968) 32-46, Drew A. Hyland argues that in at least some

passages of Plato's dialogues the use of the terms έρως, επιθυμία, and φιλία
indicates that these terms can be arranged in a hierarchy according to degree of
rationality: επιθυμία contains virtually no rationality, φιλία is the most rational of
the three, and έρως is intermediate. Hyland does not claim that the terms are never
used interchangeably; he admits that there are contexts in which distinctions among
the terms are irrelevant to the point being argued. He contends, however, that in cer-
tain important passages distinctions are relevant and are maintained consistently.
Also he suspects that this consistency extends beyond the passages he has chosen for
analysis.
I wish to take issue with Hyland's thesis. I do not agree with his reading of
several passages of the dialogues, and, more generally, I believe that his
methodology is misdirected. I shall discuss specific passages first, reserving com-
ments about methodology until afterwards. In brief, I shall argue that Hyland
presses too hard to find verbal consistency. Plato uses considerable variety in his ter-
minology for human appetency, a variety which advises the interpreter to rely first
of all upon context when considering the significance of the occurrence of this or
that term.
Hyland's first passage is Symposium 200a — 201b. Here, he says, one should
note a difference between έρως and επιθυμία. Socrates says of έρως that it επιθυμεί
τε καί έρά (200a 5-6).' Το επιθυμούν (an expression which Hyland claims is
equivalent to επιθυμία), however, is used in Socrates' next sentence as the subject of
the verb έπιθυμεΐν only, not of έραν (200 a9- bl). One sees, then, according to
Hyland, that love both desires and loves while desire only desires. Both love and
desire are self-predicative, as he puts it, but love is something more while nothing
more is said of desire. The passage suggests to Hyland that the term έρως may have
a broader meaning than the term επιθυμία.
Hyland's talk of self-predication here is an unnecessary complication. Does it
make any sense literally to say that love loves? Socrates uses language of this kind
because he is speaking of a personified έρως. When he says of έρως that it έρα he
does not mean literally to attribute an affection to an affection; he is describing an
affection by way of personification. The literal meaning is simply that one who is
possessed of έρως is said έραν.
Is Hyland correct, nevertheless, in identifying a difference between έρως and
επιθυμία? A crucial step in his argument is his reading of το επιθυμούν at 200a 9 as
equivalent to επιθυμία. (Σκόπει δη ... αντί του εικότος ει ανάγκη οϋτως, το
επιθυμούν έπιθυμεΐν ου ενδεές εστίν, ή μη έπιθυμεΐν, εάν μη ενδεές fj;) Hyland
cites Liddell and Scott's lexicon on έπιθυμέω in support of his reading and claims
that the sentence in question is "about επιθυμία, not "Ερως" (ρ. 35 n. 10). Liddell
and Scott, however, give a single citation for το επιθυμούν as equivalent to
επιθυμία: Thucydides 6.24, a passage which is not analogous.2 In the present
passage το επιθυμούν makes perfect sense as "that which desires." Socrates has just
asked whether έρως possesses or does not possess that which it επιθυμεί τε και έρα
("desires and loves": 200a 5-6). Agathon has responded that έρως very probably
does not possess it (a 7). Socrates now asks whether it is not necessary, rather than
probable, that το επιθυμούν έπιθυμεΐν ου ενδεές εστίν ("that which desires desires
Brought to you by | University of Arizona
10 Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM
what it lacks": a 8-9). When the affirmative answer is given, the inference is clearly
that έρως necessarily desires what it lacks; for, since έρως had been used as the sub-
ject of the verb επιθυμεί ("desires"), το επιθυμούν ("that which desires") applies to
έρως. A general statement about "that which desires" applies to the personified
έρως because he has been said to desire.
Taking το επιθυμούν as equivalent to επιθυμία, with Hyland, and translating
ανάγκη . . . το επιθυμούν έπιθυμεϊν as "it is necessary . . . that desire desires,"
eliminates a logical connection between έρως and the general statement about
desire, finds a distinction between the necessity (ανάγκη) with which desire lacks its
object and the probability (το εικός) with which έρως lacks its object, and suggests
that Socrates is personifying desire as well as έρως. Each of these features of the
reading is difficult to accept. Hyland offers no argument in support of his reading of
το επιθυμούν apart from the reference to Liddell and Scott. (Curiously enough,
later in his article he translates το επιθυμούν at Lysis 221d 3 as "that which desires"
or "the desiring" (p. 38; cf. p. 12 below).) The apparent cause of his implausible
reading is an effort to find a difference between έρως and επιθυμία.
Socrates' use of the verb βούλεσθαι at 200b-d is taken by Hyland to suggest
"that the desire for present possessions in the future somehow loses the passionate
force of a present desire (επιθυμία) so that the more intellectual βούλομαι is ap-
propriate" (p. 34). Socrates argues that when a person says that he desires
(έπιθυμεϊν) things which he already has, he means nothing else than that he wishes
(βούλεσθαι) to continue to possess these things in the future. Socrates then says that
this amounts to loving (έραν) what is not yet possessed, namely the secure posses-
sion of certain things in the future. Hyland infers that "the introduction of the
deliberation involved in βούλεσθαι lifts the status of the merely passionate επιθυμία
to the level of "Ερως" (ρ. 39).
Socrates says nothing about deliberation, however. The aim of the passage is to
resolve an apparent difficulty. If it is possible for a person to desire what he already
has, then it is not true in every case that desire is of that which is lacked. Socrates
must point out that when a person says that he desires something which we know
him already to possess, he is actually wishing for or loving something he does not
now have — the future possession of what he possesses in the present. The case in
point is thus shown not to constitute an exception to the general theory.
Hyland claims that Socrates' examples of things we wish (βούλεσθαι) to con-
tinue to possess in the future — strength, health, wealth — indicate that deliberation
is involved in this wishing and that therefore these things are not simply objects of
επιθυμία. He cites Republic II 357c, where the attainment of these things is said to
involve painful activities (excercise, medical treatment, money-making) which we
would never engage in for their own sake. Hyland infers that some deliberation is re-
quired before one seeks strength, health, and wealth (p. 39).
Actually the passage in the Republic suggests that we deliberate about the pain-
ful means, not the welcome ends. We choose to engage in excercise, medical treat-
ment, and money-making only because they bring us strength, health, and wealth.3
In addition, at Republic IX 580d, ff. the desirous part of the soul (το έπιθυμητικόν)
is called money-loving (φιλοχρήματον), since money is especially useful in securing
the satisfaction of that part's έπιθυμίαι. This passage implies that what is originally
a means to the satisfaction of desire can, through association, itself become an ob-
ject of desire. One cannot argue, then, that deliberation is necessarily a feature
which distinguishes wishing (βούλεσθαι) forBrought the continued possession
to you by | University of a thing
of Arizona
Authenticated
11 Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM
from desiring (έπιθυμεΐν) a thing in the present.
Hyland believes that Republic IV 437 b-c, especially the series of words διψήν
καΐ πενιήν και δλως τάς επιθυμίας, και αύ το έθέλειν και αο βούλεσθαι ("thirst
and hunger and the desires generally, and again willing and wishing"), indicates a
distinction between desiring and wishing (p. 44). Και αύ, he says, emphasizes the
distinction made by the separate mention of το βούλεσθαι and αϊ έπιθυμίαι. The
context of the passage, however, is a discussion in which Socrates is arguing for a
distinction between desirous and rational parts in the soul. He first mentions various
kinds of inclination which lead us toward something. Then he calls attention to our
capacity to reject something, grouping together the expressions "being unwilling,"
"not wishing," and "not desiring" (το άβουλεΐν και μη έθέλειν μηδ' έπιθυμεΐν: IV
437c 8). Eventually he will argue that when a man refuses to indulge an inclination
of the former type the refusal must result from the deliberations of reason (IV
439b-d). Socrates is not so much concerned to distinguish between types of positive
inclinations, or between types of refusal, as he is to distinguish between positive in-
clinations and our ability to refuse them. 4 In fact, at IV 439b 1, in Hyland's own
words, "... Socrates uses βούλεται as virtually synonomous with επιθυμεί.'" Here,
Hyland claims, "... the subtle distinction between them is not important" (p. 44 n.
38).
In sum, Hyland strains too hard for a clear distinction between the meaning of
βούλεσθαι and έπιθυμεΐν in the passages he discusses. Βούλεσθαι may well have in
general a more intellectual connotation, and may suggest deliberation; but precise,
consistently maintained distinctions between the two terms cannot be demonstrated
in the relevant passages. Plato's use of the terms is not technical.
Hyland believes that evidence for a hierarchical ordering of επιθυμία, έρως,
and φιλία is to be found at Lysis 221b 7-8. On pp. 36-37 he argues as follows:
... [Socrates] says at one point, "Is it possible for one desir-
ing and loving not to befriend (φιλεΐν) that which he desires
and loves?" (Οίον τε ούν εστίν επιθυμούντα και έρώντα
τούτου ου επιθυμεί και έρςί μη φιλεΐν;) To which Lysis
replies, "It seems to me not." This sentence is most instruc-
tive, for it directly mentions and relates the three terms in
question. It suggests that it is impossible for one desiring and
loving (επιθυμούντα καΐ έρώντα) not to befriend (μη φιλεΐν)
its object. That is, if one both desires and loves (επιθυμεί και
έρφ, he must also befriend (φιλεΐ) as well. Now, we would
hardly want to say that if one simply desired, he would also
befriend. Επιθυμία, as the lower passion, would hardly
deserve such a close association with the more rational φιλία.
Yet on the following page of his article Hyland quotes Lysis 22Id 3-4: ... ή
επιθυμία της φιλίας αίτια, και το επιθυμούν φίλον εστίν τούτω ου επιθυμεί και
τότε δταν έπιθυμή, ... He translates: "Desire is the cause of friendship and that
which desires is a friend to that which it desires, at the time when it desires."
Hyland's own citation of the text refutes his previous argument, unless we are to
suppose that Hyland reads φίλον εστίν in a passive sense ("is a friend to" in the
sense of "is beloved of") in distinction from the active φιλεΐν of 221b 8. Hyland
gives no indication of wanting to make such a distinction, and the context supports
taking φίλον in an active sense ("is a friend to" in the sense of "has friendly love
Brought to you by | University of Arizona
12 Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM
for"). It is true enough that, as Hyland says, Plato is not identifying επιθυμία with
φιλία; but neither is he separating them sufficiently to justify Hyland's description
of them as "two extremes" (p. 38).
Turning to the Symposium once more, Hyland claims that a comparison of the
passage which describes the ascent to beauty itself 21 Oa — 212a) with the immediate-
ly preceding passage (207a — 210a) reveals a distinction between επιθυμία and
έρως. The ascent to beauty itself begins with έρως for the beauty of the body and
with generation of beautiful speeches (λόγοι καλοί) in the soul of the beloved. This
is "already a fairly advanced stage of development." The "absolutely lowest level,"
according to Hyland, would be "pure επιθυμία," an indiscriminate desire for the
possession of a body, that is, for sexual intercourse. An ascent which begins at the
lowest level is found, Hyland says, at 207a — 210a, where the beginning is the
επιθυμία, characteristic even of beasts, for bodily procreation. The ascent at 210a —
212a begins at a more advanced level, at a level of discrimination of beauty, because
it is an ascent of έρως, not of επιθυμία; and έρως is characterized by a
discriminating or reasoning capacity which έπιθυία lacks (pp. 40-41).
Unfortunately the text does not support Hyland's distinction between έρως and
επιθυμία. The discussion of generation at 207a — 210a immediately follows a claim
by Diotima that έρως is not simply of the beautiful but of begetting in the beautiful.
We desire (έπιθυμεΐν) immortality along with good, for έρως is of possessing the
good forever. Hence έρως is of immortality as well as of good (206e 2 — 207a 4).
Diotima then indicates how various types of generation are an effort to achieve im-
mortality. The subject matter under discussion is referred to as τα ερωτικά at 207a
5-6, 207c 3, 207c 7, and 209e 5. The term έρως is used in general statements about
love of immortality at 207c 8 and 208b 6. At 207a 6-7 comes the question, in connec-
tion with the desire of animals to beget offspring and care for them, Τί οΐει . . . αί-
τιον είναι τούτου του έρωτος και της επιθυμίας; ("What do you think . . . is the
cause of this love and desire?") Animals are said to be "erotically" (ερωτικώς)
disposed when they desire (έπιθυμεΐν) to beget (207a 8 — b l , b 7 — c l ) . Men who
are teeming in body and who beget children in women are called ερωτικοί (208e 3).
A man who is teeming in soul with moderation and justice is said to desire
(έπιθυμεΐν) to beget in that which is beautiful (209b 2). Clearly, Diotima does not
establish a terminological distinction between a reasoning, discriminating έρως and
an unreasoning, undiscriminating επιθυμία.
Several times in his article Hyland equates the term επιθυμία with what he calls
"the lowest and most unruly faculty of the soul" (p. 43). He claims that επιθυμία is
one of the parts of the soul in the Republic (p. 44). Referring to the charioteer-and-
team image of the Phaedrus he says, "The black, ugly, unmanageable horse, it is
usually agreed, represents desire or επιθυμία" (ρ. 43; cf. pp. 36-37 and 39-40). An
identification of the term επιθυμία with one of the parts of the soul is, however,
misleading. The term επιθυμία in the Republic has both a generic and a specific
sense. In its specific sense επιθυμία is used for an intense, unreflective craving such
as the desire for food or sex. One of the parts of the soul is called the desirous part
(το έπιθυμητικόν ) because it is characterized by cravings of this sort. In its generic
sense επιθυμία is used with reference to the other two parts of the soul as well, the
rational part (το λογιστικόν) and the spirited part (το θυμοειδές).6 The term
επιθυμία, then, cannot be simply identified with έπιθυμητικόν. One type of
επιθυμία characterizes το έπιθυμητικόν. Thus only one type of επιθυμία is
Brought to you by | University of Arizona
13 Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM
represented by the dark horse of the Phaedrus. Conflicts between το λογιστικόν
and το έπιθυμητικόν should not, without qualification, be called conflicts between
reason and desire. To λογιστικόν has desires of its own, desires for wisdom. When
the charioteer checks the dark horse, one type of desire is being restrained so that
another may be satisfied. Plato is somewhat imprecise in terming one of the parts of
the soul "the desirous part," while maintaining at the same time that all three parts
manifest desire.
When Plato classifies three types of φιλία at Laws VIII 836e — 837d, he
distinguishes between επιθυμία directed towards the body and επιθυμία directed
towards the soul, implying that each type of φιλία involves its own type of επιθυμία.
(Interestingly, the classification of types of φιλία is also a classification of types of
Ερως, for έρως is said to be a name given to friendly relationships which become
particularly intense (σφοδρός).) Again it is clear that the term επιθυμία is not
restricted to the "lowest" type of desire.
The term φιλία, according to Hyland, refers to a type of love which is more ra-
tional than έρως. On Symposium 210a — 212b he comments:
. . . in the famous "ascent passage" we learn that as the
degree of reason in "Ερως increases, whereby one turns his
attention to increasingly higher objects of love, "Ερως
becomes transformed, in its highest manifestation, into
φιλία, indeed the φιλία for σοφία, or philosophy. Φιλία,
then, is "Ερως modified by an increased degree of rationality.
At the risk of being capricious we could say that the highest
pursuit of man is not "erosophy" but "philosophy" because
by the time man reaches his highest condition, the erotic drive
which started him on his way has been modified, but not sub-
limated, by an increased rationality, so that it becomes a
φιλία for wisdom, (pp. 37-38; cf. p. 42)
In the Republic, however, the spirited part of the soul (το θυμοειδές) is called
φιλόνικον and φιλότιμον, and the desirous part (το έπιθυμτικόν) is called
φιλοχρήματον and φιλοκερδές, just as the rational part (το λογιστικόν) is called
φιλομαθές and φιλόσοφον (IX 580d — 581b). Particularly noteworthy is the fact
that terms for the desirous part of the soul are formed from φιλεΐν as well as from
έπιθυμεΐν. I have already mentioned that έραν in the Republic is used of both the ra-
tional and the desirous parts of the soul (n. 6). One must be very cautious in making
generalizations about the terms έρως, επιθυμία, and φιλία in Plato's work. Ter-
minological distinctions suggested by one passage of one dialogue may be freely
violated elsewhere.
Another of Hyland's arguments aimed at showing a distinction between έρως
and επιθυμία centers on the coupling of έπιθυμεΐν and έραν at Symposium 200a
5-6: Πότερον έχω αυτό ου επιθυμεί τε και έρα7 είτα επιθυμεί τε και έπα7 fi. ουκ
έχω; ("Possessing that thing which he [Love] desires and loves when he desires and
loves, or not possessing it?") Hyland comments:
The only way this could be construed as implying that "Ερως
and επιθυμία are identical would be to interpret the presence
of the conjunction here as a rather sophomoric redundancy
on Plato's part. If "Ερως = επιθυμία, then a conjunction of
the two is entirely unnecessary. A much more plausible ex-
planation would be that by ascribing bothtoloving
Brought you by and desiring
| University of Arizona
14 Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM
 as predicates of "Ερως, having just ascribed desiring in-
dividually [to "Ερως at 200a 3], Plato is indicating to us that
there is at least some difference between them. What the dif-
ference is has as yet not even been hinted at. We see here only
the suggestion that there is a difference. 7
Though Hyland may be correct in claiming that έράν is not precisely equivalent
to έπιθυμεΐν in the passage in question, he strains for a distinction which the conven-
tions of Greek style do not require. The conjunction of two synonomous or nearly
synonomo s terms is typically not a sophomoric redundancy in Greek, but a
deliberate redundancy created for rhetorical effect. One must bear in mind the
Greek penchant for hendiadys. Greek coordinates two verbs or substantives in many
instances in which English would favor the dependence of one on the other, or
would favor the use of a qualifying adverb or adjective in place, respectively, of the
second verb or substantive.' In a case in which two coordinate terms are close in
meaning, the coordination can have the effect of broadening or intensifying the no-
tion expressed in the first term.' Plato's conjunction of έπιθυμεΐν and έραν does
not, then, necessarily imply a technical distinction between the terms. The conven-
tions of Greek style protect Plato from the charge of "sophomoric redundancy"
even if the terms are taken to be virtually synonomous in the passage in question. 10
If, on the other hand, the two terms are taken to be different in meaning, though
partially overlapping, in this passage, then Plato, in his conjunction of the terms, is
specifying the full range of meaning which is the sum of the meaning of the one term
added to the meaning of the other, without necessarily calling attention to points of
difference. The simple fact of conjunction does not indicate whether Plato has in
mind in this context a distinction between the terms." A claim that he does have a
distinction in mind would require evidence from elsewhere in the text. I have already
expressed my reasons for rejecting Hyland's arguments that certain passages of his
selection provide the required evidence. Plato's intention in conjoining έπιθυμεΐν
and έραν in the passage in question is very probably to indicate that he is referring to
all types of desiring or loving, that is, that he is interested in the generic features of
appetency, not specific differences among types of appetency.12
The final piece of evidence which Hyland submits in support of his thesis is
Charmides 167e 1-9:
Could there be any desire (επιθυμία) which is not the desire of
any pleasure, but of itself and of all other desires? Certainly
not. Or can you imagine a wish (βούλησις) which wishes
(βούλεται) for no good, but only for itself and all other
wishes? I should answer no. Or would you say that there is a
love (έρως) which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and
of other loves? I should not. [Jowett's translation]
According to Hyland, in this passage we have another instance of the "remarkable
consistency" with which Plato uses the terms επιθυμία, βούλησις, and έρως (ρ. 45).
Yet if one examines the use of these terms elsewhere, one readily finds instances in
which the distinctions drawn in this passage are not maintained. For example,
βούλεσθαι and έπιθυμεΐν are freely alternated at Lysis 207d — 209b, and at
Republic IX 586c certain pleasures are said to beget έρωτες of themselves.
It is instructive to consider the variety of meanings which the term έρως has in
but one dialogue, the Republic. It is sometimes used as a general term for intense
Brought to you by | University of Arizona
15 Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM
desire.11 At one point the verb έραν is used specifically for the sexual desire when
this desire is listed as one of many belonging to the desirous part of the soul.' 4 In
Book III there is a reference to ορθός έρως, the love for the orderly and the
beautiful which is felt by lovers who are σώφρονες and μουσικοί, who have ex-
perience of beauty, and who do not indulge in sexual pleasure. 15 In Book VI έρως is
used for the desire to know what really is, the desire which drives the true lover of
learning to couple with what really is (μίξεσθαι τω δντι δντως) and in so doing to
beget intelligence (νους) and truth." In Book IX, as I have already mentioned, Plato
speaks of certain pleasures as begetting έρωτες of themselves. In Book IX έρως is
also the name for a special sort of madness belonging to the desirous part of the
soul, a madness which drives the tyrannical man to satisfy his desires in a lawless,
frenzied fashion, completely without restraint." Finally, in Book X Plato uses the
term έρως in a comparison of the love of poetry with sexual love. 18 In sum, I do not
believe that one finds in the Republic a "remarkable consistency" in the use of the
term έρως.
In conclusion, Plato's use of the terms επιθυμία, έρως, and φιλία is not nearly
so consistent as Hyland believes, even if we concentrate on the few passages of
Hyland's choosing. Each term, along with its corresponding verbal form, has a con-
siderable range of possible meanings, and Plato freely exploits this range. One must
be wary, when interpreting Plato, of habits of mind engendered by the study of
systematic philosophy; otherwise one consciously or unconsciously anticipates find-
ing a fairly high degree of terminological consistency. Plato is fond of approaching a
subject from first one perspective and then another, often changing his terminology
as his perspective changes. His many discussions of human appetites and affections
amply illustrate this feature of his writing. One finds certain themes recurring again
and again — for example, the primacy of desire in human motivation, the variety of
types of desire, the need for intelligent direction of the fulfillment of desire — but
one does not find these themes expressed in a rigid vocabulary." Plato's literary ar-
tistry, in giving expression to his energetic and exploratory thinking, produces a
richly variegated language. The interpreter should therefore not make the mistake of
straining, as Hyland does, to discover verbal consistency. Sensitive to Plato's
literary talents, he should rely heavily upon context in assessing the meaning of par-
ticular terms. 20 Plato's method of composition, admittedly frustrating for those who
prefer systematic treatises, reflects his desire to engender in his readers living insights
rather than to communicate dogmata fixed in a technical terminology. 2 '

W. Joseph Cummins,
University of Cincinnati.

Notes
1. The line numbers refer to Burnet's edition of the dialogues.
2. ΟΙ δε [sc. 'Αθηναίοι] το μεν επιθυμούν του πλου ουκ έξηρέθησαν. .. "They [sc. the Athenians],
however, did not lose their desire for the voyage ..."
3. Cf. Corgias 467c 5-e 1.

Brought to you by | University of Arizona

16 Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM
4. IV 437b 1-5. On Plato's occasional grouping of terms similar in meaning, see pp. - below.
5. Compare IV 439a 9 — b 1 with lV437d 2-9.
6. I shall not argue this contention at length because it has been very effectively defended by H.W.B.
Joseph in his essay, "Plato's Republic: The Nature of the Soul," which appears in his Essays in
Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Oxford, 1935), pp. 41-81. See pp. 50-51 where Joseph cites the
following passages of the Republic in support of his views: V 475b 2, 475b 4 — c 4; 485d 6 — e l ;
IX 580d 3 — 581a 1, 587a 13 - b 4. Cf. R.L. Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic of Plato (Lon-
don, 1925), pp. 158-59; and R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical
Commentary (London 1964), pp. 118-19.
Joseph also calls attention to the variety of conative terms used of the action of one or more
of the parts of the soul. Έραν, he points out, is used of both το λογιστικόν and το έπιθυμητικόν.
I quote one section of his long note on pp. 51-52:
. . . note that . . . the action of what prevents us gratifying an appetite is
described by the words άπωθεΐν and άπελαύνειν (IV 437c 9). But the reader
will find in the following passages divers 'conative' terms used of the action
of the rational or the spirited; and should observe that some are used alter-
natively to έπιθυμεΐν of the action of the appetitive; the greatest variety is
found in reference to the rational, φιλεΐν, στέργειν are used generically in V
474c 9 seq., in respect of each είδος [of the soul]; and in the compounds,
φιλόσοφος φιλότιμος φιλοκερδής, this generic use is manifest: όρμασθαι,
of Ιΐιεθυμοειδές IX 581a 10, and by implication generally of all three, 582c 5:
έραν, έρως, εραστής of the rational, VI 485b 1 (μαθήματος γε αεί έρώσιν),
VI 490b 2, VI 501d 2 (αληθείας έραστάς είναι τους φιλοσόφους), but also
έραν, like ερωτικός, in its specific sense, of the appetitive, IV 439d 6 et al.:
όρέγεσθαι, of the rational, VI 485d 4, IX 572a 2: also of the rational,
άμιλλασθαι VI 490a 9, ώδίς VI 490b 7, διώκειν VI 505d 11 (cf. IX 586d 7),
τέταται IX 581b 6, έφίεσθαι Χ 61 le 2, προθυμεΐσθαι Χ 613a 8.
7. P. 35. Hyland argues in much the same fashion on p. 44 regarding a set of conjoined terms at
Republic IV 437b 7-8 (see p. 3 above). Cf. also Hyland's pp. 36-38.
8. See J.D. Denniston's Greek Prose Style (Oxford, 1952), pp. 62-63.
9. G. R nnet offers many examples from Demosthenes in his Etude sur le style de Demosthene dans
les discours politiques (Paris, 1951), pp. 71-73. H.W. Smyth lists "amplification by synonomous
doublets" as a variety of pleonasm: Greek Grammar (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), sec. 3042 i. James
Riddell, in his Digest of Platonic Idioms (originally published as Appendix B of The Apology of
Plato, Oxford, 1867; reprinted separately by A.M. Hakkert of Amsterdam, 1967), mentions
several examples of rhetorical hendiadys in Plato (sec. 324). To his list may be added Phaedo 70a
3: διαφθείρηταί τε και άπολλύηται ("may be destroyed and perish"). Additionally, Riddell's
discussion of "binary structure" includes many illustrations of other types of fullness or redun-
dancy in Plato's writing (sees. 204-230 passim).
10. See Symposium 207a 7, quoted above on p. 10, where, in reference to the sexual desire of animals,
the terms έρως and επιθυμία are conjoined without apparent distinction. Cf. Laws III 688b 3,
where the same terms are conjoined in reference to desire which attends correct intellectual judg-
ment. Note also Republic IX, 578a 11 and Philebus 35a 3-4.
11. This sort of thing is not unknown in English. Hyland writes on p. 43 that the dark horse of the
Phaedrus "resists and disobeys" the charioteer. "Resistance" and "disobedience" would not as a
rule be considered synonyms, but in this context some rather fine distinctions would be required in
order to specify cases of resistance which do not constitute disobedience, and vice versa. Hyland
very probably has no such distinctions in mind when he conjoins the two verbs. He employs a cer-
tain redundancy which neither I, nor apparently he, would fault as "sophomoric."
12. Cf. pp. 6-7 above.
13. Ill 396d 2, IX 578a 11. Cf. VII 521b 4-5, VIII 555e 1.
14. IV 439d 6. Cf. II 368a 3; III 395e 2; V 458d 5, 468c 3, 474d 4-5, 474e 3, 475a 3.
15. Ill 403a 7-8, a 11, b 2, b 6.Cf. 402d 6, d 8-9; 403c 7.
16. VI 490b 2-7, 499c 2. Cf. 485b 1, b 8, c 7; 501d 2.
17. IX 572e 5; 573a 2, b 7, c 9, d 4, e 6; 574 8, e 2; 575 a 1; 579b 5; 587a 13.
18. X 607e 5, e 7; 608a 5.

Brought to you by | University of Arizona

17 Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM
19. D.M. Levin has provided an instructive illustration of the difficulties attendant upon the attempt
to specify exactly what is meant by φιλία and by έρως in but one dialogue, the Lysis. See his
"Some Observations Concerning Plato's Lysis, " Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, ed. John
P. Anton and George L. Kustas (Albany, N.Y., 1971), pp. 236-58.
20. A fine example of judicious interpretation is Michael J. O'Brien's The Socralic Paradoxes and the
Greek Mind (Chapel Hill, 1967). For O'Brien's own remarks on interpretive methodology see,
inter alia, his discussion on pp. 6-7, including n. 3 on p. 7.
21. See Phaedrus 275c 5 — 279b 3. I should like to express my appreciation to Professor Bernard C.
Fenik of the University of Cincinnati for criticisms and suggestions which improved this paper.
The preparation of this paper was facilitated by a grant, here gratefully acknowledged, from the
Old Dominion University Research Foundation.

Brought to you by | University of Arizona

18 Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/15 4:49 PM