Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508

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Critical Perspectives on Accounting

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cpa

CPA licensure without examination: Legitimation and resistance

Richard S. Sathe ∗
University of St. Thomas, Mail MCH 316, 2115 Summit Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55105-1096, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: A 2001 law converted Minnesota’s licensed public accountants (LPAs) to certified public
Received 30 December 2008 accountants (CPAs). LPAs were individuals licensed to practice public accounting, including
Received in revised form
attestation, without having passed the CPA examination. Following the conversion, a fierce
12 November 2009
resistance arose from a small segment of Minnesota’s CPA community. This paper used
Accepted 8 February 2010
institutional theory to analyze the legitimation strategies and actions of the institutional
agents as well as the resistance.
Keywords:
The history and institutionalization of the CPA examination suggested that its cogni-
Accountant
Profession tive legitimacy was a significant factor in the resistance. The analysis of the resistance
Examination reflected back upon the pragmatic approach taken by the proponents. The case demon-
Licensure strated the importance of controlling communication resources in building legitimacy.
Legitimation Finally, it considered how the diversity of interests in a segmented professional association
Resistance shaped legitimation and resistance.
Professional association © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

All licensed public accountants (LPA) who are actively licensed by the state board on December 31, 2002, shall be
issued a certified public accountant certificate.1 LPAs are those accountants who were eligible for licensure on July 1,
1979, under the law in effect on that date and who were issued a license as a licensed public accountant by the board
at that time.2 (Accountancy Act of 2001, §326A.06)
The passage of this provision of Minnesota accountancy law, the conversion to certified public accountant (CPA) licensure
of practitioners who had not passed the CPA examination, produced a fierce backlash from a small segment of Minnesota’s
accounting profession. This resistance illuminated the fully institutionalized nature of the CPA examination as well as the
legitimation strategies and actions of the institutional agents, strategies and actions that had been relatively understated
during the legislative process. This paper documents and analyzes these strategies and actions, with the objective of better
understanding the social processes leading to them. It also analyzes the resistance and the reasons for its narrow base. The
questions that guided the research were: (1) Why would a jurisdiction grant CPA licenses to practitioners who had not passed
the CPA examination? (2) Why was the resistance so fierce when LPAs’ long experience arguably made them competent?

∗ Tel.: +1 651 962 5115; fax: +1 651 962 5093.

E-mail address: rssathe@stthomas.edu.
1
Despite different meanings in the regulatory literature (e.g., Kleiner, 2006), the Accountancy Act of 2001 equates license and certificate. Thus, the term
certificate here means license.
2
Minnesota’s LPAs were licensed to practice public accounting, including attestation, without having passed the CPA examination. The term “public
accountant” is more common across jurisdictions and I use it in this paper to refer to such practitioners in general. The term “licensed public accountant” or
“LPA” refers specifically to those so licensed in Minnesota. Minnesota’s LPA licensure was “closed”; only those licensed in 1979 would ever be so licensed.

1045-2354/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2010.02.005
 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508 497

The institutionalization of the CPA examination followed Millerson’s (1964) three-stage paradigm: (1) no examination,
(2) examination for new entrants with allowance for experienced candidates, and (3) examination for all. Examination
began inconsistently in the mid-1800s. As the new professions in the UK and US balanced professionalization with fewer
admissions because of examination, they occasionally waived examination for experienced candidates, a tactic that proved
divisive. Those admitted by waiver were “incompetents”, “a growing evil”, and in reference to one group: “mercifully 38 of
them died” (Anderson et al., 2005, p. 37).
In 1917, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA3 ) introduced a uniform CPA examination. All
extant jurisdictions4 adopted it by 1952. It was called “a decisive step in the development of the accounting profession in
America” (Bruschi and Ashworth, 1967, p. 82) and some said it placed accounting ahead of all other professions (AAA, 1973;
Rimerman and Solomon, 1991). The CPA examination has survived and evolved into its present-day function: “One of the
world’s leading licensing examinations, the CPA Examination serves to protect the public interest by helping to ensure that
only qualified individuals become licensed as Certified Public Accountants” (AICPA/NASBA, 2010).
Exactly what the CPA examination certifies has been the subject of a long-running debate. Some argued that it certifies
competence to practice on one’s own – as a principal – in a medium community (AAA, 1962; Ferrara, 1971). Others argued
that it only certifies minimum competence to enter the profession—as an associate, not as a principal (Boyd, 1945; Carey,
1970; Heckman, 1933; Trueblood, 1963). The former view attributes more importance to the examination while the latter
implies that a practitioner needs experience, serving as a reminder that experience has long played an important role in
the profession. Prior to examination, preparation had been through apprenticeship. When the profession initially adopted
examination, experience (but not higher education) was a prerequisite, a pattern that would result in the continued omission
of education requirements (Boyd, 1944). As the CPA examination became institutionalized, jurisdictional differences on edu-
cation and experience made examination the only common requirement for the CPA title. Education ultimately supplanted
experience as an examination prerequisite, but only recently.5
Regulation of the US practice of public accounting began in the late 1800s when certain practitioners began to seek profes-
sionalization through certification—restriction of the use of the CPA title to certificate holders. Those not seeking certification
nevertheless had established practices and enjoyed all practice rights, including attestation. Those pursuing professionaliza-
tion ultimately sought licensure—restriction of practice to CPAs. Early accountancy laws were “permissive”, while restricting
the use of the CPA title to certificate holders they did not restrict practice. Such restriction violated the US constitution by
infringing upon the right of contract in matters that bore no relationship to the public welfare and denying to non-CPA
practitioners the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry (State v. Riedell, 1924). Increased absentee stock ownership
and events such as the 1929 stock market crash convinced jurisdictions of the profession’s relationship to the public welfare.
Most jurisdictions ultimately created a public accountant licensure class in order to avoid the constitutional issues regarding
non-CPAs with existing practices, and then restricted attestation – the practice dimension with third party public interest
ramifications – to licensed CPAs and public accountants. As a result, US public accountancy developed two branches: CPAs
and public accountants. As of 2005, 35 jurisdictions still had a public accountant licensure class (AICPA/NASBA, 2005).
Minnesota’s first accountancy law (passed in 1909) required experience and examination for certification but was per-
missive. Minnesota adopted the uniform CPA examination in 1919 (MNCPA, 2004). The law remained relatively unchanged
until the 1971 Act6 added education requirements. The 1979 Act created the LPA class and restricted attestation to CPA and
LPA licensees. The Board of Accountancy (“the Board”) subsequently enacted rules requiring LPAs to conform to the same
disciplinary system, code of conduct, and continuing education requirements as CPAs.
With the 2000 Act, Minnesota adopted the 150-hour requirement, Section 5 of the Uniform Accountancy Act (UAA), and
deferred the remainder. Forty-seven jurisdictions had preceded Minnesota with the 150-hour requirement (AICPA, 2007) and
interested parties wished to bring Minnesota up to date. Late in the legislative process, the Minnesota Association of Public
Accountants (MAPA) and Minnesota’s 2-year colleges lobbied for a continuing class of regulated, non-CPA practitioner, to
accommodate graduates who would be ineligible for CPA licensure without additional education. The legislature amended
the 2000 Act, despite the UAA recommendation against additional classes (AICPA/NASBA, 2002). The amendment was,
according to Minnesota Society of Certified Public Accountants (MNCPA) officials, a necessary concession to pass the 150-hour
requirement.
The Accountancy Act of 2001 adopted the remainder of the UAA.7 It converted the LPAs to CPAs and then restricted
attestation to CPAs. It also designated the new class legislated in 2000 as Registered Accounting Practitioners (RAPs) and
restricted compilation pursuant to professional standards to CPAs and RAPs, providing MAPA and the 2-year colleges their

3
In 1917, the organization was called the American Institute of Accountants.
4
US accounting licensure is regulated by the 50 states. Five additional jurisdictions are the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the District
of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
5
The Virgin Islands jurisdiction remains an exception. There a candidate can sit for the CPA examination with a high school diploma plus 6 years public
accounting experience (Virgin Islands, 2010).
6
I have cited Minnesota’s accountancy laws only by year in the text to simplify presentation. While the Accountancy Act of 2001 is listed in the references
by that title, each prior law is listed as referenced by the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes: General Laws of Minnesota (1909), Laws of Minnesota
(1971, 1979), and Minnesota Session Laws (2000).
7
The UAA, third edition (AICPA/NASBA, 2002) provided the legislative intent. The 2000 and 2001 Acts adopted most UAA provisions. References to
Minnesota’s adoption recognize the fact that Minnesota adopted the UAA with modifications.
498 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508

sought-after regulatory protection. The Board subsequently enacted rules requiring RAPs to have an associate’s degree,
1 year of experience, and an examination (not the CPA examination)—requirements beyond typical regulatory registration.
I have organized the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 establishes the theoretical background. Section 3
describes the method. Section 4 provides the details of the case study—the passage of the conversion and the subsequent
debate. Section 5 discusses the conversion and debate through the framework provided by the literature. Section 6 provides
concluding comments.

2. Theoretical foundations

This paper draws mainly upon institutional theory to analyze the conversion. It also draws upon the theories of the
professions literature. First, a subsection addresses regulation of the US accounting profession.

2.1. Regulation and the public interest

Regulation of US occupations generally takes three forms (Kleiner, 2006). Registration typically requires little more than
filing with a government agency. Certification restricts the use of titles to certificate holders and may require education,
experience, examination, etc. Licensure restricts practice to licensees, typically with qualifications similar to certification.
Practitioners seeking regulation typically invoke the public interest (Young, 1986). The large practice segment of the
market for accounting services, characterized by large CPA firms vying for attestation and other business of large, publicly
traded companies, had provided the critical mass of third party public interest for jurisdictions to restrict attestation. Since
market and regulatory forces now require auditors in this segment to be CPAs, restrictive laws do not differentiate prac-
titioners (Young, 1986). In the small practice segment, Young found that non-CPA licensees performed attestation where
permitted, but a greater portion of fee revenue was typically earned from non-attest services. This segment is a milieu of
CPAs, public accountants, regulated practitioners, and unregulated practitioners in which the presence of non-CPAs affects
small CPA practices (Walker, 1991; Walker and Shackleton, 1998).
While it had taken the broad third party public interest implications of large practices to generate restriction, small
practice attestation also affects the public interest, although narrower in scope. Regulation of the professional–client private
contracting relationship for non-attestation services also affects the public interest, vis-à-vis protection from incompetence,
in the same manner as the regulation of medical practice. However, Young (1986) argued that regulation of these relation-
ships plays a lesser role in smaller communities where word-of-mouth and other informal channels provide signals. On the
other hand, the ability of consumers of accounting services to distinguish among performance or regulation levels has been
questioned (Carey, 1969, 1970; Crawford, 2002; Montagna, 1974).

2.2. Theories of the professions

Wilmott’s (1986) framework of the theories of the professions argued that each contributes to understanding professions.
Functionalism characterizes professions as homogenous communities who undertake highly skilled tasks integral to the
smooth operation of society. The accounting profession portrays itself, and professionals often see themselves, from this
point of view. Regulation protects the public from incompetence.
Interactionism views professions as interest groups striving to legitimize claims to professional recognition. Instead
of pointing to skills, this approach views professional work as the maintenance of an identity that preserves professional
recognition. It views professions as heterogeneous collectivities and illuminates their negotiated meaning and segmentation.
The critical approach sees professions as interest groups seeking social closure over a portion of the skilled labor market.
Closure might be achieved through exclusion or inclusion, through institutional closure – the merging of associations, or
functional closure – the restriction of practice (Walker and Shackleton, 1998). Regulation protects the professionals’ interests.
Professions tend use functionalist arguments about protecting the public in promoting changes they deem favorable
or defending against unfavorable changes. Critics tend to characterize such arguments as attempts to expand or defend
closure—and self-interested instead of in the public interest (Lee, 1995; Walker, 1991).

2.3. Institutions

Institutions are defined here as enduring sets of rules which enable and constrain human action—including laws, regula-
tory structures and practices, governmental agencies, interest groups, professions, and associations (Scott, 1987). This paper
analyzes the LPA conversion through a framework informed by Lawrence’s (1999) idea of membership strategy, Suchman’s
(1995) work on legitimacy, and Oliver’s (1991) work on resistance.
Professions are constituted through strategic practices of defining membership and meaning in collectivities, which link
to issues of legitimacy (Lawrence, 1999). Membership status accrues social capital and the rules that define who belongs
and who is “structurally equivalent” are often contested both from within and without (Lawrence, 1999; Richardson, 1987).
Professions maintain their exclusive memberships through practices that include examination.
When new ideas are proposed, professions engage in a process of institutional change. For new ideas to become insti-
tutionalized, deviations from prevailing conventions must be theorized (specified and justified) as a first step to gaining
 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508 499

Fig. 1. Responses to institutional demands.

Table 1
Degrees of characteristics related to resistance.

Characteristic Degree associated with resistance

Legitimacy: necessity to maintain actor’s social fitness Low

Efficiency: necessity to maintain actor’s economic fitness Low
Multiplicity: number of institutional agents making demands High
Dependence: actor’s dependence on institutional agent making demands Low
Consistency: compatibility between demands and actor’s goals Low
Constraint: degree to which actor must conform to demands High
Coercion: legal sanction associated with demands Low
Diffusion: degree to which actors voluntarily adopt demands Low
Uncertainty: degree to which future outcomes of demands are unpredictable Low
Interconnectedness: interconnectedness of institutional agents making demands Low

legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2002). Three forms of legitimacy, each successively more elusive, are: (1) pragmatic, based
on audience self-interest; (2) moral, based on normative approval; and (3) cognitive, based on comprehensibility and
taken-for-grantedness (Suchman, 1995). Full institutionalization occurs when ideas attain cognitive legitimacy. Once fully
institutionalized, ideas can survive across generations, uncritically accepted as definitive (Greenwood et al., 2002).
Associations endeavor to make professions coherent internally, as well as to individual members, by enabling the forma-
tion of shared meanings. They also help members bracket out events that would disrupt their coherent narratives (Gendron
and Suddaby, 2004). Associations’ legitimacy and control of institutional communications position them to manage institu-
tional change (Lawrence, 1999). They may legitimate a change by hosting a discourse to debate and endorse it (Greenwood
et al., 2002) or they may seek only passive acquiescence to a change, in which case, little legitimation work is undertaken
(Suchman, 1995). In a segmented profession like accounting (Richardson, 1987), legitimacy building, and managing it once
gained, is more difficult (Suchman, 1995).
Gaining legitimacy depends on communication and political language—language useful to legitimating decisions (Pfeffer,
1981). Communication strategies for gaining and managing legitimacy are manifold, and include minimization (Greenwood
et al., 2002) and normalizing accounts—explaining disruptions in a manner that preserves the organization’s worldview
(Suchman, 1995). Omission of legitimating accounts makes an organization vulnerable to claims of negligence or irrationality
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). An organization may depart from norms and yet retain legitimacy because the departure is
considered unique or because it draws no public disapproval (Suchman, 1995).
Oliver (1991) developed a typology of responses to institutional demands: acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy, and manip-
ulate. Etherington and Richardson (1994) ordered Oliver’s responses on a continuum from active/negative to active/positive
with a passive/neutral midpoint (Fig. 1). While acquiescence is the typical response to regulation, if agents believe that they
can mobilize others to help modify or overturn it, they are more likely to actively resist (Shapiro and Matson, 2008).
Oliver (1991) hypothesized relationships between 10 characteristics and the likelihood of an actor’s resistance to insti-
tutional demands. Table 1 presents Oliver’s characteristics and the degree (low or high) of each characteristic she associated
with resistance. Etherington and Richardson (1994) defined resistance as an active (positive or negative) response to insti-
tutional demands, including Oliver’s defy and manipulate responses. Oliver hypothesized both defy and manipulate to have
the same degrees for all 10 characteristics, thus only one column is presented in Table 1.
The literature provides a framework through which to examine the LPA conversion. It suggests that the CPA examination,
through its long use and decisive role in the professionalization of accounting, was fully institutionalized and cognitively
legitimate as a defining element in professional membership. This taken-for-granted status and Oliver’s (1991) characteristics
suggest that the conversion would generate resistance. Given resistance, control of the legitimation discourse would prove
especially important.

3. Method

The case study method is appropriate when time and a particular structure bound the inquiry (Yin, 2003). The conversion
was a time-specific episode that occurred in one jurisdiction. To explicate its details required a focus at the jurisdictional
level. Despite this focus, a case study can illuminate more general themes (Holm, 1995). In addition, to the extent that the
issues reflect on the professional association, the case study method is required to understand fully the intraorganizational
dynamics (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Minnesota’s long-established accounting practice (Previts and Merino, 1998),
500 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508

clear criteria and tough regulations, early position in professional licensure development, and rank near the middle of states
for the number of occupations regulated and the percentage of the workforce licensed (Kleiner, 2006), make it a fitting locus.
Detailed studies of public accountants have focused on large practice settings (e.g., Anderson-Gough et al., 1998; Grey,
1998; Montagna, 1974). Yet, the voluntary membership AICPA represents over 33,000 single-owner CPA firms, and small
firms represent over 97% of the 47,000 total practice units represented by AICPA members (Metzler, 2007). The importance
of examining professional dynamics in time-specific, local contexts (Carnegie and Edwards, 2001; Walker and Shackleton,
1998) suggests the need to study small practice settings.
The study data were mainly publications and publicly available documents supplemented by interviews. The documen-
tary data from the Board, the state agency that governs the profession in Minnesota, included newsletters, agendas, minutes,
and archives. I examined The Footnote, the monthly publication of MNCPA, the voluntary membership professional associa-
tion that promotes the interests of CPAs in the state. I also examined MAPA’s newsletter. Documents led to individuals who
I interviewed in order to gain deeper insights, and interviewees provided additional documents. The three leaders of the
grass-roots opposition to the conversion provided voluminous documentary records of their correspondence with MNCPA,
the Board, government officials, legislators, and other CPAs. Other records included legislative committee minutes and audio
tape recordings,8 and the transcript of a rules hearing that I had attended.
I conducted three interview sessions that included six individuals: the principal author of the 2001 Act; MNCPA’s President
and Legislative Issues Committee Chair (interviewed jointly and referred to as “MNCPA officials”); and the three opposition
leaders (interviewed jointly). The interviews were semistructured and the interviewees tended to answer expansively. I
asked probing questions when answers were not clear or to the point. The interviews were audio-taped and I provided
transcripts to interviewees and requested that they verify their accuracy and make corrections.

4. The case study

The principal author drafted the 2001 Act on the Board’s behalf. The Board favored conversion and the provision was
included in the bill as introduced (Minnesota House of Representatives, 2001). Two Senate committees and two House
committees heard the bill. The legislation passed without discussion of the conversion and the governor signed it into law
on May 17, 2001. MAPA supported the 2001 Act, and favored conversion, but since there was no opposition during the
legislative process, did not need to advocate publicly. While MNCPA did not favor the conversion, it favored the 2001 Act
as a whole and chose not to oppose the provision. Because of its common interest with the Board and MAPA in supporting
the 2001 Act, and its choice not to oppose the conversion, I have classified MNCPA as a proponent in order to have a simple
proponent/opponent dichotomy for discussion.
Since no 2001 Act provisions would go into effect before January 1, 2003, the Board did not commence rule-making
until April 2002 (Minnesota State Board of Accountancy, 2002a) and would not publish a draft of the rules until October
2002. MNCPA published its first notification of the conversion in the June/July 2002 issue of The Footnote and a companion
Legislative Update. Since few CPAs had been aware of the conversion, it was this notification that ignited the opposition.
The opposition campaign included correspondence with legislators, the Board, and MNCPA. It questioned the genesis of the
conversion and the roles of the Board and MNCPA, and requested action to rescind the conversion. An opponent was allowed
5 minutes to address the Board at a regular meeting (Minnesota State Board of Accountancy, Agenda, December 6, 2002).
The campaign also included letters to Minnesota’s Attorney General, requesting (unsuccessfully) an injunction to stop the
conversion until the legislature could pass technical correction legislation. Finally, it included a petition drive as well as
informal communications with other CPAs.
The opposition articulated several arguments, taking a principles-based approach. First, by not having passed the CPA
examination, LPAs were incompetent. Second, consumers presume CPAs have passed the examination; converting LPAs
would deceive the public. Third, LPA licensure had worked for over 20 years and the UAA provided for its continuation
(AICPA/NASBA, 2002). Fourth, the LPA class was small and it would cease to exist through attrition. Fifth, the UAA stresses
uniformity, but other jurisdictions would not reciprocally license converted LPAs. All Minnesota CPAs seeking recipro-
cal licensure would have to provide evidence of passing the CPA examination since there would now exist unexamined
Minnesota CPAs. Finally, conversion was unfair to those who had passed the examination through hard work.
This opposition shed light on the conversion and required the proponents to respond. The proponents took more of a
risk-based approach. First, LPAs were competent through experience since they had performed the same tasks as CPAs,
including attestation, since their licensure over 20 years earlier. In addition, this experience had occurred under the Board’s
jurisdiction; LPAs were subject to the same rules as CPAs. Second, abolishing the LPA title would eliminate the confusion
of having two classes of accountants who performed the same work, and therefore was in the public interest. Third, there
were about 12,000 CPAs, but there remained only about 300 actively licensed LPAs who could apply for conversion. The
latter, once converted, would soon fade away through attrition anyway. Fourth, the Minnesota legislature had essentially
waived examination with the 1979 Act when it granted LPAs the same practice rights as CPAs. Requiring the entry-level

8
Legislative committees audio tape record meetings and keep abbreviated minutes. I examined all four committee meeting minutes. I listened to the
audio tapes for the House committee meetings. One Senate committee tape was blank and one was missing from the Minnesota Legislative Reference
Library, not unusual circumstances according to the reference librarian.
 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508 501

examination after over 20 years of experience was of questionable value in protecting the public. Finally, other jurisdictions
had made such a conversion.
One such jurisdiction was Ohio, where a debate had occurred prior to its 1993 conversion. Two years in advance, the
Ohio Society of Certified Public Accountants (OSCPA) notified its members through The Ohio CPA Newsletter and held forums
on the conversion. The Newsletter noted that the forums ended with straw votes in which a majority favored conversion.
Proponents had argued that conversion would eliminate confusion and that the converted public accountants were few,
and soon would fade away through attrition anyway. Opponents had argued loss of professional advantage for CPAs and
concerns that clients might question all CPAs’ work. The Newsletter had expressed disappointment that only 1% of OSCPA
members attended the forums and concern that OSCPA members may have believed the association did not act in their best
interests; it had also recognized the “emotional” nature of the issue (OSCPA, 1991, p. 2).
Minnesota’s debate began after MNCPA’s June/July 2002 notification in The Footnote and Legislative Update, and continued
into the formal rule-making period that commenced with the Board’s publication of the proposed rules on October 28, 2002
(Minnesota State Board of Accountancy, 2002b). The rule-making process culminated in a hearing on December 10, 2002
before an administrative law judge whose ruling could include no relief for the opposition since the conversion had been
legislated. On January 1, 2003, Minnesota issued CPA certificates to 344 LPAs.

5. Discussion

This section analyzes the arguments on each side of the debate, which were parallel in many respects, through the
framework provided by the literature. It focuses on the parties’ strategies and actions, as well as the language used, by
whom and how, and to what effect (Greenwood et al., 2002).

5.1. Expediency

LPAs were a small portion of the total pool of licensed accountants and managing the separate class required Board effort.
In addition, RAPs temporarily created a third regulatory class. In his interview, the principal author noted:
So, now we would have RAPs, we’d have LPAs and we’d have CPAs. . . . There was a recognition that LPAs are the same
as CPAs . . . so, why go to all the effort in drafting laws and rules to spell out LPAs every place? . . . It was really just
kind of a waste of time to do that.
No demographic data is available, but since LPA licensure had required no higher education and 1 year of public account-
ing experience, some LPAs licensed in 1979 were likely in their twenties and would have been under age 50 at the conversion.
Given no upper age limit for licensure, the LPA class could continue for years. A judgmental random sample of 34 (approxi-
mately 10%) of the 344 LPAs converted on January 1, 2003 showed 70.5% licensed for 2010, 8 years following the conversion
(Minnesota Board of Accountancy, 2010).
Both sides had argued that the LPAs would soon fade away through attrition, but that does not seem to have occurred.
The Board’s position, however, benefitted regardless of the rate of attrition, or whether it occurred at all. Had the converted
LPAs disappeared quickly, the Board could have pointed to their insignificance. The fact that their numbers appear to be
continuing supports the Board’s expediency argument. The conversion was functional closure through inclusion (Walker
and Shackleton, 1998). Its expediency made it a matter of practical activity to which institutions must attend, and thus
pragmatically legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Moreover, while the conversion was a departure from norms, the fact
that the disapproval was narrowly focused and from within (i.e., from CPAs and not from the public) cost the Board and
MNCPA little in terms of their own legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).

5.2. The two sides of the public interest coin

Both sides invoked the public interest. Opponents argued that the public was deceived: LPAs were incompetent since
they had not passed the CPA examination. Proponents argued that the de facto waiver of the examination in the 1979 Act
made the issue of LPAs’ competence moot for certification in 2003 (State of Minnesota, 2002). Experience and continuing
education ensure continued competence and protect the public interest. LPAs would have over 20 years of experience and,
to convert, they would have to be in compliance with continuing education rules.
Credentials are meaningful in the public interest when they signal differentiation (Young, 1986). Prior to the 2000 Act,
Minnesota’s small practice segment included CPAs, LPAs, and unregulated accountants. Opponents believed that the CPA
title unequivocally meant having passed the CPA examination – a social fact – and signaled competence. To proponents,
the conversion would solve the confusion over the CPA and LPA titles, thus it was in the public interest. While no surveys
assessed confusion specific to Minnesota’s titles, anecdotal information attested to it. Many CPAs were uninformed regarding
LPAs, not knowing whether or not they were examined or that Minnesota permitted them to attest. The public would be
less informed (Crawford, 2002; Montagna, 1974).
The 2001 Act changed the composition of the small practice segment to include CPAs, RAPs, and unregulated accountants.
RAP – registered accounting practitioner – is not as linguistically close to CPA as is LPA, and since RAPs could not attest, the
new credentials would appear to provide clearer differentiation. Yet, others had argued previously, “It would take a close
502 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508

study of the law on the part of an interested observer to determine just how an ‘accounting practitioner’ differs from a CPA”
(Journal of Accountancy, 1969, p. 37).
What post-conversion certification itself would signal was also debatable. The converted LPA certificate would read:
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 326A.06, paragraph (a), be it known that (name of individual) having met the
requirements of the aforementioned statute is hereby granted this certificate as a Certified Public Accountant with all
the privileges and duties granted and required under Minnesota Statutes. (MNCPA, 2002a)
Proponents argued that it would contrast with the standard CPA certificate:
Be it known that (name of individual) having passed all examinations and complied with all other requirements
prescribed by statute and the State Board of Accountancy for regulation of the practice of the profession of Pub-
lic Accounting, is admitted to practice as a Certified Public Accountant, is registered as such by said State Board of
Accountancy and empowered to assume such title, by and under the authority of the State of Minnesota. (MNCPA,
2002a, emphasis added)
While strictly different, only consumers who actually would examine their accountants’ certificates, knowing that (1)
some CPAs had not passed the examination, and (2) the standard certificate referred to examination, would be able to
determine that their CPAs had not passed the examination. One opponent claimed that the idea that a consumer would ask
to examine an accountant’s certificate and then know the difference was “hare-brained”.
In addition, the Board’s “Find a CPA” directory does not distinguish between CPAs and converted LPAs (Minnesota Board
of Accountancy, 2010) and no party has made any efforts to educate the public on the difference. The Board’s position that
the old titles had really signaled nothing, since LPAs had the same practice rights as CPAs, was clear from its approach to
provide little or no post-conversion differentiation.

5.3. The legitimacy of the CPA examination

While the public may take for granted that a CPA has passed the CPA examination, it has even greater normative embed-
dedness for CPAs: it is a crucial element in professional identity and membership (Greenwood et al., 2002). The examination’s
cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) had led CPAs to a sense of security over their professional status. While security may
blind individuals to inconsistencies, insecurity may lead to questioning such inconsistencies (Gendron and Suddaby, 2004).
The LPA conversion created insecurity by disrupting the narrative of CPAs for whom examination was important to their
professional identity. “It’s personal. It’s the perception to the public”, said one opponent during the interview. Another
opponent wrote a legislator that rescinding the conversion was “for the sake of the integrity of the profession”.
The opponents believed that the converted LPAs were not structurally equivalent (Lawrence, 1999) to CPAs, making
the conversion morally illegitimate, and they expressed a sense of injustice. They believed the LPAs were “given a free
ride, an absolute gift”. Petition request cover sheets bore the headlines: “FREE CPA CERTIFICATES. NO EXAM”! The request
read, “Think of the blood, sweat, and tears when you were studying and taking the CPA exam”. One CPA wrote to MNCPA’s
Government Relations Director that the converted LPAs “simply didn’t earn it”. In their correspondence, opposition leaders
followed their signatures with “a real CPA”, coincidentally similar to the terms “real member” and “real accountant” that
Frederick Whinney and others had used over 120 years ago in debates about examination waiver in the UK (Anderson et al.,
2005, pp. 41, 49).
The CPA examination’s meaning in tension with experience proved fraught with inconsistencies. The Board had ques-
tioned the value of the “entry level” CPA examination for practitioners with such long experience, a view consistent with
that of the examination only assuring competence to enter the profession. In an electronic mail exchange, one opponent
inadvertently appeared to agree with the proponents’ questioning of the value of the CPA examination after so many years
of practice: “I wouldn’t want to take the exam again either. It would be a good way to eliminate 90% of us”. His corre-
spondent agreed: “Doesn’t experience count for something”? Nevertheless, while proponents cited long public accounting
experience as evidence of competence, the UAA actually lowered the experience required for licensure (AICPA/NASBA,
2002). Experience had been integral at the profession’s inception and had remained important, but the CPA examination
had become fully institutionalized. While experience could substitute for education, its substitution for examination had
not been contemplated.

5.4. The legitimating role of the association

At the end of the day, MNCPA had successfully lobbied for the UAA, and touted it as bringing Minnesota’s accountancy
law into the 21st century (MNCPA, 2002e). MNCPA’s role was interesting on two fronts that proved to be tightly interrelated.
The first was MNCPA’s lack of opposition to a provision contrary to its members’ interests. The second was the manner in
which it managed the discourse.
To some CPAs, MNCPA’s position on the conversion was a “sell out”, given its mission to promote the interests of CPAs.
Opponents to Ohio’s conversion and the AICPA’s global credential had made the same argument (OSCPA, 1991; Shafer
and Gendron, 2005). Some CPAs believed that MNCPA’s position was the result of a quid pro quo for MAPA’s support of the
150-hour provision in the 2000 Act. When asked in the interview if this was the case, MNCPA officials replied, unequivocally,
 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508 503

that it was not. In his interview, the principal author added, “It wasn’t traded for anything except for the efficiency of clarifying
for the public . . . between LPAs and CPAs because the law says they can do exactly the same thing”. MNCPA did not oppose
the measure because it concluded that the conversion was of inadequate significance. As one MNCPA official stated, “The
more important aspects of the bill . . . were being able to move across state borders, global practices. . . . So, there were many
larger discussions than . . . the LPA issue”. While no statistics existed, MNCPA officials believed that LPAs were performing
few (if any) audits, and were unlikely to change their practices, resulting in little or no effect on the third party public interest.
MNCPA’s position and the opposition’s narrow base appear to have been the result of membership segmentation
(Richardson, 1987) on employment, practice size, and possibly community size. Since only a minority (43%) of MNCPA
members were employed in public accounting (MNCPA, 2007), the conversion may not have been significant to the associ-
ation.
The conversion’s effects would be isolated to small practices. “I compete with LPAs and have always been able to hold
myself above them, but not anymore”, wrote one opponent. On the other hand, a national firm partner commented that the
conversion was completely “off the radar”. Market and regulatory conditions for large firms made them unlikely to either
compete against (Young, 1986) or employ LPAs. Large firm professionals tend to be employees (not principals) who may view
certification as a credential to facilitate a career move rather than a sine qua non of professional identity (Anderson-Gough
et al., 1998; Kosmala and Herrbach, 2006). Smaller practice professionals are more likely to be principals, making issues of
professional identity more salient. The three opposition leaders were principals in separate small practices. As one MNCPA
official succinctly stated it, “It is a small practitioner issue—that’s true”.
While one opponent wrote to a colleague, “If I was living in the ‘big city’ this would not be a big issue”, and one MNCPA
official said in the interview, “It doesn’t even affect the metropolitan area”, community size appears salient, but its role in
segmentation is not clear. Large practices tend to be located in large cities, so large practice interests overlap with large city
practitioner interests. Small practices are located in both large and small communities. While the three opposition leaders
practiced in smaller cities (which included no national firm offices), small practice CPAs located in Minnesota’s metropolitan
areas also opposed the conversion.
The signaling role of credentials and other informal channels in smaller communities suggested by Young (1986) was
not clear in this case study. The opponents argued that credentials play a clear role and that the conversion negatively
affected their identities as professionals in their communities. One opponent testified at the rules hearing that, “In the
smaller communities especially, we are very aware of who the LPAs are” (State of Minnesota, 2002, p. 42). In the interview,
he referred to the former LPA “down the street” gaining CPA status as “a slap in the face”. On the other hand, when prompted
by this comment in the interview, one MNCPA official countered with the argument that the difference between CPA and
LPA was unclear to the public: “Does his community even really understand the distinction”?
Even given divergent segment interests, why more CPAs failed to oppose the conversion as a matter of professional dis-
tinction may have been the result of ignorance and apathy. Professionals tend to “sit back and enjoy” their status (Wilmott,
1986, p. 561). In Ohio, only 1% of association members had engaged in the conversion debate. The opposition leaders admit-
ted that Minnesota CPAs (including themselves) were generally unaware of the conversion during the legislative process.
Professionals may simply trust the association to represent their interests. Even if MNCPA members were aware of the
conversion, and saw it as a detriment to the profession, they may not have believed it important enough to warrant the
association spending political capital fighting it. If members wish to promote interests that conflict with the association’s,
they must use their own resources to promote those interests and realize that the association will use its superior resources
to counter.9
The manner in which the proponents managed the discourse reflected the importance of nuance and control (Greenwood
et al., 2002). MNCPA officials and the principal author were unequivocal that they did not offer to propose or support a
conversion provision, whenever the legislature would take up the remainder of the UAA, in exchange for MAPA’s support
of the 150-hour provision in 2000. Nevertheless, MNCPA did describe the conversion as a compromise with MAPA over
the remainder of the UAA in 2001. “As part of a compromise with MAPA to pass the UAA, the MNCPA agreed to allow the
remaining 301 [sic] active LPAs to become CPAs by the end of calendar year 2002” (MNCPA, 2002c, emphasis added). It was
a compromise, but for general UAA support—not for anything specific. For MAPA’s part, its Executive Director testified at
the rules hearing, “The LPA/CPA conversion . . . was not initiated at all by our association. . . . We just support it” (State of
Minnesota, 2002). To summarize, it appears that the Board proposed the conversion for expediency, MNCPA did not oppose
it as a compromise to MAPA, and MAPA simply accepted it.
The proponents’ control of the main information media in the accounting milieu (e.g., the Board’s newsletter, The Foot-
note) meant that they could manage the discourse regarding the conversion (Greenwood et al., 2002; Lawrence, 1999;
Pfeffer, 1981). MNCPA took a minimization approach (Greenwood et al., 2002) reflecting its position that the conversion
was insignificant. From January 2000 through May 2001 (the period spanning the 2000 and 2001 legislative sessions), The
Footnote had referred to the UAA but never specifically to the conversion. The November 2000 issue had noted, “Because

9
As a by-product of this study, I submitted a manuscript to a journal published by an association, positing that monitoring the legislative process
regarding accountancy laws and advocating for one’s interests was a CPA’s professional responsibility in order to avoid a legislative surprise like the one
that occurred in this case study. A reviewer expressed concern that the article, if published, might encourage CPAs to oppose the association’s position. It
was not accepted.
504 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508

the UAA is long and detailed, we are highlighting only a few of its sections (and not in their entirety) that we believe are
the most pressing issues”; the conversion was not highlighted (MNCPA, 2000, p. 16). In December 2000, MNCPA surveyed
its membership on five UAA provisions; the conversion was not included (MNCPA, 2002b). In response to my query as to
whether MNCPA had publicly discussed the conversion, its Government Relations Director replied that she thought so, but
added, “I talked about [the UAA]—not always mentioning every single section of the 42 page bill” (memorandum, February
7, 2003).
Whether MNCPA representatives discussed the conversion publicly is not documented, however, its first published ref-
erences occurred in the summer of 2002. A Legislative Update dated June/July 2002 included the item “Licensed Public
Accountants become CPAs” (MNCPA, 2002c). The June/July 2002 issue of The Footnote included an article that reported on
a meeting between legislators and CPA firm managing partners, mentioning in the last paragraph that MNCPA’s Govern-
ment Relations Director “drew attention to upcoming law changes CPAs need to be aware of including. . .LPAs become CPAs”
(MNCPA, 2002d, p. 17, emphasis added). Apparently, CPAs needed to be aware of the conversion in the 6 months prior to its
implementation, but not during the legislative process or in the year after it passed. That MNCPA’s first published references
to the conversion appeared over a year after its passage, contrasted with MAPA’s reporting the conversion in the month it
passed (MAPA, 2001).
After the conversion had been publicized and as it neared, MNCPA continued to minimize it:
There are 314 active LPAs in the entire state. There are 115 inactive LPAs. There are 11,863 CPAs in Minnesota. Few,
if any, of the inactive LPAs are expected to meet the requirements for conversion. . . .No LPAs have been added since
1979. Given that fact, it is likely that most current LPAs are either at or close to retirement age. (MNCPA, 2002a)
Minnesota licensure included “active” and “inactive” status for both CPAs and LPAs. Only active licensees could practice
public accounting, inactive licensees could only use the title (denoted “inactive”) on business cards, letterhead, etc. Inactive
licensees could switch to active licensure by meeting certain requirements. Only active LPAs would be converted, inactive
LPAs would have to become active before December 31, 2002 to be converted.
The number of LPAs who would be converted was unquestionably difficult to pinpoint (344 ultimately did), but MNCPA
communications consistently understated it. The previous “compromise” quotation, dated June/July 2002, stated it as 301
(active only). The block quotation above, dated November 2002, stated it as 314 (active, allowing that few of the 115 inactive
LPAs could be converted). While inactive licensees switching to active could have caused the increase, an October 2002
electronic mail memorandum from MNCPA’s Government Relations Director to legislators stated that only 184 LPAs could
convert (memorandum, October 15, 2002). A November 2002 article in The Footnote cited this same number, and while the
article also mentioned 106 inactive LPAs (making a total of 290 LPAs—even below the 301 active from June/July) it implied
that only the 184 active LPAs would be converted, “There is little risk, since the 184 LPAs have demonstrated competency”
(MNCPA, 2002e, p. 13). Finally, the “at or close to retirement age” comment minimizes the conversion, but as previously
discussed, a sample shows that over 70% of the converted LPAs continue to be licensed 8 years after the conversion.
The opposition’s petition drive demonstrated the importance of communications resources in a different manner. It began
about 1 month prior to the scheduled rules hearing. By the hearing date, they had submitted petitions via electronic mail
to only about 1000 Minnesota CPAs, receiving 475 signatures. The limited electronic mail capacity in their small practices
restricted the number of petitions they could send at a time.
Following the conversion, MNCPA provided a normalizing account (Suchman, 1995). A page on the MNCPA website
entitled “Why Use a CPA”? stresses that, “A CPA is an accountant who has been certified by the state of Minnesota after
they’ve passed a rigorous exam”, and that a CPA is “required to pass the rigorous Uniform CPA Examination” (MNCPA, 2010).
These statements attest to the CPA examination’s legitimacy, but by ignoring the fact that not all CPAs have passed it, they
paint a business-as-usual picture.

5.5. Resistance

The resistance was consistent with the literature predicting that actors will resist institutional demands that they perceive
harmful to their interests (Oliver, 1991; Shapiro and Matson, 2008) and when the change is to a fully institutionalized concept
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). The details of this case allow further specification of resistance.
I analyzed each of Oliver’s (1991) hypothesized relationships from Table 1. The degree of each that Oliver hypothesized
led to resistance is shown in parentheses.

Legitimacy (low): The opponents believed the conversion harmed the profession’s legitimacy.
Efficiency (low): The conversion would allow LPAs to compete as CPAs and therefore was economically damaging to the
opponents. Even so, the opponents stated in their interview, “It’s not a competition issue for us”.
Multiplicity (high): The opposition found that the separate institutional agents appeared unwilling to take responsibility
for initiating the conversion. MNCPA pointed to the Board as the “driver” of the conversion (MNCPA, 2002a). When queried
by an opponent, the Board’s Chair replied, “I can only comment that the Board of Accountancy did not do anything. You
seem to believe that the Board of Accountancy passes statutes. This is not the case. This legislation was passed by our
elected officials” (memorandum, November 29, 2002). The opponents knew the rather mundane fact that legislatures, not
administrative agencies like the Board, pass legislation. To state that the Board did nothing seems a nuanced denial of the
 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508 505

role of the principal author and his statement that the Board wished to eliminate the LPA licensure class. While MAPA had
the most to gain, it denied proposing the conversion.
Dependence (low): The opponents were not dependent on the proponents. While Board-administered licensure provided the
right to practice, since the opponents had met the licensure requirements for years, they could only lose it through coercion.
There was little or no direct economic value in MNCPA membership—it is not likely that clients checked membership status
before engaging a CPA.
Consistency (low): The conversion was entirely inconsistent with the opponents’ identity of a CPA.
Constraint (high): The conversion had no direct impact on the opponents themselves, rather it affected others. This charac-
teristic had no effect on resistance in this case.
Coercion (low): The opponents faced no real threat of sanction. Any Board sanction would have to be through disciplinary
action, but the opponents to had violated no rules. While MNCPA had no legal sanction, it could revoke its voluntary
membership through due process—a sanction that would have little, if any, effect on the opponents.
Diffusion (low): This characteristic proved paradoxical in this analysis. The conversion itself was not something that actors
could voluntarily adopt. However, in terms of acceptance of, or awareness of, the conversion, the fact that there had been
little diffusion of acceptance would support resistance. On the other hand, the fact that awareness was not diffuse was one
reason for the narrow base of opposition.
Uncertainty (low): The conversion introduced little, if any, uncertainty into the small practice segment of the accounting
market.
Interconnectedness (low): This characteristic also proved paradoxical. The separate institutional agents had joined to pro-
pose and pass the UAA. Yet, regarding their roles in proposing the conversion, they had all disclaimed responsibility,
pointing to others. This mass disclaimer may have been the sanitizing of political deal-making rather than a true sign of
low interconnectedness.

In the analysis, constraint was not applicable, diffusion proved paradoxical, and interconnectedness was likely higher
than was externally apparent. Otherwise, the study generally found Oliver’s (1991) characteristics as she had hypothesized.
This finding supports the applicability of Oliver’s typology in a setting of small organization in which individual professional
issues and identity are salient.
Etherington and Richardson (1994) defined Oliver’s (1991) manipulation and defiance strategies both as resistance.
Manipulation involves the exertion of power over the content of the demands or the institutional agent making the demands.
The opponents did not possess the influence and communications resources to attempt a strategy of manipulation, Ether-
ington and Richardson’s active/positive response. However, they did utilize Etherington and Richardson’s active/negative
response – Oliver’s defiance strategy – especially her challenge and attack tactics. The opposition fit Oliver’s definition of
challenge as an offensive defiance of the demands. Oliver suggested that challengers make a virtue of their insurrection.
One opponent stated, “From an ethical standpoint, it just really hit me wrong and thus started the process of trying to see if
we could stop it”. Oliver’s more aggressive attack response is evident when agents criticize values and the individuals that
express them. Throughout their interview, the opponents referred to converted LPAs as “yahoos.” In a letter to the Senate
Majority Leader, an opponent wrote, “The Board of Accountancy will be committing FRAUD on January 1, 2003 when it
deceives all of the private citizens in Minnesota”. In an electronic mail message to MNCPA’s Chair, an opponent wrote that
MNCPA’s Government Relations Director was not credible since was not a CPA: “She cannot relate to what this means to a
real CPA. . .that means we were all had”.
While conformity to institutional change may enhance survival, it can threaten long-run prospects if it impairs the
ability to respond to future contingencies (Oliver, 1991). The opponents identified such a contingency in the possibility that
Minnesota could convert RAPs to CPAs. One opponent commented that when Minnesota’s accounting community had first
begun to discuss the UAA in the mid-1990s, he had heard a prominent accountant mention LPA conversion and add, “Well,
that will never happen”. The opponent added, “What’s going to happen in 20 years? They’re going to say, well, jeez, RAPs
have . . . education and peer review so let’s make them CPAs”. The opposition felt that the Board and MNCPA had betrayed
them through the LPA conversion and resistance would establish a position from which to oppose a RAP conversion.
The resistance brought the conversion issue into the open but the only remedy was through legislation. MNCPA denied
the opponents’ request that it seek legislative action. “We will not be using our limited time and resources to lead a grass-
roots effort to change the law” (MNCPA Chair, memorandum, February 25, 2003). Bringing the issue into the open led to
an acknowledgement that the conversion was significant to at least a segment of MNCPA membership, and ultimately led
MNCPA’s board of directors to publish the following:
To all MNCPA members:
In 2001, the Uniform Accountancy Act (UAA) was passed by the Minnesota legislature. That bill included a provision
to convert the remaining 314 [sic] active LPAs to CPAs, effective January 1, 2003, which was considered and supported
by the Board of Directors in 2001. The UAA overall met our mission to serve the public good and we did not stand in
the way of passage by objecting to this one provision.
We did not adequately understand the depth of feeling that some of our members have about the conversion. We
apologize for this lack of understanding. (MNCPA, 2003, p. 5)
506 R.S. Sathe / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010) 496–508

While technically an apology, the opposition found it hollow. Controlling the discourse to the end, MNCPA argued that its
position served the public interest; and “this one provision” minimized the conversion. Finally, “depth of feeling” portrayed
the opposition as emotional. In contrast, in their interview, MNCPA officials said, “We looked at it more on the clinical side”
and “. . . there was a rational, clinical piece . . . when you look at it you can perfectly understand why the Board of Accountancy
was interested in getting rid of the class and why there was no strong opposition on our end”. While the opponents admitted
that their position was emotional, they could not understand the conversion’s rationale, specifically questioning its “logic”
six times during the interview. From the opponents’ point of view, MNCPA had not provided a legitimating account, and this
omission had made it negligent and irrational (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

6. Concluding comments

Two questions guided this study: (1) Why would a jurisdiction license individuals who had not passed the CPA exam-
ination? (2) Why was the opposition so strong when LPAs’ over 20 years of experience arguably made them competent?
The study did not seek to conclude whether experience in lieu of examination actually yielded competence or whether the
conversion was proper. Rather, rather it sought to examine the reasons for the conversion and the processes and arguments
the proponents used to build legitimacy. It also sought to determine what factors led the opponents to resist.
The answer to the first guiding question appears to be expediency. Continuing to administer a small licensure class was
redundant and inefficient for the Board. Proponents also argued a public interest value in eliminating the confusion over
CPA and LPA titles. The titles were meaningless in a sense, because the 1979 Act had granted LPAs the right to practice public
accounting, including attestation.
Answering the second question proved a layered endeavor. Understanding the opposition first entailed understanding
how the CPA examination had become fully institutionalized. Its roles in the development of the profession and in protecting
the public interest have made it so normatively embedded that today’s CPAs cannot conceive of licensure without it. This
full institutionalization ultimately led to the ferocity of resistance, and surfaced two additional questions. First, why had
the association, whose mission it was to protect CPAs’ interests, not opposed, or at least vetted to its membership, an
issue that was contrary to those interests and could generate such fierce opposition? The association’s position was that it
had assessed the conversion as insignificant. However, its communications surrounding the conversion seemed to be both
strategic and nuanced, seeking only passive acquiescence. Second, why was the resistance so narrowly based? The analysis
showed that MNCPA’s segmentation might have led to a divergence of interests between the wider association and a portion
of its membership.
The study contributes to professionals’ understanding of the legislative process. Minnesota’s CPAs had paid little attention
to the legislation that resulted in the conversion. Professionals are responsible to be cognizant of the legislative initiatives
affecting their fields. As the principal author stated, “If you are not engaged in [the legislative process], you just have to take
what you get, I guess”. The study also contributes to understanding how an association presses its interests in the legislative
process and how members’ faith that their own interests are consistent with the association’s may be unwarranted. It
illuminated how members’ efforts to advocate their different interests face the challenge of countering the association’s
power and ability to control the discourse.
This study contributes to the literature on associations. Much work on associations (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2002) has
studied mandatory membership associations. Greenwood et al. called for the study of voluntary membership associations,
which is the case in this study. This study showed that voluntary membership might enable resistance by rendering the
degrees of dependence and coercion low. Researchers might further study other dimensions of voluntary membership
associations.
The study also clarifies the role of public accountant licensure classes, pointing out that CPAs do not have sole jurisdiction
over the provision of audit opinions, as is often presumed. It sheds light on the issues of small practices that are under-
researched since small practices do not have the resources to fund research and university chairs. It contributes to an
understanding of these practices, which constitute the vast majority of AICPA practice units. One particular dimension of
small practices that would be served by further research is the relationship between interests and community size.
Finally, while this case study focused on one jurisdiction, 35 others still have closed classes of public accountant licensees.
In addition, 11 jurisdictions have continuing classes of non-CPA practitioners similar to Minnesota’s RAPs. This study provides
insights into CPAs’ concerns about their profession and the implications should any jurisdictions also choose the expedient
option of converting or combining classes.

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