G.R. No.
L-3756             June 30, 1952 that plaintiff, upon entry of judgment, pay to the Philippine Alien
SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL SANTISMO
ROSARIO DE FILIPINAS, plaintiff-appellee,  judgment releasing the defendant and the intervenor from liability,
vs.
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
PONENTE: LABRADOR, J.:
Topic: Sources of Obligations
FACTS:
This is an action to recover the possession of a piece of real
property (land and warehouses) situated in Pandacan Manila, and
the rentals for its occupation and use.
The land belongs to the plaintiff, in whose name the title was
registered before the war. During the Japanese military occupation,
the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation Taiwan Tekkosho
After liberation, (April 4, 1946), the Alien Property Custodian of the
United States of America took possession, control, and custody
under Trading with the Enemy Act for the reason that it
belonged to an enemy national.
In 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export
Management Company under a custodianship agreement with
United States Alien Property Custodian & when it vacated the
property it was occupied by the defendant. The Philippine
Government made representations with the Office Alien Property
Custodian for the use of property by the Government .
Plaintiff made claim to the property before the Alien Property
Custodian of the United States, but as this was denied, it brought an
action in CFI Manila to annul the sale of property of Taiwan
Tekkosho, and recover its possession. The case did not come for
trial because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is
claimed by plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho
was null and void because it was executed under threats, duress,
and intimidation, and it was agreed that the title issued in the name
of the Taiwan Tekkosho be cancelled and the original title of plaintiff
re-issued; that the claims, rights, title, and interest of the Alien
Property Custodian be cancelled and held for naught; that the
occupant National Coconut Corporation has until February 28, 1949,
to recover its equipment from the property and vacate the premises;
Property Administration the sum of P140,000. The court rendered
but reversing to the plaintiff the right to recover from the National
Coconut Corporation reasonable rentals for the use and occupation
of the premises.
The present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August,
1946, the date when the defendant began to occupy the premises,
to the date it vacated it.
The defendant does not contest its liability for the rentals at the rate
of P3,000 per month from February 28, 1949 (the date specified in
the judgment aforemetioned), but resists the claim therefor prior to
this date. It interposes the defense that it occupied the property in
good faith, under no obligation whatsoever to pay rentals for the use
and occupation of the warehouse. Judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of P3,000 a month,
as reasonable rentals, from August, 1946, to the date the defendant
vacates the premises.
The judgment declares that plaintiff has always been the owner, as
the sale of Japanese purchaser was void ab initio; that the Alien
Property Administration never acquired any right to the property, but
that it held the same in trust until the determination as to whether or
not the owner is an enemy citizen.
ISSUE: Whether the fact of ownership of plaintiff rendered the
defendant liable for the use and occupation of the subject propery.
Held:
• No. Defendant’s liability does not arise from any of the four
sources of obligations, namely, law, contract or quasi-
contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Spanish Civil
Code.)
• Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all,
because it entered the premises and occupied it with the
permission of the entity which had the legal control and
administration thereof, the Allien Property Administration.
Neither was there any negligence on its part.
• There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between
the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho,
 which had secured the possession of the property from the
plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress, such that the Alien
Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant)
may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the
occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The
Allien Property Administration had the control and
administration of the property not as successor to the
interests of the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan
Tekkosho, but by express provision of law (Trading with
the Enemy Act of the United States, 40 Stat., 411; 50
U.S.C.A., 189).
NAGUIAT v. NLRC
• Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff- G.R. No. 116123 March 13, 1997
appellee herein, but a trustee of then Government of the Panganiban, J.
United States, in its own right, to the exclusion of, and
against the claim or title of, the enemy owner.
FACTS
• From August, 1946, when defendant-appellant took
Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (“CFTI”) held a concessionaire's
possession, to the late of judgment on February 28, 1948,
contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services ("AAFES") for
Allien Property Administration had the absolute control of the
the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F.
property as trustee of the Government of the United States,
Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-
with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it
president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated
were the absolute owner. (U.S vs. Chemical Foundation
("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned
[C.C.A. Del. 1925], 5 F. [2d], 191; 50 U.S.C.A., 283.)
corporation. Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the
Therefore, even if defendant-appellant were liable to the
Philippines, the AAFES was dissolved. Individual respondents were
Allien Property Administration for rentals, these would not
previously employed by CFTI as taxicab drivers. The AAFES Taxi
accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the owner, but
Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local president,
to the United States Government.
Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation
benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers. They arrived
at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given P500.00 for
every year of service as severance pay. This was not accepted by
the individual respondents.

Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union,

individual respondents, through the National Organization of
Workingmen ("NOWM"), a labor organization which they
subsequently joined, filed a complaint for payment of separation pay
due to termination/phase-out. In their complaint, herein private
respondents alleged that they were regular employees of Naguiat
Enterprises, although their individual applications for employment
were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to
Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTI, and that the
former thence managed, controlled and supervised their
employment.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular
workers of CFTI, ordered the latter to pay them P1,200.00 for every
year of service "for humanitarian consideration" and not an award for
separation pay, setting aside the earlier agreement between CFTI
and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every year of service. On
appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by
granting separation pay to the respondents where in discharging
such obligations, Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the same
time the President and Vice-President and General Manager,
respectively, should be joined as indispensable party whose liability
is joint and several. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners
was denied by the NLRC.
ISSUE
Whether or not officers of corporations are ipso facto liable jointly
and severally with the companies they represent for the payment of
separation pay.
HELD
Concept Of Tort
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate
tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of
a legal duty. Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer
to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation
of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, which is the condition
obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or
obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was actively engaged
in the management or operation of the business should be held
personally liable.
Naguiat Enterprises Not Liable
There was no substantial basis to hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an
indirect employer of individual respondents much less a labor only
contractor. Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that
Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their
employment. It appears that they were confused on the personalities
of Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual who was the president of CFTI,
and Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate
entity with a separate business. They presumed that Sergio F.
Naguiat, who was at the same time a stockholder and director of
Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was managing and controlling
the taxi business on behalf of the latter. A closer scrutiny and
analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of the matter: that
Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the-taxi drivers and determining
their employment terms, was rather carrying out his responsibilities
as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a separate
corporation does not appear to be involved at all in the taxi business.
Respondents could not deny that he received his salary from the
office of CFTI inside the base. Naguiat Enterprises was in the
trading business while CFTI was in taxi services.
CFTI President Solidarily Liable
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC is the case in point. A.C.
Ransom Corporation was a family corporation, the stockholders of
which were members of the Hernandez family. It held that 'Employer'
includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of
its officers or agents except when acting as employer.' In the
absence of definite proof in that regard, we believe it should be
presumed that the responsible officer is the President of the
corporation who can be deemed the chief operation officer thereof.
Thus, in RA 602, criminal responsibility is with the 'Manager or in his
default, the person acting as such.' In Ransom, the President
appears to be the Manager."
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who
actively managed the business. Thus, applying the ruling in A. C.
Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an "employer" as
contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and
severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed
employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat
Enterprises were "close family corporations" owned by the Naguiat
family. The Court here finds no application to the rule that a
corporate officer cannot be held solidarily liable with a corporation in
the absence of evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with
malice. In the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable
for corporate tort because he had actively engaged in the
management and operation of CFTI, a close corporation.
Antolin Naguiat Not Personally Liable
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he
carried the title of "general manager" as well, it had not been shown
that he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no evidence on the
extent of his participation in the management or operation of the
business was proffered. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily
liable for the obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat to the private
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
PARTLY GRANTED.
Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat,
president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and
severally, the individual respondents their separation pay computed
at US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso equivalent at the
time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment;
Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin
T. Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability in the payment of
separation pay to individual respondents.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARILOU T. GONZALES
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
 DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, a complaint for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to
get married.
Petitioner, an exchange student from Iran, is taking medical course
at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan. Petitioner
courted and proposed to marry Private Respondent. She accepted
his love on the condition that they would get married. They therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester.
Sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him. She was a virgin before she began living with him. A week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her
started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to
live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to
someone living in Bacolod City.
ISSUE:
Is breach of promise to marry actionable under Article 21 of the Civil
Code?
HELD: Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21,
which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered
her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind
illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted
to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. v. First Farmers Milling Co.
L-29041; March 24, 1981
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. filed an action for injunction and
prohibition with damages against First Farmer Milling Co, (FFMC)
and others, alleging that the defendant FFMC established and
operated a sugar central known as the First Farmer Sugar Central
(FFSC) and for the crop years 1964-1966, the defendants
transferred their quota A allotments to FFSC and are actually milling
their sugar with the said entity, and constitutes an illegal transfer
with the illegal approval of the Sugar Quota Administration.
Subsequently, a motion to admit amended and supplemental
complaint was filed, including PNB and National Investment and
Development Corp (NIDC) as defendants, alleging that they have
extended loans to FFMC amounting to Php16 210 000, to assist in
the illegal creation and operation of the said mill and thus, a joint
tortfeasor in the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. In answer to this,
PNB and NIDC contends that the granting of loans in favor of FFMC
were extended in the ordinary and usual course of business, and
that they have no participation on the alleged illegal transactions
complained of.
ISSUE: w/n PNB and NIDC can be considered as joint tortfeasors
HELD:
NO. PNB and NIDC granted loans in the ordinary and usual course
of business after the borrowing entity had established itself as
capable of being treated as anew milling district as it could already
operate and had its array of adhering planters. The doing of an act
which is in itself perfectly lawful will not render one liable as for a
tort, simply because the unintended effect of such act is to enable or
assist another person to do or accomplish a wrong, assuming that
there was such a wrong.
PORFIRIO CINCO V. HON. MATEO CANONOY
GR No. L-33171, May 31, 1970
Melencio- Herrera, J.
TOPIC: QUASI DELICT
FACTS:
Cinco filed a complaint with the City Court of Mandaue (CCM) for
damages against private respondents Hilot (driver) and Valeriana &
Carlos Pepito (operator) on account of a vehicular accident involving
the former’s automobile and the latter’s jeepney. A criminal case
was also filed against the driver.
During the pre-trial of the civil case for damages, private
respondents moved for its suspension on the ground of Rule 111,
Sec. 3(b), ROC. CCM ordered the suspension and denied
petitioner’s MR. It was elevated on certiorari to the CFI which
likewise dismissed the petition prompting petitioner to elevate the
case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for
damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
HELD: Yes.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. 
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also
clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the c action,
may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically
lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as
allowing of an "independent civil action."
The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action
has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the
civil action based on quasi-delict.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, 
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24803; May 26, 1977
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et
al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake."
ISSUE
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal
of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil
liability, was not reversed?
2. 2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil
Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained
of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
HELD
1. The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or negligent. More precisely, a new provision,
Article 2177 of the new code provides:
 i. ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Therefore,
under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls
a double recovery.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a
Safeguard Security Agency v Tangco
G.R. No. 165732; December 14, 2006
Austria-Martinez, J:
Evangeline Tangco was about to renew her Time Deposit
Account with Ecology Bank in Katipunan, Quezon City. She was a
licensed firearm holder with permit to carry outside her residence, so
she brought it at the time she went to the bank. As she was about to
deposit the gun to security guard Admer Pajarillo for safekeeping,
the latter shot Evangeline with a service shotgun which caused her
death. The family immediately filed a criminal case of homicide
against Pajarillo, and reserved the right to file a civil claim. Pajarillo
was convicted. Meanwhile, the family filed a civil suit against
Pajarillo for negligence and Safeguard Security Agency, the
employer of Pajarillo, for failing to exercise due diligence of a good
father of a family in the hiring and supervision of its employees.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the family and
found them entitled to damages. It found that both Pajarillo and the
Agency were liable jointly and severally. Safeguard Security and
Pajarillo appealed to the CA, but the affirmed with modifications the
ruling of the RTC. In this case, the CA declared that the liability of
Safeguard Security was only subsidiary, in light of Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code on civil liability of employers. Petitioner agency
went to the Supreme Court to challenge the decision of the CA
finding them negligent. The Supreme Court ruled that the factual
antecedents of the case would show that there was negligence, the
only thing left to resolve is whether the CA correctly ruled that the
liability of Pajarillo and the Agency were solidary or only subsidiary.
Issues:
Should the liability of an employee be based on delict, is a claim for
quasi-delict against the employer barred?
Held:
No. It is important to determine the nature of respondents'
cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. [14]
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief
Alleging negligence in the hiring and supervision of
employees, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter
are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for
their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of
shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code.
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the
criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on
culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from crime. [18] The source of the obligation
sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or
omission punishable by law.
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint,
respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence
of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employee.
INIEGO VS. GULLERMO
G. R. No. 166876; March 24, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner filed a Motion Motion to Dismiss the complaint on
the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the cause of action as claims for damages arising from a
different cause of action (i.e., other than the fault or negligence of
the defendant) should not be included in the computation of the
jurisdictional amount. According to petitioner, the moral and
exemplary damages claimed by the respondents in the case at bar
are not direct and proximate consequences of the alleged negligent
act. However, the motion was denied. According to respondent
Judge, the cause of action, which is a quasi-delict, is not capable of
pecuniary estimation and not the amount of damage prayed
for.7 From this, respondent Judge concluded that since fault or
negligence in quasi-delicts cannot be the subject of pecuniary
estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed
respondent Judge in this respect.8 Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not an action based on quasi-delict is not capable of
pecuniary estimation.
(2) Whether or not only the exemplary and moral damages shall be
included in the computation for damages to determine jurisdiction.

FACTS:
A vehicular accident happened when a freight truck allegedly HELD:
being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s jitney which private
respondent was driving at the time of the accident. As a result,
private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict
and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved
in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner
of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint prays for
actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P300,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount
of P150,000.00. Excluding attorney’s fees in the amount
of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being claimed
is P490,000.00.
(1) NO. Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily
and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the
damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts,
and are therefore capable of pecuniary estimation. In determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction
is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now
Regional Trial Courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and
effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the
damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts.
The damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary
equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant,
which are thus sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. This money
claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental
thereto or a consequence thereof. It bears to point out that the
complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC actually bears
the caption "for DAMAGES."
(2) YES. The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of
the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the
basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for
damages arise from the same or from different causes of action. The
distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries
in a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for
a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the damages sought by
respondent originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict.
The fault or negligence of the employee and the juris tantum
presumption of negligence of his employer in his selection and
supervision are the seeds of the damages claimed, without
distinction.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral
and exemplary damages arose from a cause of action other than the
quasi-delict, their inclusion in the computation of damages for
jurisdictional purposes is still proper. All claims for damages should
be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless
of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several
causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a
party to assert as many causes of action as he may have against the
opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section provides that where
the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for
recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test
of jurisdiction.
Hence, RTC has jurisdiction.
JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., vs INC
G.R. No. 160283; October 14, 2005
TOPIC: CONCEPT AND REQUISITES
FACTS:
The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It is
located in Sta. Rita East, Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the
south by a chapel of the respondent. The gasoline station
supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its
washrooms.  In view of this, the services of Dioscoro “Ely” Yoro
(Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a construction
contractor in the locality. Petitioner and Yoro executed a
Memorandum of Agreement(MOA) on 28 February 1995. Diggings
thereafter commenced.  After some time, petitioner was informed by
the members of the respondent that the digging traversed and
penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter.  The
foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly
under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent. On 18 April
1995, a Complaint against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller,
petitioner’s engineer, was filed by the respondent before the RTC,
La Union, Branch 31, docketed therein as Civil Case No. A-1646. 
Petitioner and Oller filed an Answer with Third-Party Complaint
impleading Yoro as third-party defendant. Yoro filed an Answer to
the Third-Party Complaint dated 13 July 1995.  An Amended and
Supplemental Complaint dated 30 August 1995 was later filed by the
respondent already naming Yoro as a party-defendant, to which the
petitioner and Oller filed an Answer. Yoro filed his own Answer. After
four years of hearing the case, the trial court promulgated its
Decision holding that the diggings were not intended for the
construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to
construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The trial court adjudged
the petitioner and Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-
65% basis (the petitioner liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller
from any liability. The petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, on
the other hand,  was given due course. On 25 September 2003, the
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision denying the appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PETITIONER AND
YORO HAS THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE LATTER
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE
RESPONDENT.
HELD: NO
  Petitioner avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the
blame solely on Yoro.  He argues that the MOA executed between
him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by
the courts.  Since nothing in the MOA goes against the law, morals,
good customs and public policy, it must govern to absolve him from
any liability. Petitioner relies heavily in Paragraph 4 of the MOA,
which is again reproduced hereunder:
4. Any damage within or outside the property of the
FIRST PARTY incurred during the digging shall be
borne by the SECOND PARTY.
          In answer to this, the respondent asserts that the MOA should
not absolve petitioner from any liability.  This written contract,
according to the respondent, clearly shows that the intention of the
parties therein was to search for hidden treasure.  The alleged
digging for a septic tank was just a cover-up of their real intention.  FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.COURT OF
The aim of the petitioner and Yoro to intrude and surreptitiously hunt
for hidden treasure in the respondent’s premises should make both
parties liable. The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of
Agreement but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.
There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so
states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires
solidarity.
The requisites of quasi-delict are the following : (a)  there must be
an act or omission;(b) such act or omission causes damage to
another; (c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence;
and (d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties
          All the requisites are attendant in the instant case.  The tortious
act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent
because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may
have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on
respondent’s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no
pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on
the one hand, and the respondent on the other. For the damage
caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they
are joint tortfeasors.  Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. The heavy reliance of
petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier cannot steer him
clear of any liability. 
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of
it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Indubitably, petitioner and
Yoro cooperated in committing the tort.  They even had provisions in
their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found
within or outside petitioner’s property line.  Thus, the MOA, instead
of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures
that he be so declared as liable. Besides, petitioner cannot claim
that he did not know that the excavation traversed the respondent’s
property.  In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually observe
the diggings, his security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller.
APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE
INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 118889. March 23, 1998.
Topic: Quasi-delicts - Concept and Requisites
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS
At around 3 o’clock of 21 April 1987, two (2) vehicles, both
Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising along EDSA, figured in a car
accident. The car owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the
outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other
car, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and
driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left
of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street,
the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of
the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did
not possess a Philippine driver’s license.
Consequently, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, insurer of
Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, it sued
Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune
Insurance delict before the RTC Makati. Summons was not served
on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address;
in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the
complaint.
Trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate
its claim of subrogation. Respondent CA affirmed the ruling of the
trial court although based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of
respondent FILCAR. In other words, petitioner failed to establish its
cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.
In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the
strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de
Caldo that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages
suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.
ISSUE:
For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on
quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and,
consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in
driving the rented vehicle?
HELD: NO.
The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x x”
To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must
concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and damage incurred by
the plaintiff.
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the
existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of
defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-
Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be
noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was
brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the
right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is
plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus
making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal
liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasidelict
provides:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the is
provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption
juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due
care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them
from causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent
court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the
circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under
consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car
business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and
employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible
for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an
employer of the latter.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same
Code which provides: “In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x
x x If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article
2180 are applicable.” Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither
applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship
between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner
has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of
quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can
neither prosper.
Petitioner’s insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporationis rooted
in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case, the negligent
and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation
caused injuries to several persons and damage to property.
Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporation raised the
defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control over
the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the driver was not
its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as
it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing
more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of
the burdens and responsibilities of an employer.
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUIN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
TOPIC: QUASI-DELICT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
FACTS
-The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for
violation of BP. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) by respondent Emma J.
Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables
Department, and upon authority of petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc.
(Sansio), against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio)
allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as
payment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing
from Sansio.
-As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was
unable to controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she
was indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon
her by the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of DILG. Gregorio was brought
to the PARAC-DILG Office where she detained.
-Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion for Deferment of
Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not
have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even have a
checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn.
She also alleged that her signature was patently different from
the signatures appearing on the bounced checks. MeTC granted.
Datuin then submitted an Affidavit o Desistance that Gregorio was
not one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of
prosecution. MeTC ordered the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed.
-Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin
before the RTC. The complaint, in part, reads — Datuin falsely
indicated the address of plaintiff to be at No. 76 Peñaranda Street,
Legaspi City when the truth of the matter is that the latter’s correct
address is at Barangay Rizal, Oas, Albay; that plaintiff was
therefore not duly notified of the charges filed against her; that while
plaintiff was visiting her husband Jose Gregorio and their two
daughters at their city residence at Quezon City, and without the
slightest premonition armed operatives suddenly swooped down on
their residence and arrested the plaintiff; that Datuin admitted that
the filing of the cases against the plaintiff was by virtue of an
honest mistake or inadvertence.
-Complaint further alleged: "Be that as it may, incalculable damage
has been inflicted on the plaintiff on account of the defendants’
wanton, callous and reckless disregard of the fundamental legal
precept that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons"
(Art. 26, Civil Code of the Philippines)... That by reason of all the
aforegoing and pursuant to the provision of law that "whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done," (Article
2176, Civil Code of the Philippines), the plaintiff is entitled to
damages... That Moreover, defendant SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC.
is vicariously liable as the employer of Datuin."
-Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious
prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts
constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.
RTC rendered in favor of Gregorio and expressly stated that the
complaint was one for damages based on quasi-delict and not on
malicious prosecution. CA reversed.
ISSUE
Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based
on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution
HELD
-Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of
Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in
her complaint. Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its
entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in
relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious
prosecution.
-In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the
plaintiff has to d prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties. On the other
hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for
damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach,
though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the
following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal
security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse;
(5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
-It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal
security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio
and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse
of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of
petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the
charges. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her
sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and
money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that
she had held several honorable positions in different organizations
and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in
Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.
-There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio.
On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising
from the act or omission of its employee Datuin. Sansio and Datuin
are in error when they insist that Gregorio’s complaint is based on
malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for
malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that
Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith.
Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint.
VERGARA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R NO. L-77679; September 30, 1987
Padilla, J.
TOPIC: QUASI DELICT
FACTS:
An action for damages based on quasi delict filed by private
respondent Azarcon against the petitioner arose when a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner Vergara rammed the private respondent’s
store-residence causing damages. Petitioner alleged that his driver
was driving in a diligent and careful manner, and that the accident
was an act of God because “the steering wheel refused to respond
as a result of a blown-out tire”.
The trial court held the petitioner and its insurer solidarily liable to
pay the private respondent. On appeal to the CA, the findings of the
trial court were affirmed. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the petitioner
guilty of fault or negligence
RULING: No. The trial court was correct in finding the petitioner
guilty of fault or negligence.
It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a
quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which
defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was
guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.
Applying to the facts of the case:
1. Damages: It is undisputed that private respondent suffered
damages as a result of an act or omission of petitioner.
2. Negligence: The findings of said court, affirmed by the
respondent court, show that the fact of occurrence of the
"vehicular accident" was sufficiently established by the
policyereport and the testimony of Patrolman Masiclat.
3. Connection of cause and effect between negligence and
damages: According to the police report, "the cargo truck was
travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then
it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the
highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle;
and then said cargo truck rammed the storewarehouse of the
plaintiff.
P.S:
- A mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be considered as
fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the
accident preventable.
- The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the
disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection
and supervision of his driver.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., vs. NOEL
CORDERO
G.R. No. 138550
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
Facts:
Petitioner (AMEX) is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards
to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero,
applied for and was issued an American Express charge card and
an extension card was issued to the respondent as well.
On Nov. 29, 1991, the respondent went on a holiday trip to Hong
Kong. In November 30, 1991, the group went to the Watsons
Chemist Shop. Noel picked up some chocolate candies and handed
to the sales clerk his American Express extension charge card to
pay for his purchases. The clerk then verified the card by calling
AMEX’s office, when the respondent was asked to present some IDs
for verification he declined, thus his card was confiscated and was
cut into half. This caused embarrassment and humiliation to the
respondent.
Nilda then called AMEX’s office and was informed that on Nov. 1,
1991 there was an attempt to use a charge card with the same
number as respondents card. Their office was able to determine that
the respondent that time was in Manila and not in HK, hence his
card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System which was
the reason why the sales clerk tried to verify the identity of the
respondent. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the
card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card
is revoked or confiscated.
On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the RTC of Manila, a
complaint for damages against The trial court found that the
inexcusable failure of AMEX to inform Nilo of the November 1, 1991
incident despite sufficient time was the proximate cause of the
confiscation and cutting of plaintiffs extension card which exposed
the latter to public humiliation for which defendant should be held
liable
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of petitioner to inform the respondent of
the November 1, 1991 incident was the proximate cause of the
confiscation and cutting of the respondent’s card?
HELD:
NO. In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise,
there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties. But there are exceptions such as when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have
been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the
proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon
mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
The subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had
respondent talked to petitioner’s representative and identified
himself as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that
there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore,
it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR,
petitioners
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA
VALLEJERA, respondents
G.R. No. 158995            
September 26, 2006
FACTS
Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the sps. Vallejera, was hit by a
Ford Fiera van owned by L.G. Foods Corp. and driven at that time
by their employee Ferrer. The child died as a result of the accident.
An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was
filed against the driver before the MTCC in Bacolod. Unfortunately,
before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed
suicide. Thus, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case.
Sps. Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against petitioner as
employers of the deceased driver, alleging that as such employers,
they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision
of their employees. Defendants denied liability and asserted that
they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. Petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be
resolved and the court required them to file within 10 days a
memorandum of authorities supportive of their position. Instead of
filing the required memorandum, they filed a Motion to Dismiss,
arguing that the complaint is a claim for subsidiary liability against an
employed under Art. 103, RPC. They contended that there must first
be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine
qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the
pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their
subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of
action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the
plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for
damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in
question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action, which
was already dismissed.
The trial court denied their motion for lack of merit and set the case
for trial. Their motion for reconsideration was denied by the same
court. They filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA but
it only upheld the lower court's decision. It held that the case exacts
responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176, Civil Code,
which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the
liability under Article 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
or prior showing of the latter's insolvency.
ISSUE
Whether the spouses' cause of action in their civil case is founded
on Article 103 RPC or derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code
HELD
Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article
2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily from the petitioners
as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the
employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil
action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of
no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was
dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. In
reality, therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in
the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of
their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for
damages is to ask for the impossible.
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA vs. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA,
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR
G.R. No. L-32599
June 29, 1979
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS: A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car
owned and driven by petitioner Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep
owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a gravel and
sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by
Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate
Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property
were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the
CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar
of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the
collision between Salazar’s jeep and petitioner’s car was the result
of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven
by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not
a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar. After the termination of the criminal cases,
petitioner filed a civil case against respondents Salazar and Timbol
for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision
involving their vehicles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioner’s
complaint for damagesbased on quasi-delict against private
respondents.
HELD: Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The
respondent Judge wrongfully sustained Timbol’s allegations that the
civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed
against him, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was
made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the
trial and tried to prove damages against Salazar only. For
petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based
on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error when
he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that,
“When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
actor omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.” Timbol’s submission that petitioner's failure to
make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an
independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111,
Rules of Court, bars the institution of such separate civil action is
untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to Articles 2176
and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and
different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence
under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation is required to be
made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil case filed
against Timbol is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to
reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil
action based on quasi-delict. But insofar as Salazar is concerned the
answer is no. Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal
responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option
between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article
2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action,
unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the
offended party. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case
yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of
action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana
as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the
prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil
liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its
termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to
have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for
civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.
Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by
petitioner’s car for considering that the collision between the jeep
driven by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the
result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by
Montoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right
of petitioner to claim damages from Salazar did not arise.
Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been
extinguished in consonance with Section3(c) which provides that,
“Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil right arise did not exist.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 147703; April 14, 2004
NATURE:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the herein
petitioners appeal of the RTC judgement.
FACTS:
On July 1994, the accused Macadangdang was found guilty and was
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property, and was then sentenced
to suffer the penalty. The court held that Rabbit Bus Lines shall be liable
for the civil liabilities of the accused should the latter become insolvent.
Over time, the judgement against the accused become final and
executory.
Thereafter, before the execution of judgement of the RTC decision,
Macadangdang jumped bail and absconded. Thus, Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines
filed a notice of appeals, which was later denied by the trial court.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the court reiterated the liability of
Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines. The CA held that the institution of a criminal case
implied the institution of the civil action arising from the same offense.
Henceforth, the subsidiary liability of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, as the
employer of the accused, becomes conclusive.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer may appeal the judgement of conviction of its
employee-accused and question the pronouncement of subsidiary liability
HELD:
No. The judgement has already become final and executory, thus, Phil.
Rabbit in this case is subsidiarily liable.
Under Art. 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are
subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in
the event of the latter’s insolvency. These provision are deemed written in
the judgement of conviction.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case
would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgement rendered
by a competent court. Thus an appeal if made without the consent of the
accused, such as in this case, would result in improperly defeating the
ruling of conviction.
The Supreme Court has laid down the requisites before an employer can
be held subsidiarily liable:
1. They are indeed the employers of the convicted employees
2. That they are engaged in some kind of industry
3. That the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of
their duties; and
4. That the execution of judgement against the accused has not been
satisfied due to insolvency
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES,
INC., v. MODESTO CALAUNAN
G.R. No. 150157. January 25, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J:
TOPIC: Quasi-Delict; Vicarious Liability
Facts: The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit
Bus owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep, owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. The two vehicles, both
on the way to Manila, collided in NLEX, where the front right side of
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the
latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch
with water resulting to further extensive damage. Respondent
suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. By reason of
such collision, a criminal case charging petitioner Manliclic with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries. Subsequently, the respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable
while the latter is resolute in saying it was the former who caused
the smash up. Also, PRBLI maintained that it observed and
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent Calaunan and found
petitioners to be liable and PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its
employees. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Subsequently,
petitioners informed the SC that the CA, in the criminal case,
acquitted Manliclic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners Maniliclic and PBLRI are liable?
Held: Yes.
First, the Court found Manliclic can still be held liable
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there
was an absence of negligence on his part. This is because quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime—a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra- contractual. The same negligence
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal
of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict. The civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana,
same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on
ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of
the act or omission complained of. From the foregoing, the Court
found Manliclic to be negligent, affirming the trial court for giving
credence to respondent’s testimony.
Second, having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence
that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption
that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. Art. 2180,
NCC, provides that when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. In the selection of prospective
employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of
employees, the employer must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof.
In this case, the trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but not in the
supervision of its employees. The Court found that has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its
vehicles. As to supervision, there has been no iota of evidence
introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus
company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way
its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them.
Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident,
should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to
do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there
is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all
the drivers of PRBLI.
Therefore, PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages
caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M.
EROLES, respondents
G.R. No. 141910
August 6, 2002
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on
18 June 1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators
aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the
plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway
in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in
Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north diversion
road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac,
it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep
canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid
to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in
the sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the
rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought
reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS.
Since the trucking company failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a
complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against
GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer, respondents asserted that
GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common
carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was
purely accidental.

CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF CONTRACT / CULPA
CONTRACTUAL
DEFENSE: GPS IS NOT A COMMON CARRIER
SINCE IT ONLY RENDERS
SERVICES, EXCLUSIVELY TO CONCEPION INDUSTRIES
SINCE 1988 AND THE CAUSE
OF THE DAMAGE IS PURELY
ACCIDENTAL
ISSUE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON
CARRIER OR A PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO
HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT UNDERTOOK
TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED
WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that notwithstanding the petitioner's failure
to prove that GPS trucking is a common carrier and the presumption
of negligence attaches, GPS alone may be held liable for damages
for breach of contract. No liability or whatsoever may be attached to
Lambert Eroles because the cause of action is Culpa Contractual.
Liability of Eroles wouldn't be same should the petitioners decided to
file a Culpa Aquiliana (Cause of Action) Case since it would no
longer require binding contract between parties, it is enough that
there has been an act or omission, damage or injury to another
caused by fault or negligence, and no pre-existing contractual
obligation.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA
JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO
SALVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000.
MENDOZA, J.:
Topic: Quasi-Delict as Distinguished from a Breach of Contract
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University,
took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity, Sunga was given by
the conductor an “extension seat,” a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way, the jeepney stopped
to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle,
Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured and her confinement in the hospital lasted
from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr.
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would
remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to
ambulate in crutches during said period.
Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas,
on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third party
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the
driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on
a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier
failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The
appellate court dismissed the thirdp arty complaint against Salva
and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates his liability and contends that the bumping of the jeepney by
the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
Issue:
Whether or not the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 applies in this case,
and consequently absolves the petitioner of any liability against the
private respondent?
Held:
No, it does not apply.
The issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver
Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner’s jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon
the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756
of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create
the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned,
some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the
diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of
passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of
death or injury to passengers. (See Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the
NCC)
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of
petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers. The driver of jeepney carry Sunga did not
carry the latter “safely as far as human care and foresight could
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances”
The jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. The fact that
Sunga was seated in an “extension seat” placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained
by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with a
modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.
Tort distinguished from breach of contract
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA,
CARLOS C. SYQUIA and ANTHONY C. SYQUIA vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC.
G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993, J. Campos, Jr.
FACTS:
Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in a
contract of Deed of Sale and Interment Order with Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery Inc (MMPCI). In the contract, there contained a
provision which stated that the coffin would be placed in a sealed
concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased from the
elements.
During the preparation for the transfer of Vicente’s remains in the
newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it was discovered that there
was a hole in the concrete vault which caused total flooding inside,
damaged the coffin as well as the body of the deceased and
covered the same with filth. Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of
damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict against
the MMPCI for failure to deliver a defect-free concrete vault to
protect the remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI claimed
that the boring of the hole was necessary in order to prevent the
vault from floating when water fills the grave. The trial court
dismissed the complaint holding that there was no quasi-delict
because the defendant is not guilty of any fault or negligence and
because there was a pre-existing contract between the parties. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is guilty of tort
HELD:
No, decision of the CA affirmed.
There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a
reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the
pleas of the petitioners. Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent’s
Court finding that there was no negligence.
 
“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or  negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x.”
The facts of the case shows that the Syquias and the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled “Deed
of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care” on August 27, 1969. That
agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their
respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual
negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana,but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170
of the Civil Code, to wit: “Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”
JOSEPH SALUDAGA vs FEU and EDILBERTO DE JESUS
G.R. NO. 179337
TOPIC: BREACH OF CONTRACT / CULPA CONTRACTUAL
FACTS:
- Petitioner Saludaga was a sophomore law student at FEU
when he was shot within the school premises by one of FEU’s
security guard Rosete.
- Petitioner Saludaga was confined due to his wounds.
- Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where
he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was
eventually released considering that no formal complaint was
filed against him.
- Petitioner Saludaga thereafter filed a complaint for damages
against respondents on the ground that they breached their
obligation to provide students with a safe and secure
environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning.
- FEU and Edilberto De Jesus(as president) then filed a Third-
Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation, the agency contracted by
respondent FEU to provide security services within its
premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Galaxy's President) to
indemnify them. Respondents aver that the shooting incident
was a fortuitous event because they could not have
reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by
 Rosete as he was not their employee; and that they complied
with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for
their students by having exercised due diligence in selecting
the security services of Galaxy
- On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party
Complaint against AFP General Insurance.
- The RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner.
- Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed and set
aside the RTC’s decision.
- Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
- Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON FEU is liable for damages for breach of contract
RULING:
Yes, FEU is liable for damages for breach of contract.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief. In the instant case, the Court finds that,
when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security
guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises,
there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with
its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its
students.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to
ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service
Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances,
psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security
agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the
qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents.
A learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish
or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it
hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Thus, the defense of force majeure must also fail. One’s negligence
may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and
injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or
proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event
would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be
partly the result of a persons participation whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act the whole occurrence is
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent
in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.
Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a
safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for
damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant
must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the
factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to
defendants acts.
SPOUSES ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK BATAL vs. SPOUSES
LUZ SAN PEDRO AND KENICHIRO TOMINAGA
G.R. No. 164601. September 27, 2006.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
TOPIC: QUASI-DELICT AS COMPARED TO BREACH OF
CONTRACT
Facts:
The spouses Luz San Pedro (Luz) and Kenichiro Tominaga
(Kenichiro), owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan, contracted the
services of Frank Batal (Frank) who represented himself as a
surveyor to conduct a survey of their lot. As Luz and Kenichiro
wanted to enclose their property, they again procured the services of
Frank for an additional fee in order to determine the exact
boundaries of the same by which they will base the construction of
their perimeter fence. Consequently, Frank placed concrete
monuments on all corners of the lot which were used as guides by
Luz and Kenichiro in erecting a concrete fence.
Luz and Kenichiro later faced a complaint before the barangay on
the ground that the northern portion of their fence encroached upon
a designated right-of-way. They also discovered that it was not
Frank but his wife Erlinda Batal (Erlinda), who is a licensed geodetic
engineer.
Hence, the Spouses Luz and Kenichiro filed an action for damages
with the RTC for failure to exercise due care and diligence. The RTC
decided in favor of Sposes Luz and Kenichiro and ordered Spouses
Batal. On appeal the CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Batal are liable for damages
Held:
Yes.
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses:
either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an
obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other
obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence
incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed,
and which increases the liability from such already existing
obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code and the immediately following Articles; while culpa contractual
is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.
Articles 1170 and 1173 provide:
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of articles 1171 and 2202, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out
their contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence
in the placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence
that was later constructed. Petitioner Frank Batal’s installation of the
concrete cyclone monuments had been done without the adequate
supervision of his wife, Erlinda, the one who is a licensed geodetic
engineer. As a result, the placement of the monuments did not
accurately reflect the dimensions of the lot. Because of the
encroachment, the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the
fence and, thus, suffered damages.
Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for
damages suffered by the respondents in accordance with Articles
1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code, which state:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are
the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG v. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS
GR No. 180440, Dec 05, 2012
Facts:
Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her
friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotel's
swimming pool facility.  At 7pm, they were informed by the hotel
attendant that the swimming pool area will be closed. They proceed
to the shower and dress up. At the time when they get out of the
shower room, the pool area was already pitch black. They carefully
walk towards the main door but it was locked. Petitioner and Delia
waited for 10 more minutes near the door hoping someone would
come to their rescue but they waited in vain.  Delia became anxious
about their situation so petitioner began to walk around to look for a
house phone.  Delia followed petitioner.  After some time, petitioner
saw a phone behind the lifeguard's counter.  While slowly walking
towards the phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned out
to be the folding wooden counter top, fell on petitioner's head that
knocked her down almost unconscious. The hotel staff arrived and
assisted the petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some
ointment on her head. Petitioner demanded the services of the hotel
physician.
After resting for a while, the petitioner eel extraordinary dizziness
accompanied by an uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which
lasted until the following day.  Petitioner was constrained to stay at
home, thus, missing all her important appointments with her
patients.  She also began experiencing "on" and "off" severe
headaches that caused her three (3) sleepless nights.
Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a different physicians (both in the
Ph and USA)who found that he suffered very serious brain injury.
Petitioner also started to feel losing her memory, which greatly
affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession.
The trial court found petitioner's testimony self-serving, thus, devoid
of credibility. 
Petitioner failed to present any evidence to substantiate
her allegation that the lights in the hotel's swimming pool area were
shut off at the time of the incident.  She did not even present her
friend, Delia, to corroborate her testimony. 
The respondent testified that the normal practice of the hotel
management was not to put off the lights until 10:00 p.m. to allow
the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool area.
As such, petitioner would not have met the accident had she only
acted with care and caution.
Emphatically, petitioner cannot fault the hotel for the injury she
sustained as she herself did not heed the warning that the swimming
pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.  As such, since
petitioner's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of her injury, she cannot recover damages.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the findings and
conclusions of the trial court.
It cannot be gainsaid that [herein petitioner's] use of the hotel's pool
was only upon the invitation of [Delia], the hotel's registered
guest.  As such, she cannot claim contractual relationship
between her and the hotel.  Since the circumstances of the
present case do not evince a contractual relation between
[petitioner] and [respondents], the rules on quasi-delict, thus,
govern.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the cause of action of the petitioner can be based on
both breach of contract and tort.
Held:
Petitioner asserts that the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar any liability for tort since the act that breaks a
contract may also be a tort.  Hence, the concept of change of theory
of cause of action pointed to by respondents is irrelevant.
Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on
account of their negligence but not on any breach of contract.  proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on
Surprisingly, when the case was elevated on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner had a change of heart and later claimed that an
implied contract existed between her and respondents PHI and
DTPCI and that the latter were liable for breach of their obligation to
keep her safe and out of harm.  This allegation was never an issue
before the trial court.  It was not the cause of action relied upon by
the petitioner not until the case was before the Court of Appeals.  necessarily cause injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI.  First,
Presently, petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based
both on quasi-delict and breach of contract.
Petitioner's belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of
action cannot be sanctioned by this Court.  Well-settled is the rule
that a party is not allowed to change the theory of the case or the
cause of action on appeal.  Matters, theories or arguments not
submitted before the trial court cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal or certiorari.  When a party adopts a certain theory in
the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.[73]  Hence, a party is bound by the
theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and
cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory
and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the
matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal.
In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the
following differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and
breach of contract (culpa contractual).  In quasi-delict, negligence is
direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of contract,
negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual
obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation.[75]  In quasi-
delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and
proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are
concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and
proper defense in the selection and supervision of employees.
[76] In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is
incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the
defendant, otherwise, the former's complaint will be dismissed, while
in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be
the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying
out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed.
Viewed from the foregoing, petitioner's change of theory or cause of
action from quasi-delict to breach of contract only on appeal would
the latter will have no more opportunity to present evidence to
contradict petitioner's new argument.  Second, the burden of proof
will be shifted from petitioner to respondents PHI and DTPCI. 
Petitioner's change of theory from quasi-delict to breach of contract
must be repudiated.
All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI
and DTPCI, as well as their management and staff, they cannot be
made liable to pay for the millions of damages prayed for by the
petitioner.  Since respondents PHI and DTPCI are not liable, it
necessarily follows that respondent First Lepanto cannot also be
made liable under the contract of insurance.
G.R. No. 164349. January 31, 2006.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),
petitioner, vs. ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-
INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA VER-CHEZ-CATIBOG,
AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG, respondents.
FACTS:
 Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital. Thereafter, her daughter Grace hired the
services of Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) to
send a telegram to her sister Zenaida asking for financial aid.
No response was received by Grace so she sent a letter to
Zenaida. After she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida left for
Sorsogon. She disclaimed having received any telegram.
In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband brought Editha to the
Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City. The telegram was
finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later.
Editha’s husband Alfonso demanded an explanation from the
manager of the Service Quality Control Department of the RCPI,
Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied that delivery was not immediately
effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond
the control and foresight of RCPI. Among others, during the
transmission process, the radio link connecting the points of
communication involved encountered radio noise and interferences
such that subject telegram did not initially registered (sic) in the
receiving teleprinter machine.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died. Alfonso, along with his daughters
Grace and Zenaida, filed a complaint against RCPI before the RTC
of Sorsogon for damages alleging that the delay in delivering the
telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their
damage and prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
RCPI filed its answer, alleging that: 1) any delay in the sending of
the telegram was due to force majeure; 2) it observed due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees; and 3) at all
events, any cause of action had been barred by laches.
Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch
the telegram at the earliest possible time but that it did not in view of
the negligence of its employees to repair its radio transmitter the trial
court, upon the following provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
“Article 2176—Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being at fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Accordingly, the award includes the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February 27,
2004, affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, RCPI’s present
petition for review on certiorari questioning the award of moral
damages. RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal
connection between its delay in transmitting the telegram and
Editha’s death.
ISSUE:
Is the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court found
that there was no direct connection between the injury and the
alleged negligent acts?
HELD:
RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored
on culpa contractual or breach of contract with regard to Grace, and
on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents.
As for Culpa Contractual Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (Italics supplied)
“In culpa contractual the mere proof of the existence of the
contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence or of
the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing
liability.” In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram
within the shortest possible time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI
to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure the alleged radio noise and
interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or
reception of the telegraphic message.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that
one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. When the effect is found to be partly the result
of a person’s participation the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. In other words,
there must be an exclusion of human intervention from the cause of
injury or loss.”
 As for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-respondents
following Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it
could prove that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage but RCPI failed to prove such.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a
determination of the presence of the following requisites to justify the
award is in order:
Firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;  relations of another. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established;  RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation
Thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is
the proximate cause of damages sustained by the claimant; and  her co-respondents.
Fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.
Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the
plaintiffs-herein respondents was correctly appreciated by the CA in
this wise: The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram on time,
disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members blamed each other
for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency that involved the life of
the late Mrs. Verchez, As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the
second and third requisites are present.
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches
of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it
did not inform Grace of the non-delivery thereof and waited for 12
days before trying to deliver it again, knowing—as it should know—
that time is of the essence in the delivery of telegrams. When its
second long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram again failed, it,
again, waited for another 12 days before making a third attempt.
Such nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation indicates gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth requisite is thus also
present.
Accordingly, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides: Moral
damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention,
and other relief:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also
PETITION DISMISSED.
AIR FRANCE V. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO AND CA
No. L-21438, September 29, 1966
Sanchez, J.
TOPIC: Tort as distinguished from a Breach of Contract
FACTS:
Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48
Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to Carrascoso a
'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced him to vacate the 'first class'
seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager
alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat.
When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, Carrascoso, as was to be
expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according
to said Ernesto G, Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man
[manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man and plaintiff reluctantly
gave his 'first class' seat. in the plane.
The CFI ordered Air France to pay petitioner damages and the
difference in the fare between first class and tourist class. The CA
affirmed it but slightly reduce the amount of the refund.
ISSUE:
Was there a breach of contract between Air France and Rafael
Carrascoso?
HELD:
Yes, there was a breach of contract.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect
or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier.
The relation of a passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin
an nature, nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract may also be
a tort.
The contract of Air France with Carrascoso is one attended with
public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is
placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the petitioner air carrier—a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
Purita Miranda Vestil and Agustin Vestil, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, David Uy and Teresita Uy,
respondents
November 6, 1989
Topic: Specific Cases of Liability: Possessor of Animals
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Facts: On July 29, 1975, Theness Uy, child of the respondents, was
bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners
in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita, at F.
Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the hospital and was
discharged after 9 days but was re-admitted 1 week later due to
“vomiting of saliva.” The following day, she died. Cause of death,
broncho-pneumonia. 7 months later, the Uys sued for damages,
alleging that Vestils were liable as the possessors of “Andoy,” the
dog.
Petitioners Contention: Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner
of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet
been partitioned and there are other heirs. They further allege that
the dog was a tame animal and that they could not be expected to
exercise remote control of the dog. They also argue that even
assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness,
there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Vestils may be held liable for the death
of Theness?
Held: Yes. What must be determined is the possession of the dog
that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of
the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape
or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come from force majeure or from
the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which
was still part of Vicente Miranda’s estate, there is no doubt that she
and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City. Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her family used the property
as their second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing
in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog.
The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente
Miranda.
Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the
animal should “escape or be lost” and so be removed from his
control. And it does not matter that the dog was tame and was
merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak
only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they
cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget
that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked
and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the
animal.
As to the cause of death of Theness, the latter developed
hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and
second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused
her death, was a complication of rabies, and lastly, that Theness
became afraid of water as established by the testimony of an expert.
Moreover, as held in a different case, death certificate is not
conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death.
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the
Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack
of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) AND MS.
LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295, October 18, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
TOPIC: As Distinguished from a Breach of Contract; Product
Liability
FACTS: Lydia Geronimo was the proprietress of Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft
drinks to the students of said school and the public. However, some
parents began complaining that the sodas sold by her contained
fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles. When she
checked her stocks, she saw for herself the foreign matter
complained of. As a result, she brought the said bottles to the
Regional Health Office of the Department of Health for examination,
which then confirmed that the samples she submitted were
adulterated*.
As a result, her sales plummeted and eventually she lost her
shop. Aggrieved, she filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioner. Petitioners rebuffed and moved to dismiss the complaint.
They argue that the action has already prescribed since the
complaint is one for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the
Civil Code. Private respondent alleges that her complaint was
seasonably filed since her cause of action is based on an injury to
her right which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article
1146 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding, the RTC granted the motion
to dismiss, and denied the reconsideration. She then went straight to
the SC, but the latter remanded to the CA. The CA reversed the
RTC and stated that the complaint is one for quasi-delict.
ISSUES: Whether or not the action for damages by the proprietress
against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for
breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or
merchantability, as claimed by the manufacturer, the petitioner
herein which must therefore be filed within six months from the
delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code,
or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which can
be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code

HELD: Quasi-delict. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the

cause of action is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant
to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is
supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly
paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and
negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold
for public consumption."
While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between
the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on
quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-
delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-
delict. Otherwise put, the existence of a contract between the parties
does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other
and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. The liability for
quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations.

NOTE: Adulterated – something rendered to be poorer in quality by

the addition of another substance, typically an inferior one;
contaminated.