Villaroel vs. Estrada | 74 Phil 997 | 19 Dec.

1940

On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, the mother of the defendant Juan F. Villarroel,
obtained from the Mariano Estrada and Severina spouses a loan of P1,000 payable after
seven years (Exhibit A). Alejandra passed away, leaving the defendant as the sole heir.
The spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina also died, leaving the plaintiff Bernardino
Estrada as the sole heir. On August 9, 1930, the defendant subscribed a document
(Exhibit B) by which he declares in duty to the plaintiff the amount of P1,000, with an
interest of 12 percent per year. This action is about the collection of this amount.

The Court of First Instance of Laguna, in which this action was filed, ordered the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount claimed of P1,000 with his legal interests of 12
percent a year from August 9, 1930 to its full payment. Appeal of this sentence.

It will be noted that the parties in the present case are, respectively, the sole heirs of the
original creditors and the debtor. This action is exercised by virtue of the obligation that
the defendant as the only son of the original debtor contracted in favor of the plaintiff,
sole heir of the primitive creditors. It is admitted that the amount of P1,000 to which this
obligation is contracted is the same debt of the defendant's mother to the parents of the
applicant.lawphil.net

Although the action to recover the original debt has already prescribed when the claim
was filed in this case, the question that arises in this appeal is mainly the question of
whether, notwithstanding such a prescription, the action is appropriate. However, the
present action is not based on the original obligation contracted by the defendant's
mother, which has already been prescribed, but on the one contracted by the defendant
on August 9, 1930 (Exhibit B) upon assuming compliance with that obligation, already
prescribed. Being the defendant the only heir of the original debtor, with the right to
succeed her in her inheritance, that debt legally brought by her mother, although it lost
its effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for the moral obligation, which is
considered enough to create and make effective and enforceable its obligation voluntarily
contracted on August 9, 1930 in Exhibit B.

The rule that a new promise to pay a prescreened debt must be made by the same
obligated person or by another legally authorized by it, is not applicable to the present
case in which compliance with the obligation of the originally obliged is not required, but
which you des voluntarily wanted to assume this obligation.

The sentence appealed is confirmed, with the costs to the appellant. This is how it is
ordered.

Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, MM., Are satisfied.

Ansay vs. Board of Directors of National Devt. Company | G.R. No. L-13667 | 29
April 1960

DECISION
PARAS, C.J.:

On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955.
The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued the following order:

''Considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this morning;
considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru counsel and
there was no appearance for the plaintiffs' although the court waited for sometime for
them; considering, however, that petitioners have submitted an opposition which the
court will consider together with the arguments, presented by respondents and the
Exhibits marked and presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to
dismiss; considering that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a
Christmas bonus for petitioners workers in the National Development Company;
considering that the Court does not sec how petitioners may have a cause of action to
secure such bonus because:

"(a) A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial
powers to command respondents to be liberal;

"(b) Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but
that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation
of respondents to give that but as this Court understands, it has no power to compel a
party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code).

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs."

A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this appeal.

Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their
claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is denned by law as a natural obligation.

Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed
bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that
they discussed in their brief, this Court feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the
definition and meaning of natural obligation.

Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil
obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not
being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action
to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they
authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof".

It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by
the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but
only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary
performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.
At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine Education
Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees (NUL) (92 Phil., 381;
48 Off. Gaz., 5278)

*******

"From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It
is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary compensation."

And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National Labor Union,
et al., 95 Phil, 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:

"Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or
compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on equitable
consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in succeeding two years
from low salaried employees due to salary increases."

still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one, and hence the
ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the present action.

Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera

and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

DBP vs. Confesor | G.R. No. L-48889 | 11 May 1988

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in this petition for review on certiorari is the validity of a promissory
note which was executed in consideration of a previous promissory note the enforcement
of which had been barred by prescription.

On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an
agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine Currency, as
evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves jointly and
severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. As the obligation
remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period,
Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a
second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and
promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961. The new promissory note reads
as follows --
"I hereby promise to pay the amount covered by my promissory note on or before June
15, 1961. Upon my failure to do so, I hereby agree to the foreclosure of my mortgage. It
is understood that if I can secure a certificate of indebtedness from the government of
my back pay I will be allowed to pay the amount out of it."

Said spouses not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the DBP filed a
complaint dated September 11, 1970 in the City Court of Iloilo City against the spouses
for the payment of the loan.

After trial on the merits a decision was rendered by the inferior court on December 27,
1976, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment, ordering the

defendants Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte Confesor to pay the plaintiff
Development Bank of the Philippines, jointly and severally, (a) the sum of P5,760.96 plus
additional daily interest of P1.04 from September 17, 1970, the date Complaint was
filed, until said amount is paid; (b) the sum of P576.00 equivalent to ten (10%) of the
total claim by way of attorney's fees and incidental expenses plus interest at the legal
rate as of September 17, 1970, until fully paid; and (c) the costs of the suit."

Defendants-spouses appealed therefrom to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo wherein

in due course a decision was rendered on April 28, 1978 reversing the appealed decision
and dismissing the complaint and counter-claim with costs against the plaintiff.

A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by plaintiff was denied in an order of
August 10, 1978.

Hence this petition wherein petitioner alleged that the decision of respondent judge is
contrary to law and runs counter to decisions of this Court when respondent judge (a)
refused to recognize the law that the right to prescription may be renounced or waived;
and (b) that in signing the second promissory note respondent Patricio Confessor can
bind the conjugal partnership; or otherwise said respondent became liable in his
personal capacity.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 1112 of Civil Code
provides:
"Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already
obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future.

Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results
from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired."

There is no doubt that prescription has set as to the first promissory note of February
10, 1940. However, when respondent Confesor executed the second promissory note on
April 11, 1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous
promissory note on or before June 15, 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the
foreclosure of the mortgage, said respondent thereby effectively and expressly renounced
and waived his right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note.

This Court had ruled in a similar case that -

"x x x when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the
creditor. But a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be
valid and enforceable x x x."[1]

Thus, it has been held -

"Where, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and promises to pay it
after the same has prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby
waives the benefit of prescription."[2]

This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new
promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-existing
obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but
does not discharge the debt.

"A new express promise to pay a debt barred x x x will take the case from the operation
of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory
limitation merely bars the remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is something
more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wit -- a pre-existing debt
which is a sufficient consideration for the new promise; the new promise upon this
sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action." [3]

"x x x x x It is this new promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an
acknowledgement as a legal implication, which is to be regarded as reanimating the old
promise, or as imparting vitality to the remedy (which by lapse of time had become
extinct) and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his original contract." [4]

However, the court a quo held that in signing the promissory note alone, respondent
Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife, respondent Jovita Villafuerte, citing Article 166 of
the New Civil Code which provides:

"Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is
under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she
refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same."
We disagree. Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.[5] No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory
note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable
for this obligation.

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the petition is reversed and set aside and another
decision is hereby rendered reinstating the decision of the City Court of Iloilo City of
December 27, 1976, without pronouncement as to costs in this instance. This decision is
immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to file motion for
reconsideration shall be granted.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur. Griño-Aquino, J., no part. The Confessors are my
relatives.

[1]
Villaroel vs. Estrada, 71 Phil. 140.

[2]
Tauch vs. Gondram, 20 La. Ann. 156, cited on page 7, Vol. 4, Tolentino's New Civil
Code of the Philippines.

[3]
Johnson vs. Evans, 50 Am. Dec. 669.

[4]
Mattingly vs. Boyd, 20 How (US) 128, 15 Led 845; St. John vs. Garrow, 4 Port. (Ala)
223, 29 Am. Dec. 280. American Jurisprudence Vol. 34, page 233 (Statute of
Limitations).

[5]
Article 161(1), Civil Code.

Heirs of Roldan vs. Heirs of Roldan and Heirs of Magtulis

DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision and Resolution, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The RTC ruled that petitioner heirs of Gilberto Roldan, respondent heirs of Silvela
Roldan, and respondent heirs of Leopoldo Magtulis are co-owners of Lot No. 4696.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Natalia Magtulis owned Lot No. 4696, an agricultural land in Kalibo, Aklan, which had
an area of 21,739 square meters, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
7711. Her heirs included Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan, her two children by her
first marriage; and, allegedly, Leopolda Magtulis her child with another man named
Juan Aguirre. After her death in 1961, Natalia left the lot to her children. However,
Gilberta and his heirs took possession of the property to the exclusion of respondents.

On 19 May 2003, respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Partition and
Damages against petitioners. The latter refused to yield the property on these grounds:
(1) respondent heirs of Silvela had already sold her share to Gilberto; and (2) respondent
heirs of Leopolda had no cause of action, given that he was not a child of Natalia.

During trial, petitioners failed to show any document evidencing the sale of Silvela's
share to Gilberto. Thus, in its Decision dated 14 December 2007, the RTC ruled that the
heirs of Silvela remained co-owners of the property they had inherited from Natalia. As
regards Leopoldo Magtulis, the trial court concluded that he was a son of Natalia based
on his Certificate of Baptism and Marriage Contract.

Considering that Gilberta, Silvela, and Leopolda were all descendants of Natalia, the RTC
declared each set of their respective heirs entitled to one-third share of the property.
Consequently, it ordered petitioners to account and deliver to respondents their equal
share to the produce of the land.

Petitioners appealed to the CA. They reiterated that Silvela had sold her share of the
property to her brother Gilberta. They asserted that the RTC could not have considered
Leopolda the son of Natalia on the mere basis of his Certificate of Baptism. Emphasizing
that filiation required a high standard of proof, petitioners argued that the baptismal
certificate of Leopoldo served only as evidence of the administration of the sacrament.

In its Decision dated 20 December 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that
Gilberto, Silvela, and Leopoldo remained co-owners of Lot No. 4696. The appellate court
refused to conclude that Silvela had sold her shares to Gilberto without any document
evidencing a sales transaction. It also held that Leopoldo was the son of Natalia, since
his Certificate of Baptism and Marriage Contract indicated her as his mother.

Petitioner heirs of Gilberto moved for reconsideration, but to no avail. Before this Court,
they reiterate that Silvela sold her shares to Gilberto, and that Leopoldo was not the son
of Natalia. They emphasize that the certificates of baptism and marriage do not prove
Natalia to be the mother of Leopoldo since these documents were executed without her
participation.

Petitioners additionally contend that respondents lost their rights over the property,
since the action for partition was lodged before the RTC only in 2003, or 42 years since
Gilberto occupied the property in 1961. For the heirs of Gilberto, prescription and laches
already preclude the heirs of Silvela and the heirs of Leopoldo from claiming co-
ownership over Lot No. 4696.

In their Comment, respondents assert that the arguments raised by petitioners involve
questions of fact not cognizable by this Court. As regards the issue of prescription and
laches, they insist that petitioners cannot invoke a new theory for the first time on
appeal.

ISSUES OF THE CASE

The following issues are presented to this Court for resolution:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that Silvela did not sell her share
of the property to Gilberto

2. Whether the courts a quo correctly appreciated Leopoldo to be the son of Natalia

based on his baptismal and marriage certificates

3. Whether prescription and laches bar respondents from claiming coownership over Lot
No. 4696

RULING OF THE COURT

Sale of the Shares of Silvela to Gilberto

Petitioners argue before us that Silvela had a perfected contract of sale with Gilberto
over her shares of Lot No. 4696. That argument is obviously a question of fact as it
delves into the truth of whether she conveyed her rights in favor of her brother.

The assessment of the existence of the sale requires the calibration of the evidence on
record and the probative weight thereof. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, already
performed its function and found that the heirs of Gilberto had not presented any
document or witness to prove the fact of sale.

The factual determination of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, is final and
conclusive on this Court except if unsupported by the evidence on record. In this case,
the exception does not apply, as petitioners merely alleged that Silvela "sold, transferred
and conveyed her share in the land in question to Gilberto Roldan for a valuable
consideration" without particularizing the details or referring to any proof of the
transaction. Therefore, we sustain the conclusion that she remains coowner of Lot No.
4696.

Filiation of Leopoldo to Natalia

In resolving the issue of filiation, the RTC and the CA referred to Articles 172 and 175 of
the Family Code, viz.:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The parties concede that there is no record of Leopolda's birth in either the National
Statistics Office[17] or in the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan. The RTC
and the CA then referred to other means to prove the status of Leopoldo: his Certificate
of Baptism and his Marriage Contract. Since both documents indicate Natalia as the
mother of Leopoldo, the courts a quo concluded that respondent heirs of Leopoldo had
sufficiently proven the filiation of their ancestor to the original owner of Lot No. 4696.
For this reason, the RTC and the CA maintained that the heirs of Leopoldo are entitled
to an equal share of the property, together with the heirs of Gilberto and heirs of Silvela.

We disagree.

Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal certificates.

In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, which referred to our earlier rulings in Berciles v.
Government Service Insurance System and Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals,[21] the
Court explained that because the putative parent has no hand in the preparation of a
baptismal certificate, that document has scant evidentiary value. The canonical
certificate is simply a proof of the act to which the priest may certify, i.e., the
administration of the sacrament. In other words, a baptismal certificate is "no proof of
the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of
prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence."

In cases that followed Fernandez, we reiterated that a baptismal certificate is insufficient

to prove filiation. But in Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Harper, this Court
clarified that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove kinship "if considered
alongside other evidence of filiation." Therefore, to resolve one's lineage, courts must
peruse other pieces of evidence instead of relying only on a canonical record. By way of
example, we have considered the combination of testimonial evidence, family pictures, as
well as family books or charts, alongside the baptismal certificates of the claimants, in
proving kinship.

In this case, the courts below did not appreciate any other material proof related to the
baptismal certificate of Leopoldo that would establish his filiation with Natalia, whether
as a legitimate or as an illegitimate son.

The only other document considered by the RTC and the CA was the Marriage Contract
of Leopoldo. But, like his baptismal certificate, his Marriage Contract also lacks
probative value as the latter was prepared without the participation of Natalia. In Reyes
v. Court of Appeals, we held that even if the marriage contract therein stated that the
alleged father of the bride was the bride's father, that document could not be taken as
evidence of filiation, because it was not signed by the alleged father of the bride.

The instant case is similar to an issue raised in Paa v. Chan. The claimant in that case
relied upon baptismal and marriage certificates to argue filiation. The Court said:

As regards the baptismal and marriage certificates of Leoncio Chan, the same are not
competent evidence to prove that he was the illegitimate child of Bartola Maglaya by a
Chinese father. While these certificates may be considered public documents, they are
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified - which in this case were the baptism and marriage, respectively, of Leoncio
Chan - but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect
to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship.
All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo, which merely
stated that Natalia is his mother, are inadequate to prove his filiation with the property
owner. Moreover, by virtue of these documents alone, the RTC and the CA could not
have justly concluded that Leopoldo and his successors-in-interest were entitled to a
one-third share of the property left by Natalia, equal to that of each of her undisputed
legitimate children  Gilberto and Silvela.  As held in Board of Commissioners v. Dela
Rosa, a baptismal certificate is certainly not proof of the status of legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the claimant. Therefore, the CA erred in presuming the hereditary rights
of Leopoldo to be equal to those of the legitimate heirs of Natalia.

Prescription and Laches

According to petitioners, prescription and laches have clearly set in given their continued
occupation of the property in the last 42 years. Prescription cannot be appreciated
against the co-owners of a property, absent any conclusive act of repudiation made
clearly known to the other coowners.

Here, petitioners merely allege that the purported co-ownership "was already repudiated
by one of the parties" without supporting evidence. Aside from the mere passage of time,
there was failure on the part of petitioners to substantiate their allegation of laches by
proving that respondents slept on their rights. Nevertheless, had they done so, two
grounds deter them from successfully claiming the existence of prescription and laches.

First, as demanded by the repudiation requisite for prescription to be appreciated, there

is a need to determine the veracity of factual matters such as the date when the period
to bring the action commenced to run. In Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, we considered
that determination as factual in nature. The same is true in relation to finding the
existence of laches. We held in Crisostomo v. Garcia, Jr. that matters like estoppel,
laches, and fraud require the presentation of evidence and the determination of facts.
Since petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as in this
case, entertain questions of law, petitioners claim of prescription and laches fail.

Second, petitioners have alleged prescription and laches only before this Court. Raising
a new ground for the first time on appeal contravenes due process, as that act deprives
the adverse party of the opportunity to contest the assertion of the claimant. [37] Since
respondents were not able to refute the issue of prescription and laches, this Court
denies the newly raised contention of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner heirs of Gilberto
Roldan is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-
G.R. CEB-CV No. 02327 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. Only the heirs of Gilberta Roldan and Silvela Roldan are declared co-owners of the
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7711, which should be partitioned
among them in the following proportions:
a. One-half share to the heirs of Gilberta Roldan; and
b. One-half share to the heirs of Silvela Roldan.
2. Petitioners are ordered to account for and deliver to the heirs of Silvela Roldan their
one-half share on the produce of the land.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Tijam, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on official leave.