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Mughal Centralization and Local Resistance in North-Western India: An Exploration in the Ballad of Dulla Bhatti Surinder Singh Te vast corpus of medieval historical literature in Persian, includ ing chronicles and documents, has focused largely on the territo- rial expansion of the Mughal empire and the structural features of its polity. Modern scholarship, owing to an obsessive dependence on this particular genre of evidence and reluctance to consider unconven- tional sources, has generally presented a Mughal-centric reconstruc- tion of the process of state formation, The response of diverse local elements, who occupied a dominant position in the countryside and stood in sharp opposition to the expanding Mughal state, has remained somewhat peripheral to the mainstream discourse. The exact Nature of socio-political contradictions, as reflected in the endemic local resistance that swept across the settled areas, can be better comprehended by exploring the configuration of the rural society prevailing under the hereditary warrior potentates. If this be our intention, then folklore—as the art of the oppressed classes and intermediate strata that gravitate towards the lower social orders (Propp 1984: 5)—promises to illuminate several dark comers of an important historical theatre, situated in the north-western part of the Indian subcontinent. In this chapter, an attempt is being made to explore the ballad of Dulla Bhatti, with a view to understand the encounters between the Mughal state and medieval rural society. The narrative portrays the protagonist as waging a relentless struggle against the emperor Akbar from his stronghold, which was evidently located in the Rachna Doab of suba Punjab. Though entirely absent in the officially-sponsored histories, the record of his heroic deeds has been preserved in the collective memory of the Punjabis,! who have transmitted it to successive generations across four hundred years. The narrative con- tinues to inspire sensitive individuals—folklorists, ethnographers, literateurs, poets, playwrites, dramatists, folk singers, film makers and even radical political activists—on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border. It is, however, surprising that the saga failed to attract the attention of R.C. Temple, who collected a plethora of Punjabi legends in a two-volume compilation. H.A. Rose (1883) included a few excerpts from the ballad in a massive glossary on the tribes and castes of Punjab. Kishan Singh (1897), who belonged to village Sudhar in district Ludhiana and served as daffedar in the British Indian army, produced a versified account. Balwant Gargi’s (1972) short-prose variant was included in a fresh anthology of Punjabi folktales. Ahmad Salim (1973), a Pakistan-based scholar, published select passages from the narrative, which had been acquired from Ghulam Muhammad Ruliya, a traditional folk singer of Lyallpur. Gian Chand (1987) brought out an edited version of Kishan Singh’s ballad with a literary introduction, For the present purpose, I have relied essentially on the last named version as it is quite comprehensive. I have referred to other versions also so as to consider additional episodes or to identify nuances in the narrative, THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT The flat and alluvial plain of Punjab unrolled from the foothills of the Siwaliks and extended to the lower valley of the Indus. This vast stretch, sloping gently towards the south-west, was drained by perennial rivers and seasonal streams. The interfluvial tracts (doabs) between the rivers rose from the flanking low flood plains (bets) and culminated in the somewhat arid central uplands (bars). The rainfall was sufficient in the northern submontanous belt, but declined progressively towards Multan. The scarcity of water was met by wells, which were operated by Persian wheels in the regions of Lahore, Dipalpur and Sirhind.? Extreme temperatures in summer and winter, coupled with two distinct but unequal rainy seasons, imposed an annual agricultural schedule of two crops. Abul Fazi testifies the fertility and populousness of Punjab (Abul Faz] 1978: 316), but overlooks the impact of local variations and natural calamities. Industrial production and urban dynamism had not achieved the levels noticed a century later by Sujan Rai Bhandari.’ But portents of a vibrant economy were visible during Akbar’s reign in the revival of long-distance trade between northern India and Central Asia as well as the regional commercial network that radiated from Lahore in all directions. Contemporary observers were deeply impressed with the state of tree-lined land routes, which were dotted with milestones at regular intervals Jahangir: 100; Khan 1865: 127; Husaini 1978; 279). Travellers could break their journey at well- equipped inns (sarais). Masonry bridges had been erected on seasonal streams, while the rivers were either forded or crossed by boats available at numerous ferries. The participation of non-elite sections of society in local festivals and annual pilgrimages laid the foundation of a popular culture, which was non-sectarian and pluralistic in both form and content. The Sikh gurus and Muslim mystics, through the medium of devotional lyrics in Punjabi, challenged the domination of privi- leged classes and pleaded for an egalitarian social structure. The desire to establish a firm control over Punjab—in view of its abundant economic resources and strategic location—prepared the ground for an intense conflict among the ruling elite during the sixteenth century. The Mughals were locked in a sustained military confrontation with three political structures in a particular sequential order, namely, the scattered Afghan potentates, the hereditary chiefs of autonomous principalities and the rural elites presiding over peas- ant communities. The long tenures of the Lodi governors were termi- nated by the incursions of Babur, who appointed his own officers in the major administrative centres. Mirza Kamran, while exercising sovereign power in Punjab and Afghanistan for a period of nearly 10 years (1530-1540), managed to control the frontier tribes and thwart the Persian designs on Qandhar, besides sending military expeditions to Kashmir and Rajputana (Khan 1964: 8-14). Sher Shah Sur (r. 1540- 1545) not only drove out Humayun and Mirza Kamran from Punjab, but also inflicted terrible repression on the Gakkhars in the upper teaches of the Sind Sagar Doab and constructed the fort of Rohtas to block the return of the Mughals. Haibat Khan Niyazi, the Afghan governor of Punjab, wrested Multan from the Baloch, Jat and Langah tribes. Sher Shah's successor, Islam Shah (r. 1545-1553), carried out an extensive military operation in north-western Punjab, with the twin object of subjugating the refractory Gakkhars and the rebellious Niyazi Afghans (Malik and Razi 1988: 94~98). He also constructed a massive fort complex at Mankot on the eastern bank of the Chenab. The restoration of Mughal rule under Humayun forced Sikandar Khan Sur, the last scion of the Sur dynasty, to seek shelter in the northern hills. Akbar paid a considerable attention to the affairs of Punjab, with the larger purpose of consolidating the Mughal empire. Apart from putting an end to the alliance between Sikandar Khan Sur and the 92 MUGHAL CENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL RESISTANCE IN NORTH-WESTERN INDIA chiefs of hill principalities, Akbar had to contend with the rebellion of Bairam Khan and the intrusion of Mirza Hakim from Kabul. He assigned the administration of Punjab to clans of prominent nobles— Shamsuddin Atka Khan, Mir Muhammad Khan, Husain Quli Khan, Said Khan and Raja Bhagwan Das—whose services were often utilized to impose Mughal control over Kabul. From 1580 onwards, the reorganisation of the provincial administration—with the creation of 12 subas and the appointment for each a team of functionaries including the subadar, diwan, bakshi, mir adl, kotwal, mir bahr and wagai nawis—enabled the Mughal state to register its presence in hitherto untouched localities and among unpacified rural elites. During a period of over 13 years (1585-1598) when the metropolis of Lahore served as the imperial capital, Akbar undertook the annexation of Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan, besides the subjugation of several trans-Indus Afghan tribes. On its north-east, the Punjab plain was flanked by the various Himalayan ranges. Thickly forested and difficult to access, the moun- tains enabled numerous petty principalities to retain their autonomy, despite sporadic raids from the plains. Babur forced the Janjuha and Gakkhar chiefs, who exercised zamindari rights in the upper Sind Sagar Doab, to pay tribute and render military service. He ousted Ghazi Khan, the son of Daulat Khan Lodi, from the citadel of Milwat in the Siwaliks and (on his march to Delhi) subjugated the strongholds of Kotla, Ginguta, Harur, Kahlur and all the hill forts of the neighbourhood (Babur 1970; 460-64). Khawas Khan, a general of Sher Shah, succeeded in occupying the fort of Nagarkot, paving the way for Hamid Khan Kakar to exercise his contro! over a large hilly tract extending from Kangra to Jammu. Akbar's political vision was much wider than that of his predecessors. He took a deeper interest in the affairs of the local chiefs, particularly because some of them were found. collaborating with known anti-Mughal elements. After subjugating the fort of Mankot, Akbar ordered Bakht Mal, the chief of Mau who was a strong supporter of Sikandar Khan Sur, to be put to death and replaced by his brother Takht Mal. He deprived Adam Khan Gakkhar of his ancestral domain and assigned it to his nephew Kamal Khan Gakkhar, who provided faithful military services on several occasions, He chastised Raja Kapur Chand of Jammu (1558) and Raja Ganesh of Nadaun (1562), so that a large number of northern zamindars paid homage to him, when he reached Lahore (1566) to contend with Mirza Hakim. A decade later, Husain Quli Khan, the governor of Punjab, besieged the fort of Nagarkot and forced the local chief to accept the position of a vassal, besides joining the imperial campaign against Ibrahim 4 MUGHAL CENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL RESISTANCE IN NORTH-¥VESTERN INDIA in the newly-settled villages, while their leaders acquired the hereditary status of zamindars, implying a customary share in the produce and miscellaneous services from the non-cultivating groups. Entrenched in fortified castles and served by a mixed body of retainers, they enjoyed autonomous power and social prestige in well-defined rural pockets. They paid an occasional tribute to the town-based representatives of the contemporary sovereign power, mostly when coerced to do so by superior military force. The long period of political instability, caused by the Mughal-Afghan conflict for supremacy, as well as the turbu- lence of the Gakkhars and Niyazis, provided ample opportunity for the rural elites to indulge in self-aggrandisement. The above situation began to change when, with the accession of Akbar as emperor, a series of measures were introduced to restructure the agrarian economy of north Indian plains. A number of parganas, with homogeneous climatic features and fertility levels, were consti- tuted into a revenue circle which was placed under the charge of a karori. Under a comprehensive project of village-level surveys, a huge amount of information was collected on areas under cultivation, agricultural output, local prices, castes holding zamindari rights and military resources of the zamindars (Abul Fazl 1977 Vol. III: 166-67, 413-14, $61-65; 1978 Vol. Il; 87-88, 119-20, 320-28). On the basis of statistics for the past 10 years pertaining to yields and prices, a standard assessment for each crop was determined, so that it became possible to express the state’s share from each cultivator in cash. In this manner, a reasonable allowance was made for variations between different localities (revenue circles) regarding yields and prices. Termed as zabt in the official parlance, the new system permitted the assessment to be made for the entire village and imposed the responsibility of smooth payment on the local zamindars, who were supposed to submit written undertakings confirming their obligation (Habib 1999: 243-54; Richards 1993: 84-85). The actual collection of land tax was made from a common fund created by the members of the village community, but which was effectively controlled by a few dominant elements. It must be pointed out here that it was only in a small part of the imperial territories, comprising the crown lands (khalisa), that the Mughal state realized its claim through its revenue-collecting machinery, In the temaining parts of the Mughal domains, scores of mansab-holding officers, who were assigned revenue assignments (jagirs) in lieu of their salaries, undertook this exercise through their authorized agents. Sacred establishments and religious scholars were also permitted to enjoy the revenues accruing from their land grants (madad-i-maash) Whoever was the claimant—the Mughal emperor, mansabdars or land grantees—the collection was made almost invariably through the 4 MUGHAL CENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL RESISTANCE IN NORTH-¥VESTERN INDIA in the newly-settled villages, while their leaders acquired the hereditary status of zamindars, implying a customary share in the produce and miscellaneous services from the non-cultivating groups. Entrenched in fortified castles and served by a mixed body of retainers, they enjoyed autonomous power and social prestige in well-defined rural pockets. They paid an occasional tribute to the town-based representatives of the contemporary sovereign power, mostly when coerced to do so by superior military force. The long period of political instability, caused by the Mughal-Afghan conflict for supremacy, as well as the turbu- lence of the Gakkhars and Niyazis, provided ample opportunity for the rural elites to indulge in self-aggrandisement. The above situation began to change when, with the accession of Akbar as emperor, a series of measures were introduced to restructure the agrarian economy of north Indian plains. A number of parganas, with homogeneous climatic features and fertility levels, were consti- tuted into a revenue circle which was placed under the charge of a karori. Under a comprehensive project of village-level surveys, a huge amount of information was collected on areas under cultivation, agricultural output, local prices, castes holding zamindari rights and military resources of the zamindars (Abul Fazl 1977 Vol. III: 166-67, 413-14, $61-65; 1978 Vol. Il; 87-88, 119-20, 320-28). On the basis of statistics for the past 10 years pertaining to yields and prices, a standard assessment for each crop was determined, so that it became possible to express the state’s share from each cultivator in cash. In this manner, a reasonable allowance was made for variations between different localities (revenue circles) regarding yields and prices. Termed as zabt in the official parlance, the new system permitted the assessment to be made for the entire village and imposed the responsibility of smooth payment on the local zamindars, who were supposed to submit written undertakings confirming their obligation (Habib 1999: 243-54; Richards 1993: 84-85). The actual collection of land tax was made from a common fund created by the members of the village community, but which was effectively controlled by a few dominant elements. It must be pointed out here that it was only in a small part of the imperial territories, comprising the crown lands (khalisa), that the Mughal state realized its claim through its revenue-collecting machinery, In the temaining parts of the Mughal domains, scores of mansab-holding officers, who were assigned revenue assignments (jagirs) in lieu of their salaries, undertook this exercise through their authorized agents. Sacred establishments and religious scholars were also permitted to enjoy the revenues accruing from their land grants (madad-i-maash) Whoever was the claimant—the Mughal emperor, mansabdars or land grantees—the collection was made almost invariably through the intermediacy of the local zamindars, who constituted a crucial link in the massive operation of surplus extraction. In the above circumstances, it was understandable that the Mughal state should structure its administration in a manner that the zamindars were induced, by coercion or conciliation, to extend faithful coopera- tion to the revenue collectors. The attitude of the Mughal state towards the local magnates was best reflected in the role of faujdars, who were appointed in every territorial subdivision comprising several parganas (territorial units for revenue and administrative purposes in the Mughal state). A faujdar (commandant responsible for maintaining peace and order in a group of parganas) was required to collect information from the ganungos (a pargana-level officer responsible for revenue assessment and record keeping) regarding the strength and intentions of zamindars; to ensure the regular payment of land tax by the Zamtindars; to chastise those zamindars who defied the Mughal authority by refusing to pay this tax; to cut jungles and guard roads leading to the countryside; to prevent the blacksmiths from manufac- turing matchlocks; to prop up the rivals of the rebellious zamindars and to assist the former with troops so as to crush the malcontents; to transfer the lands of the vanquished zamindars to their rivals; to keep his troops in battle-worthy condition and practice the use of various weapons; to encamp at a safe distance from the village while assaulting a rival stronghold; to inflict losses on the rebels at every opportunity without risking a general engagement; to avoid employ- ing his cavalry if the purpose could be achieved with infantry; to recover the arrears of land revenue out of spoils collected during the assault on the rebel village; and to conciliate the news writers and news carriers so that they send favourable reports leading to his advance- ment, and so on (Abul Fazl 1978: 41-42; Bihari: ff. 16-17a; Srivastava 1879; 68-71; and Sarkar 1972: 143-44). There is no doubt that the most important function of the faujdar, if not the only one, was to pacify ‘the rural society by converting the zamindars into faithful allies of the Mughal state. The restructuring of the agrarian economy, which was worked out in the Indo-Gangetic plain during the second half of the sixteenth century, led to important consequences. It enabled the Mughal state to penetrate deep into rural society and achieve an unprecedented measure of centralization. The peasants were induced to sell their produce in the market, while grain dealers and money lenders rose into Prominence. The growing demand for a wide range of administrative functionaries—surveyors, collectors, accountants, clerks and scribes— swelled the ranks of the middle class. More importantly, the agrarian reforms struck hard at the political autonomy of local magnates, who YO MUGHAL CENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL KESISTANCE IN NORTH-VVESTERN INDIA were forced to accept a reduced share in the agricultural surplus. They were not only deprived of their traditional privileges, but were also threatened with outright elimination. Thus, the stage was set for a protracted confrontation between the Mughal state and the hereditary rural elites. The possibility of such a development increased manifold in Punjab, particularly when Lahore served as the imperial capital from 1585 to 1598 and comprehensive steps were taken to consolidate the Mughal state in the north-western region of the Indian subcontinent. It is in this historical context that the conflict between Akbar and Dulla Bhatti becomes understandable. ESSENTIALS OF THE NARRATIVE Sandal and Farid, the father and son rebels of the Sandal Bar, were put to death at the orders of Akbar. Their corpses were filled with straw and hung at the entrance gate of Lahore city. Four months after this draconian punishment, Ladhi, Farid’s widow, gave birth to a son who was named Dulla Bhatti. On the same day, Akbar was blessed with the birth of Prince Salim, popularly known as Shaikhu.* The royal astrolo- gers (najwmis and pandits) advised that the prince be suckled on the milk of a Rajput wet nurse who had to be the wife of a brave warrior. The choice fell on Ladhi. Shaikhu and Dulla were brought up together at Pindi, the traditional stronghold of the Bhattis, situated 12 kos (1 kos-approx. 2 miles) from Lahore on the Delhi-Kabul highway. During a period of 12 years, the two boys learnt wrestling, horse riding and archery. At the end of this period, Akbar organized a competition between the two. He was disappointed on seeing Dulla defeating Shaikhu in every sporting discipline. He sought an explanation for Shaikhu’s weakness from Ladhi, who convinced the emperor that the Prince had been provided with adequate nourishment and training. Duly satisfied, Akbar advised Ladhi to provide an appropriate educa- tion to Dulla and promised to enrol him in the Mughal service. However Dulla showed no inclination to study, having been re- pulsed by the qazi’s empty sermons. Instead, he formed a gang of five or seven boys and, at their head, planned mischievous pranks in the manner of war. Armed with slings (gulels) acquired from the village carpenter, they smashed the water-filled pitchers that were carried by women on their heads. When these women complained to Ladhi, she provided them with copper containers (gagars). The young gangsters persisted in their favourite past time. They substituted stones with metallic balls, which were produced at the blacksmith Kanha’s furnace, where Dulla himself worked on the bellows (fookni). The women could sunnuer amy zr not tolerate the harassment any more. The outspoken Nandi, who belonged to the caste of Mirasis,° threw a challenge, ‘Oh Dulla! Why do you display your bravery against women. The corpses of your father and grandfather are still hanging from the entrance at Lahore. Have you forgotten the legacy of your ancestors? If you are a real warrior, take your revenge from the Mughal emperor and die in the sacred effort.’ This remark pierced Dulla like an arrow and proved a turning point in his life. Dulla forced a reluctant Ladhi to narrate the circumstances in which Sandal and Farid had been executed. He learnt that the deceased had been obliged by their increasing needs to withhold the payment of land revenue; that they enriched themselves by committing highway robberies; that they refused to obey the royal summons; that they were captured and carried to Lahore by a large Mughal army and were executed for abusing Akbar to his face. Ladhi also unlocked seven cellars of the mansion, each of which stored a particular kind of weapon. Dulla distributed these weapons among a freshly-mobilized retinue of 500 followers and embarked on a career of banditry in the footsteps of his forefathers. He carried out a plundering raid on Chandran (Ladhi’s parental village) and distributed the booty among fellow villagers, retaining nothing for himself. He gave four times the share to blacksmiths and carpenters who had eagerly met the needs of the warriors. He deprived Ali Saudagar of 500 horses that were being brought from Qandhar. He looted the goods of Medha Khatri who was carrying them to Bokhara. He also took away money from the possession of one of Akbar’s wives who was travelling to Mecca. He killed Bagga Malkira, a mansabdar of 12,000 rank, who was returning from Kashmir, plundered his rich baggage and sent his head to Akbar.’ Shaikhu, who had been nullifying all complaints against Dulla, volunteered to investigate the whole matter, Dulla killed a lion to save the life of the Prince, who reciprocated with an award of 25 horses. Shaikhu brought Dulla to Lahore, promising to secure a royal pardon from Akbar. But Dulla refused to make the customary bow before the Mughal emperor, asserting an autonomous status for himself. There- after, Dulla’s companions looted the shops of confectioners (halwais) and consumed eatables and milk, besides taking away money from their cash boxes. Acting on the complaint of a Brahmin named Tulsi Ram, Dulla massacred as many as 24 butchers who used to slaughter cows in the city. The angry widows rushed to the Mughal court, seeking justice just like the sweet vendors. Shaikhu’s intercession on behalf of Dulla and the eruption of a dispute among shopkeepers prevented Akbar from taking any punitive action against the bandit. 98) MUGHAL CENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL RESISTANCE IN NORTH-WESTERN INDIA By now Akbar was convinced that Shaikhu had deliberately misrep- resented Dulla’s real activities. Accompanied by Birbal, he rode to Pindi with the purpose of investigating the actual state of affairs and assessing the military strength of the rebel. Disguised as bards, the emperor and Birbal entered Dulla’s garden and encountered deer with gold-studded horns. They began to sing the praises of his ancestors. Pleased at the performance of the singers, Dulla gave them a horse as reward. The emperor felt humiliated on receiving the gift from a mere zamindar and, in anger, slashed the ears and tail of the horse. Seeing the animal in that condition, Dulla caught up with the emperor and shaved off his beard and moustache. Though he recognised Akbar, he spared his (Akbar’s) life. Out-manoeuvred and demoralized, Akbar returned to Lahore and sent a large expedition to Pindi, which, however, failed to subdue the rebel. Akbar also gave to Shaikhu a severe beating for concocting false stories about Dulla’s activities. In a short time, Dulla came to be feared to such an extent that none of Akbar’s officers was. willing to lead an expedition against him. Ultimately, Mirza Nizamuddin, who had been away to Ghazni and was unaware of Dulla’s exploits, took up the challenge. He marched at the head of a sizeable armed contingent and encamped on the outskirts of Pindi. Sundari, a Gujjar woman from the village, entered the camp with the purpose of selling milk to the Mughal soldiers. By a clever trick, she managed to lock Nizamuddin in a snare which had been brought to entrap Dulla.* Sundari also conveyed the news of the impending Mughal attack to Ladhi, who asked Dulla to prepare for battle. Dulla was urged by his advisers—the qazi, mujumi and pandit— to postpone the encounter for three days, if he desired victory. He accepted the advice and decided to leave the village for three days, disregarding the forceful pleas of his mother and wife, both of whom insisted that the battle be fought immediately. Nizamuddin entered Pindi and asked the villagers to produce Dulla, lest he should be forced to take away his kith and kin. Ladhi went to Dulla’s brother, Mehru Posti, and asked him to gird his loins. Mehru chided his mother for feeding Dulla with milk and butter, while offering him poppy buds (dodas) and abuses. However, his heart melted on seeing his mother in tears, She prepared a concoction of numerous intoxicants, which was duly consumed by Mehru and his 12 companions, all of whom were drug addicts. They rode out on horses and succeeded in killing 16 Mughal soldiers. They repeated this action on the second day, but lost four companions. On the third day, Mehru refused to fight and declared that Noor Khan (Dulla’s son) ought to take the field. At this stage, a quarrel broke out between Ladhi and Bhulran, Dulla’s wife. Ladhi accused Bhulran of conspiring to remove Dulla from the Surinder Singn 99 scene, of exposing an incapable Mehru Posti to the Mughal attack and of concealing her own son (Noor Khan) in the safety of the mansion. In an equally angry outburst, Bhulran accused Ladhi of conniving at Dulla’s flight and argued that her son was bound to join battle only after his father had done so. Noor Khan, Dulla’s 14 year-old son, entered the fray after receiving appropriate instructions from his grandmother. He performed unprecedented acts of bravery during the attack. The Mughals mistook Noor Khan for Dulla and made desperate efforts to save their lives. The gazi, who had been humiliated by Dulla on an earlier occasion, avenged himself by revealing the reality to Nizamuddin, With this the morale of the Mughals was restored. They surrounded Noor Khan and captured him. They not only plundered all the goods found in Dulla’s mansion, but also captured the entire family including his daughters, Bakhto and Takhto. Meanwhile, Mehru Posti disguised himself as a mendicant (Suthra Shah), pierced through the cordon laid by the Mughals and went straight to the village of Chandran. On learning the details of the Mughal attack, Dulla rushed back to Pindi. He had a dual task ahead—to seek revenge for a great personal humiliation and to re-establish his power in the locality of the Sandal Bar. He was accompanied by his maternal uncle, Jang Khan, and nephew, Sher Khan. On the way, he met Destiny in the garb of a woman, who sought his help in lifting a basket of cow dung. Dulla failed to raise the basket to her head and, in utter desperation, offered ‘to place his life at stake. The woman, who revealed herself as Destiny, demanded Dulla’s head. Since Dulla was also bound to reach Pindi and get the hostages released, he secured a three-day reprieve from the woman and promised to return in order to pay the price of losing the bet. He lamented his betrayal at Destiny’s hands. Exulting on his success, Nizamuddin sent a letter to Akbar asking for a jagir as reward, as per the royal promise. The emperor offered to fulfil his promise only if Dulla himself was captured. On reaching Pindi, Dulla sent a messenger to Nizamuddin and condemned him for oppressing his helpless kinsfolk. He accepted Nizamuddin’s challenge that one Bhatti be pitted against four Mughals. The fighting on the first day—dominated by Jang Khan, Sher Khan and Kehar Khan, a friend of Dulla—saw the Mughals at the receiving end. On the second day, Jalal Khan, Dulla’s younger maternal uncle, fought against seven Mughals, only to be killed by deceit.? This death ignited a volcano of anger in Dulla, who fell on the Mughals as if he was a wolf among goats. Displaying extraordinary skills in the use of a variety of weapons—sword, spear, bow and matchlock—he killed a number of opponents. Nizamuddin was unnerved at the turn of events. He fell at Ladhi's feet and implored her to save him from Dulla’s wrath. Dulla was determined to avenge Jalal Khan’s death by killing the Mughal commander, but he bowed to the wishes of his mother who argued that Jalal Khan's end had been so willed by Destiny and that no amount of vendetta would restore him to life. On his part, Nizamuddin released all the hostages and removed the Mughal camp from Pindi. He started addressing Dulla as his brother and persuaded him to accompany the Mughal contingent to Lahore, promising to arrange an audience with the emperor. Ladhi and Mehru Posti tried to dissuade Dulla from joining the Mughal cavalcade. But Dulla paid no heed to “their implorations. He declared that Shaikhu, his princely brother, was there to look after him. On his arrival at Lahore, Dulla stayed at the residence of Nizamuddin. The latter sent a message to Akbar with the claim that he had accomplished the task of capturing Dulla, which was not possible without resorting to a stratagem and which had made him eligible for the reward of a jagir. At night, Nizamuddin entertained Dulla to a feast of liquor that had been laced with poison. As soon as Dulla lost consciousness, he was put in chains and thrown in a prison. When he recovered his senses in the morning, Destiny announced that his life had come to an end with the expiry of his three-day reprieve. Dulla expressed his willingness to surrender his life to Destiny, but did not want to die at the hands of his enemy. Enraged at Dulla’s custodial death, Akbar felt that Nizamuddin had failed to capture Dulla in a fair fight and, therefore, withdrew the prospective reward of a jagir. When Shaikhu learnt that Dulla had been poisoned to death by the Mughal commander and that the deceased had expressed a desire to meet him while dying, he licked a diamond and gave up his life.!° The coffins of the two friends, who treated each other like brothers, were carried through the streets of Lahore for burial. As soon as the news of Dulla’s death reached Pindi, the women of his household—his mother, wife, sister and daughters—plunged into a sea of grief and began wailing loudly. TEXTURE OF RURAL SOCIETY The above narrative does not enable us to trace the emergence of the Bhattis as zamindars in the Sandal Bar, which largely consisted of the district of Lyallpur in the British Punjab." It cannot be known if the Bhattis had brought virgin land under cultivation or whether they had simply displaced some previously settled peasant community in the above mentioned tract.!? However the narrative does point to the substantive local dominance that was acquired by Dulla's immediate sermewce airyre rw forebears around the 1560s and their preference for a violent show- down with the emerging Mughal state, rather than a compromise over the sharing of agricultural surplus. Dulla’s grandfather, who has been referred to as Sandal in the ballad, appears to have played a leading role in the local affairs, including warfare and settlement. These heroic deeds, it may be suggested, were permanently imprinted in the area’s collective memory, so that the locality acquired the name of Sandal Bar. This name has continued to persist at the popular level till very recent times. Our narrative reveals that Dulla inherited the zamindari of 12 villages in the Sandal Bar, located on the highway leading from Lahore to Kabul and Kashmir, along with the traditional claims to a deep- rooted local autonomy.'3 Since this position rested primarily on military foundations, Dulla was brought up as a warrior-knight in the mould of legendary Rajput warlords. Understandably, his childhood was devoted to such martial sports as wrestling, athletics, hunting, horse riding, archery and swordsmanship. Though these pursuits caused a considerable hardship to the village inhabitants, this was the only manner in which sons could be groomed to don the mantle of their fathers who, in their own times, had acquired tremendous reputations as daredevil fighters. The nucleus of Dulla’s military strength lay in the ancestral fortress-like mansion.The sheer size and functional role of this structure could be gauged from the huge arsenal, which was spread across as many as seven cellars (kothris) (Gian Chand 1987: 79-80). Each one of these enclosures—normally kept locked— was stocked with a distinct category of weapons, namely, spears (sang), swords (shamshir), daggers (khanjar), matchlocks (banduq), pistols (pistaul) and gunpowder (barcod).* An important part of this armoury was a drum (tamak), which was sounded to summon the supporting peasant militia that was spread across the zamindari domain, embrac- ing 12 villages. It was beaten to assert the traditional claim to local autonomy, since the act implied a challenge for any rival power, including the Mughal state. The narrative under study reveals that the possession of a strong fortress along with a well-stocked arsenal was not enough. These alone could not guarantee the survival of a zamindar in the prevailing circumstances when his neighbouring counterparts also boasted of similar, or even better, military resources. The possession of a well- equipped armed contingent was equally important, In times of need, Dulla could mobilize 500 retainers who were provided with weapons from his ancestral stockpile. In emergency situations, he could secure the active support of his kinsmen, who were related to him through his mother. The extension of mutual support among kinsfolk appears 102 MUGHAL CENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL RESISTANCE IN NORTH-WESTERN INDIA to have been regarded as a social and moral obligation. The failure to do so was deemed as a betrayal that prepared the ground for internecine feuds between families related by blood or marriage. Dulla’s maternal uncles, who were based in Chandran village, provided shelter to him and his retainers on more than one occasion. They joined hands with Dulla during his military confrontation with the Mughal commander, so that one of them (Jalal Khan) even lost his life in the encounter (Gian Chand 1987: 99-100, 110-12). However, Dulla’s support base extended beyond the limited circle of his kinsmen, many of whom could not have been available at short notice. He enjoyed the support of a wider circle of fellow villagers—cutting across the barriers of caste, class and religion—who could be mobilized in the shortest possible time. It appears that his boon companions— Surmchu Chuhra, Killa Barwala, Shalla Mirasi, Dadu Khan Dogar, Jamal Khan, Kamal Khan, Daula Kaula, Bai Battu, Pirtha Jat, Roorh Jat and Khamba Wazir—constituted the core group of his retinue. He had adopted one of them (Roorh Jat) as a foster brother, by the mutual exchange of turbans (Salim, Ahmad 1973: 37, 60-61). Dulla availed of the indispensable services of the village artisans, particularly the blacksmiths and carpenters, in the manufacture and repair of war materials. He also received the cooperation of individuals belonging to such non-cultivating groups as Gujjars, Mirasis and Brahmins. He was opposed only by the gazi, who was found collaborating with the Mughals, and understandably so.'> We must hasten to note that the social fabric of the rural society, which appears well-knit and harmonious, could be torn asunder by violent contradictions. All Bhatti zamindars based in the Rachna Doab were not united in their opposition to the Mughal state. There always existed a scope for internecine warfare among rival zamindars, owing to conflicting local interests and an innate desire for local dominance. Minor disputes could flare up into protracted feuds which, when fuelled by the overpowering passion of vendetta, generated much violence and bloodshed. Dulla was accused by the neighbouring Bhattis of murdering one of their elders and of using his severed head like a ball in the playfield. What would be the attitude of that aggrieved party when Dulla’s family was being taken to Lahore as hostage? The younger elements wanted to stay away, as Dulla had been their enemy. But the old patriarch, Lal Khan Bhatti, argued that they could avenge themselves against Dulla on some other occasion, that the honour of the entire Bhatti clan was at stake and that they were bound to rescue the Bhatti women from the clutches of the Mughals.'® So, even before Dulla could arrive on the scene, the kinsmen of Lal Khan Bhatti, including his sons, grandsons and nephews, fell upon the Mughal camp and inflicted heavy damage. As a result of this attack, the Mirza Nizamuddin-led Mughal contingent was weakened to such an extent that it became possible for Dulla to gain the upper hand in the armed encounter. Since the rival zamindars perceived the honour of Bhatti women as a common concern, their existing enmity paled into insignificance in face of the greater threat from the Mughals (Salim, Ahmad 1973: 64-67). It becomes evident that such zamindars could bury the hatchet, even if the move could achieve merely a short-term common goal. The zamindars combined their military resources—consisting of a well constructed fortress, a rich armoury and a numerous retinue— with the support of kinsmen to establish a local centre of power. The emergence of a semi-autonomous political domain enabled the zamindars to accumulate considerable financial resources. In the first instance, they exercised the right of extracting agricultural surplus from the peasantry settled within their territorial jurisdiction. They guarded this right, which was legitimized by the use of force as well as custom, with utmost jealousy.'” They did not permit any rival claimant to encroach upon this right unless they were induced to compromise their position by a superior military force, which was normally represented by the urban ruling elite based in Lahore or Delhi. Viewed from the standpoint of the zamindars, the agricultural surplus was not sufficient to meet their multifatious needs. Therefore, they employed their military capability to supplement their financial resources. They enriched themselves by carrying out frequent preda- tory raids against neighbouring zamindars. In addition, they often indulged in highway robbery, targeting long-distance merchants as well members of the Mughal ruling elite, including the royal house- hold (Gian Chand 1987: 81-88). How did the zamindars spend their wealth? It would be safe to suggest that a part of it was invested in strengthening their military resources which, in turn, guaranteed the acquisition of still more wealth.!* The zamindars appear to have shared a part of the plunder with the peasants who constituted their personal retinue. They dis- tributed another part of it among non-agricultural social groups, including artisans and menials, whose services were found essential by them in building their power base. When Dulla distributed the booty of his first ever plundering raid, the share of the blacksmiths and carpenters was found to be four times than the amount given to the other villagers (Gian Chand 1987: 81). These actions on the part of the zamindars went a long way in legitimizing their position in the rural society It should not surprise us that the zamindars spent a sizeable chunk of their wealth on aristocratic living and conspicuous consumption. We are told that when Ladhi was carrying Dulla in her womb, she was provided with rare delicacies and exotic foods, many of which were priced at Rs 50 per tola (1 tola= approx. 10gm). On his part, Dulla was entirely faithful to the current vices of his class, because he spent liberal amounts on wine and women. The narrative reveals that Dulla not only used perfume while bathing, but also organiszed frequent drink- ing bouts in the diwan Khana of his palatial mansion, where he entertained a large circle of close friends to alcoholic drinks and meat preparations. Apart from his wife, he maintained as many as three concubines, who belonged to different non-Rajput castes. One of them, Fatti Kararhi, was known to virtually bathe Dulla in liquor. Another, Sai Gujjari, was known to soap his body with curds. The third appears to have belonged to Kangra (Salim, Ahmad 1973: 37, 39, 42). During the Mughal attack on Pindi, all three were taken hostage like the other members of Dulla’s household. The overflowing wealth was also manifested in the easy-going lifestyle of Dulla’s brother Mehru, whose pursuits as a drug addict had earned for him the nickname “Posti’. The degree of his addiction could be assessed from the recipe of his favourite concoction: three ingredients—1,25 sers of poppy buds, two chataks of opium and one bottle of liquor from the first distillation—were crushed thoroughly in a mortar-pestle before being filtered. The almirahs in Dulla’s mansion remained stocked with the drugs required by Mehru Posti, who never married or raised a family, but remained devoted to his intoxicating potions (Ibid.: 101-02). Existing studies on medieval Indian society project women as suffering a shadowy existence in a male-dominated world. It is insisted that they were condemned to live in seclusion, burdened perpetually with household chores, treated as physically and mentally deficient, denied legal rights in property and victimized by oppressive social customs (Ashraf 1970: 166-74; Rashid 1969; 129-45). This reconstruc- tion of gender relations does not correspond with the image of women that emerges from our narrative. None of the female characters encountered in our exploration—whether from to the privileged landed gentry or the underprivileged plebeian groups—can be cast in the stereotyped mould. They were strong and independent, bold and confident, intelligent and articulate. Their presence is felt throughout the narrative, within and outside the household. They were acutely conscious of contemporary realities, including the complex interplay of social forces. Even in violent situations, they made objective assessments of the conflict and took appropriate decisions, justifying them on rational grounds. Though they were often exposed to the >unnger singn 1U> uncertainties and dangers, yet they were not found wavering or nervous, The above characteristics were personified more in Ladhi than in any other woman figuring in the ballad. She was a towering person- ality, possessing extraordinary qualities. Physically strong, she was reputed to have been built like a male. At a relatively young age, she faced a series of difficulties that appeared to be insurmountable. She experienced the loss of her husband and father-in-law when she was carrying Dulla in her womb. Not only did she bear the tragedy with great fortitude, she also assumed the headship of the zamindari household. It seems that she agreed to suckle Shaikhu, the son of her arch enemy, hoping that the favour would erase the bitterness of the recent bloady conflict and pave the way for a friendly association with the Mughal state. This pragmatic move on her part constituted an act of courage. She did not fumble in convincing Akbar that she had given equal treatment to Shaikhu and Dulla while feeding her milk. She tackled the recurrent complaints of the village women against Dulla in a practical manner, having replaced their earthen pitchers by copper containers. Perhaps the most difficult moment in her life came when Dulla asked her, on the pain of death, about the circumstances leading to the execution of his father and grandfather. Assuming complete control over her emotions, she narrated the tragic experience and, for the first time since the draconian punishment, unlocked the huge ancestral stock of weapons, familiarizing Dulla with the glorious martial traditions of his lineage (Gian Chand 1987: 79-80). At the same time, Ladhi tried to dissuade Dulla from following the footsteps of his forefathers, lest he should also meet a terrible end. She did not approve of Dulla’s refusal to pay the land tax from his zamindari to the Mughals and his numerous acts of banditry in the locality which, in her opinion, had invited the Mughal assault on Pindi. Once the Mughals had actually encamped on the outskirts of the village, she urged Dulla to take a firm stand against the assailants and tried to prevent his departure (in accordance with the advice of astrologers) for Chandran. So firm was her resolve to repulse the Mughals that she even admonished (though somewhat unfairly) her daughter-in-law for conniving at Dulla’s departure to Chandran at a crucial hour. She motivated Mehru Posti to give up his lethargy and give a suitable reply to the Mughal attack. In the process, she bore a barrage of taunts from a spoilt elder son and went out of her way to meet his habitual demand for intoxicants. During Dulla’s three-day absence, she stood like a rock against the Mughal onslaught, providing the required guidance and inspiration to the forces of defence. When Mehru Posti refused to fight on the third day, Ladhi persuaded Dulla’s wife Bhulran to bring her 14-year-old son Noor Khan into the field and provided him valuable advice on battle tactics. It is worth mentioning that she did not panic when Noor Khan was captured and the Mughals plundered the mansion. She tried her best to boost the morale of other women of the household—Dulla’s wife, sister and daughter—when they were made captives to be taken to Lahore. She forgave Mirza Nizamuddin, the Mughal commander who had killed her brother Jalal Khan, because he had fallen at her feet. But for her intercession, an outraged Dulla would have surely slain Nizamuddin. She had formed a correct assessment of the intentions of the Mughals, when she pleaded with Dulla to refrain from going to Lahore along with Nizamuddin (Ibid.: 101-04, 113). Grieving over Dulla’s death, she lamented that it was his arrogance and failure to heed her advice that brought about his ultimate fall. In other words, Dulla would have been. alive if he had accepted the authority of the Mughals by paying the land tax from his zamindari in the Sandal Bar. Dulla’s wife Bhulran was cast in the same mould as Ladhi, because she invariably displayed strength of character and independence of mind. She chided Dulla for deciding to leave for Chandran just when. the Mughals had arrived on the outskirts of Pindi. She urged him to take a firm stand against the Mughals. When she found her pleas falling on deaf ears, she asked Dulla to sit at home wearing her clothes or consume poison at Chandran. She offered to ride on his horse and lead 500 men in the battlefield (Ibid.: 99-100). Women belonging to low ranking social groups, as encountered in our narrative, also played a crucial role in the local affairs. They showed considerable initiative and drive, which were embedded in physical courage of a high order. It was Nandi, a Mirasi woman, who reprimanded Dulla for displaying his bravery against helpless women and challenged him to avenge himself against Akbar, who had executed his father and grandfather. In fact, her fearless remarks ‘transformed Dulla from a mischievous village-lad to an anti-state rebel. She appears to have triggered a chain of events which brought the rural society into a violent confrontation with the Mughal political str - ture. The role of Sundari, the beautiful Gujjar woman, was even more spectacular, Unfettered by any social inihibtions, she exercised com- plete freedom of movement. She moved freely through the Mughal camp, selling milk to the soldiers. On the one hand, she brushed aside the overtures of Mirza Nizamuddin and, on the other, trapped the Mughal commander in the very chains that had been brought to trap Dulla. Her warning about the impending Mughal attack on Pindi enabled the zamindari household to organize its defence, thus under- ining her commitment to the principle of local autonomy (Ibid.: 78, re The collective memory recognizes Dulla as more than just brave. To be a folk hero, mere bravery was not enough. He had to possess numerous qualities of head and heart, including a constant willing- ness to fight for the weak and indigent. An outstanding example of Dulla’s chivalry is preserved in a folksong sung even today in Punjab on the festival of Lohri, when groups of young boys move from door to door, collecting small contributions for the common winter bonfire. As the story goes, a poor Brahmin had two beautiful daughters— Sundari and Mundari—who were betrothed. But a local Mughal officer, on hearing about their beauty, wanted to acquire them. The Brahmin requested the parents of the two prospective bridegrooms to take the girls away before the proposed marriage ceremony, lest they should be carried away by the officer. The parents refused to accede to the request, as they feared the officer. When Dulla learnt about the plight of the Brahmin as well as the high-handedness of a local representative of the Mughal state, he took upon himself the respon- sibility of the young girls. Under secrecy, a huge fire was lit in the neighbouring jungle at night. The marriage ceremonies for the two girls were duly performed, while Dulla himself acted as their father. Since he was not in a position to offer gifts to the brides, he contributed whatever he possessed at the moment—a ser of sugar (shakar) as the ceremonial gift. The uncle of the brides arranged a humble meal (choori)—a mixture of bread, butter and sugar—which was looted by the zarmindars present. Dulla intervened to punish the zamindars for their misconduct (Kapoor 1970; 217-220). According to a slightly different version, the Brahmin had only one daughter. Some local zamindars (probably acting under royal pressure) decided to offer the girl to Akbar himself. Dulla was strongly opposed to the move and, therefore, arranged her marriage. The same zamindars, out of sheer spite, looted the humble meal prepared by the bride's uncle. Dulla came down heavily against the high-handed zamindars, who were taught a lesson of their lives (Singh 1972: Introduction). The folktale under analysis portrays Dulla Bhatti as a hero of the common masses. He emerged victorious in all his exploits and adven- tures. The myth of his invincibility was fully established. It was beyond any human agency—not even the mighty Mughal state which com- manded vast military resources—to marginalize him, If he met his untimely end, it was not due to the poison administered by Mirza Nizamuddin, but because his death had been pre-determined by Destiny. In a sense, Dulla courted his own death. While returning from Chandran to Pindi he, unlike ordinary human beings, had a meeting with Destiny, who appeared in the garb of a woman and sought Dulla’s help in lifting a basket of cow dung. Since Dulla had to be shown as being vanquished at the hands of Destiny, which represented the Supreme Will, he failed to lift the basket despite his strong physique. In desperation, he offered to give up his head if he failed in his efforts to do the needful. Destiny then revealed her true identity and de- manded his head. Dulla secured a reprieve of three days, so that he was able to get the hostages released from the clutches of the Mughals and to vindicate his honour by continuing his anti-Mughal struggle. He lamented that he would not have laid the bet, had he known that the woman was Destiny (Gian Chand 1987: 107-08). He knew that he would loose the bet, since it was impossible to defy the dictates of Destiny. He could not be defeated by the Mughals in a fair fight. He was brought to Lahore by treachery and immobilized in prison through the use of poison. Even then he did not die. Destiny appeared before him in the Mughal jail and demanded his head, as the three day reprieve had come to an end. Dulla appealed that she should not let him die at the hands of the Mughals. His prayer was accepted. He surrendered his life with the satisfaction that he did not die at the hands of his earthly enemies (Ibid.; 115). His ability to interact with the supernatural forces facilitated his elevation from the domain of history to the realm of legend. The political career of Dulla Bhatti bears comparison with that of Sarvayi Papadu, a low-caste Telugu bandit who operated in the Mughal province of Hyderabad. Both exhibited a considerable ambition at a young age, with a strong inclination towards rebellion. Both suc- ceeded in mobilizing marginal elements of the rural society, motivat- ing them to challenge the existing power relations. Both had created powerful military strongholds that defied the superior resources of the local officers, Both adopted the career of banditry, targeting urban centres and mobile merchants. Both managed to accumulate substan- tial amounts of wealth, which enabled them to live in aristocratic luxury. Both entered into a protracted military confrontation against the Mughal political structure. Instead of being killed on the battle- field, the two were captured alive in the wake of betrayal by their trusted hosts. Dulla and Sarvayi have emerged as folk heroes in Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, as their heroic exploits have been immortalized in the folklore of the respective regions, In both cases, the folktales have been reproduced by present-day writers and film makers as literary or cinematic creations,'? Despite the above similarities in their careers, the two rebels differed from each other in several important respects: Dulla Bhatti was born into a family of powerful Rajput zamindars and inherited a long tradition of resistance against the Mughal state. Sarvayi Papadu belonged to the lowly placed caste of toddy tappers (gvandlas) and, therefore, made a much greater effort to acquire a position of political importance. Dulla lived during the second half of the sixteenth century, when the Mughal state was undergoing political consolida- tion and economic growth. In contrast, his Telugu counterpart lived during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when the Mughal state was undergoing political disintegration and institu- tional decline. The two were not only separated by a geographical distance of nearly 2,000 miles, but also by a chronological gap of more than a 100 years. Dulla was a kind-hearted man, popular among the lower classes. His chivalrous attitude towards women was central to the winter (maghi) festival of Lohri, which was being celebrated every year with traditional enthusiasm. Papadu was not only cruel towards his own female relatives, he was also guilty of raping a bride and abducting several upper-class women. Dulla’s confrontation against the Mughal state was aimed at retaining his ancestral zamindari of 12 villages as well as perpetuating his privileged position in the rural society. He did not seek to change the existing social structure in favour of the lower social orders, though he appears before us as a protector of Brahmins and cows. On the other hand, the aims of Papadu’s struggle were much more radical. His was a dual rebellion (Richards and Rao 1998: $14). On the one hand, it was directed, against the urban ruling class and, on the other, against the Telugu rural aristoc- racy which had a vested interest in perpetuating the existing Brahmin- dominated caste hierarchy. NOTES 1, For writing the history of peasant insurgency in the early colonial period, folklore needs to be summoned to the historian’s aid in order to combat the elitist bias in official records. See Guha (1983: 14). 2, Foran early sixteenth century description of the Persian wheel, includ- ing its various parts and operational mechanism, see Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur, Baburnama (Reprint), Vol. Il, A.S. Beveridge (tr.) New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970, p. 486. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, several urban centres acquired fair reputation owing to industrial production and commercial activities. See Sujan Rai Bhandari (1918: 65-78). 4. Shaikh Jalaluddin Thanesari, Risala Tahgig-i-Arazi-i-Hind, quoted in Zafarul Islam (1990: 91). Historical facts indicate that Marayam-uz-Zamani, the daughter of Raja Bharmal of Amber, gave birth to the prince on 30 August 1569 at Sikri, the abode of Shaikh Salim Chishti, His early wet nurses belonged to the Shaikh’s household. See Beni Prasad (1973: 1-7). ” 5. T1U MUGHAL CENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL KESISTANCE iN NORTH-WESTERN INDIA 6. A counterpart of the Hindu Dums, the Mirasis were a minor Muslim professional caste. Accorded a low social position, they recited geneaologies on ceremonial occasions, besides serving as musicians and minstrels. See Denzil Ibbetson (1970: 234). 7. Absent in Gian Chand (1987), this episode has been recorded in Ahmad Salim (1973: 43). 8, According to a variant account, the woman was a Dogari who entered the Mughal camp hawking curds. She snubbed the overtures of the Mughal commander, sat on his horse and killed him with his sword in a clever strategic move, See H.A, Rose (1960: 640), 9. According to another version, Dulla Bhatti’s maternal uncle Rehmat Khan, who lived at Chiniot, had accepted Mirza Nizamuddin as his brother by exchanging turbans. Yet he provided shelter to Dulla Bhatti and his retinue, besides contributing S00 retainers for the final battle against the Mughals. Ahmad Salim (1973: 63-64). 10. In actual fact, Jahangir ruled for 22 years (r. 1605-1627) and died of illness near Bhimbaron 28 October 1627. See Motamad Khan, Iqbalnama- i-Jahangiri, Persian Text, pp. 292-293. 11. Located in the high table land between the Ravi and Chenab, Sandal Bar comprised most of the Lyallpur District of colonial Punjab. See James Douie (1974: 263). 12. Local traditions indicate the creation of a zantindari right as the result of a long historical process involving settlement, conquest or purchase. See Irfan Habib (1999: 197-201). 13, According to Mughal archival records, the zamindari of only one mahal, that is Amraki Bhatti, out of a total of 57 mahals in the sarkar Rachna Doab, was in the hands of Bhatti zamindars, whose retinue included 50 horsemen and 1,000 foot soldiers. See Abul Fazl (1978 Vol. Il: 323). 14. During second half of the sixteenth century, peasant rebels could ac- quire handguns for only $0 paisa each. These weapons apparently had wrought iron barrels forged by simpler and less costly method of heat- ing and harnessing rolled sheets. They were quite effective when used from behind mud walls of the village by peasants who resisted the payment of land revenue. See Iqtidar Alam Khan (2004: 164-165). 15. For functions of the gazi, see Abul Fazl, Ain-i-Akbari, Vol. Il, p. 25; Hidayatullah Bihari, Hidayat-ui-Qawanin, ff. 20 a-b. 16. In feudal Europe, it was not the individual but the kinship group that lodged complaints against injustice in the courts, exercised the right of vendetta, paid fines or received compensation and impeded the free alienation of property. See Marc Bloch (1978: 123-133). 17. The fiscal claims of zamindars, forming 15-20 per cent of the land revenue, were met through various cesses on peasants and others or revenue free lands or cash allowance out of revenue collected by the authorities. See Irfan Habib (1999: 186-187). 18. The income of zamindars was nearly 33 per cent and their expenditure 16 per cent of the expected revenue (jama). They could compensate their retainers by allowing a concessional rate of land tax. They spent about

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