Civpro Digest Pool

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Criminal Procedure (San Beda University)
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I. Preliminaries
Prospective Effect of the Rules of Court/ Retroactive Application of Rules of Court
i. In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon Datumanong, G.R. No.
150274, 4 August 2006
CASE 1 TOPIC: Prospective Effect of the Rules of Court/ Retroactive

Application of Rules of Court
CASE TITLE: IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON
A. DATUMANONG
GR NO. 150274 DATE: August 4, 2006
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
DOCTRINE: Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of
procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested
right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
FACTS:
● The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the OMB
an administrative complaint against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others,
relative to the anomalous payment of the bailey bridge components owned by the
government. The Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB found
respondents guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and ordered their dismissal
from the service with accessory penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule XIV, Book
V of Executive Order No. 292 (Revised Administrative Code of 1987).
● Motions for reconsideration were denied. Three consolidated petitions were filed
before the CA. CA affirmed with modification the decision of the AAB-OMB.
● Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed. Meanwhile, while appeal
was still pending, Secretary Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum Order
dated October 5, 2001 (petitioners were ordered to be DROPPED/DISMISSED
from the service).
● Hence, the instant petition to cite Sec.Datumanong in contempt of court. Petitioner

contends that in issuing the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the
pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Sec.Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a
gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion and an unlawful interference with
the proceedings before the Court.
● Under Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman, the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e.
suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as final and
unappealable, hence, immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the
one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the
decision.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. Datumanong should be cited for contempt of court.

(application of the amendment of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the

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Office of the Ombudsman)
RULING: NO. The issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was
not a contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade
the administration of justice. The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him
in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction.
At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of confusion
considering the different rules regarding execution of decisions pending appeal.
However, two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support its
dismissal. First, on March 28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions
of the Court of Appeals and Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the service for dishonesty, falsification of
public documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Second, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was
amended by Administrative Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent provision on the execution
of decisions pending appeal is now essentially similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and other related laws.
“Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of

the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under
the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. x x x “
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive
application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal
rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly
procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively
suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall
be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or
even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition to cite former
Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the Department of Public Works and Highways in
contempt of court for issuing Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001 dismissing petitioner
Jimmie F. Tel-Equen from the service is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court

i. Sarmiento v. Zaratan, G.R. No. 167471, 5 February 2007
CASE 2 TOPIC: Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of

Court
CASE TITLE: SARMIENTO vs. ZARATA
G.R. No. 167471 DATE: February 5, 2007
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J
DOCTRINE: There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules,
(d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita
Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City which rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner.
● Respondent filed her notice of appeal and the case was raffled to the RTC of
Quezon City. In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to
submit her memorandum and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days
from receipt. Respondent’s counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he
had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite memorandum.
● But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his
failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the
delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and
flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet.
● But the motion remained unacted.
● On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum.
● On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal for being filed six (6) days
beyond the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen day period.
● Respondent moved for the Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC
asserting that it did not take cognizance of defendant-appellant’s "Motion for
Extension of Time to File Memorandum," because it did not contain a notice of
hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an
omission for which it could offer no explanation.
● Thus, defendant-appellant’s appeal was properly dismissed on account of her
failure to file an appeal memorandum within the fifteen (15) day period provided
under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
● Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which
was granted in a decision dated 17 August 2004. The appellate court nullified and
set aside the 19 June 2003 and 31 July 2003 Orders of the RTC and ordered the
reinstatement of respondent’s appeal. Consequently, respondent’s appeal
memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.
● Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

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ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in granting the Writ
of Certiorari (therefore ruling that the RTC erred in dismissing respondent’s appeal for failure
to file the required Memorandum within the period provided by law--- All because THE
MOTION FOR EXTENSION WAS UNACTED(DENIED) FOR LACKING THE REQUIRED
NOTICE OF HEARING)
RULING: NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a Notice of
Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the
latter’s motion is a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect. The notice requirement in a
motion is mandatory as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court. A motion
without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief
sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected
without an opportunity to be heard.The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the
benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time
to study and meet the arguments of the motion. The test is the presence of the opportunity to
be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert
the grounds upon which it is based.
Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process
was substantially complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not
affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file
Memorandum. There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal.
Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to
resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.
The Court has consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full
opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality
or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served.
Furthermore, this Court emphasized its policy that technical rules should accede to the
demands of substantial justice because there is no vested right in technicalities.
Litigations, should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very
aims. As has been the constant rulings of this Court, every party-litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from constraints of technicalities. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid
application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote justice must be avoided.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: The instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

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ii. Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010
CASE 3 TOPIC: Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of

Court
CASE TITLE: LABAO v FLORES
GR NO. 187984 DATE: November 15, 2010
PONENTE: BRION, J.
DOCTRINE: There are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of procedural rules.
However, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable and meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. We
have repeatedly held that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and
the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss
of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its
face.
FACTS:
● The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel Protective
Security Agency (SMPSA), a licensed security-service contractor. Respondents
were SMPSA security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation in Iligan
City.
● The petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit

pertinent documents for reevaluation in connection with the SMPSA’s new service
contract with the NPC-MRC. When respondents failed to comply with the
petitioner’s directive, despite several notices, the petitioner relieved them from
duty. Respondents filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal and money
claims.
● The NLRC found that the petitioners were in good faith when it relieved the
respondents because it was for the best interest of the business enterprise, the
SMPSA merely exercised its management prerogative and discretion. The
respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and the CA set aside the
NLRC resolution finding that the respondents were constructively dismissed.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari despite its late filing
(the respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty.
Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the resolution)
RULING: Yes. Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order,
or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case.
Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience
of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the
efficiency of, our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the

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prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business.
There are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of
the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the
case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice
and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion
by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.
However, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
advance a reasonable and meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.
In the present case, the respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight (28)
days late from Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 29, 2006
resolution. The respondents insist that they should not suffer for Atty. Plando’s negligence
in failing to inform them of the resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day period
should be their December 6, 2006 notice.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in
the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of
counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.
The failure of a party’s counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable
him to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not excusable. We have repeatedly held that
notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of
counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is
not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
Therefore, we find that the CA erred in acting on the respondents’ petition for certiorari
despite its late filing.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
iii. Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, 12 March 2019

NAME: Alhex Peralta
CASE 4 TOPIC: Power of Supreme Court to Suspend Rules of Court
CASE TITLE GIOS-SAMAR INC. vs DOTC
GR NO. 217158 DATE: March 12, 2019
PONENTE: Jardaleza, J.

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DOCTRINE:
1. Under Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court was granted with
the following: (1) the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights; and (2) the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power
of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure.
2. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is
allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or
transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a
constitutional ltering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more
fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
FACTS:
● The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached

agency, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation
to Pre-qualify and Bid on the airport development, operations, and maintenance of
the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), and Puerto
Princesa Airports (collectively, Projects) on Dec. 15, 2014.
● The projects were subsequently bundled into two groups (the Bundled Projects),
namely: Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo, and Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan,
and New Bohol (Panglao).
● On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson
Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and invoking the
transcendental importance of the issue, led the present petition for prohibition.
Petitioner alleges that it is a non-governmental organization composed of
subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of
Typhoon Yolanda relying on government assistance for the rehabilitation of their
industry and livelihood. It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the
Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with
the bidding of the same.
● Petitioner argues that the bundling of the Projects is unconstitutional because it
will: (i) create a monopoly in violation of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution; (ii)
allow the creation and operation of a combination in restraint of trade; (iii) violate
anti-dummy laws and statutes giving citizens the opportunity to invest in public
utilities; and (iv) enable companies with shaky financial backgrounds to participate
in the Projects. Petitioner asserts that the foregoing arguments involve legal
as opposed to factual issues, and consequently, the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to resolve the same.
● The DOTC counters that the petition is premature because there has been no
actual bidding yet, hence there is no justiciable controversy to speak of.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not it was proper for petitioner to file the present petition for prohibition
directly to the Supreme Court (This is more lengthily discussed under the topic of
Jurisdiction)
2. What is the nature of the SC’s rule-making power under the Constitution?
RULING:
1. NO. Petitioner's arguments against the constitutionality of the bundling of the

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Projects are inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the

determination of which require the reception of evidence. This Court, however, is
not a trier of fact. We cannot resolve these factual issues at the first
instance. Petitioner has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that bundling
will create a monopoly, in violation of the Constitution. By merely stating legal
conclusions, petitioner did not present any sufficient allegation upon which the
Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for. Similar to its assertion that
bundling will create a monopoly prohibited by law, we find that petitioner, again,
utterly failed to sufficiently state a cause of action, by failing to plead ultimate facts
to support its conclusion that bundling, as an arrangement, is in restraint of trade
or results in unfair competition under the provisions of RA No. 10667. As to
petitioner’s arguments that the bundling violates the anti-dummy law and the
constitutional provision allegedly giving citizens the opportunity to invest in public
utilities; that respondent is in grave abuse of discretion; and that the bundling
enables companies with shaky financial backgrounds to participate in the Projects,
these arguments of petitioner must be dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead a
cause of action. Even assuming that petitioner's causes of action were properly
alleged, the resolution of said issues would still require the determination of factual
issues which this Court simply cannot undertake. In fine, while this Court has
original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus
(extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution
of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the
Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends
on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the
Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure
or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary
functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'être
behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering
mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks
assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed
aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional
dimension of the issue or cause raised.
When a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue

indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to
resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling
reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case.
Such question must rst be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA,
both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.
2. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court:
Under Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, “the Supreme Court shall have
the following powers: Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.”
For the first time, the Court was granted with the following: (1) the power to

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promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights; and (2) the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
Pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power, the Court promulgated new sets
of rules which effectively increased its original and concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and the CA: (1) A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; (2)
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and (3) A.M. No.
09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
Under these Rules, litigants are allowed to seek direct relief from this Court,
regardless of the presence of questions which are heavily factual in nature. In the
same vein, judgments in petitions for writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ
of kalikasan rendered by lower-ranked courts can be appealed to the Supreme
Court on questions of fact, or law, or both, via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. In practice, however, petitions for writ
of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan which were originally led
before this Court invariably found their way to the CA for hearing and decision, with
the CA's decision to be later on brought before us on appeal. The consistent
practice of the Court in these cases (that is, referring such petitions to the CA for
the reception of evidence) is a tacit recognition by the Court itself that it is not
equipped to be a trier of facts.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is

DISMISSED.
II. General Principles

b. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
i. Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corp., G.R. No. 214241, January 13, 2016
NAME: Andrela Aquino
CASE 5 TOPIC: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
CASE TITLE: Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corporation
GR NO. 214241 DATE: January 13, 2016
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
FACTS:
● Sps. Gonzales filed a Complaint for Recognition as Tenant with Damages and
Temporary Restraining Order against Marmaine Corporation before the Office of
the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
● The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued a Resolution ordering
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in Sps. Gonzales’ favor.

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● Sps. Gonzales’ filed a notice of lis pendens which was then annotated on the
certificates of title of Marmaine’s properties.
● After due proceedings, PARAD issued a Decision dismissing Sps. Gonzales’
complaint (Tenancy Case) for lack of merit. They moved for reconsideration, which
was, however, denied.
● They appealed to the DARAB but the latter affirmed the decision of the PARAD.
Sps. Gonzales moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Sps.
Gonzales' failure to appeal made the DARAB Decision final and executory.
● Marmaine filed a Motion for Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. The PARAD
initially denied the same on the ground of prematurity because there is still a
pending civil case involving the same parties.
● On Marmaine’s Motion for Reconsideration, the PARAD directed the Register of
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens. In this relation, the PARAD pointed out
that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens only pertains to the Tenancy Case
and does not involve the pending civil case.
● Sps. Gonzales moved for reconsideration which was denied. Dissatisfied,
petitioners went straight to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
● The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It pointed out that the proper remedy is an appeal to the DARAB.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review before it due to
petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies
RULING: YES. In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of
all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative of;cer every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be
exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature
resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any ;nding of
waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
However, it must be clarified that the aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is

subject to certain exceptions, one of which is when the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice. In Vigilar v. Aquino, the
Court had the opportunity to explain the rationale behind this exception, to wit:
It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said
question at best could be resolved tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final
decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to
be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but
one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.
In the case at bar, Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue they raised before
the CA, i.e., the propriety of the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, falls within the
aforesaid exception as the same is a purely legal question, considering that the resolution
of the same would not involve an examination of the probative value presented by the
litigants and must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.

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Verily, the CA erred in dismissing Sps. Gonzales' petition for review before it, considering
that the matter at issue — a question of law — falls within the known exceptions of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In such a case, court procedure
dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA for a resolution on the merits.
However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits
may be had, as in this case, the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure
of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better
serve the ends of justice.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
c. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

i. Tan v. Cinco, G.R. No. 213054, 15 June 2016
NAME: Anna Katrina Canlas
CASE 6 TOPIC: Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial

stability
CASE TITLE: Tan v. Cinco
GR NO. 213054 DATE: June 15, 2016
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no
court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
FACTS:
1. In 2001, respondents extended a loan to Dante Tan (Dante) in the amount of
P50,000,000. The loan was facilitated by PentaCapital and was secured by Dante’s
shares in the Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC).
2. When Dante failed to pay the loan, he proposed to settle the same by selling his shares
in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), the individual
lenders, and PentaCapital (respondents). When he was due to execute the corresponding
deeds of assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving his obligations unpaid.
3. The respondents filed an action for the sum of money against him before the RTC
Makati. The RTC Makati ordered Dante to pay respondents.The levied property of Dante
was sold in an auction sale on March 29, 2005.
4. On May 2, 2007, Teresita Tan (Dante’s wife and petitioner) - filed before the RTC
Parañaque a complaint against respondents for the nullification of the auction sale and
the cancellation of the certificate of sale issued in favor of respondents.
5. The Parañaque RTC initially dismissed the nullification case on the ground of res
judicata. Upon M.R., The Parañaque RTC reversed its initial disposition and instead,
nullified the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
respondents.
6. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal before RTC Parañaque which was denied for
having been filed out of time.
7. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, arguing that
the Parañaque RTC had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a
co-equal court.
8. In the CA Ruling: the court granted the petition and directed the Parañaque RTC to
allow respondents' Notice of Appeal. Citing the doctrine of judicial stability or
non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the CA
found that the affirmance of the Parañaque RTC's assailed issuances would allow
Petitioner Teresita's husband, Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which was
already finally adjudicated by the Makati RTC, a co-equal court and the first one to
take cognizance of the controversy, on the basis of technicality.
9. Petitioner Teresita's MR was denied in the resolution, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON RTC Parañaque violated the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference
in nullifying the judgement of RTC Makati - YES
RULING:
The petition is devoid of merit. In Barroso v. Omelio, the Court explained the doctrine of
judicial stability as follows: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or
orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the
relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein
has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of
justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of
incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice. The law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing
court may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there
should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to
another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the
issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the Constitution, under Art. VIII, Sec.
1, par. 2, speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. To summarize, the various branches of the
regional trial courts, having as they do the same or equal authority and exercising as they
do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary
rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.

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In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial
stability when it took cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that
the collection case from which it emanated falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati
RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of
jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of the
subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and
co-equal court. Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was
improper and in glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered
by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as the execution thereof, and all other
incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of
concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify, or vacate the
said judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the
judgment or order is rendered or issued. Consequently, the Parañaque RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the same, rendering all the proceedings therein, as well as the Decision
and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order rendered by

the RTC Parañaque City, as well as all orders issued thereafter are hereby declared NULL
and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
ii. Specified Contractors & Dev Inc v. Pobocan G.R. No. 212014-15, 212427-28, 212694-
95, 212794-95, 6 December 2016
NAME: Camille Francisco
CASE 7 TOPIC: Doctrine of non-interference or

doctrine of judicial stability
CASE TITLE: Specified Contractors and Development Inc. vs. Pobocan
GR NO. 212014-15, 212427-28, DATE: 6 December 2016

21269495, 212794-95
DOCTRINE: Non-interference in the Ombudsman's determination of the existence of

probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
(Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining
probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse
of discretion.)
FACTS:
● Petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe
(Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis
(De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim) are all charged as co-conspirators for their
respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006
to 2010 in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.
● The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: 1) a Complaint for
Plunder filed by the NBI; and 2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 [Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act] filed by the Field

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Investigation Office of the Ombudsman.

● Petitioners were implicated for the following acts:
a) Sen. Revilla, Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for
authorizing the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated
PDAF through his endorsement of fraudulent Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles's JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation
19 19 in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects and for receiving significant
portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his "commission" or "kickback";
b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla, for processing the utilization, diversion,
and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, and for personally receiving his own
"commission" or "kickback" from the diverted funds;
c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: (1) the
commencement via "business propositions" with the legislator regarding his
allocated PDAF; (2) the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as
"conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-funded projects; (3) the use of spurious receipts and
liquidation documents to make it appear that the projects were implemented by her
NGOs; (4) the falsification and machinations used in securing funds from the
various implementing agencies (IAs) and in liquidating disbursements; and (5) the
remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for misappropriation;
d) Lim Lim and De Asis, De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the
fraudulent processing and releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled
NGOs;
e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare Bare
(Relampagos, e t al. ), as employees of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), for participating in the misuse or diversion of Sen. Revilla's
PDAF , by acting as "contacts" of Napoles within the DBM, and thereby, assisting
in the release of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of
Cash Allocation (NCAs) covering Sen. Revilla's PDAF.
In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among

others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of 1 count of
Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim, of 16 counts of violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019. The Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla,
Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a
public officer at the time material to the charges; (b) with the help of his co-accused, who
are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or
acquired ill-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and
(c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, 72 72 way more than the
threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause against all
petitioners should be upheld?
RULING: YES. Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain
non-interference in the Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause,
provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy
is based not only in respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
all in contemplation of law. Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief." It should
be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary
investigation which is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged
should be held responsible for it. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the prosecution's evidence. Therefore, the validity and merits of a party's defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely
abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles,
De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim, of sixteen
(16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
In the review of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, we are guided by this
Court's pronouncement in Vergara , where it was ruled that: Courts do not interfere in
the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable cause unless
there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or lack of
it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. In this case,
the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al) did not err in finding
probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the
evidence on record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this
Court cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay
at this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms
followed during preliminary investigation.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The findings of probable cause against all petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the
Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary
proceedings in these cases with deliberate dispatch.
III. Jurisdiction
Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
● Cang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998
NAME: Charisse Faith Arevalo
CASE 8 TOPIC: Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the

action
CASE TITLE: Cang v. Court of Appeals
GR NO. 105308 DATE: 15 September 1998
PONENTE: Romero, J.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction
of the court.

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano, who were married, had three
children, namely: Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony. Later in marriage, when
wife Anna Marie found her husband’s extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, she filed
a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Cebu. The court granted the joint manifestation of the
Cang spouses.
2. Herbert Cang went to the United States where he sought divorce from Anna Marie.
After obtaining divorce, he then had an American wife and became a naturalized
American citizen. Later on, he divorced his wife and never remarried.
3. Then, Ronald Clavano and wife Maria Clara Clavano filed a special proceeding for
the adoption of the Cang children, who at the time, were minors.
4. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption. Anna Marie, the biological mother, likewise executed an affidavit of
consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his
children. Petitioner’s consent was lacking in the petition; however, the fact of
abandonment of the children by the petitioner was sufficiently alleged.
5. Upon learning of the petition, Herbert Cang immediately went back to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto.
6. RTC: The RTC issued the decree of adoption. In ruling as such, the trial court
stated that petitioner’s opposition rests upon a very shaky foundation and found
that petitioner is morally unfit to be the father of the children.
7. In the CA, petitioner asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
and tailored to divest him of parental authority because:
(a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption;
(b) he never abandoned his children;
(c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent: and
(d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the
DSWD who made the case study report required by law.
8. CA: However, the CA affirmed the decree of adoption citing Art 188 of the Family
Code which requires the written consent of the natural parents; however, the
written consent of the parent who has abandoned the children are not necessary.
9. Petitioner appealed to the SC, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally
defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by
Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON the petition for adoption is defective for not containing the natural father’s
consent.
RULING: Yes. When the Clavano spouses filed the petition for adoption, the applicable
law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the child. During the pendency of the petition, the Family Code, which
amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code, took effect. Still, under the Family Code,
written consent of the natural parent is required. Jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Notwithstanding the amendment, the written consent of the natural parent is still a
requisite for the validity.
Nevertheless, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides that the written consent may be

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
dispensed with if the natural parent has abandoned the child or is insane or hopelessly
intemperate.The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the
written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural
aspect of adoption.
There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would
not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he
received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional
tie between him and his children. Based on the evidence presented, which was
surprisingly not considered by the RTC and CA, and contrary to Anna Marie’s claim, the
petitioner did not abandon his children as to warrant the loss of parental authority.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is

hereby GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as
well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying
the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by
the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano.
Doctrines of hierarchy of courts and continuity of jurisdiction

• Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, 12 March 2019
NAME: Divina Angela Tolentino
CASE 9 TOPIC: Doctrines of hierarchy of Courts and Continuity of

Jurisdiction
CASE TITLE: Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC
GR NO. 217158 DATE: 12 March 2019
PONENTE: Jardeleza, J,:
DOCTRINE:
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in
the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution
of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution
under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination
of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier
of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence
in the first instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory
agencies. This is the raison d'être behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as
a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more
fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be
brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional
FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid (Invitation)
on the airport development, operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao,

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
Iloilo, Laguindigan, New Bohol (Panglao) and Puerto Princesa Airports (collectively,
Projects), the total cost of which is P116.23 Billion. The Projects will be awarded through
competitive bidding (as prescribed by R.A 6957, as amended by R.A 7718). The
concession period would be for 30 years.
DOTC and CAAP issued Instructions to Prospective Bidders (ITPB), which provided that
prospective bidders are to pre-qualify and bid for the development, operations, and
maintenance of the airports, which are now bundled into two groups: namely: Bundle 1:
Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo and Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol (Panglao).
Prospective buyers are allowed to bid for only Bundle 1 or Bundle or for both Bundles.
Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, represented by its Chairperson Gerardo Malinao, suing as
taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present petition
for prohibition. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and
seeks to enjoin DOTC and CAAP from proceeding with the bidding.
The petitioner argues that:

1. The project violated the “constitutional prohibitions of the anti-dummy and the grant of
opportunity to the general public to invest in public utilities”
2. The bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies under Sec 19, Art. XII
of the Constitution because it will allow one winning bidder to operate the ports in a
bundle, establishing monopolies.
3. It restraints mid-sized Filipino companies to participate in the bidding as instead of
participating in one of six distinct projects, bundling them made them into two gargantuan
projects.
4. Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and DOTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it bundled the projects
without legal authority.
5. Bundling made a mockery of public bidding because it raised the reasonable bar to a
level higher than what it would have been, had the projects been bided out separately.
The DOTC denied these allegations while CAAP asserted that the petition violated the
basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any special
and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court (SC). The case
should have been filed with the trial court because it raises factual issues which need to
be threshed out in a full-blown trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not this petition submitted directly to the SC violates the hierarchy of
courts
RULING: YES, in filing the case directly to the SC, this petitioner violated the hierarchy of
courts and must be dismissed.
1. Petitioner claims that the bundling of the Projects violates the constitutional provisions
on monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade under Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Here, petitioner has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that bundling will create
a monopoly, in violation of the Constitution. By merely stating legal conclusions, petitioner
did not present any sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
petitioner prayed for. The bundling of the Projects is an arrangement made by the DOTC
and the CAAP in the conduct of public bidding. The question that arises is whether the
same constitutes an anti-competitive agreement prohibited by RA No. 10667. Similar to its
assertion that bundling will create a monopoly prohibited by law, we find that petitioner,
again, utterly failed to sufficiently state a cause of action, by failing to plead ultimate facts
to support its conclusion that bundling, as an arrangement, is in restraint of trade or results
in unfair competition under the provisions of RA No. 10667.
2. As to accusation that the bundling of the Projects violates the anti-dummy law and the
constitutional provision allegedly giving citizens the opportunity to invest in public utilities
In this case, petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts showing how the bundling of the
Projects violated the Anti-Dummy Law. It did not identify what corporation or association
falsely simulated the composition of its stock ownership. Moreover, it did not allege that
there is a law limiting, reserving, or requiring that infrastructure or development projects
must be awarded only to corporations, a certain percentage of the capital of which is
exclusively owned by Filipinos. Executive Order (EO) No. 65 even exempts contracts for
infrastructure/development projects covered by the BOT Law from the 40% foreign
ownership limitation.
3. On Petitioner's argument that, bundling of the Projects gave shady companies direct
access to the Projects, also raises questions of fact. Foremost, petitioner does not identify
these "shady companies."
4. On the allegation that bundling is in grave abuse of discretion is a conclusion of law. As

shown, no facts were even alleged to show which specific law was violated by the decision
to bunde the projects.
In these three above arguments of petitioner must be dismissed for failure to sufficiently
plead a cause of action. Even assuming that petitioner's causes of action were properly
alleged, the resolution of said issues would still require the determination of factual issues
which this Court simply cannot undertake.
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in
the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution
of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution
under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination
of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier
of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence
in the first instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory
agencies. This is the raison d'être behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as
a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more
fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be
brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts has exceptions, as summarized by The Diocese of

Bacolod v. Commission on Elections:
(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time;

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
(3) cases of first impression;
(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;
(5) exigency in certain situations;
(6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of
respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression; [and]
(8) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly
an inappropriate remedy."
A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases of the foregoing exceptions

would reveal a common denominator — the issues for resolution of the Court are purely
legal. In the case at bar, petitioner argues direct resort to us is proper because the issue
raised is one of transcendental importance or of paramount interest (that is bundling of the
Projects violates the constitutional proscription on monopoly and restraint of trade.)
An examination of the cases wherein this Court used "transcendental importance"

of the constitutional issue raised to excuse violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts
would show that resolution of factual issues was not necessary for the resolution of the
constitutional issue/s.
To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does not clothe us with the power to
tackle factual questions and play the role of a trial court. The only circumstance when we
may take cognizance of a case in the first instance, despite the presence of factual issues,
is in the exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the President's proclamation of martial law under Section 18, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The case before us does not fall under this exception
Accordingly, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reiterate that when a question
before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution
of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation
or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance
of the case. Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA,
both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is

DISMISSED
Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts

Katarungang Pambarangay (Sec. 399-422, Local Government Code)
• Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, 6 August 2018

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
NAME: Eliezer Carias
CASE 10 TOPIC: Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts,

Katarungang Pambarangay, Condition Precedent
CASE TITLE: Elizabeth M. Lansangan v Antonio S. Caisip
GR NO. 212987 DATE: 6 August 2018
DOCTRINE: A prior barangay conciliation proceeding is not a jurisdictional requirement

such that non-compliance therewith does not warrant the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
A condition precedent as a ground for dismissal of a complaint (in this case, the prior
barangay conciliation proceeding) must be invoked at the earliest opportunity (motion to
dismiss or answer). It may be deemed waived if not seasonably raised.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages filed before the
2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac (MCTC) by
petitioner against respondent Antonio Caisip
Petitioner, a resident of Camanse Street, Purok 4, Rose Park, Concepcion, Tarlac, alleged
that respondent, a resident of Barangay Sto. Niño, Concepcion, Tarlac, executed a
promissory note in her favor in the amount of €2,522.00 payable in three (3) installments.
As respondent defaulted in his obligation under the promissory note and refused to heed
petitioner's demands to comply therewith, the latter was constrained to file the said
complaint.
Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in
default and for the MCTC to render judgment which was granted.
Accordingly, the case was submitted for resolution.
The MCTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply
with the provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as "The Local
Government Code of 1991," which requires the prior referral of the dispute between
residents of the same barangay for conciliation proceedings before the filing of a case in
court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The MCTC opined that petitioner's
failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings rendered it without
jurisdiction to rule on her complaint. Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari before the
RTC.
The RTC upheld the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint. It ruled that prior
barangay conciliation proceedings before the filing of the instant complaint is jurisdictional;
thus, noncompliance therewith warrants its dismissal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied. Undeterred, she appealed to the

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CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that since the party-litigants are both residents of
Concepcion, Tarlac, petitioner's complaint should have undergone the mandatory
barangay conciliation proceedings before raising the matter before the courts.
Elizabeth moved for reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not prior barangay conciliation proceedings before the filing of the
instant complaint is a jurisdictional requirement.
RULING: No. As a general rule, the grounds for which may be invoked for the dismissal of
the filing of a complaint under Sec.1 Rule 16 must be invoked by the party-litigant at the
earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds
are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order the motu proprio
dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject.
In this case, the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on petitioner's
failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances,
is a condition precedent before filing a case in court. As Section 412 (a) of RA 7160
provides, the conduct of barangay conciliation proceedings is a precondition to the filing of
a complaint involving any matter within the authority of the lupon.
Under Section 409 (a) of RA 7160, "[d]isputes between persons actually residing in the
same barangay [(as in the parties in this case)] shall be brought for amicable settlement
before the lupon of said barangay." Lifted from Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law," the primordial objective of a prior
barangay conciliation is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in courts. Subject to certain exemptions, a party's failure to comply with this
requirement before filing a case in court would render his complaint dismissible on the
ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent, pursuant to the Rules of Court.
In Aquino v. Aure, the Court clarified that such conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, such that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the
court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Similarly, in Banares II v. Balising, it was mentioned that the non-referral of a case for
barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature, and
may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss or in a
responsive pleading.
Here, the ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior
barangay conciliation proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact,
respondent was declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite due
notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to order the dismissal of
petitioner's complaint on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court
finds it proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court
of origin, for its resolution on the merits.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

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January 23, 2014 and the Resolution dated May 20, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 129824 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case
No. 2738-12 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac for resolution on the merits, with reasonable
dispatch.
• Abagatnan v. Spouses Clarito, G.R. No. 211966, 7 August 2017
NAME: Elisabeth Labatos
CASE 11 TOPIC. Jurisdiction of various Philippine Courts
CASE TITLE: JOSIE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, ET. AL., petitioners vs SPOUSES
JONATHAN CLARITO AND ELSA CLARITO, respondents
GR NO. 211966 DATE August 7, 2017
PONENTE Del Castillo, J
DOCTRINE: In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express statutory
requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in
interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to
apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning
of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court.
FACTS:
● Wenceslao Abagatnan and his late wife Lydia Capote acquired a parcel of land
designated as Lot 1472-B located at Brgy. Cogon, Roxas City.
● In 1990, respondents allegedly asked for Wenceslao’s permission to allow them to

construct a residential house to which the latter agreed but subject to the condition
that respondents will vacate the subject property should he need the same for his
own use.
● When Lydia died in 1999, her children (co-petitioners in this case) succeeded into
the ownership of her conjugal share of said property.
● In 2006, the petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 1472B including the subject
property which was then still being occupied by respondents. Said portion was first
offered to the respondents, but the latter declined.
● Thereafter, a Demand letter was sent to the respondents requiring them to vacate
the subject property within 15 days from receipt.
● For failure to heed such demand, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful
detainer and Damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
2, Roxas City. Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation
proceedings are not required as a pre-condition for the filing of the case given that
not all petitioners are resident of Roxas City (Jimmy resided in Laguna; Jenalyn
resided in Pasig).

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● In their answer with counterclaim, respondents argued that prior barangay

conciliation is mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with considering
that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed a SPA in favor of co-petitioner and
sister Josephine, who is a resident of Roxas City.
● MTCC: Rendered judgement in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to

remove structures they erected and to vacate the same.
● RTC: The RTC denied respondent’s appeal ruling that since the parties raised the
issue of ownership to justify their claims of possession, and the evidence of
ownership is preponderant on petitioners, the MTCC was justified in ruling the
case in the latter's favor.
● CA: Granted respondent’s Petition for Review for lack of prior referral to the
Katarungang Pambarangay. CA also denied petitioner’s MR. Hence, this present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WON there is still a need to comply for a prior barangay conciliation
requirement under Sec. 412 of LGC despite the fact that not all real parties in
interest resided in the same city or municipality.
RULING: NO.
Section 412 of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the
Lupon Chairman as a precondition to the filing of a complaint. Also, the LGC further
provides that the “lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes”.
One exception would be in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit to their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.”
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all
the real parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City. As such, the lupon has
no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is
not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their
sister and co-petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment
proceedings before the MTCC.
In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual
residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It
further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact
of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest"
as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The Decision dated June 20, 2013 and the Resolution dated February 3, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03283 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated January 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City in
Civil Case No. V-47-07 is REINSTATED.

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SO ORDERED.
• Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159411, 18 March 2005
NAME: Gem Apostol
CASE 12 TOPIC: Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts (Katarungang

Pambarangay)
CASE TITLE: TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
JACINTO S. TRILLANA, respondents.
GR NO. 159411 DATE: March 18, 2005.
PONENTE: PUNO, J
DOCTRINE: Although the "Kasunduan"(or settlement) executed by the parties before the
Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court,
petitioner's non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which
respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand. In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party
may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if
there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for
rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the
breach thereof of the other party.
FACTS:
● In October 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana

entered into a contract of lease.
● Teodoro Chavez leased to the Jacinto Trillana his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan,
Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for six (6) years from October 23, 1994 to October 23,
2000. The rental for the whole term was two million two hundred forty thousand
(P2,240,000.00) pesos.
● Paragraph 5 of the contract provided that respondent shall undertake all
construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be
destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement
from petitioner.
● In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject
fishpond. Respondent did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the
water level was still high.
● Three (3) weeks later, respondent was informed by a barangay councilor that
major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the use of a crane; that
the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient with his
delay in commencing the work
● Respondent, then, filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs
undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the leased premises and
its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract.
● After such, an agreement or ‘kasunduan’ has been reached between them,
wherein Chavez shall return the amount of Php 150,000 as payment for the rest of

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the lease; that if Chavez were able to give Php 100,000 before September 23 of
the same year, the same constitutes full payment, instead of the Php 150,000. But
if 100,000 cannot be paid, the full payment shall remain 150,000.
● Thereafter, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC of
Valenzuela City alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and
the foregoing "Kasunduan."
● Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pretrial brief and to
attend the pretrial conference Respondent was allowed to present his evidence
ex-parte before the Acting Branch Clerk of Court.
● RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of respondent.
● Court of Appeals: modified the decision of the trial court.
● Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
● Hence, this petition for review.
● Contentions of the Petitioner:
○ That the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City
had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the
subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with
respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay
Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan.
○ That respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the
amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC Valenzuela City has jurisdiction over the action filed by the
respondent despite the presence of an amicable settlement between the parties in the
Office of Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan.
RULING: Yes, RTC Valenzuela City has jurisdiction.
Respondent, by instituting the Civil Case for recovery of unrealized profits and
reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees,
chose to regard the compromise between him and the petitioner as rescinded; and chose
to insist upon his original demand.
Indeed, under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and as enunciated in Article
2037 of the Civil Code, a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata. However, the Court has clarified in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos that the broad
precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code is qualified by Article 2041 of the Civil
Code which provides that if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise,
the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses,
bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been
any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he
may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered
mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit:
(a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature
on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which

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remedy is judicial.
However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art.
2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the
wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced
by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the
appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may"
clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
directory or merely optional in nature.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office
of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's
non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent
may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case for
recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Note: Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement

reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the
proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date. It further provides that the
settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6)
months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the
six-month period.
This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil
Code, which states that a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated April 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59023 is
modified by deleting the award of P300,000.00 as reimbursement of advance rentals. The
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
B.P. 129 – Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980

• Anama v. Citibank G.R. No. 192048, 13 December 2017
NAME: Hope Dumlao
CASE 13 TOPIC: Jurisdiction (Action for Revival of Judgment)
CASE TITLE: DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, petitioner, vs. CITIBANK, N.A. (formerly First
National City Bank), respondent.
GR NO. 192048 DATE: December 13, 2017
PONENTE: JARDELEZA, J p:
DOCTRINE: As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new cause of

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action, the rules on instituting and commencing actions apply, including the rules on
jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous action and
the petition does not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered
judgment.
FACTS:
● In consideration for a loan obtained from respondent Citibank, petitioner Anama
executed a promissory note in the amount of P418,000.00 in favor of Citibank.
● To secure payment of the obligation, Anama also executed in favor of Citibank a
chattel mortgage over various industrial machineries and equipment
● For Anama's failure to pay the monthly installments due on the promissory note,
Citibank filed a complaint for sum of money and replevin with the CFI of Manila
(now RTC), Branch 1
● Anama alleged that his failure to pay the monthly installments was due to the fault
of Citibank as it refused to receive the checks he issued, and that the chattel
mortgage was defective and void
● RTC: upon proof of default of Anama in the payment of his loan, issued an Order
of Replevin over the machineries and equipment covered by the chattel mortgage
● Citibank prayed that an alias writ of seizure be issued directing the Sheriff to seize
the properties and to dispose them in accordance with Section 6, Rule 60 of the
Revised Rules of Court. RTC granted the motion. Anama filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was denied by the RTC
● Anama then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary
injunction with the CA on the ground that the above resolutions of the trial court
were issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because of
the lack of evidence proving Citibank's right to possession over the properties
subject of the chattel mortgage
● CA rendered a Decision granting Anama's petition for certiorari and prohibition and
nullifying the RTC's orders of seizure
● Citibank filed its petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the
Decision of the CA. We promulgated a Decision dismissing Citibank's petition for
lack of merit and affirming the Decision of the CA. An Entry of Judgment was
subsequently issued
● Anama filed a petition for revival of judgment with the CA. Anama sought to revive
the CA's Decision and argued that Citibank's failure to file an action for the
reconstitution of the records in the RTC constituted abandonment of its cause of
action and complaint against Anama. In addition to the revival of the CA's
Decision, Anama sought to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings
particularly his counterclaims against Citibank.
● Citibank argued that the petition should be dismissed as an action for revival of
judgment is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. It also argued that
laches has set in against Anama for having slept on his rights for almost 10 years.
Lastly, Citibank claimed that it did not abandon its money claim against Anama
when it did not initiate the reconstitution proceedings in the RTC.
● CA denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction
● Anama filed this petition and argued that his petition for revival of judgment should
be filed in the court that issued the judgment sought to be revived, the CA in this
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to hear the petition for revival of judgment.
RULING: NO. An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to

enforce a judgment which could no longer be enforced by mere motion.

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Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment

or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.
Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can
have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of
entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion
after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must
be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the
time the judgment becomes final.
Further, a revival suit is a new action, having for its cause of action the judgment sought to
be revived. It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or
enforced. It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is the decision
itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be
revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory.
As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the rules
on instituting and commencing actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its
jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous action and the petition does
not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered judgment.
BP 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and its
amendments, is the law which confers jurisdiction to the courts. Section 19 of BP 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary

estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim.
But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable by the RTCs.
As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right to have
the final and executory judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced and does
not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that jurisdiction over a petition to revive
judgment is properly with the RTCs. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that it does not
have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's action for revival of judgment.
An action for revival of judgment is outside the scope of jurisdiction of the CA.

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DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 19, 2009 and Resolution dated April 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 107748 are AFFIRMED.
• Sps. Trayvilla v. Sejas G.R. No. 204970, 1 February 2016
NAME: Jayce Miguel Pajadan
CASE 14 TOPIC: B.P. Blg. 129 - Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980
CASE TITLE: Spouses Trayvilla v Sejas
GR NO. 204970 DATE: February 1, 2016
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE: In the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value as stated
in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined
whether the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioners' action, since the jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis of the
value of the property.
FACTS:
● Spouses Trayvilla claimed that Sejas was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T8337, and by virtue of a private handwritten document,
Sejas sold the parcel of land to them.
● Petitioners took possession of the land and constructed a house in which they
resided. However, Sejas reasserted his ownership over the land, and petitioners
alleged that respondent is guilty of fraud and deceit in doing so.
● Petitioners instituted a civil case, praying that Sejas be ordered to execute a final
deed of sale over the property and transfer the same to them. In an Amended
Complaint, petitioners claimed that Sejas sold the property to Paglinawan, and
prayed that the TCT be cancelled and the property be reconveyed to them.
● On the other hand, respondent moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and prescription. Respondents argue that the
case was not for specific performance but a real action involving title and
possession of real property. Thus, respondents argued that the value of the
property should be alleged in the complaint to properly compute the filing fee.
● Respondents further argued that since not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the
filing fee was not paid, and the case should be dismissed. They also argued that it
is already barred by prescription since the 10-year period, counted from the
purchase in 1992, to sue a handwritten contract had already elapsed.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed by reason of non-payment of
the correct docket fees due to failure to allege the fair market value of the subject
property?
(2) Whether or not the filing of the amended complaint divested the trial court of
jurisdiction over the case?

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RULING:
(1) Yes, consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the
pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding", the
well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case
only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees. Since the
Amended Complaint of the petitioners alleged new causes of action, the
non-payment of additional docket fees for these new allegations divested and
ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
(2) The handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property
was purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. Since the value of the
subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the
RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first instance; it should
have dismissed Civil Case. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of the
case, the trial court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed November

29, 2011 Decision and November 19, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 02315 are AFFIRMED.
• Heirs of Reterta v. Sps. Lopez G.R. No. 159941, 17 August 2011
NAME: Jeremy Ahmed Tejero Almijhem
CASE 15 TOPIC: IV. B.P. Blg. 129 Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980
CASE TITLE: HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA AND ELISA RETERTA,

NAMELY: EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, AND AVELINA M.
RETERTA, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES LORENZO MORES AND VIRGINIA LOPEZ,
RESPONDENTS.
GR NO. 159941 DATE: 17 August 2011
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
DOCTRINE: The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order
when appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given
due course to and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely:
(a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid
the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b)
the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss o n ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
● On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983)
contending that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land
(47,708sqm) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, having inherited the land from
their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the

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grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father
and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
● Petitioners discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father
had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and
participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769
had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.
● On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss,
insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No.
TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal
personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983.
● RTC (Trece Martires) Ruling: The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Court is
of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. The
petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied.
Thus, petitioners a ssailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA
dismissed the petition on April 25, 2003.
● CA Ruling: Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In the case at bench, when the court rendered the assailed decision,
the remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But
petitioners did not. Instead they filed the present special civil action for certiorari on
May 15, 2002 after the decision of the court a quo has become final. On
September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the
regular court?- YES
RULING: The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, which provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil
Cases. -- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud
on one's title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed
value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having
territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which
regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed
value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought.
The respondents' reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was
without basis. The provisions read:
Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and
occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell
to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed,
payable as provided in this Act at the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands xxx and
that upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the
Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the
manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act.
Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the
administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners' action for
reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor
of a private person and title duly issues in the latter's name. By ignoring the petitioners'
showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the
allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously. Given all the
foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The term grave abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft
of any remedy to protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they
would suffer grave injustice and irreparable damage. In that situation, the RTC’s dismissal
should be annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to do justice to the
unjustly aggrieved.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for certiorari;
sets aside the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 25, 2003; and
directs Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court in Trece Martires City to resume the
proceedings in Civil Case No. TM-983 with dispatch. The respondents shall pay the costs
of suit. SO ORDERED.
Republic Act 7691 – An act expanding the jurisdiction of the MTC, MeTC, MCTC,
amending B.P. 129
• Suapo et al v. Sps. De Jesus G.R. No. 198356, 20 April 2015
NAME: Jin De Jesus
CASE 16 TOPIC Jurisdiction of the MeTC
CASE TITLE: Sps. Supapo vs. Sps. De Jesus
GR NO. 198356 DATE: April 20, 2015

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PONENTE: Brion, J.
DOCTRINE: Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over
actions involving title to or possession of real property is plenary. RA No. 7691,
however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of
the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
FACTS:
1. The Spouses Supapo own a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City,
valued at P39, 980. The Spouses Supapo do not reside in the land nor do they
have an overseer but they do visit the parcel of land twice a year. During one of
such visits, they saw two houses built on the subject lot without their permission.
The Spouses De Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other.
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of
the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. After
failing to settle amicably, the Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against
respondents for violation of P.D. No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.
2. The trial court convicted the respondents ordering the latter to vacate the
premises. The respondents appealed the decision to the CA. While the appeal was
pending, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8368 (An Act Repealing Presidential Decree
No. 772), which resulted in the dismissal of the criminal case. The Spouses
Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents’ civil liability, and prayed for
the latter to vacate the lot. The RTC granted the motion and denied the
respondents’ motion to quash the writ.
3. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, stating that with the repeal of the
Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents’ criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.
However, the CA underscored that repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not
mean that people now have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not
own, and that it was not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate
landowners. In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that
recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
4. The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana in the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. The respondents stated in their answers their
affirmative defenses such as another action pending between the same parties;
the accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and res judicata. The
MeTC denied the affirmative defenses of the respondents and ruled that the
arguments are evidentiary in nature, which can be utilized in the course of the trial.
The MeTC also denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
5. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the RTC. The RTC granted the
petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii)
accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.The Spouses
Supapo appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the
complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that
the period to file the action had prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for
accion publiciana

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
RULING: Yes.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title
to or possession of real property is plenary. R.A. No. 7691, however, amended Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 and divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the property
does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
In view of the amendments under R.A. No. 7691, jurisdiction over actions involving title to
or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. The assessed
value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is
synonymous to taxable value.
The Court explained in Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals that the RTC does not have
jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property
involved. “The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that all cases of recovery of possession or accion
publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property — no
longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila;
and P50,000.00, if within.”
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the action and
the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the
subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax
declaration issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents
do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements,
the Court held that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint for accion publiciana.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition,

and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and
August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

• Sps. Erorita v. Sps. Dumlao G.R. No. 195477, 25 January 2016
NAME: Joyce Jacaba
CASE 17 TOPIC: Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
CASE TITLE: Sps. Erorita v. Sps. Dumlao
GR NO. 195477 DATE: 25 January 2016
PONENTE: BRION, J
DOCTRINE: The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint's caption. Nor is
jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily
delay a case by raising other issues, then claim lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Spouses Dumlao) are the registered owners
of the subject parcel of land. The San Mariano Academy structures are built on the
property. Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
2. Apouses Dumlao agreed to allow the former owners, Spouses Herminio and
Editha Erorita (Spouses Erorita), to continue to operate the school on the property.
3. Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a monthly rent, but had failed
to pay rentals since 1990. The Spouses Erorita countered that the Dumlaos
allowed them to continue to run the school without rental out of goodwill and
friendship.
4. Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property. Although the
Spouses Erorita wanted to comply, they could not immediately close the school
without clearance from the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports to whom
they are accountable.
5. Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlao's favor.
6. The defendants Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint patently
shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
7. The CA ruled that the applicable law on jurisdiction when the complaint was filed,
was Republic Act No. 7691. The law provides that in civil actions involving a real
property's title or possession, jurisdiction depends on the property's assessed
value and location. Because the tax declaration showed that the assessed value of
the property and its improvements exceeded P20,000.00, the CA concluded that
the RTC had jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC had jurisdiction
RULING: NO. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint's caption. Nor is
jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily
delay a case by raising other issues, then claim lack of jurisdiction.
Although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations contain
the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for
unlawful detainer is within the MTC's exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property's
assessed value. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, the
RTC's decision is void.
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or
even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by
laches. The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's jurisdiction. Thus, the general rule
should apply.

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The July 28,
2010 decision and January 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
92770 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we DECLARE the June 4,
2007 decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-492 void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Rivera v. Catalo, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422, 20 July 2015
NAME: Kat Ddelfin
CASE 18 TOPIC: Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
CASE TITLE: Rivera v. Catalo
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422 DATE: 20 July 2015
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE: A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is a

source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head.
FACTS:
1. Complainant filed her Amended Petition before the RTC, praying for the issuance
of new owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3460. The
case was raffled to the branch presided by Judge Catalo.
2. The amended petition alleged that complainant was one of the heirs of Gilbuena;
that TCT No. 3460 was registered under the name of Gilbuena; and that the
owner’s duplicate copy of the said title had remained missing despite their diligent
efforts to locate the same. When the case was called for hearing, no oppositor
appeared before the RTC. Upon motion, complainant was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
3. On May 18, 2012, Judge Catalo rendered his decision granting the petition for
issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy on the basis of the evidence presented by
complainant, particularly the affidavit of loss and the certification issued by the
Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City (RD). The RTC decision became final and
executory on July 3, 2012 and the Certificate of Finality was issued on July 6,2012.
4. The RD informed complainant that the Affidavit of Loss was being recalled
considering that the said title was already cancelled and being a cancelled title, it
could no longer be a subject of any transaction. RD Acting Records Officer
Dacanay formally filed her Manifestation before the RTC stating, among others,
that upon examination of the documents submitted to their office, it appeared that
that the discovery of the cancellation of the title was sometime when their office
found out that several titles had already originated from said title; that the truth was
that the title was not lost, rather, it was cancelled by virtue of valid transactions and
conveyance as early as April 2, 1924; and that the basis of the petition for
issuance of new owner’s duplicate, which was an affidavit of loss, was totally false,
untrue and fabricated.
5. Acting thereon, Respondent Judge issued an order requiring the complainant and
all the parties concerned to attend a hearing on the Manifestation filed by
Dacanay. Despite being given 15 days to give his side, the complainant did not

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
appear in court.
6. In the Order dated June 21, 2013, Judge Catalo recalled and set aside the May 18,
2012 decision of the RTC.
7. Complainant avers that the act of Judge Catalo in recalling and setting aside the
final and executory decision was of doubtful legal and moral basis. Complainant
adds that his act of flip-flopping was considered a violation of the Canon on
Judicial Conduct as it flagrantly disregarded well-known legal rules and constituted
grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.
ISSUE: W/N the May 18,2012 decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and
may no longer be modified in any respect.
RULING: NO. If there are facts and circumstances that would render a judgment void or
unjust after its finality, and render its execution a complete nullity, such judgment cannot
exude immutability.
Indeed, under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision

that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect. Like any other rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to
this general rule such as (1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.
In this case, Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because the second and third
exceptions on the doctrine of finality of judgments were squarely applicable. After the
finality of the RTC decision on July 3, 2012, it was discovered that TCT No. 3460 had
been cancelled as early as April 2, 1924. Complainant, when later asked to present his
stand, failed to contradict the allegation that he falsified his affidavit of loss. Clearly, these
subsequent events raised a red flag and placed the Respondent Judge on his toes. Judge
Catalo realized an execution of such judgment would definitely be unjust and inequitable
as it would be sanctioning fraud and irregularity. It would judicially permit the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate copy of a title which was no longer in existence.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Judge Leandro

C. Catalo, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, is
DISMISSED.
• Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, 10 March 2014
NAME: Kathrine Panguito
CASE 19 TOPIC: Aspects of Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction Over The Subject

Matter
CASE TITLE: : Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo
GR NO. 208232 DATE: March 10, 2014
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE:
1.) A complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
pecuniary estimation, such action is akin or analogous to one of specific performance.

Such being the case, the same is cognizable by the RTC.
2.) Principle of jurisdiction by estoppel - If a party has fully participated in all stages of
the case, and even invoking the RTC’s authority by asking for affirmative reliefs, such
party can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said court. Considering the extent of their
participation in the case, they are considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as
a ground for the dismissal of the action.
FACTS:
1. Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor, inherited a free-patent land located in Davao
Oriental, covered by Original Certificate Title No. 1572 (P-6144). He subdivided the
property and sold it to herein respondents via a notarized deed of sale. Thereafter, the
original certificate title was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in favor
of the vendees.
2. Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against
respondents before the RTC, anchoring his cause of action on Sec. 119 of the Public
Land Act. Respondents raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches
as defenses. Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner Epifania.
3. Respondents entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners whereby they

agreed to cede to Epifania 3,230 sq. m. portion of the property as well as to waive,
abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. The
compromise was approved by the RTC.
4. Other respondents however, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed
to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. They asserted that the total
selling price of all the properties is only P16,500. Since BP 129, as amended, grants
jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or
interest therein where the assessed value is more than P20,000, then the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which Epifania Bautista
seeks to repurchase is below the P20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.
5. The RTC dismissed the complaint for repurchase for lack of jurisdiction. It found that
Bautista failed to allege in the complaint that the value of the subject property exceeds
P20,000. This omission was considered by the RTC as fatal to the case.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING: YES, Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Jurisdiction of RTCs is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129 which provides, among others, that
the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds P20,000.
The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioners’ predecessor,
Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the
right of a free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act. The Court
rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
of pecuniary estimation.
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation,

viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support;
3. Right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
The Courts finds that the instance cause of action to redeem the land is one of specific
performance. The sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant within a period of 5 years
from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 110 of CA 141, hence such legal provision
is deemed integrated and made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. Thus, it is a
binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce. It is clear that his
action is one of specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin to one of
specific performance. Such being the case, his action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
cognizable by the RTC.
Moreover, because respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the
RTC and aggressively defended their position, they are already barred from questioning
the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered premises considered, the

instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The April 25, 2013 and July 3, 2013 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. (1798)-021 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 in Lupon, Davao Oriental is ORDERED to
proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. (1798)-021.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
• Heirs of Julao v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, 29 September 2014
NAME: Kate Bernadette Madayag
CASE 20 TOPIC Jurisdiction over the subject matter
CASE TITLE: Heirs of Telesforo Julao, petitioners, v. Spouses De Jesus,

respondents
GR NO. 176020 DATE September 29, 2014
PONENTE Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint. Thus, it cannot be acquired through, or waived
by, an act or omission of the parties; nor can it be cured by their silence, acquiescence, or
even express consent.
FACTS: Sometime in the 1960’s, Telesforo Julao filed before the DENR two Townsite
Sales Applications. Upon his death in 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs.
In 1979, Solito Julao executed a Deed of transfer of Rights, transferring his hereditary
share in the property to Spouses Alejandro and Morenita De Jesus. In 1983, spouses

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
constructed a house on the property they acquired from Solito. In 1986, Solito went
missing. On 1996, DENR issued an order rejection and transfer of sales right appearing
that Julao is a holder of 2 applications in violation with established policy in the disposition
of public lands, thus, one of the Townsite Sales Applications was dropped from
records.Consequently, on 1998 Original Certificate of Title covering a 641-square meter
property, was issued in favor of the heirs of Telesforo. In 1999, petitioners, representing
themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo, filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of
Possession of Real Property against respondent spouses. Petitioners alleged that they
are the true and lawful owners of a 641-square meter parcel of land. During the trial,
petitioners disputed the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights executed by Solito and
presented evidence to prove that Solito had no hereditary share in the estate of Telesforo
because Solito was not Telesforo’s biological son, but his stepson, and that Solito’s real
name was Francisco Bognot.
RTC: Decision in favor of petitioners. The RTC found that although petitioners failed to
prove their allegation that Solito was not an heir of Telesforo, they were nevertheless able
to convincingly show that Telesforo filed with the DENR two applications.
CA: reversed the ruling of the RTC. the CA found the complaint dismissible on two
grounds: (1) failure on the part of the petitioners to identify the property sought to be
recovered; and (2) lack of jurisdiction. The CA pointed out that the Complaint failed to
establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case as petitioners failed to allege the
assessed value of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the complaint
RULING: No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It is clear
that in an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the property sought to
be recovered determines the court’s jurisdiction. In this case, for the RTC to exercise
jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed P20,000.00. Since
petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property,
the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC
had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged,it
cannot be determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. Moreover,the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal is of no moment. The
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss
a complaint at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
lack of jurisdiction exists.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: Wherefore, the petition is here denied. The decision dated
December 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72845 is hereby affirmed.
Jurisdiction over the Parties

• David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015
NAME: Katherine Nicole Sy
CASE 21 TOPIC: Jurisdiction Over the Person vs. Custody of Law
CASE TITLE: DAVID VS. AGBAY
GR NO. 199113. DATE: March 18, 2015

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PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
FACTS:
● In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by

naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the
Philippines and purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong,
Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in
the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is
public land and part of the salvage zone.
● On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over
the subject land with DENR-CENRO in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
● Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disquali฀ed to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code against the petitioner.
● Petitioner’s contention: He argued that at the time he ฀led his application, he had
intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a
CENRO o฀cer that he could declare himself as a Filipino.
● On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution
finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC
and recommending the ฀ling of the corresponding information in court.
● On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner's MLA. It ruled
that petitioner's subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the
defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
● On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause in the
MTC.
● The MTC dismissed the Motion filed by the petitioner for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, and for lack of merit.
● Dissatis฀ed, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He
asserted that jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition
for the re- determination of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of
arrest
● On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for
certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court
● As a result, the petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
● On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor
General opines that in seeking an a฀rmative relief from the MTC when he ฀led his
Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to
have submitted his person to the said court's jurisdiction by his voluntary
appearance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC properly denied petitioner's motion for re-determination

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of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
(petitioner).
Other issue: Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court
can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefore constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance.
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant arrest a motion
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of
his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.
The Supreme Court clarifies that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited
case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
It is important to note that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over
his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person
nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
Hence, considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-
determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction
over his person.
As to the Criminal case for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner made the untruthful
statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the
฀ling of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63,
the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later,
the falsi฀cation was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
฀finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph
1.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October
8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No.
SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
• Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, 31 March 2006
NAME: Kenneth Aldwin Quejada
CASE 22 TOPIC: Jurisdiction over the Parties
CASE TITLE: Miranda v. Tuliao
GR NO. 158763 DATE: March 31, 2006
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As the SC held in the case of Santiago, seeking
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance. There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of
one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer
is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special
appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for
dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant
of arrest.
FACTS:
● On March 8, 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Isabela which later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao. Two informations for murder were filed against 6 police
officers and were convicted and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion
perpetua by the RTC of Manila except SPO2 Rodel Maderal who remained at
large. The case was appealed on automatic review where the Supreme Court
acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
● Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
● Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners.
Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners
and SPO2 Maderal. Subsequently the petitioners filed an urgent motion to
complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.

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● Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint Order
denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can seek affirmative relief even if they do not
voluntarily appear and submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
RULING: No. As a general rule, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As the SC held in the case of Santiago, seeking
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance. There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission
of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings
whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance. T hese pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, m
otions to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or
not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3)
motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that
failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking
the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law. The SC holds that the circumstances forcing them to require custody
of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest.
If the Court allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could
elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty.
On the other hand, if the Court allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in
the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty
would remain scot-free. In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free, it is likewise incongruous to require on to surrender his freedom before asserting it.
Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,
demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and
not after.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
criminal cases be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Manila.
• Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, 3 September 2012
NAME: Liza Tangonan
CASE 23 TOPIC: Jurisdiction Over Parties

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CASE TITLE: Palmiano-Salvador vs. Angeles
GR NO. 171219 DATE: September 3, 2012
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE: If a complaint is led for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not
authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An authorized complaint does not
produce any legal effect. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on
the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts
acquire over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint and to be bound by a decision, a
party should first be subjected to the court’s jurisdiction. If no valid complaint was ever
filed, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
FACTS:
● Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of
land.
● GALIGA leased the subject parcel of land from 1979 to 1993.
● Subsequently, petitioner SALVADOR alleged that she bought the said land on
September 7, 1993.
● Then, on October 12, 1994, ANGELES through DIAZ filed a complaint for
ejectment before the MeTC against SALVADOR when the latter heeded the letter
of ANGELES demanding her to vacate the subject property.
● The MeTC ruled in favor of ANGELES.
● SALVADOR appealed in RTC averring that DIAZ has no authority whatsoever from
ANGELES at the time of filling of the suit.
● The RTC denied his appeal.
● When the case was elevated to the CA via petition for review, the same affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the averment of SALVADOR has effect to the complaint filed by DIAZ who
was alleged to have no authority from ANGELES at the time of filing of the suit?
RULING:
Yes. This is quite unfortunate, because this threshold issue should have been resolved at
the outset as it is determinative of the court’s jurisdiction over the said complaint and the
plaintiff. In this case, DIAZ failed to present proof of his authority to represent ANGELES
in filing the complaint. This prompted SALVADOR to raise in her Answer in her Position
Paper the issue of DIAZ’s authority. More than a year later, respondent attached to his
Reply to SALVADOR’s Position Paper a document entitled Special Power of Attorney
(SPA). However, the said SPA was executed only on November 16, 1994, or more than a
month after the complaint was filed appearing to have been notarized by one Robert F.
McGuire of Santa Clara County. No certification from the Philippines Consulate General in
California that the said person is indeed a notary public. Verily, the court cannot give full
faith and credit to the official acts of McGuire, and hence, no evidentiary weight or value
can be attached to the document designated as an SPA. Thus, there is nothing on record
to show that DIaz has been authorized by respondent to initiate the action against
SALVADOR.
The Court held that if a complaint is led for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not
authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An authorized complaint does not
produce any legal effect. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on
the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
Jurisprudence also provides that Courts acquire over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court’s

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
jurisdiction. If no valid complaint was ever filed, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of respondent.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 146190, dated November 29,
1999; the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 00-96344, dated March
12, 2003; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83467, are SET
ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The complaint led by respondent before the Metropolitan Trial
Court is hereby DISMISSED.
Jurisdiction over the Issues

• Bernabe v. Vergara, G.R. No. L-48652, 16 September 1942
NAME: Lorissa Lontoc
CASE 24 TOPIC: Jurisdiction over the issues
CASE TITLE:
Lucia Bernabe, et. al. plaintiffs - appellees, vs. Domingo L. Vergara, defendant -
appellant
PONENTE: Moran, J.
DOCTRINE: The question of whether or not there was a proper issue raised in the
pleading as to said amount, is not a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, but
jurisdiction over the issue.
At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that
requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such
importance as to call for the intervention of the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
● This Civil case was an action for partition of an inheritance left by the deceased
Victoriano Zafra. Zafra was survived by his three children: Benito, Apolonia and
Dominga.
● Benito and Apolonia died but they were survived by their children. These heirs of
Benito and Apolonia were the plaintiffs in the action for partition. While the
defendants were Dominga Zafra (their tita) and the persons to whom she had sold
her share in the common property.
● Dominga Zafra alleged that she had paid certain debts contracted by Apolonia
Zafra, and these debts constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by said
deceased.
● The trial court, among others, ordered the heirs of Apolonia to pay the debts of
their deceased mother in the amount of Php 350. As a result, they filed an appeal
from this judgment to the Supreme Court, but they did not raise any question as to
the jurisdiction of the trial court to render a judgment in the said amount of Php
350. Accordingly, the Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over the case and
affirmed the judgment.
ISSUE:

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Now, the plaintiffs-appellees raised a question to the Supreme Court as to whether or not
the trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money above
mentioned.
RULING:
YES. There can be absolutely no doubt that the trial court had such jurisdiction not only
because there was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount
pleaded, but because the proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition
of inheritance wherein debts left by the deceased ancestors may be determined and
ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was the case. Plaintiffs-appellees knew that
the trial court had such jurisdiction as is shown by their omission to raise any question with
respect thereto in their appeal to this Court. And such question may be deemed to have
been passed upon impliedly by this Court when it acted on the case and decided the
same on the merits.
(RULING OF SC in relation to the topic)

● The question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of
question that confers jurisdiction upon this court. In other words, the question of
jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of question which
may be entertained by the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction involved is not one over
the subject matter but at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. A
Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over a case involving P200 or more, and
therefore the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction to render
judgment in the amount of P350. The question of whether or not there was a
proper issue raised in the pleading as to said amount, is not a question of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, but jurisdiction over the issue. (Reyes
vs. Diaz, No. 48754, November 26,1941.)
● That the question of jurisdiction raised in the instant case is not only
unsubstantial but is also not the kind of question that may deprive the Court
of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the case.
● Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may
be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an
issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is
made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression
of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties.
Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the defendant
cannot be said to have been served with a process as to that issue. At any rate,
whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question
that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this
function is without such importance as to call for the intervention of this
court.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
We hold, therefore, that the question of jurisdiction raised in the instant case is not only
unsubstantial but is also not the kind of question that may deprive the Court of Appeals of
its appellate jurisdiction over the case. It is hereby ordered that this case be returned to
the Court of Appeals for hearing and decision on the merits.
Jurisdiction over the Res

• De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, 31 January 2006

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NAME: Martina Prats
CASE 25 TOPIC Jurisdiction over the Res
CASE TITLE Dejoya vs Marquez
GR NO. 162416 DATE January 31, 2006
PONENTE Azucena
DOCTRINE: The court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over
the res
FACTS:
● This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks to nullify and set aside the
warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in an estafa case
● Petitioner claims that the respondent judge erred in finding the existence of
probable cause that justifies the warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused
● The records of the criminal case includes:
○ The report of NBI to the prosecutor on the complaint filed by private
complainant Manuel Dy against Mina Tan Hao, Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and
Victor Ngo y Tan for syndicated estafa.
○ Hao induced Dy to invest more than a hundred million pesos in State
Resources Development Management Corporation, but when the latter's
investments fell due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy as payment
for his investments were dishonored
○ Supplemental Affidavit of private complainant to include the incorporators
and members of the board of directors of State Resources Development
Management Corporation as participants in the conspiracy to commit the
crime of syndicated estafa. Among those included was petitioner Chester
De Joya.
○ the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao finding probable
cause to indict petitioner and his other co-accused for syndicated estafa
ISSUE: Whether or not it was sufficiently established that there was probable cause to
issue the warrant of arrest.
RULING: Yes, The Supreme Court found that the documents sufficiently established
the existence of probable cause.
Thus, the standard used for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that
used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a
prima facie case against the accused, the trial court judge has suffIcient ground to issue a
warrant of arrest against him. the petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor
from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court's
jurisdiction.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and
how the court acquires such jurisdiction,
thus:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint,
petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary
appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive
process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the
parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the
pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or
stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to
evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the
litigation): This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the
thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment;
or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the
property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration
proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a
non-resident defendant.
The court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when
the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in
which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of summons by
publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process
requirements.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
• Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, 10 March 2004
NAME: Michelle Santos
CASE 26 TOPIC: Jurisdiction on Res
CASE TITLE: Gomez v. CA
GR NO. 127692 DATE: March 10, 2004
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
DOCTRINE
● Unlike in actions in personam which requires that summons be personally served
to defendants to acquire jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court in cases of actions in rem or
quasi in rem, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res (property),
although summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the due
process requirements.
● An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal
liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of
against the person.
● To validly acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him
personally, or through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of
personal service. Such impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal
service failed, should be explained in the proof of service. The pertinent facts and
circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of
service or Officer’s Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

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FACTS:
● Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856 to Dr. Clarence Yujuico.
● The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public
auction on July 11, 1988, and before the expiry of the redemption period, the
spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioners Spouses Fortunato and Aurora
Gomez on December 12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico.
● The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties to
petitioners. Hence, Civil Case No. CEB-11103 was filed by petitioners. The said
complaint is an action for specific performance and/or rescission against the heirs
of Jesus J. Trocino, Sr., which include herein respondents and their mother
Caridad Trocino.
● On January 8, 1992 summons and copies of the complaint were served to the
defendants Jacob, Jesus Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice, Racheal thru
defendant Caridad Trocino.
● On January 27, 1992, the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Expedito P.
Bugarin, filed their Answer. Defendant Caridad A. Trocino, respondents' mother,
verified said pleading.
● RTC: In favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.; order to execute deed of
sale
● On March 13, 1996, respondents Adolfo and Mariano Trocino filed with the Court
of Appeals, a petition for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the
RTC-Cebu (Branch 10) in Civil Case No. CEB-11103. Private respondents alleged
that the trial court’s decision is null and void on the ground that it did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly served with a copy of the
summons and the complaint.
● CA: Granted petition and annulled the decision of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the summons served to Caridad Trocino is effective to

validly try a case against Mariano and Adolfo Trocino?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The Supreme Court held that unlike in actions in personam which requires that summons
be personally served to defendants to acquire jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court in cases of actions in
rem or quasi in rem, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res (property),
although summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the due process
requirements.
Contrary to the petitioner’s belief that the complaint they filed is an action in rem, although
the complaint they filed affects title to or possession of two parcels of land, it is still an
action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein respondents,
on the basis of their personal liability. Hence, it is not enough that the court has jurisdiction
over the res. Personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons giving such courts proper jurisdiction.
Since Adolfo Trocino is already a resident of Ohio, U.S.A. for 25 years, a non-resident, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide the case
against him.

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On the contrary, since Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol since 1986, the court
can acquire jurisdiction over his person through the personal service of summons or
through substituted service upon showing impossibility of personal service, and validly try
and decide the case against him.
However, since the summons was served to their mother, Caridad Trocino and the return
did not contain any particulars as to the impossibility of personal service on Mariano
Trocino within a reasonable time, the summon shall be rendered ineffective.
The Supreme Court also noted that,
“The fact that Atty. Expedito Bugarin represented all the respondents without an
exception does not transform the ineffective service of summons into a valid one. It does
not constitute a valid waiver or even a voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.
There was not even the slightest proof showing that respondents authorized Atty.
Bugarin's appearance for and in their behalf.”
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 40067 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Estoppel Jurisdiction
vi. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, 15 April 1968
NAME: Nicolai Torres
CASE 27 TOPIC: ESTOPPEL JURISDICTION
CASE TITLE: TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY
GR NO. L-21450 DATE: APRIL 15, 1968
PONENTE: DIZON, J.
DOCTRINE: After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision

on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.
The Court frowns upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.
FACTS:
● Spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog filed a complaint to recover the sum
of money with legal interest thereon against spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and
Lucia Baguio.
● Subsequently, the writ of attachment was issued, but was soon dissolved when a
counter-bond was filed by the defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc.

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● The writ was returned unsatisfied, which prompted plaintiffs to file a writ of
execution against the Surety’s bond.
● The motion by plaintiff was denied on the ground that no previous demand was
made on the Surety for the satisfaction of judgment. Consequently, a demand was
made, but Surety still paid to satisfy the judgment.
● A second motion for execution was filed by the plaintiff. The Surety moved to
quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. The
quashal was consequently denied by the Court.
● An appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals, which raises no question about
the lack of jurisdiction. The CA then affirmed the orders of the motion of execution.
● Surety filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Republic Act No. 296, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, placing the
original exclusive jurisdiction on civil actions involving the value of the subject
matter or the amount of the demand not exceeding P2,000.00, exclusive of interest
and costs with the inferior courts, further claiming that the Court of First Instance
therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Hence, the CA resolved to
set aside its decision and certify the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Surety is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance for the first time in the appeal
RULING: YES. The action commenced by plaintiff-appellees in the Court of First Instance
for the recovery of money amounting to P1,908.00 is well within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948
which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced.
Also, it is true that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
However, in the present case, the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea.
The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance almost fifteen years before it
raised the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be estopped or
barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons - of estoppel in
pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Further, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court. The Court frowns upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
In the present case, the facts show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction, but it failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain

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affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally raised the
question of jurisdiction.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
IV. Actions
Personal actions and Real Actions
• Sps. Trayvilla v. Sejas G.R. No. 204970, 1 February 2016
NAME: Patricia Marie Carlon
CASE 28 TOPIC: Actions; Real Actions
CASE TITLE: Sps. Trayvilla v. Sejas
GR NO.: 204970 DATE: February 1, 2016
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, a real action is
one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein
FACTS:
1. Spouses Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla, herein petitioners, filed Civil Case No.
4633-2K5 before the RTC for specific performance and damages against Bernardo
Sejas, herein respondent.
2. It was claimed that Sejas was the registered owner of a real property which was
sold to the petitioners who then took possession of the said land and constructed a
house therein. However, Sejas reasserted his ownership over the land, making
him guilty of fraud and deceit.
3. Subsequently, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint for specific performance,

reconveyance, and damages wherein they prayed that Sejas be ordered to
execute a final deed of sale in their favor and that the property be reconveyed to
them.
4. On the other hand, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground
that the action filed by petitioners is a real action or one involving title to and
possession of real property, hence, the value of the property should be alleged in
the complaint in order for the filing fee to be computed and paid. Therefore, the
case should be dismissed since the value of the land was not alleged in the
Amended Complaint and the proper filing fee was not paid.
5. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA dismissed the Amended Complaint ruling that
the said complaint is a real action as it involves the recovery of title.
6. Petitioners claimed that even if there had been additional causes of action alleged
in the amended complaint, the principal action was still for specific performance

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and reconveyance prayed for was merely incidental.
7. Respondent countered that even if the complaint was for specific performance, the
relief sought includes reconveyance, which is a real action-- in which the assailed
value of the property should be alleged for the proper computation of the docker
fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Amended Complaint is a real action.
RULING: YES.
While petitioner’s Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for specific
performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance. In other words, petitioners' aim in
filing Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 was to secure their claimed ownership and title over the
subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4
of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of
real property, or an interest therein.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed November

29, 2011 Decision and November 19, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 02315 are AFFIRMED.
• Heirs of Reterta v. Sps. Lopez G.R. No. 159941, 17 August 2011
NAME: Paulon Fan
CASE 29 TOPIC: O rdinary Civil Actions; Special Civil Actions; Criminal

Actions; Special Proceedings; Personal Actions and Real
Actions
CASE TITLE HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA,

namely: EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M.
RETERTA, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ,
Respondents.
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.
DOCTRINE: On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy
despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that the
requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously
and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of
justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the
issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of
urgency.
FACTS:
1. The petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC
in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983), averring that they were the true and real
owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing

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an area of 47,708 square meters, having inherited the land from their father who had died
on July 11, 1983.
2. That their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and
cultivation and their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open,
exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
3. That they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had
purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the
land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of
respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.
5. The respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land being friar
land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case No.
TM-983.
6. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
7. The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their
motion for reconsideration on February 21, 2002.
8. On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for
certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on April 25, 2003.
ISSUE: Whether or not special civil action of certiorari was proper
RULING: Yes. At first, the SC ruled that the petitioners’ position has no basis. For one, the
order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the
respondents’ motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby
completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the
action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.
It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has
since amended Section 1, Rule 41 ROC, by deleting an order denying a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that
such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the
CA on that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied
the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed final order.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that the requirement that there
must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable
damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one
purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
The petitioners’ cause of action for reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
upon the manner by which to establish a right in a piece of friar land. According to Arayata
v. Joya, in order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands
may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up
and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration.
The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale
of friar lands. In other words, where a person considered as a grantee of a piece of friar
land transfers his rights thereon, such transfer must conform to certain requirements of the
law.
In essence, an action for reconveyance respects the incontrovertibility of the decree of

registration but seeks the transfer of the property to its rightful and legal owner on the
ground of its having been fraudulently or mistakenly registered in another person’s name.
There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the
aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the registered
owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value.
The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft of
any remedy to protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they would
suffer grave injustice and irreparable damage. In that situation, the RTC’s dismissal
should be annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to do justice to the
unjustly aggrieved.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for certiorari; sets
aside the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 25, 2003; and directs Branch
23 of the Regional Trial Court in Trece Martires City to resume the proceedings in Civil
Case No. TM-983 with dispatch.
V. Rule 2 - Cause of Action

Meaning of cause of action
• Heirs of Tomas Dolleton v. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, 7 April 2009
NAME: Raiza Marie De Guzman
CASE 30 TOPIC: Cause of action; meaning of cause of action
CASE TITLE: HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON, HERACLIO ORCULLO, REMEDIOS SAN

PEDRO, HEIRS OF BERNARDO MILLAMA, HEIRS OF AGAPITO VILLANUEVA, HEIRS
OF HILARION GARCIA, SERAFINA SP ARGANA, and HEIRS OF MARIANO
VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., ET AL. AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, respondents.
GR NO. 170750 DATE April 7, 2009
PONENTE Chico-Nazario, J.
DOCTRINE: The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into
the su฀ciency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
FACTS:
1. In October 1997, petitioners Heirs before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of
Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary
Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against respondents Fil-Estate Management
Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development, Inc., and the
Register of Deeds of Las Piñas.
2. The eight Complaints, which were later consolidated, were similarly worded and
contained substantially identical allegations.
3. Petitioners claimed that
a. they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the
afore-described parcels of land (subject properties) for more than 90 years
until they were forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991.
b. They had cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real
estate taxes for the same.
c. Respondents cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas in their names, to support their claim
over the subject properties since, petitioners averred, the subject properties
were not covered by said certificates.
d. Said TCTs, purportedly derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
6122, issued in favor of Jose Velasquez, were spurious.
4. Petitioners thus sought from the RTC that an order be issued enjoining respondents
from making any developments on the subject properties, to recognize the rights of the
petitioners, to vacate the subject lot and peacefully surrender possession thereof to
petitioners, that TCTs be cancelled by the Register of Deeds for Las Piñas, and the
payment of moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees.
5. Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application for
a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the
dismissal of the eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of
cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
6. Respondents maintained that the Complaints should be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action. Even assuming that petitioners were able to prove their allegations of
longtime possession and payment of realty taxes on the subject properties, and to submit
a sketch plan of the same, these cannot defeat a claim of ownership over the parcels of
land, which were already registered under the Torrens system in the name of respondents
and the other consortium members.
7. On September 8, 2000, the RTC issued a Resolution granting respondents' Motion to
Dismiss. The trial court determined that the subject properties were already registered in
the names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove by clear and
convincing evidence their title to the said properties. The RTC reiterated the dismissal of
the Complaint in its June 30, 2003 Resolution.
8. On September 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' appeal and affirmed
the RTC Resolutions stating that the respondents' titles to the subject properties were
indefeasible because they were registered under the Torrens system. Thus, petitioners
could not say that any claim on the subject properties casts a cloud on their title when they
failed to demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to the same. The appellate court further
decreed that the cases for quieting of title should be dismissed based on the allegation of
petitioners themselves that the parcels of land covered by respondents' certificates of title
were not the subject properties which petitioners claimed as their own. CA denied the
petitioners’ MR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioners’ Complaints for failure to
state a cause of action
RULING: YES. Complaints sufficiently stated a cause of action. Respondents maintain

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
that their ownership of the subject properties, evidenced by certificates of title registered in
their names, cannot be defeated. This contention is untenable.
Respondents mistakenly construe the allegations in petitioners' Complaints. What

petitioners alleged in their Complaints was that while the subject properties were not
covered by respondents' certificates of title, nevertheless, respondents forcibly evicted
petitioners therefrom. Hence, it is not simply a question of whether petitioners' possession
can defeat respondents' title to registered land. Instead, an initial determination has to be
made on whether the subject properties were in fact covered by respondents' certificates
of title.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as
follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not
to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation
of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges
facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not
the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient
basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense
that may be presented by the defendant.
This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a
cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject
properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in
peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may recover the
same.
Petitioners averred that respondents had violated their rights as owner of the subject
properties by evicting the former therefrom by means of force and intimidation.
Resultantly, petitioners filed the cases before the RTC in order to recover possession of
the subject properties, to prevent respondents from using their TCTs to defeat petitioners'
rights of ownership and possession over said subject properties, and to claim damages
and other reliefs that the court may deem just and equitable.
The Court notes that petitioners' prayer for the cancellation of respondents' certificates of
title are inconsistent with their allegations. While petitioners can seek the recovery of the
subject properties, they cannot ask for the cancellation of respondents' TCTs since
petitioners failed to allege any interest in the land covered thereby. Still, the other reliefs
sought by petitioners, i.e., recovery of the possession of the subject properties and
compensation for the damages resulting from respondents' forcible taking of their
property, are still proper.
Petitioners' Complaints should not have been dismissed despite the seeming error made
by petitioners in their prayer. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
GRANTED. The Decision dated 16 September 2005 and Resolution dated 9 December
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80927 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be remanded for further proceedings to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 253, of Las Piñas City, which is hereby ordered to try and decide the case
with deliberate speed.
• Right of Action – Multi-Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 146726, 16 June 2006
NAME: Ronalyn Gacula
CASE 31 TOPIC: Cause of Action
CASE TITLE: MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE

MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, respondent.
GR NO. 146726 DATE June 16, 2006
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J
DOCTRINE: A party to an instrument is under no obligation to seek a reformation of an

instrument while he is unaware that any opposition will be made to carry out the actual
Agreement. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against an equitable cause
of action for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until the mistake has
been discovered or ought to have been discovered.
The term “right of action” is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the law of
pleadings, right of action is distinguished from a cause of action in that the former is a
remedial right belonging to some persons while the latter is a formal statement of the
operational facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is a matter of right and
depends on the substantive law while the latter is a matter of statute and is governed by
the law of procedure. The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not
accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred.
A cause of action must always consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and
the defendant’s corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they
relate—person, character, property or contract; and (2) the delict or wrongful act or
omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated
FACTS:
● Multi-Realty is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. In the
1970s, it constructed a 26-storey condominium at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
Fonda Street in Makati City known as Makati Tuscany Condominium.
● One hundred sixty-four (164) of the parking slots were allotted to Makati Tuscany,
while eight (8) slots were designated as guest parking slots, and the remaining
ninety-eight (98) were retained by Multi-Realty for sale to unit owners.
● Pursuant to RA 4726 (Condominium Act), the Makati Tuscany Condominium
Corporation (MATUSCO) was organized and established to manage the units.
Thus, Multi-Realty executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions of the
Makati Tuscany (Master Deed) in 1975 and was filed in the Register of Deeds in
1977. Multi-Realty subsequently executed a Deed of Transfer in favor of
MATUSCO over the common areas. However, both Master Deed and and Deed of

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
Transfer did not reflect or specify the ownership of the 98 parking slots.
● MATUSCO’s Board of Directors authorized its President, Jovenico Cinco, to
negotiate terms under which they would buy 36 of the unallocated parking slots
from Multi-Realty. Thereafter, Cinco informed its Board of Multi-Realty’s proposal
to sell all of the unassigned parking lots at a discounted price.
● In September 1989, Multi-Realty requested that two of their executives be allowed
to use 2 out of the remaining 72 unallocated parking slots but MATUSCO denied
such request by asserting for the first time that such parking slots were common
areas owned by it. Later, MATUSCO offered to allow Multi-Realty to use the 2
parking slots but was rejected.
● On April 26, 1990, Multi-Realty filed a complaint against MATUSCO for Damages
and/or Reformation of Instrument with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction alleging that it had retained ownership of the 98
unassigned parking slots. MATUSCO, on the other hand, alleged that Multi-Realty
had no cause of action against it for reformation of their contract since by its own
admission, the latter sold various parking slots to third parties despite its
knowledge that the parking areas, other than those mentioned in the Master of
Deed, belonged to the former.
● The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that Multi-Realty failed to prove
any ground for reformation of its agreement with MATUSCO relative to the
ownership of the common areas. Multi-Realty appealed by a petition for review
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed Multi-Realty’s appeal on
the ground that its action has already prescribed. Multi-Realty filed a motion for
reconsideration but still to no avail. Hence, this instant petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Multi-Realty’s action had already prescribed when it was filed in
1990
RULING: NO. Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides that the time for prescription of
all actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted
from the day they may be brought.
The term right of action is the remedial right belonging to some persons, as distinguished
from a cause of action which is a formal statement of the operational facts that give rise
to such remedial right. Thus, the right of action springs from the cause of action but does
not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred. A cause
of action must always consist of two elements, to wit: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and
the defendant’s corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they
relate - person, character, property or contract; and (2) the delict or wrongful act or
omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated.
To determine when all the facts which constitute a cause of action for reformation of an
instrument may be brought and when the right of the petitioner to file such action accrues,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that “an action for the reformation of an
instrument, to quiet title to real property, or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.” Thus,
one has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an instrument when
his legal right is denied, challenged or refused by another; or when there is an
antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the denial thereof by another concerning a real
question or issue; or when there is a real, definitive and substantive controversy between
the parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal interests.
In this case, Multi-Realty executed the Master of Deed in 1975 while MATUSCO assailed

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
the former’s ownership only in 1989 and claimed ownership of the unassigned parking
slots, it was then that it discovered the error in the Master of Deed, thereafter, the dispute
over the ownership of such parking slots ensued. It was only during that time that
Multi-Realty’s cause of action for a reformation of the Master of Deed accrued. Since it
filed its complaint in 1990, the prescriptive period had not yet elapsed.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the court of appeals in CA-G.. CV No. 44696 is SET ASIDE. The Court of
Appeals is directed to resolve petitioner’s appeal with reasonable dispatch. No costs.
• Consular Area Residents Association v. Casanova G.R. No. 202618, 12 April 2016
NAME: Sean Omli
CASE 32 TOPIC Meaning of Cause of Action: Right of action
CASE TITLE CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by

its President BENJAMIN V. ZABAT, ROMEO JUGADO, JR., and
NANCY QUINO, petitioner, vs. ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ENGR.
TOMAS Y. MACROHON, LOCAL HOUSING BOARD OF TAGUIG CITY,
and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGUIG, respondents.
GR NO. 202618 DATE 12 April 2016
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the
petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right
to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent
act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear
legal right, the writ must not issue.
FACTS:
1. In 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, otherwise known as the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, which, inter alia, created the
BCDA in order to "accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative
productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions "
and "to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps."
2. For this purpose, the BCDA was authorized to own, hold, and administer portions
of the Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President. In
this relation, Executive Order (EO) No. 40, Series of 1992 was issued, identifying
Fort Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for development and
disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects.
3. Located in Fort Bonifacio are the JUSMAG and Diplomatic and Consular Areas
subject of this case.The JUSMAG Area is a 34.5-hectare area located along
Lawton Avenue where military officers, both in the active and retired services, and
their respective families, had occupied housing units and facilities originally
constructed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). On the other hand, the
Diplomatic and Consular Area was declared as alienable and disposable land by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1725, 11 signed on February 10, 2009.

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4. On July 18, 2012, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certificate of
Compliance on Demolition 13 declaring that the BCDA had complied with the
requirement of "Just and Humane Demolition and Eviction," for the demolition of
structures within the JUSMAG Area.
5. Respondent Casanova, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the BCDA,

sent a Letter 15 dated July 20, 2012, informing petitioner and its members that
they should, within a seven (7)-day period ending on July 27, 2012, coordinate with
BCDA officials should they choose to either accept the relocation package being
offered to them, or voluntarily dismantle their structures and peacefully vacate the
property.
6. Petitioner led the present case to enjoin the demolition of their structures which
they claimed are within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, and not the JUSMAG
Area. They averred that the BCDA itself declared in its own website that the
Diplomatic and Consular Area is not its property, and that its members are
occupying the Diplomatic and Consular Area with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines given at the time of their assignments in the military service, and
hence, cannot be demolished especially in the absence of a court order.
7. Respondents Casanova and Engr. Macrohon maintained that the clearing

operations undertaken by the BCDA covered only the JUSMAG area, on
which the structures possessed by petitioner's members are located. They also
argued that under Section 28 (b) of RA 7279, eviction or demolition is allowed
when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented, even in the absence of a court order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the demolition should be enjoined.
RULING:
No. Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the
petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable
right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and
permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the
absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an
injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests,
and it is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Verily, the possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.
In this case, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to prove that the structures for which
they seek protection against demolition fall within the Diplomatic and Consular Area. Its
supposition is anchored on two (2) documents, namely: (a) a printed copy of BCDA's
declaration in its website that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is a non-BCDA property;
and (b) a map of the South Bonifacio Properties showing the metes and bounds of the
properties of the BCDA as well as the properties contiguous to them. However, none of
these documents substantiate petitioner's claim: the website posting is a mere statement
that the Diplomatic Consular Area is supposedly a non-BCDA property, whereas the map
only depicts the metes and bounds of the BCDA's properties.
Relying on the prima facie credibility of these documents as opposed to petitioner's fliimsy
argumentation, the Court finds that respondents have correctly identified petitioner's
structures as those belonging to the JUSMAG Area. Thus, since petitioner's purported
right in esse is hinged on the premise that the structures do not fall within the JUSMAG
but within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, the petition should already fail.

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Test of sufficiency of cause of action

• Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, G.R. No., 25 August 2005
NAME: Steph Ilacad
CASE 33 TOPIC: Test of sufficiency of cause of action
CASE TITLE MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs .

VIRGILIO S. DAVID, respondent.
PONENTE: TINGA, J
DOCTRINE: To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the
complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of
external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegations
in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a
cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Virgilio S. David, a supplier of electrical hardware, filed a case for
specific performance and damages against Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (MOELCI II), a rural electric cooperative in Misamis Occidental predicated on a
document attached as Annex “A” to the Amended Complaint that according to David is the
contract pursuant to which he sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer.
2. MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint 11 which pleaded, among others,
affirmative defenses which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint due to
lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no enforceable contract between David
and MOELCI II. In accordance with Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure MOELCI II filed with the trial court a Motion (For Preliminary Hearing of
Affirmative Defenses and Deferment of Pre-Trial Conference) that the document attached
as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint was only a quotation letter and not a contract as
alleged by David. Thus, it contends that David's Amended Complaint is dismissible for
failure to state a cause of action.
3. In his opposition to MOELCI II's Motion, David contended that because a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is required to be based
only on the allegations of the complaint, the "quotation letter," being merely an
attachment to the complaint and not part of its allegations, cannot be inquired into.
4. MOELCI II asserted that a complaint cannot be separated from its annexes; hence, the
trial court in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action must consider the complaint's annexes.

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
5. Judge Olalia of RTC of Manila denied MOELCI II's motion for preliminary hearing of
affirmative defenses and MR
6. MOELCI II elevated this incident to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action
for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Olalia in the issuance
of the two aforesaid orders.
7. CA dismissed MOELCI II's petition holding that the allegations in David's complaint
constitute a cause of action and ruled that the interpretation of the document attached as
Annex “A” requires evidence aliunde which is not allowed in determining whether or not
the complaint states a cause of action. The appellate court further declared that when the
trial court is confronted with a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action, it is mandated to confine its examination for the resolution thereof to the
allegations of the complaint and is specifically enjoined from receiving evidence for that
purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and in holding that
the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion
RULING: NO, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
A preliminary hearing permitted under Section 6, Rule 16, is not mandatory even
when the same is prayed for. It rests largely on the sound discretion of the court.
Absent any showing that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof
or with such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction, as in the
present case, the trial court's order granting or dispensing with the need for a preliminary
hearing may not be corrected by certiorari.
Moreover, MOELCI II's Motion is anchored on the ground that the Complaint allegedly
stated no cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is more than unnecessary as it
constitutes an erroneous and improvident move. To determine the existence of a cause
of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is
error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings
to determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis
by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is
whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
In the case at bar, it has been hypothetically admitted that the parties had entered into a
contract sale David bound himself to supply MOELCI II (1) unit 10 MVA Power transformer
with accessories for a total price of P5,200,000.00 plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a total
price of P2,169,500.00; that despite written and verbal demands, MOELCI II has failed to
pay the price thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of P272,722.27; and
that apart from the previously stated contract of sale, David regularly delivered various
electrical hardware to MOELCI II which, despite demands, has an outstanding balance of
P281,939.76. We believe all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action. Even
extending our scrutiny to Annex "A," which is after all deemed a part of the Amended
Complaint, will not result to a change in our conclusion. The presence of the signatures of
both the General Manager and the Chairman of the Committee of Management
immediately below the word "CONFORME" appearing on the document's last page lends

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
credulity to David’s contention that there was, or might have been, a meeting of minds on
the terms embodied therein.
In fact, the ambiguity of the import and nature of Annex "A" which necessitates a resort to
its proper interpretation, fortifies the propriety of the trial court's denial of MOELCI II's
Motion. The interpretation of a document requires introduction of evidence which is
precisely disallowed in determining whether or not a complaint states a cause of action.
CA therefore correctly dismissed MOELCI II's petition and upheld the trial court's ruling.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated 14 March 1997 and its Resolution dated 14 July 1997 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects

• Marilag v. Martinez G.R. No. 201892, 22 July 2015
NAME: Poch Inocentes
CASE 34 TOPIC RULE 2. CAUSE OF ACTION: SPLITTING OF A

SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION AND ITS EFFECTS; RES
JUDICATA; LITIS PENDENTIA
CASE TITLE NORLINDA S. MARILAG, petitioner, vs . MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ,

respondent
GR NO. 201892 DATE July 22, 2015
PONENTE PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOCTRINE: A party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a
basis for several suits as the whole cause must be determined in one action. To be sure,
splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis
pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).
FACTS:
1) On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's father, obtained from
petitioner a loan in the amount of P160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest of 5%,
payable within a period of 6 months. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over
a parcel of land. Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon maturity and despite repeated
demands, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage. Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon petitioner's motion, was declared in
default. After an ex parte presentation of petitioner's evidence, the RTC-Imus issued
January 30, 1998 Decision in the foreclosure case, declaring the stipulated 5% monthly
interest to be usurious and reducing the same to 12% per annum (p.a.). Accordingly, it
ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the amount of P229,200.00, consisting of the principal of
P160,000.00 and accrued interest of P59,200.00 from July 30, 1992 to September 30,
1995. Records do not show that this Decision had already attained finality.
2) Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent agreed to pay
Rafael's obligation to petitioner which was pegged at P689,000.00. After making a total
payment of P400,000.00, he executed a promissory note 12 dated February 20, 1998
(subject PN), binding himself to pay on or before March 31, 1998 the amount of

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
P289,000.00, "representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation of [his] father to
[petitioner]." After learning of the January 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to pay
the amount covered by the subject PN despite demands, prompting the petitioner to file a
complaint for sum of money and damages.
3) August 28, 2003 Decision - denied recovery of subject PN; It found that the
consideration for its execution was Rafael's indebtedness to petitioner, the extinguishment
of which necessarily results in the consequent extinguishment of the cause. There being
an excess payment of P171,000.00, it declared that a quasi-contract (in the concept of
solutio indebiti) exists between the parties and, accordingly, directed petitioner to return
the said amount to respondent, plus 6% interest p.a.
4) November 3, 2003 Order - granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and
recalled and set aside the August 28, 2003 Decision. It declared that the causes of
action in the collection and foreclosure cases are distinct, and respondent's failure to
comply with his obligation under the subject PN justifies petitioner to seek judicial relief.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order
dated January 14, 2004, prompting him to elevate the matter to the CA.
5) CA Ruling: Recalled and set aside the court a quo's November 3, 2003 and January 14,
2004 Orders, and reinstated the August 28, 2003 Decision. It held that the doctrine of
res judicata finds application in the instant case, considering that both the judicial
foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the non-payment of
Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate
mortgage and the primary consideration for the execution of the subject PN. Since
res judicata only requires substantial, not actual, identity of causes of action and/or identity
of issue, it ruled that the judgment in the judicial foreclosure case relating to Rafael's
obligation to petitioner is final and conclusive on the collection case. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the dismissal of the
collection case.
RULING: No, the CA did not err in upholding the dismissal case.
1) However, res judicata does not exist in the following case.
A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur: (a)
the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final ; (b ) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be as
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.
In the case at bar, there is no res judicata because the records are bereft of any indication
that the August 28, 2003 Decision in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained
finality, evidenced, for instance, by a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case.
Accordingly, with the very first element of res judicata missing, said principle cannot be
made to obtain.
2) The petitioner's prosecution of the collection case was barred, instead, by the
principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and
singularity of the causes of action in the foreclosure and collection cases, such that
the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner's recourse to the subsequent collection
case.
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action,
such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b ) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res
judicata in the other. Splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the
ground of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee
has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e. to recover the debt, through
the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real
action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not
cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an

action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in
order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of
such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection
of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the
foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 4, 2011 and the Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 81258 reinstating the court a quo's Decision dated August 28, 2003 in
Civil Case No. 98-0156 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS: (a) directing
petitioner Norlinda S. Marilag to return to respondent Marcelino B. Martinez the latter's
excess payments in the total amount of P134,400.00, plus legal interest at the rate of 6%
p.a. from the filing of the Answer on August 6, 1998 until full satisfaction; and (b) deleting
the award of attorney's fees.
• Yap v. First E-Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 169889, 29 September 2009
NAME: Juan Inigo Miguel
CASE 35 TOPIC: RULE 2. CAUSE OF ACTION: SPLITTING OF A

SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION AND ITS EFFECTS
CASE TITLE: Spouses Simon Yap and Milagros Guevarra v. First e-Bank Corp.
(Previously known as PDCP Development Bank, Inc.)
PONENTE: Corona , J.:
DOCTRINE: A creditor who obtains a personal judgment against the debtor on a loan
waives his right to foreclose on the mortgage securing loan. Otherwise, the creditor
becomes guilty of splitting a single cause of action.
No man shall be twiced vexed for one and the same cause.

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
P.S Doctrine is inapplicable in the case since the complaints for violation of BP 22
were filed prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular 57-97
FACTS:
1.) August 30, 1990, Sammy Yap obtained a P2M loan from PDCP Development
bank. As security, Sammy’s parents executed a third-party mortgage on the land.
2.) November 7, 1990, Sammy issued a promissory note and six postdated checks in
favor of PDCP as additional security of the loan.
3.) When Sammy defaulted on the payment of his loan, PDCP presented the six
checks the drawee bank but the said checks were dishonored.
4.) On February 8, 1993, PDCP filed a complaint against Sammy for six counts of
violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). On December 16, 1993, the BP 22
cases were provisionally dismissed.
5.) On October 26, 1994, pursuant to the petition of PDCP for extrajudicial
foreclosure, the extrajudicial sale was set on December 28, 1994.
6.) December 20, 1994, petitioners filed in the RTC of San Carlos City a complaint of
injunction, damages and accounting of payments against PDCP. Petitioner’s
complaint sought to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground that PDCP waived its
right to foreclose the mortgage on their property when it filed the BP22 cases
against Sammy.
7.) On April 2, 1997, RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. The RTC ruled that the
remedies available for PDCP were alternative and the choice of one excluded the
others. Thus, PDCP was deemed to have waived its right to foreclose on the
property of the petitioners when it elected to sue Sammy for violation of BP 22.
8.) On February 8, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC. It opined that PDCP was not
barred from exercising its right to foreclose on the property of petitioners despite
suing Sammy for violation of BP22. The purpose of BP22 was to punish the act of
issuing a worthless check, not to force a debtor to pay his debt.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: w/n PDCP is barred to foreclose the property when it elected to Sammy for
violation of BP 22
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97, the
alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and collection of suit were not barred
even if a suit for BP 22 had been filed earlier, unless a judgment of conviction had been
rendered in the BP 22 case finding the accused debtor criminally liable and ordering him
to pay the amount of the checks. And since PDCP filed the complaint prior to the adoption
of circular 57-97, PDCP is not barred to foreclose the property.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Cost against

petitioner.
• Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp., G.R. No. 167246, 20 July 2011
NAME: Jasmine Tiff

CASE TITLE: Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp
GR NO.167246 DATE: 20 July 2011

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
PONENTE: BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
Tests to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action:
(1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second
causes of action or the "same evidence" test
(2) Whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the
other.
(3) Whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the
first complaint.
FACTS:
● January 4, 2000 - Petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent for a
period of two (2) years starting from January 16, 2000- January 15, 2002,a prime
lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The respondent acquired the subject lot
from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership with several conditions.
● In the contract of lease between petitioner and respondent, the latter imposed
several conditions:
1. The petitioner shall use the leased lot as a parking space for light vehicles
and as a site for a small drivers' canteen,
2. May not utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the
respondent's prior written consent.
● October 10, 2000- respondent filed an unlawful detainer case (ejectment case)
against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8084 on the ground that the petitioner violated their
stipulations in the lease contract:
1. Petitioner constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial
establishments on the lot, without first securing the required written consent
from the respondent, and the necessary permits from the Association and
the Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership.
2. The petitioner also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants
● MTC-Branch 68 decided in favor of the respondent.
● RTC-Branch 155, Pasig City affirmed in toto the MTC-Branch 68 decision.
● The case, however, was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, as the Presiding Judge
of the RTC-Branch 155 inhibited himself from resolving the petitioner's MR.
● The RTC-Branch 267 granted the petitioner's motion (reversing and setting
aside the MTC-Branch 68 decision).
● Civil Case No. 8084 (the first unlawful detainer case) was dismissed for being
prematurely filed. Respondent, then, filed a petition for review with the CA.
● During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed another case
for unlawful detainer (ejectment case) against the petitioner before the
MTC-Branch 71, Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9210 (the
second unlawful detainer case). on the ground of the expiration of the parties'
lease contract.
● The MTC-Branch 71 ruled in favor of the respondent
● RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and
dismissed Civil Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia. (But petitioner
still had to pay rent of P71,500.00)
● Respondent filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the
CA.
● RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
No litis pendentia between Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210: the two cases
involved different grounds for ejectment—the first case was filed because of
violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
expiration of the lease contract.

● CA: nullified and set aside the assailed decision of the RTC-Branch 68
● Petitioner's MR was denied; hence, the filing of the present petition for review on
certiorari.
● Petitioner’s ARGUMENT:
1. litis pendentia exists between the two ejectment cases because of their
identity with one another and that any judgment on the first case will
amount to res judicata on the other. He also averred that respondent
reiterated the ground of violations of the lease contract, with the additional
ground of the expiration of the lease contract in the second ejectment case.
2. not related issue: forum shopping
ISSUE: Whether or not litis pendentia exist - NO, Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve
different causes of action
RULING:
As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, l itis pendentia refers to a situation where
two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that
one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:

1. identity of the parties in the two actions;
2. substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties;
and
3. the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be
rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on
the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action,
1. whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second
causes of action or the "same evidence" test
2. Whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in
the other.
3. Whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the
filing of the first complaint.
NO LITIS PENDENTIA: CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE SECOND CASE

WAS NOT YET IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF FILING OF THE
FIRST EJECTMENT CASE.
The facts show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on petitioner's
violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was
based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first
ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still
in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000 to
January 15, 2002 without renewal.
RESTATEMENT OF THE VIOLATION DOES NOT RESULT

IN SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY BETWEEN THE TWO CASES

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
Even if the respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment
in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was
the expiration of the lease contract.
NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISIONS RENDERED

IN CIVIL CASE NOS. 8084 AND 9210
MTC-Branch 71 decided the 9210 on the sole issue of whether the lease contract between
the parties had expired. Although alleged by the respondent in its complaint, the
MTC-Branch 71 did not rule on the alleged violations of the lease contract
committed by the petitioner.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision dated August 20, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 78836 are AFFIRMED.
• Chu et al v. Cunanan G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011
NAME: Nina Alexia Hermosura

CASE TITLE: Chu et al v. Cunanan
GR NO. 156185 DATE:12 September 2011
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
DOCTRINE:
Petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage and to present only a portion of the grounds upon which a
special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to
leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation.
Rule 2, Sec.4, ROC If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others.
FACTS:
● In September 1986, Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage involving their 5 parcels of land in Pampanga in
favor of Respondent Trinidad N. Cunanan (Cunanan) for P5,161,090.00.
● Without knowledge of petitioners, Respondent Cunanan transferred the five lots to
her name and failed to pay the balance to the Chus. She later transferred two of
the lots to the Spouses Carlos.Petitioner Chus caused the annotation of an unpaid
vendor's lien on three of the lots. Despite that, Cunanan still assigned the
remaining three lots to Cool Town Realty.
● In 1988, Chus filed a case with the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from
respondents. Five years later, they amended the complaint to seek the annulment

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage (Civil Case No. G-1936). They
added Cool Town Realty and the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as defendants.
Chus further amended the complaint to implead Benelda Estate (buyer of Spouses
Carlos) as additional defendant.
● Benelda Estate filed its answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
complaint stated no cause of action because it had acted in good faith.
● On March 1, 2001, the Court upheld the dismissal of Civil Case No. G-1936.
● In 1999, the Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty entered into a
compromise agreement whereby the Cunanans transferred to the Chus their 50%
share in "all the parcels of land in Saguin, San Fernando, Pampanga" registered in
the name of Cool Town Realty "for and in consideration of the full settlement of
their case." The RTC approved the compromise agreement in a partial decision.
● In 2001, the petitioners brought another suit (Civil Case No. 12251) against the
Carloses and Benelda Estate, and adding the Cunanans, seeking the cancellation
of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate, and the issuance of new
TCTs in their favour.
● The Cunanans moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on two grounds,
namely: (a) bar by prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand had been paid,
waived, and abandoned.
● Benelda Estate likewise moved to dismiss the amended complaint, citing as
grounds: (a) forum shopping; (b) bar by prior judgment, and (c) failure to state a
cause of action.
● Carloses raised affirmative defenses in their answer, namely: (a) the failure to
state a cause of action; (b) res judicata or bar by prior judgment; and (c) bar by
statute of limitations.
● RTC denied both motions to dismiss holding that there is a cause of action
against all the defendants; that the action was not barred by res judicata as there
was no identity of parties and subject matter between Civil Case No. 12251 and
Civil Case No. G-1936; and pointed out that the compromise agreement involved
only the three parcels of land registered in the name of Cool Town Realty.
● CA ruled that the compromise agreement had ended the legal controversy
between the parties with respect to the cause of action arising from the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage covering all the five parcels of land; that Civil
Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 involved the violation by the
Cunanans of the same legal right under the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage; and that the filing of another civil case contravened the rule against
splitting of a cause of action, and rendered Civil Case No. 12251 subject of a
motion to dismiss based on bar by res judicata.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Civil Case No. 12251 is a contravention of the rule against splitting of a
cause of action and is barred by res judicata.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or
rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of
action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them. A single
cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be
made the subject of two or more different actions.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits splitting of a single cause of

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action, viz.:
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in
any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage and to present only a portion of the grounds upon which
a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then
to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary
objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of
the policy merited the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on the ground of bar by res
judicata.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur:
1. the former judgment must be final;

2. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties;
3. it must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. there must be between the first and second actions
a. identity of parties,
b. identity of the subject matter, and
c. identity of cause of action.
All were attendant in the case.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision
promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 72558. The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
• Riviera Golf Club Inc v. CCA Holdings B.V. G.R. No. 173783, 17 June 2015
NAME: Mheltina Deniece Buizon Espenida
CASE 38 TOPIC Splitting of a Single Cause of Action and its Effects
CASE TITLE Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings
GR NO. 173783 DATE June 17, 2015
PONENTE Brion, J.
DOCTRINE
A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be filed. A single
action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more different
actions. Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly states:
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. – If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

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FACTS:
● On 11 October 1996, Riviera Golf entered into a Management Agreement with
CCA Holdings for a period of five years. Under the agreement, Riviera Golf would
pay CCA Holdings a monthly Base Management Fee of 5.5% of the adjusted gross
revenue equivalent to $16,500.00.
● They also entered into a co-terminous Royalty Agreement that would allow Riviera
Gold and the Club’s developer, AFP-RSBS to use CCA Holdings’ name and
facilities to market the club’s shares. For this, Riviera will pay CCA Holdings a
gross licensing fee of 1% on all membership fees paid in the sale of shares, an
additional 4% on all club shares, and 7% on non-golf membership sold.
● Riviera initially paid the agreed fees but eventually defaulted in September 1997
and on June 1999 likewise failed to pay the monthly management fees.
● On October 1999, Riviera Golf sent CCA Holdings a letter pre-terminating the
management agreement. CCA Holdings protested and demanded the unpaid fees
which the petitioner refused.
● In April 2001, CCA filed before the RTC of Makati City a complaint for a sum of
money with damages docketed as Civil Case No. 01-611. During the pendency of
the case, the parties executed a compromise agreement.
● On November 2002, CCA Holdings sent again a letter demanding $390,768.00
representing the expected business profits for the unexpired portion of the
Agreement. The demands were unheeded prompting CCA Holdings to file another
complaint for sum of money and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 03-399.
● On August 2003, a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and violation
of the rule against splitting causes of action was filed by Riviera Golf.
● The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss while the CA set aside the order granting
the motion to dismiss and remanded the case to the RTC for adjudication on the
merits.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CCA Holdings violated the prohibitions against res judicata and splitting
a single cause of action.
2. WON the parties may stipulate on an agreement violating the prohibitions against
res judicata and splitting a single cause of action.
RULING:
1. Yes. Under the rule on res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits, and on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following requisites:

1. the former judgment must be final;
2. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties;
3. it must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. there must be identity of the parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
causes of action.
All the elements are present in the case. While Civil Case No. 01-611 is for the collection
of unpaid fees and Civil Case No. 03-399 is for recovery of damages for the premature
termination of agreement both cases were filed on the basis of the same Management
and Royalty Agreements.
A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be filed. A single
action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more different

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
actions. Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly states:
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. – If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
2. No. A compromise agreement must be consistent with the requisite and principles of
contracts. While it is true that the agreement is binding between the parties and becomes
the law between them, it is also a rule that to be valid, a compromise agreement must not
be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy. In the case, paragraph 4 of
their compromise agreement allows the splitting of causes of action and res judicata. The
court ruled that the provision should be invalidated for being repugnant to our public
policy.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition.

The decision dated January 11, 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83824 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the decision dated September 29,
2004, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 03-399 is
REINSTATED.
Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action

• Perez v. Hernano, G.R. No. 147417, 8 July 2005
NAME: Erica Lopez
CASE 39 TOPIC: Joinder and Misjoinder of Causes of Action
CASE TITLE: SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ AND CRISTINA AGRAVIADOR
AVISO, PETITIONERS, VS. ANTONIO HERMANO, RESPONDENT
GR NO. 147417 DATE 08 July 2005
PONENTE Chico-Nazario, J.
DOCTRINE: Joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties.
If the joinder involves different parties, there must be a question of fact or of law common
to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.
FACTS:
● On 27 April 1998, petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and
Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie
Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio
Hermano.
● Petitioners presented three causes of action in their complaint, the first for
enforcement of contract to sell entered into between petitioners and Zescon Land,
Inc., the second for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered
into between petitioners and respondents Hermano and the third for damages
against all defendants.
● First cause of action - petitioners allege that sometime in November 1997, they
entered into a Contract to Sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Zenie
Sales-Contreras, for the purchase of five (5) parcels of land in the total amount of
P19,104,000.00. As part of their agreement, a portion of the purchase price would

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be paid to them as down payment, another portion to be given to them as cash

advance upon the execution of the contract and another portion to be used by the
buyer, Zescon Land, Inc., to pay for loans earlier contracted by petitioners which
loans were secured by mortgages.
● Second cause of action - petitioners contend that "in a tricky machination and
simultaneous with the execution of the aforesaid Contract to Sell," they were made
to sign other documents, two of which were Mortgage deeds over the same five
properties in favor of respondent Hermano, whom they had never met. It was
allegedly explained to themby Sales-Contreras that the mortgage contracts would
merely serve to facilitate the payment ofthe price as agreed upon in their Contract
to Sell. Petitioners claim that it was never their intention to mortgage their property
to respondent Hermano and that they have never received a single centavo from
mortgaging their property to him.
● Third cause of action - Petitioners pray for damages against all the defendants
alleging that due to the failure and refusal by defendants Zescon and Contreras to
comply with their obligations the “plaintiffs have suffered sleepless nights”.
● Respondent Hermano filed a "Motion With Leave To Dismiss The Complaint
Against Defendant Antonio Hermano, Or Ordered Severed For Separate Trial"
before Branch 224. In said motion, respondent Hermano argued that there was a
mis-joinder of causes of action under Rule 2, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. This
was granted by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint against respondent Hermano in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211.
RULING: YES. Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano should not have been
dismissed from the complaint. As far as we can glean from the Orders of the trial court,
respondent Hermano was dropped from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of
causes of action. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that there was no misjoinder in this
case.
To better understand the present controversy, it is vital to revisit the rules on joinder of
causes of action as exhaustively discussed in Republic v. Hernandez, thus:
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting
of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one
cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each
of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or
petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same
parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete
determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one
subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision
should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to
the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally
construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be
adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end
in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage
joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs,
although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used
or in developing a rule of universal application.

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Section 6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides:

Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the
initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5,
Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative
or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special
rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court
provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money,
the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
As far as can be gathered from the assailed Orders, it is the first condition - on joinder of
parties - that the trial court deemed to be lacking. It is well to remember that the joinder of
causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves
different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both
parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.
It becomes reasonably apparent that there are questions of fact and law common to both
Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of transaction over the
same properties. There is the question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon
Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent
Hermano. There is also the question of which of the four contracts were validly entered
into by the parties
Prescinding from the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the joinder of causes of action
should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all
matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners' cause of action
against respondent Hermano.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the

Court of Appeals dated 19 October 2000 dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and
its Resolution dated 02 March 2001 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, dated 28 February 2000 and 25
May 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is further ordered to reinstate
respondent Antonio Hermano as one of the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211.
• Danilo v. Pedro, G.R. No. 155736, 31 March 2005
NAME: Josh Valdez

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CASE 40 TOPIC: Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action
CASE TITLE: DANILO VS PEDRO
GR NO. 155736 DATE: 31 MARCH 2005
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J
DOCTRINE:
The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has
stated more than one cause of action. If the complaint shows one primary right and one
wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are incidentally
involved. Where two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of
causes of action.
FACTS:
● Petitioner spouses Danilo were owner of a parcel of land located in Paranaque,
Metro Manila. On September 7, 1997, the parties executed a Memorandum of
Agreement where petitioners sold the land to respondent spouses Piquero for
940,000.00 payable in six installments via post dated checks. In the MOA, it
appeared that there was a condition that if two of the post dated checks would be
dishonoured by a drawee bank, the respondents would be obliged to reconvey the
property to petitioners.
● On May 17, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents with the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan for annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession, and
damages. Petitioners alleged that the first two checks issued by respondents were
dishonoured by the drawee bank, and were not replaced despite several demands
from respondents.
● Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action.
Respondents also averred that the principal action for the rescission of the MOA,
and the recovery of possession of the property is a real action and not a personal
one, hence it should have been brought in the RTC of Paranaque City where the
property was located and not in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan where the petitioners
resided.
● Petitioners insisted that the action for damages is a personal action and not a real
action, hence it may be filed in the RTC where they reside. They also averred that
while their second cause of action for the recovery of possession of property is a
real action, it may be joined with the rest of their causes of action for damages,
conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
● The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit but found merit in the application
of Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. The case was re-raffled to Branch 10
of RTC Malolos and the same court granted the motion of reconsideration by
respondents and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court was applicable
2. Whether the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan was the proper venue where the action
should be filed
RULING:
1. No. Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court is not applicable.
According to Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court,

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“Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues
or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein..”
A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of action in a
complaint. The main thrust is whether more than one primary right or subject of the
controversy is present. The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not
indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action. If the complaint shows one
primary right and one wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other
matters are incidentally involved. Where two or more primary rights and wrongs appear,
there is a joinder of causes of action.
In this case, petitioners only had one cause of action against the respondents namely, the
breach of the MOA upon respondent’s refusal to pay the first two installments in payment
of the property, and turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real property. The
claim for damages suffered by petitioners on account of the breach of contract are merely
incidental to the main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes of
action.
2. No. The RTC of Malolos, Bulacan was not the proper venue where the action should
be filed.
According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
“Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be

commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.”
In this case, the action of petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of
respondents’ breach thereof, and the failure of respondents to return the property is a real
action. As such, it should have been filed where the property was located as stated in
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners filed the complaint in the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan which was not the proper venue.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
• Totality Rule (BP 129, Sec. 33)

• Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps, G.R. No. L-66620, 24 September 1986
NAME: Julie De Gracia
CASE 41 TOPIC: Joinder & Misjoinder of causes of action
CASE TITLE: Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps
GR NO. L-66620 DATE: 24 September 1986

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PONENTE: Feria, J.
DOCTRINE: The application of the Totality Rule under Sec 33(l) of BP 129 and Section
11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties
under Sec 6 of Rule 33 of ROC.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Flores filed a single complaint against private respondents Binongcal
and Calion. In the complaint, there were 2 causes of actions stated:
● Against Binongcal for allegedly refusing to pay P11,643.00 for the truck
tires purchased from Flores; and
● Against Calion for allegedly refusing to pay P10,212.00 for the truck tires
he also purchased from Flores.
***These are 2 separate transactions made on separate occasions.
2. Respondent Judge Mallare-Phillips of RTC Baguio and Benguet dismissed the

above complaint for lack of jurisdiction, hence this appeal by certiorari before this
court. A Motion to Dismiss was then filed by the counsel for Binongcal, and
subsequently, the counsel for Calion joined in moving for the dismissal.
Parties’ contentions:
3. According to the petitioner, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case following the
“novel” totality rule” introduced in Sec 33(I) of BP129 and Sec 11 of the Interim
Rules:
Sec 33(l), BP129:

Provided,That where there are s everal claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions.
Sec 11, Interim Rules:

Application of the totality rule - In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved, the t est of jurisdiction shall be the
aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs,
irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to
different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount
thereof must be specifically alleged.
4. The counsel for private respondents contended that the petition must be
dismissed and the decision of the RTC must be sustained since the RTC’s
exclusive original jurisdiction may only be exercised if the amount of the demand is
more than P20,000. In this case, the respondents contended that there are 2
separate and distinct obligations to the petitioner, neither of which falls under
RTC’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality rule should be applied in this case.
RULING: No. The respondent judge correctly dismissed the complaint because RTC
has no jurisdiction.
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied to cases where two or more plaintiffs

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having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as
to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more defendants
joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more
plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or
fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under

Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test.
Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate
actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall
furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, there is misjoinder of parties because the claims against
respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct, and neither of which
falls within RTC’s jurisdiction.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.
VI. Rule 3 - Parties to Civil Actions

a. Natural and Juridical Persons, Entities Authorized by law
• Verzosa v. Fernandez, 49. Phil. 627 (1926)
NAME: Kiezlle Manalili
CASE 42 TOPIC Parties to Civil Actions
CASE TITLE Mons. ALFREDO VERZOSA, Roman Catholic Apostolic Bishop of Lipa,
constituted as a unipersonal religious corporation, plaintiff- appellant, vs. ZOSIMO
FERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
GR NO. 25254 DATE November 22, 1926
PONENTE STREET, J
DOCTRINE A Roman Catholic Bishop having the right of supervision and inspection over
religious brotherhoods established in his bishopric may maintain a civil action to compel
the persons comprising the directorate of such a fund in their custody, it being alleged that
they are using it in contravention of the spirit and purposes of the trust.
FACTS:
1. Monseñor Alfredo Verzosa, as Roman Catholic Apostolic (RCA) Bishop for the
diocese of Lipa, constituted as a unipersonal religious corporation, for the purpose of
compelling the 6 defendants, Zosimo Fernandez, Salvador Unson, Tomas Cabreza,
Ramon Fabella, Pedro F. Caballes, and Pedro Lavadia , to account for a fund held
by them as trustees pertaining to the Brotherhood (Archicofradia) of the Most Holy
Sacrament of the town of Pagsanjan, and for other purposes.
2. The defendants demurred to the amended complaint, the grounds of exception to
the complaint are three: First that the plaintiff has no right to maintain the action;
secondly, that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action;
and thirdly, that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit

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3. Trial court sustained the demurrer and upon the election of the plaintiff to not amend
further, the court dismissed the action, from which the plaintiff appealed.
4. As a background to the case, on February 20, 1807, a number of individuals
constituting or representing the guild of sangley mestizos of the pueblo of
Pagsanjan, in the Province of Laguna united themselves into a religious association
or brotherhood for the purpose of raising and supplying, from year to year, the
means necessary to meet the expenses of the annual fiestas in honor of the Most
Holy Sacrament and of their patroness the Virgen Lady of Guadalupe, as well as for
the purpose of procuring the celebration of an annual requiem mass for the repose
of the souls of the deceased members. The step met the approval of their superior,
the Archbishop of Manila, who was at the time upon a pastoral visit in Pagsanjan,
and the brotherhood was formally organized under the name of La Archicofradia del
Santisimo Sacramento.
5. Under the law as it then existed royal approval was essential to the legality of an association of this character; and it
was not until July 23, 1819, that a royal cedula was issued by the king of Spain, placing the brotherhood upon a
lawful basis and defining the manner in which it should be organized and conducted. Meanwhile, however, under the
approval of the Archbishop, the association had begun exercising its functions and had maintained a de facto
existence from the time of its first organization.
6. The members of the guild were able to raise a fund of P1,128.86 for the purpose of
promoting their purposes. The administration of this fund was confided to the love,
zeal, and prudence of the directorate of the brotherhood. The fund was intended to
be merely held and administered by the Directorate(The Elder Brother and other
Brothers of the Executive Board) in trust.
7. The money was to be lent from year to year with 5% interest per centum per annum,
to the founders or their descendants other than the actual administrators of the fund,
with a view that the fund should reach at least 6,000. If the conservation of the
money was with fidelity, it seems that the amount of the trust fund now in the hands
of the defendants is alleged to be approximately 29,921. The fund was to be used for
the celebration of fiestas, as well as salary for school teachers of the guilt and for the
celebration of two masses for any member of the guilt who might die, as well as to
pay teacher of grammar for the instruction of the children of mestizos who desired to
follow the literary career for the last one, if the fund reaches 6k)
ISSUE:
1) Whether the plaintiff, as Bishop of the diocese, has the right to maintain his
action
2) Whether the defendants be held accountable for the fund held by them as trustees
pertaining to the brotherhood.
3) Whether the demurrer should be sustained
RULING:
1) YES. As ecclesiastical superior of the parish priest (who is ex officio Rector of the
Brotherhood), the Bishop necessarily has an interest in the enforcement of the trust,
even apart from the duty imposed upon his predecessor, the Archbishop of Manila in
the closing paragraph of the royal cedula, to enforce exact and punctual performance
of the trust. In view of the allegations of the complaint, there can be no sort of doubt
as to the right of the plaintiff, as Bishop of the diocese of Lipa, to maintain his action.
2) YES. In the exercise of their equitable powers our courts have undoubted jurisdiction
to compel a trustee properly to perform his trust and, if necessary, to remove him
from office. We note that it is prayed in the complaint that the defendants be required
to render account to the plaintiff; but it is to the court that the defendants be required
to render account to the plaintiff.
3) NO. It takes but a moment's reflection upon the allegations of the complaint and
especially the statement that the defendants are employing the properties of the
Brotherhood in contravention of the spirit and purposes of the trust to enable one to

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realize that the complaint is not demurableThe demurrer to the amended complaint is
of a general character, being directed to the questions of the jurisdiction of the court,
the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action, and the sufficiency of the facts stated
to constitute a ground of action. None of the points presented in the demurrer are as
well founded.
DISPOSITIVE RULING N/A
Real parties in interest

• Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, 29 April 2005
NAME: Aya Galaroza
CASE 43 TOPIC: Real parties in interest
CASE TITLE: Nemencio EVANGELISTA, Pascual Guinto, Luis Buena, Eusebia Tablada,
Canuto Tisbe, David Carullo, Sofonias Colegado, Felix Buena, Toribio Evangelista,
Lebrada Nicolas, Alecia Ramos, Mila de los Reyes, Salvador de la Torre, Moises Cruz,
Rufino Infante, Alicia Astrologo, Trinidad Lumiqued, Luzminida Quiniquini, & Teodora
Temeras vs Carmelino SANTIAGO
GR NO. 157447 DATE: April 29, 2005
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J
DOCTRINE:
A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
real party-in-interest, hence grounded on the failure to state a cause of action. It can be
used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face
thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
FACTS:
● In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of
land located in Sitio Panayawan, Brgy. San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriguez),
Rizal by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila.
● According to the Deeds of Assignment, the subject property was part of a vast tract
of land called “Hacienda Quibiga” which extended to several provinces; awarded to
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish
title. Ismael claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don
Hermogenes. Acting as an attorney-in-fact to a SPA executed by his “mga
kapatid”, Ismael signed the Deeds of Assignment, assigning potions of the subject
property in exchange for labor and work done by petitioners on subject property.
● Petitioners learned that the respondent was planning to evict them from subject
property. Their investigation revealed that subject property was included in TCTs,
all originating from OCT No. 760, and now in the name of respondent. OCT No.
760 was issued in the name of respondent’s mother, Isabel Manahan and 3 others.
The whole property covered by OCT No. 760 was subsequently adjudicated in
favor of Isabel Manahan. Consequently, OCT No. 760 was cancelled and a TCT
was issued exclusively in the name of Isabel Manahan. Isabel Manahan
transferred the land to her son through a Deed of Donation. Respondent

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subsequently secured TCTs in his own name.

● Petitioners filed an action for declaration of nullity of respondent’s TCTs on the
basis that OCT No. 760 was fake and spurious.
● Respondent claimed that petitioners had no legal capacity to file the complaint,
and thus, the complaint stated no cause of action. He claimed that since the OCT
was genuine on its face, all of his land titles derived therefrom are indefeasible and
conclusive against petitioners and the whole world.
● RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of
the land for they did not comply with PD 892, thus, they do not have the legal
standing to bring the complaint to RTC. Moreover, the RTC stated that the
principal issue in the case is for the declaration of nullity of defendant’s title and
has nothing to do with plaintiffs’ claim of ownership and possession.
● CA affirmed the RTC’s decision dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have the legal personality to file the complaint against the respondent.
RULING: No.
In the present case, the Court assumed that respondent is raising the affirmative defense
that the complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC stated no cause of action because
the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real party-in-interest.
Respondent contended that only the State can file an action for annulment of his
certificates of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the ownership of the
subject property to the State.
In their complaint, petitioners never alleged that the subject property was part of the public
domain. Petitioners asserted their title over the subject property by virtue of their actual,
physical, open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof, in the concept of owners, by
themselves, and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The action
was more appropriately an action to remove cloud on or to quiet title over the subject
property.
Even as the Court agrees that the action was one for removal of cloud on or quieting of
title, it does arrive with the same conclusion as the RTC and CA that petitioners had no
personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their complaint
should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
According to Art. 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to
quiet a title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is
the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in their complaint that they
had any legal or equitable title to, or a legitimate interest in, the subject property so as to
justify their right to file an action to remove cloud on or to quiet title.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the subject
property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the
Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. The title to and possession of the
subject property by petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest could be traced only as far back as
the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the subject
property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their
predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish
title.

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Respondent maintained that PD 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title
as basis of their ownership of the subject property. Petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint that their predecessors-in-interest complied with PD 892. It could then be
assumed that they failed to comply with PD 892. Since they failed to comply with PD 892,
then the successors of Don Hermogenes were already enjoined from presenting the
Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the subject property in registration proceedings.
Petitioners failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their complaint aside from
possession of the subject property from time immemorial and the Spanish title, which is
already ineffective to prove ownership over the subject property. Therefore, without legal
or equitable title to the subject property, petitioners lacked the personality to file an action
for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of title and their complaint was properly dismissed
for failing to state a cause of action.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS the decision of CA
and order of RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, dismissing petitioners’ complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.
representatives as parties
• V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel & Tours, Inc., G.R. No. 186305, 22 July 2015
NAME: Cecille Ebreo
CASE 44 TOPIC: Representatives as Parties
CASE TITLE: V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel & Tours, Inc.
GR NO. 186305 DATE: 22 July 2015
PONENTE: Brion, J.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the exception when an agent may sue or
be sued without joining the principal.
Section 3. Representatives as parties. - “xxxx An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except
when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.”
Thus an agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal
when the following elements occur: 1) the agent acted in his own name during the
transaction; 2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and 3) the
transaction did not involve the property of the principal. When these elements are present,
the agency becomes bound as if the transaction were its own, consistent with Article 1883
of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
In June and in September 1998, Petitioner V-Gent bought 26 two way plane tickets
(Manila-Europe-Manila) from respondent Morning Star. However, V-Gent returned a total
of 15 unused tickets worth $8,747.50 to respondent. Morning Star refunded only 6 tickets
worth $3,445.62 and refused to refund the 9 unused tickets. In December 2000, V-Gent
filed a money claim against Morning Star for payment of the unrefunded tickets. While,

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Morning Star countered that V-Gent was not entitled to a refund because the tickets were
bought on the airline company’s “buy one, take one” promo. Having refunded more or less
50% of unused tickets, there was nothing else to refund. Morning Star also questioned
V-Gent’s personality to file the suit. It asserted that the passengers, in whose
names the tickets were issued, are the real-parties-in-interest.
MeTC declared that, as agent of the passengers who paid for the tickets, V-Gent stood as
the real-party-in-interest. Nevertheless dismissed the complaint because V-Gent failed to
prove its claim by a preponderance of evidence.
RTC set aside the MeTc’s judgement and ordered Morning Star to pay V-Gent the value
of the 9 unrefunded tickets plus attorney’s fees.
CA held that V-Gent is not a real-party-in-interest because it merely acted as an agent of
the passengers who bought the tickets from Morning Star with their own money.
V-Gent move for reconsideration but CA denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the legal standing of V-Gent to file the complaint has already
become final because Morning Star did not appeal the MeTC’s ruling on the issue;
2) Whether or not V-Gent is a real-party-in-interest in filing the complaint; and
3) Whether or not the Morning Star is already estopped from questioning V-Gent’s
legal standing to file the complaint.
RULING:
1. No. The MeTC dismissed V-Gent’s complaint against Morning Star for failure to
prove its claim. The judgment was in favor of Morning Star. Indeed, it would be
legally illogical for Morning Star to file an appeal to question a ruling of dismissal in
its favor.
2. Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real-party-in-interest - the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgement in the suit. In suits where an agent represents a party, the principal is
the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his own name on behalf of
the principal. Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the exception when
an agent may sue or be sued without joining the principal (see doctrine table
above).
In the present case, only the first element is present; the purchase order and the
receipt were in the name of V-Gent. However, the remaining elements are absent
because: 1) V-Gent disclosed the names of the passengers to Morning Star - in
fact the tickets were in their names, and 2) the transaction was paid using the
passengers’ money. Therefore, Rule 3, Section 3 of ROC cannot apply.
3. No. Morning Star’s recognition of V-Gent’s authority to collect a refund for the
passengers is not equivalent to recognition of V-Gent’s authority to initiate a suit on
behalf of the passengers. Morning Star, therefore, is not estopped from
questioning V-Gent’s legal standing to initiate the suit.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE,premises considered, we DENY the petition for

lack of merit.
• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993
NAME: Mikhaila Klaudine Rosales
CASE 45 TOPIC: Parties to Civil Actions - Representatives as Parties

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CASE TITLE: Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.
GR NO. 101083 DATE: July 30, 1993
PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE: [Petitioners] can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
FACTS:
● The petitioners in this case are minors, represented and joined by their parents,
and Philippine Ecological Network, Inc., a domestic, non-stock, and non-profit
corporation. The respondents are Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. (DENR
Secretary) and Hon. Eriberto Rosario (Presiding Judge).
● Petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint (Civil Case No. 90-777) instituted as a
taxpayers’ class suit against respondent Factoran, Jr., praying that the latter be
ordered to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country, and
to cease and desist from processing new ones.
● Petitioners claim that they are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the country’s
natural resources; and that they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn.
● As their cause of action, petitioners allege, among others, that deforestation brings
serious injury and irreparable damage to their generation and to generations yet
unborn; that the failure and refusal to cancel existing TLAs are acts violative of the
rights of plaintiffs to a balanced and healthful ecology.
● Respondent Factoran, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing lack of cause of action
as one of the grounds therefor.
● Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion, maintaining that the complaint shows
a clear and unmistakable cause of action.
● Respondent Judge Rosario issued an order granting the Motion to Dismiss,
declaring that the complaint has no cause of action and that it raises a political
question.
● Petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, asking the Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order.
● Note: T
he issue of legal standing was not specifically raised, but the Court
nonetheless addressed the same because of the “special and novel element” of
the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have personality to sue in behalf of their generation
and succeeding generations - YES
RULING: We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature.” Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that

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rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
[Related ruling] On the validity of the class suit: The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside.
• Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait v. Reyes G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
NAME: Patrick Joseph
CASE 46 TOPIC: Representatives as Parties
CASE TITLE: Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait v. Reyes
GR NO. 180771 DATE: April 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
DOCTRINE: Sec. 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases allows a citizen
suit and permits any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws. This rule collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest,
on the principle that humans are the stewards of nature.
FACTS:
● Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) was awarded a service contract,
Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the latter to conduct oil exploration
in the Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well.
● Shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait, a petition challenging the legality of
the service contract was filed in the name of “Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, Joined in and Represented by Human Beings
Gloria Entenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma Osorio in their capacity as
Responsible Stewards of God’s Creations. The petitioners are the toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and
around the Tañon Strait. The purpose of the petition was to stop the petroleum
exploration activities in the Tañon Strait on the ground that this would cause
environmental damage to the ocean life therein.
● Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., the petitioners assert their right to sue for the faithful
performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their
favor and for their benefit and that they have the right to demand that they be
accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that

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the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour
autrui. Furthermore, they argued that they have the obligation to build awareness
among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment,
especially in light of the government’s failure, as primary steward, to do its duty
under the doctrine of public trust. In totality, the human petitioners wants to create
substantive and procedural rights for animals through their allegation that they can
speak for them and that the interests that they assert are identical to what the
Resident Marine Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal
strategies that they invoked are the strategies that they agree with.
● The Respondents, on the other hand, argues that the petitioners have no legal
standing to file the present petition as animals cannot be real parties in interest
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which requires parties to an
action to be either natural or juridical persons. Furthermore, they contest the
applicability of the Oposa case on the ground that the petitioners therein were all
natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.
ISSUE: Whether animals may be real parties in interest?
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the law under Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court provides that only natural or juridical entities authorized by law may be parties in
a civil action. However, the petition should not be dismissed on this ground since the need
to give the petitioner a legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which allow any Filipino citizen as steward of nature, to bring a suit
to enforce our environmental laws.
Furthermore, in this case, the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not
just in representation of the mammals. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having
shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat
of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to
file this petition by virtue of our environmental laws allowing the bringing of citizen suits.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth
noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio,
having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the
habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.
indispensable parties
• In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, G.R. No. 182645, 15
December 2010 (Resolution)
NAME: Keanu Castañeda
CASE 47 TOPIC: Rule 3 - Parties to Civil Actions; Indispensable Parties
CASE TITLE: In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez
GR NO.182645 DATE: December 15, 2010

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PONENTE: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE: An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final

determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority
to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of
indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality.
FACTS:
● A petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and
Settlement of the Subject estates. The petition was filed by Henry, Certeza, and
Rosalina and sought to be declared as sole surviving heirs of the subject estates.
● In 1990, RTC rendered a partial judgement declaring the private respondents as
heirs of the subject estate of the decedents.
● Subsequently, oppositors entered their appearances, and one of them is the
respondent, Jaime Robles. He prayed that he be appointed as administrator to the
subject estate and be allowed to sell a certain portion of the estate. RTC dismissed
the opposition and affirmed that Henry and his group are the heirs of the subject
estate.
● RTC referred the petition to the CA. Thereafter, CA rendered a judgment annulling
the previous decision of the RTC.
● Henry and his group moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. On the
other hand, Robles filed an appeal but the same was denied because the
resolution became final and executory.
● Contention of the Petitioner: Petitioner contends that Robles has no legal standing
to participate in the instant petition. He argues that in an original action for
certiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party against the lower court and the
prevailing party.
● Contention of the Respondent: Robles contends that he is a part-in-interest who
stands to be adversely affected or injured or benefited by the judgement in the
instant case. He also argues that the failure of service upon him of a copy of the
instant petition as well as the petitioner's memorandum is a clear denial of his right
to due process.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent is an indispensable party in the case?
RULING: Yes, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by

the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed without his presence.
Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would
benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render the petition for
certiorari defective.
Moreover, the rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If the petitioner
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may
dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTLY

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GRANTED . The Decision dated December 4, 2009 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is

ORDERED to furnish Robles a copy of his petition for certiorari within a period of fve (5)
days from receipt of this Resolution. Thereafter, Robles is DIRECTED to file his comment
on the petition within a period of ten (10) days from notice.
• Cerezo v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, 23 March 2004
NAME: Grace Granil
CASE 48 TOPIC: Rule 3- Indispensable Parties in a Solidary liability
CASE TITLE: Cerezo v. Tuazon
GR NO.141538 DATE: March 23, 2004
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE: An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action
in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. Where the
obligation is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even
necessary as complete relief is available from either. The action can be brought directly
against the person responsible (for another) without including the author of the act.
FACTS:
● A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle driven by Tuazon. He
then filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Hermana Cerezo, bus line owner,
her husband, Atty. Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo Foronda. Tuazon filed a
motion to litigate as a pauper.
● Summons were issued by the trial court against Spouses Cerezo. But the
summons were returned unserved as the Cerezo spouses no longer held their
office nor resided in Makati. Then summons were once again served in Tarlac
where Atty. Cerezo was working as Tarlac provincial Prosecutor.
● The records show that Cerezo participated in the proceeding before the trial court
and filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars. The trial court issued an
order directing the Cerezos to file an answer in which they failed to do so. The trial
court issued an order declaring the spouses in default and ruled in favor of Tuazon
making Mrs. Cereso solely liable. The trial made no pronouncement on Foronda’s
liability because no service of summons on him.
● The spouses filed a petition for relief of judgement due to “fraud, mistake or
excusable negligence.” The trial court denied the petition. The CA denied the
petition for certiorari and affirmed the trial court’s order.
● The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari. This
Court denied the petition for failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the
petition of the CA and to the adverse parties. The judgement becomes final and
executory.
● Then the Cerezo spouses filed before the CA for a petition for annulment of
judgement under Rule 47 with prayer of restraining order. The CA denied. Mrs.
Cerezo, alone, filed a petition for review before this Court.
● In addition, Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case as there is no service of summons on Foronda who is an indispensable
party in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court could render a valid judgement given that it lacks
jurisdiction over Foronda.

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RULING: YES. As contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable
party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s
action in the litigation, and without whom no ฀final resolution of the case is possible.
However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only
solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final
resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and
the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect
damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because
he opted to file civil damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for
her own negligence. An employer’s liability based on quasi-delict (Art. 2180 CC) is primary
and direct, while the employer’s liability based on delict is merely subsidiary. Thus there is
no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial
courts’s acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present
case on the merits.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for review. The
Resolution dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53572, as
well as its Resolution dated 20 January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION.
• |||Foster-Gallego v. Spouses Galang, G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004
NAME: Nicole Chu Tan
CASE 49 TOPIC Indispensable Parties
CASE TITLE Foster-Gallego v. Spouses Galang
GR NO. 130228 DATE July 27, 2004
PONENTE Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest. A person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that he
will not necessarily be injuriously affected by a decree that does complete justice between
the other parties. He is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit
complete relief between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid
multiple litigations.
FACTS:
● Vive Realty Corporation ("VRC") acquired a parcel of land ("Property") at a public
auction.
● On 22 June 1984, the Spouses Galang purchased the Property from VRC through
a Deed of Absolute Sale. Register of Deeds later issued TCT No. (86872) 22786
over the Property in the name of the Spouses Galang. The Spouses Galang took
possession of the Property and had it declared in their name for taxation purposes.

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They diligently paid the corresponding real property taxes.

● In April 1989, Romeo Galang came home from Saudi Arabia and discovered a
hollow block fence along the perimeter of the Property. Lito Gallego built the fence
in March 1989.
● The Spouses Galang filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against
Gallego. Gallego alleged that his brother, Bernabe Foster-Gallego, owned the
Property.
● Bernabe Foster-Gallego ("petitioner") filed a motion for intervention with an
attached answer-in-intervention. The trial court granted the motion of the petitioner
and admitted the answer-in-intervention.
● The trial court eventually decided the original case in favor of the Spouses Galang,
and denied petitioner's intervention and third-party complaint.
● Petitioner then filed on 26 January 1995 a notice that he was appealing the Order
to the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing his own brief, however, petitioner joined in
Gallego's appeal.
● The Court of Appeals held that petitioner had no legal personality to join Gallego's
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is an indispensable party to the action for quieting of title
RULING:
NO. Petitioner, whose title RTC-Branch 138 cancelled, is not an indispensable party to the
action for quieting of title. The assailed decision quieting title in favor of the Spouses Galang
has no appreciable effect on petitioner's title. Petitioner's title could still be cancelled with or
without the trial court's declaration that the Spouses Galang are the owners of the Property "at
this time." Further, the assailed decision does not bind petitioner. The rules on quieting of title
expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who
are not parties to the action. Given that the trial court denied petitioner's intervention and
struck it off from the records, petitioner is not a party to the instant case. Suits to quiet title are
actions quasi in rem, and the judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties to the action.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM the Decision of 22 July 1997 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43439.
necessary parties;
• Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10,
2016
NAME: Karlo Supan
CASE 50 TOPIC: Indispensable and necessary parties
CASE TITLE: Caravan Travels and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar
GR NO.170631 DATE: February 10, 2016
PONENTE: LEONEN J.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
● Reyes was walking along the west-bound lane in Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300

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van was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes.To avoid an incoming
vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Upon investigation, it was found that
the registered owner of the van was Caravan.Bautista(driver) was Caravan's employee
assigned to drive the van as its service driver. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died
two (2) days after the accident.
● Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who
raised her since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. Summons could
not be served on Bautista. Thus, Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant.
Regional Trial Court found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It
awarded damages in favor of Abejar.
● Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a
real party in interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or
substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially appointed guardian or the
only living relative of the deceased. She is also not "the executor or administrator of
the estate of the deceased. According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs
can enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for damages.
● Furthermore, Caravan argues that since Bautista(driver) was dropped out of the case,
him being an indispensable party, the court cannot render judgement without him
being joined in the action.
ISSUE: A.W/N the respondent is a real party in interest; and

B.W/N Bautista is an indispensable party.
RULING: A. Yes
B. No
Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a
real party in interest in this case. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he [or she] must appear to be the present real owner of
the right sought to be enforced." Respondent's capacity to file a complaint against petitioner
stems from her having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes.
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons
shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;56
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Respondent supported Reyes' education and provided for her personal needs. To echo
respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own daughter. As
Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and
duties of a parent. While parental authority is terminated upon emancipation,68 respondent
continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned 18. Except for the legal
technicality of Reyes' emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained the same. The
anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes' death was no different because of

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Reyes' emancipation. In any case, the termination of respondent's parental authority is not an
insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her Complaint.
Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because Bautista was already
dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious. The liability imposed on the registered owner is
direct and primary. Bautista, the driver, was not an indispensable party under Rule 3, Section
7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, he was a necessary party under Rule 3,
Section 8.
A person is not an indispensable party, if his interest in the controversy or subject

matter is separable from the interest of the other parties Petitioner's interest and liability
is distinct from that of its driver.
Regardless of petitioner's employer-employee relationship with Bautista, liability

attaches to petitioner on account of its being the registered owner of a vehicle that
figures in a mishap. This alone suffices.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated

October 3, 2005 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) actual damages in
the amount of P35,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the time it was
judicially or extrajudicially demanded from petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International,
Inc. until full satisfaction; (b) moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the Regional Trial Court Decision
until full satisfaction; and (c) civil indemnity shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the date of the Court of Appeals Decision until full satisfaction.
indigent parties;
• Spouses Algura v. City of Naga G.R. No. 150135, 30 October 2006
NAME: Patricia Palacol
CASE 51 TOPIC: Indigent Parties (Litigants’ privilege as indigents to

seek exemption from the payment of docket and legal fees)
CASE TITLE: Spouses Algura v. City of Naga
GR NO. 150135 DATE: October 30, 2006
PONENTE: Velasco Jr., J.
DOCTRINE:
When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize
the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the
applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in Section 19 of
Rule 141 that is, the applicant’s gross income and that of the applicant’s immediate family
do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the
applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than PhP
300,000.00.
FACTS:
pouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a complaint for damages
S
against the Naga City Government and its officers, alleging that the defendants had

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
caused the illegal demolition of their residence, thus depriving them of income in the form
of monthly rentals amounting to P7,000 paid by their boarders.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants.
To this Motion was appended Antonio Algura’s pay slip showing a gross monthly
income of P10,474.00 and a net pay of P3,616.99 for the month of July 1999. Also
attached was a certification by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, stating that
petitioners had no property declared in their names for taxation purposes.
On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for
Non-Payment of Filing Fees. They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00
net income of petitioner Antonio, who is a member of the Philippine National Police,
spouse Lorencita also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their
residence. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners' second floor was used as their
residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a
month. Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.
The Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on
the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal
fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules
of Court, directing them to pay the requisite filing fees. The pay slip of Antonio showed
that the "GROSS INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS of plaintiff Algura was PhP10,474.00
which amount was over and above the amount mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule
141, Section 18 for pauper litigants residing outside Metro Manila." Said rule provides that
the gross income of the litigant should not exceed PhP 3,000.00 a month and shall not
own real estate with an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify
for exemption from paying filing fees
RULING:
Since complaint was filed in 1999. RTC Naga incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18
on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent
Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants
which became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000
On March 1, 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely, Rule 3,
Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 18.
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita
Algura and neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing
a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00, and a Certification of the Naga City assessor
stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their names for taxation.
Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property as shown by the Certification of the
Naga City assessor and so the property requirement is met. However with respect to the
income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of
petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when
combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then
Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied.
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is
a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be
made to harmonize them.

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The High Court, through Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. clarified the pertinent rules as
follows:
1. When an application to litigate as an indigent party is filed, the court shall

scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted, in order to determine
if the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule
141 have been met. The court must determine if: (1) the applicant’s gross income
and that of the immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly
minimum wage of an employee; and (2) the applicant does not own real property
with a fair market value of more than P300,000. If the trial court finds that these
income and property requirements have been met, it automatically grants the
applicant the authority to litigate as an indigent litigant, and the grant is a matter of
right.
2. If the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, it shall set
a hearing to enable the presentation of proof that the applicant has “no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself
and his family.” In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing
evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant. Afterwards, the trial
court will rule on the application, depending on these presentations.
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption
meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant
of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy
one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the
court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Furthermore, the Naga City RTC is ordered
to set the "Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants" for hearing and apply Rule 3,
Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether petitioners can
qualify as indigent litigants.
Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

• Divinagracia v. Parilla G.R. No. 196750, 11 March 25
NAME: Ria Tolentino Dalipe
CASE 52 TOPIC: Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties
CASE TITLE: Divinagracia v. Parilla
GR NO. 196750 DATE: March 11, 2015
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOCTRINE: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
FACTS: Conrado Nobleza, Sr. owned the subject land, a 313-sq.m. parcel of land in Iloilo

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
City covered by TCT No. 12255. During Nobleza’s lifetime, he contracted two marriages.
His first marriage was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two children, namely,
Cresencio and Conrado, Jr. His second marriage was with Eusela Niangar with whom he
had seven children, namely, Mateo Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio,
Ceruleo, and Cebeleo Sr.
According to Santiago, some of Conrado Sr.’s heirs, including Felcon (in

representation of his father and siblings) sold their interests over the subject land to him
for P447,695.66 as embodied in the subject document, a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22, 1989. However, said document
was not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares.
On Dec. 22, 1989, the vendor-heirs and Santiago executed a Supplemental

Contract whereby they agreed that out of the whole price of the lot, only P109,807.93 will
be paid up front, and that Santiago will only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73
upon partition of the subject land. However, Santiago was not able to have the TCT No.
T-12255 to the said lot cancelled and the subject document registered because of the
refusal of the remaining heirs who did not sell their interest to surrender the said title.
Furthermore, said heirs’ failure to partition the subject land prompted Santiago to file a
Complaint for judicial partition and for receivership.
The remaining heirs contend that Santiago had no legal right to file an action for
judicial partition nor to compel them to surrender TCT No T-12255 because the full
purchase price of the shares sold to him was not yet paid and that the subject land is a
conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Niangar, and thus, only their legitimate issues may
validly inherit the lot.
The RTC ruled in favor of Santiago and ordered, among others, the partition of the
subject lot between Santiago and the remaining heirs. The RTC also ordered the
cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate in
favor of Santiago and the remaining heirs. It was held that Santiago became a co-owner of
the subject land, with the exception of Felcon’s share, through the subject document. On
reconsideration, the RTC ordered Santiago to pay the remaining amount upon partition of
the subject land. The CA set aside the RTC’s rulings and dismissed Santiago’s complaint
for judicial partition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
A. WON Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable
parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition? Yes.
B. WON the CA erred in dismissing Santiago’s complaint for his failure to implead
said omitted heirs? Yes.
RULING:
a. Yes, they are indispensable parties. An indispensable party is one whose interest will
be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

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With regard to actions for partition, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the ROC requires that all
persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and
persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
In this case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate
and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely:
Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo,
Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr.
pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the
Civil Code, their respective interests shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for
Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for
Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of

their direct ascendant – have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be
impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading
of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was
impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard
to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude,
when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest
should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the
aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant

complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.
b. Yes, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s
failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint.
In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., the Court definitively explained that in
instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them
and not to dismiss the case, to wit:
“The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for

the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at
such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or
on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court
may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.”
Therefore, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to
the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for
the disposition of the case on the merits.

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly,

the Decision dated March 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated April 6, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 80167, setting aside the Decision dated November 29, 2002
and the Order dated April 4, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31 in
Civil Case No. 19003, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION REMANDING the
instant case to the court a quo, which is hereby DIRECTED to implead all indispensable
parties and, thereafter, PROCEED with the
resolution of the case on the merits WITH DISPATCH.
Effect of death of party litigant

• Spouses De la Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005
NAME: Darla Lira
CASE 53 TOPIC: Effect of death of party litigant
CASE TITLE: Spouses De la Cruz v. Joaquin
GR NO. 162788 DATE: July 28, 2005
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE: The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of
the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
FACTS:
● Pedro Joaquin filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership, the
cancellation of title, and damages against the petitioner spouses in the RTC.
● Joaquin alleges that he had obtained a loan from the petitioners and secured the
same by executing a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera,
Nueva Ecija.
● Moreover, a document entitled “Kasunduan” was executed evidencing that the
Deed of Sale was truly an equitable mortgage.
● The Spouses averred that the document merely evinced an accommodation to
allow the repurchase of the property which right the respondent failed to exercise.
● The RTC ruled in Joaquin’s favor and held that the latter had made a valid tender
of payment to exercise his right of repurchase.
● The CA sustained the RTC’s ruling and ordered a substitution by legal
representatives, in view of Joaquin’s death.
● Hence, this petition for review assailing the appellate court’s decision on the
ground that the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case upon Joaquin’s death.
● Petitioners contend that the RTC’s jurisdiction was invalid for lack of jurisdiction
considering that Joaquin died during the pendency of the case and no substitution
by the heirs took place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro
Joaquin?
RULING: NO. The general rule is that a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when
they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in the
defense of the deceased. Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not
violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a
promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient
ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an
undeniable violation of due process.
In the instant case, records reveal that a “Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff” was
filed before the CA. Additionally, the heirs of Joaquin voluntarily appeared and participated
in the case. The CA had duly ordered Joaquin’s representatives to appear and substitute
for him. Based on the foregoing, there had been no violation of due process, and the issue
of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the trial court’s decision.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
• Gaffney v. Butler G.R. No. 219408, 8 November 2017
NAME: Andie Padernal
CASE TITLE: Gaffney v Butler
GR NO. 219408 DATE: November 08, 2017
PONENTE: CAGUIOA, J.
DOCTRINE: Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action.
A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so
much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An
action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal
person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to
amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to
amend.
FACTS:
1. Donald Francis Gaffney(Gaffney) filed a complaint against Gina Butler(Butler) for sum
of money
2. Gaffney alleged that between 2006 to 2007, Butler and her husband Anthony
Butler(Anthony) approached and invited Gaffney to invest in ActiveFun Corporation.
Butler was the President while Anthony was the Treasurer and Chief Executive Officer.
3. Gaffney advanced the approximate amount of PhP12,500,000.00 representing his initial
investment in ActiveFun.
4. The proposed investment agreement did not materialize because Anthony passed
away.
5. Gaffney demanded the return of his investments from Butler, who personally undertook
to repay the total amount of his investments plus accrued interest but was only able to pay
the initial amount of PhP1,000,000.00.
6. Gaffney then instituted a legal action for the enforcement of his claim against Butler.
7. Because no full relief can be had against the Estate/heirs of Anthony Richard Butler
under the original Complaint, Gaffney filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate or the heirs of the late Anthony
Richard Butler [as additional party-defendant], allegedly represented by petitioner as his

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surviving spouse.
8. Butler opposed the motion stating the ground that "only natural or juridical persons may
be parties in an ordinary civil action.
9. On the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC ruled that the inclusion of the estate of the late
Anthony Richard Butler (Anthony), represented by his surviving spouse Gina, is necessary
for a complete relief on the determination or settlement of the controversy raised in the
case.
10. The CA ruled that dismissal of the case against Anthony's estate is warranted under
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which states that "only natural or juridical persons,
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving
spouse Gina, could be named as additional defendant in the present case.
RULING: No.
A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a
defendant in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states
that “only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action."
Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be
impleaded as a defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. Thus, when
Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded as
respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. As such, the complaint against
him should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against
one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
Moreover, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person or estate of Anthony.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him and
service thereof is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.30 In
the present case, no valid service of summons upon the deceased Anthony was or could
have been made, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint
against him and his wife was filed in court. In several occasions, the Court has held that
the trial court fails to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant who was already dead at the
time the complaint was filed against him.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for

Review is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 6, 2015 and
the Resolution dated July 14, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
133762 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the Amended Complaint is
REINSTATED insofar as Gina V. Butler is concerned.
• San Juan v. Cruz G.R. No.167321, 31 July 2006
NAME: Dette Palanog
CASE TITLE: San Juan v. Cruz

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
GR NO. 167321 DATE: July 31, 2006
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J.
DOCTRINE: The second paragraph of Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased
without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor.The second paragraph
of Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the heirs may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
administrator or executor.
FACTS:
1. Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa
as one of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino
filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
2. While said petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate.
3. The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their
appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs
of Oscar Casa and their representative.
4. Later on, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of
said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or
administrator of the estate of the devisee.
5. Atty. Teoderico A. Aquino then filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of
Administrator" signed by the legal heirs of the deceased Oscar Casa praying that
one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate of
the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased.
6. In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to
Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient." He
maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar
Casa as the representative of the estate in the case.
7. In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
heirs of Oscar Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of
Oscar Casa, or whether it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs
RULING: There is no need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar
Casa. It is enough that he be substituted by his heirs.
The second paragraph of Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is plain
and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring
the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a
legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a
specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall
immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of

Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as
representatives of the estate. This is because from the very moment of his death, his heirs
stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto
San Juan. Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before
the trial court.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.

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Costs against petitioner.
VII. Rule 4 - Venue

Venue vs. Jurisdiction
• Nocum v. Lucio Tan G.R. No. 145022, 23 September 2005
NAME: Thaddeus Luke Tubban
CASE 56 TOPIC: Venue vs. Jurisdiction
CASE TITLE: Nocum vs. Lucio Tan
DOCTRINE: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the
place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law;
venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the
subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and
respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties;
venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
FACTS:
Responent Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo
Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the RTC for the alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer alleging that (1) the complaint failed to
state a cause of action; (2) the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were
general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the questioned news report constituted
fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and
therefore, was privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the
publication in the same article of plaintiff’s or PAL’s side of the dispute with the pilot’s
union.
ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer alleging that (1) the complaint stated
no cause of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a
real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the
complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the
libelous article was printed and first published.
Thus, RTC of Makati issued an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the
ground of improper venue .
Aggrieved, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration alleging that
"This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati".
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC acquired jurisdiction when the case was filed before it.
RULING: Yes. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter upon the filing of the
original complaint. It did not lose jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on the
ground of improper venue. The amendment merely laid down the proper venue of the
case.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of
action. Respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of
which is vested with the RTC.

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
The additional allegations that the article and the caricature were printed and first
published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction.
These would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to
include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Respondent’s failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power,
upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not
properly laid. By dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the lower court
had jurisdiction over the case.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: Did WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Venue in civil cases vs. Criminal cases

• Nocum v. Lucio Tan G.R. No. 145022, 23 September 2005
NAME: Tine Cruz
CASE 57 TOPIC: Venue in Civil Cases vs. Criminal Cases
CASE TITLE: Nocum vs. Lucio Tan
GR NO.145022 DATE September 23, 2005
DOCTRINE: Petitioners' argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case
because respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and
first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure
of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact
involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. T his is not
to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
FACTS: Respondent Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum,
Florentino, ALPAP and Inquirer with the RTC of Makati seeking moral and exemplary
damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news
article. INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of
action; (2) the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions
without factual premises; (3) the questioned news report constituted fair and true report on
the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was privileged in
nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of
plaintiff's or PAL's side of the dispute with the pilot's union.
ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, dated October 31, 1998, and alleged
therein that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) venue was improperly laid;
and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint
failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of
the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. Thus,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent contends that; THE COURT OF

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE (ON THE BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD EARLIER DISMISSED THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONFER JURISDICTION UPON THE COURT.
ISSUE: Whether or not venue in civil cases is different from criminal cases
RULING: Yes. In civil cases, venue may be waived. It is elementary that objections to
venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating
as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.
Venue in Civil Cases is not a matter of Jurisdiction. In essence, venue concerns a rule of
procedure. Improper venue is not equivalent to lack of jurisdiction because it is merely
procedural, the parties in a civil case can waive the venue of a case. As it relates to the
place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to
restrict their access to the courts.
Venue in Criminal Cases is jurisdictional because it is an essential element of jurisdiction

and it cannot be waived by the parties. Where the information is filed in a place where the
offense was not committed, the information may be “quashed” for lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged, and not merely “improper venue.”
DISPOSITIVE RULING: The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000
is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
When the rules on venue does not apply

• Ley Construction & Development Corp v. Sedano G.R. No. 222711, 23 August 2017
NAME: Miggy Cabalquinto
CASE 58 TOPIC When the rules on venue do not apply
CASE TITLE Ley Construction & Development Corp. v. Sedano
GR NO. 222711 DATE 23 August 2017
PONENTE Perlas-Bernabe, J.
DOCTRINE Although generally, the venue for personal actions lie with the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or defendant resides, parties may, through a written
instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
FACTS: Petitioner Ley Construction & Development Corp. filed a complaint for collection
of sum of money and damages against respondent Marvin Medel Sedano, doing business
under the name and style, “Lola Taba Lolo Pato Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside” before
the Valenzuela RTC. Ley Construction alleged that on 14 January 2005, it leased a
50,000-sq.m. parcel of land located at Financial Center Area, Pasay City, from respondent
third-party defendant, Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). On 11
September 2006, petitioner subleased a 14,659.80-sq.m. portion thereof to Sedano for a
term of 10 years. Sedano allegedly failed to pay the rent due for the period of August 2011

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
to December 2011, amounting to a total of ₱8,828,025.46, and despite demands, refused

to settle his obligations.
In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint, Sedano argued, among others, that the venue
was improperly laid since Section 21 of the lease contract provides that all actions in
connection with the contract shall be filed with the Pasay RTC, exclusive of all others.
Hence, according to Sedano, the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds of
improper venue.
In its Comment/Opposition to Sedano’s affirmative defense of improper venue, Ley

Construction argued that Section 21 of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue,
but a stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. Such a stipulation deprives other courts, i.e.,
the MTC, of jurisdiction over cases, which under the law, are within its exclusive original
jurisdiction, such as an action for unlawful detainer. Besides, as Ley Construction asserts,
Sedano had already submitted himself to Valenzuela RTC’s jurisdiction and had waived
any objections on venue by seeking affirmative reliefs from the court when he asked
several times for additional time to file his pleadings.
The Valenzuela RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds of improper venue. It held
that Section 21 of the lease contract is void insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the
Pasay RTC, even when the subject matter jurisdiction over the case is with the MTC. But
it nevertheless found Section 21 to be a valid limitation of the venue with the Pasay RTC,
with respect to cases cognizable by RTCs. The Valenzuela RTC also disagreed with Ley
Construction’s assertion that Sedano had waived his right to question the venue, as
improper venue has been raised as one of the defenses in the Answer. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the venue was improperly laid in the Valenzuela RTC.
RULING: YES. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to
wit:
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of

real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved,
or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the
municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be

commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of the defendants

does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is
situated or found.
Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of
the action on the exclusive venue thereof. (Emphases supplied)
Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie
with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict
the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. x x x
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson, the Court held that an exclusive venue
stipulation is valid and binding, provided that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is
exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c)
it is entered into before the filing of the suit.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all these elements are
present and that the questioned stipulation in the lease contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is
a valid venue stipulation that limits the venue of the cases to the courts of Pasay City. It
states:
21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms and
conditions of this lease contract, it shall be liable for damages.
All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this lease shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all
others. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above provision clearly shows the parties' intention to limit the place where actions
or cases arising from a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease
may be instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase "exclusive of all others" and
the specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Orders

dated June 15, 2015 and January 27, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City,
Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 40-V-12 are hereby AFFIRMED.
• Unimasters Conglomeration Inc v. CA G.R. No. 119657, 7 February 1997
NAME: Aiden Cyrus Tinoco
CASE 59 TOPIC When the rules on venue does not apply.
CASE TITLE Unimasters Conglomeration Inc. vs. CA
GR NO. 119657 DATE February 07, 1997
PONENTE Narvasa, C.J.
DOCTRINE In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical
and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescription of Rule 4,
agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive but merely
permissive, or complementary of said rule.
FACTS: On October 28, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. (KUBOTA) and
Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. (UNIMASTERS) entered into a "Dealership Agreement
for Sales and Services" of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
On December 24, 1993, UNIMASTERS filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City against KUBOTA, a certain Reynaldo Go, and Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company-Tacloban Branch (METROBANK) for damages for breach of contract, and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order.
On January 4, 1994 KUBOTA filed two motions. One prayed for dismissal of the case on
the ground of improper venue. The other prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing
to January 11, 1994 because its counsel was not available on January 10 due to a prior
commitment before another court.
On January 13, 1994, the Trial Court handed down an Order authorizing the issuance of
the preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a bond of P2,000,000.00. And on February 3,
1994, the same Court promulgated an Order denying KUBOTA's motion to dismiss. Said
the Court:
"The plaintiff UNIMASTERS Conglomeration is holding its principal place of

business in the City of Tacloban while the defendant . . . (KUBOTA) is holding its
principal place of business in Quezon City. The proper venue therefore pursuant to
Rules of Court would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election of the
plaintiff. Quezon City and Manila, as agreed upon by the parties in the Dealership
Agreement, are additional places other than the place stated in the Rules of Court.
The filing, therefore, of this complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Tacloban City
is proper."
The Appellate Court agreed with KUBOTA that — in line with the Rules of Court and this
Court's relevant rulings — the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership Agreement
with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and
exclusively to "the proper courts of Quezon City." The Court also held that the participation
of KUBOTA's counsel at the hearing on the injunction incident did not in the premises
operate as a waiver or abandonment of its objection to venue; that assuming that
KUBOTA's standard printed invoices provided that the venue of actions thereunder should
be laid at the Court of the City of Manila, this was inconsequential since such provision
would govern "suits or legal actions between petitioner and its buyers" but not actions
under the Dealership Agreement between KUBOTA and UNIMASTERS, the venue of
which was controlled by paragraph No. 7 thereof.
ISSUE: Whether the agreement on venue between petitioner (UNIMASTERS) and private
respondent (KUBOTA) limited to the proper courts of Quezon City the venue of any
complaint filed arising from the dealership agreement between them.
RULING: No. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the
venue of actions, whether real or personal, or involving persons who neither reside nor are
found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By
written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred
from one province to another." Parties may by stipulation waive the legal venue and such
waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary to

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
public policy or prejudicial to third persons.
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed
only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit
not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically).
As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the
parties respecting the matter.
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the
proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed permissive merely, and
that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties' convenience. In other
words, stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be
interpreted as designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions
arising from or in relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or
expanding the venues indicated in said Rule 4.
In Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, decided in 1969. In this case, the venue stipulation
was as follows:
"The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila."
This Court ruled that such a provision "does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence
of the plaintiff or the defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to
be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and
Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. It simply is permissive.
The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may
resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned
in Section 2(b) of Rule 4."
The Polytrade doctrine was reiterated expressly or implicitly in subsequent cases,

numbering at least ten (10).
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of
business in Tacloban City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule 4, the venue of any
personal action between them is "where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff." In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue KUBOTA for
breach of contract in the Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon
City.
But the contract between them provides that " . . . All suits arising out of this Agreement
shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City, " without mention of Tacloban City.
The question is whether this stipulation had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as
an optional venue and limiting litigation between UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and
exclusively to Quezon City.
In light of all the cases above surveyed, and the general postulates distilled therefrom, the
question should receive a negative answer. Absent additional words and expressions
definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between
them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City — or other
contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention — the stipulation
should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one
place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at
the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).

lOMoARcPSD|9251584
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED, the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6, dated
February 3, 1994, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and said Court is DIRECTED to
forthwith proceed with Civil Case No. 93-12-241 in due course.

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Criminal Procedure (San Beda University)

StuDocu is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university

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CASE 1 TOPIC: ​Prospective Effect of the Rules of Court/ Retroactive

GR NO. 150274 DATE​: August 4, 2006

● Hence, the instant petition to cite Sec.Datumanong in contempt of court. Petitioner

ISSUE: ​W/N Sec. Datumanong should be cited for contempt of court.

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Office of the Ombudsman)

“​Section 7. Finality and execution of decision​. - Where the respondent is absolved of

Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to

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Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court

CASE 2 TOPIC: ​Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of

CASE TITLE: ​SARMIENTO vs. ZARATA

G.R. No. 167471 DATE: February 5, 2007

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ii. Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010

CASE 3 TOPIC: ​Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of

CASE TITLE:​ LABAO v FLORES

GR NO. 187984 DATE: ​November 15, 2010

● The petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit

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DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, ​the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed

iii. Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, 12 March 2019

CASE 4 TOPIC: ​Power of Supreme Court to Suspend Rules of Court

CASE TITLE ​GIOS-SAMAR INC. vs DOTC

GR NO. ​217158 DATE: ​March 12, 2019

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● The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached

1. NO. Petitioner's arguments against the constitutionality of the bundling of the

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Projects are inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the

When a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue

2. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court:

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promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

DISPOSITIVE RULING: ​WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is

II. General Principles

NAME: Andrela Aquino

CASE 5 TOPIC: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

CASE TITLE: Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corporation

GR NO. 214241 DATE: January 13, 2016

DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

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However, it must be clarified that the aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is

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c. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

NAME: Anna Katrina Canlas

CASE 6 TOPIC: ​Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial

CASE TITLE: ​Tan v. Cinco

GR NO. 213054 DATE: ​June 15, 2016

PONENTE: ​PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

DOCTRINE: ​The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

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9. Petitioner Teresita's MR was denied in the resolution, hence, this petition.

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DISPOSITIVE RULING: ​WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order rendered by

NAME: Camille Francisco

CASE 7 TOPIC: ​Doctrine of non-interference or

CASE 1 TOPIC: Prospective Effect of the Rules of Court/ Retroactive

GR NO. 150274 DATE: August 4, 2006

ISSUE: W/N Sec. Datumanong should be cited for contempt of court.

“Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of

CASE 2 TOPIC: Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of

CASE TITLE: SARMIENTO vs. ZARATA

CASE 3 TOPIC: Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of

CASE TITLE: LABAO v FLORES

GR NO. 187984 DATE: November 15, 2010

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed

CASE 4 TOPIC: Power of Supreme Court to Suspend Rules of Court

CASE TITLE GIOS-SAMAR INC. vs DOTC

GR NO. 217158 DATE: March 12, 2019

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is

CASE 6 TOPIC: Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial

CASE TITLE: Tan v. Cinco

GR NO. 213054 DATE: June 15, 2016

PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order rendered by

CASE 7 TOPIC: Doctrine of non-interference or

CASE TITLE: Specified Contractors and Development Inc. vs. Pobocan

GR NO. 212014-15, 212427-28, DATE: 6 December 2016

DOCTRINE: Non-interference in the Ombudsman's determination of the existence of

In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among

CASE 8 TOPIC: Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the

CASE TITLE: Cang v. Court of Appeals

GR NO. 105308 DATE: 15 September 1998

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is

CASE 10 TOPIC: Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts,

PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE: A prior barangay conciliation proceeding is not a jurisdictional requirement

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

CASE 11 TOPIC. Jurisdiction of various Philippine Courts

GR NO. 211966 DATE August 7, 2017

PONENTE Del Castillo, J

● MTCC: Rendered judgement in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

CASE 12 TOPIC: Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts (Katarungang

GR NO. 159411 DATE: March 18, 2005.

RULING: Yes, RTC Valenzuela City has jurisdiction.

Note: Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement

CASE 13 TOPIC: Jurisdiction (Action for Revival of Judgment)

GR NO. 192048 DATE: December 13, 2017