Freedom of Speech and the Internet Shutdown:

Supreme Court of India- I

The internet started as a free unregulated space for exchange and flow of ideas. The
governments have come to regulate it, including a partial or complete shutdown for
varying periods of time. The Supreme Court of India has explored the constitutional
validity of the internet shutdown in ‘the Internet Shutdown Case’. 1 On August 5,
2019, the Government of India brought about constitutional changes in Jammu and
Kashmir, breaking up the state in the Union Territories of Jammu, Kashmir and
Ladhaak. Apprehending unrest, all mobile phone networks, internet services and
landline connectivity were discontinued in the valley. Several applications challenged
the constitutional validity of the internet shutdown before the Supreme Court of India.
The Supreme Court has ruled on the internet, freedom of speech and expression
and limits of the government in constraining it. It is the first judgement from any
constitutional court on the freedom of speech and expression and the internet.

Freedom of Speech and Expression

The judgement is based on the freedom to speech and expression enshrined in the
Constitution of India. The Constitution of India makes no mention of the internet. It
could not have as the internet was not there in 1950 when the constitution was
adopted. The constitution gives protection to the freedom of speech and expression.
Article 19(1) reads:

Article 19: All citizens shall have the right—

(a) to freedom of speech and expression;

(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India;
***
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.

The freedoms are not absolute and unlimited. Each of the above freedom is
constrained by the subsequent clauses of Article 19. The limitation on the freedom of
speech and expression is in Article 19(2). It reads:

(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing
law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause
in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

On a plain reading, every citizen has the right to free ‘speech and expression’. The
state, however, can make laws restricting the freedom. The restriction can only be

1
Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, Supreme Court of India, January 10, 2020.
on one or more of the following grounds:

… the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations
with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of
court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

If the restriction is not for achieving any of these ends, it must fail. If it qualifies, the
additional requirement is the restriction must be ‘reasonable’ and not more.

The first question before the court was whether use of the internet was covered
under Article 19(1)(a). Only if the answer were yes, would the order of the
government shutting down the internet be subject to judicial review by the court. The
meaning of each of the terms in Article 19, including ‘speech’, ‘expression’ and
‘reasonable’ has developed from case to case over the decades. We will explore this
trajectory. Within this chain of cases, we would be able to understand and locate the
current judgement. In this first parts of the case, we will only explore the expansion
of the term ‘freedom of speech and expression’. The following was the first case
which came before the Supreme Court of India on Article 19(1)(a), within months of
adoption of the constitution in 1950.

Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras

The Government of Madras perceived the rise of communism. 2 It imposed a ban on

the entry and circulation of a weekly newspaper, Cross Roads. The journal was
printed and published in Mumbai, then Bombay. Romesh Thappar, the printer,
publisher and editor of the newspaper, challenged that the order violated his freedom
of speech. The Supreme Court noted on the scope of the freedom of speech and
expression:

… there can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of
propagation of ideas, and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation.
Liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication.
Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value. … It is therefore
perfectly clear that the order of the Government of Madras would be a violation of the
petitioner's fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(a), unless … it … is saved by the
reservations mentioned in Cl. (2) of Art. 19.

The Supreme Court drew and relied on the United States Supreme Court
judgements. The Constitution of the United States is the oldest written constitution.
The framers of the Indian constitution drew significantly from it, including the
freedoms in Article 19. The judgements of the US Supreme Court have been widely
employed as support in interpreting the provisions in all these decades. The
corresponding freedom in the Constitution of the United States is in the ‘First
Amendment.’ It protects ‘the freedom of speech, or of the press.’

Having recognised that the freedom of ‘speech and expression’ covered propagation
and circulation, the court moved to appraise if the order was saved by the
reservations stipulated in Article 19(2). In this very first case before the court, the
court noted on the limited grounds for restricting the freedom:
2
Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
 … very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative
abridgement of the right of free speech and expression and this was doubtless due to
the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all
democratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so
essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular Government, is
possible. A freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of an abuse. But the
framers of the Constitution may well have reflected with Madison who was 'the
leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution’,
that ‘it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth than,
by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits’.

Evaluating the grounds for the ban by the government of Madras, the court was not
satisfied that the narrow requirements of Article 19(2) were met. It quashed the order
of the government, allowing a free movement of the newspaper in the state of
Madras.

Brij Bhusan v. The State of Delhi

In the early years of the republic, there was religious and communal disharmony. 3
The Chief Commissioner of Delhi took the view that Organiser, an English Weekly
published from Delhi, was publishing highly objectionable material, which posed a
threat to law and order. It ordered the newspaper to submit all communal matter for
scrutiny before publication. Brij Bhusan, the printer, publisher and editor, challenged
that the order violated Article 19. Patanjali Sastri J. for the Supreme Court noted:

There can be little doubt that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a

restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of the right to freedom
of speech and expression declared by Art.19 (1) (a).

Another judge, Fazl Ali, J. noted on the freedom:

It must be recognised that freedom of speech and expression is one of the most
valuable rights guaranteed to a citizen by the Constitution and should be jealously
guarded by the Courts. It must also be recognised that free political discussion is
essential for the proper functioning of a democratic Government …

Evaluating the order, the court judged that it did not meet the requirements of Article
19(2) and quashed the pre-censorship.

Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India

Newspapers had started as individual initiatives during the independence

movement.4 Later, it became an industry. The government appointed a Press
Commission in 1952 to explore and recommend on all aspects of the working of the
newspapers. The Press Commission noted that advertisement was a major source
of revenue for the newspapers enabling them to sell below the cost of production.

3
Brij Bhusan v. The State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129
4
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305
The space allocated to advertisements varied from 46% to 59%. The Press
Commission noted that the older established newspapers, with a large and stable
advertisement revenue, were in an advantageous position. They could squeeze out
a new newspaper and small newspapers. The Press Commission emphasised that
the small newspapers too should have a fair chance to sustain themselves and put
forward their views and opinions.

To secure this, the Press Commission recommended a cap on the proportion of

space a newspaper could put to advertising. Further, taking account of all the factors
of the economics of the newspapers, including cost of newsprint, salaries,
commissions and overheads, it prescribed a price schedule. The price schedule
recommended different number of pages and corresponding prices for the
newspapers to sell to their readers. To give effect to the recommendations, the
Parliament enacted the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956. The preamble of the
legislation read:

An Act to provide for the regulation of the prices charged for newspapers in relation
to their pages and of matters connected therewith for the purpose of preventing unfair
competition among newspapers so that newspapers may have fuller opportunities of
freedom of expression.

The act gave the power to the government to settle the prices for different page
numbers in the newspapers. Following the law, the government issued an order
prescribing the prices.

The order disrupted the functioning of the newspapers. Sakal Papers Private Limited
was a company publishing a newspaper in Marathi from Pune, named Sakal. The
shareholders of the company along with the company challenged the constitutional
validity of the law. They pointed out that Sakal had 34 pages. Following the law, the
newspaper will either have to reduce the pages to 24 or increase the price. If they
reduced the pages, it would diminish dissemination of news and views. If they
increased the price, it would lower the circulation and reduce their reach. Thus, the
law violated their freedom of speech and expression, stated in Article 19(1)(a).

Deciding the constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court first explored whether the
freedom of speech and expression extend to the newspapers. Building on the earlier
cases, the Supreme Court noted:

Our Constitution does not expressly provide for the freedom of press but it has been
held by this Court that this freedom is included in "freedom of speech and expression"
guaranteed by cl. (1) (a) of Art. 19. … The right to propagate one's ideas is inherent in
the conception of freedom of speech and expression. For the purpose of propagating
his idea every citizen has a right to publish them, to disseminate them and to circulate
them. He is entitled to do so either by word of mouth or by writing. The right
guaranteed thus extends … not merely to the matter which he is entitled to circulate,
but also to the volume of circulation. In other words, the citizen is entitled to
propagate his views and reach any class and number of readers as he chooses.

The court formulated to take newspapers and press in the folds of the freedom of
speech. The court noted the basis for this wider reach and extension:
 It must be borne in mind that the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad way and
not in a narrow and pedantic sense, Certain rights have been enshrined in our
Constitution as fundamental and, therefore, while considering the nature and content
of those rights the Court must not be too astute to interpret the language of the
Constitution in so literal a sense as to whittle them down. On the other hand the Court
must interpret the Constitution in a manner which would enable the citizen to enjoy
the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest measure.

The court concluded:

Bearing this principle in mind it would be clear, that the right to freedom of speech
and expression carries with it the right to publish and circulate one's ideas, opinions
and views with complete freedom and by resorting to any available means of
publication subject again to such restrictions as could be legitimately imposed under
cl. (2) of Art. 19.

The Government of India claimed that the law was enacted to prevent unfair
competition among the newspapers and prevent the rise of monopolies. Further, the
government asserted that the Act It did not directly or indirectly deal with the subject
of freedom of speech and expression. As a result, even if circulation of Sakal got
reduced, the question of violation of Article 19(1)(a) did not arise. To the contrary,
the government reasoned, the Act strengthened the newspaper business and
furthered the freedom of speech and expression. Thus, the government argued that
it neither intended to nor the law abridges the freedom of speech and expression.

The court readily concluded that limiting advertisement and the price schedule would
lead to increase in price, reducing the circulation of the newspaper. The court
observed that the object of the law was not a relevant consideration. What was
relevant was whether the law directly affected the freedom of speech and
expression. The court noted:

The only question [is] … whether the enactment directly impinges on the guarantee of
freedom of speech and expression. It would directly impinge on this freedom either by
placing restraint upon it or by placing restraint upon something which is an essential
part of that freedom. The freedom of a newspaper to publish any number of pages or
to circulate it to any number of persons is each an integral part of the freedom of
speech and expression. A restraint placed upon either of them would be a direct
infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression.

The court illustrated it with a law which limited the number of subscribers a
newspaper could have. It asked if the law would attract Article 19(1)(a) and thus
answered it:

The answer must unhesitatingly be no, because such a law would be recognised as
directly impinging upon the freedom of expression which encompasses freedom of
circulation and to restrain the citizen from propagating his views to any other beyond
the limit or number prescribed by the statute. If this were so, the fact that the
legislation achieves the same result by means of the schedule or rates makes no
 difference and the impact on the freedom would still be direct notwithstanding that it
does not appear so on its face.

The court recognised that the law ‘directly prohibits a newspaper from exercising that
right’. It noted:

This is a direct invasion of the right under Art. 19(1)(a) and not an incidental or
problematic effect… The distinction between direct and indirect effect of a law upon
the freedom of press has been adverted to in the Express Newspapers case.

In the Express Newspaper case5, several newspaper organisations had challenged a

law enacted by the Parliament which provided for the fixation of salary and working
conditions of the journalists. The newspapers, among others, argued that this
abridged the freedom of speech and expression of the press. The court reasoned:

The likelihood of the independence the press being undermined … would be

remote and depend upon various factors which may or may not come into
play. Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences of the measures
enacted in the impugned Act, it would not be possible to strike down the
legislation as having that effect and operation.

Coming back to the Sakal case, The Supreme Court recognised that the law was
made on the recommendation of the Press Commission and was to bring protection
to the small newspapers. But this was done by encouraging the circulation of small
newspapers and impeding the circulation of the larger papers. This directly affected
the freedom of speech. The court noted:

Such a course is not permissible and the courts must be ever vigilant in guarding
perhaps the most precious of all the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. The
reason for this is obvious. The freedom of speech and expression of opinion is of
paramount importance under a democratic Constitution … No doubt, the law in
question was made upon the recommendation of the Press Commission but since its
object is to affect directly the right of circulation of newspapers which would
necessarily undermine their power to influence public opinion it cannot but be
regarded as a dangerous weapon which is capable of being used against democracy
itself.

The law was to protect and advance public good. But this is not one of the basis for
restricting the freedom of speech under Article 19(2). For this reason, the court
declared the law to be bad.

The Bennett Coleman Case

The newspapers in India were heavily dependent on imported newsprint. 6 The

government of India, under the Import Control Order, 1955 sought to regulate
import, allocation and utilisation of newsprint. Several of the newspapers
challenged that the order limiting availability of the newsprint violated the freedom
of speech and expression. The court, referring to a wide body of literature,
5
Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd. v the Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578.
6
Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106.
emphasised the pivotal place of a free press in the modern world and
democracies. Justice Mathew noted:

The matter can be looked at from another angle. The constitutional guarantee of the
freedom of speech is not so much for the benefit of the press as it is for the benefit of
the public. The freedom of speech includes within its compass the right of all citizens
to read and be informed. … the freedom of speech protects two kinds of interest.
There is an individual interest, the need of men to express their opinion on matters
vital to them and a social interest in the attainment of truth so that the country may not
only accept the wisest course but carry it out in the wisest way.

Justice Mathew, noting the significant role of the press in political education,
concluded:

The affirmative obligation of the Government to permit the import of newsprint by

expanding foreign exchange in that behalf is not only because press has a fundamental
right to express itself, but also because the community has a right to be supplied with
information and the Government a duty to educate the people within the limits of its
resources.

The Indian Express Case

In 1981, the Government of India introduced a custom duty on newsprint. The

newspapers were significantly dependent on imported newsprint. Newsprint was
60% of the cost of the newspapers. The newspapers challenged that the
imposition of the customs duty was a violation of the fundamental right of speech
and expression. The Supreme Court noted that the constitution did not use the
expression 'freedom of press' in Article 19 but it was a part of the freedom of
speech and expression. The court noted:

The freedom of press, as one of the members of the Constituent Assembly said, is
one of the items around which the greatest and the bitterest of constitutional
struggles have been waged in all countries where liberal constitutions prevail. The
said freedom is attained at considerable sacrifice and suffering and ultimately it has
come to be incorporated in the various written constitutions.

The court further noted:

The leaders of the Indian independence movement attached special significance to

the freedom of speech and expression which included freedom of press apart from
other freedoms. During their struggle for freedom they were moved by the
American Bill of Rights containing the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States of America which guaranteed the freedom of the press.

The court highlighted the role of the press in democracies:

In today's free world freedom of press is the heart of social and political
intercourse. The press has now assumed the role of the public educator making
formal and non-formal education possible in a large scale … The purpose of the
press is to advance the public interest by publishing facts and opinions without
 which a democratic electorate cannot make responsible judgments.

Thus, the freedom of press was a freedom of speech and expression. Through the
1970s, television network was expanding in India. The following case in on the
freedom of speech and expression in relation to the television.

Odyssey Communications Private Limited v Lokvidayan Sanghatana

While the television made a start in India in 1965, the national network expanded
in the late 1970s.7 Telecasting was a monopoly of the government of India, done
through Doordarshan. Doordarshan was telecasting a serial called Honi Anhoni. A
public interest litigation objected to the serial before the Supreme Court that the
serial was propagating superstition and blind faith by stories of ghosts and rebirth.
The Supreme Court noted on the application of the freedom of speech and
expression to the television:

It can no longer be disputed that the right of a citizen to exhibit films on the
Doordarshan subject to the terms and conditions to be imposed by the Doordarshan
is a part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression guaranteed under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India which can be curtailed only under
circumstances which are set out in clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of
India. The right is similar to the right of a citizen to publish his views through any
other media such as newspapers, magazines, advertisement hoardings etc. subject to
the terms and conditions of the owners of the media. We hasten to add that what we
have observed here does not mean that a citizen has a fundamental right to establish
a private broadcasting station, or television center. On this question we reserve our
opinion. It has to be decided in an appropriate case.

The court was making a distinction. It recognised that a citizen has the freedom of
speech and expression through the medium of television. Does the right extend
further to the very means, establish and run television stations. The question
raised in a later case.

Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manubhai D. Shah

Doordarshan refused to telecast a film ‘Beyond Genocide’ on the Bhopal gas

disaster on the ground that it lacked moderation, restraint and fairness. 8 The film was
critical of the government. The decision was challenged before the Supreme Court.
The court noted:

"The words "freedom of speech and expression" must, therefore, be broadly construed
to include the freedom to circulate one's views by words of mouth or in writing or
through audio-visual instrumentalities. It therefore, includes the right to propagate
one's views through the print media or through any other communication channel e.g.
the radio and television. Every citizen of this free country, therefore, has the right to
air his or her views through the printing and/or the electronic media subject of course
to permissible restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

7
Odyssey Communications Pvt. Limited v Lokvidayan Sanghatana, AIR 1988 SC 1642.
8
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manubhai D. Shah, 1992 AIR SCW 3099.
Thus, airing one’s views through the radio and television got established as a
freedom of speech and expression.

Cricket Association of Bengal v. Union of India

As stated earlier, public telecast was established by the government of India and
was a state monopoly.9 The government of India did telecast through
Doordarshan. Doordarshan started telecasting cricket matches. This led to a
massive popularity of cricket and expansion of viewership of the matches.
Doordarshan earned revenue from advertising and shared revenue with the cricket
administering body, the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). BCCI started
earning significant revenue from the telecast. The matches were international and
thus, there was an international viewership. Doordarshan was the host telecaster.
It would put its camera at the stadium, develop the signal and then, use the feed in
India and sell to the international broadcasters.

In the early 1990s, following economic liberalisation and globalisation, private

television channels got allowed in India. Considering the popularity of the game,
private and foreign television channels were willing to pay a lot more revenue to
the BCCI for the matches than Doordarshan was paying. BCCI moved to award
the telecast rights to a foreign telecaster. The arrangement was for the foreign
telecaster to be the host broadcaster where it would have its cameras in the
stadium, generate the signal and upload it to a satellite through mobile telecasting
van. It will then sell the signal to the telecasters in the different countries who could
receive it and telecast the match. Doordarshan objected and claimed only it could
be the host broadcaster. The dispute case before the Supreme Court. The court
noted the contention of BCCI:

The game of cricket provides entertainment to public. It is a form of expression and

is, therefore, included within the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. This right includes the right to telecast and
broadcast the matches. This right belongs to the organiser of the matches which
cannot be interfered with by anyone. The organiser is free to choose such agency as it
thinks appropriate for telecasting and broadcasting its matches. The Doordarshan or
the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting can claim no right whatsoever to
telecast or broadcast the said matches. If they wish to do so, they must negotiate with
the organiser and obtain the right. They have no inherent right, much less a monopoly,
in the matter of telecasting and broadcasting these matches. It is not their events.

The Supreme Court ruled:

In our country, since the organisation of an event is an aspect of the fundamental

right to freedom of speech and expression protected by Article 19 (1) (a), the law
can be made to control the organisation of such events only … as laid down under
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. … a law can be made for restricting or prohibiting
the organisation of the event itself, and also for telecasting it, on the same grounds
as are mentioned in Article 19(2). There cannot, however, be restrictions on
producing and recording the event on grounds not permitted by Article 19(2). For
the same reasons, the publication or communication of the recorded event through
9
Cricket Association of Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1236.
 the mode of cassettes cannot be restricted or prevented except under such law. All
those who have got the apparatus of video cassette recorder (VCR) and the
television screen can, therefore, view and listen to such recorded event.

The court noted ‘a game of cricket like any other sports event provides
entertainment - and entertainment is a facet, a part, of free speech.’ It can be
subject to the limitations only under Article 19(2). Thus, BCCI can record the event
and propagate it. But whether it could set up a mobile van to uplink to a satellite
would be a different and further question. As the government of India further
liberalised foreign and private telecasters, this further questioned ceased to be
important and did not get decided.

The Internet Shutdown Case

Coming to the present case, Anuradha Bhasin was one of the petitioners before
the court. She was the executive editor of one of the major newspapers. Her
contention was the print media came to a grinding halt due to non-availability of
the internet services. Her contention was the internet was absolutely essential for
the modern press. Further, curtailment of the internet, is a restriction on the right to
free speech. The second aspect of the internet shutdown was its effect on
businesses. The questions framed by the court for answering the challenge
included:

Whether the freedom of speech and expression … over the Internet is a part of the
fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution?

Whether the … freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation,

trade or business over the Internet is a part of the fundamental rights under Part III
of the Constitution?

Whether the Government's action of prohibiting internet access is valid?

The Supreme Court noted the overwhelming presence of the internet as medium
for communication:

There is no gainsaying that in today's world the internet stands as the most utilized
and accessible medium for exchange of information. The revolution within the
cyberspace has been phenomenal in the past decade, wherein the limitation of storage
space and accessibility of print medium has been remedied by the usage of internet.
…from morning to night we are encapsulated within the cyberspace and our most
basic activities are enabled by the use of internet.

The court located the freedom of speech over the internet in the context of its earlier
judgement over the decades. It noted:

… this Court, in a catena of judgments, has recognized free speech as a fundamental

right, and, as technology has evolved, has recognized the freedom of speech and
expression over different media of expression. Expression through the internet has
gained contemporary relevance and is one of the major means of information
diffusion. Therefore, the freedom of speech and expression through the medium of
 internet is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) and accordingly, any restriction on the
same must be in accordance with Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

The court further noted:

There is no dispute that freedom of speech and expression includes the right to
disseminate information to as wide a section of the population as is possible. The
wider range of circulation of information or its greater impact cannot restrict the
content of the right nor can it justify its denial.

The court noted on the question of doing business with and over the internet:

In this context, we need to note that the internet is also a very important tool for trade
and commerce. The globalization of the Indian economy and the rapid advances in
information and technology have opened up vast business avenues and transformed
India as a global IT hub. There is no doubt that there are certain trades which are
completely dependent on the internet. Such a right of trade through internet also
fosters consumerism and availability of choice. Therefore, the freedom of trade and
commerce through the medium of the internet is also constitutionally protected under
Article 19(1)(g), subject to the restrictions provided under Article 19(6).

There is a distinction between the freedom of speech and expression through the
internet and the freedom to the internet itself. That is, the distinction between ‘the
internet as a tool and the freedom of expression through the internet.’ The court
noted on this aspect:

At this point it is important to note the argument of Mr. Vinton G. Cerf, one of the
'fathers of the internet'. He argued that while the internet is very important, however,
it cannot be elevated to the status of a human right. Technology, in his view, is an
enabler of rights and not a right in and of itself. He distinguishes between placing
technology among the exalted category of other human rights, such as the freedom of
conscience, equality etc. With great respect to his opinion, the prevalence and extent
of internet proliferation cannot be undermined in one's life.

The court left the question of the right over the internet open. It noted:

None of the counsels have argued for declaring the right to access the internet as a
fundamental right and therefore we are not expressing any view on the same. We are
confining ourselves to declaring that the right to freedom of speech and expression
under Article 19(1)(a), and the right to carry on any trade or business under 19(1)(g),
using the medium of internet is constitutionally protected.

The court, thus, concluded:

We declare that the freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to practice
any profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation over the medium of
internet enjoys constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(g).
The restriction upon such fundamental rights should be in consonance with the
mandate under Article 19 (2) and (6) of the Constitution.
The court proceeded to examine whether the restriction on the freedom was
‘reasonable’.

Conclusion

The Constitution of India recognizes the freedom of speech and expression. As the
courts are the guarantors of the right, the Supreme Court has interpreted the right in
a broad expansive way. The freedom has come to include to publish and circulate
one's ideas, opinions and views through all mediums including print, radio and
television. In this case, the court has extended the freedom of speech and
expression over the medium of the internet. As a result, a law restricting citizens
from communicating over the internet must qualify under Article 19(2) to be valid. We
will turn to this aspect in the second part of the case.