Professional Documents
Culture Documents
This Practice Note is one of a series of engineering notes issued on behalf of the Mondi Group and
contains the precautions that are required to control fire hazards. It describes asset protection
requirements that either eliminate the identified fire hazard or ensure that it is reduced to an acceptable
level consistent with good international industry practice. The Practice Note primarily refers the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA), an US organisation charged with creating and maintaining minimum
standards and requirements for fire prevention and suppression activities as well as other life-safety codes
and (building) standards. It supports Operating Standard 19, Process and Equipment Safety and in
particular implements PR 19.10, Fire Safety Management. The health & safety of people working for
Mondi is heavily dependent on good asset integrity, a pre-condition for working together successfully
towards Zero Harm.
www.mondigroup.com
Practice Notes
As the costs of incidents can compromise the Group’s reputation and right to operate, structured and
systematic managing processes and systems, high standards of performance, tracking results of key
indicators and audits will help to achieve and to sustain safety and operational excellence. A number of
key management processes and controls exist that must be applied in a way that hazards (risks) are
identified, understood and controlled so related injuries and incidents are prevented. The Group uses a
common approach to integration of these processes and controls in business decisions that include
Governance, Risk Management, Incident Reporting and Investigation, Plant and Equipment Integrity or
Audits. Nevertheless, leadership, visible management commitment as well as thorough management
systems, a robust organisational structure and operational discipline as well as the skills of inspired
employees/ contractors are needed to identify and control risk.
Practice Notes are meant to assist managers and engineers with providing assurance and improving
performance. They should be read and used in conjunction with the Group’s Policies, Standards and
Requirements (PSRs). The Group’s Sustainable Development management system (SDMS) is
hierarchical where documents and systems must meet and support the requirements of those of higher
levels. Management Standards are not supplemented by Requirements as; in general, operations already
have their management systems and related procedures in place.
The mandatory requirements of Policies, Standards and Requirements are signified by the use of the word
‘shall’. A ‘must’ denotes a Mondi obligation as it outlines a statutory requirement applying to the activities.
The word ‘should’ indicates that the primary intent is to comply with the full requirements as if they were
mandatory. It represents good practice (recognised good international practice, GIIP), which, if adopted,
will usually be what is reasonably practicable under the given circumstances although there may be other
legally acceptable ways of achieving the same objective. However, there will be circumstances where
local conditions may demonstrate that the requirement is either not applicable or an alternative approach
is necessary. In cases where ‘should’ has been used in a requirement, variation can only be considered
as compliance if the most senior Line Manager approves it based on an evaluation of the risk.
Chapter 8: Fire Hazards and Precautions for Electrical Equipment, Spare Parts
Storage and Offices Page 62
The intent of the Fire Protection Code is to eliminate or minimise the risk of fatality, injury or asset loss
arising from fire and explosions in the manufacture of pulp, paper and packaging materials. It applies to
all Mondi Group operations.
It establishes requirements and responsibilities related to the Group’s fire protection programme. It
contains requirements for fire prevention, detection, control and suppression. Compliance with the
requirements expressed in this Fire Protection Code is mandatory for all Group owned/leased and/or
occupied facilities, both new and existing. The individual operations are responsible for implementation
and enforcement. It supports Operating Standard 19, Process and Equipment Safety which requires
“hazards to be eliminated or the consequent risk reduced in accordance with leading industry
practice”. The Fire Protection Code details the engineering requirements for fire management which “as
far as possible, identifies the hazards and ensures that their potential consequences and
likelihood are assessed (…) and as far as possible, appropriate fire safety management systems
(will) reduce the fire risks to an acceptable level” (SDMS PR 19.10, Clause 2.1(b), Fire Safety
Management).
Any decision to waive or vary from the requirements in this Code requires the concurrence of the
responsible Technical Director. The Fire Protection Code is not a substitute for regulatory life safety
requirements. Statutory requirements apply to all Mondi operations and they are responsible for keeping
up-to-date with the current statutory requirements that apply to their operations. Countries may have
their own fire prevention programmes that must comply with. It is our approach that where requirements
are conflicting, the most stringent applies. In general, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Fire Codes apply to the Group’s fire protection programme and exceptions are stated.
Adequate safeguards are to be provided for all operations. This can be accomplished by conducting an
analysis to identify all fire hazards and accomplish the following:
Significant hazards shall be eliminated or reduced to acceptable risk levels.
Where the hazard cannot be eliminated or reduced, it shall be relocated to an area less
threatening to people and property.
Where the hazard cannot be eliminated or removed, it shall be isolated within the operation so as
not to pose a danger to the remainder of the structure or its occupants.
Where the hazard cannot be eliminated, relocated or isolated, protection shall be provided to
ensure adequate levels of personal and structural safety.
In the event of a fire occurrence, the occupants of the operation shall be provided with protection
to enable them to leave the area safely, with the structure protected to ensure its continued
integrity.
Final decisions regarding fire safety shall be made after consultation with a fire safety expert.
Solid fire protection judgment is necessary to assure that adequate levels of fire and personal safety are
achieved. The release of the Fire Protection Code is not preventing the use of systems, methods or
devices of equivalent or superior quality, strength, fire resistance, effectiveness, durability and safety over
The Fire Protection Code contains the Group’s knowledge about the fire protection standards in the
paper and packaging industry. It applies the relevant fire protection developments of the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), an international non-profit organisation whose missions in the reduction
of the worldwide burden of fire and other hazards on the quality of life. NFPA codes provide globally
recognised standards of protection allowing the Group to achieve a rating of overall good protection.
The Group Technical Director sponsors the Fire Protection Code and the Group Loss Prevention Manager
has to ensure it is kept up-to-date and relevant. In order to be effective, the Group Loss Prevention
Manager is required to network with appointed BU experts on good international practice, technology,
audit results, benchmarking, risk reduction and avoidance of failures experienced elsewhere.
Although paper reels and board are combustible materials and may not be easily ignited, once they
caught fire the flames will spread rapidly. On the other side loose paper, plastic films or flammable liquids
can ignite easily. These types of fires are often very difficult to extinguish once they have started. In the
paper and packaging industry ignition sources can be found throughout the operations.
The development of an incipient fire and its spread throughout the operation depends on several factors
such as stored materials, plant layout and building materials, housekeeping and the training of
employees/contractors. Adequate maintenance of means of escape, alarm systems and the training for
first responses will reduce the risk to people in a major fire event. Regularly performed fire safety audits
shall ensure that the:
Risk of fire starting is reduced to an absolute minimum.
Risk of an incipient fire developing into a major fire and spreading through the plan is minimised.
Every person working for Mondi is able to leave the plant on its own and reach a ‘safe habour.’
In the last decades there has been considerable progress in the area of fire protection. Not only does fire
protection was regulated on the basis of strict laws and norms but it also has improved by the use of risk-
oriented engineering methods. By risk-oriented fire protection concepts, advantages can be achieved in
the efficiency of industrial building’ fire protection. However, fire protection has to be seen in the context of
the overall asset integrity to ensure efficiency of the fire protection measures in the case of fire.
This Code is aimed at managers and engineers who are responsible for the fire safety at their operations
and should provide them with the Group’s protection practices taking note of the recommendations made
by Global Risk Consultants (GRC), our joint loss prevention auditor.
Fire protection measures have been divided into three categories (organisational, structural and technical)
in order to get an overview how much costs are involved and what kind of impact they have on the risk.
Mitigation measures shall be applied which are consistent with the fire risk assessment and appropriate
to the nature of the activity or operation. These can include preventing fires and explosions from
spreading to other plant and equipment or to other parts of the workplace, reducing the numbers of
employees exposed to a minimum or, in the case of process plant, providing plant and equipment that
can safely contain or suppress an explosion or vent it to a safe place. Measures taken to achieve the
elimination or the reduction of risk should take into account the design, construction and maintenance of
the workplace and work processes, including all relevant plant, equipment, control and protection
systems.
Where the assessment and, in particular, past experience indicates the types of fires which can be
anticipated, specific plans to tackle these shall be made. The emergency plan shall specify the particular
fire safety responsibilities of the most Senior Line Manager present having overall control of the
workplace and specify the responsibilities of other nominated people. In the event of a fire, everybody in
the workplace should be familiar with the fire routine and fire safety arrangements to take the correct
actions and evacuate the workplace safely. The arrangements could include the following:
Take each part of the process or plant in turn, assume it is out of commission and assess the
potential for damage to business should a fire occur.
Consider whether the process can be done elsewhere.
Find out if alternative machinery can be used or obtained.
Fire is only one type of emergency that happens at work. Large and small workplaces alike experience
fires, explosions, medical emergencies, chemical spills, toxic releases and a variety of other incidents.
To protect people working for Mondi from fire and other emergencies and to prevent property loss,
whether large or small, operations must use emergency preparedness plans. The two essential
components are the following:
An emergency plan, which details what to do when a fire occurs.
A fire prevention plan, which describes what to do to prevent a fire from occurring.
Fire audits must identify all the hazards and risks together with existing control measures including
information provision and training. The audit may be done either on a process-by-process basis or on an
area-by-area. There should be definite conclusions about the level of hazard and risk and decisions
about the adequacy of protection and the need for improvement. The responsibilities for fire protection
are documented PR 19.10, Fire Safety Management, Clause 2.1(c), Responsible Person.
The term ‘Fire Prevention’ is used to refer to the sum of all measures for preventing fires or their spread
with the goal to minimise the fire damages. Included are the technical and organisational fire protection
measures. Fire protection and its measures can be divided as follows:
Constructional fire protection measures.
Plant engineering fire protection measures.
Protective fire protection measures.
Operational fire protection measures.
The technical fire protection includes constructional and plant engineering fire protection measures,
whereas organisational fire protection consists of protective and operational fire protection measures.
1.1.3 Self-Ignition
The normally accepted minimum self-ignition temperature of wood, paper, cotton, wool and
combustible fibreboards is 200°C to 260°C. Ignition can occur at lower temperatures if the material
is contaminated with oils or if charcoal is formed followed by ensuing self-heating.
Employee actions are critical to the spread of fire. If the wrong extinguishers are used or people
working for Mondi fail to follow appropriate instructions then the situation will be considerably worse
than it needs to be. Where there is a fire team, there must be clear instructions as to when the local
authority fire brigade is called in.
R = Es K Rborder
R Existing Risk
Rborder Borderline Risk
Es Frequency of Occurrence of a Fire
K Probable Extent of Damage
The existing fire risk R is determined by various factors such as e.g. the construction classification,
construction method, use as well as the number of people. The risk of a fire emergence can never
be completely excluded and therefore the existing fire risk is always larger than zero. The sum of
the expectable damages to people and material goods constitutes the probable extent of damage K.
The exact calculation of the existing risk is impossible, because the damage to humans is very
difficult to quantify. The borderline risk Rborder depends on the use of the building and constitutes
the level of the accepted risk. It has to be taken into account that this borderline risk is determined
by the defined protection goals. On the basis of the probability of the emergence of fires as well as
their spread to a blazing fire, the frequency of occurrence E s can be calculated. The probability of
the emergence of a fire in industrial buildings is about 2 on a floor area of one million m 2 within one
Risks can be divided into major and minor risks. Major risks are, for instance, blazing fires of the
entire plant, while a blazing fire in one fire section is considered as a minor risk. The according fire
protection measures reduce major risks to a minor risk level. With regard to the risk focus, the
individual protection goals must be determined. Every building has its own risk depending on its
purpose. By the use of preventive fire protection measures as defined by good international industry
practice acceptable risk can be achieved and held. The constructional and organisational regulatory
fire protection measures must be complied with because they exhibit the local/national
understanding of the highest efficiency in people protection. In case of a fire where major damage
costs are likely, additional plant engineering fire protection measures have to be designed and
implemented. Various fire protection measures are used in to keep the fire risk as low as
reasonably practical. Reducing the fire risk to the lowest level possible by exaggerated fire
protection measures is not economic because the costs for the effort can be much higher than the
costs that can result from fire damage. In order to prevent financial imbalance between the effort
and the damage costs that can be expected, fire protection measures have to be optimised. The
exact determination of the optimal fire protection is questionable as the loss of human life would
have to be quantified. The graphic depicts the financial imbalance that can occur between the effort
and the damage costs that can be expected.
For this reason, an effective fire protection concept includes protection objectives, defining the degree of
safety for people and protection of property. Apart from the fire risk, such concept must take into account
possible consequential losses such as business interruption as well as environmental protection. The
protection objectives specify which risks must be reduced and the residual risks which are consciously
accepted and properly controlled. Often, there is a certain amount of leeway allowed within a local/national
law which is where a risk policy manifests itself. The protection objectives form the basis of the fire
protection concept alongside available resources in terms of people working for Mondi, public emergency
services and finance as well as official requirements. The objectives always shall describe what is to be
achieved but not specify how this is to be done. The latter is reserved for the fire protection action plan.
Fire Risks
Available Resources
Action Plan
Protection Measures with Organisational, Structural and Technical Actions
Structural, technical and organisational fire protection measures must be dovetailed in such a way as to
ensure that the pre-arranged protection objectives are achived as efficiently as possible, taking into
account the specific risk situation of each individual plant circumstance.
For industrial risks with an average fire load, the minimum volume is about 300 m³ of fire-fighting
water per hour and time to extinguish the fire is calculated at around three hours. Hydrostatic
pressure should be between 5 bar and 10 bar and flow pressure should not drop below 3.5 bar. For
the water supply to hydrants at industrial facilities, the minimum pipe diameter across the various
different standards is generally set at around 15 cm. In areas where the topography is flat, water
towers (gravity tanks) or a redundant pump system must be used to create sufficient pressure.
2.3.1 Personnel
2.3.1.1 Personnel involved in organisational fire protection should be grouped together under the
heading of Safety and Security. The structure and importance of the safety and security
organisation are reliable indicators of safety awareness.
2.3.1.2 The Fire Safety Expert is the central fire person within the safety and security organisation.
The individual’s commitment, expertise and personality have a fundamental effect on the
effectiveness of the organisation and also influence the culture of fire safety within the
operation. The expert is responsible for the implementation of the fire safety concept at an
organisational level and must also constantly review and adjust this concept to take account
of changes in internal and external conditions.
2.3.1.3 The external emergency services generally include the public fire brigade, police and
paramedic services. Their manpower, intervention times and approach routes may vary from
place to place. As they are a sustained influence on the intervention concept, it is
recommended that regular contact be maintained and joint exercises and site visits carried
out. The manpower of public fire brigades can vary widely. The lowest level of manpower is
that provided by voluntary local fire brigade. They are normally called to action by telephone
or pager and must first go to the local fire station to pick up their equipment and join their
team-members. The number of fire fighters available at any one time may also fluctuate
considerably (during holiday periods or at weekends). At the other end of the scale are
professional fire brigades which are equipped and trained both for fighting major fires and for
dealing with events involving hazardous goods or radioactive materials.
2.3.1.4 As with the public fire service, the internal emergency services (firefighting manpower in
internal fire brigade) can vary widely, from a team of employees trained to use hand-held fire
extinguishers up to a permanent in- house fire brigade, available around the clock, such as
in large chemical facilities. It is essential that the combination of public and company fire-
fighters is appropriate for the risk situation of the respective site.
2.3.1.5 Site security personnel may be allocated the following tasks in the event of an alarm:
2.3.5.1 Identifying the cause of the alarm if a smoke detector goes off.
2.3.5.2 Transmitting the fire alarm to internal and external emergency services, if required.
2.3.5.3 Acting as guide for the external emergency services.
2.3.5.4 Blocking off the location of the fire during fire-fighting and clean-up operations.
2.3.1.6 Depending on the size of the operation, an on-call roster this may consist of members of the
crisis management team and employees from the maintenance department or other
departments. These persons are called in as necessary, depending on the type of event.
Their responsibilities range from fixing technical malfunctions through to catastrophe
management by the crisis management team upon occurrence of a large loss event.
2.3.1.7 In addition to the security officer, the crisis management team generally consists of senior
and/or executive management and in-house specialists in emergency organisation and
possesses the necessary authority to make decisions in critical situations. It is important for
Loss scenarios are based on individual risks. Insurers and reinsurers are limiting their commitment to an
individual risk of an estimated or calculated maximum loss. Familiar expressions for this calculation include
Maximum Possible Loss (MPL), Probable Maximum Loss (PML) and Estimated Maximum Loss (EML),
which are a percentage of the total sum insured or an absolute figure.
4.1.5 Arson
Arson is one of the main fire causes and accounts for approximately 40% of all fire losses. Waste
and pallets kept in the open are frequently targeted by arsonists especially if in close proximity to
buildings. It is very important that arsonists are denied easy access to materials that they may use
to fuel a fire. The risks to the operation significantly reduces by clearing waste from the yards and
ensuring that accumulations are prevented by arranging for regular housekeeping. In addition, idle
pallets shall be collected frequently enough to prevent build-up of large piles.
4.1.6 Security
Security covers several aspects of protection. These range from preventing unauthorised persons
from entering the plant including arsonists or people planning criminal damage after obtaining
access to the plant. The outside of the plant, yard area and fencing shall be inspected on a weekly
basis by established control rounds with a check list, reporting and follow-up. Action shall be
decided for any detected weak points and they shall be remedied within an agreed time frame.
Plant access should be limited by complete fencing of the premises and a controlled gate access for
both visitors and employees. Central IT facilities shall be secured by controlled access, preferably
by a key card system or similar. PR 18.20, Security of People and Assets applies.
4.1.7 Maintenance
Protection and detection systems like any technical system will only operate reliably when properly
maintained. Whereas malfunctions are spotted immediately in production systems, in safety
systems they will only show up when the system would actually be needed and is not performing as
designed. All fire detection and protection systems shall be maintained and inspected according to
manufacturer’s instructions and inspection routines given in the relevant NFPA standards. For
water-based extinguishing systems refer to NFPA 25 and fire detection systems refer to National
Fire Alarm Code NFPA 72. PR 19.7, Plant and Equipment Integrity applies.
4.1.8 Inspection
Fire safety not only depends on the function of detection and protection systems but to a much
larger extent, on fire prevention. This can only be achieved by regular self-inspection carried out by
plant or maintenance personnel according to predefined routines and check lists in the same way
as any management system. Housekeeping rounds shall be conducted on a weekly basis. PR 19.7,
Plant and Equipment Integrity applies.
4.1.12 Thermography
Electrical installations shall be inspected at regular intervals. The most efficient technology is infra-
red thermography. This allows the detection of local heat spots at a very early stage and can be
carried out at full production. This maintenance service shall be carried out after each new
installation. Following this, it shall be repeated annually. Should no problem areas be detected
during these checks, the interval can be extended to coincide with the frequency required by
authorities for the inspections of electrical installations. Nevertheless, condition monitoring/scanning
must not be taken as a substitute for robust engineering practices such as checking for the
tightness of connections, regular cleaning of panels or the insulation’s integrity check.
4.3.4 IT Centres
IT centres are critical for the operation of the plant. Fires can do serious damage and incorrect fire-
fighting can ruin the left-over. IT centres shall be fitted with automatic smoke detection systems.
The most sensitive detectors are smoke aspiration detectors which will give very early warning.
Critical IT centres shall be protected by automatic gaseous fire extinguishing systems like CO 2.
Care should be taken to plan for the dissipation of the displaced air to avoid overpressure leading to
building damage. For CO2 systems the applicable standard is NFPA 12. If CO2 systems are not
acceptable by local legislation, inert gas systems such as Inergen, Argon, NOVEC 1230 or FM2000
shall be used.
1
Equipment critical to production is defined as that equipment which regardless of its replacement cost would inhibit production or
otherwise adversely affect the operation of a facility.
2
Valuable equipment in the context used is defined as equipment having a high replacement cost but which will not necessarily
impact production or facility operations.
5.4.6 Conveyors
There are several types of conveyor systems in the paper and pulp producing mills. Belt
conveyers form a special risk due to the fact that the belt is made from combustible
materials. Although the conveyed product and the structure may be non-combustible, loss
history demonstrates that the belt itself presents combustible loading sufficient to spread
the fire without other fuel contribution. Conveyor belts are manufactured of natural and
synthetic rubber or plastic such as PVC), polyethylene, polypropylene or nylon. They are
often reinforced with fibres for strength. Outdoor belts usually are formed in laminated
layers and may have, for example, a PVC base for flexibility with a rubber top layer to allow
for product adhesion under incline conditions. Belt conveyors, whether made of natural or
synthetic rubber or plastics, generally are assumed to be capable of self-sustained fire
propagation whether or not other combustibles are present. For this reason, automatic
sprinkler protection has been recommended for most installations regardless of the
conveyor material’s claimed fire or flame retardancy or of the combustibility of materials
conveyed. The use of fire-retardant belts is encouraged. They are typically harder to ignite
when exposed to a low-energy ignition source, thereby reducing the frequency of fire.
Accessibility and openness of the system directly influences fire spread, severity, ease of
manual response and damage. A fully enclosed system will not allow heat to be released or
hose streams to be introduced from outside the conveyor system. Fire-fighters cannot
physically fight the fire except from the ends of the conveyor and dense smoke often
prevents effective response. A fire-fighting team will rarely enter an enclosed conveyor
system. All of these factors combine to permit a free-burn fire that will spread rapidly with
very high heat release and expose the steel structure. If this occurs, the entire structure can
sag, cantilever, or collapse. Alternatively, an open or partially open system will allow heat to
escape and hose streams to penetrate the fire plume. Damage can be significantly less with
structural collapse much less likely.
5.4.6.1 As organisational fire protection conveyor systems are seldom tight closing so
material and dust tends to fall off the belt. Thus combustible material tends to
accumulate under the belts and on the horizontal surfaces in the area of the belt,
e.g. on cable tracks. This material dries up and becomes easy to ignite. There are
several source of fire at a conveyor belt. The most prominent are linked to heat
generated by friction. This can be a blocked bearing, a slipping drive roll etc. A
second source is electrical faults. Finally, a fire can be introduced by the
transported material. Conveyor areas must be cleaned at regular intervals
5.4.7.3 As technical fire protection fire detection systems shall be installed in order to
summon fire-fighting capacity quickly. For practical reasons this would be smoke
detection either by linear beam or smoke aspiration. Detection alone is not useful
without a strong fire brigade that can intervene quickly. In most cases this needs to
be a plant fire brigade, as public fire brigades are seldom equipped and trained to
fight industrial fires. Fire detection systems shall be installed according to NFPA 72.
The building shall be equipped with sufficient heat and smoke venting installations
in order to prevent early collapse of the building and to give the fire brigade a
realistic chance of intervention. In cases where a fast and effective intervention by
the fire brigade is not certain, sprinklers may be the only option to protect the
building and contents. If no production capacity is at risk because of distance or
other means of separation, sprinkler protection may be omitted, but the possible
capital loss should be considered. Installation of sprinklers shall be carried out
according to the standard NFPA 13.
5.5.2.2 The drive and operating side of a paper machine shall be protection by a sprinkler
or water mist system. The pump systems that are typically located in the basement
Combustible Liquids have closed-cup flash points at or above 38°C. They are referred to as either
Class II or Class III liquids and are subdivided as follows:
Class II liquids: flash points at or above 38°C and below 60°C.
Class IIIA liquids: flash points at or above 60°C and below 93°C.
Class IIIB liquids: flash points at or above 93°C.
The current liquid classification scheme followed by the U.S. Transportation Code and U.N.
Transportation Recommendations classify flammable liquids into two basic groups:
The fire hazard of a flammable liquid is determined by both inherent physical properties of the liquid
and external factors such as container construction, container size, storage arrangement and
building construction factors. Two measures of fire severity are heat release rate and flame height.
For liquid fires the heat release rate is controlled by the surface area of the liquid, the liquid’s heat of
combustion and the mass loss rate of the liquid. The flame height is controlled by the fire’s heat
release rate. The heat of combustion and mass loss rate are physical properties of the liquid. The
surface area available to burn is dependent on numerous external factors such as liquid release
method (spray release, liquid stream and catastrophic mass release), floor surface and pitch (rough
surface and/or floor pitch will limit liquid spread) and container construction (combustible/non-
combustible). Control of ignition sources such as matches, fired heating equipment and hot work
must be strictly controlled in and around areas storing flammable liquids. Any open flame or spark
has ample energy to ignite flammable vapours released by flammable liquids. Since the vapours are
heavier than air, they have the ability to flow away from the point of release. Hot work or an open
flame well away from a liquid spill can ignite the spill if the vapours flow to the work area.
Flammable liquids are either stored in metal or conductive plastic containers.
6.1 Vapours
Ignitable liquids create vapours which present an explosion hazard. The liquid must be dispersed either as
a vapour or mist in air to create a premixed fuel-air mixture within the flammable range. The liquid
dispersion can occur when a liquid is heated and vapours are released or through mechanical means. In
either case, there needs to be enough fuel-air mixture within the contained space to create damaging
overpressure when it ignites. A vapour-air explosion is the rapid combustion of a flammable vapour and air
which produces heat, light and an increase in pressure. A vapour-air explosion can occur when flammable
vapour and air are present in a confined space within the vapour’s flammable (explosive) range and when
the mixture becomes ignited. If unvented, the developed pressure may reach six to nine times the initial
absolute pressure. Boiling-liquid expanding-vapour explosions occur when a confined liquid is heated
above its atmospheric boiling point by an exposure fire and suddenly released by rupture of the closed
container. Part of the heated liquid immediately flashes to vapour and is ignited by the exposure fire,
releasing heat at a lower rate than the vapour-air explosion but for a longer period of time. Explosion
damage is largely the result of pressure created by rapidly expanding gases in a confined space.
Conditions under which explosive mixtures may accumulate shall be eliminated or carefully controlled by
providing adequate ventilation to dilute the vapours, using an inert atmosphere or by other means. The
effects of an explosion are reduced and controlled by explosion vents or damage-limiting building
construction. Explosions can be prevented by reducing heat input to the closed mixer or container or by
bleeding off excess pressure. Heat input rates can be reduced by insulation, by burying or mounding the
vessel or by automatic sprinklers or water spray. Excessive pressure can be prevented by atmospheric
vent pipes, relief valves, bursting disks or safety bungs. Conditions that impact the creation of an
explosion hazard include:
Amount of fuel released.
Rate of fuel vaporisation.
Enclosure volume.
Air movement within the enclosure.
Release scenario (i.e., high-pressure spray, elevated 3-D spill, loss of containment above a
boiling liquid or vaporisation of a spilled liquid).
The potential for an explosion hazard exists when any of the following applies:
An ignitable liquid is handled/processed/used at or above its atmospheric boiling point and has a
closed-cup flash point at or below 218°C.
The process uses an ignitable liquid with a boiling point at or below 38°C.
The ventilation system shall be located to take suction within 0.3 m of the floor. Intake
openings at open tank lips, near equipment or dispensing and in any pits located within the
cut-off room or within 8 m of operations that produce vapour shall be extracted. Exhaust
fans shall be interlocked with equipment power supplies. However, if ignitable liquids are
kept in the room or building during idle periods, the exhaust ventilation shall be designed to
operate continuously and plant/ equipment shall be monitored (provide visual or audible
ventilation-failure alarms at occupied locations).
Areas where Class I, Division 1 and 2 classified electrical equipment is needed for a flexography press using low-
flash point ignitable inks.
Where Class I, Division 1 and 2 classified electrical equipment is needed for a rotogravure press using low-
flash point inks and where Class II, Division 2 classified electrical equipment is needed within and below the
folder sound enclosure.
Means to eliminate static electricity for all press types shall be provided. Copper
tinsel (tacker bars) have been found effective on presses. Bonding and grounding
when transferring any ignitable liquid that is at or above its closed-cup flash point
must be applied. Establish a formal procedure on static electricity control and
prevention.
7.3 Presses
During the stamping, cutting and printing process in corrugated production, waste material is
generated which is transported away by mechanical or pneumatic transport systems. Fires have
spread throughout such pneumatic systems backwards from the waste compactor all the way to the
cutting machines. Cut-offs also tend to accumulate at the cutting machines.
Fire hazards are present in offices, spare parts storages and operating electrical equipment and standards
of precaution must be set out to protect people and assets.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are instructions that summarise requirements and behavioural
expectations in a certain functional area. This attachment presents a list of standard operation
procedures related to fire protection.
Regular workplace inspections shall be conducted by the appointed fire expert(s). Topic areas are listed
below.
Detailed checklists can be found in the Network Library on the Intranet (Fire Protection micro-site). In
addition, the fire protection systems need to be maintained according to the respective NFPA or local
code. Impairments should be reported directly to AON.
This Engineering Practice Note is the output from a doctoral thesis to research, establish and promote
good practice for the mitigation of loss from industrial fire events in packaging and paper. The code has
benefitted from stakeholder consultation and we would wish to acknowledge the experts input from our
loss prevention advisers at GRC, Global Risk Consultants. In general, fire-prevention involves depriving a
fire of any one of its three sources: fuel, oxygen and heat. If any one of these is missing, a fire cannot start
and therefore eliminating one is the most effective fire prevention. If this is not feasible, the fire risk must
be reduced to an acceptable level. This code is intended to explain the effective use of fire protection
requirements, ensuring good international practice conditions that are affecting the way we build and use
buildings, install systems or use materials. It refers in many instances the resources created by the NFPA
as the globally accepted standard by insurers and re-insurers. The code presents vital information on the
elements and classes of fire, the fire protection standards and their application. Applying the code, an
operation shall be able to demonstrate that it has an effective and practical plan for the containment and fighting of
fires on its installations.