Germany

Foreign Policy Aims: ​Lebensraum​ and ​Anschluss

- Written about in Mein Kampf (1925) and well-known by Germans
- Differentiate between domestic and foreign policy → “​Domestic policies​ affect
people/institutions within a country ​and​ tend to be internal. ​Foreign policy​ b/n 2+ nations ​and​ is
external (be explicit, work backwards from aims to get to his domestic policies)
- International support for facism exists (Australian source), but international nature removes from
source (Germany in 1932)
- Zeitgeist ​= spirit of a generation/period of time

German Expansion 1933-38 (phrases/perspectives from Oxford textbook)

- International $ situation encouraging ​national insularity​ (lack of national interest outside of
one’s country) instead of collective security
- Br/Fr evacuated Rhineland 1929-30 + Lausanne Conference 1932 cancelled reparations
- Hitler worked to withdraw Germany from ​multilateral commitments​ that would limit his actions
→ he preferred bilateral agreements which could more easily be broken
- Claimed Geneva Conference + LoN part of a ​French conspiracy​ to keep G weak
- Germany broke out of the ​diplomatic encirclement​ the Fr tried to impose on it with Little
Entente and 1921 Fr alliance with Poland
- 1934 Non-Aggression Pact with Poland seemed to international community to be an ​act
of statesmanship​ to convince that G was peaceful
- Mussolini wanted to keep Austria as a ​buffer state​ b/n Italy and Germany
- July 1934 = assassination of Austrian Chancellor Englebert Dollfuss (organized by
Austrian Nazis), intended as first step of a ​coup d’état​ to force union with G → Italy
mobilized 100,000 troops on border, Hitler forced to back down
- Saar Plebiscite = 90.0% support (1935), voting ​supervised by LoN​ so done fairly

Gordon Craig (1978): Hitler survived due to “​distractions and differences of the other Powers, his own
tactical skill, and a good deal of luck​” from 1933-35

Feb 1933 → Hitler told generals that “​the next five years
must be devoted to the defence capacity of the German
people”​
By 1935 → army had increased from 7 to 21 divisions
In 1935 → conscription introduced, army increased to 36
divisions + over half a million men (Hitler justified
rearmament with Br/Fr failing to disarm + needing to
defend against USSR)
Remilitarizing the Rhineland (March 7, 1936) made
sense b/c:
1. Rising prices/food shortages in G = unrest
(needed to distract attention from $ probs)
2. Mussolini seeking closer ties with Hitler
 3. Br/Fr distracted by Abyssinian Crisis + fallout from Hoare-Laval Pact (b/n Br and Fr, offered to
partition Abyssinia, public outraged b/c seemed to contraction LoN values)
- Hitler’s excuse was the ​Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty​ (March 4, 1936) that he
argued violated spirit of Locarno Pact
- This movement was risky → Hitler hoped the ​diplomatic disarray ​caused by Abyssinian Crisis
would prevent Br/Fr action
Hitler “​If the French had marched into the Rhineland, we would have had to withdraw with our tails
between our legs”​

Ian Kershaw (1991): Remilitarization of the Rhineland “​matched the revisionist expectations of the
traditional conservative-nationalist elites; and it was hugely popular among the masses​”

Gordon Craig (1978): Remilitarization of the Rhineland’s “​psychological effect was to reveal the
exclusively defensive nature of French strategical thinking​”

Spanish Civil War pushed Mussolini + Hitler closer, G involved b/c:

1. Wanted friendly gov’t in Spain to supply G with resources + military bases for G subs
2. Wanted to test out air force + effects on civilian pop’ns
3. To pose as defender of EU civilization against communist threat
4. Pro-Fascist gov’t in Spain would further undermine Fr security
Effects:
1. Polarized opinion in EU (3 year war)
2. Prevented strong anti-Fascist alliance b/c increased suspicions b/n Br/Fr and USSR
3. Distracted the West → led Hitler to believed Br wouldn’t oppose G expansion in E EU
4. Stronger relations with Italy (​Rome-Berlin Axis​ in Oct 1936)

- Anti-Comintern Pact​ (November 1936) = militant nature indicated beginning of openly

aggressive G foreign policy (against Communist International)
- Four Year Plan​ (Sept 1936) = for lebensraum, increased pace of rearmament (even though
consumer $ struggling)
- Hossbach Memorandum​ (Nov 1936) = meeting b/n Hitler and top generals/war ministers
(Hermann Göring for air), turning point when expansion of Third Reich explicit, proposed:
- “​The aim of Germany foreign policy was​ to make secure and to preserve the racial
community and to enlarge it​”
- “​Germany’s problem could only be solved by the ​use of force​”
- Hitler appointed himself ​Supreme Commander of the German Army​ in Feb 1938