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Fatal Distraction: Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy

Author(s): Richard N. Haass
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 108 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 112-123
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
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 Fatal Distraction:
Bill Clinton's
Foreign Policy
by Richard N. Haass

y what yardstick is one to judge American

foreign policy? By how well it alleviates
human misery and prevents the rise of a
geopolitical challenger? By how much it avoids
and how little it costs?
The criteria for judgment were not always so unclear. During the four
decades after World War II, the measure of U.S. policy was how well it
limited and, where possible, rolled back the expansion of Soviet and
communist influence-in a manner that avoided bringing Soviet and
American military arsenals into direct conflict.
Creating a new yardstick-a post-Cold War doctrine-is no easy
task. The Bush administration's "new world order" was never fleshed
out and never caught on; still, foreign policy was relatively consistent
under President George Bush, focusing mostly on managing relations
among the great powers, protecting those few U.S. interests deemed
vital, and promoting open trade.
President Bill Clinton's foreign policy is less easy to define. Although
Clinton's approach contains elements of his predecessor's policy-as

R I C H A R D N. H A A S S is the director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Insti-

tution in Washington, D.C. From 1989 to 1993 he served as special assistant to President
George Bush and as a senior director at the National Security Council. His most recent book
is The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1997).

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 Haass

well as selective preoccupations with American exports, human rights,

and nation-building-it lacks a general framework. The one attempt to
articulate an overall construct was embodied in then national security
advisor Anthony Lake's September 1993 address, which postulated that
the "successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of...
enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies."
But this neo-Wilsonian vision has had a negligible impact on day-to-
day affairs. Enlarging the community of democracies might look good
on paper, but it has provided few policy-relevant guidelines for pressing
foreign policy problems such as those presented by Bosnia, Iraq, North
Korea, Rwanda, or Somalia. In the real world, the active promotion of
democracy must normally take a back seat to other principal interests-
most notably, stemming the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons, safeguarding
Western access to oil, defusing
Time is running
regional crises, and containing poten- Clinton. In the af
tial aggressors.
of the 1998 m
Such a discrepancy between theory
and practice is worrisome: A great elections, the pr
power cannot just possess great will truly begin
strength. Many vital policy questions,
into a lame duck.
including the sizing and shaping of
armed forces, aid programs, and intel-
ligence, as well as the training of diplomats, do not lend themselves to ad
hoc approaches. Also, Congress and the public must be educated in the
basic tenets of policy if they are to support international undertakings and
not bolt at the first sign of difficulty or unexpected cost. Predictability is
essential if allies are going to continue to count on the United States and
if foes are to think twice before challenging U.S. interests.
Time is running out for Clinton. In the aftermath of the 1998 mid-
term elections, the president will truly begin to turn into a lame duck. He
will be entering the last quarter of his presidency while the country will
be entering the season of choosing his successor. The foreign policy
debate will degrade even further into partisan posturing and sound bites.
Moreover, in the final months and years of his tenure, Clinton may
have his hands full just reacting to events; for example, the situation in
Bosnia will surely turn difficult again come summer 1998, the arbitrary
deadline for the departure of the current multilateral force. Likewise, a
violent breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is an all-too-

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Clinton's Foreign Policy

real possibility, and a potential crisis on the Korean peninsula also cannot
be discounted. If the president is to leave a lasting and creative imprint
on foreign affairs, he must focus-and act-now.

A CRUMBLING BASE

If and when Clinton does act, he is likely to find others in his way
absence of a consistent and coherent foreign policy agenda ine
creates a vacuum that other political forces are more than willing
Chief among those political forces is Congress. From the mome
Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994, they put the
House and the entire country on notice that they intended to
activist role in domestic and foreign affairs. The Contract with Am
called for a larger NATO and raised doubts about U.S. support
United Nations. Republican members of Congress have made cle
intention to rake the White House over the coals when it comes to
sive or embarrassing foreign policy issues. Hence, Congress and th
House have engaged in a series of long, bitter debates and hear
issues such as the sale of Iranian arms to Bosnia, the Mexican bailo
most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status for China.
The Republican majority notwithstanding, internal stru
changes within Congress have also made it a more difficult p
Now, authority is less concentrated in the hands of a few infl
members or committees; instead, foreign policy decisions ha
delegated among 535 increasingly independent members who
by their large staffs, can introduce or block change to an extraord
degree. One need only focus for a moment on the prevalence of
tive "earmarks" that dictate how foreign aid (what little there is)
spent, or look at the increase in legislated economic sanctions
Cuba, Iran, Libya, and their respective business partners.
Widespread public apathy has further expanded the foreign
vacuum: The last election was virtually devoid of issues related to i
national affairs. A telling moment occurred during one of the pre
tial debates when moderator Jim Lehrer pleaded for someone
audience to ask about foreign policy and was met only with a
on trade. In just the last few years, the amount of time devoted to
national affairs in the major networks' half-hour evening news
casts has plummeted by nearly 50 percent. This decline in
interest has also manifested itself in the federal budget-total s

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 Haass

Bill Clinton Unplugged

What candidate Clinton said about President Bush:

On vision: ". . . my central criticism is this: George Bush has invoked a new
world order without enunciating a new American purpose.... the presi-
dent has failed to articulate clear goals for American foreign policy." (For-
eign Policy Association, New York, April 1, 1992)

On Iraq: "In the Persian Gulf, first the Bush administration made mis-
guided efforts to purchase Saddam Hussein's goodwill through generous
American assistance. Then, after America's smashing victory over Iraq,
he [President Bush] left Saddam Hussein with enough military force to
remain in power and savagely suppress uprisings by Shiites and the
Kurds-who rose up after the president's promptings to do so." (Foreign
Policy Association, New York, April 1, 1992)

On China: "In China, the president continues to coddle aging rulers with
undisguised contempt for democracy, human rights, and the need to con-
trol the spread of dangerous technologies. Such forbearance on our part
might have been justified during the Cold War as a strategic necessity,
when China was a counterweight to Soviet power. But it makes no sense
to play the China card now, when our opponents have thrown in their
hand." (Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 1, 1992)

"We [the Clinton administration] will link China's trading privileges to

its human rights record and its conduct ... of weapon sales." (World
Affairs Council, Los Angeles, August 13, 1992)

On Japan: "Mr. Bush's economic neglect has invited foreign pity-literal-

ly. You remember the Japanese trip, which ended with the Japanese prime
minister saying he felt sympathy for the United States.... He felt sympa-
thy for us because he thought we had refused to address our problems here
at home, we had gone into a period of economic decline, and our best days
might be behind us. It is time for economic leadership that inspires foreign
respect." (World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, August 13, 1992)

On Bosnia: "When I argued that the United States, in cooperation with

international community efforts, should be prepared to use military force
to help the U.N. relief effort in Bosnia, Mr. Bush's spokesman quickly
denounced me as reckless. Yet, a few days later the administration adopt-
ed the very same position. While the administration goes back and
forth, more lives are being lost and the situation grows more desperate by
the day." (Institute of World Affairs, Milwaukee, October 1, 1992)

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Clinton's Foreign Policy

on defense, intelligence, diplomacy, and foreign assistance has

decreased by more than one-fourth in real terms over the past decade.
When the White House fails to articulate its foreign policy objec-
tives-and public apathy is high-it leaves the door wide open for special
interest groups and lobbyists to shape the agenda. Organizations as diverse
as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Family
Research Council, and the Cuban American National Foundation have
demonstrated tremendous media savvy and in many cases have added to
that clout by funneling significant funds to sympathetic politicians.
While these domestic constraints upon the formulation of foreign
policy might seem daunting, they are, in fact, surmountable. After all,
following the Republican sweep in 1994 the president orchestrated an
unexpected comeback by forming temporary coalitions with centrist
Democrats and Republicans. Such tactics secured majority support for
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
administration can, and should, use these tactics again for other foreign
policy initiatives. But success will not come cheaply. The president will
have to invest heavily in foreign policy and not waver in the face of
public or congressional pressure. Without a guarantee of steadfast sup-
port from the White House, centrist Democrats and Republicans have
little motivation to break ranks with the ideological extremes of their
respective parties.
Indeed, when it comes to confronting public opinion, the Clinton
administration has a decidedly mixed record. The White House bailed
out Mexico's economy successfully, despite shouts of protest from Pat
Buchanan and Ross Perot, and it negotiated an Agreed Framework
regarding North Korea's nuclear program, despite accusations of
"appeasement" from Congress and widespread skepticism in the nation-
al press. The administration also persevered in promoting Russia's fledg-
ling democracy and in brokering a tentative peace in Bosnia.
But Clinton has fared worse in other areas. Political pressure compelled
the administration to support draconian sanctions against Haiti. When
those same sanctions caused a mass emigration of Haitians, political pres-
sure then compelled the White House to invade Haiti and "fix" the situ-
ation. Japan-bashing, always popular in the United States, once again
reared its ugly head when the administration allowed narrow trade con-
siderations to upset the strong bilateral political-military ties that serve as

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 Haass

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Looking for his place in history?

a hedge against instability on the Korean pen

and Japan's own politics. The administration
straight until 1996, when it decided to refer tra
concluded a "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration o
lished the primacy of that vital partnership.
When implementing foreign policy, the admi
unpleasant reality that the domestic consensus
of the Cold War is largely gone. Even the bit
over Vietnam and Central America assumed
desirability of American leadership and the
posed by the Soviet Union and communism.
exists today on either the nature of the post-C
the United States should do to shape it.
Building consensus is all the more complicated
ing trend toward global integration. The expans
ties and the free movement of capital h
framework of economic codependencies that
national security objectives. Investors from J
the United States have holdings in industrie

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 Clinton's Foreign Policy

the Chinese military. And, despite evidence implicating Iran in acts of

terrorism on European soil, the European Union has repeatedly refused
to impose even limited punitive sanctions against Tehran.
Indeed, global interdependence has moved to center stage a diverse
assortment of issues that once were relegated to the periphery of foreign
policy agendas. International trade, the spread of communicable dis-
eases, drug trafficking, and the environment now share the spotlight
with more traditional U.S. concerns such as arms control and the con-
tainment of potential aggressors. Structural changes within the admin-
istration must reflect this changing reality in international affairs. For
starters, the White House should think twice before choosing to farm
out key decisions to agencies such as the Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative which, in the pursuit
of narrow objectives, often loses
In his second term, the first sight of broader foreign policy
post-Cold Warpresident has goals. The National Security
Council should be revamped-
focused most of his foreign and the National Economic
policy efforts on NATo, a childCouncil pruned of its overseas
role-so that economic and envi-
of the Cold War. ronmental interests receive
stronger but less separate consider-
ation. Within the State Department, a reduction of fiefdoms and sing
issue advocates would force senior officials to determine priorities ra
than react to crises that have been created, in part, by a lack of
grated policy. With regard to the foreign policy establishment
President Al Gore's much-hyped proposals for "reinventing gov
ment" seemed to flounder: The White House only began taking
crete steps in the right direction this past summer when, in respons
congressional pressure, the administration agreed to eliminate the Ar
Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agen
separate agencies and to consolidate parts of the U.S. Agency for I
national Development.
In other cases, the administration has hurt its own cause by ac
ing foreign policy only episodic attention. Consider, for instance
crisis that erupted last September when Saddam Hussein moved
forces into northern Iraq against the Kurds. When the White H
authorized cruise-missile strikes against Iraq, the reaction from the G
War coalition nations was tepid at best, and highly critical at w

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 Haass

Unilateral American retaliation and a lack of consultation went down

poorly with a coalition that was formed with the explicit purpose of
forcing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and containing future Iraqi
aggression. The price of neglect proved high-the public bickering that
followed the cruise-missile strikes created the impression that the Gulf
War coalition had become weak and divided. Subsequent revelations of
what was, at best, a feckless American initiative on behalf of Iraqi oppo-
sition groups only reinforced the impression of an eroding U.S. policy
toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

RETHINKING PRIORITIES

It speaks volumes about this administration that, in his second te

first post-Cold War president has focused most of his foreign polic
on NATO, a child of the Cold War. In fact, a recently publish
House report, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, lis
ing a "peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe" as the United Stat
priority for advancing core national security objectives. And wit
rubric, NATO enlargement is singled out as the principal underta
While a larger alliance will contribute to reassuring and stabiliz
eral of the new democratic countries of Central Europe, it will al
problems-in particular, for the security of those countries exclud
NATO, for alliance decision-making, for Western defense budget
the implementation of nuclear arms reductions with Russia.
But wherever one comes out on the issue-my own view
enlarging NATO was an unnecessary initiative but one that
nonetheless be seen through at this point given all that has b
and done-it is important not to exaggerate the historical im
NATO expansion. NATO's enlargement is not the modem-day e
of NATO's creation. Even an enlarged NATO will be more a politic
a military grouping, its security role increasingly that of a holdi
pany that provides some support for those members willing to ac
ticular situations. Alliances depend on clear foes and obvious
for their cohesion; the absence of such clarity and predictabi
hallmark of post-Cold War politics.
Furthermore, shepherding NATO enlargement through a critic
ate will take up enormous time and energy-all of this on beh
initiative that is mostly just a strategic distraction. Europe
Atlantic, which dominated world attention in the twentieth

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 Clinton's Foreign Policy

will cease to be the focal point of foreign affairs in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Instead, the Asia-Pacific region will dictate events in the
post-Cold War world. More major powers will confront one another in
the Far East than anywhere else. The region's states will be tempted to
translate their enormous and growing wealth into political and military
power, given the existence of numerous disputes, the absence of effec-
tive regional institutions, and the continuing allure of nationalism.
With that in mind, China should be the administration's top priority
in its second term. Whether one chooses to view the Chinese as military
adventurists or as venture cap-
italists, there is little doubt that
Europe and the Atlantic will the People's Republic is a sig-
cease to be the focal point of nificant emerging power. The
Soviet-American relationship
foreign affairs in the twenty- defined the previous half cen-
first century. Instead, the tury; Sino-American ties are
likely to define the next. So far,
Asia-Pacific region will however, the White House has
dictate events in the handled relations with China
rather poorly. Clinton's exces-
post-Cold War world.
sive campaign rhetoric on Chi-
nese dissidents continues to
haunt him--even now, an emerging alliance of Left and Right threatens
to overwhelm the administration and redefine U.S. foreign policy priori-
ties around human rights, trade, or both. While the White House over-
came such opposition during the MFN debate over China, this
strange-bedfellows coalition will probably bedevil the administration's
attempts to expand America's policy of economic and diplomatic engage-
ment with Beijing. Bowing to such domestic pressure would be a strategic
error and a historic blunder. Liberalism in China is most likely to be the
product of economic growth; sanctions would only retard the emergence
of America's goals.
Moreover, the United States has multiple interests at stake, including
deterring any use of force against Taiwan, discouraging Chinese provision
of nuclear technology to Iran, eliciting diplomatic cooperation vis-a-vis
North Korea and within the U.N. Security Council, fostering democracy
and market reform on the mainland and in Hong Kong, and encouraging
China to adopt a sound environmental policy. For the administration to
narrowly focus on human rights is an unjustifiable luxury. One day, the

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 Haass

United States might find itself in the position of having to contain an

expansionist, hostile China-if that happens, so be it. But containing
China would be expensive, dangerous, and vastly inferior to a more coop-
erative U.S.-China relationship. Only patient, determined diplomacy
has the potential to preclude such a scenario.
A second area that the White House should focus on is opening
trade-nothing would do more to promote prosperity within countries
or peace among them. Here, Clinton can build upon the impressive
foundation he laid during his first term with the emergence of NAFTA
and the WTO. Building a legacy around trade could involve enlarging
NAFTA even beyond Chile, accelerating the introduction of reforms in
the Asia-Pacific region, proposing a free trade area with Europe, and
reforming the WTO to increase its scope and effectiveness. Such a set
of undertakings would make good economic sense: Not only is expand-
ing trade one key to U.S. economic performance, but also it should
help consolidate bilateral relationships and minimize frictions that
would otherwise jeopardize cooperation on other important issues.
None of this will happen, however, without both a concerted push for
"fast-track" authority-the key to negotiating accords free of ruinous
congressional amendments-and a detailed road map for what follows.
The White House needs to move with determination and speed to take
advantage of the current positive economic scene; if and when the eco-
nomic picture deteriorates, trade pacts are likely to become targets of
frustration rather than opportunity.
A third focus for the White House should be the Middle East. It is
a focus born less of choice than necessity. Up until recently, Clinton
has garnered considerable credit for the Middle East even though he
has done little more than host events. When peace talks between the
Israelis and Palestinians broke down, the White House dragged its feet
for five months before starting to use its voice. The United States
should work harder to encourage the Israelis to be more generous in
terms of the amount of land they return under Oslo, more forthcom-
ing in economic policies affecting Palestinians, and more restrained in
settlement-building. Similarly, the White House should continue to
push the Palestinians to rewrite their covenant and rein in violence
and terror. Failure by either party to meet any of these standards ought
to provoke clear and consistent criticism from the Oval Office. There
are times when allowing local protagonists to stew in their own juices
makes sense; this is not one of them. Moreover, shifting the focus of

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Clinton's Foreign Policy

the negotiations to the most difficult final status issues is unlikely to

prove successful. Israeli-Palestinian relations are fraying badly and sig-
nificant violence could well return to the region, in the process not
only polarizing local politics but also making it much more difficult for
the United States to cooperate with local states against Iran and Iraq.
Whether Clinton chooses to tackle an agenda that aims seriously
at more than NATO enlargement is anybody's guess. It would certain-
ly constitute a break with past behavior, signaling that at least in this
one area the president was leading, not listening to his pollsters. And
it would mean that the president was willing to adopt some contro-
versial stands that would weaken short-term support for his adminis-
tration and create problems for a White House bid in the year 2000
by Gore. Reaching out to China would be questioned by those cyn-
ics who claimed that Clinton was simply paying back those individ-
uals who may have funneled money to his campaign. Organized labor
would resist a new free trade effort, and many of Israel's traditional
supporters would criticize any policy that pressured the Netanyahu
government. Moreover, political advisers would oppose the president
devoting so much time to foreign affairs.
They would have a point, for undertaking one or more of these ini-
tiatives would require a considerable investment of time and energy.
Clinton would have to take to the bully pulpit with a fervor he has
shown only when discussing race relations, health care, and jobs. He
would have to explain to the country exactly why foreign policy still
matters. And he would have to work hard to persuade Congress to
fund adequate military, intelligence, diplomatic, and foreign assis-
tance capabilities. What would be required-what is required-is
tantamount to a national dialogue on foreign policy and, more specif-
ically, the United States' relationship with the rest of the world.
Would it be worth the effort? The short answer is "yes." Any one
of these areas-relations with China, open trade, a stabilized Middle
East-has more potential to shape the next century than does NATO
enlargement. Also, the price of avoiding such issues might be costly
to the president's legacy, something with which he is said to be
increasingly preoccupied. During the last campaign, Bill Clinton
made much of his wish to be a bridge to the next century. Without
both increasing and shifting the attention he devotes to foreign pol-
icy, the risk is that he may turn out to be just that and nothing more.

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 Haass

WANT To KNOW MORE?

Critiquing Bill Clinton's foreign policy has emerged as a cotta

few noteworthy examples include E.J. Dionne's "Running
Policy" (Washington Post, October 12, 1993), Linda B. Miller'
ton Years: Reinventing U.S. Foreign Policy" (International Af
ber 1994), Michael Mandelbaum's "Foreign Policy as
(Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996), and Joshua Muravc
a Small Stick" (National Review, September 2, 1996). Also,
was graded in the pages of this magazine (Issue 101, Winter
William Hyland ("gentleman's C") and Richard Ullman ("B
For a reprint of the most important foreign policy speech
administration's first term, see former national security ad
Lake's "From Containment to Enlargement" (U.S. Department
patch, vol. 4, no. 39, September 27, 1993). Two recent statem
all administration thinking are A National Security Strat
Century (Washington D.C.: The White House, May 1997)
Security Advisor Samuel Berger's March 27, 1997, address "A
icy Agenda for the Second Term." Researchers seeking more
may access this speech and other online resources, includ
House and National Security Council home pages, via FORE
Web site at www.foreignpolicy.com.

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