SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN VILLAGE INDIA

WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE

PANCHAYATI RAJ

by

DOUGLAS S. MOSER

B.A., Western Washington State College, 1963

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts

i n the Department

of

Anthropology and Sociology

We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the

required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

In p r e s e n t i n g this thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for

an advanced d e g r e e a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that

the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and Study.

I f u r t h e r agree that p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying of t h i s thesis

f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department or

by his representatives. I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g or publication

of t h i s thes.is f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my

written permission.

Department o f (XM^TN€^(^g \ yUi'U-^j

The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia
V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada

X
Date |(Xvtit4^i % . (
 ii

ABSTRACT

The v i l l a g e has been t h e s i g n i f i c a n t s o c i a l u n i t on t h e

I n d i a n subcontinent f o r thousands of y e a r s . To m a i n t a i n i t s

i n t e g r i t y i t has d e v e l o p e d a s e t o f i n t e r l o c k i n g structures,

some o f w h i c h a r e u n i q u e t o t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t , w h i c h a r e v e r y

r e s i s t a n t t o change. The I n d i a n n a t i o n a l government passed

l e g i s l a t i o n w h i c h p r o v i d e d f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f new structures

of p o l i t i c a l a l l o c a t i o n without p r o v i d i n g the basis o f sup-

port f o r changing the other r e l a t e d s t r u c t u r e s existing within

the v i l l a g e . T h i s t h e s i s a t t e m p t s t o show why t h i s p a r t i c u l a r

change, a d v o c a t e d by t h e s t a t e and n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s , failed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Introduction 1

P u r p o s e o f t h e Study 1

D i s c u s s i o n o f Reasons f o r t h e Use o f a
Typical Village 1
V i l l a g e as t h e B a s i c U n i t R a t h e r t h a n
Caste o r Household 3

Description of the T y p i c a l V i l l a g e 5

1. P o s i t i o n w i t h i n the Larger Setting 5

2. Description 13

II. Structures of Role D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n the

Village 20

Role D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n the Household 21

D e f i n i t i o n o f Household 22

Age as t h e B a s i s o f R o l e D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 24

G e n e r a t i o n as t h e B a s i s o f R o l e D i f f e r e n t i -
ation 29

Sex as t h e B a s i s o f R o l e D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 31

H o u s e h o l d S t a t u s as a Means o f R o l e
D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n the V i l l a g e 35
III. Structure of S o l i d a r i t y 46

S o l i d a r i t y S t r u c t u r e s w i t h i n the Household 48

1. • The F a t h e r - S o n R e l a t i o n s h i p 48

2. The B r o t h e r - B r o t h e r Relationship 52

S o l i d a r i t y Structures w i t h i n the V i l l a g e 55

S o l i d a r i t y Structures i n t h e C a s t e System 56

1. S o l i d a r i t y S t r u c t u r e s as t h e y order
Intracaste Relationships 56
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CHAPTER PAGE

2. S o l i d a r i t y Structures i n Intercaste
Relationships 58
S o l i d a r i t y Structures w i t h i n the Jajmani
System 59

IV. The S t r u c t u r e o f Economic A l l o c a t i o n 63

D e f i n i t i o n o f Economic A l l o c a t i o n 63

The S u b s t r u c t u r e o f Economic P r o d u c t i o n 63

The J a j m a n i System 64

The J a j m a n i System as i t O p e r a t e s i n
Rampur 65

The S u b s t r u c t u r e o f Economic C o n s u m p t i o n 78

V. P o l i t i c a l A c t i v i t y w i t h i n the V i l l a g e 84

Size of Caste 87
P e r s o n a l i t y and Number o f P r o m i n e n t

I n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n t h e Dominant C a s t e 88

Length of Residence i n the V i l l a g e 89

Type o f I s s u e 92

P a c t i o n s w i t h i n Nonland-owning Castes 93

S a n s k r i t i z a t i o n as a Long Term Political

Activity 95

S o u r c e s o f Power W i t h i n t h e V i l l a g e 97

VI. Panchayati Raj 103

BIBLIOGRAPHY 122

APPENDIX 128
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author of t h i s t h e s i s would l i k e t o express h i s

a p p r e c i a t i o n t o h i s a d v i s o r , Mr. J e a n L o u i s de L a n n o y ,

and t o M i s s H e l g a J a c o b s o n , b o t h o f whom p r o v i d e d v a l u a b l e

criticism.
 CHAPTER I

Introduction

PURPOSE OF THE PAPER

I propose to a n a l y z e the p a t t e r n s of s o c i a l interaction

in a t y p i c a l northcentral Indian v i l l a g e with particular

emphasis on the n a t u r e and direction o f s o c i a l change result-

ing f r o m the i n t r o d u c t i o n of f o r m a l p a n c h a y a t s . I shall be

examining i n p a r t i c u l a r the following analytic structures;

role differentiation, s o l i d a r i t y , economic a l l o c a t i o n , and

political allocation. Much o f what I s h a l l d i s c u s s w i l l be

couched i n a s e r i e s of h y p o t h e s e s w h i c h h o p e f u l l y can and

w i l l be t e s t e d i n the field a t some l a t e r date.

DISCUSSION OF REASONS FOR THE USE OF A TYPICAL VILLAGE

The r e a s o n s I have c h o s e n t o d i s c u s s s o c i a l Interaction

i n a t y p i c a l v i l l a g e r a t h e r than a p a r t i c u l a r village are

several. F i r s t , much of the d a t a I s h a l l use I s the result

of secondary analysis.

Second, many o f the data gathering agencies define the

v i l l a g e i n such f a s h i o n t h a t i t i s not really a social unit.

Thus, the n a t i o n a l agency whose j o b i t i s to collect taxes

may lump s e v e r a l v i l l a g e s t o g e t h e r w h i c h do not act as a social

unit i n o r d e r t h a t the collection of t a x e s might be expedited.

And the N a t i o n a l E x t e n s i o n S e r v i c e , c u t s and lumps the villages

i n an e n t i r e l y different way t h a n the tax collection agency.

1
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t s o f t h e s e two government a g e n c i e s need

not c o i n c i d e . A g a i n , t h e Census B u r e a u has still another

d e f i n i t i o n o f what t h e y mean by t h e village.

T h i r d , the v i l l a g e r s t h e m s e l v e s as t h e a c t o r s d e f i n e t h e

v i l l a g e i n q u i t e d i f f e r i n g ways. F o r e x a m p l e , Andre B e t e i l e ,

in a r e c e n t p u b l i c a t i o n , p o i n t s out t h a t when B r a h m i n s a r e asked

to enumerate t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f t h e v i l l a g e t h e y number o n l y

themselves, e x c l u d i n g a l l t h o s e who belong to other castes

r e s i d e n t i n the v i l l a g e . The Brahmins h a d n ' t t h o u g h t to

i n c l u d e t h e o t h e r c a s t e s u n t i l t h e f a c t o f e x c l u s i o n was pointed

out and even t h e n t h e y were h e s i t a n t b e c a u s e t h e o t h e r s owned no

p r o p e r t y i n t h e v i l l a g e o t h e r t h a n p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y and very

little of t h a t . To t h e o u t s i d e r i t m i g h t seem t h a t t h e

Brahmins t h o u g h t o f t h e o t h e r r e s i d e n t s as coming w i t h t h e
1

land. T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n was made i n s o u t h e r n I n d i a and may

o r may not o c c u r i n o t h e r p a r t s o f I n d i a . (That other

r e s e a r c h e r s have n o t m e n t i o n e d t h i s does n o t mean t h a t t h i s

s o r t o f s i t u a t i o n does not e x i s t ; i t may merely mean t h a t t h e

question.has n e v e r been asked i n t h a t manner.)

F o u r t h and f i n a l l y , t h e r e I s t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e p a t t e r n o f

settlement. Some v i l l a g e s a r e compact, c e n t r a l l y l o c a t e d b l o c k s

of houses. Some a r e o f t h e d i s p e r s e d h a m l e t t y p e and still

o t h e r s are o f t h e d i s p e r s e d h o u s e h o l d type. Some o f t h e vil-

l a g e s w h i c h I s h a l l r e f e r t o a r e i n f a c t d i s p e r s e d h a m l e t s even

though t h e y i n t e r a c t i n much t h e same way as t h e v i l l a g e s w h i c h

are o f the compact s e t t l e m e n t t y p e . 2
 3

WHY USE THE VILLAGE AS THE BASIC UNIT RATHER THAN CASTE
OR HOUSEHOLD
A p e r t i n e n t q u e s t i o n at t h i s p o i n t i s : Why choose t h e

v i l l a g e as t h e s o c i a l u n i t r a t h e r t h a n c a s t e o r h o u s e h o l d ?

I n my e s t i m a t i o n the v i l l a g e I s the c l o s e s t t h i n g t o b e i n g a

s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t s o c i a l u n i t t h a t can be found i n I n d i a . Neither

t h e h o u s e h o l d n o r t h e c a s t e can be c o n s i d e r e d as self-sufficient

u n i t s i n terms o f e i t h e r economic a l l o c a t i o n o f goods and ser-

v i c e s or p o l i t i c a l a l l o c a t i o n o f power and authority. There

a r e a c o n s i d e r a b l e number o f o u t s i d e f o r c e s w h i c h Impinge upon

the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g powers o f e i t h e r o f t h e s e two units. To

use e i t h e r u n i t as t h e b a s i s f o r a n a l y s i s w o u l d e x c l u d e much

significant interaction. The h o u s e h o l d and t h e c a s t e do, of

c o u r s e , make d e c i s i o n s t h a t a f f e c t t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e members,

but a l a r g e number o f d e c i s i o n s can be and a r e made f o r t h e

members o f the c a s t e o r h o u s e h o l d I n w h i c h t h e s e members have

no p a r t i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process. The r e a s o n s I have

a p p l i e d f o r not u s i n g e i t h e r c a s t e o r h o u s e h o l d may be l e v e l e d

by some a g a i n s t my choice of the v i l l a g e f o r the v i l l a g e i s

"not c o m p l e t e l y self-sufficient either. The i n t e r a c t i o n which

o c c u r s between v i l l a g e s cannot be i g n o r e d and I s h a l l have

o c c a s i o n t o d i s c u s s t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n , b u t , on t h e w h o l e , t h e

significant interaction (e.g., p o l i t i c a l and economic activity)

does o c c u r w i t h i n the v i l l a g e p r o p e r ( s i g n i f i c a n t i n terms o f

t h e amount o f i n t e r a c t i o n and t h e t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n ) . Per-

haps t h e s i n g l e most i m p o r t a n t p a t t e r n o f behaviour w h i c h i s

 4

not v i l l a g e o r i e n t e d i s t h a t w h i c h i s b a s e d on the marriage

o f v i l l a g e males t o e x t r a - v i l l a g e f e m a l e s . I n most villages

there i s a l s o some t r a d i n g f o r s p e c i a l i z e d p r o d u c t s and some

sharing o f the t a l e n t s o f s p e c i a l i z e d labourers.

Defining as the s o c i a l u n i t a n y t h i n g l a r g e r than the vil-

l a g e w o u l d be m i s l e a d i n g . Only on s p e c i a l o c c a s i o n s do

residents o f two adjacent v i l l a g e s cooperate—normally one

would expect h o s t i l i t y r a t h e r than c o o p e r a t i o n . Caste-mates

from a d j a c e n t v i l l a g e s o c c a s i o n a l l y work t o g e t h e r i n c e r e m o n i e s

r e l a t e d t o b i r t h , m a r r i a g e , and d e a t h t o make a b i g g e r show

f o r the r e s t o f t h e i r own v i l l a g e and Improve t h e i r prestige.

Within the v i l l a g e i t i s p o s s i b l e t o see antagonistic groups,

but t h i s antagonism i s m i t i g a t e d by t h e need t o c o o p e r a t e i n

m a t t e r s economic o r p o l i t i c a l . Above t h e v i l l a g e l e v e l s u c h

i s not the case. V i l l a g e s do not need t o c o o p e r a t e t o ensure

economic s u r v i v a l . The production u n i t i s s m a l l enough t o

be easily contained w i t h i n the v i l l a g e . P o l i t i c a l groups or

f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the v i l l a g e are often quite antagonistic,

but, again, t h i s i s m i t i g a t e d by the existence of o t h e r kinds

o f t i e s s u c h as c a s t e bonds w h i c h do not operate effectively

above t h e v i l l a g e level.

I t must be constantly k e p t i n mind t h a t t h r o u g h o u t the

paper, unless o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d , I am talking about a typical

village. There i s a g r e a t d e a l of v a r i a t i o n i n v i l l a g e social

s t r u c t u r e w i t h i n any one region and obviously there i s even

more v a r i a t i o n when I n d i a i s t a k e n as a w h o l e . The typical

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v i l l a g e under a n a l y s i s i n t h i s s t u d y w i l l more c l o s e l y resemble

what i s g e n e r a l l y known about n o r t h c e n t r a l I n d i a t h a n any of

the other r e g i o n s . There w i l l , o f c o u r s e , be some s i m i l a r i t i e s

between r e g i o n s . On some o c c a s i o n s i n t h i s paper I s h a l l infer

or h y p o t h e s i z e behaviour p a t t e r n s f o r the n o r t h c e n t r a l p o r t i o n

o f t h e c o n t i n e n t w h i c h have n o t been o b s e r v e d ( m a i n l y , I am

a s s u m i n g , because no one has l o o k e d f o r them o r t h o u g h t t o look

for them) e x c e p t i n o t h e r r e g i o n s . To do a p r o p e r j o b f o r t h e

whole o f I n d i a one w o u l d have t o e s t a b l i s h t y p i c a l villages

for each o f t h e m a j o r r e g i o n a l v a r i a n t s , w h i c h l i e s beyond

the scope o f t h i s p r o j e c t .

DESCRIPTION OP THE TYPICAL VILLAGE

To put the t y p i c a l v i l l a g e i n p r o p e r p e r s p e c t i v e I t h i n k

it i s necessary t o d e s c r i b e the n a t i o n a l s e t t i n g i n which the

v i l l a g e m i g h t be f o u n d as w e l l as t h e v i l l a g e i t s e l f . So I

b e g i n t h i s s e c t i o n w i t h a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the l a r g e r

s e t t i n g i n which the v i l l a g e f i n d s itself.

1. P o s i t i o n o f t h e V i l l a g e w i t h i n the L a r g e r S e t t i n g

I n d i a i s t h e second most p o p u l o u s n a t i o n on t h e earth.

The p o p u l a t i o n i n 1961 was 436,424,429.^ It i s largely a

p e a s a n t t y p e a g r i c u l t u r a l n a t i o n w i t h o n l y a few large centers

of p o p u l a t i o n . The 1961 S t a t i s t i c a l Abstract l i s t s only 2,609

5
c e n t e r s whose p o p u l a t i o n I s g r e a t e r ^ t h a n 5,000. There are a
 6

few very large centers of population like Calcutta, Bombay,

and New D e l h i , but even these large cities seem t o differ

greatly^ from large cities i n most W e s t e r n n a t i o n s . In 1961

7
roughly 82 per cent of the total population was living in

approximately 558,000 villages of less than 5,000 i n h a b i t a n t s .

(The Census Bureau d e f i n e s the village as having less than 500

inhabitants.) Since this means t h a t the average village size

can only be about 640 there are obviously thousands of villages

w h i c h may have only two or three hundred inhabitants. Most of

these villages contain within their borders little more land

in numbers of acres than they have inhabitants (this varies

from r e g i o n to region). In the northwest of India the villages

tend t o be l a r g e r and the land/man r a t i o s higher because the

soil i s not as productive. In some p a r t s of the northeast and

in the south the village population i s smaller and the village

land holdings are less, both because i t i s more p r o d u c t i v e land

and because there are more p e o p l e . The f u r t h e r south one travels

in I n d i a the more one is likely to see dispersed hamlets or

households. People live on high ground wherever i t exists

because of the annual threat of floods, rather than form fairly

large compact settlements i n the center of the fields as they

do i n the north of India. This high ground i s often around the

tanks ( p o n d s ) and i s the result of the original preparation as

well as the r e p a i r of the tank.

The climate of India varies widely from desert type condi-

tions t o monsoon t y p e weather. Soil type varies with the

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a l t i t u d e , type of parent rock from which the s o i l i s d e r i v e d ,

and t h e amount o f r a i n f a l l . And as t h e s e f a c t o r s v a r y so do

t h e t y p e s o f c r o p s w h i c h may be grown. Southern and eastern

I n d i a are b a s i c a l l y r i c e - g r o w i n g areas. The d r i e r areas i n

the northwest are predominantly wheat and m i l l e t - g r o w i n g a r e a s .

N o r t h c e n t r a l I n d i a a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s grow b o t h t y p e s o f crops

d e p e n d i n g upon t h e amount o f w a t e r a v a i l a b l e . G e n e r a l l y the

w e t t e r p a r t s of the v i l l a g e lands are g i v e n over t o r i c e and

t h e d r i e r p a r t s t o wheat o r m i l l e t . Supplementary crops appro-

p r i a t e t o the g r o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s a r e grown w h e r e v e r p o s s i b l e on

t h e v i l l a g e l a n d s and c a s h c r o p s a r e b e g i n n i n g t o be grown on

increasingly large acreages.

U n t i l r e c e n t l y the s u b c o n t i n e n t has been a b l e t o p r o d u c e

enough t o meet i t s c o n s u m p t i o n needs i n most y e a r s , g i v e n the

s t a t e of t h e t e c h n i c a l a r t s . There have been p e r i o d i c f a m i n e s

9
a l l through India's history but the b u l k of these famines can

be a t t r i b u t e d t o l a c k o f d i s t r i b u t i o n f a c i l i t i e s r a t h e r than

to any absolute l a c k of p r o d u c t i o n . ( V i l l a g e r s I n one locality

c o u l d be s t a r v i n g w h i l e j u s t f i f t y m i l e s away t h e r e m i g h t be a

surplus.) The l o c a l f a m i n e s were n o r m a l l y t h e r e s u l t o f p o o r

rainfall. Oscar L e w i s p o i n t s out t h a t t h e r e i s g r e a t varia-

t i o n not o n l y i n t h e m o n t h l y amount o f r a i n b u t i n t h e y e a r l y

amount as w e l l . 1 0
The s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t l y i s more g r i m . With

t h e tremendous i n c r e a s e i n p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e l a s t few decades

even good crop y e a r s do not p r o v i d e enough f o o d , and when t h e

r a i n s f a i l o r come a t t h e wrong t i m e as t h e y have i n t h e last

few y e a r s i n I n d i a f a m i n e r u n s r a m p a r t . Only t h e s h i p m e n t o f
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l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s o f g r a i n f r o m s u r p l u s n a t i o n s has k e p t India

from s u f f e r i n g t h e death of millions of her inhabitants.

U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e s i t u a t i o n c a n o n l y g e t worse as f u r t h e r

p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e s a r e marked.

I n d i a i s j u s t b e g i n n i n g t o develop industrially. She has

a f a i r l y good s u p p l y o f t h e b a s i c m i n e r a l s needed f o r i n d u s -

trialization, 1 1
and good s o u r c e s o f power i n t h e many rivers

w h i c h come down f r o m t h e H i m a l a y a s and f r o m t h e c e n t r a l h i g h -

12

lands. Development o f t h e s e r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e s , among o t h e r

t h i n g s , c a p i t a l and t r a i n e d manpower ( b o t h s k i l l e d l a b o u r and

t r a i n e d management) b o t h o f w h i c h a r e I n v e r y s h o r t supply.

India's great problem i s her r a p i d l y expanding p o p u l a t i o n

w h i c h e a t s up any economic g a i n s she c a n make. Very l i t t l e of

t h e government's e f f o r t t o r a i s e t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g of the

average I n d i a n through i n c r e a s e d c r o p p r o d u c t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l -

i z a t i o n reaches t h e average peasant. T h i s i s made f a i r l y obvious

I n t h e w r i t i n g s o f v a r i o u s a u t h o r s who have been c o n c e r n e d with

13

the problem. ^ Many v i l l a g e s a r e n o t even aware t h a t t h e

n a t i o n a l government has f o r m u l a t e d F i v e Y e a r P l a n s t o a i d them

to i n c r e a s e crop p r o d u c t i o n .

Politically I n d i a i s a very d i v i d e d n a t i o n . The o r i g i n a l

d i v i s i o n of the subcontinent a t the time o f independence i n

19^7 i n t o I n d i a and P a k i s t a n was c a u s e d p r i m a r i l y by t h e f e a r s

o f t h e M u s l i m m i n o r i t y t h a t t h e y w o u l d be swamped by t h e m a j o r -

i t y who a r e f o l l o w e r s o f t h e H i n d u r e l i g i o n . The s e p a r a t i o n o f

t h e two n a t i o n s on t h e b a s i s o f r e l i g i o n has n o t been e n t i r e l y

 9

s u c c e s s f u l i n t h a t s o m e t h i n g o v e r 35 m i l l i o n s o f M u s l i m s were
14
s t i l l l i v i n g i n I n d i a a t t h e t i m e o f t h e 1951 c e n s u s . Reli-
g i o n i s a p r o b l e m i n I n d i a , b u t t h e b i t t e r n e s s w h i c h was so

e v i d e n t i n 1947 i s somewhat l e s s t o d a y . The l o c a l p e o p l e i n

each c o u n t r y s t i l l p e r i o d i c a l l y p u t p r e s s u r e on t h e m i n o r i t y

t o c l e a r o u t , b u t i t seems t h a t t h e y a r e l i v i n g t o g e t h e r i n

much t h e same f a s h i o n t h a t t h e y d i d p r e v i o u s t o Independence.

P r o b a b l y t h e most d i v i s i v e f o r c e i n e f f e c t t o d a y i n I n d i a

i s t h e f r i c t i o n between t h e v a r i o u s l a n g u a g e g r o u p s . No

s i n g l e l a n g u a g e can come even c l o s e t o e n c o m p a s s i n g a majority

of c i t i z e n s . H i n d i , Urdu and P u n j a b i a r e t h e most commonly

spoken l a n g u a g e s and between them t h e y number j u s t s h o r t o f

150 m i l l i o n s of speakers. The t w e l v e m a j o r l a n g u a g e s men-

t i o n e d i n t h e I n d i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n number r o u g h l y 323 millions

of speakers. There a r e 47 o t h e r l a n g u a g e s whose s p e a k e r s

number o v e r 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . In a d d i t i o n t o these languages t h e r e

15
a r e a f u r t h e r 720 m i n o r l a n g u a g e s . The boundary location

of t h e I n d i a n s t a t e s has been d r a s t i c a l l y e f f e c t e d by language

and t h e r e i s c o n s t a n t a g i t a t i o n f r o m some l a n g u a g e groups t o

f o r m new s t a t e s on t h e b a s i s o f l a n g u a g e .

In the r e c e n t past v e r y s e r i o u s language r i o t s have

occurred. These r i o t s a t t i m e s have r e a c h e d t h e p r o p o r t i o n s

o f communal r i o t s ^ w h i c h t o o k p l a c e between Hindus and M u s l i m s

1

b e f o r e and d u r i n g Independence. The m u l t i p l i c i t y o f l a n g u a g e s

i s a s e r i o u s problem at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , but at the local

v i l l a g e l e v e l t h e v i l l a g e r s do n o t r e a l l y g e t i n v o l v e d unless
 10

t h e y l i v e i n an a r e a w h i c h i s t r a n s i t i o n a l between two lan-

guages or i n a r e g i o n i n w h i c h two l a n g u a g e s are u s e d by groups

w h i c h have commingled. An i n t e r e s t i n g example o f c o m m i n g l i n g

is the Punjab. The m a l e s speak b o t h U r d u and P u n j a b i and the

17

f e m a l e s speak o n l y P u n j a b i . By and l a r g e , however, t h e vil-

l a g e r s a r e unaware o f t h e n a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e p r o b l e m f o r t h e y

have o n l y s p o r a d i c c o n t a c t w i t h t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d and t h a t gen-

e r a l l y w i t h agencies which are s e r v i c e o r i e n t e d .

Politics i n I n d i a have become i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n f u s e d as

t h e number o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s p r o l i f e r a t e s . There was really

o n l y one p a r t y a t t h e t i m e of i n d e p e n d e n c e — t h e C o n g r e s s P a r t y .

A l m o s t i t s s o l e r e a s o n f o r e x i s t e n c e was t o g a i n freedom f o r

I n d i a from the B r i t i s h Empire. S i n c e i t was the o n l y n a t i o n a l

p o l i t i c a l p a r t y and was f a i r l y w e l l organized, the Congress

P a r t y assumed p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o f I n d i a . I t very q u i c k l y

became e v i d e n t t h a t t h e C o n g r e s s P a r t y was l i t t l e more t h a n

a v e r y l o o s e c o a l i t i o n o f i n t e r e s t g r o u p s who had but one

common i n t e r e s t — f r e e d o m f r o m B r i t a i n because o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n

the r a n k s soon d e v e l o p e d c o n c e r n i n g the d i r e c t i o n i n which the

p a r t y was t o move and t h e means f o r a t t a i n i n g g o a l s . The results

of t h e 1951 e l e c t i o n s showed t h a t the C o n g r e s s P a r t y was still

t h e most p o w e r f u l , w i n n i n g 357 seats i n a Parliament of 489-

18
They had, however, o n l y about 45 p e r c e n t o f the p o p u l a r vote.

That t h e y won such a h i g h p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e Parliamentary

s e a t s w i t h such a s m a l l p e r c e n t a g e of t h e p o p u l a r vote may

be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e l a r g e number o f m i n o r p a r t i e s
 11

contesting the e l e c t i o n . Even t h o u g h t h e C o n g r e s s P a r t y was

the most p o w e r f u l p a r t y and formed t h e government t h e y d i d n o t

have t h e k i n d o f s u p p o r t n e c e s s a r y t o p r e s e n t and c a r r y o u t

the s o r t o f f o r c e f u l p r o g r a m needed t o b r i n g I n d i a i n t o t h e

i n d u s t r i a l world. I n more r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s t h e C o n g r e s s Party

has received even l e s s p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . They a r e s t i l l t h e

l a r g e s t o f t h e n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s , b u t t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s has

been g r e a t l y reduced.
There i s a l a r g e number o f s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s and t h e number

seems t o be I n c r e a s i n g . I n t h e 1951 e l e c t i o n s t h e r e were 14

parties entering as n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s , 51 more as s t a t e parties

and i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p a r t i e s t h e r e were a tremendous number

of i n d e p e n d e n t s . ( s o m e o f whom were f o r m e r p r i n c e s o f t h e more

t h a n 500 P r i n c e l y S t a t e s of pre-lndependence I n d i a ) . None

of t h e s e p a r t i e s has a l a r g e n a t i o n a l f o l l o w i n g and few o f them

have enough i n t e r e s t s i n common t o a t t e m p t t o f o r m some k i n d o f

coalition. About t h e o n l y t h i n g t h e y have i n common i s o p p o s i -

t i o n t o t h e Congress R a j . They seem u n a b l e t o p r e s e n t any s o r t

of v i a b l e , r e s p o n s i b l e program b e c a u s e t h e i r i n t e r e s t s a r e

d i r e c t e d t o t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f s p e c i f i c , group o r i e n t e d goals.

The s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s seem t o be o f t h r e e s o r t s ; first,

r e g i o n a l p a r t i e s , the basis f o r membership o f w h i c h i s t h e a r e a

i n w h i c h one l i v e s and t h e l a n g u a g e one s p e a k s ; s e c o n d , c a s t e

p a r t i e s , t h e membership o f w h i c h i s b a s e d on I n c l u s i o n i n a

p a r t i c u l a r caste; and t h i r d , i d e o l o g i c a l l y b a s e d p a r t i e s whose

membership i s r e c r u i t e d on t h e b a s i s of b e l i e f i n a p a r t i c u l a r
 12

ideology. These p a r t i e s g e n e r a l l y have a f a i r l y solid local

b a s i s , but this p o w e r on the l o c a l l e v e l does not give them

any p o w e r on the n a t i o n a l l e v e l except perhaps to block local

Congress moves. I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t o draw a p a r a l l e l between

these p a r t i e s and, f o r example, the Social Credit Party in

British Columbia. The Social Credit Party i s powerful i n

British Columbia but has little influence at the national

level.

A g a i n , at the village l e v e l , the villager i s not really

aware o f the n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the local party plat-

f o r m s i f , i n f a c t , he is truly aware t h a t India i s a nation.

The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s on the n a t i o n a l scene have the knack of

arriving i n the village only during e l e c t i o n times fully

expecting the villagers t o be knowledgeable and ready to

s u p p o r t them o n l y to find t h a t the villagers d o n ' t e v e n know

who they are. The only kind of p l a t f o r m which the local resi-

dents can u n d e r s t a n d i s one which deals with local problems.

I suspect that this i s one of the reasons f o r the proliferation

of state parties. I n o r d e r t o get and maintain local support,

broad n a t i o n a l issues are avoided and, of c o u r s e , each region

has I t s own particular issues.

Many v i l l a g e r s are disillusioned about a l l p o l i t i c a l

20

parties and don't r e a l l y understand the election process.

They have n e v e r b e f o r e i n t h e i r p a s t b e e n a s k e d t o make a

choice b e t w e e n two sets of l e a d e r s . A l o t of the villagers

are of the opinion that the government ought t o h e l p them with

 13

t h e i r p r o b l e m s s i n c e i t i s t h e government t h a t i s t h e a u t h o r

o f schemes i n v o l v i n g s a n i t a t i o n , r o a d b u i l d i n g , s c h o o l s ,

formal panchayats, e t c . , and t h e v i l l a g e r s s e e t h e s e schemes

as c a u s i n g changes w h i c h t h e y cannot cope w i t h a t t h e v i l l a g e

level.

Keeping i n mind t h a t t h e l a s t few pages have d e s c r i b e d

t h e I n d i a n a t i o n a l scene i n o n l y a r u d i m e n t a r y way I s h o u l d

now l i k e t o d e s c r i b e t h e t y p i c a l village.

2. Description

The t y p i c a l v i l l a g e i s s m a l l , n u m b e r i n g somewhere between

500 and 700 i n h a b i t a n t s . Some v i l l a g e s may be s m a l l e r , b u t

t h e y v e r y r a r e l y number b e l o w 200 t o 3 0 0 . Villages larger

t h a n around 1000 s t a r t t o become s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a t y p i c a l

village.

The a r a b l e l a n d c o n t r o l l e d by t h e v i l l a g e r s i s h a r d l y

more i n a c r e s t h a n t h e r e a r e i n h a b i t a n t s . Although I t can

v a r y w i d e l y , t h e man/acre r a t i o i s t y p i c a l l y n e a r one. Rampur

had a man/acre r a t i o o f 1.22 i n 1940 and by t h e t i m e o f L e w i s '

s t u d y i n 1952 t h e r a t i o had changed t o .71. The change r e s u l t e d

f r o m a p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h o f 645 i n 19^0 t o 1095 i n 1 9 5 2 . 2 2

The s e t t l e m e n t p a t t e r n i s o f t h e compact s o r t . The r e s i -

d e n t s l i v e , jammed v e r y c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r , I n a more o r l e s s

c e n t r a l l y l o c a t e d area. I n the densest part of the v i l l a g e

each house may s h a r e t h r e e o f i t s w a l l s w i t h t h r e e neighbours.

Around t h e p e r i m e t e r t h e houses w i l l be more w i d e l y spaced.

 14

Who l i v e s where i n t h e v i l l a g e depends n o r m a l l y upon two t h i n g s .

F e l l o w c a s t e members t e n d t o c l u s t e r i n one a r e a o f t h e v i l l a g e .

This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f b o t h t h e h i g h and l o w c a s t e s and

not so t r u e o f t h e middle castes. The h i g h c a s t e and low c a s t e

groups a r e n o r m a l l y s i t u a t e d as f a r f r o m one a n o t h e r as p o s s i b l e
23
and still remain w i t h i n the confines o f the v i l l a g e . The

second f a c t o r o p e r a t i o n a l i n d e t e r m i n i n g residence patterns

w i t h i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t has t o do w i t h t h e t i m e a t w h i c h t h e

f a m i l y became r e s i d e n t s i n t h e v i l l a g e and t h e space a v a i l a b l e

f o r home b u i l d i n g . The l a t e r a r r i v a l s i n the v i l l a g e o f t e n must

t a k e what i s l e f t o v e r . T h i s means t h a t some m i x i n g o f c a s t e s

does o c c u r — m a i n l y i n t h e m i d d l e - r a n g e c a s t e s , however.

The economy o f t h e v i l l a g e i s b a s e d on t h e l a n d . Only

r e c e n t l y have t h e v i l l a g e r s began g o i n g o u t s i d e t h e v i l l a g e t o

o b t a i n j o b s and t o p u r c h a s e c o n s u m p t i o n goods. Traditionally

the v i l l a g e produced, w i t h a few minor e x c e p t i o n s , everything

t h a t i t consumed. The b a s i c d i e t consisted of the various

c e r e a l g r a i n s w h i c h were a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e c l i m a t e and s o i l

conditions. Most v i l l a g e s have l a n d t h a t i s a b l e t o s u p p o r t

both r i c e (commonly c a l l e d paddy) and wheat o r m i l l e t . The

w e t t e r areas of the v i l l a g e lands are normally double—cropped;

paddy i n t h e wet s e a s o n and d r y l a n d g r a i n i n t h e d r y s e a s o n .

The drier l a n d s a r e s i n g l e — c r o p p e d w i t h wheat, m i l l e t , o r some

other l o c a l e q u i v a l e n t . A few v e g e t a b l e s a r e grown t o be u s e d

i n sauces, and sometimes a few f r u i t t r e e s are p l a n t e d .

C a t t l e are a part of the v i l l a g e s c e n e — a very necessary

part. Animals are v i r t u a l l y the only source o f m o t i v e power i n

 15

the v i l l a g e . The b u l l o c k s , b u f f a l o e s , and cows a r e n o r m a l l y

a l l present. The b u l l o c k s a r e t h e work a n i m a l s , p u l l i n g t h e

p l o w s and c a r t s as w e l l as d r a w i n g t h e w a t e r f r o m t h e v i l l a g e

w e l l s f o r i r r i g a t i o n purposes. B u f f a l o e s and cows a r e u s e d

primarily f o rmilking. The cow i s u s u a l l y l e s s abundant

b e c a u s e i t i s n o t as good a p r o d u c e r as t h e b u f f a l o . The m i l k
24
i s n o t n o r m a l l y d r u n k , b u t r a t h e r i s t h e s o u r c e o f ghee.

There may be a few o t h e r a n i m a l s s u c h as g o a t s , s h e e p , d o n k e y s ,

and even t h e odd mule o r camel p r e s e n t as w e l l . Aside from the

more o b v i o u s uses t h a t t h e s e a n i m a l s a r e p u t t o t h e y a r e u s e d

a d d i t i o n a l l y as a v e r y i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e o f f u e l . One o f t h e

most common s i g h t s i n t h e v i l l a g e i s t h e dung cakes w h i c h a r e

p a t t e d i n t o shape b y v i l l a g e women and d r i e d on t h e w a l l s and

r o o f s o f t h e houses t o be u s e d as f u e l f o r c o o k i n g and sometimes

even f o r h e a t i n g .
Most i n d i v i d u a l s work d i r e c t l y on t h e l a n d as f a r m e r s o r

l a n d l e s s l a b o u r e r s and t h o s e who do n o t c e r t a i n l y depend indi-

r e c t l y upon t h e l a n d . The v a r i o u s a r t i s a n s l i v i n g i n t h e v i l l a g e

trade t h e i r services d i r e c t l y f o r food. Not e v e r y o n e owns l a n d .

U s u a l l y t h e dominant c a s t e owns a l l b u t a few a c r e s , w h i c h they

may o r may n o t d i r e c t l y f a r m t h e m s e l v e s . Whether o r n o t t h e y

do depends upon w h i c h caste they belong t o . F a r m e r c a s t e s do

c u l t i v a t e and Brahmin's u s u a l l y do n o t . (They a r e p r o b a b l y more

apt t o do so i n n o r t h c e n t r a l I n d i a t h a n i n s o u t h e r n I n d i a . ) The

c a s t e w h i c h owns t h e l a n d and c u l t i v a t e s i t ( o r h a s i t c u l t i v a t e d )

I s t h e dominant c a s t e i n t h e v i l l a g e . The dominant c a s t e i n t h e

 16

v i l l a g e i s not always at the top of r i t u a l h i e r a r c h y . Which

c a s t e i s dominant i s u s u a l l y d e t e r m i n e d by e v e n t s i n the long

p a s t h i s t o r y o f t h e v i l l a g e and t h e r e g i o n i n w h i c h i t i s

located.

Although the caste c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e v i l l a g e can vary

w i d e l y , most v i l l a g e s c o n t a i n enough d i f f e r e n t c a s t e s t o e n s u r e

t h a t t h e v i t a l t a s k s be c a r r i e d o u t . To have t o o few castes

g e n e r a l l y means t h a t t h e v i l l a g e w i l l have t o depend upon o u t -

s i d e r s t o come i n and do some o f t h e v i l l a g e work, The greater

the extent t o which t h i s i s necessary the l e s s the village

operates as t h e s i g n i f i c a n t social unit. In the t y p i c a l village

t h e r e i s a s i n g l e dominant a g r i c u l t u r a l c a s t e w h i c h numbers a t

l e a s t h a l f of the v i l l a g e p o p u l a t i o n . Because c a s t e i s s i m i l a r

t o a c l o s e d u n i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o o c c u p a t i o n t h e number o f other

occupations p r a c t i s e d w i t h i n t h e v i l l a g e i n d i c a t e d t h e number

of other castes i n the v i l l a g e . Most o f t h e common occupations

are r e p r e s e n t e d — s o m e by p e r h a p s o n l y one f a m i l y because the

v i l l a g e hasn't the business t o s u p p o r t more t h a n one. The

o u t c a s t e s or u n t o u c h a b l e s a r e o f t e n t h e second l a r g e s t group

i n the v i l l a g e p o p u l a t i o n . The o u t c a s t e s a r e v i e w e d as one

l a r g e group by t h e o t h e r c a s t e s i n t h e v i l l a g e even t h o u g h , I n

r e a l i t y they d i f f e r e n t i a t e between t h e m s e l v e s i n much t h e same

f a s h i o n as do t h e c a s t e s . I t i s mostly the untouchables who

work as l a n d l e s s l a b o u r e r s f o r t h e dominant c u l t i v a t o r caste.

Political i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e v i l l a g e , and f o r t h a t

matter o u t s i d e t h e v i l l a g e , i s c o n t r o l l e d by the dominant

caste. I n some ways one can say t h a t t h e o n l y significant

 17

political i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t occurs i n the v i l l a g e i s w i t h i n the

ranks o f t h e dominant c a s t e . ( T h i s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d more

fully i n C h a p t e r V.) D e p e n d i n g upon t h e m a t t e r under c o n s i d e r a -

t i o n t h e dominant c a s t e does o r does n o t a c t as a u n i f i e d body.

S p l i t s i n caste s o l i d a r i t y g e n e r a l l y occur only i n those matters

where c o n t r o l o f t h e o t h e r c a s t e s i n t h e v i l l a g e i s n o t a q u e s t i o n .

The above d e s c r i p t i o n s o f I n d i a as a whole and t h e typical

I n d i a n v i l l a g e a r e v e r y g e n e r a l and are g i v e n only t o provide

a minimum o f b a c k g r o u n d i n f o r m a t i o n . As t h e d i s c u s s i o n p r o c e e d s

I s h a l l present a fuller p i c t u r e of v i l l a g e l i f e . Theoretically,

i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e changes w h i c h have o c c u r r e d and are o c c u r r i n g

I should d e s c r i b e the 'classical' or 'traditional\ s t a t e of

a f f a i r s i n the v i l l a g e . S i g n i f i c a n t changes were a l r e a d y t a k i n g

p l a c e i n I n d i a by t h e m i d d l e o f t h e 19th century because of the

pervasive B r i t i s h influence. The s t u d i e s done b e f o r e 1900 were

c o n c e r n e d w i t h d e s c r i b i n g f o o d , d r e s s , and u t e n s i l s , r a t h e r than

social relationships. The primary concern of t h i s paper i s

what w i l l happen g i v e n the p r e s e n t interaction pattern.

In the f o l l o w i n g chapters I s h a l l discuss four analytical

structures: r o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , s o l i d a r i t y , economic alloca-

t i o n , and p o l i t i c a l allocation. These f o u r c h a p t e r s should

give a f a i r l y complete view of the present p a t t e r n s of social

i n t e r a c t i o n i n the v i l l a g e . The l a s t c h a p t e r w i l l be devoted

to a d i s c u s s i o n about w h i c h o f t h e s e a n a l y t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s i s

c h a n g i n g and i n w h i c h d i r e c t i o n t h e change I s t a k i n g p l a c e .
 18

FOOTNOTES

"'"Andre B e t e i l e , C a s t e , ' C l a s s a n d Po'w'er ( M a n c h e s t e r , 1965),

p . 9.
R a l p h W. N i c h o l a s , " S t r u c t u r e s o f P o l i t i c s - t h e V i l l a g e s
o f S o u t h e r n A s i a , " S t r u c t u r e ' 'and 'Change - I n d i a n S o c i e t y , e d .
M. S i n g e r a n d B . S . C o h n ( C h i c a g o , 1968).
. . . .

K r a v e , 1953: 119 ( w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o a s i n g l e c a s t e b u t
may a p p l y t o o t h e r s a s w e l l ) ; L e w i s , 1958: l 6 0 - l 6 l ; C o h n , 1954
12; M a y e r , i 9 6 0 : 208, 213.
4
S t a t i s t i c a l Abstract of the Indian Union, C e n t r a l S t a t i s -
t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , D e p t . o f S t a t i s t i c s , Government o f I n d i a
(New D e l h i ) , New S e r i e s , #10.
5
E x a m p l e s o f some d i f f e r e n c e s i n c l u d e : 1) l a c k o f ' s k y
s c r a p e r s ' g e n e r a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l a r g e r c i t i e s i n t h e West;
2) many more h o m e l e s s r e s i d e n t s l i v i n g w i t h i n t h e c i t y t h a n i s
t h e c a s e , s a y , i n t h e U . S.; 3) l e s s w e l l d e v e l o p e d s u b u r b s ;
4) f a s t e r e x p a n s i o n o f p o p u l a t i o n t h a n i n t h e W e s t j 5) r a p i d
t r a n s i t i o n f r o m u r b a n t o r u r a l a p p e a r a n c e ' s ; 6) v e r y p o o r l y
d e v e l o p e d w a t e r , s a n i t a t i o n , and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s e r v i c e s .
^ S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t . . . , op cit

7I b i d ,

Ibid.
9 !
L e w i s , 1958, p . I b b e t s o n , 1883, p . 4; Wood a n d
M a c n a c h i , 1882, p . 19-
10 L e w i s , 1958, p. 8.
11.M i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s :
Known R e s e r v e s
Bauxite 30,000,000 t o n s
Coal 60,960,000,000 t o n s
Copper 3,266,000,000 t o n s
Gold 530,298 t o n s
Gypsum 47,641,000,000 t o n s
Iron ore 21,300,000,000 t o n s
Lead ore
Lignite 130,000,000 t o n s
Limestone S e v e r a l t h o u s a n d m i l l i o n tons.
Manganese O v e r 100 m i l l i o n t o n s
Mica Ample r e s e r v e s
Sulphur 156,000,000 t o n s
 19

Economic H i s t o r y o f I n d i a , ed. U. B. S i n g h (New D e l h i ,

1 9 6 5 ) , PP. 4 0 - 5 B . . .
Known r e s e r v e s
Petroleum At l e a s t 100 m i l l i o n t o n s
N a t u r a l Gas At l e a s t 43 m i l l i o n t o n s
I n d i a 1964, I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e o f I n d i a (London, 1 9 6 4 ) .
12
P o t e n t i a l k i l o w a t t p r o d u c t i o n i s 216,000,000 k i l o w a t t
h o u r s ; a c t u a l p r o d u c t i o n i s 12.5 m i l l i o n . T o i d . , p. 31.
13
A l b e r t M a y e r , P i l o t P r o j e c t ; ' I n d i a , 1959; Kusam N a i r ,
Blossoms i n t h e D u s t (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 2 ) .
14 ^
Demographic Yearbook: 1956, S t a t i s t i c a l O f f i c e o f t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s , D e p t . o f Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s (New Y o r k ,
1 9 5 6 ) , p. 275.
15
S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t o f t h e I n d i a n U n i o n 19&"0, C e n t r a l
S t a t i s t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , Cabinet O r g a n i z a t i o n , Govt, of I n d i a ,
(New D e l h i ) , New S e r i e s #9 •
x
^ T h e s e r i o t s a r e ones i n w h i c h one p r o t a g o n i s t was t h e
H i n d u community and t h e o t h e r t h e M u s l i m community. They were
e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o c o n t r o l b e c a u s e t h e y were so s u d d e n l y
t r i g g e r e d and b e c a u s e s u c h huge numbers o f i n d i v i d u a l s were
involved.
17
P e r s o n a l Communication w i t h a P u n j a b i l a n g u a g e I n s t r u c t o r
at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a i n t h e summer o f 1963.
18
Myron W e i n e r , P a r t i e s i n I n d i a n P o l i t i c s , ( P r i n c e t o n ,
New J e r s e y , 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 20.
19
N i c h o l a s , op_. c i t . , p. 254.
20 , . ,
T
Ibid.
21
The l a r g e r v i l l a g e s t e n d t o become m a r k e t s i t e s w h i c h
means t h a t t h e y w i l l have more c o n t a c t w i t h b o t h t h e o u t s i d e
w o r l d and w i t h the s u r r o u n d i n g v i l l a g e s t h a n w o u l d t h e t y p i c a l
village.
22
L e w i s , p. 10.
23
I n some v i l l a g e s t h e o u t c a s t e p o p u l a t i o n may a c t u a l l y
r e s i d e a few hundred f e e t f r o m t h e main s e t t l e m e n t . This i s
p r o b a b l y more common i n t h e s o u t h o f I n d i a t h a n anywhere e l s e
because t h e r e seems t o be a l a r g e r p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n
who are e i t h e r v e r y h i g h c a s t e o r v e r y low c a s t e .
24
Ghee i s c l a r i f i e d b u t t e r and i s much d e s i r e d f o r c o o k i n g
pv uir rle pl oa sgr ea st i.seems
o n .I n tf oa c tbe one
t h e o famount
the measures
o f ghee aofv a ri ellaabtliev ef o wre ause
l t h I nI n f ot oh ed
 CHAPTER I I

Role D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n Within the V i l l a g e

. . . the analytic structure of role d i f f e r e n t i a -

t i o n i n any s o c i a l s y s t e m may be d e f i n e d as t h e s t r u c -
t u r e s o f d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e members o f t h e s y s t e m among
the v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n
the s y s t e m and hence t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l arrangement o f
the members o f t h e s y s t e m . 1

In order t o a r r i v e a t how a p a r t i c u l a r society goes about

allocating " t h e v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d "

Levy p r o p o s e s n i n e d i f f e r e n t criteria: age, g e n e r a t i o n , s e x ,

economic a l l o c a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l a l l o c a t i o n , r e l i g i o n , cognition,

nonhuman e n v i r o n m e n t , and s o l i d a r i t y . Not a l l o f t h e s e a r e

significant indicators f o ra l l societies. I n some societies,

f o r example, t h e r e may n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be any r o l e differentia-

t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f r e l i g i o n , nonhuman e n v i r o n m e n t o r c o g n i t i o n .

L e v y h i m s e l f uses o n l y t h e f i r s t f i v e i n h i s discussion of the

2
f a m i l y i n " t r a d i t i o n a l " and " t r a n s i t i o n a l " C h i n a .

While a g r e e i n g w i t h Levy t h a t r o l e s must be differentiated,

I would argue t h a t t h e n i n e c r i t e r i a w h i c h L e v y o u t l i n e s as

minimal f o r d i s c o v e r i n g the nature of the s t r u c t u r e of r o l e

d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n a s o c i a l system are inadequate f o r t h e

analysis of the Indian v i l l a g e . I t does n o t seem t h a t their

use s h o u l d a l l o w me t o show how c e r t a i n individuals come t o

fill particular roles within the v i l l a g e . I would h y p o t h e s i z e ,

rather, that roles are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and a l l o c a t e d i n the

I n d i a n v i l l a g e on t h e b a s i s o f b u t two c a t e g o r i e s o f c r i t e r i a ,

one o f w h i c h i n c l u d e s t h r e e o f t h e c r i t e r i a s u g g e s t e d by L e v y .

20
 21

In the f i r s t c a t e g o r y we s h a l l he c o n c e r n e d n o t about i n d i v i d -

u a l s but households. An i n d i v i d u a l assumes a r o l e i n t h e vil-

l a g e on t h e b a s i s o f t h e s t a t u s o f h i s h o u s e h o l d . How one

d e t e r m i n e s t h e s t a t u s o f a p a r t i c u l a r h o u s e h o l d w i l l be dis-

cussed l a t e r i n the c h a p t e r , but s u f f i c e I t t o say t h a t role

a s s u m p t i o n by an i n d i v i d u a l i s o n l y I n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to either

a s c r i b e d or achieved c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The second c a t e g o r y i s

concerned w i t h the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , mainly a s c r i b e d character-

i s t i c s , o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l h i m s e l f s u c h t h a t he does o r does

n o t assume a p a r t i c u l a r r o l e w i t h i n t h e h o u s e h o l d . I shall

consider three c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : age, s e x , and g e n e r a t i o n .

They a r e t h e most u s e f u l f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e of

r o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n the household.

An i n d i v i d u a l ' s r o l e i n v i l l a g e a c t i v i t i e s i s determined

f i r s t by h i s r o l e I n h o u s e h o l d a c t i v i t i e s and s e c o n d (and more

i m p o r t a n t l y ) by t h e p o s i t i o n of h i s household r e l a t i v e t o other

households In the v i l l a g e . The i n d i v i d u a l must become p a r t o f

the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g machinery o f t h e h o u s e h o l d b e f o r e he can

b e g i n t o t h i n k of assuming a p a r t i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g

machinery of the v i l l a g e . Achieved c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s become

i m p o r t a n t o n l y when two i n d i v i d u a l s have t h e same a s c r i b e d

characteristics and t h e i r h o u s e h o l d s t a t u s i s r o u g h l y t h e same.3

ROLE DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD^

Before d i s c u s s i n g r o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n the household

i n terms o f t h e t h r e e c r i t e r i a m e n t i o n e d above ( a g e , g e n e r a t i o n ,

and s e x ) i t I s n e c e s s a r y t h a t some c o n s i d e r a t i o n be d e v o t e d t o a
 22

d e f i n i t i o n of "household." I n the v i l l a g e the adult i s not

r e a l l y c o n s i d e r e d a whole p e r s o n u n t i l he i s m a r r i e d and

rearing children. Those who a r e n o t m a r r i e d and t h o s e who

a r e m a r r i e d b u t w i t h o u t c h i l d r e n a r e o b j e c t s o f p i t y a n d , as

S r i n i v a s p o i n t s o u t , t o be a v o i d e d by some g r o u p s , "Brahmin

beggars who a r e supposed t o be v e r y o r t h o d o x do n o t t a k e alms

5
from t h e c h i l d l e s s . . .' P r i m a r y emphasis i s p l a c e d on m a l e

c h i l d r e n because t h e e l d e s t male c h i l d i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r see-

i n g t h a t h i s f a t h e r and m o t h e r , b u t p r i m a r i l y t h e f a t h e r , become

p r o p e r a n c e s t o r s , and b e c a u s e t h e m a l e p r o g e n y a r e a s o u r c e o f

s u p p o r t i n t h e i r p a r e n t s ' o l d age. Female c h i l d r e n a r e o f l e s s

6

importance f o r the household because they t y p i c a l l y pass out

of the household a t an e a r l y age and i n t o t h e h o u s e h o l d I n

w h i c h t h e husband r e s i d e s — n e a r l y a l w a y s I n another village

and o f t e n a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s t a n c e away. B a r e l y do t h e f e m a l e s

become o l d enough t o be p r o d u c i n g members t h a n t h e y a r e m a r r i e d

i n t o another household. Not o n l y do t h e y l e a v e , b u t t h e y t a k e

a s i z a b l e dowry w i t h them.
DEFINITION OP HOUSEHOLD
The i d e a l household i n northcentral India i s the j o i n t

household i n which three generations l i v e t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r

w i v e s and c h i l d r e n under one r o o f s h a r i n g a s i n g l e h e a r t h .

The j o i n t h o u s e h o l d i s b e g i n n i n g t o l o s e i t s " j o i n t n e s s " when

m u l t i p l e h e a r t h s a r e employed. There seems t o be a d e f i n i t e

p a t h down w h i c h j o i n t h o u s e h o l d s t r a v e l towards splitting:

 23

first, separate h e a r t h s ; second, p a r t i t i o n s w i t h i n the house;

t h i r d , s e p a r a t e h o u s e s ; and f o u r t h , s p l i t t i n g up t h e l a n d among

the h e i r s . F r i e n d s and a s s o c i a t e s work h a r d t o p r e v e n t the

b r e a k up b u t n o r m a l l y s u c c e e d o n l y i n s l o w i n g down t h e process.

Only v e r y r a r e l y are f o u r g e n e r a t i o n s f o u n d l i v i n g t o g e t h e r .

Indeed, a three-generation household i s n o t common and t h e n may

last o n l y f o r a v e r y few y e a r s b e c a u s e o f t h e s h o r t l i f e expec-

tancy. T h i s i s p o i n t e d out by C o l l v e r i n h i s c o m p a r i s o n of the

f a m i l y c y c l e i n I n d i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . The death of one

of t h e p a r e n t s f r e q u e n t l y o c c u r s b e f o r e t h e m a r r i a g e of the

eldest child i n India. Thus t h e j o i n t h o u s e h o l d i s more likely

t o be t w o - g e n e r a t i o n a l c o n s i s t i n g o f a group o f male siblings,

t h e i r wives and c h i l d r e n . Being part of a j o i n t household would

seem t o be t h e i d e a l s t a t e o f c o n d i t i o n r a t h e r t h a n something

w h i c h e x i s t s i n t h e r e a l w o r l d t o any d e g r e e . There are too

many f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d w h i c h tend to m i t i g a t e the possibility

of a c h i e v i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g a j o i n t h o u s e h o l d . J o i n t house-

h o l d s a r e most numerous i n t h e w e a l t h i e r c a s t e s and become l e s s

f r e q u e n t w i t h t h e d e c r e a s i n g s t a t u s and w e a l t h o f t h e c a s t e

group. Only t h o s e h o u s e h o l d s which possess a large resource

b a s e — u n t i l r e c e n t l y ownership of l a n d i n the village—can

a f f o r d to maintain a s i z a b l e household. Even p o s s e s s i o n o f

w e a l t h does not mean t h a t t h e y a r e l i k e l y t o r e m a i n f o r v e r y

l o n g as a j o i n t h o u s e h o l d as we s h a l l see l a t e r . I n Oscar

L e w i s ' Rampur s t u d y o n l y t h i r t e e n out o f 150 households con-

t a i n e d more t h a n t w e l v e members and a l l o f t h e s e households

 24

were e i t h e r J a t i s o r Brahmins who e i t h e r owned a c o n s i d e r a b l e

amount o f l a n d o r had good j o b s o u t s i d e o f t h e v i l l a g e . Among

the l e s s w e l l - o f f c a s t e s o n l y one h o u s e h o l d out o f a t o t a l of

55 had more t h a n n i n e members. Average h o u s e h o l d s i z e varies

f r o m 8.3 f o r t h e J a t i s who are the w e a l t h i e s t caste i n the

v i l l a g e t o 5.0 f o r t h e Chamars ( a l o w c a s t e g r o u p s r i t u a l l y and

one w i t h l i t t l e w e a l t h i n e i t h e r l a n d o r o u t s i d e j o b s ) . ^ On

the b a s i s o f h o u s e h o l d s i z e , i t w o u l d seem t h a t t h e s i n g l e most

common t y p e o f h o u s e h o l d i s t h e stem h o u s e h o l d — t h a t i s , one,

and i n f r e q u e n t l y b o t h , o f t h e aged p a r e n t s o f t h e head o f t h e

h o u s e h o l d and sometimes an u n m a r r i e d s i s t e r o r b r o t h e r . Most

of the d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s i s d i r e c t e d toward the l a r g e

h o u s e h o l d and may i n f a c t be an idealization.

AGE AS THE BASIS OF ROLE DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD

As might be e x p e c t e d a b s o l u t e age has a g r e a t d e a l t o do

with role selection. I d e a l l y t h e e l d e s t male i n t h e h o u s e h o l d

i s t h e f i n a l a u t h o r i t y on a l l m a t t e r s h a v i n g t o do w i t h t h e

maintenance of the household. Obedience I s e x p e c t e d t o be

prompt and c o m p l e t e . The h o u s e h o l d head makes t h e decisions

and sees t h a t t h e y a r e i m p l e m e n t e d . In a c t u a l f a c t the house-

h o l d r e l a t i o n s h i p s are never t h a t e x a c t . There a l w a y s seem

t o be m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The d e c i s i o n s made by t h e

head o f t h e h o u s e h o l d a r e n e v e r made I n a vacuum. A 'good'

h o u s e h o l d head t a k e s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e o t h e r members o f

the household. As I p o i n t e d out above t h e head o f h o u s e h o l d

 25

may have l i v i n g w i t h h i m h i s aged f a t h e r . According t o the

i d e a l t h e aged f a t h e r i s t h e head o f t h e h o u s e h o l d , b u t t h e

r e a l i t y o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t t h e aged f a t h e r exercises

very little authority. He i s o n l y t h e t i t u l a r head o f h o u s e -

h o l d , n o t t h e de f a c t o h e a d . The a u t h o r i t y o f t h e male b e g i n s

t o wane when he no l o n g e r can p r o v i d e the bulk of the f i n a n c i a l

resources necessary t o maintain the household. As w e l l , h i s

i n t e l l e c t u a l c a p a c i t y t o make d e c i s i o n s may be a f f e c t e d should

he be f o r t u n a t e enough t o l i v e t h a t l o n g . U s u a l l y what happens

i s t h a t t h e son simply leaves s o o n a f t e r m a r r i a g e i f he cannot

get a l o n g w i t h h i s f a t h e r . 1 0

I d e a l l y t h e h o u s e h o l d head has c o m p l e t e a u t h o r i t y t o make

any and a l l d e c i s i o n s about h o u s e h o l d m a t t e r s . In r e a l i t y the

male assumes more and more i m p o r t a n c e as he m a r r i e s and has

c h i l d r e n , and t a k e s a f u l l p a r t i n p r o v i d i n g t h e h o u s e h o l d t h e

wherewithal to e x i s t . The n e w l y m a r r i e d s o n does n o t need t o

be consulted about h o u s e h o l d d e c i s i o n s , b u t t h e w i s e father

c o n s u l t s him i n order t o keep t h e s o n s a t i s f i e d a n d , p e r h a p s

more i m p o r t a n t l y , t o provide the son w i t h experience i n d e a l i n g

w i t h ' the v a r i o u s f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d I n making d e c i s i o n s . I f there

i s more t h a n one s o n , t h e o t h e r sons w i l l n o t l i k e l y be as

i n v o l v e d f o r i t i s t h e e l d e s t son who w i l l look a f t e r the

p a r e n t s and c a r r y o u t t h e p r o p e r r i t u a l s w h i c h w i l l a l l o w t h e

p a r e n t s t o become pukah a n c e s t o r s . A l w a y s t h e d e c i s i o n must

be obeyed, b u t h a v i n g had a hand i n t h e p r o c e s s o f a r r i v i n g a t

a d e c i s i o n , t h e son's o b e d i e n c e comes e a s i e r .
 26

On t h e f e m a l e s i d e , age h a s a g r e a t d e a l t o do w i t h posi-

t i o n i n the decision-making machinery. I d e a l l y o f course

f e m a l e s have no p o s i t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y i n t h e p a t r i a r c h i c a l

Indian household. N o n e t h e l e s s f e m a l e s do e x e r t c o n s i d e r a b l e

influence. I n t h e h o u s e h o l d o f o r i g i n t h e y have v i r t u a l l y no

i n f l u e n c e because t h e y pass o u t o f t h a t h o u s e h o l d a t a young

age. However, i n t h e h o u s e h o l d w h i c h t h e y j o i n upon m a r r i a g e

I t i s p o s s i b l e t o come t o a p o s i t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e as t h e y

i n c r e a s e i n age ( t h e m o t h e r - i n - l a w I s a p o w e r f u l f o r c e within

the family).

As a young b r i d e a f e m a l e c l e a r l y has no i n f l u e n c e because

she I s c o m p l e t e l y under t h e thumb o f h e r m o t h e r - i n - l a w . The

p a r e n t s make t h e d e c i s i o n s , n o t h e r h u s b a n d — t h i s i n c l u d e s t h e

d e c i s i o n as t o who w i l l be h e r husband. The b r i d e must satisfy

h e r husband's p a r e n t s , n o t h e r h u s b a n d . She has no a u t h o r i t y

whatsoever. Her r e a s o n f o r e x i s t e n c e i s t o p r o v i d e h e r husband

w i t h c h i l d r e n and u n t i l she h a s them she c a n be t r e a t e d as

though she d o e s n ' t e x i s t . With the a r r i v a l of c h i l d r e n

( p a r t i c u l a r l y a male c h i l d ) h e r t r e a t m e n t a t t h e hands o f h e r

new r e l a t i v e s i m p r o v e s . She c a n make c l a i m s f o r b e t t e r treat-

ment (more f o o d , b e t t e r c l o t h i n g ) , i f n o t f o r h e r s e l f , a t

l e a s t f o r the c h i l d r e n . As t h e m o t h e r - i n - l a w g e t s o l d e r , and

more f e e b l e , t h e w i f e b e g i n s t o 'take up t h e s l a c k . ' The a r e n a

o f a u t h o r i t y f o r women c o n s i s t s i n m a i n t a i n i n g o r d e r w i t h i n t h e

household. The woman h a s t o see t h a t a c t i v i t i e s a r e so a r r a n g e d

t h a t t h e needs o f t h e husband a r e met. She i s r e s p o n s i b l e t o

 27

the husband and any r e a l l y i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n s a r e made i n

his name. By t h i s t i m e t h e husband and w i f e who b e f o r e mar-

r i a g e were s t r a n g e r s have a r r i v e d a t some k i n d o f r e l a t i o n s h i p

11
w h i c h e n a b l e s them t o f u n c t i o n f a i r l y s m o o t h l y as a h o u s e h o l d .

The p e r i o d o f g r e a t e s t i n f l u e n c e comes t o t h e woman when

she a c h i e v e s t h e p o s i t i o n o f m o t h e r - i n - l a w . She now has a

young d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w t o mold so t h a t she w i l l be a f i t w i f e

for her son. She has c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o v e r a l l i n t e r n a l house-

hold matters. She may even have i n f l u e n c e o v e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s

w h i c h have d e v e l o p e d between t h e h o u s e h o l d and o t h e r h o u s e -

holds i n the v i l l a g e . T h i s r o l e w i l l be d i s c u s s e d more fully

when I t a l k about t h e s o l i d a r i t y s t r u c t u r e s i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r .

In the p r e c e d i n g paragraphs I have d i s c u s s e d t h e e f f e c t of

a b s o l u t e age on t h e m a k i n g o f d e c i s i o n s . In c e r t a i n situations

r e l a t i v e age i s I m p o r t a n t — p r i m a r i l y when male s i b l i n g s are

concerned. R e l a t i v e age i s a l w a y s i m p o r t a n t i n s u c h e v e n t s

as h o u s e h o l d c o u n c i l s ( i f such a t h i n g i s h e l d ) , b u t t h e r e

are two o t h e r p e r i o d s when r e l a t i v e age I s p a r t i c u l a r l y crucial.

The f i r s t i s In childhood. D u r i n g c h i l d h o o d o l d e r c h i l d r e n are

o f t e n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r younger siblings—particularly In

p o o r e r h o u s e h o l d s t h a t cannot a f f o r d t o r e t a i n a n u r s e o r do

n o t have g r a n d p a r e n t s about t o do t h e j o b . V a r y i n g amounts

of t h e t r a i n i n g o f younger c h i l d r e n a r e c a r r i e d out by t h e

o l d e r c h i l d r e n i n whose charge t h e y a r e p l a c e d d u r i n g a good

p a r t o f t h e day. The amount depends upon age and sex o f b o t h

the o l d e r c h i l d r e n and t h e younger.

 28

The second o c c a s i o n i n which r e l a t i v e age i s important i s

after t h e d e a t h of t h e f a t h e r when t h e group o f b r o t h e r s con-

t i n u e s t o o p e r a t e as a j o i n t h o u s e h o l d . In t h i s s i t u a t i o n the

eldest brother i s the one t h r o u g h whose mouth d e c i s i o n s emanate.

As t h e e l d e s t he makes d e c i s i o n s f o r t h e g r o u p . That t h e r e must

be o t h e r b a s e s f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f power and authority than

t h a t of r e l a t i v e age i s e v i d e n c e d by t h e s h o r t - l i v e d nature of

j o i n t h o u s e h o l d s composed o f b r o t h e r s . The eldest brother takes

the p l a c e of the f a t h e r w i t h o u t h a v i n g the same i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d

bases f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n as d i d h i s f a t h e r . Often brothers may

f i n d i t p o s s i b l e to operate w i t h the e l d e s t b r o t h e r as t h e house-

h o l d head, but the wives of the b r o t h e r s f o r c e the separation.

The w i v e s o f t e n do not have t h e m u t u a l t i e s of a f f e c t i o n that

e x i s t between b r o t h e r s and f r e q u e n t l y q u a r r e l among t h e m s e l v e s .

T h i s i s not t o say that brothers a l w a y s get a l o n g , b e c a u s e t h e y

do n o t , n o r i s i t t o say t h a t w i v e s c a n n o t g e t a l o n g , because

i n some c a s e s t h e y do. I have no s t a t i s t i c s , but i t would

seem t h a t w i v e s a r e more f r e q u e n t l y t h e cause o f j o i n t h o u s e h o l d

12
disintegration t h a n are b r o t h e r s . Perhaps t h e b a s i c reason

f o r t h e q u a r r e l s between w i v e s i s t h a t t h e s e n i o r w i f e (wife of

the e l d e s t b r o t h e r ) assumes t h e r o l e o f h o u s e h o l d manager w h i c h

was p r e v i o u s l y o c c u p i e d by t h e m o t h e r - i n - l a w w i t h o u t t h e genera-

t i o n a l prerogatives of the mother-in-law. The other wives are

quick to resent t h i s and j u s t as q u i c k l y work on t h e i r respective

husbands t o s e t up s e p a r a t e h o u s e h o l d s so t h a t t h e y can do their

own managing w i t h o u t I n t e r f e r e n c e from other wives. I n some

 29

cases t h e b r o t h e r s m a i n t a i n t h e h o u s e h o l d p r o p e r t y as a s i n g l e

u n i t , b u t s e t up s e p a r a t e living quarters.

Prom t h e above I c a n c o n c l u d e t h a t r o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n on

t h e b a s i s o f r e l a t i v e age must r e i n f o r c e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n on t h e

b a s i s o f a b s o l u t e age. Obviously t h e two a r e c l o s e l y t i e d and

any c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between t h e two b a s e s c a n o n l y l e a d t o

instability o f the system. R e l a t i v e age by I t s e l f i s o n l y a

v e r y weak b a s i s f o r a u t h o r i t y .

ROLE DIFFERENTIATION ON THE BASIS OF GENERATION

R o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f g e n e r a t i o n I s o b v i o u s l y

t i e d i n w i t h age. I n some r e s p e c t s g e n e r a t i o n i s s i m i l a r t o

the c a t e g o r y o f r e l a t i v e age. One c a n n o t p l a c e d e f i n i t e limits

o f age on g e n e r a t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s . Generation here r e f e r s t o

a p e r s o n ' s p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s who l i e e i t h e r

above o r below h i m on t h e b i o l o g i c a l , o r p u t a t i v e l y b i o l o g i c a l ,

descent T i n e . Thus t h e f a t h e r and h i s b r o t h e r s a r e o f a d i f -

f e r e n t g e n e r a t i o n t h a n t h e f a t h e r ' s s o n . The f a t h e r ' s youngest

b r o t h e r may be y o u n g e r t h a n h i s o l d e s t s o n so t h a t one may

o c c a s i o n a l l y see t h e i n c o n g r u o u s situation ( t o u s ) o f an o l d e r

man t r e a t i n g a y o u n g e r man w i t h t h e same r e s p e c t as he w o u l d

h i s own f a t h e r . This i s of course f a r from the normal situation

and i f i t were I t would l e a d t o i n s t a b i l i t y of t h e system because

it i s i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f r o l e s on t h e

b a s i s o f age. Under n o r m a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s there i s a d e f i n i t e

gap between t h e members o f one g e n e r a t i o n and t h e n e x t . The

f i r s t ascending g e n e r a t i o n i s u s u a l l y t h e g e n e r a t i o n w h i c h has
 30

t h e c a p a b i l i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r e a r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g

generation. I t i s p r i m a r i l y t h e husband and w i f e who manage

t h e c a r e and u p b r i n g i n g o f t h e c h i l d r e n . I n most c a s e s this

i s b e c a u s e t h e r e a r e o n l y t h e husband and w i f e as a d u l t s i n

the household.
13
I have no i n f o r m a t i o n concerning the r e l a t i o n s h i p between
a l t e r n a t e g e n e r a t i o n s , b u t one may assume t h a t i t i s d i f f e r e n t
14
than t h a t of t h e p a r e n t - c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . The grandparents

probably do n o t have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h e same manner as t h e

parents. They a r e l e s s d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h t r a i n i n g the

g r a n d c h i l d r e n and hence t h e r e a r e more p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r ties

of a f f e c t i o n t o develop. G r a n d p a r e n t s and g r a n d c h i l d r e n may

see t h e m s e l v e s as a l l i e s . Grandparents are l o s i n g previous

a u t h o r i t y and t h e g r a n d c h i l d r e n have none. Each i s s u b o r d i n a t e

t o t h e g e n e r a t i o n between. I suspect that parents make use o f

grandparents as p a r e n t subrogates o n l y when a b s o l u t e l y necessary

b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o t t h e c l e a r d i c h o t o m y between s u b o r d i n a t e and

s u p e r o r d i n a t e as t h e r e i s i n t h e p a r e n t - c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p .

Although i t i s t h e p a r e n t s who a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r a i s i n g t h e

c h i l d , i t i s the grandparents who a r e t h e s o u r c e o f much o f

the c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y w h i c h e v e r y o n e i s e x p e c t e d t o know b e c a u s e

t h e y a r e t h e group w h i c h has t h e t i m e t o do s o . The f a t h e r and

mother a r e t o o b u s y as p r o d u c e r s to t a l k with the c h i l d r e n . In

any e v e n t , t h i s i s o f t e n n o t a c r u c i a l i s s u e b e c a u s e t h e r e a r e

o n l y a few h o u s e h o l d s w h i c h have I n c l u d e d i n t h e i r members a

grandparent. Most o f t e n , i n p o o r e r h o u s e h o l d s , younger c h i l d r e n

 31

are c a r e d f o r by o l d e r c h i l d r e n o r c h i l d r e n t a g a l o n g w i t h their

parents as t h e y go about t h e i r d a i l y tasks.

I n t h e I n d i a n v i l l a g e g e n e r a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , and

t h e s u b s e q u e n t b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s , a r e e x t e n d e d beyond t h e

immediate k i n s h i p g r o u p . The f a t h e r ' s age mates w i t h i n t h e

l o c a l c a s t e group a r e t r e a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t similar t o that

given the f a t h e r . Generational d i f f e r e n c e s are observed

between c a s t e s as w e l l . The f u r t h e r away b i o l o g i c a l l y t h e

g e n e r a t i o n a l l y o l d e r man I s , t h e l e s s he w i l l be t r e a t e d i n

the same manner as t h e y o u n g e r man w o u l d t r e a t h i s f a t h e r .

ROLE DIFFERENTIATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX

R o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f s e x i s n o t , i n some

i n s t a n c e s , as c l e a r c u t as r o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n on t h e b a s i s

o f age. The p r i m a r y d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s s t r i c t l y biological

i n nature. Women b e a r t h e c h i l d r e n and d u r i n g t h e e a r l y y e a r s

of t h e c h i l d ' s l i f e are v i r t u a l l y the only sex with which the

c h i l d h a s any i n t e r a c t i o n r e g a r d l e s s o f i t s sex. By and l a r g e

it c a n be s a i d t h a t t h e women a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e p r e p a r a -

t i o n o f f o o d and t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f c l o t h i n g . Beyond t h e s e

few t h i n g s t h e r o l e s p l a y e d by a d u l t s I n t h e h o u s e h o l d depend

upon c a s t e membership and t h e l e v e l o f w e a l t h . Many o f t h e j o b s

n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e h o u s e h o l d c a n be done by

e i t h e r men o r women and a r e o f t e n done by b o t h w o r k i n g together.

There a r e v e r y few j o b s w h i c h r e q u i r e s h e e r b r u t e strength.

R o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n I s on t h e b a s i s o f what i s t h o u g h t t o be

appropriate and t h i s v a r i e s from c a s t e t o c a s t e and on t h e

wealth of the household.

 32

The women o f w e a l t h y , h i g h c a s t e h o u s e h o l d s do v e r y little

a c t u a l p h y s i c a l l a b o u r even i n terms o f r a i s i n g t h e i r own

children. Those h o u s e h o l d s c a n a f f o r d t o r e t a i n o t h e r s t o do

t h e housework and t h e w i v e s a r e m e r e l y a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and

managers. Females are concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h the i n t e r n a l

a f f a i r s of the household. The r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h t h e y f o r m

a r e w i t h o t h e r women. Men a r e n o t r e a l l y p a r t o f t h e i r w o r l d .

The o n l y men w i t h whom t h e y i n t e r a c t a r e t h e i r husbands and

sons. The f a t h e r - i n - l a w and t h e e l d e r b r o t h e r s - i n - l a w a r e t o

15

be a v o i d e d . Any r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h e x i s t between h o u s e -

h o l d s a r e m a i n t a i n e d by t h e males o f the household. Females

f r o m one h o u s e h o l d do have o c c a s i o n t o i n t e r a c t w i t h f e m a l e s

o f o t h e r h o u s e h o l d s , b u t t h i s does n o t o c c u r f r e q u e n t l y . One

i n t e r a c t s f r e e l y w i t h e q u a l s o n l y and t h e r e a r e n o t v e r y many

equals i n a s o c i a l system which i s h i g h l y concerned about

r e l a t i v e ranking.

I n t h e s e s o r t s o f w e a l t h y h o u s e h o l d s t h e males a r e i n much

t h e same p o s i t i o n as t h e f e m a l e s . They a r e t h e managers o f

t h e h o u s e h o l d p r o p e r t i e s and o n l y r a r e l y do any p h y s i c a l work.

H i g h c a s t e h o u s e h o l d s w o u l d r a t h e r l e a v e t h e work undone t h a n

do i t t h e m s e l v e s because t h e y w o u l d s u f f e r a l o s s o f p r e s t i g e

were t h e y t o do s o . Generally speaking, i n wealthy households

t h e males form the p r o d u c t i o n u n i t t h a t b r i n g s i n the r e q u i s i t e

income t o m a i n t a i n t h e h o u s e h o l d . This i s accomplished e i t h e r

by managing t h e h o u s e h o l d p r o p e r t y o r by o c c u p y i n g a p o s i t i o n

w h i c h b r i n g s i n income f r o m o u t s i d e t h e v i l l a g e .
 33

A c t u a l l y i t i s o n l y i n t h e upper c a s t e o r wealthy house-

h o l d s t h a t t h e r e i s a g r e a t d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e r o l e s o f

men and women--and t h e s e r e p r e s e n t a s m a l l p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e

t o t a l households i n the v i l l a g e . I n t h e low c a s t e h o u s e h o l d s

or h o u s e h o l d s w i t h l o w incomes t h e p o s i t i o n o f b o t h males and

f e m a l e s i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t . I n d i v i d u a l s , b o t h male and

female, a c t n o t i n terms o f what I s d e s i r a b l e b u t what i s n e c e s -

sary. The women a r e o f t e n r e q u i r e d t o perform d u t i e s which

t a k e them o u t o f t h e h o u s e . The women o f t h e l o w e r c a s t e s must

perform f o r t h e women o f t h e u p p e r c a s t e s t h e same s o r t o f

s e r v i c e t h a t t h e i r husbands p e r f o r m f o r t h e husbands o f t h e

upper c a s t e w i v e s . The v i l l a g e washerman washes t h e c l o t h i n g

o f t h e u p p e r c a s t e males and t h e w i f e o f t h e washerman washes

the c l o t h i n g o f t h e u p p e r c a s t e f e m a l e s . The c l o t h i n g i s washed

i n t h e l o c a l s t r e a m o r t a n k s o t h a t t h e j o b c a n n o t be done w i t h i n

t h e home. T h i s b e i n g t h e case f o r a f a i r l y l a r g e number o f c a s t e

occupations t h e f e m a l e c a n spend o n l y a p a r t o f t h e a v a i l a b l e

time c a r r y i n g o u t t h e d u t i e s o f c h i l d c a r e and f o o d prepara-

tion. They a r e i n e f f e c t managers a l t h o u g h they are not

managing s e r v a n t s b u t t h e i r own c h i l d r e n . O f t e n women o f t h e

poorer a g r i c u l t u r a l castes or poorer households o f the higher

a g r i c u l t u r a l c a s t e s must h e l p t h e i r husbands i n t h e f i e l d s dur-

ing t h e c r i s i s p e r i o d s o f p l a n t i n g and h a r v e s t i n g . It is

d e f i n i t e l y c o n s i d e r e d demeaning f o r women o f t h e h i g h caste

h o u s e h o l d t o be seen d o i n g any k i n d of work o u t s i d e o f t h e home.

I t i s n o t c o n s i d e r e d demeaning f o r l o w e r c a s t e women t o work

 34

o u t s i d e o f t h e home ( i t i s a c t u a l l y p a r t o f t h e i r r o l e ) so t h a t

t h e r e i s n o t t h e sharp d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f r o l e s i n the lower

c a s t e h o u s e h o l d s as t h e r e i s i n t h e h i g h c a s t e household.

The i d e a l r o l e o f women i n t h e I n d i a n h o u s e h o l d seems t o

be s i m i l a r i n some ways t o t h e i d e a l r o l e o f women i n o u r

society. That i s t o s a y t h a t t h e y a r e v i e w e d as consumers

and n o t as p r o d u c e r s . The man who r e q u i r e s t h a t h i s w i f e work

to help support the family i s not r e a l l y f u l f i l l i n g h i s r o l e

as p r o v i d e r . One b i g d i f f e r e n c e between t h e w e a l t h y o f our

s o c i e t y and t h e w e a l t h y of the Indian v i l l a g e i s that i n the

I n d i a n v i l l a g e t h e woman i s n o t e x p e c t e d t o conspicuously

consume.

I d e a l l y o f c o u r s e , t h e r e i s a l w a y s a d i s t i n c t i o n between

male and f e m a l e r o l e s , b u t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e male must

depend upon t h e h e l p o f h i s w i f e as p r o d u c e r r a t h e r than con-

sumer t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between male and f e m a l e ' r o l e s i s b l u r r e d

I do n o t t h i n k t h e r e c a n h e l p b u t be a c e r t a i n amount o f c o n -

f u s i o n where r o l e d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e n o t c l e a r and t h i s c a n i n

t u r n e f f e c t such t h i n g s as t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f power and

responsibility. The f e m a l e c a n and does e x e r t more a u t h o r i t y

t h a n she I s i d e a l l y allowed.

Age, g e n e r a t i o n , and s e x , t h e n , a r e t h e m a j o r bases f o r t h e

d i s t i n c t i o n s between r o l e s w i t h i n t h e h o u s e h o l d i n t h e I n d i a n

village. I s h o u l d now l i k e t o examine t h e s e c o n d category

mentioned a t t h e f i r s t o f t h e c h a p t e r , t h a t o f household s t a t u s
 35

which w i l l a i d i n the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of r o l e s w i t h i n the

village social structure.

HOUSEHOLD STATUS AS A MEANS OF ROLE DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN

THE VILLAGE
R o l e s a r e o c c u p i e d w i t h i n t h e v i l l a g e s t r u c t u r e on t h e

basis of household s t a t u s . One must be t h e head o f a h o u s e h o l d

w i t h h i g h s t a t u s b e f o r e i t i s p o s s i b l e t o assume any i m p o r t a n t

r o l e w i t h i n the v i l l a g e . Since at the v i l l a g e l e v e l household

has d i f f e r e n t c o n n o t a t i o n s t h a t i t does a t t h e h o u s e h o l d level

I t h i n k i t i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e t e r m h o u s e h o l d be p r o p e r l y under-

stood. To t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h e h o u s e h o l d r e f e r s t o t h e group of

p e o p l e who have a common r e s i d e n c e . The p r i m a r y orientation

and l o y a l t y o f e v e r y I n d i v i d u a l i s d i r e c t e d i n w a r d s t o w a r d s the

r e s t of the h o u s e h o l d . ^ 1
At t h e v i l l a g e l e v e l i n d i v i d u a l s see

t h e h o u s e h o l d as t h e b a s i c u n i t out o f w h i c h v i l l a g e social

structure arises. Each i n d i v i d u a l d i s t i n g u i s h e s between r o l e s

w i t h i n h i s own h o u s e h o l d b u t does n o t do so f o r o t h e r h o u s e -

holds . The o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n between h o u s e h o l d s i s

t h a t between h o u s e h o l d heads who act f o r t h e i r respective

h o u s e h o l d s as a u n i t . In a d d i t i o n to t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n the

h o u s e h o l d I s seen as a more a l l - i n c l u s i v e u n i t t h a t t h e indi-

v i d u a l perhaps views i t . The h o u s e h o l d u n i t f o r t h e individual

i s t h e group who s h a r e a common h e a r t h . The h o u s e h o l d as seen

by o t h e r s i n t h e v i l l a g e may p e r h a p s be b e t t e r r e f e r r e d t o as

the " k i n d r e d o f c o o p e r a t i o n . " T h i s i s a t e r m w h i c h I have b o r -

rowed f r o m Mayer who uses I t i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f c a s t e and kinship

 36

i n c e n t r a l I n d i a .17 The k i n d r e d o f c o o p e r a t i o n I s t h a t group

of k i n which cooperates i n matters e c o n o m i c a l , p o l i t i c a l and

religious. They o p e r a t e as a u n i t v i s - a - v i s o t h e r k i n d r e d s .

The minimum s i z e f o r a k i n d r e d i s a s i n g l e h o u s e h o l d and t h e

maximum s i z e i s t h a t number o f h o u s e h o l d s w h i c h c a n s t i l l main-

t a i n a u n i t e d face against other kindreds. E f f o r t s a r e made

t o m a i n t a i n as l a r g e a k i n d r e d o f c o o p e r a t i o n as p o s s i b l e , how-
18
ever, because i t i n c r e a s e s t h e s t a t u s p o t e n t i a l o f t h e k i n d r e d .

In o t h e r words t h e i n d i v i d u a l v i l l a g e r has two c o n c e p t i o n s

of the household. Which one he employs depends upon t h e c i r -

cumstances. I f i t i s an i n d i v i d u a l h o u s e h o l d matter the house-

h o l d i s composed o f t h o s e who s h a r e a common h e a r t h . Ifi t is

a v i l l a g e or caste matter i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n the household are

not i m p o r t a n t r a t h e r i t i s t h e h o u s e h o l d as a w h o l e .

Kindred o f c o o p e r a t i o n are always i n t r a c a s t e i n c o m p o s i t i o n .

Each c a s t e group w i t h i n t h e v i l l a g e w i l l t h e n have a t l e a s t one

kindred. The n u m e r i c a l l y s m a l l c a s t e s may be composed o f o n l y

two o r three households, t h e heads o f w h i c h a r e b r o t h e r s , c o u s i n s

19
or even more d i s t a n t r e l a t i v e s , but i f they a c t t o g e t h e r

socially, politically, e c o n o m i c a l l y , and r e l i g i o u s l y t h e y c a n

be c o n s i d e r e d a k i n d r e d . The n u m e r i c a l l y l a r g e r c a s t e s w i l l

more t h a n l i k e l y be composed o f a t l e a s t s e v e r a l k i n d r e d s each

ol
f w h i c h see i t s e l f as a s e p a20r a t e u n i t a n d , more i m p o r t a n t l y , i s
seen by o u t s i d e r s as a u n i t .
G i v e n t h a t t h i s i s t h e group w h i c h i s g r a n t e d o r n o t g r a n t e d

s t a t u s , on what b a s i s does t h e group a t t a i n i t ? There a r e t h r e e

 37

primary sources of status f o r the kindred. They a r e , 1)

p o s i t i o n i n t h e r i t u a l h i e r a r c h y , 2) t r a d i t i o n a l occupation,

and 3) membership i n a p o l i t i c a l faction operating w i t h i n the

village (and sometimes o u t s i d e t h e v i l l a g e as w e l l ) .

Each o f these three sources o f k i n d r e d s t a t u s i s an

analytical aspect o f what i s u s u a l l y d e s c r i b e d as t h e c a s t e

s y s t e m ( s e e t h e a p p e n d i x f o r a g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n and d i s -

c u s s i o n o f caste). No m a t t e r t h e r e g i o n and no m a t t e r t h e

particular focus of the observer, every community s t u d y o r

f o r t h a t matter every s t u d y o f s o c i a l a c t i o n must t a k e Into

account the caste system. There a r e c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n s

i n t h e way i n w h i c h c a s t e o p e r a t e s from r e g i o n t o r e g i o n ,

but t h e r e a r e no r e g i o n s i n w h i c h i t does n o t o p e r a t e i n the

Hindu areas o f the subcontinent. Even i n t h e predominantly

Muslim areas there are m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of i t s operation. The

c a s t e s y s t e m i s v e r y o l d and has undergone c o n s i d e r a b l e change

s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n a t the time of the D r a v i d i a n submission

to t h e i n v a d i n g Aryans from t h e n o r t h . The f o u r original

religious v a r n a have p r o l i f e r a t e d into s e v e r a l thousand

21

secular 'economic' c a s t e s ( o r p e r h a p s more a p p r o p r i a t e l y ,

j a t i s ) some o f w h i c h have a s m a l l l o c a l membership, some a

r e g i o n a l , and some a l a r g e n a t i o n a l membership. These jatis

are a l l r a n k e d r e l a t i v e t o one a n o t h e r such t h a t members o f

each j a t i a r e aware w h i c h j a t i s r a n k above them and w h i c h b e l o i

The c l o s e r t h e d i s t a n c e between two j a t i s t h e more t h e r e i s

s p e c i f i c knowledge about each o t h e r . The way i n w h i c h one

j a t i member behaves t o w a r d a member o f a n o t h e r j a t i i s related

t o t h e d i s t a n c e , e i t h e r above o r b e l o w , t h a t e x i s t s between

them. There i s no c l e a r c u t a b s o l u t e r a n k i n g f o r i n one r e g i o n

one j a t i may be r e c k o n e d h i g h e r r i t u a l l y r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r jatls

t h a n i t m i g h t be i n a n o t h e r region.
The b a s i s f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g r a n k i n v o l v e s s u c h t h i n g s as who
22
w i l l e a t w i t h whom, who w i l l a c c e p t w h i c h k i n d s o f f o o d from
23
whom, and who w i l l m a r r y whom. As w e l l as t h e s e k i n d s o f

a c t i v i t i e s t h e a p p r o a c h t o r e l i g i o n by each c a s t e must be t a k e n

i n t o account. Brahmins have a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f w o r s h i p which

o n l y t h e y c a n employ. L e s s e r c a s t e s may have e l e m e n t s o f t h e

B r a h m i n f o r m o f w o r s h i p , b u t s h o u l d t h e y a t t e m p t t o copy t h e

Brahmins t o o c l o s e l y t h e y r u n t h e r i s k o f a sound b e a t i n g .

Occupation o f t h e c a s t e has a d e c i s i v e e f f e c t on c a s t e

status. The h i g h e s t s t a t u s o c c u p a t i o n s are those which Involve

no p h y s i c a l l a b o u r o r t h o s e w h i c h a r e n o t d i r e c t l y concerned

w i t h p r o d u c t i o n o f goods ( f o r example t h e B r a h m i n p r i e s t s ) .

The n e x t group o f o c c u p a t i o n s are those which i n v o l v e working

the l a n d ( p r o v i d i n g i t i s t h e owner who i s w o r k i n g ) . Equal

or p e r h a p s s l i g h t l y b e l o w t h e c u l t i v a t o r s a r e t h e a r t i s a n s who

m a n u f a c t u r e t h e t o o l s needed f o r p r o d u c t i o n . The l o w e s t ranked

c a s t e s i n terms o f o c c u p a t i o n a r e t h o s e castes which are

responsible f o r p r o v i d i n g services t o the higher castes. These

castes are the m a j o r i t y of the v i l l a g e p o p u l a t i o n . Below t h e

castes are the outcastes. These a r e p e o p l e who do n o t b e l o n g

w i t h i n t h e caste system because t h e i r occupations are too

 40

degrading. These p e o p l e c l e a n t h e s t r e e t s , remove dead ani-

mals, e t c . They a r e a l s o known as t h e u n t o u c h a b l e s because

to t o u c h them i s p o l l u t i n g and r e q u i r e s a f a i r l y e x t e n s i v e

ceremony t o become p u r e a g a i n .

In some ways t o t a l k about p o s i t i o n I n t h e r i t u a l h i e r a r c h y

and o c c u p a t i o n (because occupation l a r g e l y determines ritual

p o s i t i o n ) as two s e p a r a t e d e v i c e s f o r d e t e r m i n i n g c a s t e s t a t u s

i s t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n n o t w o r t h m a k i n g , b u t i t I s u s e f u l I f

for o n l y one r e a s o n . C a s t e s do change t h e i r o c c u p a t i o n w i t h o u t

immediately affecting their r i t u a l position. For example,

A h i r s who a r e h e r d e r s o c c u p a t i o n a l l y may stop being herders

and become l a n d l e s s l a b o u r e r s . T h i s o c c u p a t i o n i s n o t as pol-

luting ritually so t h a t t h e y g a i n s t a t u s I n terms o f o c c u p a t i o n

w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e r e t a i n i n g t h e i r v e r y low s t a t u s r i t u a l l y .

24
Over a p e r i o d o f t i m e t h e i r r i t u a l p o s i t i o n may improve, but
I t won't do so i m m e d i a t e l y .

The t h i r d method f o r d e t e r m i n i n g s t a t u s f o r t h e c a s t e group

i s membership w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n . I shall

not d i s c u s s t h i s h e r e b e c a u s e i t i s c o v e r e d i n t h e c h a p t e r on

a l l o c a t i o n o f power and responsibility.

A l t h o u g h i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r a c a s t e t o r a n k h i g h i n terms

of o c c u p a t i o n and low i n terms of r i t u a l p o s i t i o n , t h i s k i n d

of d i s c r e p a n c y does not o c c u r v e r y o f t e n . Normally there i s

a h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e s e t h r e e means o f establishing

relative status. Thus Brahmins who are at the top of the

r i t u a l h i e r a r c h y n o r m a l l y have o c c u p a t i o n s w h i c h do n o t i n v o l v e
 41

p h y s i c a l l a b o u r and a r e members o f one o f t h e p o w e r f u l political

factions i n the v i l l a g e . Sweepers r a n k v e r y l o w r i t u a l l y , must

p e r f o r m t h e most m e n i a l t a s k s , and a r e n o t members o f a p o w e r f u l

political f a c t i o n i f t h e y a r e members o f any f a c t i o n s .

I t i s from h i g h s t a t u s households or k i n d r e d s o f coopera-

t i o n that v i l l a g e leaders are s e l e c t e d . The h o u s e h o l d head o f

the household w i t h t h e h i g h e s t s t a t u s w i l l n o r m a l l y occupy t h e

most p o w e r f u l p o s i t i o n i n t h e v i l l a g e . I f one h o u s e h o l d does

n o t emerge c l e a r l y as t h e most p o w e r f u l , t h e n i t i s p o s s i b l e

t h a t p e r s o n a l i t i e s w i l l be t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Compe-

t e n c e i s a f a c t o r o n l y when a l l o t h e r t h i n g s a r e e q u a l . Thus

an i n d i v i d u a l o f g r e a t a b i l i t y b u t a member o f a low s t a t u s

household has v e r y l i t t l e chance o f making h i m s e l f f e l t i n

village affairs. H i s s p h e r e o f a c t i v i t y w i l l be c o n s t r a i n e d

to w i t h i n h i s own c a s t e group o r h o u s e h o l d . He may be r e c o g -

n i z e d as d o i n g a v e r y good j o b a t t h a t l e v e l by t h e r e s t o f

t h e v i l l a g e , b u t he w i l l n o t be i n v i t e d t o h e l p make d e c i s i o n s

at the v i l l a g e level.
 42

FOOTNOTES

x
M a r i o n J . L e v y , The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i e t y ( P r i n c e t o n ,
1 9 5 2 ) , p. 299-
L e v y , The F a m i l y R e v o l u t i o n - Modern C h i n a (Cambridge,
1 9 4 9 ) , C h a p t e r 1.
As an a s i d e and t o go o u t on a l i m b I w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t
t h e avenues t o power a r e s o n a r r o w l y d e l i n e a t e d t h a t t h e r e i s
a l m o s t n e v e r a q u e s t i o n o f who w i l l become what i n t h e v i l l a g e
activities. T h i s does n o t h o l d t r u e i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l v i l -
lages i n I n d i a today because w i t h wider c o n t a c t s i n t h e o u t s i d e
w o r l d t h e r e a r e o t h e r avenues t h a n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l one open.
The t e a c h e r as a r o l e i s one such example and I w i l l d i s c u s s
the r o l e o f t e a c h e r i n v i l l a g e p o l i t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n the
c h a p t e r on t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p o l i t i c a l a l l o c a t i o n . We as o u t -
s i d e r s c a n 'see' t h a t t h e r e a r e many ways t o a c h i e v e power i n
the v i l l a g e , b u t t o t h e a c t o r s t h e r e may n o t be any a l t e r n a t i v e s

The I n f o r m a t i o n f o r r o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e h o u s e -
h o l d I s d e v i s e d m a i n l y f r o m t h e f o l l o w i n g books and a r t i c l e s :

Books:
a) A. S. A t t e k a r , The P o s i t i o n o f Women - H i n d u Civiliza-
t i o n (Banaras, 1956).
b) K. M. K a p a d i a , M a r r i a g e and F a m i l y - India (Oxford,
1 9 5 6 ) , 2nd E d .
c) I r w a t t i K a r v e , K i n s h i p O r g a n i z a t i o n - I n d i a (Poona,
1953) •
d) Oscar Lewis, V i l l a g e L i f e - Northern I n d i a (Urbana,
1958) .
e) P. H. P r a b h u , H i n d u S o c i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n (Bombay, 1 9 5 8 ) .

f) A. D. R o s s , The H i n d u F a m i l y - i t s Urban S e t t i n g
( T o r o n t o , 1961) .
g) S. N. S r i n i v a s , M a r r i a g e and F a m i l y - Mysore (Bombay,
1942). '
h) P. Thomas, H i n d u R e l i g i o n , Customs and Manners (Bombay)
 43

Articles:
a) F. G. B a i l e y , "The J o i n t F a m i l y - I n d i a , " The Economic
Weekly, Bombay, F e b r u a r y 2 0 , i 9 6 0 .
Andrew C o l l v e r , "The F a m i l y C y c l e - I n d i a and t h e U n i t e d
b)
S t a t e s , " ASR 2 8 ( 1 ) : 8 6 - 9 6 , F e b r u a r y , 1963.

c) J . D. M. D e r r e t t , "The H i s t o r y o f t h e J u r i d i c a l Frame-
work of t h e H i n d u J o i n t F a m i l y , " C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o
I n d i a n S o c i o l o g y , V I , December, 1962.

d) D. Mandelbaum, "The F a m i l y - I n d i a , " The F a m i l y : Its

F u n c t i o n and D e s t i n y , ed. R. N. Anshen (New Y o r k , 1949).

e) D. Mandelbaum, " F a m i l y , J a t i , V i l l a g e , " S t r u c t u r e and

Change I n I n d i a n S o c i e t y , ed. S i n g e r and Cohn ( C h i c a g o ,
1968) .
f) M. E. O p l e r , " V i l l a g e L i f e - N o r t h I n d i a , " P a t t e r n s
f o r Modern L i v i n g , D i v i s i o n 3 , C u l t u r a l P a t t e r n s ,
The D e l p h i a n S o c i e t y ( C h i c a g o , 1 9 5 0 ) .

g) M. E. O p l e r and R. S i n g h , "Two V i l l a g e s o f E a s t e r n
U t t a r P r a d e s h , I n d i a ; An A n a l y s i s o f D i f f e r e n c e s and
S i m i l a r i t i e s , " AA, V o l . 54, 1952.

h) Henry O r e n s t e i n , "The R e c e n t H i s t o r y o f t h e Extended

F a m i l y - I n d i a , " S o c i a l Problems

i) G i t e l P. S t e e d , "Notes on an A p p r o a c h t o a Study o f
P e r s o n a l i t y Formation - a Hindu V i l l a g e - G u j a r a t , "
V i l l a g e I n d i a , ed. M a r r i o t t ( C h i c a g o , 1955).

S. N. S r i n i v a s , M a r r i a g e and' F a m i l y - Mysore (Bombay,

1 9 4 2 ) , p. 171.
^ D a v i d G. Mandelbaum, " F a m i l y , J a t i , V i l l a g e , " S t r u c t u r e
and Change - I n d i a n S o c i e t y , ed. M i l t o n and S i n g e r ( C h i c a g o ,
1 9 F 8 ) , p. 26.
F o r t h e v i l l a g e as a whole f e m a l e s are q u i t e i m p o r t a n t .
Females who marry i n t o a n o t h e r v i l l a g e p r o v i d e l i n k s between
two v i l l a g e s . There are s t a t i s t i c s w h i c h show t h e e x t e n t t o
w h i c h f e m a l e s marry i n t o p a r t i c u l a r o u t s i d e v i l l a g e s and t h e
k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h t h e n e x i s t between t h e two v i l l a g e s .
I t i s much more d i f f i c u l t t o m a i n t a i n an argument w i t h a v i l l a g e
i n w h i c h l i v e t h e d a u g h t e r s and d a u g h t e r s - i n - l a w o f t h e p r o -
tagonists .
 44

7 In Mayer's Ramkheri s t u d y o n l y two o u t o f 194 m a r r i a g e s

o c c u r r e d between i n d i v i d u a l s who were b o t h r e s i d e n t s o f t h e
village. Of t h e s e m a r r i a g e s , 184 were v i r i l o c a l . Marriott,
i n h i s s t u d y on K i s h a n G a r h i , p o i n t s o u t t h a t o n l y once I n
t h r e e g e n e r a t i o n s has a m a r r i a g e o c c u r r e d between K i s h a n
G a r h i and any o f e l e v e n o t h e r s u r r o u n d i n g v i l l a g e s . The
a v e r a g e d i s t a n c e between n a t a l home and c o n j u g a l home f o r
the women i s 12 m i l e s , a f a i r l y g r e a t d i s t a n c e i n v i l l a g e I n d i a .

C o l l v e r , op_. c i t .
Q
L e w i s , op_. c i t .
10
M a n d e l b a u m , " F a m i l y , J a t i , V i l l a g e , " p. 3 2 .
11
There a r e two r e a s o n s f o r s u g g e s t i n g t h i s . First,i f
t h e w i f e does n o t p r o v e t o be what e i t h e r t h e h u s b a n d , o r ,
more p a r t i c u l a r l y , t h e husband's p a r e n t s t h i n k she s h o u l d be
she can be s e n t b a c k t o h e r p a r e n t s . T h i s i s a f a i r l y d r a s t i c
move, b u t i t i s employed I f t h e w i f e p r o v e s t o be t o o r e c a l c i -
trant. The s e c o n d r e a s o n i s t h a t e v e r y woman d e s i r e s m a r r i a g e
because she i s n o t r e a l l y welcome p a s t p u b e r t y I n h e r n a t a l
home. Once she i s m a r r i e d t h e n a t a l f a m i l y w o u l d l o o k w i t h
extreme d i s f a v o u r upon h e r permanent r e t u r n . S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g
one c o u l d s a y t h a t t h e woman has a c h o i c e between s t a y i n g w i t h
her c o n j u g a l f a m i l y or r e t u r n i n g t o the n a t a l f a m i l y , b u t i n
r e a l i t y she has no c h o i c e . G i v e n t h e above t h e f e m a l e w o u l d
r a t h e r r e m a i n i n t h e c o n j u g a l h o u s e h o l d and I t h i n k one c a n
assume t h a t she w i l l do h e r b e s t t o g e t a l o n g w i t h a l l o f t h e
members o f t h e c o n j u g a l h o u s e h o l d . T h i s may i n v o l v e e f f o r t s
on h e r p a r t t o m o d i f y e i t h e r h e r own b e h a v i o u r o r t h a t o f t h e
o t h e r members. S i n c e she I s a d e f i n i t e m i n o r i t y most o f t h e
changes w i l l p r o b a b l y o c c u r w i t h i n h e r own b e h a v i o u r . As a
consequence o f t h i s I w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t q u i t e s t r o n g bonds
a r e formed between t h e husband and w i f e . They may n o t n e c e s -
s a r i l y be b a s e d on a f f e c t i o n , b u t t h e y n o n e t h e l e s s do e x i s t .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h e x i s t s between Wang Lung and h i s w i f e
in" P e a r l Buck's The Good E a r t h i s a good example. Each i s a
s t r a n g e r t o t h e o t h e r a t t i m e o f m a r r i a g e and each has c e r t a i n
r e a s o n s f o r e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e s t a t e o f m a r r i a g e , and so l o n g as
the o t h e r p a r t n e r f u l f i l l s e x p e c t a t i o n s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s
smooth. A f f e c t i o n I s n o t e x p e c t e d t o be p a r t o f t h e r e l a t i o n -
s h i p b u t i t c e r t a i n l y does d e v e l o p . I t h i n k i t w o u l d be v e r y
d i f f i c u l t t o compare m a r r i a g e and d i v o r c e s t a t i s t i c s I n I n d i a
w i t h those o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s because t h e approach t o these
r o l e s I s so d i f f e r e n t . I n I n d i a , s t r a n g e r s marry and hope t o
d e v e l o p a f f e c t i o n and i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s I n d i v i d u a l s who have
a f f e c t i o n f o r one a n o t h e r marry and hope t o d e v e l o p o t h e r bonds
t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e bonds.
 45

12
Mandelbaum, " F a m i l y , J a t i , V i l l a g e , " p. 33-
13
I assume t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s n o t a v a i l a b l e s i m p l y b e c a u s e
t h o s e who have s t u d i e d t h e I n d i a n v i l l a g e have n o t a s k e d t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e q u e s t i o n s . The r e s e a r c h e r s were c o n c e r n e d about
other things.
14
A f r i c a n Systems o f K i n s h i p and M a r r i a g e , e d . R a d c l i f f e -
Brown and D a r y l l Forde~T"London, 1 9 5 0 ) , S e c t i o n U o f t h e
Introduction.
15
Mandelbaum, " F a m i l y , J a t i , V i l l a g e , " p p . 3 0 - 3 7 -
l 6
I b i d . , p. 37-
17
A d r i a n C. M a y e r , C a s t e and K i n s h i p - C e n t r a l I n d i a
(London, I 9 6 0 ) , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n .
l8
The s i z e o f t h e k i n d r e d may v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i s s u e
at hand. I s s u e s may a r i s e w h i c h l e a d t o t h e s p l i t t i n g o f t h e
k i n d r e d , e i t h e r t e m p o r a r i l y o r p e r m a n e n t l y . C o n v e r s e l y , new
k i n d r e d s may be formed as t h e r e s u l t o f o t h e r i s s u e s .
19
T h e o r e t i c a l l y a l l members o f a c a s t e c a n t r a c e t h e i r
i n d i v i d u a l b i o l o g i c a l l i n e s b a c k t o a common p o i n t so t h a t
a l l c a s t e members a r e r e l a t e d .
20
For a f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of the kindred o f cooperation
w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c a s t e see t h e a p p e n d i x on C a s t e .
21
Secular r e l a t i v e t o the o r i g i n a l idea of varna but
d e f i n i t e l y n o t s e c u l a r as we t h i n k o f s e c u l a r I n o u r s o c i e t y .
22
The h i g h e r r a n k e d c a s t e w i l l a c c e p t uncooked b u t n o t
cooked f o o d f r o m t h e l o w e r r a n k e d c a s t e . The l o w e r r a n k e d
w i l l a c c e p t b o t h cooked and uncooked f r o m t h e h i g h e r r a n k e d
caste.
23
M a l e s may marry down, f e m a l e s must marry I n t o t h e same
c a s t e o r h i g h e r . The d i s t a n c e between c a s t e s cannot be t o o
g r e a t , however. F o r example, s h o u l d a Brahmin male marry an
o u t c a s t e f e m a l e he becomes o u t c a s t e as w e l l .
24
1) F. G. B a i l e y , T r i b e , C a s t e and N a t i o n (Manchester,
I 9 6 0 ) , pp. 211-27-
2) R a l p h W. N i c h o l a s , " P o l i t i c s I n V i l l a g e s o f S o u t h e r n
A s i a , " S t r u c t u r e and Change - I n d i a n S o c i e t y ( C h i c a g o , 1 9 6 8 ) ,
pp. 2 7 3 ^
 CHAPTER I I I 1

Structure of S o l i d a r i t y

I n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r I have d i s c u s s e d t h e way i n w h i c h

r o l e s a r e a l l o c a t e d among t h e v a r i o u s v i l l a g e r s . Implied i n

the d e f i n i t i o n of r o l e Is a separation o f v i e w p o i n t s because

the o c c u p a n t o f each r o l e l o o k s upon each s i t u a t i o n f r o m a

d i f f e r e n t vantage p o i n t . I n t h i s chapter I propose t o analyze

that structure which operates t o standardize the r e l a t i o n s h i p s

between t h e s e r o l e s . I am n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h the structures

w h i c h o p e r a t e i n any s o c i e t y to integrate r o l e s ; rather I am

concerned w i t h the s t r u c t u r e which functions t o standardize the

modes o f b e h a v i o u r w h i c h a r e c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o p r i a t e between

occupants o f d i f f e r e n t i a t e d r o l e s .

There a r e t h r e e a s p e c t s t o t h e s t r u c t u r e of s o l i d a r i t y

w h i c h must be c o n s i d e r e d i n a n a l y z i n g any r e l a t i o n s h i p between

roles. I s h a l l use L e v y ' s d e f i n i t i o n s f o r each o f t h e t h r e e

following aspects: content, strength,and i n t e n s i t y . The c o n -

tent o f any r e l a t i o n s h i p i s d e f i n e d as ". . . t h e t y p e o f

r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t i s t o e x i s t and t h e members between ( o r among)

2
whom i t i s t o e x i s t . " The s t r e n g t h of the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s

defined as ". . . t h e r e l a t i v e p r e c e d e n c e o r l a c k o f p r e c e -

dence t a k e n by t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p o v e r o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f

i t s g e n e r a l s o r t , and o v e r o t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s and commitments

i n the larger s o c i a l sphere." J

The I n t e n s i t y o f t h e r e l a t i o n -

ship i s defined as ". . . t h e s t a t e o f a f f e c t i n v o l v e d i n the

46
 47

relationship." There are two possible types of v a r i a t i o n i n

the state of a f f e c t : first, the t y p e of a f f e c t i n v o l v e d (e.g.,

l o v e , h a t e , anger, j o y , r e s p e c t , e t c . ) ; and second, the degree

of a f f e c t i v e i n v o l v e m e n t t h a t i s expected (e.g., whether the

r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t o be intimate o r one of avoidance).

I f I am g r a n t e d the above by way of e x p l a i n i n g and defin-

i n g the structure of s o l i d a r i t y then i t f o l l o w s that the struc-

ture o f s o l i d a r i t y i s c r u c i a l i n a t l e a s t two circumstances:

f i r s t , where the frequency of i n t e r a c t i o n i s high; and second,

where r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e s t r a t e g i c t o the system (strategic

r e l a t i o n s h i p s may have a h i g h i n c i d e n c e o f i n t e r a c t i o n , but

t h i s need not be the case).

It i s neither possible nor i s i t desirable f o r my purposes

t o t r e a t a l l o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h can o c c u r between

r o l e s w i t h i n the village. Theoretically I should f i n d i t

n e c e s s a r y t o a n a l y z e o n l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h e x i s t between

r o l e s i n the v i l l a g e s o c i a l system, but, as i n the previous

c h a p t e r on r o l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , the s o l i d a r i t y structure of

the lower l e v e l s o c i a l u n i t s (the h o u s e h o l d ) must be considered

as w e l l b e c a u s e t h e y so c o l o u r the upper l e v e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s

t h a t the upper l e v e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s c a n n o t be fully understood

w i t h o u t knowledge of l o w e r l e v e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Thus we must

b e g i n by discussing the structure of s o l i d a r i t y as i t functions

a t the l e v e l of the household.

In t h i s chapter, as i n the l a s t , I have had trouble

f i n d i n g any material which deals w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p as i t

 48

a c t u a l l y operates rather t h a n how i t s h o u l d o p e r a t e i d e a l l y .

Hence much o f t h e m a t e r i a l that i s presented i n t h i s chapter

is suppositional and hypothetical.

SOLIDARITY STRUCTURE WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD

Of t h e many p o s s i b l e relationships w h i c h e x i s t between

members o f t h e h o u s e h o l d t h e r e a r e two w h i c h must be u n d e r -

s t o o d i n o r d e r t o comprehend t h e s t r u c t u r e of s o l i d a r i t y at

the village level. These a r e t h e f a t h e r - s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p and

the b r o t h e r - b r o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . At the v i l l a g e l e v e l females

do n o t f i g u r e as p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e r o l e s w h i c h a r e t o be

allocated. A t t h e h o u s e h o l d l e v e l , f e m a l e s do e f f e c t t h e c o n -

tent, strength, and i n t e n s i t y o f t h e above m e n t i o n e d male

r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but i d e a l l y a t l e a s t they should not e f f e c t

the content, s t r e n g t h or i n t e n s i t y of the v i l l a g e l e v e l

relationships.

1. The F a t h e r - S o n Relationship
B e f o r e c o n t i n u i n g I must m e n t i o n a n o t h e r m a j o r p r o b l e m

w h i c h I have been u n a b l e t o s o l v e (and one w h i c h no one e l s e

has s o l v e d t o my k n o w l e d g e ) . Social relationships a r e dynamic

and my a n a l y s i s i s static. I d e a l l y the r o l e of both father

and son does n o t change w i t h t i m e , n o r does t h e s o l i d a r i t y

structure which orders the r e l a t i o n s h i p . Actually the con-

tent of the r e l a t i o n s h i p changes d r a s t i c a l l y o v e r t i m e as does

the s t r e n g t h and I n t e n s i t y . The f a t h e r - s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p I s

not t h e s.ame when t h e f a t h e r i s t w e n t y - f i v e and t h e s o n f i v e

 49

as i t i s when the f a t h e r i s s i x t y and t h e son forty. The best

t h a t I can do i n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s t o examine t h e father-

son r e l a t i o n s h i p a t d i f f e r e n t s t a g e s i n i t s d e v e l o p m e n t .

I n a s o c i a l s y s t e m w h i c h i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d as p a t r i a r c h a l ,

p a t r i l o c a l , and p a t r i l i n e a l I t h i n k i t can s a f e l y be assumed

t h a t t h e t y p e o f r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l be that of superordinate-

subordinate. The f a t h e r has complete c o n t r o l over the actions

o f t h e son. However, t h e s i t u a t i o n I s n e v e r c l e a r c u t b e c a u s e

t h e young f a t h e r i s as d o m i n a t e d by h i s f a t h e r as he i s dominant

o v e r h i s young son ( i d e a l l y he i s d o m i n a t e d w h e t h e r the father

is s t i l l a l i v e or n o t ) . The f o l l o w i n g , rather lengthy quote,

f r o m G. Morris C a r s t a i r s ' book, The Twice B o r n d e s c r i b e s the

k i n d o f r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h e x i s t s between f a t h e r and son among

the upper castes i n t h e v i l l a g e he was observing:

In s t r i k i n g contrast to a l l t h i s a t t e n t i v e mothering,
the c h i l d ' s f a t h e r i s an a l o o f s e e m i n g l y unwelcome
figure. The r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h a t a man, so l o n g
as he r e m a i n s u n d e r h i s own f a t h e r ' s r o o f , must keep
up the f i c t i o n o f d e n y i n g t h a t he l e a d s an a c t i v e s e x u a l
l i f e o f h i s own. Not t o do so i s t o be d i s r e s p e c t f u l .
C o n s e q u e n t l y , a man and h i s w i f e can n e v e r t a l k t o each
other n a t u r a l l y , i n h i s parents' presence; nor i s i t
p r o p e r t o e i t h e r o f them t o show a f f e c t i o n f o r t h e i r
own c h i l d r e n i n f r o n t o f t h e i r e l d e r s . T h i s o b l i g a t o r y
s u p p r e s s i o n o f any o v e r t show of t e n d e r f e e l i n g s I s
r e l a x e d o n l y when t h e c h i l d c r i e s . Then h i s needs
t a k e p r e c e d e n c e even o v e r the g r a n d p a r e n t s ' a u t h o r i t y ,
so t h a t he w i l l be handed o v e r t o h i s m o t h e r , o f t e n
w i t h the command " G i v e him the b r e a s t . " A father,
however, e x p e r i e n c e s no such e x c e p t i o n t o the demand
t h a t he r e m a i n i m p a s s i v e and d e t a c h e d . Even i f h i s
w i f e o r c h i l d f a l l s i l l he must c o n t a i n h i s f e e l i n g s
and s u r r e n d e r t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of tendingthe.m t o h i s
own p a r e n t s . T h i s taboo p e r p e t u a t e s I n each g e n e r a t i o n
t h e t e n s i o n w h i c h e x i s t s between f a t h e r and son; and i t
i s very strong. Young Chauthmal", who l i v e d i n h i s
f a t h e r Bhurmal's h o u s e , had a boy of e i g h t e e n months,
 50

and o f t e n t h e g r a n d f a t h e r c o u l d be s e e n c a r r y i n g t h i s
c h i l d i n h i s arms, o r d a n d l i n g h i m w h i l e t h e y s a t a t
t h e i r s h o p — b u t never Chauthmal: " I don't l i k e t o
f o n d l e h i m , even when we a r e a l o n e i n o u r room," he
said: " i f I d i d , he m i g h t g e t i n t o t h e h a b i t o f
r u n n i n g t o my knee i n t h e b a z a a r , and t h a t w o u l d n o t
look r i g h t . " . . . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e r e were
t h r e e among my y o u n g e r I n f o r m a n t s who d i s r e g a r d e d t h e
r u l e , and o p e n l y f o n d l e d t h e i r young c h i l d r e n . They
were a b l e t o do s o b e c a u s e i n each case t h e i r f a t h e r s
were d e a d , and t h e y were t h e heads o f t h e i r s e v e r a l
households: b u t s t i l l t h e c o n s e n s u s o f o p i n i o n (as
t h e y were w e l l aware) condemned t h e i r unashamed d i s p l a y
of a f f e c t i o n . . . . The u s u a l f a t h e r - c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p ,
t h e n , was d r a i n e d o f s p o n t a n e o u s warmth o f f e e l i n g .
I n s t e a d i t was g o v e r n e d by s t r i c t o b l i g a t i o n s on e i t h e r
side. . . .The o b l i g a t i o n o f each t o t h e o t h e r , o f
f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t and i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e one h a n d , and
d u t i f u l s e r v i c e t h r o u g h o u t one's f a t h e r ' s l i f e (and
a f t e r h i s d e a t h ) on t h e o t h e r , were c o n s t a n t l y empha- ,-
s i z e d , b u t p e r s o n a l i n t i m a c y was c o n s p i c u o u s l y a b s e n t .

The above o b s e r v a t i o n s , made on t h e c o n t e n t , s t r e n g t h ,

and i n t e n s i t y o f t h e f a t h e r - s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p among t h e t h r e e

h i g h e s t c a s t e s i n t h e v i l l a g e o f D e o l i , a r e made on a s i t u a -

t i o n where, i n f a c t , t h e r e i s more o p p o r t u n i t y t o l i v e up t o

the i d e a l f a t h e r - s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p . Among the - l o w e r c a s t e s one

would not expect these o b s e r v a t i o n s t o be made f o r a t l e a s t

two reasons. As C a r s t a i r s o b s e r v e d , i t i s the presence of

the g r a n d f a t h e r and/or grandmother w h i c h c o n s t r a i n s t h e

behaviour o f the f a t h e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o the son i n the upper

castes. Among t h e l o w e r castes the presence of grandfathers

and grandmothers w i t h i n t h e f a m i l y i s even more u n l i k e l y than

among t h e u p p e r c a s t e s where t h e p r o b a b i l i t y i s o n l y about

fifty-fifty t h a t b o t h p a r e n t s w i l l be s u r v i v i n g a t t h e t i m e

o f t h e son's m a r r i a g e . There i s a f a i r l y good c o r r e l a t i o n

between c a s t e r a n k i n g and w e a l t h (the h i g h e r the caste the

 51

more l i k e l y t h a t c a s t e w i l l be w e a l t h y ) and t h e r e i s a f a i r l y

h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n between w e a l t h and l i f e expectancy.

The second r e a s o n i s t h a t among t h e l o w e r c a s t e s t h e r e i s

very l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a f a t h e r t o accumulate wealth over

w h i c h he has c o n t r o l i n h i s o l d age. I n a wealthy household

t h e aged f a t h e r has no r e a l need o f p h y s i c a l s t r e n g t h , he

m e r e l y needs t h e m e n t a l a b i l i t y t o make d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g

its disposition. The f a t h e r c a n be t r a d i t i o n a l l y oriented

because he has t h e power t o b a c k h i s p o s i t i o n . Among t h e p o o r

l o w e r c a s t e s when a man l o s e s h i s p h y s i c a l p o w e r s , as he

i n e v i t a b l y must, he c a n hope t h a t h i s s o n w i l l f o l l o w tradi-

t i o n and p r o v i d e f o r h i m i n h i s o l d age. Thus when t h e s o n

i s t h e main c o n t r i b u t o r o r o n l y s o u r c e o f h o u s e h o l d income

he need n o t pay a t t e n t i o n t o t h e demands o f h i s f a t h e r . It

i s much e a s i e r i n t h e p o o r e r h o u s e h o l d s f o r the son t o take

o v e r f r o m h i s f a t h e r and b e g i n t o make d e c i s i o n s about t h e

d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e h o u s e h o l d Income. Concomitantly the poorer

h o u s e h o l d heads may e x h i b i t d i f f e r e n t b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s towards

t h e i r sons t h a n I s f o u n d among t h e w e a l t h y , h i g h - c a s t e h o u s e -

holds. F a t h e r s and sons w i l l p r o b a b l y spend more t i m e , more

p l e a s a n t l y and l e s s f o r m a l l y , w i t h one a n o t h e r .

A t h i r d f a c t o r w h i c h i s p r o b a b l y n o t as i m p o r t a n t as t h e

f i r s t two i s t h a t w h i l e t h e r e I s a l o t o f d i r e c t c o n t a c t between

f a t h e r and s o n among poor h o u s e h o l d s t h i s does n o t h o l d among

wealthy households. The f a t h e r i n t h e w e a l t h y h o u s e h o l d appears,

 52

and more l i k e l y i s , as a more d i s t a n t f i g u r e t o t h e s o n . He

does n o t have many d i r e c t d e a l i n g s w i t h h i m . Mother, grand-

p a r e n t s , t e a c h e r and p o s s i b l y s e r v a n t s w i l l s t a n d between h i m

and h i s father.

Even among w e a l t h y h o u s e h o l d s , however, i t i s p o s s i b l e

f o r the father t o f l y i n the face of t r a d i t i o n with respect

t o h i s b e h a v i o u r towards h i s son. While i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o

know t h a t extreme v a r i a t i o n s c a n and do e x i s t w i t h regard to

the content, strength, and i n t e n s i t y o f t h e f a t h e r - s o n rela-

tionship I think that t h e more n o r m a l t y p e o f s o l i d a r i t y struc-

ture that e x i s t s between some r o l e s on t h e v i l l a g e l e v e l more

nearly resembles that of the wealthy household than that of

the p o o r e r h o u s e h o l d s . The i n t e r v e n t i o n of caste i n t o the

structure of s o l i d a r i t y at the v i l l a g e l e v e l resembles the

intervention o f t h e m o t h e r , g r a n d p a r e n t s , t e a c h e r and s e r v a n t s

at t h e h o u s e h o l d level.

I s h a l l discuss s h o r t l y which r o l e s i n the v i l l a g e seem

t o have a s o l i d a r i t y s t r u c t u r e modeled a f t e r t h e s o l i d a r i t y

structure o f t h e f a t h e r - s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p , b u t b e f o r e I do so

I wish t o discuss the s o l i d a r i t y structure of the brother-

b r o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p on w h i c h o t h e r v i l l a g e r o l e s a r e b a s e d .

2. The B r o t h e r - B r o t h e r Relationship

One cannot say t h a t the b r o t h e r - b r o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s

a s t r o n g one e x c e p t i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . There a r e a

number o f o t h e r h o u s e h o l d r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h c a n and do
 53

assume p r e c e d e n c e over the brother-brother relationship. Some

examples a r e t h e f a t h e r - s o n , mother-son and husband-wife

relationships. The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of brothers occurs on t h e

basis of relative age. The e l d e s t son I s expected t o take

over t h e h o u s e h o l d and r i t u a l obligations of the father after

the father's death. Neither the eldest brother nor the

younger b r o t h e r ( s ) h a v e much p o w e r t o make d e c i s i o n s while

the father i s alive (and capable o f making d e c i s i o n s ) so t h a t

the d i f f e r e n c e i n r o l e s i s n o t much e m p h a s i z e d . As t h e b r o -

thers g r o w up t h e y r e c e i v e much t h e same s o r t o f t r e a t m e n t

from others i n the household. The y o u n g e r b r o t h e r may i n f a c t

r e c e i v e more a t t e n t i o n s i m p l y because i ti s the older brother

who w i l l h a v e t h e a d v a n t a g e w h e n t h e f a t h e r dies.

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e above b r o t h e r s inherit equally from

the estate of the father—although the senior s o n may b e

granted something e x t r a from the estate t o compensate f o r

the e x t r a r i t u a l expenses b e i n g head o f t h e f a m i l y .

Although i n theory the elder brother should stand i nthe

same k i n d o f r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h i s y o u n g e r b r o t h e r as t h e f a t h e r

stands t o h i s s o n , t h i s kind o f r e l a t i o n s h i p c a n n o t be m a i n -

tained—particularly a f t e r the f a t h e r i s dead. The f a t h e r c a n

c o n t r o l h i s son because whatever w e a l t h t h e household has i s

i n h i s n a m e , b u t e a c h b r o t h e r h a s h i s own s o u r c e of wealth i f

any. To q u o t e a g a i n f r o m C a r s t a i r s ,

I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e same s u b s e r v i e n c e was p o s t u l a t e d i n
r e l a t i o n t o one's e l d e r brother." As R a j m a l p u t i t :
 54

" i f my f a t h e r o r my e l d e r b r o t h e r t e l l s me t o s t a n d
i n one p l a c e , I ' l l s t a n d t h e r e , d a m m i t , a l l day i f
n e e d b e , u n t i l t h e y t e l l me I c a n move." He was
e x a g g e r a t i n g , b e c a u s e he w a s , i n f a c t , a man o f v e r y
i n d e p e n d e n t s p i r i t ; a n d l i k e some o t h e r y o u n g e r s o n s
i n t h e v i l l a g e , he w e n t h i s own w a y , s e l d o m b o t h e r i n g
to consult h i s elder brother. In general, however,
e l d e r b r o t h e r s were a c c o r d e d , at l e a s t i n p u b l i c ,
t h e d e f e r e n c e due t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e f a m i l y ; a n d
t h e same r e s t r a i n t was o b s e r v e d b y a y o u n g e r b r o t h e r
i n s u p p r e s s i n g a l l show o f a f f e c t i o n t o w a r d s h i s w i f e
a n d c h i l d r e n b e f o r e a n e l d e r b r o t h e r , as b e f o r e h i s
father. As H i r a S i n g h p u t i t : " E v e n I f s h e i s s i c k ,
I w o u l d n o t l i k e t o s a y t h i s t o my e l d e r b r o t h e r —
but i f younger b r o t h e r i s t h e r e , I can t e l l him and
a s k h i m t o go f o r m e d i c i n e . " Hari L a i extended t h i s
category further saying: " E v e r y man h a s g o t f i v e
f a t h e r s , and i t i s h i s d u t y t o obey them w i t h o u t q u e s -
t i o n , w h a t e v e r they ask him t o do. They a r e , h i s
f a t h e r , h i s e l d e r b r o t h e r , h i s k i n g , h i s g u r u , and
his friends."6

I t w o u l d seem f r o m t h e above t h a t t h e distinction

between b r o t h e r s i s p e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t after childhood.

As we s h a l l see in a later chapter, i t i s important that

brothers stick t o g e t h e r i n e c o n o m i c and political matters

b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e m o r e p o w e r as a g r o u p t h a n as I n d i v i d u a l s .

This combined w i t h the power of t r a d i t i o n a l r e s p e c t for the

elder brother means t h a t i t w i l l be the elder brother who

makes d e c i s i o n s after taking into c o n s i d e r a t i o n the attitudes

and desires of h i s younger b r o t h e r . Often the brothers will

maintain joint property e v e n t h o u g h t h e y h a v e s e t up separate

households. The ideal is a joint h o u s e h o l d , ( c f . p. ), but

this is difficult to maintain because the wives so often quar-

r e l with one a n o t h e r a b o u t who i s t o make w h a t k i n d s of deci-

s i o n s w i t h i n the household. (This is particularly true after

the death of the mother-in-law.)

 55

Sometimes b r o t h e r s do q u a r r e l and d e c i d e t o go s e p a r a t e

ways. This i s u s u a l l y at the i n s t i g a t i o n of t h e i r respective

wives. What happens i n e f f e c t i s t h a t t h e w i v e s have forced

t h e i r husbands t o g i v e p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e h u s b a n d - w i f e relation-

ship over the b r o t h e r - b r o t h e r relationship. When t h e b r o t h e r -

brother r e l a t i o n s h i p i s f o r c e d t o give precedence t o other

r e l a t i o n s h i p s i t may b r e a k down c o m p l e t e l y . Brothers actually

j o i n p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s w h i c h a r e opposed q u i t e b i t t e r l y t o

one another. They may even be t h e heads o f t h e s e f a c t i o n s .

( A c t u a l l y i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t f a c t i o n s may be formed i n t h i s

way as we s h a l l see l a t e r . )

SOLIDARITY STRUCTURES AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL

D u r i n g t h e r e s t o f t h i s c h a p t e r I s h a l l be d i s c u s s i n g t h e

s o l i d a r i t y s t r u c t u r e s which e x i s t f o r r e l a t i o n s h i p s a t the

village level. J u s t as t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s t h e b a s i c u n i t o f

t h e h o u s e h o l d so on t h e v i l l a g e l e v e l t h e h o u s e h o l d i s t h e

basic unit. The e l d e s t male i s t h e head o f t h e h o u s e h o l d and

I n any r e l a t i o n s h i p s o u t s i d e of the household at the v i l l a g e

l e v e l t h e head o f h o u s e h o l d r e p r e s e n t s the household. House-

h o l d s a r e i n t e r a c t i n g and t h e p o i n t s of i n t e r a c t i o n ( i n t e r -

s e c t i o n ) a r e t h e r e s p e c t i v e household heads. There a r e e s s e n -

t i a l l y two t y p e s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n t o w h i c h h o u s e h o l d s enter

at the v i l l a g e l e v e l : f i r s t , those i n which caste i s Involved

and s e c o n d , t h o s e w h i c h have t o do w i t h t h e j a j m a n i system

(.cf. p. ).
 56

S O L I D A R I T Y STRUCTURES I N THE CASTE SYSTEM

Solidarity structures order the r e l a t i o n s h i p s which

exist i n b o t h i n t r a c a s t e and I n t e r c a s t e situations. I shall

discuss first the intracaste situation and second t h e i n t e r -

caste situation.

1. Solidarity Structures as They O r d e r I n t r a c a s t e Relationships

I would hypothesize that r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f an i n t r a c a s t e

nature a r e o r d e r e d i n much t h e same f a s h i o n as t h e b r o t h e r -

brother relationships i s ordered. The b e h a v i o u r w h i c h i s

m a n i f e s t e d by t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of brothers i s very similar

t o t h a t m a n i f e s t e d when t h e h o u s e h o l d h e a d s who make up t h e

7
caste panchayat interact. Membership i n t h e caste panchayat

is ascribed t o t h e same d e g r e e t h a t t h e male s i b l i n g group I s

ascribed within the household. R e l a t i v e age i s i m p o r t a n t i n

determining who w i l l b e t h e h e a d o f t h e c a s t e panchayat.

However, i n s t e a d o f r e l a t i v e age as t h e p r i m e selective

f a c t o r f o r panchayat l e a d e r s h i p , I t i s the s i z e and w e a l t h

of the household which the i n d i v i d u a l r e p r e s e n t s . That

i n d i v i d u a l who h a s t h e l a r g e s t a n d w e a l t h i e s t h o u s e h o l d behind

him w i l l be t h e r a n k i n g member o f t h e c a s t e panchayat unless

of c o u r s e h e i s much y o u n g e r t h a n any o f t h e o t h e r panchayat

members. As t h e h e a d o f t h e h o u s e h o l d i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r

the b e h a v i o u r o f a l l t h e members o f t h e h o u s e h o l d , s o t h e

head o f t h e c a s t e p a n c h a y a t w i l l be h e l d responsible f o r the

b e h a v i o u r o f t h e members o f t h e c a s t e _ r e s i d e n t w i t h i n t h e

village. This responsibility i s more t h e o r e t i c a l t h a n real,

 57

although i t does have r e a l i s t i c elements, because, just as the

eldest male of the sibling group does not have absolute

authority over h i s s i b l i n g s and must s e c u r e t h e i r consent

in some s o r t o f h o u s e h o l d c o u n c i l , so that ranking panchayat

member m u s t s e c u r e t h e consent of h i s f e l l o w members. More

simply stated the r a n k i n g member o f the caste panchayat and

the eldest male of the sibling group are each i n t h e i r set-

ting the first among e q u a l s . Like the sibling group there

are t i m e s when o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s take precedence over this

p a r t i c u l a r one. Intercaste relationships seem t o take prece-

dence o v e r i n t r a c a s t e relationships j u s t as the father-son

relationship takes precedence over the brother-brother

relationship.

There i s a g r e a t e r frequency of i n t e r a c t i o n at the intra-

caste l e v e l and l e s s power d i f f e r e n t i a l between the heads of

households i n the same c a s t e and h e n c e t h e r e w o u l d seem to

be a greater p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a f f e c t i o n t o be manifested and

f o r the relationships t o be more i n t i m a t e . The development

of intimate and affectionate relationships depends, I think,

upon the s i z e of the caste. I f there are only f o u r or five

households living within the village i t i s much e a s i e r for

h o u s e h o l d h e a d s t o b e h a v e as s i b l i n g s t o w a r d one another. Just

as one can I m a g i n e i t t o be a difficult thing for a large sib-

ling group to act In concert i n a l l matters so i t is difficult

f o r a c a s t e panchayat of twenty or thirty members t o maintain

a g r e e m e n t on a l l matters a f f e c t i n g them. N o r m a l l y , what happens,

 58

as I s h a l l discuss i n the c h a p t e r on p o l i t i c a l structure,

i s that factions appear. There w i l l be several groups of

h o u s e h o l d heads w i t h i n the p a n c h a y a t - - e a c h group a c t i n g as

a unit with a head who Interacts with the heads of the other

groups.

2. S o l i d a r i t y Structures In I n t e r c a s t e Relationships

I f the b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s m a n i f e s t e d i n intracaste

r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e a r c l o s e r e s e m b l a n c e t o t h o s e of the brother-

b r o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p , then i n t e r c a s t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s bear a

s i m i l a r r e s e m b l a n c e t o the father-son relationship. Just as

the father g i v e s o r d e r s and i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the son and

e x p e c t s them t o be c a r r i e d out so a h i g h e r c a s t e gives

o r d e r s and i n s t r u c t i o n s t o a l o w e r c a s t e and e x p e c t s them

t o be obeyed. As the son i s responsible t o the father and

the father i s responsible f o r the son so w i t h the upper caste

and lower caste. As the son depends upon h i s f a t h e r f o r sup-

p o r t but not vice versa, so the l o w e r c a s t e s depend upon the

upper c a s t e s but not vice versa. As the father-son relation-

s h i p t a k e s p r e c e d e n c e o v e r any o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r the son

but not vice versa, so the upper c a s t e - l o w e r c a s t e relationship

t a k e s p r e c e d e n c e o v e r any other r e l a t i o n s h i p ( a t the village

l e v e l , of c o u r s e ) f o r the lower c a s t e but not vice versa.

Just as the father-son relationship i s cold, distant, and

f o r m a l so the intercaste relationship i s cold, distant, and

formal. As the f a t h e r - s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p appears t o be asymmetri-

c a l so the intercaste relationship appears.

 59

SOLIDARITY STRUCTURES WITHIN THE JAJMANI SYSTEM

The second t y p e o f r e l a t i o n s h i p a t t h e v i l l a g e level

w h i c h i n v o l v e s t h e head o f t h e h o u s e h o l d a c t i n g as t h e r e p r e -

s e n t a t i v e of the u n i t i s the jajman-kamin relationship. This

r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i n content e s s e n t i a l l y an economic one—

a l t h o u g h i t does have d e f i n i t e p o l i t i c a l o v e r t o n e s - - i n which

the kamin i s i n an i n f e r i o r and dependent p o s i t i o n relative

to the j a j m a n . The j a j m a n i s y s t e m w i l l be d i s c u s s e d more

fully In the next c h a p t e r , but i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o l o o k at

the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n terms o f t h e s o l i d a r i t y structures now.

The r e l a t i o n s h i p I s d e f i n e d by t h e t y p e o f s e r v i c e which

i s exchanged between j a j m a n and kamin h o u s e h o l d s . As I n t h e

c a s t e o r i e n t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h e p o i n t o f c o n t a c t i s t h e heads

of t h e two h o u s e h o l d s , b u t i n some ways t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p can

be r e g a r d e d as an u n w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t between two households

so t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p can e x i s t t h r o u g h more t h a n one

generation. I t i s up t o each head o f h o u s e h o l d t o see that

the terms o f t h e agreement a r e l i v e d up t o . I n t h e case o f

the j o i n t h o u s e h o l d — b r o t h e r s a f t e r the death of the father--

it i s t h e e l d e s t b r o t h e r who as head o f h o u s e h o l d assumes t h e

r i g h t s and d u t i e s o f t h e p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g agreement. If

the j a j m a n h o u s e h o l d i s s m a l l and t h e kamin h o u s e h o l d i s l a r g e

i t may be t h a t t h e s e r v i c e s o f o n l y p a r t o f t h e kamin h o u s e h o l d

are needed. I n t h a t case t h e unneeded p o r t i o n o f t h e joint

h o u s e h o l d w i l l have t o f o r m a new relationship with another

jajman. The s i t u a t i o n may, o f c o u r s e , be r e v e r s e d .

 60

The content of the jajman-kamin relationship is very

similar to that of the father-son relationship. The kamin

is in an i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n w i t h respect to the jajman because

of h i s caste and o c c u p a t i o n , and t h e b e h a v i o u r patterns mani-

fested in interaction patterns between the two are very

similar to those between father and s o n . The k a m i n always

shows a great deal of r e s p e c t , deference and o b e d i e n c e to his

jajman. The j a j m a n i n turn expects this and so l o n g as that

kind of behaviour is forthcoming treats the k a m i n as though

he w e r e a s o n .

The r e l a t i o n s h i p for the jajman is not a s t r o n g one just

as it is not for the father in the father-son relationship.

For the kamin the relationship with his jajman may t a k e prece-

dence over any of the others he m i g h t form at the village level.

For example the kamin w i l l observe his o b l i g a t i o n s to his jajman

before he observes the o b l i g a t i o n s he h a s to h i s caste panchayat

SUMMARY

Solidarity structures at the village level operate to

order the s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s - - i n t r a and intercaste

and j a j m a n - k a m i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s — i n a manner v e r y like the

f a t h e r - s o n and b r o t h e r - b r o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s at the household

level. The v i l l a g e c a n be v i e w e d almost as the household

writ large with e a c h h o u s e h o l d as an i n d i v i d u a l w r i t large.

 61

FOOTNOTES

1
T h e f o l l o w i n g books and a r t i c l e s were particularly
useful f o rthe w r i t i n g of t h i s chapter:

(a) A l a n R. R e a l s , Gopalpur (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 2 ) , C h a p t e r I I .

(b) G. M o r r i s C a r s t a i r s , T h e T w i c e B o r n (Bloomington,
1962) , C h a p t e r s 3 a n d 4.

(c) M. L. C o r m a c k , She Who R i d e s a Peacock (New Y o r k ,

1961) .
(d) J o h n T. H i t c h c o c k , "The R a j p u t s o f K h a l a p u r , I n d i a , "
S i x C u l t u r e s , S t u d i e s o f C h i l d R e a r i n g (New Y o r k ,
1963) •
(e) D a v i d G. M a n d e l b a u m , " F a m i l y , J a t i , C a s t e , " S t r u c t u r e
and Change - I n d i a n S o c i e t y , e d . S i n g e r a n d Cohn
( C h i c a g o , 1968).

(f) M a n d e l b a u m , "The F a m i l y - I n d i a , " I n t r o d u c t i o n t o

C i v i l i z a t i o n of India (Chicago).

(g) J o a n M e n c h e r , " G r o w i n g Up - S o u t h M a l a b a r , " Human

O r g a n i z a t i o n 22 : 54-65.

(h) Leigh Minturn, "Child Training," S i x Cultures,

S t u d i e s o f C h i l d R e a r i n g , e d . B e a t r i c e B. W h i t i n g
(New Y o r k , 1 9 6 3 ) •

(i) R. K. N a r a y a n , T h e B a c h e l o r of Arts (East Lansing,

1954) .
M a r i o n J . L e v y , J r . , The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i e t y (New J e r s e y ,
1 9 5 2 ) , p . 350.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., p . 352.
Carstairs, op_. c i t . , p p . 67-8.

^ I b i d . , p . 69 .
7
P a n c h a y a t l i t e r a l l y t r a n s l a t e d means C o u n c i l o f F i v e b u t
g e n e r a l l y i n c l u d e s a l l h o u s e h o l d heads o f t h e c a s t e i n q u e s t i o n .
A l t h o u g h I s h a l l d i s c u s s t h e j a j m a n i s y s t e m more f u l l y i n
a l a t e r c h a p t e r , I s h a l l o u t l i n e b r i e f l y I t s n a t u r e now. I n t h e
j a j m a n i system t h e r e i s a jajman (patron) and a s u r r o u n d i n g
I '' I I
'!;(•; j ;i J iii:j | i i ; :
: I 'J i )
1
I • >V; I 1 • • r '

] ' I. i ;:;; 11; :j. I i

iiii,; w i 1f r'f';; | n..' <' 1. i, <, 1.; i' - '
l:'. i) 1 !.
•, , r i i, j 1111 <,', \ i. \ > r< 1 ! ."'I') " i (.J f! • 1, i i i
1

t /1 i u t ] Iv W fl': 11 ' <l*i' '• o i ' i. I i' ' <

 CHAPTER IV

The Structure of Economic A l l o c a t i o n ^

The processes of e c o n o m i c a l l o c a t i o n m u s t be divided

into two broad categories: the processes of p r o d u c t i o n and

the processes of consumption. This breakdown i s necessary

because the u n i t which i s involved i n production is not

exactly the same as the unit which consumes.

D E F I N I T I O N OF ECONOMIC A L L O C A T I O N

I shall define economic allocation following Levy,

"Economic a l l o c a t i o n i n c o n c r e t e social structures may be

defined as the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the g o o d s and services making

up the income of the concrete structure concerned and of the

g o o d s and e f f o r t s m a k i n g up the output of that structure

among t h e various members o f t h e structure and among the

members o f the structural unit and other structural units

2

with which I t i s i n contact i n these respects." The sub-

structure of economic p r o d u c t i o n i n terms of this definition

includes a l l the structures f r o m whose o p e r a t i o n goods and

services accrue to the concrete structures concerned. The

substructure of consumption includes a l l structures whose

operation ensures the a l l o c a t i o n o f goods and services to the

appropriate concrete structures.

THE SUBSTRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC PRODUCTION

In d e s c r i b i n g the substructure of economic p r o d u c t i o n the

sorts of q u e s t i o n s w h i c h m u s t be answered are who does what to

63
 64

p r o d u c e w h i c h goods and s e r v i c e s . The f i r s t thing that needs

t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i s the n a t u r e of t h e c o n c r e t e production

unit. I t i s not t h e h o u s e h o l d b e c a u s e i t i s n o t l a r g e enough

to d i r e c t l y produce a l l i t consumes. H o u s e h o l d s are bound by

t h e i r c a s t e t o p r o d u c e o n l y one k i n d o f good or s e r v i c e which

i s exchanged f o r the o t h e r n e c e s s a r y goods and s e r v i c e s . And

it I s n o t the v i l l a g e as a whole w h i c h a c t s as a m i n i m a l p r o -

d u c t i o n u n i t because t h e r e are s e v e r a l p r o d u c t i o n u n i t s coexisting

I n the v i l l a g e . ( A l t h o u g h the v i l l a g e can be c o n s i d e r e d as a

unit with respect t o the s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d by such c a s t e groups

as the s w e e p e r s , this is really a rather special case.)

The b a s i c p r o d u c t i o n u n i t i s on a s c a l e i n terms of

numbers o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d somewhere between the household

and the v i l l a g e . I t I s a m u l t i h o u s e h o l d , m u l t i c a s t e group w i t h

one o f t h e h o u s e h o l d s r e c o g n i z e d by the r e s t as m a n a g e r i a l and

the r e s t of t h e h o u s e h o l d s r a n k e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r c a s t e and

c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the g r o u p . These groups as u n i t s o f p r o d u c -

tion exist o v e r a l l of I n d i a and c e r t a i n l y t h r o u g h o u t northern

India. T h i s u n i t has many names d e p e n d i n g upon the language

of the a r e a , b u t , i n general, at l e a s t s i n c e W i s e r ' s 1936 study,

The H i n d u J a j m a n i S y s t e m , i t has been known as the jajmani

system.

THE JAJMANI SYSTEM

The j a j m a n i system comes i n t o e x i s t e n c e because o f the

caste system. H o u s e h o l d s are c o n f i n e d t o c a r r y i n g out only

one o f the t a s k s of p r o d u c t i o n because o f t h e i r c a s t e . As a

 65

result a fairly elaborate system of reciprocal exchanges

develops. Each h o u s e h o l d depends upon t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f

other households a n d some k i n d o f s y s t e m m u s t be d e v e l o p e d

to ensure r e c i p r o c i t y between households. The resulting

system i s the jajmani system. Each h o u s e h o l d has a l l t h e

o t h e r h o u s e h o l d s i n t h e s y s t e m as a j a j m a n - - i n o t h e r w o r d s ,

each h o u s e h o l d i n t h e system s e r v e s a l l t h e o t h e r h o u s e h o l d s .

And i n turn a l lthe other households serve a single household.

Thus e a c h h o u s e h o l d s h o u l d r e c e i v e a l lthat i s necessary to

ensure survival. F o r example, t h e p o t t e r makes p o t s f o r a

group composed o f h o u s e h o l d s o f other castes which i n turn

supply the potter with t h e goods t h e y p r o d u c e . Each potter

is a member o f a s i m i l a r group. However, j u s t as i t I s c a s t e

t h a t makes t h i s elaborate system n e c e s s a r y , so i t i s c a s t e that

causes t h i s s y s t e m t o be a n y t h i n g b u t t h e e g a l i t a r i a n model I t

seems.

To show how t h e j a j m a n i system a c t u a l l y works I shall

make u s e o f t h e d a t a w h i c h O s c a r L e w i s p r o v i d e s I n h i s 1958
4
study of the v i l l a g e o f Rampur i n U t t a r Pradesh.

1. The J a j m a n i S y s t e m as i t O p e r a t e s i n Rampur

There a r e 150 households i n residence i n Rampur village.

There are twelve castes represented i n the v i l l a g e with the

following distribution: "Seventy-eight J a t i f a m i l i e s , fifteen

Brahmin, t w e n t y Chamar (leatherworker), t e n Bhangi (sweeper),

s e v e n Kumhar (potter), five Jhinvar (water c a r r i e r ) , four

Dhobi (washerman), f o u r K h a t i (carpenter), three Nai (barber),

 66

two Chip! (calicao printer or t a i l o r ) , one L o h a r (blacksmith),

and one B a n i y a (merchant)." T h u s 52% o f t h e h o u s e h o l d s i n

the village are J a t i . ^ This preponderance i s made e v e n greater

when i t i s c o n s i d e r e d that J a t i households a r e on t h e a v e r a g e

larger than the households of other castes. The p e r c e n t a g e o f

Jatis by n u m e r i c a l count i s e x a c t l y 59%. The n e x t three largest

groups account f o r n o t q u i t e 25%. The o t h e r eight castes total

just over 15% of the resident population.

The village o f Rampur i s l o c a t e d i n a n a r e a w h i c h i s

dominated by t h e J a t i caste and t h e v i l l a g e s a r e k n o w n as Jati

villages. In other parts o f t h e U.P. the Rajputs or the Thakurs

are t h e dominant caste and I n s t i l l other areas t h e r e may be

other castes who d o m i n a t e . A t any r a t e t h e t y p i c a l pattern

is f o r one c a s t e to numerically dominate the v i l l a g e . Although

in the J a t i areas o f U.P. one e x p e c t s t h e dominant caste t o be

Jati the presence of other castes i n the v i l l a g e as w e l l as

their n u m b e r s i s n o t n e a r l y as p r e d i c t a b l e . Unlike Rampur

there may be v i l l a g e s i n which there are only two o r t h r e e

households o f B r a h m i n s a n d C h a m a r s a n d more D h o b i s , Bhangis,

and Lohars.

Not only do t h e J a t i s dominate n u m e r i c a l l y i n Rampur,

they a l s o own o v e r 90% o f t h e 784 acres of land w i t h i n the

boundaries of the v i l l a g e i n c l u d i n g the land on w h i c h t h e vil-

lage residences are b u i l t . Landholdings vary i n size, and

twelve of the J a t i h o u s e h o l d s depend c o m p l e t e l y upon sources

other than the land f o r their livelihood. Although this

 67

situation i s not too unusual today, i t should be pointed out

that i n the past and f o r many v i l l a g e s today there is no

outside source of income. There are an additional 30 house-

holds, some o f w h o s e members a c q u i r e Income f r o m n o n v i l l a g e

sources. There a r e , i n f a c t , only 36 Jati households which

rely completely on the land they own for their livelihood.

Among t h e other castes the percentage of those relying upon

outside sources f o r income i s q u i t e h i g h . Indeed, there are

few of the o t h e r c a s t e s who rely completely upon s o u r c e s of

income w i t h i n the village. For both Jatis and non-Jatis this

is a r e l a t i v e l y new phenomenon. Previously virtually the only

source of income l a y w i t h i n the village and i t Is i n this con-

text that I shall examine the jajmani system, f o r i t i s only

in this context t h a t the j a j m a n i system can actually work.

As l o n g as h o u s e h o l d s m u s t l o o k i n w a r d s towards the village

t h e y must work w i t h i n t h e system.

As I pointed out earlier i n the chapter, the jajmani

system i n theory i s a set of r e c i p r o c a l exchanges between

h o u s e h o l d s a l l o f whom i n c a r r y i n g o u t their daily tasks pro-

vide each other w i t h the goods and services necessary for

survival. Each household serves a l l the other households and

all o f them s e r v e each household. When b e i n g served the

household i s known as jajman and when s e r v i n g t h e household

is known as k a m i n . T h e s e two t e r m s mean r o u g h l y master and

servant respectively, so t h a t an individual household should

be both m a s t e r and servant to a l l the other households in the

group. This however, i s n o t h i n g like what t h e system really

 68

is. Were i t s o t h e k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s between households

would more c l o s e l y resemble those o f a group of s i b l i n g s .

There would b e some g i v e a n d t a k e , some semblence of equality,

m u t u a l r e s p e c t f o r one a n o t h e r , e t c .

Par from b e i n g a w e l l - b a l a n c e d system f o r the production

and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f goods and s e r v i c e s , i t i s rather a repressive

and coercive system i n which c e r t a i n households are able t o

almost c o m p l e t e l y dominate other households. I t resembles,

in f a c t , the father-son relationship quite closely from a l l

Indications. Ideally the jajman-kamin relationship is a

voluntary one i n w h i c h each of the households i s able t o opt

out s h o u l d i t be f e l t necessary. The j a j m a n h a s t h e r i g h t t o

sever the r e l a t i o n s h i p s h o u l d the kamin not p r o v i d e adequate

service and t h e kamin has a s i m i l a r r i g h t should the jajman

fail to live up t o h i s o b l i g a t i o n s . In reality severing the

relationship i s more p o s s i b l e than probable f o r the household

which i s i n the p o s i t i o n o f kamin. In reality each household

is k n o w n i n t h e v i l l a g e as e i t h e r j a j m a n h o u s e h o l d o r as a

kamin household. A household i n t h e v i l l a g e i s known t o a l l

other households as e i t h e r jajman o r kamin and t h i s i s a f i x e d

status. Those h o u s e h o l d s which a r e k n o w n as j a j m a n households

are those which own l a n d - - t h o s e t h a t do n o t own l a n d a r e known

as k a m i n s . In addition to this 'either/or' ranking, households

are ranked w i t h i n either group. The p o o r e r J a t i households

(poorer g e n e r a l l y because t h e y own o n l y s m a l l amounts o f l a n d )

are jajmans but not n e a r l y t o t h e same e x t e n t a s t h e w e a l t h y

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Jati households. I n some w a y s t h e y are considered jajmans

only because they a r e . o f the same c a s t e as the wealthy jaj-

mans. By the same t o k e n some k a m i n s a r e more d e p e n d e n t than

others on their jajmans and t o the extent t h a t they are depen-

dent they take on a g r e a t e r amount o f t h e quality of 'kamin-

ness . ' The kamin i s i n r e a l i t y the servant of the jajman and

the extent t o w h i c h he m u s t be just a servant d e p e n d s on his

importance to the jajman.

A test of the m u t u a l i t y of the jajman-kamin relationship

and the respect each has f o r the other i s to observe the

n u m b e r o f c a s t e s w h i c h any one caste serves and the number

of castes which are i n turn servants to that caste. This is

g

one of the aspects which Wiser looked a t and i t is obvious

that there are some c a s t e s w h i c h o n l y s e r v e and are not served

in turn. These i n c l u d e the v e r y low castes which are responsib

for carrying out the tasks which the h i g h e r castes designate

as b e i n g ritually polluting (e.g., removing waste of either

human o r a n i m a l origin from the village confines). These

castes are jajmans t o no one and they are kamins to a l l . They

must p e r f o r m a l l the services necessary for their survival for

themselves and they must s t i l l depend upon the village (e.g.,

the jajmans) f o r g i f t s of food.

The role of kamin i s , then, essentially a servile one,

but I t i s a matter of degree--that i s , one has more o r less

of the quality of 'kaminness' which d i c t a t e s the appropriate

pattern of b e h a v i o r w i t h the jajman. The variation extends

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from a r e l a t i o n s h i p which has elements o f e q u a l i t y about i t

to a relationship with i m p l i c a t i o n s of complete i n e q u a l i t y .

At one p o l e t h e j a j m a n - k a m i n r e l a t i o n s h i p may approach the

ideal and a t t h e o t h e r pole i t may approach very nearly the

opposite of the i d e a l . The j a j m a n - k a m i n r e l a t i o n s h i p a p p r o a c h e s

the i d e a l when t h e two h o u s e h o l d s i n v o l v e d are of roughly the

same s t a t u s i n the r i t u a l hierarchy and each o f f e r s t o the

other what i s c o n s i d e r e d b y e a c h t o be a n i m p o r t a n t service,

and i t i s f u r t h e s t when t h e t w o h o u s e h o l d s are separated by

great ritual distance a n d when t h e n e e d o f one f o r t h e other

is greater than the reverse. It is difficult, i f not impos-

sible, to generalize about which castes will or w i l l not enter

into a jajman-kamin r e l a t i o n s h i p with a modicam o f e q u a l i t y .

One m u s t f i r s t e s t a b l i s h t h e c a s t e of the jajmans i n the vil-

lage. This is fairly easily done by a s k i n g any o f t h e r e s i d e n t s

what k i n d o f v i l l a g e i ti s . I n Rampur t h e a n s w e r w o u l d be that

It i s a Jati village. Most o f the v i l l a g e s i n the v i c i n i t y of

Rampur are J a t i villages. Further t o t h e e a s t , where most o f

the village land i s owned b y R a j p u t s , the v i l l a g e s a r e known

as Rajput villages and t h e R a j p u t s m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d the j a j -

mans i n t h o s e villages.

I n Rampur Jatis are not very h i g h l y ranked i n the ritual

hierarchy. Their patterns of behaviour preclude high ritual

status (based on t h e t y p e of food they e a t a n d i t s mode o f

preparation as w e l l a s t h e f a c t that they a l l o w widow remar-

riage. Their jajman status i s based s o l e l y on t h e f a c t that

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they own the village lands. Thus t h e y are able to form a

relationship with some o f t h e h i g h e r artisan castes which

is based on r e c i p r o c a l n e e d s and i s not over coloured by

ritual differences. T h i s w o u l d be particularly true with

respect to the Brahmin p r i e s t . The Rajput jajmans to the

east a r e much h i g h e r on the ritual h i e r a r c h y and the ritual

d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n them and n e a r l y a l l of the other castes

(perhaps w i t h the exception of the Brahmin p r i e s t s ) prevents

to a l a r g e degree any approximation to the ideal jajman-

kamin relationship.

In a d d i t i o n t o the r e l a t i v e position i n the ritual hier-

archy as a method of d e t e r m i n i n g the amount o f e q u a l i t y there

will be i n the jajman-kamin r e l a t i o n s h i p , one must a l s o con-

sider the size of the resident population of each c a s t e as

well as the fact t h a t some c a s t e s p e r f o r m a fairly specialized

task. The Kumhars are a typical example of t h i s combination

of f a c t o r s . Everyone i n the village needs c l a y pots for con-

9
tainers o f one sort or a n o t h e r . There i s , however, a definite

limit to the number o f p o t s t h a t the v i l l a g e can use. As long

as there are o n l y enough or not q u i t e e n o u g h Kumhar households

to meet t h e n e e d s of the village their s e r v i c e s are In demand.

The other castes do not have a c h o i c e as t o whom t h e y will

patronize. I f there i s a dire shortage the village may even

make e f f o r t s to persuade another, o u t s i d e r Kumhar household

to come l i v e i n the village. Various kinds of advantages will

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be o f f e r e d t o get them t o l e a v e t h e v i l l a g e t h e y are already

s e r v i n g - - t h e p r i m e one w i l l be t h a t t h e j a j m a n - k a m i n r e l a t i o n -

s h i p w i l l have l e s s emphasis on s e r v i l i t y . I f t h e r e a r e more

Kumhar h o u s e h o l d s t h a n t h e v i l l a g e has needs t h e n t h e Kumhars

are i n a more d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n . They have s e v e r a l courses

o f a c t i o n open t o them--none o f w h i c h a r e v e r y a p p e a l i n g i n

t h e eyes o f t h e Kumhars. The f i r s t o p t i o n i s t h a t each house-

hold w i l l c o n t i n u e t o make p o t s b u t I n s m a l l e r q u a n t i t i e s thus

r e d u c i n g t h e i r income. The second o p t i o n i s t h a t some o f the

households cease t o make p o t s and become t e n a n t s of the jajmans

or worse (and p r o b a b l y more l i k e l y ) l a n d l e s s labourers. This

course of a c t i o n i s l i k e l y t o be r e s i s t e d because i t w o u l d l o w e r

t h e i r o v e r a l l status i n t h e eyes o f t h e o t h e r c a s t e s - - i t would

lower the s t a t u s even o f t h o s e who a r e s t i l l m a k i n g p o t s . The

third alternative is f o r some o f t h e h o u s e h o l d s t o l e a v e the

v i l l a g e i n s e a r c h o f o t h e r v i l l a g e s w h i c h do not have an o v e r

supply of p o t t e r s . T h i s i s u n d e s i r a b l e b e c a u s e i t means leaving

b e h i n d e s t a b l i s h e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h f a m i l y , f r i e n d s and p o l i t i -

c a l and economic p a t r o n s . There are seven Kumhar h o u s e h o l d s in

Rampur. I do not have any i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e d e s i r a b l e (from

t h e Kumhar v i e w p o i n t ) h o u s e h o l d r a t i o , but I would s u s p e c t that

i n Rampur the Kumhars w o u l d l i k e t o be l e s s numerous.

The Chamars are a n o t h e r e x a m p l e . T h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l occupa-

t i o n i s t h a t o f r e m o v i n g dead a n i m a l s from the s t r e e t s and

fields of the v i l l a g e . T h e i r income i s d e r i v e d from t h e p r o -

d u c t s w h i c h they can make from the dead a n i m a l s " ^ ( e . g . , leather

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buckets f o r the P e r s i a n water wheels, sandals, traces for

bullocks, etc.), the meat o f t h e dead a n i m a l s as w e l l as a

certain amount o f t h e agricultural produce of the village at

harvest time. The Chamars a r e a very low caste group. (In

some a r e a s they are not part of the caste system being regarded

as untouchables.) In each v i l l a g e the needs for this kind of

occupation are small, only enough t o support a couple of house-

holds. I n Rampur t h e r e are twenty Chamar h o u s e h o l d s . This

is o b v i o u s l y more t h a n i s needed so t h a t they have been forced

into one of the three alternatives suggested f o r the Kumhars

above. They have n o t moved o u t of the village because a l l of

the other villages i n the a r e a have the same p r o b l e m . There

are just too many h o u s e h o l d s f o r them t o s p l i t up the a v a i l a b l e

income. Thus t h e y have had t o become t h e servants and part

time field hands f o r the Jati farmers who have need for their

labour. Because there are s o many o f t h e m t h e y h a v e no real

b a r g a i n i n g power w i t h i n the jajmani system. 1 1

A caste only has

b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r when i t h a s a l t e r n a t i v e ways o f securing the

requisite income f o r survival.

Aside from the ritual d i s t a n c e between the K u m h a r s who are

a fairly high caste group and the C h a m a r s who are definitely

low c a s t e , the Kumhars have a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the jajmani

system because they are not tied to a single jajman. Rather

they serve s e v e r a l jajmans and can play the jajmans off one

against the other. I f they are not t r e a t e d t h e way they feel

they should be by a particular jajman, they can simply stop

making pots f o r the household. C h a m a r s a r e much more likely

to be t i e d to a p a r t i c u l a r jajman.

Thus t h e q u a l i t y of 'kaminness' depends upon the c a s t e

of t h e j a j m a n and t h e c a s t e o f t h e k a m i n as w e l l as t h e size

of the caste to which the kamin b e l o n g s .

Just as t h e r e a r e d e g r e e s of 'kaminness' so t h e r e a r e

degrees of 'jajmanness.' A l l of the J a t i households i n the

village partake of t h i s quality. None o f t h e o t h e r castes,

including the Brahmin, would be c o n s i d e r e d as j a j m a n s . A l l

Jati households i n the v i l l a g e are e n t i t l e d t o equal r e s p e c t

by a l l of the o t h e r h o u s e h o l d s , but t h i s i s o n l y by virtue

of b e l o n g i n g t o the J a t i caste. I t i s not d i f f i c u l t f o r the

individuals living i n the v i l l a g e to determine which of the

jajmans are 'hangers-on' and w h i c h are not. There are b i g

jajmans and little jajmans.

The J a t i s a r e t h e j a j m a n s by virtue of the land which

they own. T h o s e who own t h e most l a n d are those which have

more o f t h e q u a l i t y of 'jajmanness.' Of t h e 78 Jati house-

holds I n Rampur o n l y 28 h a v e more t h a n t e n a c r e s o f l a n d . I

would suggest that those households which own less than ten

acres of land are the hangers-on because these households

probably do n o t h a v e s u f f i c i e n t s u r p l u s after feeding them-

selves and m e e t i n g r i t u a l obligations t o command m o r e than

12
minimally the s e r v i c e s of the other castes. They w i l l have

very little basis for reciprocation with other castes.

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Of t h e 2 8 h o u s e h o l d s owning more t h a n 1 0 a c r e s , there

are 14 h o u s e h o l d s w h i c h own b e t w e e n 1 0 a n d 14 a c r e s , s i x

which own b e t w e e n 14 a n d 1 8 a c r e s , t h r e e w h i c h own between

18 and 22 a c r e s , t h r e e which own b e t w e e n 2 2 a n d 25 a c r e s , a n d

13

two w h i c h own more t h a n 2 5 a c r e s . One o f t h e l a t t e r two

owns j u s t over 50 acres. Only those jajman with considerable

l a n d h o l d i n g s c a n command t h e s e r v i c e s o f l a r g e numbers o f

kamins. A household which owns 2 5 a c r e s r e q u i r e s the services

of a l a r g e number o f l a b o u r e r s . These h o u s e h o l d s require the

services o f o t h e r c a s t e s t o meet t h e i r needs. I f there are

enough h o u s e h o l d s involved then the i n d i v i d u a l castes involved

will h a v e e n o u g h w o r k t o do a n d r e m a i n t i e d to the entire group.

For e x a m p l e t h e j a j m a n may h a v e a t t a c h e d t o h i m e n o u g h house-

holds to require the f u l l - t i m e services o f a Kumhar h o u s e h o l d .

This household w i l l be l o y a l t o t h e group because they provide

it with the services i t needs t o s u r v i v e . A s we s h a l l see i n

the next chapter i t i s t o the p o l i t i c a l advantage o f the jajman

to have a l a r g e following o f kamins who a r e l o y a l t o him and t o

the rest o f t h e group. Thus t h e l a r g e r jajmans w i l l t r yto

increase the size of t h e i r following. The l a r g e r the following

the more p o l i t i c a l p o w e r t h e j a j m a n h a s a n d t h e more political

p o w e r he h a s t h e e a s i e r i t i s t o a c q u i r e more l a n d . As c a n be

seen t h e process o f c u m u l a t i v e ( c i r c u l a r ) causation I s a t work

in t h e economic activity of the jajman households.

There are 28 households i n Rampur w h i c h could form the

nucleus o f a jajman-kamin group. Not a l l o f t h e s e households

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have done s o . There just a r e n o t enough kamins t o go around.

Only t h e l a r g e s t land owners w i l l be a b l e t o d e v e l o p this

kind o f group. The s m a l l e r landowners are not l e f t out i n

the cold, rather they j o i n with the larger landowner to form

a rather c o h e s i v e economic unit which shares the services of

the other castes. Thus w i t h i n a n y one v i l l a g e there w i l l be

several of these units consisting of the jajman, other

cooperating, lesser j a j m a n , and a s u r r o u n d i n g group o f kamins.

The j a j m a n a s s u m e s w h a t may b e t e r m e d a managerial role which,

as I m e n t i o n e d i n t h e c h a p t e r on s o l i d a r i t y structures, takes

on some o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s of the father role i n the household.

A l t h o u g h much o f t h e a c t u a l f a r m i n g i s done b y J a t i households,

some o f t h e k a m i n households w i l l provide additional labour

either as t e n a n t s o r a s d a y l a b o u r e r s . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between

these households and t h e j a j m a n w i l l be c l o s e r t h a n t h e r e l a t i o n -

ship with any o f t h e o t h e r kamins because farming i s the primary

activity of t h e group. The n e x t closest ring o f kamin house-

holds includes t h o s e who p r o v i d e g o o d s a n d s k i l l s which neither

the jajman nor the labouring households p o s s e s s o r do n o t h a v e

the time t o pursue. T h i s group includes the smith, the c a r -

ill

penter, the potter, the t a i l o r , etc. The o u t e r m o s t ring of

kamin households which surrounds the jajman c o n s i s t of castes

who f o l l o w occupations which are r i t u a l l y impossible f o r the

jajman and t h e o t h e r kamins. This l o tincludes such o c c u p a t i o n s

as t h e b a r b e r , t h e w a t e r c a r r i e r , and t h e washerman.

All of these castes, with t h e j a j m a n o p e r a t i n g as a manager

at t h e c e n t e r , work t o g e t h e r i n such f a s h i o n t h a t their needs,

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both r i t u a l l y and physically, a r e more o r l e s s satisfied.

Their needs w i l l be m o r e s a t i s f i e d i f t h e y a r e h i g h e r on

the p r i o r i t y list and less i f t h e y a r e low on t h e list.

The members o f t h i s s y s t e m assume p r i o r i t y i n the order that

I described immediately a b o v e when o u t l i n i n g their respective

contributions to the g r o u p — t h e jajman as m a n a g e r , t h e

l a b o u r e r as farmer, the s e r v i c e castes for their skills,

and t h e s e r v a n t c a s t e s f o r p e r f o r m i n g r i t u a l l y polluting

jobs.

Not a l l of the households i n the v i l l a g e are eligible

f o r membership i n the j a j m a n i system. The Chamars and the

Bhangis a r e o u t c a s t e s o r u n t o u c h a b l e s and h e n c e can never

become p a r t of the system. They a r e , i n e f f e c t , kamins to

the v i l l a g e as a u n i t . They s e r v i c e the e n t i r e village, but

do n o t r e c e i v e services i n return. What f o o d t h e y r e c e i v e i s

more i n t h e n a t u r e o f c h a r i t y t h a n as s o m e t h i n g due for serv-

ices rendered. Failure to perform this service can and does

lead t o such punishment as a s e v e r e beating.

The jajmani system as d e s c r i b e d above, then, i s a system

which o p e r a t e s t o e n s u r e t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f goods and services

needed t o s u s t a i n the i n d i v i d u a l households within the village.

In saying that the jajmani system i s the b a s i c production unit,

I am not saying that the unit is totally self-sufficient.

There a r e some i t e m s w h i c h cannot e v e n be produced by the

village as a w h o l e l e t a l o n e by t h e j a j m a n i system. Items

s u c h as s a l t h a v e t o be p u r c h a s e d outside of the village,

 78

b u t by and l a r g e e v e r y t h i n g n e e d e d by t h e u n i t could be

produced by i t s members.

The jajmani system i s a r a t h e r u n i q u e way o f h a n d l i n g

the p r o d u c t i o n needs o f a s o c i e t y . I t seems t o h a v e developed

in response t o t h e needs o f a s o c i e t y which has very rigid

caste boundaries. There m u s t b e some k i n d of structure which

can c o o r d i n a t e t h e e f f o r t s of a l l the castes. That I ti s

r a t h e r unique c a n be s e e n w h e n i t i s c o m p a r e d w i t h other

agrarian societies . Normally the production unit i n other

societies i s the household. There seems t o b e more division

of labour w i t h i n the household and n o t q u i t e s o much between

households. A l l households carry o u t r o u g h l y t h e same tasks

necessary f o r s u r v i v a l r a t h e r than d i v i d i n g up t h e t a s k s

between households.

THE SUBSTRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC CONSUMPTION

I have s a i d above t h a t the basic unit of production In

the Indian v i l l a g e i s a group of households consisting of a

j a j m a n h o u s e h o l d and a v a r y i n g number o f a s s o c i a t e d kamin

households. The c o m b i n e d activities o f t h e kamin households,

under t h e management of the jajman produce the r e q u i s i t e

goods and s e r v i c e s t o meet a t l e a s t t h e minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s

of t h e whole group. Distribution of the produce occurs i n

one o f two ways: goods f l o w I n t o t h e hands o f t h e manager

for future redistribution among t h e m e m b e r s ; a n d / o r , s e r v i c e s

and goods a r e t r a d e d between t h e kamin households as w e l l as

between t h e j a j m a n and kamins.

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The substructure of consumption i s ,like the substructure

of production, complicated. I n some I n s t a n c e s i t i s t h e

jajman-kamin group which i s the basic consumption u n i t and

in other cases I t I s the i n d i v i d u a l household. I t Is possible

to differentiate these instances on t h e b a s i s of the direction

and flow o f t h e goods and s e r v i c e s produced. I n o t h e r words

the substructure o f consumption i s tied Intimately with the

process of d i s t r i b u t i o n . Those goods and s e r v i c e s which are

produced by kamins and c o l l e c t e d by t h e j a j m a n t o be distri-

buted at a l a t e r d a t e t o o t h e r kamins are instances of the

whole group acting as a c o n s u m p t i o n u n i t . I t I s the jajman

who d e c i d e s w h i c h h o u s e h o l d w i l l g e t how much o f t h e t o t a l

product. This occurs p r i m a r i l y with respect t o t h e consump-

tion of agricultural products.

When K a m i n h o u s e h o l d s e x c h a n g e g o o d s among t h e m s e l v e s

with t h e j a j m a n as i n t e r m e d i a r y i t I s the household which i s

acting as t h e c o n s u m p t i o n u n i t because i t i s the household

w h i c h makes t h e c h o i c e as t o what i t w i l l t a k e f o r consump-

tion purposes i n exchange f o r i t s products — in other words,

when t h e d e c i s i o n rests with the household.

It can perhaps be s a i d that this i s an u n n e c e s s a r y distinc-

tion, but the fact that t h e k a m i n h o u s e h o l d may n o t b e g r a n t e d

as much f o r c o n s u m p t i o n a s i t h a s p r o d u c e d makes t h e d i s t i n c t i o n

warranted. So l o n g a s t h e j a j m a n h a s t h e p o w e r t o f o r c e a sur-

plus from the p r o d u c t i o n u n i t I think I t i s a necessary dis-

tinction. The s i z e of the surplus which t h e j a j m a n keeps back

 80

depends upon h i s power i n the village as w e l l as w h e t h e r or

not the kamin h o u s e h o l d s have a v i a b l e alternative (whether

or not there exists the possibility t h a t the kamin household

can enter another production unit).

Generally speaking the s u r p l u s which the jajman i s able

to command i s a v e r y small percentage of the total product of

the p r o d u c t i o n u n i t . The t o t a l product of the p r o d u c t i o n unit

is b a r e l y able to cover the consumption needs of the unit . In

many c a s e s i f there i s a s u r p l u s I t Is only because the con-

sumption u n i t In terms of the individual households is not

granted e v e n t h e minimum. When t h i s happens the individual

household must l o o k e l s e w h e r e f o r the rest of the necessary

income. Often the only course o f a c t i o n i s t o b o r r o w money

from the jajman and this I s one o f t h e most e f f e c t i v e means

at the d i s p o s a l of the jajman to ensure t h a t h i s kamins remain

within his group.

As we shall see i n the following chapter on the s t r u c t u r e

of p o l i t i c a l allocation the s t r u c t u r e of economic allocation

is extremely important i n terms of the decision-making process.

As i n any social system of t h i s nature the separation of eco-

nomic and political allocation can occur only analytically.

C h a n g e s i n any concrete structure w i l l effect other concrete

structures and this i s what I s h a l l t r y t o show i n t h e last

chapter on social change.

To s u m m a r i z e , t h e n , what I have d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s chapter,

an economic s t r u c t u r e has developed which i s designed to

 81

overcome a v e r y r i g i d caste s y s t e m such t h a t a l l c a s t e s a r e

a b l e t o more o r l e s s r e c e i v e t h o s e goods and s e r v i c e s neces-

sary f o r s u r v i v a l .
 82

FOOTNOTES

"'"Of p a r t i c u l a r u s e in writing this chapter I would

i n c l u d e the f o l l o w i n g :

a) F. G. B a i l e y , C a s t e a n d t h e E c o n o m i c Frontier
( M a n c h e s t e r , 1957), C h a p t e r s 4-7-

b) Thomas 0. B e i d e l m a n , A C o m p a r a t i v e A n a l y s i s o f t h e
J a j m a n i System, Monographs of the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r
A s i a n S t u d i e s (New Y o r k , 1 9 5 9 ) , C h a p t e r s 1 a n d 2.

c) T. S c a r l e t t E p s t e i n , E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t a n d
S o c i a l C h a n g e - S o u t h I n d i a ( M a n c h e s t e r , 1962) ,
C h a p t e r s 2 a n d 5-

d) M a r i o n J . L e v y , J r . , The S t r u c t u r e of Society
( P r i n c e t o n , 1 9 5 2 ) , C h a p t e r 9.

e) Albert Mayer, P i l o t Project - India, 1958.

f) Kusam N a i r , Blossoms - The Dust (New York, 1962).

g) W. H. W i s e r , The Hindu J a j m a n i System (Lucknow, 1936),

C h a p t e r 1.
2
Levy, op_. c i t . , p . 330.
3
W i s e r , op. c i t .
^Oscar Lewis, V i l l a g e L i f e - Northern India (New York,
1958) .

^ I b i d . , p. 15•

^ J a t i s are a farmer caste. As l a n d o w n e r s t h e y may n o t

have t o work i n the f i e l d s but t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l o c c u p a t i o n
is that of farming.

L e w i s , op_. c i t . , p. 98.

W i s e r , op_. c i t . , p. 9-

^The K u m h a r s h a v e e n c o u n t e r e d more s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s
t h a n p o p u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e s . The m a n u f a c t u r e o f b r a s s a n d a l u m -
i n u m p o t s has p u t a l a r g e number o f p o t t e r s o u t o f work. Clay
p o t s a r e n o t n e a r l y as d u r a b l e as b r a s s o r a l u m i n u m .
1 0
T h e Chamars, l i k e the Kumhars, have almost c o m p l e t e l y
l o s t t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l means o f l i v e l i h o o d . V i l l a g e r s c a n g e t
b e t t e r q u a l i t y cheaper products from the c i t i e s .
 83

A l t h o u g h t h e y h a v e no p o w e r w i t h i n t h e j a j m a n i s y s t e m ,
t h e same c a n n o t be s a i d when t h e j a j m a n i s y s t e m b e g i n s t o
b r e a k down. I s h a l l d i s c u s s t h i s more f u l l y i n t h e l a s t
chapter.
12
O u t s i d e sources of income i n c l u d e : T e a c h i n g , army a n d
p o l i c e s e r v i c e , c l e r k s and d r i v e r s f o r t h e p o s t o f f i c e and
n e a r b y m i l l s and f a c t o r i e s , and p e n s i o n s . Obviously not a l l
v i l l a g e s w i l l be n e a r e n o u g h t o s u c h s o u r c e s o f i n c o m e t o t a k e
advantage o f them. Because t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i s extremely l i m i t e d ,
v i l l a g e s w i t h a h i g h p e r c e n t a g e o f o u t s i d e i n c o m e m u s t be l o c a t e d
quite near l a r g e r c i t i e s .
13
Lewis p o i n t s out t h a t v i l l a g e r s r e c k o n a h o u s e h o l d w i t h
o x e n r e q u i r e s 12.5 a c r e s t o l i v e p r o p e r l y . H o w e v e r , 15 h o u s e -
h o l d s h a v e o x e n a n d l a n d h o l d i n g s o f l e s s t h a n 12.5 a c r e s a n d
s t i l l seem t o s u r v i v e . I t i s f o r t h i s reason that I set ten
a c r e s as t h e l o w e r l i m i t .
14 L e w i s , op. c i t . , P P • 97-101.
 CHAPTER V

Political Activity Within the V i l l a g e

It will b e my h y p o t h e s i s i n this chapter that although

political activity i s widespread, i tw i l l have as i t s s o l e

object the c o n t r o l of land w i t h i n the v i l l a g e . The i m p l i c a -

tions of this statement are that there i s very little politi-

cal activity among t h e l o w e r castes except as t h e y serve as

instruments o f the upper castes i n the struggle f o rcontrol

over land. I h e s i t a t e to state that there I s no political

activity among t h e l o w e r castes because I would also hypothesize

among t h e l o w e r castes because I would also hypothesize that

the sanskritization process first d e s c r i b e d by S r i n i v a s (cf.

p. ) i s a form o f p o l i t i c a l activity p r a c t i c e d by t h e lower

castes. (I shall deal with this In a later section of this

chapter.)

In the majority of v i l l a g e s i n North I n d i a one c a s t e owns

all or at least a very high percentage of the v i l l a g e lands.

Actually i t I s t h e i n d i v i d u a l h o u s e h o l d w h i c h owns t h e l a n d ,

but o n l y members o f a p a r t i c u l a r caste are allowed t o own

land. The l a n d may b e a l i e n a t e d b y t h e h o u s e h o l d , but p o l i t i -

cal pressure I s s u c h t h a t o n l y members o f t h e l a n d owning caste

will purchase i t . A l i e n a t i o n i s always the l a s t resort, how-

ever, f o r i t means a l o s s o f p o l i t i c a l power. Increase or

decrease of acreage i s an i n d i c a t i o n of either an i n c r e a s e i n

political power o r a decrease.

84
 85

Normally a h o u s e h o l d does not c o n t r o l enough l a n d to

h a v e much p o w e r w i t h i n t h e village so t h a t t o g a i n power the

i n d i v i d u a l h o u s e h o l d must combine w i t h other households.

This combination of s e v e r a l households is called a faction

by most w r i t e r s 1
who have observed political activity within

the village. Generally speaking the households which combine

are k i n o f one s o r t or another. Often a sibling group will

form the nucleus of such a combination. These f a c t i o n s are

fairly s t a b l e i n the short run (i.e. five or ten y e a r s ) , but

in the long run there i s considerable shifting of alliances.

In order for a faction to operate s u c c e s s f u l l y i n the long

run i t m u s t meet t h r e e conditions: (1) i t m u s t be sufficiently

cohesive t o a c t as a unit, (2) i t m u s t be l a r g e enough t o act

as a self-sufficient ceremonial g r o u p ; f o r example, i t must

be able t o summon an impressive number o f r e l a t i v e s for a

marriage party, (3) i t must have s u f f i c i e n t economic resources

2
to be independent of other groups.

Of the three c o n d i t i o n s i t i s the first t h a t i s most

difficult t o meet o v e r an extended p e r i o d of time. A faction

may d i s i n t e g r a t e when one of the h o u s e h o l d heads of which i t

Is composed d i e s and his holdings are d i v i d e d up among h i s

sons. Even i f a l l of the sons m a i n t a i n their holdings as a

g r o u p i t means t h a t t h e n u m b e r o f h o u s e h o l d h e a d s w h i c h make

up the group has increased. If this happens w i t h several of

the o r i g i n a l households, the n u m b e r o f h o u s e h o l d s may become

too unwieldy t o be efficient relative to other factions. A

 86

second p o s s i b i l i t y whic.i occurs i s that brothers do not main-

tain their property jointly because e i t h e r they or their

respective wives are not able t o get along with one another.

In t h i s event brothers may join different factions.

As the cohesion of the f a c t i o n begins t o b r e a k down i t

b e c o m e s more a n d more d i f f i c u l t t o meet t h e other two con-

ditions necessary for stable factions. Thus t h e r e is a con-

stant formation and reformation of f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the village

in the long run. Political activity takes place within fac-

tions at one level and between f a c t i o n s at another.

Given that c o n d i t i o n s a r e met such t h a t f a c t i o n s are

formed I would hypothesize t h a t the n u m b e r and size of fac-

tions w i t h i n the dominant caste o f the village i s dependent

upon f o u r i n t e r r e l a t e d factors. These f o u r f a c t o r s are as

follows: (1) the size of the caste (number o f households,

average s i z e of household, and p r o p o r t i o n of the total vil-

l a g e p o p u l a t i o n ) , (2) the personalities of the prominent

individuals and the number o f them w i t h i n t h e caste, (3) the

length of r e s i d e n c e w i t h i n the village ( I . e . how long the

h o u s e h o l d s m a k i n g up the f a c t i o n have l i v e d i n the village

and how long the faction, recognized as a f a c t i o n by the

other f a c t i o n s , has been a p a r t of the village political

scene r e l a t i v e to other factions), and (4) the nature of the

issue which i s before the factions. I shall discuss each of

these factors separately below.

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SIZE OP CASTE

In those v i l l a g e s where the dominant caste controls

the land completely out of p r o p o r t i o n to I t s percentage of

the total population there w i l l be a tendency f o r the caste

t o have fewer f a c t i o n s . The r e s t of the v i l l a g e population

could easily become a t h r e a t i f the c o n t r o l l i n g caste were

not united i n i t s efforts t o keep the r e s t of the village

disunited—disunited at l e a s t with respect to the dominant

caste. In a d d i t i o n , the f a c t that there are fewer households

in the dominant caste means t h a t there i s more l a n d to go

a r o u n d and individual land owners w i l l be the focus of a

rather large jajman-kamin group. Managing this system of

relationships c a n i n some c i r c u m s t a n c e s supercede In impor-

tance i n t r a c a s t e disputes. ( I t should be noted here that i t

can have the o p p o s i t e effect i n that the j a j m a n can use h i s

group of kamins as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e , and h a v i n g i n hand a

l a r g e group o f kamins certainly m u s t be tempting.)

In those v i l l a g e s w h i c h have a l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n of the

dominant caste there i s less likelihood of unity f o r there

is l e s s need of u n i t y i n the face of the r e s t of the village

population. There is likely t o be a greater spread of wealth

and hence political power between the households of the

dominant caste. There a r e more h o u s e h o l d s competing f o r the

same a m o u n t o f w e a l t h and fewer kamins i n the v i l l a g e to be

u s e d as p o l i t i c a l pawns. In t h i s situation one w o u l d expect

 88

a l a r g e r number o f f a c t i o n s - - e a c h f a c t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of a

group of households, usually based on k i n s h i p ties, working

together to protect their interests from the depredations of

3
other similarly constituted groups ( c f . page i n chapter ).

P E R S O N A L I T Y AND NUMBER OP PROMINENT I N D I V I D U A L S WITHIN THE

DOMINANT CASTE

The number o f a b l e and a m b i t i o u s i n d i v i d u a l s within the

village determines t o a great extent t h e number o f f a c t i o n s .

In Hitchcock's K h a l i p u r study a single i n d i v i d u a l managed

t o assume most o f t h e r e i n s o f power and f a c t i o n s virtually

ceased t o e x i s t a s l o n g a s he r e m a i n e d i n control. H i s down-

fall a f t e r ten years i n 'office' came p a r t i a l l y as t h e r e s u l t

o f h i s own f a i l i n g s , but p a r t i a l l y because there came on t o

the s c e n e o t h e r y o u n g e r i n d i v i d u a l s who w e r e a b l e and ambitious.

With t h e i r coming and t h e p r e v i o u s leader's passing, factions

within the dominant Rajput caste rose a g a i n , each headed by

one of the able and a m b i t i o u s y o u n g e r men. Since the p o l i t i -

c a l p i e does n o t g e t l a r g e r i n the v i l l a g e except i n the long

run, each o f these i n d i v i d u a l s i s competing f o r a static

amount o f power. One I n d i v i d u a l c a n g a i n more p o w e r o n l y a t

the expense o f another Individual. Each I n d i v i d u a l attempts

to a l i g n a s many o f h i s f e l l o w c a s t e members w i t h h i s p o s i -

tion as p o s s i b l e . The more h o u s e h o l d s t h e r e are t o back him the

stronger i s h i s p o l i t i c a l position r e l a t i v e to other positions.

Too many a b l e and a m b i t i o u s i n d i v i d u a l s might tear a village

apart—particularly i f they make t o o much u s e o f t h e i n t e r c a s t e

 89

group f o r which they are the jajman. Pear of l o s i n g control

of the lower castes probably limits this kind of competition--

at any r a t e , I have s e e n nowhere i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e any e x a m p l e s

of a s t r u g g l e between f a c t i o n s which has l e d t o t h e d o w n f a l l

of t h e dominant caste. J u s t a s t o o many p r o m i n e n t individuals

could cause problems f o r the dominant caste so the l a c k o f

prominent l e a d e r s may cause problems. This would particularly

be the case should t h e r e be a b l e and a m b i t i o u s leaders among

the lower castes.

Cohesiveness of the f a c t i o n i s at l e a s t as i m p o r t a n t as

size i f n o t more s o a n d c o h e s i v e n e s s i s directly related to

the p e r s o n a l i t y of the leader. The f a c t i o n w i l l operate

successfully i n the face of other f a c t i o n s only as l o n g as

the leader i s able to maintain unity.

LENGTH OP R E S I D E N C E I N THE VILLAGE

Length of residence i n the v i l l a g e , f o r purposes of

demarcating factions, i s measured i n terms o f depth of lineage.

The effective historical p e r i o d i n terms o f f a c t i o n formation

is. only as f a r b a c k as l i n e a g e s c a n be t r a c e d . I n any given

village there w i l l be c e r t a i n lineages which c a n be t r a c e d

f u r t h e r back than others. Often the oldest lineage i s d i r e c t l y

descended from the v i l l a g e founder or at least i s thought t o

be directly descended. This lineage w i l l feel a certain amount

of u n i t y i n the face of other l i n e a g e s and i n c e r t a i n types of

i s s u e s may operate as a f a c t i o n t o oppose o t h e r lineages. This

 90

lineage may o r may not be powerful: the vigourousness of

the lineage ( i . e . the presence of dynamic and interested

leaders and f o l l o w e r s ) i s as important as i t s depth.

Thus a v e r y o l d l i n e a g e may be dying out and even

though i t continues to act as a u n i t i t s power w i l l not

be as great as a n o t h e r , newer l i n e a g e which is vigourous

about i t s interests.

The formation of f a c t i o n s on the basis of lineage may

be the r e s u l t of an o l d q u a r r e l or through the process of

fission. The f u r t h e r back a l i n e a g e can trace i t s origin the

greater the distance there will be between the living members

of the lineage. T h e r e seems t o be a limit not only to the

number o f h o u s e h o l d s w h i c h can cooperate, but as well a limit

in terms of d i s t a n c e of k i n s h i p t i e s . Brothers are usually

found w i t h i n the same f a c t i o n . First cousins may be included

d e p e n d i n g upon the i s s u e , but beyond fairly close kinship ties

it is difficult to maintain cooperation. A l t h o u g h most fac-

tions c o n t a i n households which are related fairly closely,

some f a c t i o n s a r e formed where t h e r e are no kinship t i e s —

the basis for cooperation in this kind of f a c t i o n i s a similar

attitude toward a p a r t i c u l a r issue and may not last beyond the

successful or u n s u c c e s s f u l r e s o l u t i o n of the issue.

Aside from being one of the founding lineages there are

at l e a s t two other ways i n w h i c h a new lineage may become

established i n the village and become t h e basis f o r new fac-

tions . The first way i s that an i n d i v i d u a l may come i n t o the

village s o m e t i m e a f t e r i t i s f o u n d e d and establish a household

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f r o m w h i c h a new l i n e a g e springs. Because the caste i s

endogamous t h e two l i n e a g e s are ultimately related, but i t

may n o t b e p o s s i b l e to trace the linkage. The v a l i d i t y o f t h e

newcomer's c l a i m to a particular caste status w i l l be Investi-

gated before he i s a l l o w e d t o become a member o f t h e v i l l a g e ,

but such tenuous connections a r e n o t o f much i m p o r t a n c e t o

faction formation within the v i l l a g e . The I n c o m i n g founder

h o u s e h o l d may h a v e m e r e l y b o u g h t land i n the v i l l a g e 0 10

the

individual may h a v e come a s a s u p p l i c a n t seeking refuge from

some k i n d o f awkward s i t u a t i o n i n the v i l l a g e of o r i g i n . The

individual may h a v e come a s a p a r t i a l o r c o m p l e t e conqueror.

The Jati caste i n R a m p u r may h a v e e n t e r e d the v i l l a g e i n this

way. A t any r a t e this m i g h t be an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the fact

that the J a t i s I n t h e Rampur a r e o f much l o w e r c a s t e status

than the other land-owning castes i n that part of north India.

The Jatis may p e r h a p s h a v e b e e n g r a n t e d land i n return f o r

helping some m i l i t a r y c o n q u e r o r who h a d moved i n t o the area

some h u n d r e d s o f y e a r s ago.

The s e c o n d way I n w h i c h a new l i n e a g e c a n come t o be

established w i t h i n the v i l l a g e I s f o r an i n d i v i d u a l who i s

related t o an e s t a b l i s h e d lineage through female t i e s t o take

up land i n the v i l l a g e either by p u r c h a s e o r t h r o u g h g i f t . An

example o f t h i s m i g h t be t h e m a r r i a g e o f a y o u n g man i n t o a

household which has nothing but females i n the younger genera-

tion. This kind of beginning Is not considered very auspicious

and i t may t a k e a l i n e a g e established i n this way q u i t e a number

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of generations t o be c o n s i d e r e d by o t h e r lineages i n the

caste as l e g i t i m a t e . The m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e l i n e a g e comes

Into e x i s t e n c e has a great d e a l t o do w i t h the p r e s t i g e of

the f a c t i o n which i s formed out of the l i n e a g e .

Even where t h e e n t i r e caste population i n the v i l l a g e i s

closely related and where t h e r e has n o t been any In-migratlon

one can expect f a c t i o n s t o develop because the very size of

the g r o u p makes i t t o o u n w i e l d y - - u n l e s s there is a single

strong leader or a very strong reason f o rmaintaining unity

of caste w i t h i n the v i l l a g e .

THE TYPE OP I S S U E

The i s s u e which i s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i t h i n the caste

p o p u l a t i o n has a great significance f o r the formation of

factions. Issues develop at three different levels within

the village. The i s s u e s a t t h e f i r s t level concern those

events which e f f e c t just the caste Itself. Factions are

formed and m a i n t a i n e d as t h e r e s u l t o f , f o r example, a

court case over irrigation rights or over a boundary dispute

or again over certain forms o f caste b e h a v i o u r relating to

ritual purity. The f a c t i o n lines harden over the years and

further e x a m p l e s a r e f o u n d by e a c h o f t h e f a c t i o n s w h i c h show

that they need t o m a i n t a i n unity.

Issues which Involve other castes tend to create unity

between f a c t i o n s t h a t otherwise m i g h t be b i t t e r enemies. If

the Chamar c a s t e suddenly decides t o g i v e up i t s t r a d i t i o n a l

occupation o f l e a t h e r w o r k e r a n d become more sanskrltlzed

 93

(cf. p. ) this will effect a l l o f t h e members o f t h e d o m i -

nant caste equally. I n many v i l l a g e s i n north India the

C h a m a r s may i n c l u d e a s much a s a q u a r t e r of the v i l l a g e popu-

lation and t h e i r attempt at s a n s k r i t i z a t i o n would represent

a full scale threat of revolution. T h e r e c a n be l i t t l e ques-

tion of disagreement among h o u s e h o l d s of t h e dominant caste

if they are t o preserve their hold i n the village. In effect

a committee o f t h e whole w i l l be f o r m e d b y t h e d o m i n a n t caste

to deal with the matter.

Issues at the third level are those i n which the world

outside the v i l l a g e becomes t h e f o c u s . The v i l l a g e caste

population w i l l normally t r y t o present a united front to

outsiders from other nearby v i l l a g e s even though they be o f

the same c a s t e . This does n o t always h o l d t r u e how ever.

T
One

f a c t i o n may t r y t o e x p l o i t i t s relationships with individuals

or groups outside of the village i n order t o improve their

position relative t o other f a c t i o n s I n the caste. Pactions

may even develop i n response t o the attempt o f one g r o u p o f

h o u s e h o l d s t o g a i n power w i t h i n t h e v i l l a g e by t a k i n g advantage

of r e l a t i o n s h i p s formed w i t h powerful individuals outside the

village.

FACTIONS WITHIN NONLAND-OWNING CASTES

Factions exist, o r can e x i s t , i n any o f t h e c a s t e s

resident i n the village. I n Rampur, f o r e x a m p l e , b o t h t h e

6

Chamars a n d t h e B h a n g i s a r e d i v i d e d i n t o factions. That

other castes are not divided i s a function of size. A caste

 94

which has o n l y three or four households i s not very likely to

be divided. Since there is little intercaste sociability i f

the three or four households are not united there is a great

need t o get a l o n g w i t h one a n o t h e r . They n e e d e a c h o t h e r t o o

much e c o n o m i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y to quarrel.

The fact t h a t I t I s p o s s i b l e t o d i s c o v e r f a c t i o n s among

castes other than the dominant land-owning caste does n o t

mean t h a t t h e r e is political activity among c a s t e s other than

the dominant caste. I n terms o f my definition of p o l i t i c a l

activity, factional activity among t h e C h a m a r s a n d B h a n g i s

7

is not p o l i t i c a l . The Chamar f a c t i o n s I n Rampur are based

on t h e p o s i t i o n s e a c h o f two g r o u p s o f h o u s e h o l d s took with

respect t o the 'kidnapping'of aChamar g i r l by a group o f

Chamars f r o m a n o t h e r village. The g i r l who was kidnapped

became t h e w i f e o f one o f t h e o u t s i d e r C h a r n a r s — t h i s was

why s h e was k i d n a p p e d i n t h e f i r s t place. The B h a n g i factions'

a r e b a s e d on a q u a r r e l o v e r who was t o r e p l a c e a dead headman

of the caste. Some h o u s e h o l d s favoured one i n d i v i d u a l and

another group o f households favoured another I n d i v i d u a l each

o f whom a p p e a r e d t o h a v e a b a s i s f o r m a k i n g t h e c l a i m t h a t he

should be t h e n e x t headman.

In n e i t h e r of these cases i s there any chance o f g a i n i n g

control over land. N e i t h e r o f t h e i s s u e s have a n y t h i n g t o do

with acquisition or maintenance of land ownership.

 95

S A N S K R I T I Z A T I O N AS A LCNG TERM P O L I T I C A L ACTIVITY

The first u s e o f t h e t e r m S a n s k r i t i z a t i o n was made b y

Srinivas i n a 1952 s t u d y of the r e l i g i o u s and s o c i a l life

of t h e Coorgs o f South I n d i a . Srinivas explained t h e term

in a f o l l o w i n g passage:

The c a s t e s y s t e m I s f a r f r o m a r i g i d s y s t e m i n
w h i c h t h e p o s i t i o n o f each component c a s t e i s
f i x e d f o ra l l time. Movement h a s a l w a y s b e e n
p o s s i b l e , and e s p e c i a l l y so I n t h e m i d d l e r e g i o n s
of the h i e r a r c h y . A l o w c a s t e was a b l e , i n a
generation o r two, t o r i s e t o a higher p o s i t i o n
i n t h e h i e r a r c h y by a d o p t i n g v e g e t a r i a n i s m and
t e e t o t a l i s m , and by S a n s k r i t i z i n g I t s r i t u a l and
pantheon. I n s h o r t , i t t o o k o v e r , as f a r as
p o s s i b l e , t h e customs, r i t e s , and b e l i e f s o f t h e
B r a h m i n s , a n d t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e B r a h m i n i c way
o f l i f e b y a l o w c a s t e w h i c h seems t o h a v e b e e n
f r e q u e n t , though t h e o r e t i c a l l y f o r b i d d e n . The
process has been c a l l e d " S a n s k r i t i z a t i o n " i n t h i s
b o o k , i n p r e f e r e n c e t o " B r a h m l n i z a t i o n , " as c e r -
t a i n Vedic r i t e s a r e c o n f i n e d t o t h e Brahmins and
t h e two o t h e r " t w i c e - b o r n " castes.9

The term 'sanskritization' was p u t f o r w a r d to explain certain

kinds of behaviour patterns which function to increase the

power o f p a r t i c u l a r castes i n the v i l l a g e relative to the

other castes. I t i s a u s e f u l term because i t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s

between two t y p e s o f power p l a y s . Sanskritization refers to

behaviour on t h e p a r t o f t h e caste which I s d i r e c t e d not

towards changing the s t r u c t u r e o f the v i l l a g e , but rather i s

directed toward changing t h e s t a t u s quo. In other words,

s a n s k r i t i z i n g behaviour i s essentially conservative I n nature.

The second type o f p o w e r p l a y w h i c h i s known a s W e s t e r n i z a t i o n

is d i r e c t e d toward overthrowing t h e whole s t r u c t u r e . Both o f

these f o r c e s a r e a t work I n t h e v i l l a g e . Sanskritization as a

 96

process has b e e n o p e r a t i n g f o r h u n d r e d s , and perhaps thousands

of years. Westernization as a process o n l y began t o operate

after the arrival of the British.

Since the 1952 study q u o t e d above, S r i n i v a s has somewhat

modified his definition. S r i n i v a s had assumed t h a t t h e model

the lower c l a s s e s w o u l d be emulating was the Brahminical

model. Pocock p o i n t e d out i n a 1955 publication 1 0

that the

K s h a t r i y a m o d e l was u s e d i n some r e g i o n s of I n d i a :

J u s t as t h e K s h a t r i y a o r K i n g s t a n d s w i t h t h e B r a h m i n
as s u p e r i o r t o t h e V a i s h y a a n d S h u d r a v a r n a , so we
may a l s o s p e a k o f t h e K i n g l y m o d e l i n H i n d u s o c i e t y w h i c h
Is complementary t o , though dependent i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s
upon, the Brahmlnic. A t any g i v e n t i m e o r p l a c e t h e
K i n g l y m o d e l i s r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e d o m i n a n t p o l i t i c a l
p o w e r i n a n y a r e a , a n d i s m e d i a t e d by t h e l o c a l d o m i -
nant non-Brahmin caste or castes of that area. Thus
i n s e c u l a r m a t t e r s t h e M o g h u l s and t h e B r i t i s h a t
v a r i o u s t i m e s h a v e p r o v i d e d a s t a n d a r d by w h i c h s e c u -
l a r p r e s t i g e I s gauged.

S a n s k r i t i z a t i o n has come t o s t a n d f o r the process whereby the

lower castes in a particular area w i l l emulate the behaviour

of the dominant land-owning caste whether that caste traces

its origins t o any of the varna. I n terms o f t h i s discussion

what i s i m p o r t a n t i s the effort t h a t a c a s t e makes towards

sanskritizing i t s behaviour patterns. Success In the venture

depends upon s e v e r a l t h i n g s . I f the caste attempts t o make

too great a change i t w i l l likely be sanctioned by the castes

above i t . Chamars, f o r example, are at the very bottom of the

c a s t e h i e r a r c h y and would have l i t t l e luck In attempting to

model t h e i r behaviour on t h a t of the Brahmins In the village.

They w o u l d n o r m a l l y emulate the behaviour of a caste only a

 97

few ranks above them. A l o n g w i t h the change i n b e h a v i o u r there

m u s t be some c h a n g e i n t h e e c o n o m i c s t a t u s of the group. They

m u s t somehow f i n d a source o f income which would place them

higher than they had been p r e v i o u s l y relative t o the other

castes. Finally, the success o f the attempt depends upon t h e

strength and u n i t y of the upper castes. I f the upper castes

are s p l i t i n their attitudes towards this attempt a t upward

mobility i twill be much e a s i e r f o r the attempt to succeed.

SOURCES OF POWER WITHIN THE VILLAGE

So f a r i n t h i s c h a p t e r I have c a r e f u l l y refrained from

u s i n g t h e word power. I have d i s c u s s e d those activities which

are p o l i t i c a l . These a c t i v i t i e s are pursued by households,

factions, and c a s t e i n t h e hope t h a t s h o u l d t h e y be successful

they w i l l have g a i n e d power r e l a t i v e to other households,

factions and c a s t e s . Power a c c r u e s to households, factions,

or caste from several different sources of which successful

political activity I s b u t one. The e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t i e s dis-

cussed i n the l a s t chapter are a second source. A third source

o f p o w e r comes f r o m t h e p o s i t i o n h e l d i n t h e r i t u a l hierarchy.

A fourth source comes f r o m t h e i n d i v i d u a l s involved. A dynamic,

ambitious individual will h a v e m o r e p o w e r t h a n one who i s not

all else equal.

As i n m o s t s o c i a l systems there i s a definite positive

c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p o w e r h o l d e r s i n one k i n d of a c t i v i t y and

power h o l d e r s i n t h e o t h e r k i n d s o f activity.
 98

The principle of 'circular and c u m u l a t i v e causation'

as developed by M y r d a l 1 1
among o t h e r s , i s q u i t e appropriate

in the v i l l a g e setting. A single household w i l l only rarely

enjoy p o w e r i n one a r e a of a c t i v i t y without having power i n

other activities. This d o e s n o t mean t h a t a particular house-

hold w i l l occupy r o u g h l y t h e same p o s i t i o n i n a l l of the

various p o w e r - s o u r c e h i e r a r c h i e s , r a t h e r i t means t h a t a

p a r t i c u l a r household high i n one h i e r a r c h y w i l l , o r c a n , be

high i n another hierarchy without any a p p a r e n t b a s i s . Thus

a very poor Brahmin household w i l l likely h a v e some political

power because i t i s at the top of the r i t u a l h i e r a r c h y , and

conversely a wealthy, low caste household (a not very likely

occurrence) will h a v e some p o l i t i c a l power. Normally, how-

ever, there i s little of this kind of t h i n g happening i n the

village. Should a low caste group g a i n w e a l t h they will

gradually rise on t h e r i t u a l hierarchy relative to other

castes. I t i s t o o d i s t u r b i n g t o have these kinds of dis-

parities i n the v i l l a g e .

Before ending this chapter I should like to discuss the

p a n c h a y a t , t h e d e s c r i p t i o n and workings o f which are u s u a l l y

included i n chapters on p o l i t i c s of Indian v i l l a g e s . The

assumption i s that the panchayat i s the focus of factional

disputes—that I s , t h a t one c a n o b s e r v e t h e d e l i n e a t i o n a n d

interaction of f a c t i o n s best at panchayat meetings. I agree

in t h e main w i t h t h i s assumption. I t I s during meetings of

 99

the panchayat t h a t the f a c t i o n lines a r e most c l e a r l y formed.

H o w e v e r , much o f t h e b u s i n e s s of the panchayat i s not really

political a c c o r d i n g t o my definition of p o l i t i c a l . Pactional

disputes need not always center around control over land-

indeed many d i s p u t e s a r i s e as t h e r e s u l t o f w h a t one faction

considers d e v i a n t b e h a v i o u r on t h e p a r t o f a member o f another

faction. A l t h o u g h I have n e v e r s e e n any statistics, i t i s my

impression from r e a d i n g the l i t e r a t u r e that the bulk of the

disputes which are s e t t l e d (or I f not settled, at l e a s t brought

into the perview of the panchayat) are n o n p o l i t i c a l i n nature.

I would hypothesize t h a t most o f t h e f a c t i o n a l interaction

whose s u b j e c t I s c o n t r o l over land takes place outside of the

panchayat. Only on the r a r e occasions when t h e r e is a con-

c r e t e p o i n t t o argue i s the panchayat used. For example, two

households may be d i s p u t i n g a boundary and the f a c t i o n s backing

each of the households may meet i n a p a n c h a y a t to settle the

differences. Most p o l i t i c a l activity i s o f a more s u b t l e

nature and, again h y p o t h e s i z i n g , r e v o l v e s around such things

as a t t e m p t i n g to persuade households to r e a l i g n themselves

with another faction.

SUMMARY

In d i s c u s s i n g p o l i t i c a l activity at the v i l l a g e level i t

Is possible to either see a l l a c t i v i t y as p o l i t i c a l or to see

very little activity as p o l i t i c a l . I have chosen the latter

because I t makes i t e a s i e r t o d e c i d e how to a t t a c k the problem

 100

of inducing change a t t h e v i l l a g e level. A l la c t i v i t i e s have

s o m e t h i n g about them t h a t i s p o l i t i c a l and, a g a i n , a l l activi-

ties have s o m e t h i n g about them t h a t i s economic or r e l i g i o u s .

However, I think i t c a n be s a i d of every activity i n the

village that i t i s predominantly one o r t h e o t h e r of the

possibilities. The v a l u e of this approach w i l l become more

evident i n t h e f o l l o w i n g and l a s t chapter.

 101

FOOTNOTES
1
a) P. G. B a i l e y , T r i b e , C a s t e a n d N a t i o n - A S t u d y
of P o l i t i c a l A c t i v i t y and P o l i t i c a l Change i n
H i g h l a n d Q r i s s a ( M a n c h e s t e r ^ I960).

b) D h i l l o n , L e a d e r s h i p and Groups - a South I n d i a

V i l l a g e , New D e l h i P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n , P r o g r a m
E v a l u a t i o n O r g . , G o v t , o f I n d i a , 1955.

c) J . T. H i t c h c o c k , " L e a d e r s h i p - a N o r t h I n d i a n
Village: Two C a s e S t u d i e s , " L e a d e r s h i p a n d P o l i t i -
c a l I n s t i t u t i o n s - I n d i a , e d . R. L . P a r k a n d
I . T i n k e r TPrTnceton, 1959).

d) Oscar Lewis, V i l l a g e L i f e - Northern Indi? .New York,

1958), e s p e c i a l l y C h a p t e r 4.

Other articles Include:

a) F. G. B a i l e y , " P o l i t i c s - Village India," an
unpublished a r t i c l e .

b) P. G. B a i l e y , " D e c i s i o n s b y C o n s e n s u s - C o u n c i l s
and Committees: with S p e c i a l Reference t o V i l l a g e
and L o c a l Government - I n d i a , " P o l i t i c a l Systems
a n d t h e D i s t r i b u t i o n o f P o w e r , ASA M o n o g r a p h (New
Yoi k7 1965) •
T _

c) R. W. N i c h o l a s , " P a c t i o n s : A Comparative A n a l y s i s , "

P o l i t i c a l Systems and t h e D i s t r i b u t i o n o f Power,
ASA M o n o g r a p h (New Y o r k , 196FuH
2
Lewis, op_. c i t . , p. 115-
E d w a r d E . L e C l a i r , J r . , "The D y n a m i c s o f t h e P a n c h a y a t
S y s t e m o f M o d e r n I n d i a , " C o n t e m p o r a r y I n d i a , e d . B. N. V a r n a
(New Y o r k , 1 9 6 4 ) , p p . 206-17-
4H i t c h c o c k , op_. c i t . , C h a p t e r 7 •
5
The p o l i t i c a l p i e i s c o n t r o l o v e r l a n d u n t i l s u c h t i m e
as t h e v i l l a g e b e c o m e s more c o n s c i o u s l y a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f
the l a r g e r w o r l d o u t s i d e t h e v i l l a g e .
6
L e w i s , op_. c i t . , p . 137-
l b i d . , p . 138 .
7

8
lbld., p . 139-
9
"M. N. S r i n i v a s , R e l i g i o n a n d S o c i e t y among t h e C o o r g s
of S o u t h I n d i a ( O x f o r d , 1952), p . 32.
 102

1 0
D. P. P o c o c k , "The Movement of Castes," Man, May, 1955,
pp. 71-72.

P o w e r i s d e f i n e d as t h e a b i l i t y
i : L
t o i n f l u e n c e the atti-
t u d e s and a c t i o n s o f o t h e r s .

Gunnar M y r d a l , Rich Lands and Poor (New Y o r k , 1957),

p. 11-12.
 L H A P T E R VI

Panchayat! R a j 1

In t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s I have o u t l i n e d the social

structure of the v i l l a g e i n order that I can p o i n t out the

way i n w h i c h t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s h a v e b e e n c h a n g e d and a r e

being changed by t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a new c o n c e p t o f t h e

nature o f the panchayat. Panchayats are e v i d e n t l y as o l d as

India. It i s difficult t o know how l o n g t h e y h a v e t e e n part

of the village social s t r u c t u r e , b u t i t appears that the con-

2

c e p t was a l r e a d y extant during Vedic times. The t e r m pan-

chayat literally means c o u n c i l of five, but I n actual usage

the term r e f e r s t o an a p p r o a c h t o d e c i s i o n making rather

than t o a p a r t i c u l a r body o f I n d i v i d u a l s . Most simply the

panchayat i s a body b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r I n order t o conduct

deliberations about m a t t e r s o f importance t o t h e v i l l a g e o r

to the caste I f I t i s a caste panchayat. Traditionally i t

is n o t an o f f i c i a l body, I t h a s no o f f i c i a l members, no

official m e e t i n g t i m e , and no o f f i c i a l matters t o which i t

must a t t e n d . When p r o b l e m s i n s o l u b l e b y o t h e r means arise

in the v i l l a g e It i s likely that a panchayat w i l l be convened.

If i t i s a matter which c a n be t a k e n c a r e o f a t t h e c a s t e level

a caste panchayat will meet. I f , f o r example, two h o u s e h o l d s

within t h e c a s t e h a v e some k i n d o f argument t h a t Is threatening

the unity of the caste, a caste panchayat w i l l meet. The

panchayat would include t h e heads o f t h e two h o u s e h o l d s and

103
 10 4

discussion would continue u n t i l a consensus i s reached.

Everyone m u s t be i n agreement. Voting and m a j o r i t y deci-

sions were d e f i n i t e l y not part of the concept of the pan-

chayat. Should a dispute arise between households of dif-

ferent castes then a panchayat of a m u l t i c a s t e nature would

be assembled to discuss and deliberate the i s s u e . The vast

bulk of the ' c a s e s ' h a n d l e d by p a n c h a y a t s were nonpolitical

in nature--that i s , disputes arising out of c o n f l i c t over

land c o n t r o l were few r e l a t i v e to other kinds of disputes.

The effectiveness of the panchayat Is related t o the

willingness o f t h e two sides to modify their position.

Without this m o d i f i c a t i o n through which t h e two sides reach

a middle ground, t h e r e c a n be no d e c i s i o n . In ancient times,

as i n t h e p r e s e n t , i t c a n be fatal to the u n i t y of the village

when c o n s e n s u s c a n n o t be reached about a c r u c i a l matter. If

It i s known b e f o r e h a n d t h a t consensus will n o t be reached

the panchayat may not convene. An attempt i s made t o I g n o r e

the problem.

The willingness to modify a position i s determined by

the interaction o f two factors. The first factor i s the amount

of s u p p o r t t h e i n d i v i d u a l h o u s e h o l d c a n g e n e r a t e among o t h e r

households. The stronger the support the l e s s likelihood

there I s f o r any modification. The second f a c t o r tends to

counteract the f i r s t . The second f a c t o r has t o do w i t h the

extent to which the household i s t i e d t o the v i l l a g e . Most

households are c l o s e l y tied to the v i l l a g e economically i f

 105

not socially and r e l i g i o u s l y . Unwillingness t o modify a

position means t h a t e i t h e r one o r t h e o t h e r of the parties

m i g h t be f o r c e d t o l e a v e the v i l l a g e or that the v i l l a g e

m i g h t be s p l i t i n two. Neither of these possibilities Is

very d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e same r e a s o n s w h i c h I explained In

chapter four. Thus most p o s i t i o n s a r e m o d i f i e d before total

chaos results.

In reality the village p a n c h a y a t i s a l s o t h e cas~ :e !

panchayat o f t h e dominant caste i n the v i l l a g e so t h a t while

we c a n n o t c o m p l e t e l y ignore caste panchayats i t i s the v i l l a g e

panchayat which i s important f o rthis discussion. The members

of the v i l l a g e panchayat would normally b e made up o f t h e

powerful heads o f t h e households o f t h e dominant c a s t e plus

the head o f t h e dominant household o f each o f t h e o t h e r castes

in the v i l l a g e . T h e s e l a t t e r a t t e n d more b y i n v i t a t i o n than

by right and w o u l d n o t be p r e s e n t at a l l panchayats—they

w o u l d be p r e s e n t only at those i n which discussions directly

affecting their own c a s t e are undertaken. Membership i s , t h e n ,

almost e n t i r e l y ascriptive. Membership i s o n l y achieved on

rare occasions.

T h i s was t h e t y p e of l o c a l government i n o p e r a t i o n when

the B r i t i s h moved i n t o the subcontinent. I t i s so i n f o r m a l

that the B r i t i s h probably d i d n o t even r e c o g n i z e i t . A l l they

could s e e was a d o m i n a n t c a s t e telling the rest of the castes

what t o do.
 106

It is difficult t } really know t h e thinking behind the

British decision to reconstitute the v i l l a g e panchayats in

a form more f a m i l i a r to the B r i t i s h but one must assume i t

was because they felt the whole v i l l a g e should share i n the

decision-making process and b e c a u s e t h e new form would result

In more d e c i s i v e action taken i n a shorter time. That they

were committed to i n d i r e c t rule i s beyond doubt. Not only

were they p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y a g a i n s t complete direct cortrol,

but they were not numerous enough t o e n f o r c e i t .

The British response t o the t w i n needs o f i n d i r e c t rule

and more d e c i s i v e action on t h e p a r t o f v i l l a g e councils was

to pass l e g i s l a t i o n which would ensure that every village have

a democratically elected official panchayat w i t h which they,

the B r i t i s h , could deal i n times of need. The need, at least

in early British t i m e s , was mainly concerned w i t h the efficient

collection of revenue from each village.

The British attempt t o change t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e pan-

chayat was largely u n s u c c e s s f u l f o r the same r e a s o n that the

older, i n f o r m a l panchayat was largely successful. Individuals

really had very little choice. The village r e s i d e n t s would be

hard put to s u r v i v e unless they cooperated. L i f e was hard

enough w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o c o n t e n d w i t h enemies i n s i d e the

village. M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e d o m i n a n t c a s t e was very domi-

nant indeed. Their control over the r e s t of the v i l l a g e popula-

tion was virtually complete. The only alternative to doing

what t h e d o m i n a n t caste suggested was to leave the v i l l a g e and

 107

join c a s t e mates i n a n o t h e r village. A n d one w o u l d still be

at t h e mercy of t h e dominant caste i n that v i l l a g e . For a

member o f t h e d o m i n a n t caste the decision to fight fora

particular s i d e i n an argument w i t h no i n t e n t i o n to give i n

w o u l d be e q u a l l y d a n g e r o u s f o rthe r e s t of the caste would

merely o s t r a c i z e h i m a n d q u i c k l y he w o u l d lose h i s position

in the v i l l a g e . J u s t as m i g r a t i n g t o a new v i l l a g e was a

possibility f o rthe lower castes so t h e upper c a s t e household

could entertain this possibility. To do s o w o u l d mean start-

ing a l l over because t h e upper castes i n t h e new v i l l a g e would

not likely sell o r g i v e l a n d t o t h e newcomer.

U n d e r t h e new B r i t i s h l e g i s l a t i o n any h o u s e h o l d head

c o u l d be e l e c t e d t o t h e p a n c h a y a t . In p r a c t i c e the household

heads o f the lower castes could not run f o r office because

their e c o n o m i c w e l l - b e i n g was c o n t r o l l e d by t h e dominant

caste. They v o t e d as they were t o l d . The o f f i c i a l panchayat

nearly always looked exactly like the u n o f f i c i a l panchayat.

The m e m b e r s h i p was a l m o s t certainly t h e same. Occasionally

a group o f t h e lower castes might get together and e l e c t one

of themselves t o the panchayat. The e f f e c t that this lone

individual c o u l d h a v e o n t h e r e s t o f t h e members was negligible

and would normally only serve to increase h o s t i l i t y between

the c a s t e s which worked a g a i n s t the v i l l a g e i n the long run.

Sometimes t h e dominant c a s t e a l l o w e d the lower castes to elect

a member f r o m among t h e m s e l v e s , but t h i s individual w o u l d be

so concerned about a v o i d i n g c o n f l i c t and g e t t i n g a l o n g with

 108

the other p a n c h a y a t members t h a t , a g a i n , he c o u l d have little

effect on t h e d e c i s i o n s of the panchayat.

The British attempt t o c l a r i f y the decision-making

machinery w i t h i n the v i l l a g e was p r e t t y much a f a i l u r e . The

British d i d n o t make j u s t one a t t e m p t , h o w e v e r , r a t h e r one

could s a y t h e y n e v e r g a v e up i n a t t e m p t i n g t o change t h e

decision-making process. Throughout their long administration

of the subcontinent they continued t o push t h e i d e a \.f t h e

elected panchayat. Meanwhile other f a c t o r s o f change were a t

w o r k on t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t . A i l of these f a c t o r s , w h i c h seem t o

operate everywhere I n the world, combined t o decrease t h e

insularity of the v i l l a g e . Increasingly the outside world

i m p i n g e d upon l i f e i n the v i l l a g e . The i n f o r m a l , flexible

style of dealing with problems s t i l l worked t o a l a r g e extent,

but i n s o l u b l e problems i n c r e a s i n g l y plagued the v i l l a g e .

When t h e B r i t i s h pulled out o f I n d i a i n 19^7 they left

a t r a d i t i o n behind them. One f a c e t of this t r a d i t i o n was a n

e m p h a s i s on t h e e l e c t e d v i l l a g e panchayat. The n a t i o n a l

leaders of India continued the B r i t i s h tradition--unavoidable

considering that nearly a l l of the Indian leaders were British

educated either i n Britain itself, or i n Indian schools closely

patterned after British schools.

The Indian n a t i o n a l government passed legislation soon

after independence which o u t l i n e d the broad p a t t e r n of the

panchayat! r a j . As e a r l y a s 19^8 Nehru d e c l a r e d at the f i r s t

Local Self-Government M i n i s t e r s ' Conference that "Democracy

 109

at t h e t o p c o u l d n o t he a s u c c e s s u n l e s s i ti s built on t h e

f o u n d a t i o n from below." J
The n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s e t out the

broad outlines of the panchayat! r a j , but l e f t implementation

up to the states out of r e c o g n i t i o n that the d i f f e r e n t culture

areas would require different handling of the matter. The

recommendations of a nationally a p p o i n t e d S t u d y Team o n t h i s

m a t t e r were a d o p t e d . T h e i r recommendations follow:

F i r s t l y , we s h o u l d h a v e v i l l a g e p a n c h a y a t s p u r e l y
on a n e l e c t i v e b a s i s , w i t h a p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e c o -
o p t i o n o f t w o women members a n d one member e a c h
f r o m t h e s c h e d u l e d c a s t e s and s c h e d u l e d t r i b e s .
S e c o n d l y , P a n c h a y a t S a m i t i s h o u l d be f o r m e d f o r
an a r e a i n c l u d e d i n a b l o c k a t p r e s e n t t o be c o n -
s t i t u t e d by i n d i r e c t e l e c t i o n f r o m t h e v i l l a g e
panchayats. The p a n c h a y a t s w i t h i n t h e b l o c k a r e a
c a n be g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r i n c o n v e n i e n t u n i t s a n d t h e
panches of a l l t h e panchayats i n each o f t h e s e u n i t s
s h a l l e l e c t f r o m amongst t h e m s e l v e s p e r s o n o r p e r -
s o n s t o b e members o f P a n c h a y a t S a m i t i , a b o u t 20 i n
number. . . .Vast powers have been e n t r u s t e d t o t h i s
body w h i c h s h o u l d be t h e m a i n a g e n c y f o r d e v e l o p m e n t
work i n t h a t a r e a w i t h s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s , b o t h
C e n t r a l as w e l l as P r o v i n c i a l , a t i t s d i s p o s a l .
Then t h e r e w o u l d be t h e Z i l a P a r i s h a d a t t h e D i s t r i c t
l e v e l , mainly w i t h a view t o enable the necessary co-
o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e P a n c h a y a t S a m i t i , a l l members
o f t h e S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e a n d o f P a r l i a m e n t whose
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s l i e w i t h i n t h e d i s t r i c t and t h e d i s -
trict level officers.^

The village p a n c h a y a t , t h e n , i s t h e broad base on w h i c h t h e

rest o f t h e government superstructure i s to rest. Gandhi

wrote of panchayats i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner, " I n d i a n inde-

pendence must b e g i n a t t h e b o t t o m . Every v i l l a g e s h o u l d be

a republic or a panchayat having f u l l powers—the greater

t h e power o f p a n c h a y a t s the better f o r the people."5 Thus

each v i l l a g e i s t o have an e l e c t e d panchayat some o f w h o s e

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6
members w i l l be p l a c e d on t h e b l o c k level panchayat which is

intermediate to the d i s t r i c t level Zila Parlshad.

Implementation of panchayat! r a j by the s t a t e s began i n

r 7

1959 and had been c a r r i e d out almost c o m p l e t e l y by 1902. The

panchayats which came i n t o existence during these years are

quite different than e i t h e r the t r a d i t i o n a l village panchayat

or the B r i t i s h n o t i o n of the v i l l a g e panchayat. In the first

place, the I n d i a n n o t i o n i s a r a t h e r s t r a n g e one, perhaps I

should say a d i v i d e d one. The state and national governments

recognize the v i l l a g e as an autonomous s o c i a l unit. For

example, i t i s the I n d i a n government which has arrived at

558,000 as t h e n u m b e r o f v i l l a g e s i n India. They suggest

that every v i l l a g e have a panchayat. They t h e n l i s t the

number o f v i l l a g e s In Uttar Pradesh, f o r e x a m p l e , and say

that every v i l l a g e has a panchayat. There are 72,333 pan-

g
chayats i n Uttar Pradesh—there are 112,624 v i l l a g e s . It

follows that some o f t h e p a n c h a y a t s m u s t be c o m p o s e d o f mem-

bers f r o m m o r e t h a n one village. The village, thus, i s a

social unit one t i m e and an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e unit another.

Apparently the government uses whichever i s convenient.

I have i n c l u d e d the above p a r a g r a p h s t o show t h a t the

Indian government has an e s s e n t i a l l y different viewpoint

about the nature of l o c a l government than d i d the British

or, as we shall s e e , t h a n do the v i l l a g e r s themselves.

 Ill

At the v i l l a g e level the t r a d i t i o n a l l y dominant caste

is still dominant--they are s t i l l able to control the affairs

of the v i l l a g e . As I pointed o u t i n t h e c h a p t e r on economic

allocation some o f t h e h o u s e h o l d s i n t h e v i l l a g e are no

l o n g e r dependent upon t h e v i l l a g e for their source of liveli-

hood. They a r e a b l e to find income outside the v i l l a g e . To

the extent that they are e c o n o m i c a l l y independent of the

dominant caste they are independent of the p o l i t i c a l control

of the dominant caste. The numbers o f h o u s e h o l d s a r e still

few, however, and the dominant caste merely i s o l a t e s or ignores

them. The bulk of the households are s t i l l dependent upon t h e

dominant caste for their livelihood. The panchayat still

operates to settle issues which a r i s e at the l o c a l level and

this is still s e e n as t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n of the panchayat.

I would h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t t o the v i l l a g e r s the connection

between the panchayat and t h e Community D e v e l o p m e n t Plan i s

only a grafted on c o n c e p t b e c a u s e i t i s n o t an i n t e g r a l part

of the concept of the panchayat as a d e l i b e r a t i v e body. To

the villagers the panchayat i s a d e l i b e r a t i v e b o d y whose main

function i s not p o l i t i c a l but social. The officials at the

state and n a t i o n a l level saw the panchayat as p r i m a r i l y dealing

with political problems. They d i d t h i s because t h e y d i d and

do n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r e o f p o l i t i c a l activity at the vil-

lage level. At the s t a t e and n a t i o n a l level the p o l i t i c a l arena

is q u i t e wide and they have l o n g been accustomed to working

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within i t . They a s s u r e d that the v i l l a g e r s w o u l d be a b l e t o

do so as w e l l . The a t t e m p t a t t h e s t a t e a n d n a t i o n a l level

to change t h e n a t u r e of the v i l l a g e p a n c h a y a t w o u l d be a

complete failure, j u s t a s was t h e B r i t i s h attempt, except

for one t h i n g - - T h e C o m m u n i t y D e v e l o p m e n t P l a n . The C o m m u n i t y

Development P l a n involves the expenditure of f a i r l y large sums

o f money (in village t e r m s ) on p r o j e c t s at the village level

and t h e P a n c h a y a t ! R a j and t h e Community Development P l a n will

share personnel.

The e f f e c t o f i n c l u d i n g t h e d i s p o s a l o f community develop-

ment f u n d s among t h e o t h e r functions of the v i l l a g e panchayat

has been t o Increase the l i k e l i h o o d of i n d i v i d u a l s other than

the traditionally powerful running f o r a p o s i t i o n on t h e o f f i -

cial panchayat. The s c o p e o f p o l i t i c a l activity has widened

in the v i l l a g e . In addition t o land ownership there i s now

competition f o r Community D e v e l o p m e n t funds.

I n many v i l l a g e s there a r e two p a n c h a y a t s operating.

The t r a d i t i o n a l panchayat still functions much as i t a l w a y s

has a n d t h e new o f f i c i a l panchayat functions mainly to dispose

of development funds, but i s g r a d u a l l y beginning t o take over

some o f t h e f u n c t i o n s of the t r a d i t i o n a l panchayat. The p r e s e n t

primary responsibilities of the o f f i c i a l panchayat include:

"Construction, r e p a i r maintenance, cleaning and l i g h t i n g o f

public s t r e e t s ; medical r e l i e f : s a n i t a t i o n ; r e g u l a t i n g the

construction o f a new b u i l d i n g ; a s s i s t i n g t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f

agriculture, commerce a n d i n d u s t r y ; t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f
 113

civil and c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e ; the construction and maintenance

of public wells, a n d t h e c a r e a n d management o f t h e common

grazing grounds. . . assisting and a d v i s i n g agriculturists

in the obtaining o f government l o a n s , development of co-

operation, and e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f i m p r o v e d seed and implement

stores." Most of these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a r e new t o t h e

village. The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c i v i l and c r i m i n a l justice

and t h e c a r e and management o f w e l l s a r e about the only func-

t i o n s which might be i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the purview of the t r a d i -

tional panchayat.

The villages a r e n o t a b l e t o w i t h s t a n d t h e power o f t h e

state and so t h e y a r e f o r c e d to include t h e s e new functions

within their realm of p o l i t i c a l activity. Ralph Retzlaff

p r o v i d e s what i s p r o b a b l y t h e b e s t a n a l y s i s o f t h e way i n

which the o f f i c i a l panchayat operates i n the v i l l a g e . 1 0

He

studied the a c t i v i t i e s of the f i r s t two o f f i c i a l panchayats

In a village w h i c h he c a l l e d Khalapur. Three particular weak-

nesses prevented the f i r s t official panchayat from b e i n g very

effective; first, t h e weakness o f t h e e l e c t e d leader of the

panchayat; second, lack o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g by t h e members o f

the panchayat about t h e powers and d u t i e s of the panchayat;

and third, the Irregular pattern of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the

e l e c t e d members. One o f t h e f i r s t items of business the o f f i -

cial panchayat c o n s i d e r e d was t h e t r o u b l e s o m e p r o b l e m o f

drunkenness i n the v i l l a g e . R e s o l u t i o n s were p a s s e d prohibit-

ing the manufacture, sale and c o n s u m p t i o n of alcoholic beverages

These r e s o l u t i o n s were s u p p o r t e d and passed by a m i n o r i t y of

 114

the panchayat members—the others having stayed away. Among

those who stayed away w e r e some o f t h e more p o w e r f u l members

of the v i l l a g e . Khalapur i s a Rajput village. Several of

the Rajput factions w i t h i n the v i l l a g e supported the r e s o l u -

tion while several of the others refused t o . The R a j p u t s , who

would normally dominate the t r a d i t i o n a l panchayat, were unable

to dominate the o f f i c i a l panchayat because o f t h i s split.

Passage of other equally unenforceable r e s o l u t i o n s by t h e

official panchayat l e d t o almost complete inactivity by t h e

end o f t h e t e r m s o f t h e e l e c t e d members. Because o f this,

elections f o r membership i n the second official panchayat were

contested i n a different manner t h a n i n the f i r s t election.

The b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e was a concerted effort on t h e p a r t o f

the dominant Rajputs to control the e l e c t i o n . They d i d n o t

want t o g e t c a u g h t s h o r t as t h e y h a d i n t h e e a r l i e r election

by dividing their forces. As w e l l the other v i l l a g e r s had

had time t o s e e t h a t t h e new p a n c h a y a t was v e r y ineffective

b e c a u s e i t h a d no way of enforcing i t s decisions without the

consent of the Rajputs.

It i s interesting t o note that at the state l e v e l there i s

a realization that contested e l e c t i o n s might tend to Increase

conflict i n the v i l l a g e r a t h e r than decrease i t . 1 1

To avoid

this possibility a l l candidates who filed nomination papers

w e r e named i n a p o s t e d list for public scrutiny i n order that

other individuals m i g h t be a b l e t o q u e s t i o n t h e i r eligibility.

Each c a n d i d a t e had t e n days a f t e r filing f o r nomination during

w h i c h he c o u l d w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e c o n t e s t . The r e s u l t i s that
 115

the real campaigning took p l a c e b e f o r e the o f f i c i a l election

in many c a s e s . The positions of the o f f i c i a l panchayat are

t h e n f i l l e d by a process which is traditional—each candidate

g a t h e r s h i s s u p p o r t f r o m among t h o s e who would have s u p p o r t e d

him i n the t r a d i t i o n a l panchayat.

I would hypothesize that the i n t r o d u c t i o n of official

panchayats into the v i l l a g e causes one of f i v e things to

happen; f i r s t , the o f f i c i a l panchayat i s t a k e n o v e r by the

already existent unofficial panchayat because only members

of the u n o f f i c i a l panchayat are a l l o w e d to campaign for

membership i n the o f f i c i a l panchayat; s e c o n d , t h e members

and attempted activities of the o f f i c i a l panchayat are

largely i g n o r e d by t h e r e s t of the v i l l a g e r s because they

lack any real power t o d i r e c t a c t i v i t i e s i n which event the

official panchayat becomes i n a c t i v e ; third, the o f f i c i a l and

the u n o f f i c i a l panchayats m a i n t a i n separate but a c t i v e exis-

tence clashing frequently over v i l l a g e centered issues; fourth,

the official panchayat b e c o m e s t h e mere l a c k of the already

established village leadership; and f i f t h , the o f f i c i a l pan-

c h a y a t becomes t h e s e a t o f r e a l power w i t h i n t h e village.

The outcome o f t h e c o n t e s t between t h e o f f i c i a l and unofficial

panchayats v a r i e s with the state of l o c a l l e a d e r s h i p , the kind

of organization ( t h o s e who are both f o r or against this new

way c a n m u s t e r ) , and finally t h e amount o f d e v e l o p m e n t funds

available f o r d i s p e r s i o n by t h e o f f i c i a l panchayat.
 116

Earlier I defined p o l i t i c a l activity as t h a t activity

which centers around t h e c o n t r o l o f land as t h e s o u r c e of

wealth within the village. The e x i s t e n c e o f development

funds substantially enlarges t h e scope o f p o l i t i c a l activity.

Where b e f o r e political activity c o u l d be s a i d t o be confined

to t h e dominant caste i n the village i t i s no l o n g e r possible

to do s o . Some o f t h e s e a t s on t h e o f f i c i a l p a n c h a y a t were

reserved f o r untouchables a n d women n e i t h e r o f w h i c i were

granted an o f f i c i a l v o i c e i n the t r a d i t i o n a l panchayat. These

people a r e drawn i n t o the p o l i t i c a l arena t o d e a l w i t h only

certain types of p o l i t i c a l activity, but since a l l o f these

activities are connected they m u s t now b e c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t

of t h e p o l i t i c a l membership o f t h e v i l l a g e and as s u c h have

an effect on p o l i t i c a l activities which before were beyond

their purview.

So f a rI have d i s c u s s e d the effect of the coupling ofthe

Community Development P l a n w i t h the Panchayat! Raj w i t h i n a

single village. I would hypothesize that the effect i s even

greater on v i l l a g e s w h i c h must s h a r e membership i n t h e o f f i -

cial panchayat with an a d j a c e n t village. In addition tothe

effects on a s i n g l e v i l l a g e o u t l i n e d above t h e r e Is the effect

of b e i n g forced t o cooperate with the leadership of another

village. This forced cooperation could l e a d t o one o f t w o

courses of action. The f i r s t course o f a c t i o n m i g h t b e com-

plete i n a c t i o n because t h e two g r o u p s o f l e a d e r s stalemate

one another. V i l l a g e s have cooperated with one a n o t h e r i n t h e

 117

p a s t b u t I t d i d not happen f r e q u e n t l y s i m p l y because there

was l i t t l e need or i n c l i n a t i o n t o do s o . I t was m o r e likely

that adjacent villages would quarrel—usually over boundaries.

The second course o f a c t i o n m i g h t be t h a t t h e o f f i c i a l pan-

chayat of t h e combined v i l l a g e s i s stronger than the t r a d i t i o n a l

panchayats o p e r a t i n g on t h e i r own i n e a c h o f t h e v i l l a g e s . I l -

ls not very likely that the o f f i c i a l panchayat c a n be captured

as i t i s when i n v o l v e d w i t h a s i n g l e village.

I am n o t s u r e w h a t c h a n g e s w i l l occur i n the economic

structure as t h e r e s u l t o f t h e changes I n t h e p o l i t i c a l struc-

ture, but I tend t o t h i n k that they will n o t be t o o f a r r e a c h -

ing i n the short r u n . The f u n d s channeled Into the v i l l a g e

through the o f f i c i a l panchayat are b e i n g used t o improve t h e

village i n terms o f s a n i t a t i o n and e d u c a t i o n , b u t t h e b u l k

of t h e funds are b e i n g used t o improve a g r i c u l t u r a l productivity

This can d i r e c t l y effect only those who own l a n d . The l a n d

owners w i l l find themselves w e a l t h i e r than ever relative to

those who own no l a n d . Since community development i s seen

as a self-liquidating program t h i s means t h a t o n l y i n t h e

short r u n can castes other than the dominant caste effect

village activities. The f u n d s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e o f f i c i a l

p a n c h a y a t m u s t be u s e d I n t h e m a i n t o i m p r o v e agricultural

output. T h i s i n t u r n means t h a t t h e d o m i n a n t c a s t e w i l l be

e v e n more w e a l t h y s o t h a t when t h e c o m m u n i t y d e v e l o p m e n t funds

cease to enter the v i l l a g e they w i l l have even f u l l e r control

over a l l others In the v i l l a g e who d e p e n d u p o n t h e m f o r

sustenance.
 118

CONCLUSION

It i s my considered judgment t h a t the attempt to graft

a new way of o r g a n i z i n g p o l i t i c a l activity onto the tradi-

tional method w i l l fail—has failed in fact. In the short

run there i s probably more p a r t i c i p a t i o n by Individuals who

would not have p a r t i c i p a t e d w i t h i n the traditional panchayat

s y s t e m , but the participation is essentially meaningless

because i t comes f r o m a p o s i t i o n of powerlessness. Channel-

ing Community Development f u n d s t h r o u g h the formal panchayat

has appeared to give i t life and make i t a s u c c e s s , but there

Is an alternative way o f l o o k i n g a t what has happened. The

aim of the n a t i o n a l and s t a t e governments i s a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n

of p o l i t i c a l activity. The effect of t h e i r p r a c t i c e s has not

been r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , r a t h e r i t has been to I n c r e a s e the scope

of p o l i t i c a l activity at least temporarily. Political activity

is now centered around competition over c o n t r o l of land and

control of Community Development f u n d s . Since the state and

national governments have earmarked the major p o r t i o n of the

Community Development f u n d s f o r improvement of agricultural

production they have b u i l t failure into the attempted innova-

tion. No matter what k i n d o f r e o r g a n i z a t i o n t a k e s place the

fruits of the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n go t o the same p e o p l e . The caste

which i s already dominant has the power t o p r e v e n t the other

castes f r o m c o m p e t i n g and does so. The only r e a l effect i s to

provide the already dominant caste w i t h another source of power.

The traditional p a n c h a y a t has w e a k e n e d and i s becoming

weaker w i t h the passage of time. I t has weakened because i t

 119

Is unable to solve t i e problems which are beginning to con-

front i t . These problems are brought a b o u t as the result of

increased contact and interaction with the world outside the

village. As the outside world impinges on the village i t can

less and l e s s be considered the relevant, local social unit.

So long as the other structures which I have discussed

in the earlier chapters continue to function, direct frontal

attacks by the n a t i o n a l and state governments, which the

Introduction of formal panchayats constitutes, w i l l not suc-

ceed. As long as roles are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d w i t h i n the village

in terms of p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the household and p o s i t i o n of one

household relative to others, employing the presently used

criteria, one cannot expect the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f new rules

governing p o l i t i c a l activity t o be effective--if they can

e v e n be understood.

Indian villagers are as fearful o f c h a n g e as anyone,

whether they are high caste or low caste, and they are well

aware t h a t the P a n c h a y a t i Raj i s an attempt from above to

force them t o change. T h e y may not know how o r why the force

Is being a p p l i e d , but they are aware t h a t i t exists, I am

sure .

The Indian n a t i o n a l and state governments a r e , I think,

correct In attempting to change the economic structure of

the village so that they can change the structures involved

in political activity. Their method of applying economic

force i s i l ladvised i n that i t supports the existing structure

 120

rather t h a n c r e a t i n g new e c o n o m i c r o l e s . The e m p h a s i s on

improving a g r i c u l t u r a l production is a necessity in food

poor I n d i a , but it c a n n o t be e x p e c t e d t o change the nature

of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y w i t h i n the village.

The t r a d i t i o n a l p a n c h a y a t is doomed—of t h i s there can

b e no d o u b t , b u t the o f f i c i a l panchayat has n o t h a d much of

a role In this change. In the l o n g run the Indian government

will be s u p p o r t e d b y d e m o c r a c y at the b o t t o m and t h e apparatus

for a c h i e v i n g t h i s may l o o k v e r y much l i k e the o f f i c i a l pan-

chayat of the present day, but the development o f a new type

of p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l evolve into existence not be

legislated Into existence. The r e o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l come about

because the p o l i t i c a l arena Is larger (more b a s e s of power)

not because someone f r o m t h e top orders a revision of an

already adequate method.

 121

FOOTNOTES

As n e a r l y a s I c a n d i s c e r n t h i s t e r m r e f e r s t o t h e
c o n c e p t h e l d by s t a t e a n d n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s t h a t government
i n I n d i a a t t h e l o c a l l e v e l w i l l be b y r o l e o f v i l l a g e p a n -
chayats--that p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y w i l l take place w i t h i n the
c o n f i n e s o f an o f f i c i a l l y e l e c t e d panchayat.

^Rad Nakumud M o o k e r j i , L o c a l Government i n A n c i e n t

India ( O x f o r d , 1920), p p . 36-52.
o
J
Hindustan Y e a r B o o k , p . 496•
4
R. D a y a l , C o m m u n i t y D e v e l o p m e n t , P a n c h a y a t ! Raj and
S a h a k a r i Sarnaj ( ( D e l h i , 1965), p . 7 1 .
5
I b i d . , p . 70.
^ T h i s c o n n e c t i o n between t h e p a n c h a y a t and t h e B l o c k i s
a c r i t i c a l f a c t o r i n the t h i n k i n g of the o f f i c i a l s at the
s t a t e and n a t i o n a l l e v e l . I t n e e d s some e x p l a n a t i o n . The
I n d i a n Community Development P l a n uses t h e c o n c e p t o f d e c e n -
tralization. T h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t l a y s down t h e b r o a d
outlines of the plan. Since each s t a t e has d i f f e r e n t kinds
o f p r o b l e m s a n d p r i o r i t i e s i t i s l e f t up t o t h e s t a t e t o
f u r t h e r r e f i n e t h e program. The s t a t e g o v e r n m e n t t h e n p a s s e s
t h e p l a n o n t o t h e d i s t r i c t o f f i c i a l s who c o n t i n u e t o make
more e x p l i c i t t h e d i r e c t i v e s . B e l o w t h e d i s t r i c t l e v e l i s
the b l o c k l e v e l . E a c h b l o c k e n c o m p a s s e s somewhere b e t w e e n
50 a n d 100 v i l l a g e s — t h e r e a r e e x c e p t i o n s i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n .
The m a j o r i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t much o f t h e w o r k o f t h e p a n c h a y a t
w i l l be d e v o t e d t o community d e v e l o p m e n t . Theoretically
e x t e n s i v e communication s h o u l d pass back and f o r t h t h i s l i n e
o f a u t h o r i t y s o t h a t t h e l o w e r l e v e l s c a n h a v e some i n f l u e n c e
on t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f p o l i c y . In practice there i s l i t t l e
c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m t h e b o t t o m upwards and t h i s has h u r t b o t h
the p a n c h a y a t and t h e development p l a n .

H i n d u s t a n Y e a r B o o k , p . 497.

Dayal, op_. c i t . , p . 77.

^M. P. S h a r m a , L o c a l Self-Government i n India (Bombay,

I960), pp. 57-8.
~^R. H. R e t z l a f f , V i l l a g e G o v e r n m e n t i n I n d i a (New Y o r k ,
1962) .

Ibid., p p . 90-91-
 122

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 APPENDIX

The concept of caste i s probably the most discussed

aspect of Indian life. I have b e f o r e me, in writing this

a p p e n d i x , n e a r l y a l l of the classic d i s c u s s i o n s of caste.

On some p o i n t s t h e r e Is complete a g r e e m e n t — and these I

shall merely l i s t — o n other points there is controversy.

A c a s t e I s an e n d o g a m o u s g r o u p , o r c o l l e c t i o n o f
e n d o g a m o u s g r o u p s , b e a r i n g a common name, membor-
Ghip of which i s h e r e d i t a r y , a r i s i n g from b i r t h
a l o n e ; i m p o s i n g on i t s members c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s
i n the matter of s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e ; e i t h e r

(i) f o l l o w i n g a common t r a d i t i o n a l o c c u p a t i o n , or
(11) c l a i m i n g a common o r i g i n , o r
(iii) both f o l l o w i n g such occupation and
c l a i m i n g s u c h o r i g i n ; and g e n e r a l l y
r e g a r d e d as f o r m i n g a s i n g l e homogene-
ous c o m m u n i t y . 1

The word c a s t e itself comes f r o m t h e L a t i n word CASTUS

meaning pure. The w o r d was originally u s e d by the Portuguese

to d e n o t e what t h e y t h o u g h t was the Indian system of social

2

classification to preserve the purity of blood. The system

which they though they were d e s c r i b i n g has a very long history

in India. There were four o r i g i n a l castes ( o r , as they are

sometimes called, varna—varna meaning c o l o u r ) . These four

castes (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras) are said

to have been c r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y from the mouth, the arms,

the thighs and the f e e t r e s p e c t i v e l y of the creator."^ These

four castes are seen i n the traditional literature of India

as a unified whole. Each p a r t i s related t o the other parts

129
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and each Is necessary f o r the existence of the other. The

origin of other castes comes a b o u t i n one o f two ways accord-

ing to the traditional literature. The first way was by a

series of crosses b e t w e e n members o f t h e four o r i g i n a l varna.

Dutt provides a list of 29 ' c a s t e s which come i n t o existence

in this manner. The s e c o n d way t h a t new castes are formed i s

when t h e members o f t h e original varna failed to follow the

prescribed sacred rituals. The number o f c a s t e s gradually

increases through time and the number i s s t i l l increasing in

India today.

Whatever the way castes are formed, there are thousands

o f them o p e r a t i n g i n I n d i a t o d a y . W h i l e t h e r e may have been

little trouble identifying the number o f c a s t e s In the tradi-

tional literature, such i s not the c a s e i n modern I n d i a . The

greatest point of controversy i n present day discussions of

caste revolve around attempts to establish boundaries around

castes. The b a s i c problem i s t h a t subgroups w i t h i n a caste

may t h e m s e l v e s be endogamous. Since this I s one of the cri-

teria f o r d e f i n i n g a g r o u p as a c a s t e , the problem rises

Immediately: Is the group a c a s t e or a subcaste?

A d r i a n Mayer provides w h a t I t h i n k I s an excellent way

out of t h i s dilemma. He feels that there are effectively

three levels of membership i n a caste.

The l o w e s t i s t h a t o f an e f f e c t i v e l o c a l subcaste
p o p u l a t i o n which I c a l l the k i n d r e d of c o o p e r a t i o n .
T h i s v a r i e s f o r e a c h i n d i v i d u a l a t any t i m e , a n d
a r o u n d i t t h e r e I s a g r o u p w h i c h c a n be c a l l e d t h e
k i n d r e d of r e c o g n i t i o n . This i s the p o p u l a t i o n w i t h i n
 131

w h i c h m a r r i a g e i L . a r e made a n d / o r k i n l i n k s c a n b e
t r a c e d t h r o u g h m u t u a l k i n . T h e s e two f e a t u r e s t e n d
t o go t o g e t h e r , f o r p e o p l e w i l l n o t make m a r r i a g e s
w i t h f a m i l i e s a b o u t w h i c h t h e y know n o t h i n g , a n d t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n runs along k i n s h i p channels. The k i n -
d r e d o f r e c o g n i t i o n forms a l a r g e and r a t h e r amor-
p h o u s b o d y , b e i n g much t h e same f o r members o f a
s i n g l e v i l l a g e ' s subcaste group . . . . Beyond
t h e s e t w o k i n d r e d s a r e p e o p l e who a r e r e c o g n i z e d
as members o f a s u b c a s t e w h i c h i s e n d o g a m o u s , named
and s e p a r a t e f r o m o t h e r c a s t e s . B u t i t u s u a l l y
s p r e a d s o v e r a w i d e a r e a and i s t h e r e f o r e n o t an
e f f e c t i v e group. S u b c a s t e s a r e m o s t l y b a s e d on
provincial distinction.

In r e a l i t y the question of subcastes seems c o b e impor-

tant o n l y t o t h o s e who a r e members o f t h e c a s t e . Those within

a caste d i f f e r e n t i a t e among t h e m s e l v e s and those who a r e o f

other c a s t e s s e e a l l members of that caste, regardless of

m e m b e r s h i p i n one s u b c a s t e or another, as t h e same. Caste

membership, i n o t h e r words, i s s i g n i f i c a n t for relations with

other c a s t e s and s u b c a s t e membership I s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r

activities within the caste.

Thus f o r t h i s study i t i s probably not Important t o worry

about t h e problem of subcastes simply because the caste group

at the l o c a l level i s t h e k i n d r e d o f c o o p e r a t i o n and most o f

its external relationships will be w i t h o t h e r c a s t e s a n d n o t

with other subcaste groups.

Castes are always ranked In the v i l l a g e . T h e r e seems t o

be no p r o b l e m s d e c i d i n g w h i c h c a s t e i s t h e h i g h e s t and which

is the lowest. I n the middle i t i s not quite so c l e a r - c u t .

As Ghurye r e m a r k s , " E x c e p t i n g t h e B r a h m i n a t one e n d a n d t h e

admittedly degraded castes l i k e the Holeyas at the other, the

 132

members o f a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e Intermediate castes

thirji-: or p r o f e s s to think that t h e i r caste is better than

their neighbours.

There are s e v e r a l ways i n w h i c h r a n k i n g Is accomplished.

F1 t there are restrictions on who can e a t w i t h whom. There

a.rt.- two c a t e g o r i e s of food in village India—food cooked in

w a i / T and food c o o k e d I n ghee (clarified butter). Water-cooked

food will g e n e r a l l y be accepted only from caste mates. Ghee-

co'jked food w i l l be accepted from castes which are slightly

lower- than o n e ' s own. A high caste can accept water from a

low caste providing i t i s contained i n a particular kind of

c o n t a i n e r and not i f i t i s i n a different kind. A very low

caste individual can pollute a well f o r a l l others in the

village so t h a t t h e w a t e r i s u n d r i n k a b l e until appropriate

purification ceremonies are h e l d — u s u a l l y a bath o f some k i n d .

Cocial intercourse i s restricted. I n d i v i d u a l s of the

intermediate castes can mingle fairly f r e e l y but the high

castes and low c a s t e s have t o m a i n t a i n a careful distance

f r o m one another. To be t o u c h e d by a lowr c a s t e p e r s o n i s

polluting. In the south of I n d i a the shadow o f an untouchable

is as polluting as h i s t o u c h . I n some p l a c e s the untouchable

always keeps a s t a t e d d i s t a n c e from a h i g h caste individual.

A N a y a r may a p p r o a c h a M a n b u d i r i B r a h m i n b u t must
n o t t o u c h h i r n ; w h i l e a t i y a n must k e e p h i m s e l f a t
the d i s t a n c e of t h i r t y - s i x steps from the Brahmin,
and a P u l a y a n may n o t a p p r o a c h h i m w i t h i n n i n e t y -
s i x paces. A T i y a n m u s t k e e p away f r o m a N a y a r a t
 133

t w e l v e p a c e s , w h i l e some c a s t e s may a p p r o a c h t h e
T i y a n , t h o u g h t h e y must n o t t o u c h h i m . '

It i s n o t q u i t e as r i g o r o u s a s e p a r a t i o n I n t h e n o r t h o f

India--one does n o t have t o m a i n t a i n a d i s t a n c e , but merely

not t o touch.

A third source of rank i n v o l v e s the kinds of activities

i n w h i c h t h e c a s t e s may i n d u l g e . High castes are freer t o

take up a n y o c c u p a t i o n t h a t they want. Low c a s t e individuals

are u s u a l l y t i e d to their occupations and any a t t e m p t s to

c h a n g e w o u l d b e met w i t h v i o l e n c e o n t h e p a r t of t h e upper

castes. High castes are able t o perform certain religious

rituals which the low caste individuals are not. T h e move-

ment of h i g h caste individuals through the village i s free.

Low c a s t e individuals are confined to certain parts of the

illage. To l e a v e t h e m a n d come t o t h e h i g h caste part of

v
the village i s to court violence. The c l o t h i n g w h i c h each

c a s t e wears i s p r e s c r i b e d . I understand from conversations

with a B e n g a l i language i n s t r u c t o r that i n present day I n d i a

even t h e k i n d o f u m b r e l l a one h a s i s d e t e r m i n e d b y c a s t e .
 134

FOOTNOTES

1
E . A. H. B l u n t , The Caste System of Northern India
( L o n d o n , 1 9 3 1 ) , p . 5-

N. K. D u t t , O r i g i n a n d G r o w t h of Caste i n I n d i a
( L o n d o n , 1 9 3 1 ) , p . 1.
3
Ibld., p. 4.

^ I b i d . , pp. 7-8.

A. C. M a y e r , C a s t e a n d K i n s h i p i n Central India
(London, I 9 6 0 ) , pp. 4-7.

^G. S. Ghurye, C a s t e and Race i n I n d i a (London, 1932),

p. 6.
7
lbid., p. 9.