Historical Development

of Citizenship
Sanjeev Kumar

Introduction
The notion of citizenship has acquired renewed salience and popularity over the past
two decades. Today, citizenship as an issue has become increasingly prominent because
the traditional boundaries ofthe nation-state have been profoundly challenged
byglobal
developments that have affected the organization of modern societies. The social di-
vision and marginalization brought about by the economic restucturing (nco-liberal
policy) of the 1970s and 1980s, and the growth of multiculturalism resulting from glob-
al migration and communication flow, have brought in doubt the capacity of the state
to satisfy a diverse range of needs and demands for participation. At the level of theory.
it is a natural evolution in political discoursc because the concept of citizenship scems
to integrate the demands of justice and community membership-the central con cept
of political philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. Citizenship is intimately
linked to ideus of individual entitlement on the one hand, and of attachment to a par-
ticular community on the other.
Today, the growing interest in citizenship has led to questioning the standardized
formulations of rights within the legal constitutional framework. Citizenship is no
longer defined only in narrow legul-formal terms and has acquired significance as a
normative and conceptual tool for understanding social reality. It is increasingly being8
seen as a substantive notion capturing a range of issues in which are manifested the
lived experiences of people.
The development of citizenship rights has involved a series of struggles to dismantle
the modes of exclusion which prevented marginal groups from enjoying ful-tledged
 2 Citizenship in a Globalizing Worid

membership to the political community. These struggles have uimed to universalize

citizenship rights and create the social and economic conditions that ensure that their
protection remains at the centre of radical politics in modern states.
The moderm notion of citizenship acknowledges individuals' ability to make judge-
ments about their own lives, which are not predetermined by their race, religion, clas,
gender, or any other single aspect of their identity. Citizens formally enjoy a legitimate
and equal membership to society. They are conceived of as bearing rights and exer
cising these rights equaly with other citizens. Seen in this manner, citizenship con
stitutes an overarching identity that conceals all other identities to produce what are
called masked/unmarked (and therefore) equa> citizens. Thus citizenship, more than
any other identity, is able to satisfy the basic political impulse of humans, which Hegel
has termed the need for recognition. The status of citizen' implies a sense of incu-
sion within the wider community. I recognizes the contribution a particular individ-
ual makes to the community, while at the same time granting him or her individual
This autonomy is reflected in a set of rights which, although varying enor-
autonomy.
mously in content over time and spacc, always implics recognition of political agency
on the part of the bearer of those rights. Thus, the key defining characteristic of itizen-
ship, and what differentiates it most from mere subjecthood, is an ethic of participation.
Citizenship is an active rather than a passive status. In short, citizenship is incompatible
with domination, whether the source of that domination be the state, the family, the
husband, the church, the ethnic group, or any other force that seeks to deny us recogni-
tion as an autonomous individual.
The appeal of citizenship, however, does not lie merely in the beneits it gives to the
individual. Citizenship is always a reciprocal, and therefore a social, idea. It can never
be purely a set of rights that frees the individual from obligation to others. Rights
always require a framework for their recognition and mechanisms through which this
can be fulfilled. Such a social framework, which includes courts, schools, hospitals
and parliaments, requires all citizens to play their part to maintain it. This means that
citizenship implies duties and obligations, as well as rights. Through its package of
rights, duties and obligations, citizenship provides a way of distributing and managing
resources justly by sharing the benefits and burdens of social life. By demanding that
we treat individuals cqually, citizenship can negate social tensions that may threaten
the social order. Citizenship, then, is a powerful idea. It recognizes the dignity of the
individual, but at the samne time reaffirms the social context in which the individual
acts.
In addition to the conventional thinking on citizenship-primarily in terms of the
rights and duties of individuals-today talk of community rights-culturallreligious
have become integral to the understanding of the notion of citizenship. Contemporary
debates on citizenship and rights have questioned the idca that the (individual) citizen
 Historical Development of Citizenship3

can enjoy rights independent of the contexts/circumstances to which s/he belongs., that
is, class, race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Since the 1980s, multiculturalism. plurality, diver
sity and difference have become significant terms of reference in thinking about citi-
zenship. Detailed discussions on these issues have been provided in Chapters 3 and 4
of this volume.
Having discussed the conceptual aspects of citizenship, I proceed to sketch a histori-
cal overview in the next section that will provide the necessary background tor our un-
derstanding of the context in which the controversies surrounding modern citizenship
have emerged.

TheOrigins of Citizenship
Modern citizenship is
commonly described as an
interface relating the state and civil
society, the government and the people, the territorial political organization and its
At its
members. most general level. citizenship refers to full and equal member-
a
ship in the community in which one lives. "Full and equal membership in a political
community denotes (a) the unit of membership, that is, the political community
which in the modern context is the nation-state, and (6) the nature of that member-
ship. that is, full and equal. Indusion as member implies certain rights and reciprocal
obligations towards the community. Ctizenship would thus manifest a signiicant
aspect of the relationship among people who live together in nation. It
a
comprises,
theretore, a range of issues and elements. incduding rights, freedom and equality
political allegiance to the state, civic loyalties within the community, and cultural
and emotional ties and identities that mediate the
relationship between citizens and
the state. As citizenship is about human
relationships, it defies a simple, static defini-
tion that can be applicd to all societics at all times, Instcad, the idea of
citizenship is
inherently contested and contingent, al ways reflcecting the particular set of relation-
ships and types of government found within a given society. With the
of capitalism and liberalism, the idea of the citizen as an
development
individual bearing rights
irrespective of her/his caste, class, race, gender, ethnicity, etc., became entrenched.
Since the 1980s, however, globalization and multiculturalism have
texts within which this notion of
provided the con
citizenship has been challenged. The nation, it is
argued, is no longer the sole unit of membership, and ideas of world citizenship and
human rights beyond national borders are
being earnestly talked about. Similarly
the individual, it is
argued, has been displaced from the core of citizenship theory
and rights of cultural communities and
groups have started gaining ground. Thus, it
may be said that the icdca of citizenship has
Its form and substance have not remained the
developed over several historical periods.
same, but have
specific historical contexts.
changed according to
4 Citizensnip in a Globalizing VWorld

BOX 1.1 KEY THINKERS

Aristotle (384-322 BC) was a Greek philosopher, logician and scientist. Along with
his teacher Plato, Aristotle is generally regarded as one of the most intluential ancient
thinkers in a number of philosophical fields, including political theory. His philoso-

phy had a lasting impact on the development of all Western philosophical theories.
He wrote on diverse subjects, including physics, metaphysics, poclry (including the
alre), bioloEY and zoolkogy, logic, rheloric. politics, government and ethics. Aristotles
world
discussion in Politics is firmly grounded in
the
lie assumed that any state would consist of the
of the Greek city-state,
of
or polis.
samebasic clements Greckcity a

state: male citizens who administer the state, and then women, slaves, foreigners,
and non-citizen labourers who perfornm the necessary menial keep
tasks that
running In the Greek world, citizenship was a much more involved responsibility
the city
than it is in modern representative democracies. All citizens in a Greek city-state
participated in government and held various public offices, which was why Aristotle
considered public office a defining feature of citizenship. Since citizenship involved
an active role in running the state, a citizen identificd strongly with the city-state to
which he belonged, to the point that the Greeks considered exile a fate worse than
death. The tight bond between citizen and city-state also explains why Aristotle con-
sidered active citizenship a necessary feature of the good life. Ile insisted that we
can only fully realize our rationality and humanity as citizens of a city-state, and so
concluded that fully realized humans are, by necessity, political animals.

The origin of the idea of citizenship can be traced back to the ancient Greek and
Roman Republics. Aristotle's Politics represents the first systematic attempt to devel-
op a theory of citizenship, while the practice of citizenship found its first institutional
expression in the Greek Polis, notably in Athens trom the ifth century until the tourth
century BC. The citizenship of the Greeks was very different in its form and function
from citizenship in the modem period. The duality that shapes the modern Polis, such
as a divide between state and society, between public and private, or between law and
morality, simply did not apply in Athens. Instead, the context of Greek citizenship was
that of closely-knit,
self- governing political communities characterized by small popu-
lations and minimum social differentiation. In ancient Greece, citizenship was neither a
right to be claimed by, nor a status to be conferred on, anybody outside the established
ranks of the class, no matter how worthy such an outsider might be. Citizenship was
primarily perceived as a bond forged by participation in public affairs and associated
with duties/ responsibilities. Aristotle defined a state as a collective
a citizen in Aristotle's view
body of citizens, and
was the 'one who
enjoyed the right sharing in delibera-
of
tive and judicial office for
any period fixed or unfixed. Citizens were 'all who shared in
 Historical Development of Citizenship 5

the civic life of ruling

and being ruled in turn. The affairs of the state were run
directly
by its citizens. As a member of the assembly (a deliberative body constituting 5,000
members who met over 40 timesa year), each citizen was eligible for various otfices
of state, which included financial and military appointments. The organization of the
republic was based on the notions of familiarity and trust, commitment to civic virtue
and the common good, principles of active political participation, the prioritization of
public and political aspects of life over private interests, and the primacy of the identity
of as citizen. the
man Citizens in
and exccutors, and defined themselves
polis ran their own affairs, acting as both legislators
through a highly developed sense of military
obligation. Citizenship in the polis offered tangible benefits: freedom, the security to
pursue oncs own good, and the opportunity to win honour by guiding and defending
the community.
The status of citizenship in the polis was, however,
highly
exclusive. In fact, the pri-
mary difference between pre-modern and modern citizenship is that in ancient Greece
and Rome, as well as in those cities that
practised citizenship in the middle ages, in
equality of status was accepted without question. Indeed, citizenship was valued in part
because of its exclusive nature and because it stood as a mark of superiority over non-
citizens, whether they be women, resident foreigners, slaves or the
and exclusion were axiomatic in ancient Greece. Slaves were excluded from
peasantry. Hierarchy
citizenship
as
they lacked the deliberative faculty. Women were scen as lacking
the necessary ra
tionality required for political participation. Additionally, at certain times the Athenian
Polis applied strict criteria to the
question
of which residents qualified for
citizenship
status. In 451-450 BC, under the leadership of Pericdes, citizenship was restricted to
only those residents whose parents had both been born in the polis. Citizenship during
Pericles' time meant common
good and common endeavour among citizens. The con
stitution was not a legal document but a way of life, with every Athenian participating
with total commitment. In the process, individuals
acquired a civic personality and a
sense of responsibility.

Roman Conceptions of Citizenship

In Greek polis, as discussed above,
citizenship was a privileged status, tied closely to
the notion of political
participation. In contrast, the Roman republic developed a more
pragmatic. legalistic and inclusive conception of citizenship as the empire expanded. The
Rulers, by extending privileges of citizenship to all, includ ing the deprivedresident for
eigners, traders, merchants and plebeians (something finally achieved through an edict
in AD 212 by the emperor Caracalla),
legitimized its rule and authority in the republic.
Full citizenship entailed six
privileges. Of these, four were public rights-service in the
army, voting in the assembly, eligibility to public office, and the legal right of action
6 Citizenship in a Gobalizing Workd

and appeal. The other two pertained to the rights of intermarriage and trade with other
Roman citizens. The motive underpinning this moOve was to dispel the exacerbating
social discontent among the masses. In addition, this also facilitated the collection of
taxes and reduced the overbearing military strength. The status of citizenship in Rome
was detached from an ethic of participation and became a thin and legalistic concept.
For a vast majority of Roman citizens, citizenship was reduced to a judicial safeguard
of a that
instead status agency. fact. the concept was stretched to
denoted political In
breaking point and citizenship became little more than an expression of the rule of law.
In terms of the definition outlined above, Roman imperial citizenship was citizenship
in name only. According to Derek Heater, the Romans developed a form of citizenship
that was both pragmatic and extensible in application. Yet that very elasticity was the
ultimate cause the of of the ideal in its noble form.
perishing
After the colapse of the Roman Empire in the West, the importance of citizenship

diminished even further. In the middle pursuit ofhonour

ages, the through the exercise
of citzenship was replaced by the search for personal salvation. The church replaced
the the
political community as focus ofloyaltyand moral guidance. The practice of
zenship, howevet, did find expression during the medieval period in the context of sev-
citi-
city such as Florence and Venice. Such cities drew inspiration from
eral Italian republics
the republican model of Greece. and particularly Rome. Importantly, they included an
ethic of participation that was lacking in other forms of political community during
this period. Machiaveli and Rousseau favoured the ideals of civic virtue and
partici-
pation as the necessary elements of citizenship. According to Machiavelli, citizenship
was not to be passively enjoyed, but actively exercised as a duty and obligation stem-
ming from concern for the good of the community as much as from self-interest. Rous-
seau considered 'General Will' to be citzens
contributing without thought of personal
advantage to political decisions.
Citizenship finally found voice as a massively influential political concept in the six
teenth to the eighteenth centuries in the world-historical events of the American War of
Independence and the French Revolution. The French Revolution (1789) can be seen as
arevolt against the pasive citizenship of the late medieval and early modern times. The
revolution attempted to resurrect the ideals of active participation against the claims
of the monarchical/ imperial state.
Apart from attempting to change the apolitical/pas-
sive lives of citizens, the French
revolutionary tradition introduced an important ele
ment to citizenship, which changed the way rights were incorporated into the notion
of citizenship. The Decaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which followed in the
wake of the revolution, brought in the notion of the citizen as a 'free and
autonomous
individual' who enjoyed rights equally with others and participated in making deci-
sions which all agreed to obey. The manner in which citizenship is understood today
as a
system of horizontal (equal) rights, as against the hierarchical (unequal) privileges
 Historical Development of Citizenship 7

which acerued to persons earlier by reason of higher birth, has its roots in the doctrines
of the French Revolution. With the development of capitalist market relations and the
growing influence of liberalism in the nineteenth century, the notion of citizens as indi
viduals with private and conlicting interests gradually gained primacy, and citizenship
as civic activity, public spiritedness and active political participation was relegated to a
vestigial past.

Evolution of the Llberal Theory of Citizenship

By the sixteenth century. however, the conception of citizenship as a legal status that
guaranteed the enjoyment of liberty/protection became dominant. One of the earliest
political theorists to consider the relationship between the individual and the political
community in this new context was Thomas Hobbes. This relationship is at best termed
subject-citizenship, because it had as its aim the securing of order rather than the pre
dominance of civic virtue, or the protection of individual rights. In fact, the logic of his
theory, which defended the sovereigns' right to absolutist power, left little conceptual
space for any sense of citizenship. Yet Hobbes was an important figure in the history
of citizenship, with many of his ideas leading directly to the more developed sense of
citizenship found in cdassical liberals such as Locke.
First, unlike in the middle ages, where rights were extended to groups, corporations
and estates rather than to individual subjects, the individual in Hobbes' theory enjoys a
direct relationship with the state, which in practice requireda more developed sense of
citizenship through which this relationship could be mediated.
Second, Hobbes believed that in terms of their abilities as well as in their potential to
upset the basis of social order, individuals were essentially equal:

Nature bath made men so cqual, in the faculties of body. and mind; as that thou gh there
bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body. or of quicker mind than
another: yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man is not
so conslderable, as that one man can there upon claim to himselfto which another may
not pretend as well as he.

Crucially, this insight enabled liberal thinkers to make the conceptual link between
equality and 'citizenship
Third, and despite Hobbes' preference for a monarchical system of government, his
theory breaks with the assumption that the ruler and the state are indivisible.
Fourth, by arguing that the sovereign should enjoy absolutist power, Hobbes was
advocating the concentration of one of the means of violence. This is important for citi
zenship since it marked a break with the feudal notion ofa divided site of power where
violence was cxercised by a number of factors. By limiting the exercise of violence to the
8 Citizenship in a Globalizing World

state in this way, opportunity was created for more consensual methods of governance
to emerge

Citizenship and Rights

The liberal tradition founded by Hobbes was further developed by Locke, who built
upon the idea of the egalitarian individua's direct relationship with the state to con-
structa right-based theory of citizenship. Locke's theory aimed to balance a Hobbesian
concern with security with the protection of the rights of Life, Liberty and Property,
for the basis of self-interest.
which most liberals form for the fulflment
Till most of the twentieth century. the bias in the liberal theory of citizenship in fa-
vour of the individual citizen continued, and citizenship was seen as a legal status which
the rights assuring protection from state interference. Here, it would
gave citizen certain
be appropriate to discuss T. I1. Marshal's account of the development of citizenship in
Britain, as outlined in his influential work Citizenship and Social Class, published in
1950. Citizenship in Britain evolved through three stages, beginning with civil rights,
to which political and social rights were subsequently added. In this work, Marshall
studies the growth
of citizenship
alongside capitalism througha peculiar
relationship ot
and
collusion contlict. Marshall describes the development of citizenship as a process of
the inequality of social class. He distinguishes three strands
expanding equality against
or
bundles of rights which onstitute citizenship: civil. political and social, each having
a distinct
history specific to a partic entury. Civil rights, which developed in the

eighteenth century have been defined by Marshall rights necessary for individual
as
freedom. These were 'negative' rights, in the sense that they limited or checked the exer
cise of government power. and included freedoms of speech, movement, conscience, the
right to cquality before the law and the right to property. Political rights, viz., the right
to vote, the right to stand for clections and the right to hold public office, developed
by and large in the nineteenth century and provided the individual with the opportu
nity to participate in the political life of the community. Social rights, which developed
largely in the twentieth century guaranteed the individual a minimum economic/social
status and provided the basis for the exercise of both civil and political rights. For Mar
shall, social rights were 'positive' rights, enabling one to live the life of a civilized being
according to the standards prevailing in society. These standards of life and the social
heritage of society are realized through uctive intervention by the state in the form of
social services (the welfare state) and the educational system. Through this progressive
expansion of rights-civil, political and social--the very idea of status underwent a

transformation. Status came to be defined in

terms of the equal rights of citizenship in
place of the hierarchical gradation of estates. The dialectic advance of citizenship that
Marshall analysed cannot be termed universal as the evolution of citizenship has in the
 Historical Development of Citzenship 9

last 200 years taken many different forms in different countries of the world; however,
what remains valid in Marshall's account is the argument that the original claim for
citizenship in the eighteenth century provoked demands for a more comprehensive

understanding of what it means to full member of a political community. Each re-

be a

articulation of the idea of citizenship has been associated with struggles to enlarge the
cirde of those entitled to participate as equals in public deliberations about the nature of
the collective, and each has involved eforts to deepen the meaning and expand the
signiicance of citizenship for members of excluded groups.

Dilemmas of Liberal (Universal)Citizenship

For most of the twentieth century, the dominant understanding of citizenship contin-
ued to place the individual at its core, and citizenship was seen as a legal status indicat-
ing the possession of rights. Citizenship in the democratic nation-state established the
principle of non-discrimination insofar as all citizens participate cqually in universal
rights and entitlements. This ideal of Universal citizenship' is premised on the assertion
of the equal moral worth of all persons, who, according to Kant, are deserving of equal
respect as rational agents capable of directing their lives through principles. After all,
it had been this assumption of equality that underlay the political attack on the ancient
regime with its system of status and group differences before the French Revolution.
from the ideal of universal citizenship which claims
We inherited Enlightenment an

to deal with us in our essentially human concerns. The vision of democracy associated
with this ideal cdlaims to treat us as abstract individuals or citizens regardless of our sex,
race or class. Liberalism takes no interest in the character or identity of individuals; nor
is it concermed directly with furthering the human cause. It has no collective projects,

expresses no group prelerences, and promotes no particular individual or individual

interests. It is only concerned with upholding the framework of law within which indi-
viduals and groups can function peacefully. This of course is not to deny that upholding
the framework of the rule of law may at some time require intervention in the affairs
of individuals and groups. However, liberal politics is indiferent to both particular hu-
man affairs and the
particular pursuits of individuals and groups.
The dominant liberal model of citizenship, as discussed above, has some limitations.
Contemporary debates on citizenship and rights have therefore questioned the idea that
the (individual) citizen can enjoy rights independent of the contexts/circumstances to
which s/he belongs, that is, dass, race, cthnicity,
gender,
etc. Since the 1980s, globaBization
and multiculturalism have newly interpreted the notion of citizenship. Ideas of world citi
zenship and human rights beyond national borders are gaining ground.
Given that
ern socictices are being increasingly
mod
recognized multicultural, the liberal understanding
as

of the idea of
citizenship has been opened up for debate. The specific contexts-cultural,
10 Citizenship in a Globali zing Word

in
religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc.-of citizens are now seen as determining citizenship
those diferences which liberal
significant ways. This ongoing contest aims to make visible
theory saw as irrelevant for understanding citizenship. In most societies, ethnic, religious
and racial communities have pressed for rights that would look at their special cultural

contexts and substantiate the formal equality of citizenship. An increasing number of the-
orists argue that different groups can be accommodated into common citizenship only

through adopting what Iris Marion Young calls differentiated citizenship. Young argues
that in a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, and yet
affiliations
one which insists that as citizens, persons should leave behind their particular
and experiences and adopt a general point of view, serves only to reinforce the privileged.
tend to dominate this
This is perspectives and interests of the privileged will
because the
to redefine the
uniñed public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups seeking

principle of equality, to make it compatible with the 'multicultural present.

and membership which
Will Kymlicka, too, provides a framework of representation
mem-
accommodates cultural and group ditferences in such a way that a person's group
to
bership and membership in a cultural community do not pose any disadvantage
her/him. Moreover, Kymlicka also sceks to find a meeting ground between the rights

and those rights of individuals defined

of cultural communities to self-preservation
of national minorities and
as civil and political rights. Ile suggests that the demands
ethnic groups may be accommodated within a framework of democratic citizenship
(a) by protecting the common rights of all citizens, which basically means the protec-
tion of the civil and political rights of individuals: freedom of association, religion,
in order to protect group difference, and
speech, mobility and political organization
(6) by accommodating cultural diversity through special legal and constitutional mea
iden-
sures, with members of specific groupsbeing guaranteed special rights. Kymlicka
tifies three foms of group-diferentiated righis
the structures
(i) Special group representation rights: For example, democratizing
representa-
of state within mainstream political institutions by makingit
more

members of
tive, that is, making legislatures more representative by including
ethnic and racial minorities, and women, the poor, disabled,
etc.

with the specific rights of immigrant

(i) Polyethnic rights concern thems
and differences
communities, enabling them to express their particularities
mainstream society. These in-
without fear of prejudice o r discrim ination in
clude protecting their religious and cultural practices.
political autonomy or territo-
Self-government ríghts recognize some kind
of
(ii)
rial jurisdiction of the national minority.
claimed by a collective:
Bhikhu Parekh identifies two kinds of rights that can be
are identi
derivative and primary collective rights, wherein cultural community rights
 Historical Development of Citizenship 11

fied with the latter category. Derivative collective rights are acquired by puling individ-

ual rightstogether alienating

or them to the collective right of trade unions or clubs.
Primary collective rights are of two kinds: individually exercised and collectively ex
ercised collective rights. Individually exercised collective rights are manifested in the
Sikh and the
right to wear turban,
a
Muslim right to the time for prayers. Collectively
exercised collective rights or can
are be exercised
by the collective.
rights are the right to national self-determination, the right of a community to
Examples of such
make
to the consulted by it on issues that are
Tepresentations government or
be of vital interest
to it. Parekh disagrees with the view that collective rights are a threat to indvidual rights.
that
Instead, he points out ll rights be misused, inchuding individual rights. He states
can

that there is a highly complex relation between individual and collective rights, which
has often been over-drawn. Some collective rights threaten individual rights, for example
of to moral conformity. Some
the night a
group enforce preconditions of individual
are
rights, for example a political community's right to self-government or independence.
Some collective rights protect individual rights and empower their bearers because orga-
nized groups and communities are better able to defend the rights of their members, for
example, a community's right to its culture, language or educational institutions.

Globalization and Challenges to Citizenship Theory Today

In the contemporary arena, the sphere of citizenship rights has changed drastically.
War followed
The post-Cold era. by the breakdown of Soviet Russia and the unsetled
situationin Eastern Europe, massively transformed the rights of citizens. But the most
important factor in addition to these changing circumstances was the emergence of
has the prevalent notions of citizenship. Pro-
globalization, which severely questioned
cesses of globalization are beginning to change our perception of the nature of rights.
The new security dilemmas associated with cross-border threats-such as nuclear

annihilation or ecological disasters-are making states more sensitive to the rights of

others. Injustices and rights violations within states can no longer be easily contained,
and state sovereignty is undoubtedly being challenged by the extension of arguments
for human rights and by a more vigorous UN. Regional bodies
attempting manage
to
the problems associated with globalization, such as the European Union (EU), are also
extending citizenship rights beyond the boundaries of individual states. In fact, the EU
is unique amongst regional economic bodies because unlike, say, the North American
Free Trade Agreement or Association of Southeast Asian Nations, it had looked to
create political and not just economic institutions of cooperation.
Another way in which globalization is challenging an abstract view of rights is
through enhancing awareness of threats to the eco-structure, and theretore humanity's
vulnerability to the Harm caused by ecological damage. This idea captures the relational
12 Citizenship in a Clobalizing World

nature of citizenship in a way that the atomistie logic of liberals such Hobbes and Locke
fails to grasp. A relational view of rights demands not only that we find ways to extend
benefits to all peoples, regardless of national boundaries, but also
means recognizing
that rights are only sustainable if we display a much greater sense of responsibility to
other communities and to our natural environment. Global citizenship must involve re-
sponsibilities as well as rights. Ecological citizenship means extending our understand
ing of citizenship beyond material concerns with welfare rights and rights to property
and market exchange. It represents a deeper conception of citizenship than that offered
by classical liberalism. Many of the responsibilities associated with this form of post-
liberal citizenship will be voluntary obligations rather than enforceable duties

Conclusion

Citizenship, in its modern understanding, refers to full and equal membership in the
political community, which in the present global context refers to the nation-state. How
ever, citizenship also provides a terrain for a number of contesting views over its form
and substance. Historicaly, civic republicanism formed the most influential under-
standing of citizenship. The dominant understanding of citizenship today comes from
the liberal tradition, it as set of
which sees constituting a individual rights. Most con
temporary contractarian liberals, especially since the 1971 publication of John Rawls
A Theory of Justice, claim that a liberal account of justice uniquely permits citizens of
to form, and of
diverse beliefs and backgrounds revise pursue
the good. Liberal theories and institutions, however, as discussed.
their
own
conceptions
today confront
an ever-increasing array of demands from ethnic cultural minorities for respect and
recognition. The problem concerning how to respond to these claims has come to pre-
occupy leading political theorists. Cultural pluralists and communitarians regard indi
vidual rights as mcaningless, unless they also take into account thec specific contexts of
the rights-bearing individuals. The multicultural theorist champions the cause of group
to the meted out to on account of unifor-
rights redress discrimination cultural
groups
mity in procedures of liberal democracy. However, there is almost no unanimity among
nature of appropriate political stature, and
thinkers with regard the
he of
to the
groups, their
range permissible diversity suited multicultural
to polity. While Young
ons the cause of all oppressed groups, Kymlicka privileges national groups over ethnic
champi
ones. Parekhs analysis shows concern mainly for non-liberal society. In essence, he
provides a critique of the Western discourses on multiculturalism by trying to include
elements from Asiatic societies. Despite these divergences, the conception of
citizen
ship has today raised a host of important questions, and addresses inequalitics among
nation-states in the world. It focuses our attention on questions of rights, freedom
and equality, political allegiance to the state, civic loyalties within the community, and
 Historical Development of Citizenship 13

cultural and emotional ties and identities that mediate the relationship between citizens
and the state. These diverse understandings of
citizenship thus make it an important
concept, significant for understanding modern democratic societies today.

SummarY
A citizen is member of a political community who
a
enjoys the rights atten-
dant to, and assumes the duties of, membership. The development of
citizenship
rights has involved a serics of struggles to dismantle the modes of exclusion
which prevented marginal groups from enjoying full-fledged membership to the
political community.
In Greek polis, citizenship was a
privileged status, tied dosely to the notion of
political participation. The recognition of citizenship as a legal status in the Ro-
man Empire brought in a certain degree
indusiveness. of
The French Revolution (1789) resurrected the ideals of active
participation
against the claims of the monarchicallimperial state. T.H. Marshall distinguished
three strands or bundles of rights constituting liberal
citizenship: civil, political
and social, each with its distinct
history specific to a
particular century
Contemporary debates on citizenship and rights have questioned the idea that
the (individual) citizen can
enjoy rights independent of the contexts/circum-
stances to which s/he
belongs, that is, dass, race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Today,
talks of community
rights-cultural/ religious--have become integral to an un-
derstanding of the notion of citizenship.
Since the 1980s, globalization and multiculturalism have
within which the notion of
provided the contexts
citizenship has been challenged. Multiculturalism,
plurality, diversity and difference have become significant terms of reference in
thinking about citizenship today.

Ouestions for Discussion

. What do you understand by citizenship? Brietly discuss the events leading to the emer
gence of modern citizenship.

2 In what do the classical notions of

ways citizenship differ from modern
Tllustrate this with few
citizenship?
a
examples.
3. What are the strengths and limitations of the liberal notion of citizenship?
Suggested Readings
Aristotle, 1992, The Politices (London: Penguin).
Barbalet, J. M., 1988, Citizenship (Milton Keynes: Open
Cniversity Press).
 14 Citizenshp in a Clobaizing Word

Faulks, Keith, 2000, Citizenship (Routledge).

Heater, Derek, 1980, Citicenship (London: Longman).
Held, David, 1994, Transformation of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Con
text of Globalization, in lan Shapiro and Casino Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracya Edges
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman, 1994, The Return of the Citizen, Ethics, 104 (January).
1995, Multicultural Citizenship: Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon
Press).
Parekh, Bhikhu, 2000, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (0Lon-
don: Macmillan Press).
Roy, Anupama, 2005, Gendered Citizenship: Historical and Conceptual Explorations (New Delhi:

Orient Longman).
Taylor, Charles, 1994, "The Politics of Recognition, in Amy Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism: Ex-
amining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Turner, Bryan S, 1986, Citizenship and Capitalism The Debate Over Reformism (London: Allen
and Unwin).
Young, 1. M., 1990, Justice and the Politics of Diference (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
 2
The Classical Conception
of Citizenship
Ashok Acharya

The polis properly speaking is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the

organization ofthe people it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its
as
true space hes between people living together for this purpose, no matter where
they happen to be.
Hannah Arendt, 1958

Introduction

In the Suppliant Women, written probably around 422 Euripides-one of the great
Bc,
Greek tragedy playwrights living in fifth-century BC
Athens-captures some aspects
of the conventional contrast between one man's rule (understood here as tyranny) and
the rule of the many. A messenger from Thebes, as Euripides recounts, appears betore
Theseus of Athens and asks who the master of the land, whom he should the
give
sage of King Creon to, is. Theseus responds by saying:"To begin with, stranger you
mes
started your speech on a false note by asking for the master here. The city is not ruled
by a single man but is free. The people rule, and offices are held by yearly turns: they
do not assign the highest honours to the rich, but the
poor also have an equal share
Unimpressed, the Theban messenger engages Theseus by arguing that the city he comes
from is 'ruled by one man and not by a rabble. There is no one to fool the city with flat-
tering speech and lead it this way and that to suit his own advantage. And anyway how
Can the common
people, if they
cannot even make a speech properly, know the
right
way to guide a city?' Not to let go of the wordy contest, Theseus deepens the contrast by
 16 Citizenship in a Globalizing world

suggesting that there Is nothing more hostile to a city than a tyrant. In the first place,

there are no common laws in such a city, and one man, keeping the law in his own
hands, holds sway. This is unjust. When the laws are written, both the powerless and the
has his side,
rich have
equal
access to
justice, and the litle
man,
ifheon right
big man. Freedom consists in this "Who has a good proposal and wants to set it before
defeatsthe
the city? (Euripides 2004: 154-55). The contrast between the injustice ofa tyrants rule
and the chaos involved in the rule of the 'rabble' in a democracy is hard to miss. For
many of democracy's imperfections, one of the first that needed a robust defence during
a time when the idea and its practices, albeit imperfect, emenged, was: How do we stand
up to secure a form of collective self-government that was intrinsicaly good?
Many others, such as Herodotus, Plutarch, Thucydides, Demosthenes and Aristotle,
have written or commented on some aspect of the Athenian democratic experience that
roughly dates back to the sixth-fourth century BC. As scholars pore over the available
sources, dig for new ones, debate the authenticity of the available sources, and try new
lines of interpretation in order to reconstruct that ancient democratic experience, most
that in ancient was a novel and
agree democracy Greece experience one that gives u s -
we, the citizens of contemporary democracy-some useful lessons to learn from. While
we hold in abeyance our own views on what we need to learn from the Greeks, we do
need to engage the claim on whether ancient Greece was the first place where democ-
took the of the Greek, or the classical, model? Can
racy root. What explains popularity
the attention that the Greek experience has drawn in Western literature be attributed
primarily to the wealth of scholarship surrounding the origins of democracy? Or has
our own understanding of democratic citizenship been so warped that we have not
the of
expanded imaginary democracy include other
to valuable experiences in other
questions assume an enhanced significance in the present century, when
places? These
we find ourselves more open to sharing political knowledge-especially on the compar-
ative evaluations of democratic politics-than before, when the journey of
democracy
was widely assumed to be a one-way flow-from the West to the rest.
There is no doubt today that the Greek experiment was not the sole narrative of the
early origins of democracy; however, it certainly was unique. There are other parallels
to the Grecek experience, narratives of different places in ancient times. For instance,
we know that democracy in some form fourished in ancient Egypt and India, and
there are good reasons to unearth what we may ind of value to compare and learn
from different sources. Perhaps ata later time such an exercise might help us to better
understand the trajectories of democracy as it has evolved in various places, and how
these might serve us to enrich our understanding and explanation of the plural origins
of democracy. Perhaps when we are able to unearth all of that, and establish interre-
lationships across space in seeking to decode the plural nature of such origins, wOuld
we rewritc much of the uncritical, conventional accounts of democracy and citizenship
 The classica conception of Citizenship 17

today. This
however, need not detain detract
nor any longer beyond flagging the
us

complex origins of democracy. We turn our attention, in what follows, to how classical
citizenship is captured both in theory and practice and the lessons that we can learn
from this account.

Classical Citizenship in Theory

The term 'classicar comes with a double bind: frst, something which denotes ideal or
authoritative and is hence worthy of serious attention; and second, it has reference to
particular period in history that in turn relers to the ancient civilization, especially
to Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BC and later to that of Rome (Pocock 1995:
of of democracy in ancient Athens is the fact
29). One of the paradoxes the experience
that while Athens was at the peak of this experimentation in actual practice, the ancient
Greek political philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, were less inclined to con-
sider democracy as a preferred regime in their works.

Aristotle

Aristotle was one of the hrst ancient political philosophers to chronicle the democratic
in He draws from that cxperience to frame his own con-
experiment dassical Greece.
ception of citizenship. Aristotle is famous for his remark: "Man is by nature a poBlitical
This encapsulates, on
animal lzoon politikon. was not intended acasualremark but
as
the contrary a major thrust of his political philo sophy. At the core of the statement is an
of the origins of political community or the polis-how it comes into being for
account
natural reasons and exists for the sake of the good life, which is the end of the political
community.
Nature, in Aristotle's usage, reflects the very process of evolution. The polis, having
grown out of natural partnerships such as the household and the village, is natural
because it fulfls the end to which human life tends self-sufñiciency. All partnerships
are natural inthat they serve the of
ends self-suffciency: however. the polis, or the
cily-state, 'while coming into being for the sake of living .. exists for the sake of living
1984: 12526). As a form of political partnership, it is higher than other
well' (Aristote
torms of partnerships for it enables and directs us towards the good life. Clearly, there
is something else to nature that assigns the polis a higher standing. For Aristotle, the
that the aim of the good lifc of the polis is a natural end, its
answer lies in recognizing
telos, and indeed the telos of all associations prior to and smaller than the polis. This is
why political partnership is the highest form of partnership and the polis, Aristotle is
quick to
add, is prior by nature to the household and to cach of us. He would go on to
explain that the whole must of necessity be prior to the part' (ibid.: 1253a).
 18 Citizens hip in a Globalizing World

What set humans apart from other animals, according to Aristotle, are the faculties
of speech and reason (logos). Speech 'serves to reveal the advantageous and the harm-
ful and hence also the just and the unjust, and enables humans a perception of the good
and the bad, the just and the unjust, and other related objects of human judgement
(Aristotle 1984: 1253a). These faculties predispose humans to deliberate upon their
flourishing (eudaimonia) as active partners engaged in the quest to realize the political
community. As such, the polis is greater than its parts, and its citizens (polites). Citizen-
ship is and must be geared towards the goals of the polis. Aristotle, though, is aware of
the diversity of the poleis (plural of polis), and would make a case for a regime-differ
entialed understanding of citizenship. That is, the nature of citizenship varies from re-
gime to regime, and citizenship is to be understood as largely regime-specifc. In other
words, the requirements of citizenship in a democracy are different from those required
by.say, an oligarchy or aristocracy.
The Aristotelian conception of citizenship cssentially hinges on what Aristotle de-
scribes as ruling and being ruled in turn. The citizen in an unqualified sense is de
fined by no other thing s0 much as "by sharing in decision and office (Aristotle 1984:
1275a).
A citizen in the common sense is one who shares in ruling and being ruled; but he
differs in accordance with each regime. In the case of the best regime, he is one who is
capable of and intentionally chooscs being ruled and ruling with a view to the life in
accordance with virtue (ibid.: 1283b, 84a).

This view is in contrast to the Platonic ideal in which ruling is a prerogative of a

distinct class. One needs to step down from this ideal, Aristotle may insist, in order to
accommodate the practice of sharing power among active partners as cqual citizens.
But the universe of citizenship in a Grcek polis was restricted to adult males born to

members ofthesame. In most poleis there were a significant number of inhabitants who
were not accorded citizenship. Women, slaves and metis (of
foreign origin) comprised
the excuded lot, and ironically constituted the majority in any polis. What, then, justi-
fies the political privilege of citizenship for the adult males only? The idea of 'ruling and
being ruled in turn, Aristotle argued, must apply to things
advantageous.
He
to angue that "immediately from birth certain things diverge, some toward being ruled, goes on
others toward ruling' (1984: 1254a). For as the soul rules the body, 'intellect' rules over
appetite'; it is advantageous for both the body and the appetite to be ruled by the soul
and the intellect. This sets the tonc for the master-slave relationship, as one where the
master is the ruler and the slave the ruled. This relationship, Aristotle would contend,
is not an equal one, and the axiom
of'ruling and being ruled in turn' would only apply
among equals. Similarly. the relation of male to female is by nature a relation
of superior
 The Classical Conception of Citizenship 19

to inferior and nuler to ruled. The slave 'participates in reason only to the extent of per-
ceiving it, but does not have ie (ibid.: 1254b). In Aristotde's exclusionary schema then,

the free person rules the slave, the male the female, and the man the child in different

ways. The parts of the soul present in al, but they

are
present in different way. The
are a

slave is wholy lacking the deliberative element; the female has it but t lacks authority;
the child has it but is incomplete (ibid.: 1260a).

ltis important to notice that in building these relationships of inequality, he is making

a larger case for separating the household (oikos) from the polis. By separating the work
of the master from that of the slave and man from woman, Aristotles polis builds up a
that belongs to adult
public sphere only
likely
males. How arbitrary is the distinction? As mod-
by his arguments and take affront to the
ern subjects we most
are
the
unconvinced he
arbitrariness of distinctions employed. Is only justifying the prevalent convention
of slave-owning, or is there more to it? Perhaps there is a bit of conventionalism. And
perhaps there is also a perceived need, within the Aristotelian system, to free males from
everyday chores and thereby allow them more time to participate as active citizens.
Aristotle requires citizens to inculcate certain virtues that will prove crucial in the
pursuit of the good life. For him, human character is neither wholly good nor wholly
bad, and definitely not fixed at birth. Hence, without proper laws and education, people
in
areiableto degenerate various ways. Citizens
in them, both by a regime of education and
need to the right habits instilled
have
by appropriate laws. Early on in The
tics, Aristotle claims that 'just as man is the best of the animals when completed, when
Poli
separated trom law and adjudicalion he is the worst of alr (1984: 12534). Further on, he
would make a stronger case for the rule of law over the rule of men. Ina stronger sense,
the rule of law better reflects the principle of 'ruling and being ruled in turn, but the
argument goes deeper when Aristotle suggests that

one who asks law to rule, therefore, is asking god and intellect alone to rule, while one
who asks man adds the beast. Desire is thing of this sort; and
a
spiritedness perverts
rulers and best men. Hence law is intellect without appetite (ibid.: 1287a).

Laws shape citizens' characters, and education fosters a collective spirit. Aristotle
favours a state-sponsored education programme, which should be common to all and
is not to be introduced on a private basis. 'Since there isa single end for the
city as a
whole, it is evident that education must necessarily be one and the same for all (1984:
1337a). This is a far cry from our times; most liberal democracies allow the coexistence
of both public and
private schools, even if the curriculum remains the same. Much of
the contemporary revival of civic republicanism is
inspired by Aristotle, and it is easy
to understand claims
why for a common education system with a curriculum designed
20 Citizenship in a Globalizing Worid

to inculcate in citizens some of the significant civic virtues are being made. If cducation
shapes characters in a desired way and induces the cultivation of virtues, what brings
together the citizens in a polis and keeps them bonded are the associational ties of civic
friendship (philia'). Ties of friendship do not run counter to the demands of justice in a
political community. but complement each other. What is more, they help to arrive at
harmonious agreements in the disputes that generate in a diverse citizenry.
Aristotle's works on citizenship as a full-blown account in The Politics is one of the
earliest systematic attempts to theorize the subject. His limitations apart, 7he Politics
has inspired almost all successive scholars to imagine and engage with the ideal of citi-
zenship in their own times, most of all in the modern period.

Classical Citizenship in Practice

Any serious, scholarly discussion of citizenship is held to be relatively incomplete with-
out an understanding of how not only the idea, but also the practice of citizenship
originated. Knowledge of the ancient practice becomes invaluable, especially when the
practice in question offers an alternative or corrective to practices in contemporary
times, as we debate the continuing significance of our democratic lineages. We would
get a better sense of the idea of classical citizenship in practice if we turn our attention
chiefty to the working of the classical model of democracy in Athens, although we need
to be forewarned that it is only recently, say, in the last couple of decades, that we have
turned serious scholarly attention towards a reconstruction of democracy in practice by
piecing together classical literature with archaeological discoveries.
Demos (people) was an expression to denote the collective existence of citizens. Most
accounts of citizenship are incomplete without reference to the democratic poleis of
ancient Greece. Democracy took many, many years to take root in Athens and other
poleis. It was a powerful practice; it was powerful because it cmpowered the majority.
who were poor. In giving power to the people, it frightened the rich. This was a major
revolution in the collective life of a polis. Resonating with Aristotles views to a large
extent, many scholars of ancient Gireece judge how "Tiln ancient democraces, as indeed
in all poleis ofwhatever constitutional or ideological hue, citizenship was construed and
constructed actively, as a participatory sharing' (Cartledge 2007: 157).
The participatory sharing of power (or 'ruling and being ruled in turn) grew out of
the constitutional reforms carried out in the Athenian polis. Two figures, Solon and
Cleisthenes, loom large in ancient history, to whom credit must go for having rescued
Athens from tyranny and the reign of the archons (aristocratic rulers), and initiating
reforms that paved the way for the evolution of democracy. Whereas Solon chieftly insti
tuted reforms aimed towards freeing the poor from debt and introducing a mixed con
stitution whereby power could be shared between different social classes, Cleisthenes
 The Classica Conception of Citizenship 21n

brought about political reforms by reconstituting the demes that made up the polis and
in securing the alleglance of the citizens towards the polis instead of the traditional
loyalty to ones tribe. The Athenian citizenry chiefty comprised of a lange body of smal
landholders, supported by the institution of slavery.
The democratic polis had three main institutions: the Assembly (or the Ekklesia'), the
Council of 500, and the People's Court. The Assembly (Ekklesia) was the regular gather
ing of adult male citizens to deliberate upon and vote on decrees and laws that touched
their lives, both public and private, involving matters as diverse as taxes, war, treaties,
religion, public festivals, ostracism, and various other sundry matters. The Assembly
captured the spirit of isegoria-the equal right of every Athenian citizen, irrespective
of one's class background, to speak on issues significance. All citizens were
of public re
quired to attend the Ekklesia, which met roughly 40 times in a year. However, although
the population of the Athenian citizenry varied from 30,000 to 60,000 over the period
of the democratic polis, the actual attendance in the Ekklesia was roughly around 6,000-
8,000 where the required quorum was 6,000. There could be various reasons for this
One reason that perhaps explains this non-participation may well be that it was easier
forwealthy citizens attend
to meetings than it was for their poorer counterparts. An
other reason could be that those citizens who lived in the countryside and away from
urban clusters would have found it difficult to attend meetings at short notice (Rhodes
2009:65). However, those who did attend had the freedom to raise any particular mat-
ter that they felt was of concern for the entire poBis.
The Council of 500 (or Boule) effcctively represented the government of Athens. Its
500 members were drawn from the 10 demes (formed by Cleisthenes), with each select
ing 50 members by lot to the Coundil, who served for a year. A citizen needed to be 30
years of age to be selected to the Council, and then could be selected only twice in his
lifetime. The Council also had a President, rotated among members, and he was like the
Chief Executive Officer of Athens. The main function of the Council was to prepare the
agenda for the Assembly. Whereas cach citizen could become a member of the Council
twice in his lifetime, he was
paid for attending meetings.
Athenian democracy required
every prospective member of the Council, including other public offices, to undergo a
public scrutiny by citizens, in which they could be asked personal questions determin-
ing their suitability to political office. The Council's agenda was usually controlled by
one of the demes, who divided the year into 10 parts. Each deme was also required to
rotate amongst its members the office of thePresident, and Aristotle records in The
Constitution of Athens that this effectively meant that a President enjoyed the office for
only one day and one night!
Participation in the Asscmbly and the Council essentially mcant the involvement of
citizens in framing and passing decrees, which had more im mediate relevance than the
framing of laws (nomos), the passingofwhich involved other bodies such as Nomothetae
22 Citizenship in a Globalizing World

and involved a longer and complex procedure. Most scholars-except those who
manticize the Athenian model argue, however, that the participation of ordinary
citizens in the Ekklesia and Boule was more or less compromised by the domination of
cittzens from aristocratic and wealthy backgrounds, besides the presence of the dema-
gogues who dominated proceedings.
In Solona mixed constitution of sixth century BC, where power was shared between
the oligarchs, aristocrals and ordinary people (or the many who were poor, referred to
as the kakoi), the principle of democracy was introduced not in the Council or the po-
litical offices, but in the courts, From then on, the role of the courts has assumed a pro-

found signifcance in Athenian democracy. Later, as democracy took root, they would
be known as People's Courts in the fifth and fourth centuries Bc. The Peoples Courts
(also known as Heliaea) were primarily responsible for the administration of law, and
were also sites for public trials (recall the famous trial of Socrates). These courts had

large juries with more than 200 jurors who listened to oral arguments in both civil and
criminal cases, as well as to appeals by citizens
made were who dissatisied with the ru
ings of the Assembly or the Counci. Jurors were paid for their service, which
allowed
poorer citizens to participate in the governance of their city.
Besides participation in the above institutions, which were thrown open to all. citi-
zens were also obligated to be conscripted for service in the army as hoplites (heavy-
armed infantry) if they had the means to buy their own armoury as well as fnancially
support the war efforts of the polis. In other words the obligations of citizenship in.
volved serving the polis with person and property. There has been some criticism of
roles of citi-
these practices, suggesting that due to these obligations, the appropriate
zenship were understood differently by the rich and the poor. Cutting across clas dif
ferences, however, Athenian citizens related to each other as members of a face-to-face
community. Finley (1983) describes this pretty well:
This was not only a face-to-face society. it was also a Mediterranean society in which
people congregated out of doors, on market-days, on numerous festive occasions,
and al the time in the harbor and the town square. itizens were members of varied

formal and informal groups-the family and household, the neighbourhood or village,
military and naval units, occupational groups (tarmers at harvest-time or urban

crafts which tended to concentrate in particular streets), upper-class dining-clubs,

innumerable private cult-associations. All provided opportunities lor news and gossip

for discussion and debate, for the continuing political education ... (p. 82).

This depiction captures not only the nature of the Athenian community, but also
that of other cities. Depending on the types of regimes that each had, there would be
subtle ditferences between them. A large part of our analysis has focused on Athens
chiety because it symbolized the pinnacle of the cassical democratic experience, and
 The Classical Conception of Citizenship 23

also because it is
written about more
than other poleis (except Sparta). As new material
emerges on Athens and life in the Greek polis, some of the earlier romances' ot modern
authors is now being replaced by a more accurate, historically-sensitive balanced analy
sis. Given this new interest and a newer approach, one more sober and less romantic
we rethink what it is that we take as our lessons from the classical model of citizenship,
and how these help us evaluate contemporary democratic practices.

Classical Citizenship: A Model for the Future?

As citizens in modern democracies, which are much langer than the Greck poleis, we enjoy
a few basic rights that we consider for the most part inviolable. Modern liberal democra-
cies bestow upon their citizens certain rights, and also require a certain way of doing poli-
tics that is institutionalized. Opposition and contestation are built into both the electoral
framework and the public space. We have political parties, interest groups, more formal
structures, associations and political processes that were largely absent in the Greek polis.
One could angue, for instance, that citizens in Athens had 'rights' in a loose sense of being
able to express themselves in the Assembly or the courts or participate in public activities,
but
most such 'rights' are to be understood in a different vein and certainly not in the way
we understand rights today (catalogued in the Constitution and zealously guarded by
the courts). By any stretch of the imagination, the Greek polis was anything but "liberal,
although it was and still remains tied to the democratic imagination.
One paradox of ancient Athens that remains unexplained is the trial and execution of
Socrates. Some regard this 'as clear evidence of Athenian democracy's moral
turpitude
(Ober 2008: 79), and certainly a denial of the freedom to deserve a fair trial. Was this
one of the reasons for Plato's anti-democratic political philosophy? Whichever way we
answer this, the fact remains that Plato and Aristotle, both of whom defined the content
of ancient political philosophy, were
sceptical of the inherent goodness of democracy
It is difficult to explain how, when ancient Greece was
experimenting with novel demo-
cratic practices, including citizenship, of course with all their limitations, the pinnacle
of ancient Greek philosophy
epitomized in the works of Plato and Aristotle achieved its
greatness outside the realm of the democratic imagination. Perhaps one answer lies in
how both theory and practice, despite their
differences and separation from cach other,
took all too seriously the collective pursuit of the good life in different directions.
What lessons do we as citizens of
contemporary democracy take from the classical
conception of citizenship? For one, we are reminded of the selfless service of 'virtuous
citizens to their political
community. This has been the stuff of current discussions on
participatory, deliberative and republican (each one is distinct from the other) concep-
tions of citizenship, and has animated both
political theorists and practitioners from
Rousseau through J. S. Mill and Tocqueville, to Hannah Arendt and
others. At the heart
24 Citizenship in a Globalizing Worid

of all these diffcrent conceptions is a desire to reclaim for democratic life the imperative
of active citizenship.
Second, it is believed that some forms of accountability found to be lacking in contem-
porary forms of electoral democracy can be revived by looking back at the ancient model,
and best reworked at the local levels of governance. Novel practices of accountability
(such as social audits or democratic audits), the sine qua non of any true democracy, need
to be encouraged outside the realm of formal political structures and institutions
in a globalizing world, there may well be limits to the use of the ancient
However,
model to undertake cosmopolitan projects. As responsible citizens of an increasingly
interconnected world
with a
greater perception of responsibility towards the needs of
those who live beyond the borders of our political communities, we would find it diff
cult, if not impossible, to balance our interests of active citizenship, both at thc local and
global levels. So a more realistic assessment of the classical conception of citizenship
may be called for. But the idea of the bounded polis with an active citizenship body will
keep alive the democratic imagination for a long time.

Ouestions for Discussion

1.Does the phrase 'ruling and being ruled in turn' corectly capture the classical conception
of citizenship? Does this help us understand the politics of exclusion in ancient Greece?
How?

W h a t , according to you, are some of the innovative features of Athenian democratic citi-

zenship?
3. What useful lessons do we derive from the clasical model of citizenship?

Suggested Readings
Arendi, Hannah, 1958, The Hurman Condition (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press)
Aristotle, 1984, The Politics, Translated and with an Introduction, Notes and Glossary by Carnes
Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Cartledge, Paul, 2007, 'Democracy, Origins Of: Contribution toa Debate, in Kurt A. Raafaub,

Josiah Ober and Robert W. Wallace (eds). Origins of Democracy in Ancient Athens (Los An
geles: University of California Press).
Euripides, 2004, Suppliant Women (lines 346-57, 403-50), trans. D. Kovacs, in Eric W. Robinson
(ed.), Ancient Greek Democracy: Readings and Sources (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwel).
Finley, M. 1 1983, Politics in the Ancien! World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Heater, Derek, 2002, What is itenship?( Cambridge, England: Polity Press).
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